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THESIS

**HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AND DISASTER
RELIEF POLICIES IN THE ASSOCIATION OF
SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS**

by

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ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS**

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ABSTRACT

In 2004, a 9.1 magnitude earthquake struck off the coast of Aceh, Indonesia and triggered a tsunami that traveled across the Indian Ocean. In Southeast Asia, Indonesia and Thailand suffered the most destruction. Within hours of the tsunami, a massive international relief effort began. However, there was no regional effort made by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Even though Southeast Asia sees a major portion of the world's natural disasters, ASEAN had no mechanisms in place to lead a regional humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) effort. The question arises: How have ASEAN's HA/DR policies changed since 2004? This thesis shows that ASEAN's policy evolved through a three-step process from non-commitment to commitment, commitment to institutionalization, and institutionalization to deployment of assets. Case studies of ASEAN's responses to the East Timor crisis in 1999, the Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004, Cyclone Nargis in 2008, and Typhoon Haiyan in 2013 illustrate the evolution of ASEAN's HA/DR policy.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

III MEF	III Marine Expeditionary Force
AADMER	ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response
ACDM	ASEAN Committee on Disaster Management
ADMM	ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting
ADMM+	ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting Plus
AEGDM	ASEAN Expert Group on Disaster Management
AHA Centre	ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance
AHTF	ASEAN Humanitarian Task Force
APG	AADMER Partnership Group
ARDEX	ASEAN Disaster Emergency Response Simulation Exercise
ARF	ASEAN Regional Forum
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASEAN-ERAT	ASEAN Emergency Rapid Assessment Team
DELSA	Disaster Emergency Logistics System for ASEAN
DIREX	Disaster Relief Exercise
DMRS	Disaster Monitoring and Response System
ERC	Emergency Relief Coordinator
EU	European Union
HA/DR	Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IFRC	International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
INMARSAT	International Maritime Satellite Organization
INTERFET	International Force East Timor
ISM-DR	Inter-sessional Meetings for Disaster Relief
JAIF	Japan-ASEAN Integration Fund
JTF-CR	Joint Task Force Caring Response
LNO	Liaison Officer
NDRRMC	National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management
NFP	National Focal Point

NGO	non-governmental organization
OCHA	Officer for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
PACOM	Pacific Command
PDC	Pacific Disaster Center
SAF	Singapore Armed Forces
SASOP	Standard Operating Procedure for Regional Standby Arrangements and Coordination of Joint Disaster Relief and Emergency Response Operations
SMART	Special Malaysia Assistance and Rescue Team
SOP	Standard Operating Procedure
TCG	Tripartite Core Group
TNI	Tentara Nasional Indonesia – Indonesian National Armed Forces
UN	United Nations
UNAMET	United Nations Mission in East Timor
UNDAC	UN Disaster Assessment Coordination Center
UNHRD	UN Humanitarian Response Depot Network
UNOCHA	UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
UNOSOCC	UN On-Site Operations Coordination Centre
UNTAET	United Nations Transitional Administration East Timor
USAID	US Agency for International Development
USAR	Urban Search and Rescue Teams
VDR	Voluntary Demonstration of Response
WG	Working Group

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I. INTRODUCTION

Since 2004, Southeast Asia has seen significant activity in the realm of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) operations. The Indian Ocean tsunami of 2004 left over 150,000 dead in Southeast Asia. The international response to the tsunami was on a level not seen before, with over thirty-five countries contributing more than thirty thousand people to the relief efforts.¹ During the tsunami response, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) did not take charge of coordinating relief efforts. Efforts among member nations were bilateral at first, with the United States eventually taking charge of coordinating relief efforts.² ASEAN's lack of leadership in coordinating relief efforts showed an absence of commitment in its approach to HA/DR.

The question examined in this thesis is: how has ASEAN changed its approach to HA/DR since 2004? This study reviews historical case studies on HA/DR, what policies and institutions have been put in place, and how HA/DR assets have been used to respond to disasters.

A. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION

The Southeast Asia region has seen a large number of natural disasters in recent years. From 2001 to 2009, there were forty-two earthquakes and landslides, one hundred and thirty-two storms, and two hundred and thirteen floods.³ Of the disaster total worldwide in that timeframe, Southeast Asia saw twelve percent of the total, with forty-one percent of disaster-related deaths.⁴ With casualties this high, ASEAN has become increasingly interested in coordinating disaster relief efforts. In response to the East Timor and Indian Ocean tsunami, non-ASEAN countries and other ASEAN states

¹ Udai Bhanu Singh, "Disaster Management in South-east Asia," *Journal of Defence Studies* 6, no. 1 (January 2012), 3–5, https://www.academia.edu/1499483/Disaster_Management_in_South-east_Asia.

² Heide H. Gentner, "ASEAN: Cooperative Disaster Relief After the Tsunami," *Südostasien Aktuell* 24, no. 4 (2005), 7.

³ Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Secretariat, *ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response: Work Programme 2010–2015*, 4th ed. (Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat, 2013), "Introduction," http://www.asean.org/resources/item/asean-agreement-on-disaster-management-and-emergency-response-aadmer-work-programme-2010-2015-4th-reprint?category_id=382.

⁴ Ibid., "Annex 1."

provided relief efforts, but ASEAN did not provide coordination efforts. In previous disasters, ASEAN could have provided a regional link for relief efforts that outside states, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and even the UN could tap into for coordination. Understanding the existing regional institutions and policies that gives organizations that would be in charge of U.S relief efforts, such as the Pacific Command (PACOM) and III Marine Expeditionary Force (III MEF), the ability to provide liaison officers (LNOs) to the right places and ensure that manpower and material are put to the best use during crisis responses.

B. LITERATURE REVIEW

This literature review is organized in five parts. The first part discusses the case studies of the East Timor crisis in 1999 and the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami, showing ASEAN's non-commitment to a regional HA/DR response. Part two discusses how policies have changed from non-commitment to commitment of a regional HA/DR response, as well as the development of institutions to support HA/DR efforts. Part three uses the case studies of Cyclone Nargis and Typhoon Haiyan, showing ASEAN's evolution from commitment to a regional HA/DR response to the deployment of ASEAN HA/DR assets. Part four deals with changes that have occurred in the international consensus on the importance of HA/DR to include the United Nations (UN), the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting Plus (ADMM+). Part five discusses the debate as to whether or not the changes ASEAN made to its HA/DR response is mostly just rhetoric.

1. Non-commitment in East Timor and the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami

In 1999, Southeast Asian countries were faced with a crisis when the East Timorese voted for independence from Indonesia. After the vote, pro-Indonesian militias mounted a terror campaign that led to a humanitarian crisis in which almost 1,000 East Timorese were killed and twenty-five percent of the population fled to West Timor.⁵ In September 1999, the UN Security Council authorized the Australian-led International

⁵ "East Timor profile - Timeline," *BBC*, last modified July 22, 2014, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-14952883>.

Force East Timor (INTERFET), even though Indonesia had yet to withdraw its military and security forces from East Timor. Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, and the Philippines all committed personnel to INTERFET; with 1,580 troops, Thailand made the largest ASEAN contribution.⁶ However, the East Timor crisis showed that ASEAN states were neither trained nor equipped to lead peacekeeping and humanitarian operations.

Even after the East Timor crisis, ASEAN did little to advance HA/DR cooperation in the region. On December 26, 2004, an earthquake resulted in the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami that caused over 150,000 deaths in four ASEAN countries: Thailand, Indonesia, Myanmar, and Malaysia. ASEAN's initial reaction was to issue a declaration on the tsunami, pledging to strengthen regional efforts in disaster management and prevention.⁷ The declaration fell short of stating that ASEAN would assume a leading role in coordinating relief efforts, and showed that ASEAN did not have the institutions in place to act as a coordinating agency. Instead, ASEAN's declaration emphasized an international NGO- and UN-led effort. Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, representing ASEAN in the UN, asked for the UN to organize relief efforts.⁸ In the absence of ASEAN coordination, member relief efforts for the 2004 tsunami were initially unilateral, with the United States eventually leading coordination efforts.⁹ The Special Malaysia Disaster Assistance and Rescue Team was the first team to arrive in Indonesia. Singapore committed seven hundred military personnel to the efforts, and pledged \$3,000,000 to the effort.¹⁰ International assistance also arrived, with the United States, China, Japan, Germany and Great Britain among the contributors.¹¹

⁶ Alan Dupont, "ASEAN's Response to the East Timor Crisis," *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 54, no. 2 (July 2000), 163–67, doi: 10.1080/713613510.

⁷ Gentner, "ASEAN: Cooperative Disaster Relief," 5.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Ibid., 7.

¹⁰ Ibid., 6.

¹¹ Ibid.

2. Evolution from Non-commitment to Commitment to HA/DR

ASEAN has had a basic understanding of disaster relief since 1971, when the ASEAN Expert Group on Disaster Management (AEGDM) began holding biannual meetings. Five years later, in 1976, members signed the “ASEAN Declaration on Mutual Assistance on Natural Disasters.” This agreement was intended to provide supplies to the stricken country, and required that each member country create an agency to coordinate efforts internally, but stopped short of creating an ASEAN institution for relief coordination.¹² The AEGDM rarely met, and in 2002 held its twelfth meeting. During this meeting, the group’s name changed to the ASEAN Committee on Disaster Management (ACDM).¹³ The heads of ASEAN members’ national disaster management agencies make up the ACDM, and it is responsible for coordinating and implementing responses and activities. It first met in December 2003.¹⁴

In the aftermath of the tsunami relief efforts, ASEAN decided that changes were needed to facilitate its responses to future crises. On July 26, 2005, ASEAN foreign ministers signed the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response (AADMER). Comprised of thirty-six articles, the AADMER describes how ASEAN will coordinate disaster responses.¹⁵ One of the key features of the AADMER is the establishment of the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance (AHA Centre) in article 20, which would serve as a regional coordinating body for relief efforts in the event of a disaster.¹⁶ The AADMER also established a set of standard operating procedures for the ASEAN Emergency Rapid Assessment Team (ASEAN-ERAT).¹⁷ On

¹² Gentner, “ASEAN: Cooperative Disaster Relief,” 4–5.

¹³ Ibid., 3–9.

¹⁴ “Overview,” ASEAN Secretariat, <http://www.asean.org/communities/asean-socio-cultural-community/category/overview-2>.

¹⁵ “ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response Vientiane, 26 July 2005,” *ASEAN Secretariat*, July 26, 2005, <http://www.asean.org/news/item/asean-agreement-on-disaster-management-and-emergency-response-vientiane-26-july-2005-3>.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ “Standard Operating Procedure for Regional Standby Arrangements and Coordination of Joint Disaster Relief and Emergency Response Operations (SASOP),” *ASEAN Secretariat*, November 1, 2009, <http://www.asean.org/resources/item/standard-operating-procedure-for-regional-standby-arrangements-and-coordination-of-joint-disaster-relief-and-emergency-response-operations-sasop-2>.

November 17, 2011, the ASEAN Foreign Ministers signed the “Agreement on the Establishment of the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management.” This agreement formally established the AHA Centre, and placed its headquarters in Jakarta. The AHA Centre gives ASEAN a regionally controlled body that is able to coordinate relief efforts from external states, the UN, and other external organizations.¹⁸ It also serves as a data collection and early warning center, manages the ERATs and material stockpiles, and helps customs process customs requirements for relief workers and material to expedite access to required areas.¹⁹

3. From Commitment to Deployment of HA/DR Assets

On May 2, 2008, Cyclone Nargis struck the Ayeyarwady Delta in Myanmar, creating the worst natural disaster in the history of the country. The country officially stated that 140,000 people lost their lives, and 2.4 million people required immediate assistance.²⁰ Three days later, Myanmar authorities made a formal plea for help to the UN; however the plea centered on bilateral efforts vice a large-scale international effort like the 2004 tsunami. Myanmar also did not make it easier for humanitarian workers to get expedited visas or relax their restrictive internal travel requirements. International pressure began to mount on Myanmar to open up access to affected areas, with France, the United Kingdom, and the United States requesting help from the UN Security Council, which was rejected by the other council members.²¹

In responding to Cyclone Nargis, ASEAN assumed a leadership role by managing international efforts and convincing Myanmar to open its borders to international aid. The ASEAN Secretary General Surin Pitsuwan also requested that all member states “provide urgent relief assistance through the framework of the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster

¹⁸ Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), *Agreement on the Establishment of the ASEAN Co-ordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management* (Bali: ASEAN, November 17, 2011), <http://www.asean.org/archive/documents/19th%20summit/AHA.pdf>.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Julie Belanger and Richard Horsey, “Negotiating Humanitarian Access to Cyclone-Affected Areas of Myanmar: A Review,” *Humanitarian Exchange*, no. 41 (December 2008), 2–4, <http://www.odihpn.org/humanitarian-exchange-magazine/issue-41/negotiating-humanitarian-access-to-cyclone-affected-areas-of-myanmar-a-review>.

²¹ Ibid.

Management and Emergency Response,” and on May 9 the ASEAN ERAT was deployed for the first time.²² Ten days later, on May 19, the ERAT submitted a report back to a Special ASEAN Ministerial Meeting with recommendations for better handling the relief effort. In response to this report, ASEAN created two institutions, the ASEAN Humanitarian Task Force (AHTF) and Tripartite Core Group (TCG), to facilitate coordination. The AHTF was made up of twenty-two members and its primary function was to supervise the TCG. The TCG was based in Myanmar and comprised members from ASEAN, the Myanmar government, and members from the UN with the primary function of facilitating relief operations.²³

Typhoon Haiyan (also known as Yolanda) hit the Philippines on November 8, 2013, and ASEAN’s response to the disaster showed that the association’s commitment to HA/DR had evolved even further to include early deployment of the ERAT and coordination of civilian relief efforts. In the aftermath of the typhoon, Filipino President Aquino declared a state of “national calamity” and began to solicit international support.²⁴ While the United States, New Zealand, Japan, Australia, the European Union, and the United Nations sent money and relief personnel, ASEAN helped out in accordance with the AADMER. Prior to Haiyan making landfall, the AHA Centre sent personnel to Tacloban City in order to establish an emergency satellite communication system. The AHA Centre also sent two members of the ERAT, as well as one person from the AADMER Partnership Group to help out the Philippines. The AHA Centre mobilized stockpiled relief supplies—such as office kits, generators, forklifts, and mobile storage units—from an ASEAN Disaster Emergency Logistics System in Malaysia. The AHA Centre coordinated the relief efforts and supplies from member countries and chartered government aircraft for delivery to the Philippines.²⁵ While the AHA Centre

²² Yves-Kim Creac’h and Lilianne Fan, “ASEAN’s Role in the Cyclone Nargis Response: Implications, Lessons and Opportunities,” *Humanitarian Exchange*, no. 41 (December 2008), 5–6, <http://www.odihpn.org/humanitarian-exchange-magazine/issue-41/aseans-role-in-the-cyclone-nargis-response-implications-lessons-and-opportunities>.

²³ *Ibid.*, 6.

²⁴ Khiam Jin Lee, “ASEAN’s Response to Typhoon Haiyan,” *Penang Monthly*, March 4, 2014, <http://penangmonthly.com/aseans-response-to-typhoon-haiyan/>.

²⁵ *Ibid.*

was coordinating civilian relief assets, ASEAN received criticism for a lack of coordinated defense response. This was done at the bilateral level with Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia, and Brunei each reaching separate agreements with the Philippine government to provide ships and aircraft to deliver supplies.²⁶

4. Changes to the International Consensus on Importance of HA/DR

With the end of the Cold War, the world began to take more notice of issues such as HA/DR that had previously not been prominent on the international stage. There were very few organizations that were dedicated to HA/DR: the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), International Federation of the Red Cross, and Doctors Without Borders.²⁷ Then, in 1991, the United Nations General Assembly passed Resolution 46/182 in response to the growing number of humanitarian crises and the increasing number of UN Security Council resolutions authorizing interventions.²⁸ This resolution established the United Nations as a leader in coordinating relief efforts to affected states and established a committee to serve as a liaison with organizations such as the ICRC and other relevant agencies. Resolution 46/182 also allowed the UN Secretary General to appoint an Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC), who would consolidate existing emergency response representatives and place the United Nations Disaster Relief Coordinator under the responsibility of the ERC.²⁹

Prior to the 2004 tsunami, the ASEAN Regional Forum held inter-sessional meetings for disaster relief (ISM-DR), but suspended those meetings in 2000 because of conflicting views regarding the use of member militaries in relief operations.³⁰ In

²⁶ Euan Graham, "Super Typhoon Haiyan: ASEAN's Katrina Moment?" *RSIS Commentaries*, no. 213/2013 (November 25, 2013), <http://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/CO13213.pdf>.

²⁷ Michael Barnett, "Humanitarianism Transformed," *Perspectives on Politics* 3, no. 4 (December 2005), 729, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3688176>.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 729.

²⁹ United Nations General Assembly, "Resolution 46/182: Strengthening of the Coordination of Humanitarian Emergency Assistance of the United Nations," December 19, 1991, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/46/182.

³⁰ Jürgen Haacke, "The ASEAN Regional Forum: From Dialogue to Practical Security Cooperation," *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 22, no. 3 (September 2009), 439, doi: 10.1080/09557570903104057.

response to the 2004 tsunami, the ISM-DR resumed in 2005 with the objective to “work towards effective mechanisms to achieve substantial reduction of disaster losses in lives and in social, economic and environmental assets as well as to respond jointly to disaster emergencies through concerted national efforts and intensified regional and international co-operation.”³¹ In 2006, ARF released the ARF Statement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response, which promoted cooperation among regional and international programs that were already in place, and would study the feasibility of creating standby arrangements and standard operating procedures (SOPs). Indonesia and Australia also conducted an ARF Disaster Relief desktop exercise in Jakarta from May 1–2, 2008 at the Naval Command and Staff College in Jakarta, with the purpose of enhancing military and civilian cooperation while responding to a country that suffered a volcanic eruption, an earthquake, and a tsunami.³²

In 2009, the ARF came up with the ARF Strategic Guidance for Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief and that May held a live HA/DR exercise. The exercise was called Voluntary Demonstration of Response (VDR), co-hosted by the United States and the Philippines, and held in the Philippines. The VDR was civilian-led with military support, and consisted of a tabletop exercise, maritime search and rescue exercises, and medical assistance.³³ The inaugural VDR consisted of 600 personnel from 20 ARF countries, with the Philippines making the largest contribution of 280 personnel. The exercise centered around a typhoon hitting the Philippines in Central Luzon and worked on the countries abilities to respond effectively, using lessons from the 2004 tsunami and Cyclone Nargis.³⁴ Also in 2009, the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting (ADMM) released a concept paper for the use of military assets during an HA/DR response. The concept paper discussed making available military assets to ASEAN as part of standby

³¹ Haacke, “ASEAN, From Dialogue to Practical Security,” 439.

³² Ibid., 440–42.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ “20 Nations, 600 Personnel Involved in First ARF Disaster Simulation in Philippines,” *Asia News Monitor*, May 1, 2009.

agreements, but only the affected country could request military assistance. The paper also pledged military assets to the AHA Centre on a voluntary basis.³⁵

In March 2011, the ARF conducted its inaugural Disaster Relief Exercise (DIREX), with Indonesia and Japan jointly hosting the event in the town of Manado, Indonesia. The scenario for ARF DIREX-11 was a 7.5-magnitude earthquake followed by a tsunami, and two thousand personnel attended the exercise with the purpose of improving coordination between military and civilian agencies.³⁶ The second DIREX was held in Thailand in May 2013, and was hosted jointly by the Republic of Korea and Thailand. Expanding on the previous two DIREXs this exercise consisted of 2,400 personnel and had both a field and tabletop exercise. The field exercise encompassed activities such as responding to a rock slide and building collapse, establishing emergency operation and evacuation centers, and maritime rescue and air operations, while the table top exercise was more policy and asset coordination centered.³⁷ The ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting-Plus also held a disaster relief and military medicine exercise in June 2013. The exercise took place in Brunei, and was comprised of over 3,200 personnel from eighteen countries.³⁸

5. Debate over ASEAN's Changes

Despite the advancements ASEAN has made to establish a regional HA/DR response the association is still criticized for having not done enough in operational HA/DR missions. After Typhoon Haiyan, ASEAN received criticism for being slow to respond and for not coordinating a military response for the disaster. Even though ASEAN had a team in the Philippines before the disaster struck the majority of the first responders came from the navies of the United States, the United Kingdom, and Japan.

³⁵ ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting, *Annex D: The Use of ASEAN Military Assets and Capacities in Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief*, February 27, 2009, <https://admm.asean.org/dmdocuments/8.%20ANNEX%20D%20ADOPTED%20Concept%20Paper%20The%20Use%20of%20ASEAN%20Military%20Assets.pdf>.

³⁶ "ARF DiREx Strengthens Regional Ties," *Antara*, January 25, 2011.

³⁷ "ARF DiREx 2013 co-hosted in Thailand," *Asia News Monitor*, May 10, 2013.

³⁸ "ADMM-PLUS HADR & MM Ex Was Impressive," ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting, June 20, 2013, <https://admm.asean.org/index.php/admm-news/7-news/287-admm-plus-hadr-mm-ex-was-impressive.html>.

ASEAN military and monetary contributions did come from Thailand, Brunei, Singapore, and Indonesia; however this was done on a bilateral basis and not coordinated by the AHA Centre.³⁹ Two foreign ministers from ASEAN member states, Thailand and Indonesia, expressed frustration with the slow speed of ASEAN-provided aid. Thai Foreign Minister Surapong Tovichakchaikul even stated on November 14 that “a quick response team is needed for ASEAN, the ten countries have human resources and enough equipment, so it is time to share and cooperate.”⁴⁰

Critics pointed to both the successful AFR DIREX held in May 2013 and the ADMM+ HADR/Military Medicine exercise in June 2013 as evidence that the AHA Centre should be able to conduct a coordinated military response. The ADMM+ exercise was the largest joint ASEAN/ADMM+ HA/DR exercise and involved all the ADMM+ countries. The scenario for the exercise was that a typhoon struck Brunei and the AHA Centre was activated to coordinate efforts, including military assets. Since the exercise was successfully conducted it was expected that ASEAN should be able to provide this type of environment to a real-world disaster.⁴¹

The criticism toward ASEAN for slow and uncoordinated defense response does need to be put into perspective, however. First, ASEAN is a relatively new participant in HA/DR. In the nine years between the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami and Typhoon Haiyan, ASEAN went from having no commitment to HA/DR as a whole, to putting assets on the ground before a disaster even occurs. The AHA Centre has primarily led civilian relief efforts to this date. In its response to Typhoon Haiyan the AHA Centre did share its assessments with ASEAN members so individual countries and organizations could decide what assets and relief supplies to send.⁴² Second, in terms of ASEAN’s disaster response efforts should not be compared to ADMM+ and ARF exercises. The first joint ASEAN/ADMM+ exercise took place only three months before Typhoon Haiyan hit.

³⁹ Graham, “ASEAN’s Katrina Moment?”

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Dylan Ming Hui Loh, “ASEAN’s Norm Adherence and its Unintended Consequences in HADR and SAR Operations,” *Pacific Review* (March 26, 2015), <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2015.1022589>.

⁴² Graham, “ASEAN’s Katrina Moment?”

C. HYPOTHESIS

The case studies of the East Timor crisis in 1999, the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami, Cyclone Nargis, and Typhoon Yolanda all illustrate ASEAN's gradual enhancement of HA/DR cooperation. The organization did have a policy on relief efforts that dates back to 1971; however, ASEAN did not make actual commitments to association-led relief efforts until after the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami. This thesis argues that ASEAN has changed its approach to HA/DR in a three-step process from non-commitment to commitment of regional HA/DR responses, commitment to regional HA/DR responses to the development of institutions for HA/DR, and from development of institutions to deployment of HA/DR assets.

D. RESEARCH DESIGN AND THESIS OVERVIEW

This thesis analyzes institutions created by ASEAN, such as the AADMER and the AHA Centre. The gradual development of these institutions in response to specific crises is examined in four case studies: the East Timor crisis in 1999, the Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004, Cyclone Nargis in 2008, and Typhoon Haiyan in 2013. The East Timor and the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami show that, while ASEAN members offered relief on the individual state level, the association itself did not yet have either a commitment or a capability to do so. However, the cases of Cyclone Nargis and Typhoon Haiyan show that ASEAN as organization had developed a commitment as well as an institutional capability to coordinate and deploy relief assets.

This thesis is organized into three additional chapters. Chapter II looks at ASEAN's policies from non-commitment to institutionalization to include the AADMER and AHA Centre. Chapter II also includes an analysis of changes that have occurred in the international consensus on the importance of HA/DR to include the UN, the ARF, and the ADMM+. Chapter III shows the evolution from non-commitment to deployment of ASEAN's HA/DR assets through four case studies: the East Timor crisis in 1999, the Indian Ocean tsunami, Cyclone Nargis, and Typhoon Haiyan. Chapter IV consists of the conclusion.

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II. INSTITUTION AND POLICY CHANGES SINCE 2004

Chapter II is organized to analyze the evolution of ASEAN's approach through a three-step process. The first section shows how ASEAN went from not having a commitment to a regional HA/DR approach to the development of that commitment after the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami by discussing the background and adoption of the AADMER, the start of the AADMER Work Programme, and the beginning of the ASEAN Disaster Emergency Response Simulation Exercises (ARDEXs). Section two discusses the second step of transition from the development of a commitment to a regional HA/DR approach to development of institutions to implement this commitment, such as the ERAT and the AHA Centre. Section three discusses the third step in the process, which was the deployment of ASEAN assets, such as the ERAT and logistical supplies, to respond to HA/DR crises. The fourth section details the changes in HA/DR efforts throughout the ARF and ADMM+. This is important because the AHA Centre and the ERAT participate in both ARF and ADMM+ exercises.

A. STEP ONE: ESTABLISHING A COMMITMENT TO A REGIONAL HA/DR APPROACH

In 1971 ASEAN members realized that they needed some sort of commitment to HA/DR, so they established the ASEAN Expert Group on Disaster Management, which met on a biannual basis. Five years later in 1976 the "ASEAN Declaration on Mutual Assistance on Natural Disasters" was signed by ASEAN member states. The intent of the agreement was to provide supplies in the event that a member state suffered a disaster. It also required that each member state create its own national agency to respond to internal disasters. However, it did not require ASEAN to establish a regional HA/DR organization.⁴³

When violence erupted in East Timor after the elections in September 1999, ASEAN was unprepared, ill-equipped, and not committed to an organized response. The

⁴³ Gentner, "ASEAN: Cooperative Disaster Relief," 4–5.

association viewed the crisis in East Timor as “purely an Indonesian matter.”⁴⁴ Four member states—Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and the Philippines—did contribute forces to the Australian and UN-led peacekeeping efforts.⁴⁵ This landmark contribution showed a will by ASEAN states to engage in humanitarian operations.

In 2002, ASEAN took a small step in increasing its commitment to a regional HA/DR approach when it upgraded the AEGDM from an expert group status to a standing committee that would meet on an annual basis, known as the ASEAN Committee on Disaster Management. This decision to change the status occurred during the twelfth meeting of the AEGDM.⁴⁶ The fact that the AEGDM only met twelve times in twenty-one years illustrates ASEAN’s non-commitment to a regional HA/DR approach. The ACDM is made up of the heads of each member states disaster relief agency, and is in overall control for HA/DR efforts in the region.⁴⁷

The 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami marked the change in ASEAN from non-commitment to commitment to coordinate a regional HA/DR effort. ASEAN was unprepared for the disaster and was unable to coordinate relief efforts. Any relief efforts provided by ASEAN states occurred at the bilateral level with Indonesia, or were under the coordination of the United States.⁴⁸ On January 6, 2005, ASEAN leaders met in Jakarta and released the “Declaration on Action to Strengthen Emergency Relief, Rehabilitation, Reconstruction and Prevention on the Aftermath of Earthquake and Tsunami Disaster of 26 December 2004.”⁴⁹ This declaration laid the basis for the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response by requiring the

⁴⁴ Dupont, “ASEAN’s Response to the East Timor Crisis,” 163.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ Gentner, “ASEAN: Cooperative Disaster Relief,” 5.

⁴⁷ “Overview,” *ASEAN Secretariat*, <http://www.asean.org/communities/asean-socio-cultural-community/category/overview-2>.

⁴⁸ Gentner, “ASEAN: Cooperative Disaster Relief,” 5–7.

⁴⁹ Ibid., 5.

development of “a regional instrument on disaster management and emergency response.”⁵⁰

On July 26, 2005, ASEAN finally established its full commitment to a regional HA/DR approach when the foreign ministers from all ten ASEAN member states signed the AADMER in Vientiane, Laos.⁵¹ Composed of thirty-six articles, the AADMER entered into force on December 24, 2009. This happened three months after the government of the Philippines, the last ASEAN member to do so, ratified it.⁵² When it entered into force it became the first legally binding regional agreement on HA/DR.⁵³

The purpose of the AADMER is to put a regional face on HA/DR. While many of the ASEAN member countries had existing disaster relief organizations and policies, they were underdeveloped. The AADMER was designed to strengthen the disaster relief capabilities of each member country, but stated that the “primary responsibility for implementing the AADMER remains with member states.”⁵⁴ The AADMER does establish any regional authority for building HA/DR capabilities within the member states, however.⁵⁵ This results in a two-tiered commitment for the AADMER. The first commitment is to establish both the capacity and rules at the regional level for a uniform support to member states across the association. The second is to help each state develop

⁵⁰ Special ASEAN Leaders’ Meeting on Aftermath of Earthquake and Tsunami, “Declaration on Action to Strengthen Emergency Relief, Rehabilitation, Reconstruction, and Prevention on the Aftermath of Earthquake and Tsunami Disaster,” January 6, 2005, <http://www.asean.org/communities/asean-socio-cultural-community/item/declaration-on-action-to-strengthen-emergency-relief-rehabilitation-reconstruction-and-prevention-on-the-aftermath-of-earthquake-and-tsunami-disaster-of-26-december-2004>.

⁵¹ Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), *Agreement on the Establishment of the ASEAN Co-ordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management* (Bali: ASEAN, November 17, 2011), <http://www.asean.org/archive/documents/19th%20summit/AHA.pdf>.

⁵² “AADMER Workplan,” ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance (AHA Centre), 2014, <http://ahacentre.org/aadmer-workplan>; ASEAN Secretariat, “ASEAN Disaster Management Agreement to Enter into Force by End of 2009,” September 16, 2009, <http://www.asean.org/archive/PR-AADMER-EIF-End-2009.pdf>.

⁵³ Lilianne Fan and Hanna B. Krebs, *Regional Organisations and Humanitarian Action: The Case of ASEAN* (HPG Working Paper) (London: Humanitarian Policy Group, Overseas Development Institute, September 2014), 4.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ Ibid.

its own disaster management programs.⁵⁶ The one drawback to the AADMER is that there is no way for ASEAN to enforce participation in the implementation or punish members if they don't participate, even though the document is legally binding.⁵⁷

In order to fully adopt and implement the AADMER, the ACDM implemented the *AAMDER Work Programme*, and broke it into two phases. Phase 1 occurred between 2010 and 2012, and the completion of phase 2 is supposed to be finished by the end of 2015. The Work Programme is split into four "strategic components": risk assessment, early warning, and monitoring; prevention and mitigation; preparedness and response; and recovery.⁵⁸ Since the focus of this thesis is on the relief side of the house, only the third area of the Work Programme, preparedness and response, is discussed.

Drawing authority from articles 8 through 16 of the AADMER, the preparedness and response component is designed to "provide specific instructions to further ASEAN's preparedness and its responsiveness to disasters, and ensure rapid and collective deployment of ASEAN's assistance following a major disaster in one or more Member States within the ASEAN region."⁵⁹ The Work Programme also established a working group (WG) on Preparedness and Response under the ACDM chaired jointly by Malaysia and Singapore with Brunei, Laos, Philippines, and Thailand making up the additional member countries.⁶⁰ The WG is directed under the AADMER to meet at least once a year, with a report delivered to the ACDM as well. The WG on Preparedness and Response is responsible for three "flagship projects" during Phase 1 of the Work Programme.⁶¹ The first project is the establishment of a disaster and emergency response logistics system for the ASEAN Region. This includes building stockpiles of relief supplies and implementing a supply chain to distribute supplies during a HA/DR mission. The second project is the establishment of a fully functional ERAT, which includes the

⁵⁶ Daniel Petz, *Strengthening Regional and National Capacity for Disaster Risk Management: The Case of ASEAN* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, November 2014), 15.

⁵⁷ Ibid., 16; Fan and Krebs, *Regional Organisations and Humanitarian Action*, 4.

⁵⁸ ASEAN Secretariat, *ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management*, 4.

⁵⁹ Ibid., 48.

⁶⁰ Ibid., 98.

⁶¹ Ibid., 116–19.

training of ERAT personnel using standardized training procedures. The final flagship project for the WG is to finalize the *Standard Operating Procedure for Regional Standby Arrangements and Coordination of Joint Disaster Relief and Emergency Response Operations* (SASOP). This includes developing and implementing procedures to deploy military assets during HA/DR responses, and to conduct exercises (such as ARDEXs) to test SOPs.⁶²

The Work Programme also uses two main “building blocks” to implement the AADMER: institutionalization and the creation of training and knowledge management systems.⁶³ In terms of institutionalizing the AADMER, the Work Programme states:

The AADMER is a regional cooperation on disaster management and emergency response, it is necessary to institutionalize AADMER at the national level, where many of its provisions will take place. While programs are developed at the regional level (particularly with the operationalization of the AHA Centre), the primary responsibility for the implementation of the AADMER Work Programme shall be with the Member States.⁶⁴

Creating a training and knowledge management system is the second main block for the AADMER Work Programme and is broken down in two subsets: training and knowledge management. The objectives for the training subset are as follows: train personnel at all levels in disaster management and emergency response, ensure that responders receive relevant training in their specific fields through a certification system, and have a training pipeline that is sustainable.⁶⁵ The second subset, knowledge management systems, is designed to use knowledge and information to aid in disaster response and risk-reduction. The objectives of building systems are to determine the information needs of ASEAN, create an online resource center to disseminate information, and ensure that proper information can get down to communities.⁶⁶

⁶² ASEAN Secretariat, *ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management*, 119.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, 73.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 74.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 85.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 88.

B. STEP TWO: ESTABLISHING INSTITUTIONS TO SUPPORT A REGIONAL HA/DR EFFORT

The next step in the evolution of ASEAN's approach to HA/DR is the establishment of institutions to oversee HA/DR efforts. The main ASEAN institution involved in HA/DR is the AHA Centre, which was established on November 17, 2011 when ASEAN foreign ministers signed the "Agreement on the Establishment of the ASEAN Co-ordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management" in Bali.⁶⁷ The directive for the AHA Centre comes from Article 20 in the AADMER which says the AHA Centre "shall be established for the purpose of facilitating co-operation and co-ordination among the Parties," and with "relevant United Nations and international organizations, in promoting regional collaboration."⁶⁸ Headquartered in Jakarta, the AHA Centre also has the responsibility of responding to disasters when requested by an affected member state. The AHA Centre may also act as a coordinating body for outside parties offering assistance. Article 16 of the AADMER also delineates the responsibility for facilitating the movement of personnel, equipment, facilities, and materials while responding to a disaster.⁶⁹ The AHA Centre currently has a small staff of seventeen members and an annual budget of \$5.8 million.⁷⁰ The AHA Centre serves as the main hub for the institutionalization of the AADMER through the AADMER Work Programme, along with the ASEAN Secretariat and the ACDM.⁷¹ Funding for the AHA Centre comes from multiple sources. Individual member states make annual donations of \$30,000, for a total of \$300,000 annually. The majority of funding comes from international partners like Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and the United States.⁷²

The ERAT is another institution that was created by ASEAN in order to establish a regional approach to HA/DR. Working under the AHA Centre, the mission of the ERAT is to "respond quickly to a major sudden disaster or man-made emergency in one

⁶⁷ ASEAN, *Agreement, ASEAN Co-ordinating Centre*, 1.

⁶⁸ ASEAN Secretariat, "ASEAN Agreement, Vientiane, 26 July 2005."

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ Petz, *Strengthening Regional and National Capacity*, 13.

⁷¹ Ibid., 15.

⁷² Fan and Krebs, *Regional Organisations and Humanitarian Action*, 4.

or more Member States within the ASEAN region.”⁷³ When responding to a disaster, the ERAT provides a critical assessment capability to see what supplies and resources are needed. This is then sent to the AHA Centre, which distributes it to the rest of ASEAN and the international community to help get the right assets to affected areas.⁷⁴ In order to train the ERAT members an induction course was implemented.⁷⁵ From 2010 through 2013, the Singapore Civil Defense Force conducted three courses in Singapore.⁷⁶ In 2014 the AHA Centre took control of training the AHA Centre from Singapore and held their first induction course in Jakarta that June.⁷⁷ Currently there are ninety-one members of the ERAT.⁷⁸

Institutionalization of the AADMER occurs through capacity building at three levels: within ASEAN itself, among member states, and inside the member states. At the ASEAN level, in addition to the AHA Centre and ERAT, it also includes using the AADMER Partnership Group (APG) to coordinate NGO support of the AADMER.⁷⁹ The APG began in 2009 during the meetings at the ASEAN Secretariat to establish the AADMER Work Programme. Its mission is to serve as a partnership between ASEAN and seven NGOs: ChildFund International, HelpAge International, Mercy Malaysia, Oxfam, Plan International, Save the Children International, and World Vision International.⁸⁰ Since its inception, the APG has educated 194 NGOs about the

⁷³ AHA Centre, *ASEAN-ERAT Guidelines* (Jakarta: Author, n.d.), 14, <http://ahacentre.org/erat-guidelines>.

⁷⁴ Mely Caballero-Anthony and Julius Cesar I. Trajano, “Lessons of Two Disasters: Building Resilience from within,” *RSIS Commentaries*, no. 244 (December 9, 2014), <http://www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/nts/co14244-lessons-of-two-disasters-building-resilience-from-within/#.VXh04GPxlIF>.

⁷⁵ ASEAN Secretariat, *AADMER Work Programme Phase 1: Accomplishment Report* (Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat, 2013), 22, [http://www.asean.org/images/2013/socio_cultural/AADMER%20Work%20Programme%20Phase%201%20Accomplishment%20Report%20\(final\).pdf](http://www.asean.org/images/2013/socio_cultural/AADMER%20Work%20Programme%20Phase%201%20Accomplishment%20Report%20(final).pdf).

⁷⁶ “More ASEAN-Emergency Rapid Assessment Team (ASEAN-ERAT) Members Trained,” *ASEAN Secretariat News*, April 16, 2013, <http://www.asean.org/news/asean-secretariat-news/item/more-asean-emergency-rapid-assessment-team-asean-erat-members-trained-2>.

⁷⁷ ASEAN Secretariat, *AADMER Work Programme*, 22; “Events,” AHA Centre, 2014, http://ahacentre.org/events#popup_emergency15.

⁷⁸ “About ERAT,” AHA Centre, 2014, <http://www.ahacentre.org/about-erat>.

⁷⁹ Petz, *Strengthening Regional and National Capacity*, 15.

⁸⁰ “History,” AADMER Partnership Group (APG), 2012, <http://www.aadmerpartnership.org/who-we-are/history/>.

AADMER. It has also helped Cambodia incorporate the AADMER into its National Emergency Management Policy.⁸¹ The APG also participated in DIREX-11.⁸²

Two other ASEAN-level institutions that were established are the Disaster Emergency Logistics System for ASEAN (DELSA) and the Disaster Monitoring and Response System (DMRS). Both institutions fall under the AHA Centre. The DELSA is headquartered in Subang, Malaysia launched on December 7, 2012, and is co-located with the UN Humanitarian Response Depot (UNHRD).⁸³ The DELSA is the logistics hub for stockpiles of quickly-deployable relief supplies for the ERAT and other responders.⁸⁴ The supplies stockpiled at the DELSA include “mobile storage units, office and living prefabs, generators, family tents, ASEAN Family Kits, rescue boats, ready-to-eat meals, and office supplies.”⁸⁵ In order to fund the DELSA, ASEAN partnered with Japan through the Japan-ASEAN Integration Fund (JAIF).⁸⁶ The establishment of the DELSA marked the completion of another flagship program during Phase 1 of the AADMER Work Programme.⁸⁷ During the response to Typhoon Haiyan, the DELSA provided supplies such as drinking water, family kits, tarps, and other relief supplies to the Philippines for distribution by relief workers.⁸⁸

Launched on April 12, 2012, the DRMS provides the AHA Centre with the ability to track disasters in real-time across the region in one system. The Pacific Disaster Center (PDC), a U.S. organization in located Hawaii, installed the system and trained AHA Centre personnel to operate it. It is funded by the US Agency for International

⁸¹ Fan and Krebs, *Regional Organisations and Humanitarian Action*, 5.

⁸² APG, “History.”

⁸³ ASEAN Secretariat, *AADMER Work Programme Phase 1*, 20.

⁸⁴ “Disaster Emergency Logistics System,” AHA Centre, 2014, <http://www.ahacentre.org/disaster-emergency-logistics-system-for-asean>.

⁸⁵ ASEAN Secretariat, *AADMER Work Programme Phase 1*, 20.

⁸⁶ “A Disaster Emergency Logistic System for ASEAN is Officially Launched,” *ASEAN Secretariat News*, December 10, 2012, <http://www.asean.org/news/asean-secretariat-news/item/a-disaster-emergency-logistic-system-for-asean-is-officially-launched>.

⁸⁷ ASEAN Secretariat, *AADMER Work Programme Phase 1*, 13.

⁸⁸ “Japan’s Assistance to AHA Centre is Actively Used in Dealing with Typhoon Haiyan,” AHA Centre, July 2, 2014, http://www.ahacentre.org/news-from-aha-centre#popup_emergency15.

Development (USAID).⁸⁹ Launching the DRMS marked the completion of a flagship project for Phase 1 of the AADMER Work Programme.⁹⁰ The DRMS became fully operational in January 2013.⁹¹

In order to institutionalize among member states, a set of standard practices was required to develop a uniform approach to HA/DR.⁹² To do this ASEAN established a set of standard operating procedures to guide relief efforts. This set of procedures is called the *SASOP: Standard Operating Procedures for Regional Standby Arrangements and Coordination of Joint Disaster Relief and Emergency Response Operations*.⁹³ The *SASOP* guides how standby arrangements are initiated and established within ASEAN, how disaster relief and emergency response operations are conducted, how military and civilian assets are used during a response, and how disaster relief exercises in ASEAN are conducted. It also provides templates for requesting assistance, sharing information, and providing updates on disaster relief responses.⁹⁴ The first version of the *SASOP* was signed in 2005, and first used during the response to Cyclone Nargis in 2008. The *SASOP* entered into force in 2009.⁹⁵ The AHA Centre demonstrated the success of the *SASOP* during its response to Typhoon Haiyan when the Philippine government requested ERAT assistance through the *SASOP*; and Brunei and Malaysia offered assistance to the AHA Centre through the forms.⁹⁶ When it finalized the *SASOP* in 2011, and validated it in subsequent ARDEX's, ASEAN marked the completion of one of the flagship projects for Phase 1.⁹⁷

⁸⁹ "U.S. Supports State-of-the-Art Disaster Monitoring and Response System for ASEAN," United States Mission to ASEAN, April 12, 2012, <http://asean.usmission.gov/pr4122013.html>.

⁹⁰ ASEAN Secretariat, *AADMER Work Programme Phase 1*, 13.

⁹¹ Fan and Krebs, *Regional Organisations and Humanitarian Action*, 4.

⁹² Petz, *Strengthening Regional and National Capacity*, 15.

⁹³ ASEAN Secretariat, *SASOP: Standard Operating Procedure for Regional Standby Arrangements and Coordination of Joint Disaster Relief and Emergency Response Operations* (Jakarta: Author, 2009), 1, <http://ahacentre.org/sasop>.

⁹⁴ "SASOP," AHA Centre, 2014, <http://ahacentre.org/sasop>.

⁹⁵ Fan and Krebs, *Regional Organisations and Humanitarian Action*, 5.

⁹⁶ Lee, "ASEAN's Response to Typhoon Haiyan."

⁹⁷ ASEAN Secretariat, *AADMER Work Programme Phase 1*, 23.

Within member states, ASEAN institutionalized the AADMER when it developed National Focal Points (NFPs) and established the AHA Centre Executive Program. One of the ways that institutionalization occurs at the state level is through the designation of NFPs under article 22 of the AADMER. The AADMER NFP is the single point of contact for implementing the agreement and SOPs within their respective state. Each state already had to designate a focal point for the ACDM, and the AADMER suggested that each NFP be the same for both.⁹⁸ The second way ASEAN institutionalized the AADMER at the state level is through the AHA Centre Executive Program. The program is a training course that started in January 2104 and lasts six months.⁹⁹ The course is designed to familiarize disaster management officials from member states in AHA Centre operations and other states disaster management agencies. Course attendees also receive training in areas including on the job training at the AHA Centre, civil-military coordination, humanitarian logistics and supply chain management, emergency operations training, and ERAT training.¹⁰⁰

C. STEP THREE: FROM DEVELOPMENT OF INSTITUTIONS TO DEPLOYMENT OF HA/DR ASSETS

The third step in ASEAN's evolution of its approach to HA/DR is the deployment of HA/DR assets like the ERAT. During a disaster, the ERAT will work with the NFP (National Focal Point) of the affected country to accomplish four functions: form an initial assessment of the area, figure out the scale of damage, determine what the affected population immediately needs, and coordinate with the AHA Centre to mobilize and deploy the appropriate resources. In order to request assistance from the ERAT, the affected ASEAN state submits a report to the AHA Centre. The AHA Centre then notifies the ERAT, as well as other member states to request additional assistance.¹⁰¹ Once notified the ERAT has a mobilization timeline of eight hours and is designed to be

⁹⁸ ASEAN Secretariat, *AADMER Work Programme Phase 1*, 23.

⁹⁹ Fan and Krebs, *Regional Organisations and Humanitarian Action*, 4.

¹⁰⁰ Petz, *Strengthening Regional and National Capacity*, 18.

¹⁰¹ AHA Centre, *ASEAN-ERAT Guidelines*, 14.

deployed for up to fourteen days.¹⁰² Figure 1 shows the flow chart for ERAT deployment.




Figure 1. Flow Chart for ERAT Deployment¹⁰³

The ERAT saw its first deployment on May 9, 2008, two months after its creation, when eight members responded to Cyclone Nargis in Myanmar.¹⁰⁴ In October 2009, another ERAT deployed to Laos in support of the Joint Damage and Loss Assessment for Typhoon Ketsana.¹⁰⁵ Since 2009 ERATs have deployed seven times. In 2010 the ERAT deployed to Mentawai, Indonesia, following an earthquake and tsunami. In 2011 it deployed to Bangkok in response to massive floods. In 2012 it deployed seven members to the Philippines in response to Typhoon Bopha. Following an earthquake in Bohol, the Philippines, in 2012 the ERAT deployed four members to assist relief efforts.

¹⁰² AHA Centre, *ASEAN-ERAT Guidelines*, 13–15.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, 24.

¹⁰⁴ Johannah Wegerdt and Siu Sue Mark, *Post-Nargis Needs Assessment and Monitoring: ASEAN's Pioneering Response* (Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat, 2010), 8, 17, <http://hdl.handle.net/1765/50967>.

¹⁰⁵ AHA Centre, *ASEAN-ERAT Guidelines*, 8.

In 2013 the ERAT deployed twice: first two members went to Jakarta during the floods, and then fifteen members deployed in response to Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines. The ERAT's most recent deployment saw five members go to the Philippines and Vietnam in support of the Typhoon Rammasun recovery efforts.¹⁰⁶

ASEAN also showed how it moved from the second step, development of institutions to support HA/DR responses, to the third step, deployment of assets, through the organization and execution of the ASEAN Regional Disaster Emergency Exercises. The ARDEXs began in 2005 with ARDEX-05. The purpose of the ARDEXs is to use the *SASOP* procedures operationally and test joint responses to a simulated disaster using host-country agencies, ASEAN Member States agencies, and any teams from international agencies that are invited.¹⁰⁷ The inaugural ARDEX (ARDEX-05) began on September 19, 2005. Hosted by Malaysia, the exercise involved responding to an earthquake affecting Selangor, Malaysia. Search and rescue teams from Malaysia, Brunei, and Singapore deployed in response.¹⁰⁸

The second ARDEX (ARDEX-06) was hosted by Cambodia on September 27, 2006. This exercise focused on responding to flooding in the Takhmau and Kein Svay districts of Cambodia, and involved response teams from Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand.¹⁰⁹ Singapore hosted the third ARDEX (ARDEX-07), which began October 20, 2007 and took place in the Mandai Training Village. This exercise focused on the scenario of collapsed residential buildings and the response of Urban Search and Rescue Teams (USAR). Singapore led the response with assistance

¹⁰⁶ AHA Centre, "About ERAT."

¹⁰⁷ "Disaster Exercise," AHA Centre, 2014, <http://ahacentre.org/disaster-exercise>.

¹⁰⁸ "Press Release of the ASEAN Mounts First Regional Disaster Emergency Response Simulation Exercise 16 September 2005," ASEAN Secretariat, September 16, 2005, <http://www.asean.org/communities/asean-socio-cultural-community/item/press-release-of-the-asean-mounts-first-regional-disaster-emergency-response-simulation-exercise-16-september-2005>.

¹⁰⁹ "Announcement by the ASEAN Committee on Disaster Management (ACDM): ASEAN to Test Regional Emergency Response and Humanitarian Assistance Capacities in a Simulated Flood Disaster in Cambodia 6 September 2006," ASEAN Secretariat, September 6, 2006, <http://www.asean.org/communities/asean-socio-cultural-community/item/announcement-by-the-asean-committee-on-disaster-management-acdm-asean-to-test-regional-emergency-response-and-humanitarian-assistance-capacities-in-a-simulated-flood-disaster-in-cambodia-6-september-2006>.

from ASEAN countries, as well as UN teams.¹¹⁰ ARDEX-08 was the fourth ARDEX and held in August 2008. Hosted by Thailand the exercise involved the response to a typhoon hitting the Map Ta Phut Industrial Estate with teams from Brunei, Cambodia, Malaysia, Philippines, and Singapore assisting Thai responders. ERAT members were also involved, as were members of the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the Thai Red Cross, and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) and Red Crescent.¹¹¹ ARDEXs were planned for 2009 and 2010, but were cancelled due to real world disasters. The most recent exercise, ARDEX-13, was the first since the AHA Centre became operational, and was hosted by Vietnam in October 2013. ARDEX-13 involved a response to a Super Typhoon that hit the coastal Northern Delta provinces.¹¹² Participants included ASEAN countries and the ERAT; Japan, China, Korea, Australia, New Zealand, the United States, and the United Nations also sent observers for the exercise.¹¹³

D. INCREASED HA/DR EFFORTS BY THE ARF AND ADMM+

Since 2004 both the ARF and ADMM+ have increased their involvement in HA/DR. In 2004 the ARF renewed its involvement in HA/DR when its ISM-DR resumed in response to the 2004 tsunami. The ISM-DR was suspended back in 2000 due to conflicting views among its members concerning the use of military forces during HA/DR operations.¹¹⁴ Because of the severity of the tsunami, the ARF decided that the ISM would reconvene for the 2005–2006 inter-sessional year with Indonesia and China

¹¹⁰ AHA Centre, “Disaster Exercise.”

¹¹¹ “Announcement by the ASEAN Committee on Disaster Management (ACDM): ASEAN’s Regional Emergency Response and Humanitarian Assistance Capacities Put to the Test in Simulated Typhoon Disaster Scenario 22 August 2008,” ASEAN Secretariat, August 22, 2008, <http://www.asean.org/communities/asean-socio-cultural-community/item/announcement-by-the-asean-committee-on-disaster-management-acdm-asean-s-regional-emergency-response-and-humanitarian-assistance-capacities-put-to-the-test-in-simulated-typhoon-disaster-scenario-22-august-2008>.

¹¹² AHA Centre, “Disaster Exercise.”

¹¹³ “ASEAN Disaster Emergency Response Simulation Exercise Begins in Hanoi Today,” *ASEAN Secretariat News*, October 21, 2013, <http://www.asean.org/news/asean-secretariat-news/item/asean-disaster-emergency-response-simulation-exercise-begins-in-hanoi-today>.

¹¹⁴ Haacke, “ASEAN, From Dialogue to Practical Security,” 439.

as the co-chairs.¹¹⁵ The ISM-DR convened on November 30, 2005, and was attended by representatives from the ARF Member States, as well as representatives from the European Union, the ASEAN Secretariat, the IFRC, and UN OCHA. This meeting discussed the need for coordinated responses, early warning programs, as well as an overview of the AADMER.¹¹⁶ In May 2006 the ARF Statement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response was released after the Yogyakarta and Central Java earthquakes. This stated that the participants would try to increase cooperation and support regional and international efforts in risk identification, disaster prevention, disaster relief, and capacity building. The statement also called for the ARF to develop standby arrangements for HA/DR responses. During the fourteenth ARF Ministerial Meeting in 2007 the ARF adopted the ARF General Guidelines for Disaster Relief Cooperation, which resulted from China's efforts to establish procedures during HA/DR responses.¹¹⁷

In May 2008, the ARF held its first disaster relief desktop exercise in Jakarta, organized by Indonesia and Australia. This scenario revolved around the response to a volcanic eruption, earthquake, and tsunami, with the objectives of improving “civil and military coordination in disaster relief” and promoting “understanding and cooperation among ARF participants.”¹¹⁸ After Cyclone Nargis during the fifteenth ARF, the foreign ministers requested that the ISM-DR co-chairs develop the ARF Strategic Guidance for Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief. The co-chairs were also tasked to create a work plan for implementing the guidelines. This Work Program was revised in 2012, and

¹¹⁵ ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), *Chairman's Statement on the Twelfth Meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)* (Vientiane, Laos: July 29, 2005), http://www.aseanregionalforum.asean.org/files/library/ARF%20Chairman%27s%20Statements%20and%20Reports/The%20Twelfth%20ASEAN%20Regional%20Forum,%202004-2005/12%20ARF%20CHAIRMANs%20Statement-Final%20from%20Phanthaly,%2030July2005%2018_00hr.doc.

¹¹⁶ ARF Disaster Relief Exercises 2015 (ARF DiREx 2015), *Co-Chairs' Summary Report of the Fifth ASEAN Regional Forum Intersessional Meeting on Disaster Relief* (Bandung, Indonesia: November 30–December 2, 2005), <http://www.aseanregionalforum.asean.org/files/library/ARF%20Chairman%27s%20Statements%20and%20Reports/The%20Thirteenth%20ASEAN%20Regional%20Forum,%202005-2006/Summary%20Report.doc>.

¹¹⁷ Jürgen Haacke, “The ASEAN Regional Forum and Transnational Challenges: Little Collective Securitization, Some Practical Cooperation,” in *Cooperative Security in the Asia-Pacific*, ed. Jürgen Haacke and Noel M. Morada (New York: Routledge, 2010), 144.

¹¹⁸ Ibid.

identifies three priority areas for progress: creating a network to share information among ARF participants; conducting rapid assessments, deployments, and accepting provided support; ensuring that interoperability and coordination exists between responders during HA/DR operations.¹¹⁹ The work plan is supposed to be finished in 2014, yet no progress report has been released.

In May 2009 the ARF conducted the Voluntary Demonstration of Response. This civilian-led exercise centered on a typhoon and featured a tabletop exercise, maritime search and rescue efforts by the Philippine Navy and Coastguard, and the Japanese coast guard, as well as medical and construction field exercises. The United States, Philippines, Indonesia, Papua New Guinea, Australia, New Zealand, and Singapore all participated in the field exercises, and other ARF participants, including China, sent observers.¹²⁰ In March 2011 the ARF held the inaugural Disaster Relief Exercise in Manado, Indonesia, co-hosted by Indonesia and Japan. DIREX-11 tested joint responses to a tsunami that hit Manado. Two thousand personnel took part in the event.¹²¹

The second DIREX, DIREX-13, took place in Thailand in May 2013. Thailand and the Republic of Korea co-hosted the event, which aimed to expand on DIREX-11. Approximately 2,400 personnel took part in both field and tabletop exercises, including responding to rock slides, establishing emergency operation and evaluation centers, and maritime rescue operations.¹²² During DIREX-13 both the AHA Centre and ERAT participated. The AHA Centre worked with the UN On-Site Operations Coordination Centre (UNOSOCC) to coordinate inter-agency operations. The ERAT partnered with the UN Disaster Assessment and Coordination Team (UNDAC) to deploy and provide assessment capabilities.¹²³ The third DIREX, DIREX-15, took place from May 24–28,

¹¹⁹ ARF DiREx 2015, *ARF Work Plan for Disaster Relief 2012–2014*, 2012, <http://aseanregionalforum.asean.org/files/References/ARF%20Work%20Plan%20on%20Disaster%20Relief%202012-2014%20%28FINAL%29.pdf>.

¹²⁰ Haacke, “ASEAN, Transnational Challenges,” 145.

¹²¹ Antara, “ARF DIREX Strengthens Regional Ties.”

¹²² Asia News Monitor, “ARF DiREx 2013 co-hosted in Thailand.”

¹²³ Petz, *Strengthening Regional and National Capacity*, 19.

2015.¹²⁴ It was held in Kedah and Perlis, Malaysia, with Malaysia and China as co-hosts. The exercise consists of a response to a super typhoon in the northern regions of the Malaysian Peninsula, with the goal of building upon the previous two DIREXs and effectively implementing the AADMER.¹²⁵ DIREX-15 included over 1,700 personnel from twenty-two countries.¹²⁶

In 2013 the ADMM+ held its inaugural Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Response and Military Medicine exercise in Brunei. The exercise involved more than 3,000 personnel from all eighteen ADMM+ countries and centered on the response to the fictional Typhoon Simpbur. The AHA Centre successfully handled the request for assistance from Brunei, and established a Multi-National Coordination Center to coordinate all aid.¹²⁷

E. CONCLUSION

During the East Timor crisis in 1999 and the Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004, ASEAN did not have a committed regional HA/DR approach. The 2004 tsunami marked the turning point and ASEAN developed the commitment to a regional HA/DR approach. It did this by signing the AADMER and instituting the AADMER Work Programme to implement the AADMER once it was ratified and entered into force. Next ASEAN developed institutions such as the AHA Centre, the ERAT, DELSA, and DRMS in order to support a regional HA/DR effort. ASEAN reached the third step, deployment of its own HA/DR assets, in 2008 when it deployed the ERAT for the first time in response to Cyclone Nargis. In addition to real-world deployments, ASEAN also started conducting ARDEXs in 2005 to strengthen responses. This evolution happened concurrently with measures by the ARF and ADMM+ to increase their own HA/DR capabilities.

¹²⁴ “DiREx 2015,” ARF DiREx 2015, last modified July 20, 2014, <http://arfdirex2015.my/index.php/about/direx2015>.

¹²⁵ Ibid.

¹²⁶ “Inputs From ARF-DiREX’s Table Top Exercise to Help Enhance Disaster Management,” *Malaysian National News Agency*, May 25, 2014, ProQuest 1682969377.

¹²⁷ Scott Cheney-Peters, “Southeast Asian Rivals Work Together in Disaster Relief Exercise,” *USNI News*, June 24, 2013, <http://news.usni.org/2013/06/24/southeast-asian-rivals-work-together-in-disaster-relief-exercise>.

III. CASE STUDIES: HOW ASEAN EVOLVED ITS RESPONSE TO HA/DR

This chapter discusses four important case studies in the evolution of ASEAN's approach to HA/DR: the East Timor crisis in 1999, the Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004, Cyclone Nargis in 2008, and Typhoon Haiyan in 2013. With the East Timor crisis in 1999 and the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, ASEAN did not have the commitment to an organized response as an association, even though member states did send forces and supplies either individually or part of a larger multi-national effort. After the 2004 tsunami, ASEAN realized that it needed to be able to respond to crises within the association. The AADMER was passed and signed, the ERAT formed, the AHA Centre established, and ARDEXs started. In the case of Cyclone Nargis, ASEAN provided two important services. First, as an organization it convinced Myanmar to allow international relief efforts in. Second, the disaster marked the first deployment of the ERAT, just two months after being organized. Typhoon Haiyan shows ASEAN's further evolution, when members of the ERAT deployed to Tacloban ahead of the typhoon hitting the Philippines.

A. THE EAST TIMOR CRISIS

In December 1975, Indonesia invaded and annexed East Timor after it was granted independence by Portugal; in January 1999, after forty-three years under Indonesian rule, President B. J. Habibie of Indonesia announced that if the East Timorese rejected autonomy, then he would consider independence for the region.¹²⁸ Then, on May 5, 1999, the governments of Indonesia and Portugal signed the "Agreement between the governments of Indonesia and Portugal on the question of East Timor," which was also signed by Kofi Annan, the UN Secretary General. This set the stage for a vote by the East Timorese, as to whether they would become a special autonomous region inside Indonesia or an independent country. If the vote failed, then Indonesia would transfer control of East Timor to the United Nations for transition to independence. The UN was put in charge of monitoring the vote while the Indonesian government retained

¹²⁸ BBC, "East Timor profile."

responsibility for security.¹²⁹ Then on June 11, 1999 the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1246 which provided for the creation of the United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET).¹³⁰ Three ASEAN member states—Thailand, Malaysia, and the Philippines—contributed personnel to UNAMET.¹³¹ The vote on autonomy took place August 30, 1999, and on September 1 riots broke out in Dili causing the UN compound to be sealed.¹³² The UN announced the results of the vote on September 4, with 78.5 percent of the vote against autonomy and in favor of independence. This caused the pro-Indonesian militias to increase their violence.¹³³ On September 12, President Habibie sent a formal request to the United Nations to send a peacekeeping force to East Timor. Three days later, on September 15, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1264 which became the legal basis for the Australian-led International Force East Timor.¹³⁴

Although INTERFET was Australian-led, it had significant contributions from ASEAN member states. Major General Songkitti Jaggabatara of Thailand served as the deputy commander for the force. Thailand also contributed 1,600 personnel to the force, the second largest contribution to the force.¹³⁵ Malaysia initially refused to participate in INTERFET because it was Australian-led, but consented after negotiations with the Indonesian government.¹³⁶ Singapore and the Philippines also contributed personnel, ships, and aircraft to INTERFET.¹³⁷ When the United Nations Transitional

¹²⁹ United States Institute of Peace, *Agreement Between the Republic of Indonesia and the Portuguese Republic on the Question of East Timor*, May 5, 1999, http://www.usip.org/files/file/resources/collections/peace_agreements/east_timor_05051999.pdf.

¹³⁰ “Resolution 1246: The Situation in Timor,” United Nations Security Council Resolutions, June 11, 1999, <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/1246>.

¹³¹ James Cotton, “Against the Grain: The East Timor Intervention,” *Survival* 43, no. 1 (Spring 2001): 130, ProQuest 217600318.

¹³² “UN Calls an Emergency Meeting,” *Bangkok Post*, September 2, 1999.

¹³³ Ian Martin and Alexander Mayer-Rieckh, “The United Nations and East Timor: From Self-Determination to State-Building,” *International Peacekeeping* 12, no. 1 (2005), 131, doi: 10.1080/1353331042000286595.

¹³⁴ Ibid.

¹³⁵ Cotton, “Against the Grain,” 131.

¹³⁶ Nicholas J. Wheeler and Tim Dunne, “East Timor and the New Humanitarian Intervention,” *International Affairs* 77, no.4 (October 2001). 823, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3095596>.

¹³⁷ Alan Dupont, “ASEAN’s Response to the East Timor Crisis,” *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 54, no.2 (July 2000), 167, doi: 10.1080/713613510.

Administration East Timor (UNTAET) took over from INTERFET in February 2000, the first two commanders of the force were from the Philippines and Thailand, respectively.¹³⁸

Before the United Nations began its involvement in East Timor in 1999, ASEAN took the position that “East Timor was purely an Indonesian matter.”¹³⁹ ASEAN’s inaction as an association was heavily criticized and questions were raised in the West about the usefulness of the organization in solving regional problems.¹⁴⁰ Individually five member states did step up and provide forces for operations in another member state, which at that time was a “groundbreaking development for the region.”¹⁴¹ By stepping up and contributing forces ASEAN members showed that there was a will within the organization to participate in humanitarian operations.¹⁴²

B. 2004 INDIAN OCEAN TSUNAMI

On December 26, 2004, a 9.0 magnitude earthquake occurred off the coast of Aceh, Indonesia. This resulted in a massive tsunami that made its way across the Indian Ocean causing complete devastation as far away as Tanzania.¹⁴³ The coasts of four ASEAN countries saw significant damage to their coastlines: Indonesia, Thailand, Myanmar, and Malaysia.¹⁴⁴ Aceh saw the greatest devastation: over 130,000 people died, over 36,800 were missing, and over 500,000 people lost their homes.¹⁴⁵ Thailand also suffered extensive damage and over 5,000 people lost their lives.¹⁴⁶ Figure 2 details the deaths by state. Aceh’s count is combined with Indonesia.

¹³⁸ “East Timor – UNTAET Background,” United Nations (UN), last modified May 2002, <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/etimor/UntaetB.htm>; Cotton, “Against the Grain,” 131.

¹³⁹ Dupont, “ASEAN’s Response to the East Timor Crisis,” 163.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid.

¹⁴¹ Wheeler and Dunne, “East Timor and the New Humanitarian Intervention,” 823.

¹⁴² Dupont, “ASEAN’s Response to the East Timor Crisis,” 168.

¹⁴³ Pradyumna P. Karan, “Introduction: When Nature Turns Savage,” in *The Indian Ocean Tsunami: The Global Response to a Natural Disaster*, ed. Pradyumna P. Karan and Shanmugam P. Subbiah (Lexington, KY: University of Kentucky Press, 2011), 1–2.

¹⁴⁴ Gentner, “ASEAN: Cooperative Disaster Relief,” 5.

¹⁴⁵ Karan, “When Nature Turns Savage,” 13.

¹⁴⁶ Gentner, “ASEAN: Cooperative Disaster Relief,” 5.




Figure 2. Breakdown of 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami Death Toll by Country¹⁴⁷

In Indonesia, responders—including the armed forces—found themselves completely overwhelmed. Due to ongoing security operations in Aceh, the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI) already had 40,000 troops in the area. These troops were immediately instructed to take up a more humanitarian role. The day after the disaster, December 27, the Indonesian government requested the UN take the lead in coordinating incoming international relief efforts. Indonesian President Yudhoyono also opened up Aceh to international personnel since it was previously closed off to outsiders. The government also realized that existing HA/DR procedures did not include allowing entry of international relief workers, so the government issued temporary instructions. These instructions included waiving visa requirements and allowing relief supplies to go through without a customs check.¹⁴⁸ Indonesia also realized that it needed assistance from foreign militaries. The TNI commander, General Endriartono Sutarto sent personal

¹⁴⁷ Karan, “When Nature Turns Savage,” 2.

¹⁴⁸ Sharon Wiharta et al., *The Effectiveness of Foreign Military Assets in Natural Disaster Response* (N.p.: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute: 2008), 90.

requests for assistance to the following countries: Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, Malaysia and the United States. These personal requests were negotiated bilaterally through the Indonesian government.¹⁴⁹ Malaysia's "Special Malaysia Disaster Assistance and Rescue Team" was the first foreign asset to arrive on scene in Aceh. Malaysia also sent in 300 soldiers to Aceh, set up a relief center to hold up to 10,000 people, and sent one naval vessel to help with relief efforts.¹⁵⁰ Malaysia also contributed four aircraft and 133 medical personnel.¹⁵¹ Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) sent in cargo aircraft—C-130 Hercules—for relief efforts beginning on December 28, 2004, bringing medical and other relief supplies to Aceh. SAF helicopters began missions the next day, December 29, when they flew in a medical team. Three amphibious ships, six C-130s, and eight helicopters were all in Aceh by the end of the year. On the ground, Singapore had 130 medical officials as well as 103 engineers in the area who helped the TNI conduct missions such as supply transport, casualty evacuation, and providing access to affected areas.¹⁵² Brunei also sent one helicopter, one cargo aircraft, and a medical team.¹⁵³

Indonesia hosted a summit on January 6, 2005, to bring together both ASEAN and world leaders. The attendees at this conference included Australia, New Zealand, the European Union, India, the World Bank, and twenty-one other countries and organizations. Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono personally asked the UN for assistance on behalf of ASEAN.¹⁵⁴ It was at this summit that ASEAN took its first step—thirteen days after the disaster—when it issued the "Declaration on Action to Strengthen Emergency Relief, Rehabilitation, Reconstruction, and Prevention on the Aftermath of Earthquake and Tsunami Disaster of 26 December 2004."¹⁵⁵ This declaration called for the United Nations to take the lead in relief efforts and decided to

¹⁴⁹ Wiharta et al., *Effectiveness of Foreign Military Assets*, 91.

¹⁵⁰ Gentner, "ASEAN: Cooperative Disaster Relief," 6.

¹⁵¹ Wiharta et al., *Effectiveness of Foreign Military Assets*, 101–105.

¹⁵² *Ibid.*, 92–93.

¹⁵³ *Ibid.*, 101–105.

¹⁵⁴ Gentner, "ASEAN: Cooperative Disaster Relief," 7.

¹⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

“establish regional mechanisms on disaster prevention and mitigation.”¹⁵⁶ By asking the United Nations to lead all disaster relief efforts, ASEAN showed that it was unprepared and ill-equipped to deal with HA/DR efforts.¹⁵⁷ The declaration did lead to the signing of the AADMER in July, which represented ASEAN’s transition from non-commitment to commitment to the development of a regional HA/DR approach.

C. CYCLONE NARGIS

On May 2, 2008 Cyclone Nargis slammed into the Irrawaddy Delta region of Myanmar, which is home to approximately one-eighth of the Burmese population. With winds reaching 132 miles an hour, Cyclone Nargis devastated approximately nine thousand square miles of the delta.¹⁵⁸ Aid from existing supply stocks in Rangoon (also known as Yangon) was available from a small contingent of international agencies already had ongoing projects in the country. Burmese authorities informally requested aid through the UN as early as May 5, but did not do anything to accelerate the visa process or expedite the entry of international aid workers. Workers who were already in the country were able to access affected areas, but due to the devastation their access was limited.¹⁵⁹

1. Myanmar’s Restrictions on Relief

The USS *Essex* Amphibious Ready Group was dispatched from Thailand to Burma with relief supplies, as well as the USS *Kitty Hawk* and USS *Nimitz* carrier strike groups.¹⁶⁰ British and French ships took positions off the coast of Myanmar to deliver aid as well. Myanmar was not allowing any ship-to-shore movements, however.¹⁶¹ United Nations flights were allowed into Myanmar on a limited basis, however. On May 7 the

¹⁵⁶ Special ASEAN Leaders’ Meeting on Aftermath of Earthquake and Tsunami, “Declaration on Action to Strengthen Emergency Relief.”

¹⁵⁷ Gentner, “ASEAN: Cooperative Disaster Relief,” 7.

¹⁵⁸ Jennifer D. P. Moroney et al., *Lessons from Department of Defense Disaster Relief Efforts in the Asia-Pacific Region* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2013), 17.

¹⁵⁹ Belanger and Horsey, “Negotiating Humanitarian Access,” 2.

¹⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 19.

¹⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 4.

UN was given authorization for flights to begin.¹⁶² U.S. military flights began on May 12, with fixed-wing cargo aircraft only, and were eventually allowed to fly from Utapao into Rangoon. The U.S. military was not allowed to offload or distribute the gear; only Burmese personnel were allowed to do that. Two more flights were allowed which brought in over 72,000 pounds of relief supplies.¹⁶³ The U.S. military-led Joint Task Force Caring Response (JTF-CR) was allowed to make a total of 185 aid flights into Rangoon.¹⁶⁴ JTF-CR also offered CH-53 Super Stallion and CH-46 Sea Knight helicopters to deliver relief supplies brought ashore to Mae Sot, Thailand, however the Burmese rejected these after several attempts. Thailand and Singapore also offered the use of their helicopters, but the Burmese turned these requests down as well.¹⁶⁵ On May 15, the junta told international relief workers to leave the Irrawaddy Delta, and in some cases doctors and medics were turned away at military checkpoints.¹⁶⁶

In the meantime France, the United Kingdom, and the United States tried to get a briefing by the UN Emergency Relief Coordinator to the UN Security Council on May 7. This briefing was in the hopes of gaining a Security Council resolution, under the responsibility to protect doctrine. Other members disapproved it, however. The European Union (EU) also considered ways of dealing with Myanmar. Member countries thought that Myanmar's refusal to let aid in could constitute crimes against humanity. The EU's High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana, said that aid should be sent using any means necessary. UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown also said that nothing was ruled out as far as unauthorized deliveries were concerned.¹⁶⁷

¹⁶² Moe Thuzar, "The Nargis Experience: Pragmatic Solutions Towards Change," in *ASEAN Matters! Reflecting on the Association of Southeast Asian Nations*, ed. Yoong Yoong Lee (Singapore: World Scientific Printers, 2011), 73.

¹⁶³ Moroney et al., *Lessons from Department of Defense*, 20.

¹⁶⁴ Belanger and Horsey, "Negotiating Humanitarian Access," 4.

¹⁶⁵ Moroney et al., *Lessons from Department of Defense*, 21.

¹⁶⁶ Alison McCormick, "From Sovereignty to Responsibility: An Emerging International Norm and Its Call to Action in Burma," *Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies* 18, no. 1 (Winter 2011), 577, <http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ijgls/vol18/iss1/22>.

¹⁶⁷ Belanger and Horsey, "Negotiating Humanitarian Access," 3.

2. ASEAN Steps in

With all the controversy surrounding relief supplies in Myanmar, ASEAN became involved in the relief efforts. This was highly unusual given humanitarian situations in the past, like East Timor and the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami, where ASEAN as a whole made no substantial actions. As international pressure grew on the Burmese junta in the years before Cyclone Nargis hit, ASEAN was criticized for not taking a firm stance against the regime.¹⁶⁸ Immediately after the disaster ASEAN offered help to Myanmar, and urged the member states to offer aid to Myanmar within the construct of the Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response. ASEAN members the Philippines and Singapore also sent HA/DR experts with the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) team on May 7th, and on May 9th the ASEAN Emergency Rapid Assessment Team deployed to Myanmar.¹⁶⁹ This marked the first deployment of the ERAT. The ERAT conducted its assessment from May 9–18. During its assessment the ERAT worked with the UNDAC—many ERAT members were trained by the UNDAC, making coordination easier—and conducted interviews of relief workers and government officials from the Myanmar Information Management Unit and the Ministry of Social Welfare, Relief, and Resettlement. The team also visited affected areas in the Irrawaddy Delta and Rangoon.¹⁷⁰ On May 19, 2008 the ERAT presented its findings to the Special ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, where the establishment of a “Humanitarian Coalition for the Victims of Cyclone Nargis.”¹⁷¹ Following the recommendation of the ERAT, ASEAN leaders came up with a two-tiered system in order to coordinate international relief efforts in Myanmar. The ERAT’s recommendations created the ASEAN Humanitarian Task Force and the Tripartite Core Group on May 25th.¹⁷² On May 19th ASEAN foreign ministers proposed that ASEAN lead the coordination efforts for international assistance, and on May 23rd UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon met personally with Myanmar’s Senior General Than Shwe in the

¹⁶⁸ Thuzar, “Nargis Experience,” 72.

¹⁶⁹ Ibid., 73.

¹⁷⁰ Wegerdt and Mark, *Post-Nargis Needs Assessment*, 17.

¹⁷¹ Ibid.

¹⁷² Creac’h and Fan, “ASEAN’s Role in Cyclone Nargis,” 6.

capital of Naypyitaw. This meeting secured a commitment from the junta to allow international relief efforts into the country, and since ASEAN would lead it gave a less threatening and more of a regional face in operations.¹⁷³

The AHTF was the diplomatic arm for ASEAN to engage Myanmar on relief efforts. It was made up of twenty-two members: two from the ASEAN Secretariat and two officials from each member country. The AHTF supervised the TCG giving it “broad strategic planning, priorities, and targets,” and met once a month for the first three months.¹⁷⁴ The TCG’s job was to monitor and coordinate the resources, operations, and reports from the disaster area. The group was made up of an ASEAN component, a Burmese component, and a United Nations component. The ASEAN component was an ambassador from an ASEAN country, an official from the ASEAN Secretariat, and an ASEAN HA/DR expert. The component from Myanmar consisted of three members appointed by the Myanmar’s Central Coordinating Board. The UN component was made up of the UN Humanitarian Coordinator, the Resident Coordinator for Myanmar, and on a rotational basis, the head of an operational agency.¹⁷⁵ The TCG also took on the responsibility of ensuring aid workers had full access and also preparing the Post-Nargis Joint Assessment.¹⁷⁶

D. TYPHOON HAIYAN

Typhoon Haiyan made landfall in the central Philippines on November 8, 2013. The Category 5 storm was one of the strongest storms ever recorded to make landfall, with sustained winds of 195 miles per hour and gusts reaching 235 miles per hour.¹⁷⁷ The UN estimates that approximately 6,000 people lost their lives, over 4,000,000 people

¹⁷³ Belanger and Horsey, “Negotiating Humanitarian Access,” 4.

¹⁷⁴ Creac’h and Fan, “ASEAN’s Role in Cyclone Nargis,” 6.

¹⁷⁵ Ibid., 6.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷⁷ Jethro Mullen, “Super Typhoon Haiyan, One of Strongest Storms Ever, Hits Central Philippines,” CNN, November 8, 2013, <http://www.cnn.com/2013/11/07/world/asia/philippines-typhoon-haiyan/index.html>.

were displaced from their homes, and over 1,000,000 houses were destroyed.¹⁷⁸ Figure 3 shows the path of Typhoon Haiyan through the Philippines.



Figure 3. Path of Typhoon Haiyan through the Philippines¹⁷⁹

In the aftermath of the typhoon, Filipino President Benigno Aquino declared a state of “national calamity,” and solicited international relief efforts.¹⁸⁰

In the weeks before Typhoon Haiyan struck the Philippines, ASEAN conducted ARDEX-13 in Hanoi. Coincidentally the scenario for the exercise centered on a super typhoon that struck the coast of Vietnam.¹⁸¹ Fifteen days after ARDEX-13 concluded, Typhoon Haiyan made landfall in the Philippines. On November 7, the day before Typhoon Haiyan hit, the AHA Centre deployed two staff members and two ERAT

¹⁷⁸ Thomas Lum and Rhoda Margesson, *Typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda): U.S. and International Response to Philippines Disaster* (CRS Report No. R43309) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2014), 2, <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R43309.pdf>.

¹⁷⁹ “The Trail of Destruction Haiyan Carved,” digital image, November 13, 2013, *South China Morning Post*, <https://www.scmp.com/sites/default/files/2013/11/13/philippines-flood.jpg>.

¹⁸⁰ Lee, “ASEAN’s Response to Typhoon Haiyan.”

¹⁸¹ “ASEAN Tests Regional Disaster Readiness Prior to Typhoon Haiyan,” Pacific Disaster Center, November 27, 2013, <http://www.pdc.org/news-n-media/pdc-updates/ASEAN-Tests-Regional-Disaster-Response-Readiness-Prior-to-Typhoon-Haiyan/>.

members to Manila and Tacloban. The purpose of this deployment was to establish emergency communication between Tacloban and the Philippine National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council (NDRRMC). To help the team accomplish this task, the Government of Japan donated access to an International Maritime Satellite Organization (INMARSAT) terminal.¹⁸²

In order to execute ASEAN's response, ASEAN Secretary-General Le Luong Minh directed that the AHA Centre coordinate relief efforts in accordance with the AADMER. The AHA Centre then sent a Field Team Leader in from Jakarta, more members of the ERAT that were already in Brunei, and a representative from the AADMER Partnership Group for a needs assessment.¹⁸³ The AHA Centre tapped into a fund that was set up with the help of the Japanese, known as the Japan ASEAN Integration Fund, which covers the DELSA. The AHA Centre supplied two and a half tons of rice and 2,000 bottles of drinking water through the fund, and purchased 2,000 family kits and one thousand tarps to give to the NDRMMC on November 14. The AHA Centre also supplied equipment such as prefabricated offices, storage units, tents, generators, and office supplies through DELSA to the NDRMMC on November 20.¹⁸⁴ In order to transport this equipment, the AHA Centre chartered a C-130 transport from the Malaysian government.¹⁸⁵

Brunei and Malaysia also provided assistance to the Philippines through the SASOP Form 4: Offer of Assistance. Malaysia sent a C-130 aircraft loaded with food supplies, blankets, tarps, and medical personnel to assist HA/DR efforts. This airlift took three trips and was paid for by the Malaysian government.¹⁸⁶ Malaysia also deployed the

¹⁸² AHA Centre, "Japan's Assistance to AHA Centre."

¹⁸³ "ASEAN Offers Support to Philippine Government in the Wake of Typhoon Haiyan," *ASEAN Secretariat News*, November 11, 2013, <http://www.asean.org/news/asean-secretariat-news/item/asean-offers-support-to-philippine-government-in-the-wake-of-typhoon-haiyan>.

¹⁸⁴ AHA Centre, "Japan's Assistance to AHA Centre."

¹⁸⁵ Lee, "ASEAN's Response to Typhoon Haiyan."

¹⁸⁶ *Ibid.*

Special Malaysia Assistance and Rescue Team (SMART) to the Philippines.¹⁸⁷ Brunei also used its own CN-235 cargo aircraft and navy ships to transport rice, noodles, biscuits and drinking water. AHA Centre personnel were used to receive and distribute Brunei's supplies to the Philippine government once they arrived.¹⁸⁸

Other ASEAN member states sent assistance to the Filipino government bilaterally. The Indonesian government sent \$1,000,000 worth of supplies to the Philippines. The Singapore Red Cross sent \$40,000 in donations and the Singapore Civil Defense Force sent a team to Tacloban to work with the UNOCHA rescue operations.¹⁸⁹ Vietnam and Cambodia sent \$100,000, and Laos sent \$50,000 to the Philippines.¹⁹⁰

E. CONCLUSION

Chapter III uses the four case studies of the East Timor crisis in 1999, the Indian Ocean tsunami, Cyclone Nargis, and Typhoon Haiyan to illustrate ASEAN's three-stage evolution from non-commitment to an HA/DR crisis to deploying ASEAN assets during an HA/DR crisis. In the cases of East Timor and the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, ASEAN the capability, or even a commitment as an association, to respond to these crises. Individual member states did contribute assets to the missions, which showed the commitment of ASEAN states to conduct HA/DR missions. During the response to Cyclone Nargis, ASEAN performed three important functions. First, the ERAT deployed for the first time ever in order to conduct needs assessments in affected areas. Second, ASEAN convinced Myanmar to open up and accept international aid. Third, ASEAN formed two bodies—the AHTF and the TCG—at the recommendation of the ERAT in order to coordinate relief efforts. The case study of Typhoon Haiyan demonstrated ASEAN's ability to pre-deploy ERAT members to an area and coordinate the delivery of ASEAN-provided supplies through the AHA Centre.

¹⁸⁷ Jean Magdaraog Cordero and Carlo Sumayao, "Typhoon Haiyan: ASEAN Provides Relief to Philippines," *Asia Pacific Forum*, November 18, 2013, http://apdforum.com/en_GB/article/rmiap/articles/online/features/2013/11/18/philippines-asean-react.

¹⁸⁸ Lee, "ASEAN's Response to Typhoon Haiyan."

¹⁸⁹ Cordero and Sumayao, "ASEAN Provides Relief to Philippines."

¹⁹⁰ Lee, "ASEAN's Response to Typhoon Haiyan."

IV. CONCLUSION

This thesis has shown that since the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami ASEAN's approach to HA/DR has evolved through a three-step process. First, ASEAN developed a commitment to coordinating and conducting a regional HA/DR response by adopting the AADMER and conducting HA/DR exercises. Second, it built institutions, such as the AHA Centre, the ERAT, and DELSA, which created a capacity to respond to crises by coordinating and conducting relief efforts. Third, ASEAN deployed assets—the ERAT—to respond to an HA/DR crisis, and coordinate relief efforts through the AHA Centre.

During the 1999 East Timor crisis and the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, ASEAN did not have the capability, or even the commitment to respond to HA/DR crises. Member states did contribute forces and relief personnel on their own, which showed their will to conduct HA/DR missions. For example, Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines, and Thailand all contributed assets to UNAMET, INTERFET, and UNTAET. Thailand was the second largest contributor to INTERFET and even provided the force's deputy commander. The first two military commanders of UNTAET were from the Philippines and Thailand, respectively. The fact that ASEAN members were willing to commit to these missions was unprecedented. After the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami occurred, ASEAN still did not have a regional commitment to coordinate or conduct relief operations. However, member states contributed to relief efforts either bilaterally or as part of the U.S.-led combined task force. Malaysia, Brunei and Singapore sent civilian and military assets in addition to relief supplies. ASEAN's only action was to issue a declaration that pledged to strengthen regional efforts in disaster relief. This foreshadowed the changes that ASEAN would eventually make in order to develop a regionally coordinated response to HA/DR missions.

On July 26, 2005, ASEAN took the first and second of three steps in evolving its approach to HA/DR. That day ASEAN foreign ministers signed the AADMER, which became the world's first legally binding agreement on disaster management.¹⁹¹ This

¹⁹¹ Fan and Krebs, *Regional Organisations and Humanitarian Action*, 4.

represented ASEAN's commitment to a regional HA/DR response and development of institutions. The AADMER set the basis for the third step in the evolution of ASEAN's HA/DR approach: development of an institution to coordinate HA/DR missions in the region. The AADMER also required the establishment of a regional team to respond to disasters, known as the ERAT. The AADMER entered into force on December 24, 2009, after it was ratified by every ASEAN member state. The AADMER also required establishment of the AHA Centre to coordinate relief efforts. This finally occurred on November 17, 2011. Headquartered in Jakarta the AHA Centre is responsible for the coordinating the deployment and training of the ERAT, coordinating relief supplies, and coordinating the ARDEXs. The AHA Centre also manages the Disaster Emergency Logistics System for ASEAN headquartered in Subang, Malaysia.

After Cyclone Nargis struck Myanmar in 2008, ASEAN took the third step in the evolution of its HA/DR policy—deployment of assets. On May 9, seven days after Nargis, ASEAN deployed the ERAT for the first time. ASEAN also convinced Myanmar to allow international relief efforts into the country after the junta blocked relief efforts. On May 19 the ERAT submitted its assessment report to ASEAN, and in response two groups were created in order to coordinate relief efforts: the AHTF and TCG.

During its response to Typhoon Haiyan the AHA Centre actually deployed ERAT members to the Philippines before the disaster occurred in order to set up emergency communication equipment. This demonstrated further development in the third step—deployment of assets—in the evolution of its HA/DR approach. In addition to the pre-deployment of ERAT members, the AHA Centre mobilized relief supplies from DELSA and contracted Malaysian military aircraft to deliver the supplies to the Philippines. Thailand, Malaysia, Brunei, and Indonesia also provided military support to the Philippines, but their efforts were conducted on a bilateral basis.

ASEAN still received criticism for being slow to get supplies into the Philippines and not coordinating a military response to the disaster. Critics cited the example of the ADMM+ HA/DR exercise that was held in June 2013 as a case in which ASEAN had

demonstrated the ability to coordinate a military response.¹⁹² The foreign ministers from Thailand and Indonesia expressed frustration with the pace of ASEAN's response, and even suggested developing a quick response team to deploy.¹⁹³ The problem with this is that ASEAN had already created the ERAT, which had a short, eight-hour deployment window. Also the ADMM+ exercise was the first of its kind but only occurred a few months before the typhoon, and involved countries that are not members of ASEAN itself. To expect immediate results is premature. This does suggest that ASEAN has room to grow in its evolution, and in the future could possibly incorporate coordinating military responses, not just civilian ones. While its role was not highly publicized, the AHA Centre worked behind the scenes to assist the Filipino response agencies, and when requested deployed the ERAT ahead of the storm. This response represents "low-profile, but well targeted boutique operations conducted by the AHA Centre" which is valuable in helping regional responses. This low-profile response can lead to criticism since it is overshadowed by larger military and NGO responses.¹⁹⁴

The bottom line is that in ten years ASEAN has gone from having nothing in terms of a regional HA/DR response to being able to deploy assets before disasters strike. It took the first step and created a commitment to HA/DR by signing the AADMER, which was the first legally binding regional disaster management agreement. After the AADMER was signed ASEAN established the ERAT in March 2008 and AHA Centre in November 2011, and completed the second step in its evolution only six years after the AADMER was signed (two years after it entered into force). The ERAT had operated for only five years before Typhoon Haiyan hit, and the AHA Centre was in only its second year of operation at that time, so both were very young in terms of operational experience at that time.

Understanding this evolution is important to any HA/DR relief response agency in Southeast Asia. For example if a typhoon was heading towards the Philippines, knowing

¹⁹² Loh, "ASEAN's Norm Adherence," 8.

¹⁹³ Graham, "ASEAN's Katrina Moment?"

¹⁹⁴ Hendri Yuzal and Muamar Vebry, "Past Lessons for Haiyan Recovery," *East Asia Forum*, January 21, 2004, <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2014/01/21/past-lessons-for-haiyan-recovery/>.

that the AHA Centre is going to deploy ERAT members in advance of the storm is important. This knowledge would allow NGOs, civilian disaster response teams, or military units the opportunity to respond in three ways. First, an NGO or military command could send supplies to the AHA Centre for the ERAT to pre-deploy with. Second, the leader of either an NGO, civilian disaster response team, or a military response team could place an LNO at the AHA Centre in order to ensure that the proper supplies and personnel get to the right places. Third, a response team could request that an ERAT member embed with it to ensure that delivery of aid is expedited. An embedded ERAT member could also ensure that aid, or personnel, is not held up by host country customs officials, for example. Agencies like the World Food Program, United Nations Children's Fund, World Health Program, and the United Nations Refugee Agency all could provide better relief efforts by partnering with the AHA Centre in both short-term and long-term HA/DR efforts in a country. This is in addition to the UNOCHA, which already works with the AHA Centre.

Knowledge of ASEAN's evolution is also important to the United States military, specifically III MEF, Seventh Fleet, and PACOM. These commands are often the first to deploy U.S. assets in response to a disaster in Southeast Asia. Each of these three commands could have a permanent LNO in the AHA Centre so that initial relief supplies can be delivered to ERAT members for pre-deployment. After a disaster, if PACOM were to stand up a joint or combined command, the commander would know to work with the AHA Centre through the LNOs to ensure that the responders get what they need in terms personnel and supplies, and that relief efforts are delivered to the right area. An LNO at the AHA Centre could also request that an ERAT member embed with a ground unit like the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit to help coordinate delivery of supplies.

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