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**TURKEY AND THE KURDS: A GAME THEORETIC
APPROACH TO STRATEGY AND POLICY**

by

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June 2015

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ABSTRACT

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AKP	Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi)
BAC	Basque Autonomous Country
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
DTP	Democratic Society Party
ELN	National Liberation Army
ETA	Basque Homeland and Freedom (Euskadi Ta Askatasuna)
EU	European Union
FARC	Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
IRA	Irish Republican Army
HDP	People's Democratic Party (Halklarin Demokratik Partisi)
KCK	Kurdish Communities Union
MIT	Turkish National Intelligence Organization
PKK	Kurdistan Workers Party
SDLP	Social Democratic Labor Party
UK	United Kingdom
UP	Patriotic Union
U.S.	United States

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. BACKGROUND

Any attempt to analyze various types of conflicts in the contemporary world will inevitably find that the related concepts of ethnicity, ethnic groups, and ethnic conflict play major roles. It seems fair to define an ethnic group as a segment of a larger society whose members are thought, by themselves or others, to have a common origin and to share important segments of a common culture (Yinger, 1994). Until recently, many social scientists expected ethnic conflicts to gradually decrease and ultimately vanish, especially as a result of the modernization process. On the contrary, ethnic mobilization is quite strong in modern states. It is true that the economic and political changes that stem from the effects of modernity diminished small-scale ethnic disparities; however, modernity concurrently increases large scale ethnic mobilizations (Olzak, 1992). This is not to say that ethnic conflict is a stable constant that always stays the same. Obviously, ethnic identities, just like religious or linguistic identities, are dynamic, and this dynamism is prone to be channeled through both violent and nonviolent courses of action (Ryan, 1998).

The Kurdish conflict in Turkey is one of the ethnic conflicts that remains unresolved for the last three decades. The root causes of this ethnic conflict are many, but a widely agreed upon reason is the differential treatment of the Kurds community since 1960 by the Turkish government. The Turkish military made a coup d'état on May 27, 1960, and a new and relatively libertarian constitution was adopted in 1961. As a reflection of this libertarianism in the social and political life of Turkey, leftist political groups and trade unions emerged (Ozcan, 2006). Kurds in Turkey felt prejudiced by the Federal government and started an armed struggle in 1984 as the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). The negotiations between the Turkish government and the PKK have started and failed many times. The violent struggles of the PKK and related military actions in the area have likewise witnessed many ups and downs. The arrest of founding leader Abdullah Ocalan in 1999, followed by the end of separatist war by the PKK, was

welcomed by Turkish government. This was considered a success of the government and that it would lead to collapse of the PKK. But the arrest of its founding leader and the end of war by the PKK was not the end of the PKK (Marcus, 2007). A gradual change in the stance of the PKK from separation to demanding more rights and autonomy for the area after the arrest of Ocalan encouraged the Turkish government to engage this organization in dialogue for a permanent solution to the problem. We discuss detailed historical background of the armed struggle in Chapter II. Both sides, though, look interested in the negotiation process, even though they have not yet succeeded in resolving the conflict.

Many violent ethnic conflicts have sought permanent solutions in the recent past. The Irish Republic Army (IRA) in “The Troubles” and the Basque conflict in northern Spain are examples of recent successes. However, long-term ethnic conflicts in places like Colombia persist. In this thesis, we analyze these three case studies where negotiations have succeeded in two ethnic conflicts and have yet to succeed in Colombia’s case. We hope to identify if there is a specific pattern for successful negotiations, and if this pattern could potentially be applicable to Turkey’s Kurdish conflict. If there is no discernable pattern, we investigate which of the success strategies can best be applied, or which of the failed strategies can be avoided to make the ongoing negotiations a success. This study also analyzes the options available to both sides in the Kurdish conflict in response to each other through a game theoretic model. We apply game theory to determine the best possible outcome for both sides in both cases (i.e., without communication and with communication). Using game theory, we also analyze if there are further options for both sides other than negotiations. Finally, we offer policy recommendations for making the ongoing negotiations between the Turkish government and the PKK a success.

This chapter discusses the fundamentals that drive the remainder of the thesis. First, the literature on ethnic conflict and game theory is reviewed. Then the hypotheses that are to be tested in the study, the research question, the methodology, and the organization of the research are laid out.

B. LITERATURE REVIEW

1. Ethnic Conflict

The underlying reasons for ethnic conflict are highly debated. Scholars like Burton (1996) argue that a correlation exists between the deprivation of personal or social basic human needs and alienation and a lack of socialization of these people within the society. This is because “ontological needs of identity and recognition, and associated human developmental needs are frustrated. These conflicts cannot be contained, controlled, or suppressed, but can be resolved and prevented by the satisfaction of these needs” (Burton, 1996). According to Burton, regardless of the kind of conflict being examined, the essence of the problem is generic: the ontological needs of the people. And the resolution of this conflict, whether it is interpersonal, communal, ethnic, or international, necessitates the same analytical process.

However, some scholars object to this sort of generalization, believing in the existence of major misconceptions about the roots and the resolution strategies of ethnic conflicts. They claim that theoretical improvements in the field of ethnic conflict and conflict management dispute some basic misconceptions concerning the essence and the roots of ethnic conflict. On this view, root causes of these conflicts are especially misunderstood, and ethnic conflicts are different from other conflicts in their form and content (Carment & Frank, 2001).

There are as many different perspectives on the resolution of ethnic conflict as there are about the roots of it. In any case, in order to resolve a conflict, one should be able to define it clearly. The territory plays a significant role in understanding the essence of an ethnic conflict because it is strictly attached to group identity. Symbolic importance of the territory becomes more important than its geographical, strategic, or economic importance because the territory’s people have a common feeling of national belonging to a given piece of land. If both sides claim possession of the land and neither one can overwhelm the other, the only options are partition or autonomy. Nevertheless, partitions are dangerous resolutions because they may bring new problems whilst solving the old ones, such as another identity-based conflict. Autonomies in political, social, and

economic fields can be more powerful tools than partitions, as long as the central government does not feel threatened by the autonomous group (Hanauer & Laurel, 2012).

The resolution process of an ethnic conflict may be conducted under the auspices of a third party acting as a mediator or reconciliatory agent. This third party can be another country or an international organization. The main role of the third party is to encourage the effective use of non-violent political courses of action. In other words, the third party acts as a catalyst and a stabilizer in the resolution process, preventing escalation or resurrection of violent activities. Nonetheless, involvement of a third party in the resolution of an ethnic conflict does not guarantee that the negotiations will succeed.

Sometimes third parties can be ineffective or counter-productive. The first reason is the outcomes of the negotiation process will have results affecting regional or international politics. The third party may not be fully devoted to its role because the possible consequences or this kind of a commitment may seem too costly compared to the resources allocated for the task. For example, the third party may have to support the negotiation process heavily in terms of financial and/or military support. Especially if the available means of the third party are relatively limited and the peace process takes a longer time than expected, the third party may not want to sustain its backing. Even when the third party is able to overcome the burden of this role, the mediation of international organizations like the United Nations or NATO is more legitimate in the eyes of the international community due to their objective stands (Hanauer & Laurel, 2012, pp. 128–129).

2. Game Theory

Game theory is the science of interactive decision-making introduced by Von Neumann and Morgenstern in 1944 (Zagare & Slantchev, 2009). It is a rational and logical analysis of the situation of conflict. Straffin (1991) suggested that game theory should meet the following requirements:

1. There must be at least two players in the game. These could be persons, organizations, nations, or a system.

2. Each player must have more than one strategy to choose from.
3. The strategy chosen will determine the outcome of the game.
4. The outcome is associated with numerical payoffs as values of the outcome.

Myerson (1991) stated that game theory assumes the players are rational and intelligent. The player should make a decision that maximizes expected output utility. The player is also intelligent in the sense that the player knows about the operation of the game (Myerson, 1991). According to Zagare and Slantchev (2009), there are three conceptual devices used in the conflict literature to capture the strategic structure of a game:

1. A game tree is used to represent a game in the extensive form. The form is typically used in the analysis of two-, and sometimes three-, person games.
2. A payoff matrix is the basis of the normal or strategic form of representation. It is typically used in the analysis of two-, and sometimes three-, person games.
3. A mathematical function that assigns a payoff to every player and to every combination of players is known as the characteristic function form of representation. The form is most frequently encountered when an n-person game is under consideration.

Feix (2007) developed a toolkit and manual on game theory application for the Naval Postgraduate School's Defense Analysis students' usage. The tool covers two-person games including zero-sum games and their solutions in the pure or mixed strategy, partial-sum games without communication between the players, and communication among players and its effect on the game. Three-person games focus on possible coalitions among the players. The toolkit also covers two-person zero-sum games, the Nash Arbitration scheme, strategic moves, and prudential and equalizing strategies in partial-sum games (Feix, 2007).

C. PURPOSE AND SCOPE

A vast literature on nationalism, ethnicity, and national identity, as well as on ethnic conflict, testifies to the fact that in almost every country there is some degree of civil unrest due to ethnicity. In some countries, the societies are able to digest this unrest and continue their normal courses despite this tension. However, in other countries, this

civil unrest escalates into serious disorder and civil war. In the worst cases in history, that ethnic conflict has led to civil wars and decomposition of states. Nevertheless, there are also examples where the troubled groups have negotiated in order to solve their problems. These kinds of negotiations have always been fragile due to radical extremists or mistrust on both sides. The purpose of this thesis is to understand the necessary environment for the conciliation to succeed.

The scope of this thesis is limited to explaining the factors that affect the process of ethnic arbitration positively or negatively. It is impossible to cover every aspect of ethnic conflict. We are interested in sorting out theoretical principles that are applicable to the Turkish-Kurdish conflict. We also use game theory to help us decide the security levels of both sides and the set where the negotiation will occur. The Turkish government can choose one of two options: grant more social and cultural rights and a certain degree of local autonomy to the Kurdish political movement, or go back to oppressive methods to prevent violent acts from the PKK, the terrorist wing of the Kurdish political movement. The Kurdish political movement can pursue conciliation or return to armed struggle to reach its political goals. Game theory reveals which course of action is more rational for both sides.

D. RESEARCH QUESTION

What are the necessary conditions for the Turkish-Kurdish negotiations to succeed?

E. HYPOTHESES

1. Rational and utilitarian analysis of the Turkish-Kurdish conflict shows that success of the negotiations is in the best interest of both sides.
2. The involvement of a third party does not affect the possibility of success in the resolution process of the Turkish-Kurdish conflict.

F. METHODOLOGY

This thesis begins with analyzing the nature of the Turkish-Kurdish armed conflict by examining literature on the evolution of this conflict over time. The root

causes that set up the precursors for an armed struggle are explained in the context of the social and political atmosphere of Turkey, the rhetoric of the Kurdish extremists, their interaction with left wing political movements, and interaction of Kurdish intellectuals with European countries. Turkey's nation-state approach and problems caused by the lack of basic human rights, such as freedom of speech, are also highlighted.

For the next step, this thesis analyzes case studies where negotiations have succeeded and failed. This is aimed at identifying a pattern of negotiation to succeed. We further determine if the pattern of success can be applied to Turkey's Kurdish case and whether the reasons for the failure of negotiations in the Colombian case can be avoided.

As the final step, this thesis applies game theory and Nash Arbitration to the negotiations between the Turkish state and the Kurdish political movement. While applying the game's theoretical approach to the Turkish-Kurdish case, it is presumed a zero-sum game. The payoffs of each side according to their courses of action and the possible consequences of their respective choices are the basis for making policy recommendations.

G. ORGANIZATION

The roadmap of this thesis for the following chapters is as follows: Chapter II focuses on the historical background of the Turkish-Kurdish armed conflict. Chapter III provides an in-depth analysis of case studies where negotiations succeeded and failed and examines whether a pattern of success can be applied to Turkey's Kurdish case and whether the reasons for failure can be avoided. Chapter IV applies the game theory and Nash Arbitration to the Turkish-Kurdish case to find out the possible outcomes with and without communication. Chapter V sums up the findings of the thesis and concludes with policy recommendations.

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II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE PKK

A. INTRODUCTION

The Kurdish conflict has been an ongoing low-intensity war in southeastern Turkey for over 30 years. This war has cost the lives of more than 40,000 people and hundreds of billions of dollars. This huge cost has been paid by the Turkish and the Kurdish populations. Both sides have made serious mistakes that are explained throughout this study.

If Turkey is to be a member of the European Union (EU) or to become an influential regional actor, it has to resolve the Kurdish conflict. It is fair to say that Turkey cannot reach any of its strategic goals as long as Turkey carries that burden on its shoulders.

In order to solve any problem, one has to understand its root causes. Without knowing the historical background and the reasons underlying the problem, it would take luck to come up with practical solutions. That is why we begin with analyzing the events that have led to the emergence of the Kurdish ethnic violent organization, the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). While the main goal of the paper is to bring the Turkish-Kurdish negotiations to light, we avoid other external factors that may have been involved in the process because those factors are beyond the scientific limits of this study.

B. THE KURDISH POLITICAL MOVEMENT AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE PKK (BEFORE 1984)

After the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk established the Turkish Republic in 1923. Ataturk's vision was to create a Westernized, secular nation-state. Nevertheless, this was difficult to achieve because there were several ethnic identities within the society that the Turkish Republic inherited from the Ottoman Empire. During the Ottoman Empire, the multitude of these identities did not cause a big issue because the cement that united the Empire was religion. Following the

establishment of the Turkish Republic, the state and the regime started to use all available means to fortify this new identity against other ethnic identities and Islam (Yavuz, 2001).

There was an active leftist movement in Turkey during the 1960s and the 1970s. This was the time when the Kurdish political movement found its course as an ethnic, secular, and socialist movement. During this period, the traditional tribal and religious leaders started to lose their authority, whereas the new intellectual leaders began to consolidate their position within the formation of the Kurdish identity. These religiously-oriented traditional leaders had close relations with the central state and were perceived as incapable of defending the Kurdish identity against it. That is how young Kurds found ideological sympathy with the left wing rather than with their own elders (Bacik & Coskun, 2001). While the Turkish state was denying the existence of ethnic diversities within the society, the Turkish Labor Party was forming an alliance with Kurdish intellectuals in order to challenge the central authority, the government in Ankara (Yavuz, 2001).

After the Turkish military made a coup d'état in 1980, the state implemented tough policies against every religious and political movement—whether it was rightist or leftist—including the Kurdish movement. A lot of activists from various factions were sentenced to death or imprisoned for many years under harsh conditions, including torture. The Kurdish political activists were not exceptions; they also suffered from the rough policies of the state, and some of them escaped to European countries as refugees. Those who escaped built an international network of Kurdish political activism. Although the intention of the military coup was to erase every religious and political movement other than the official state doctrine, its policies led the Kurdish movement as well as other politico-religious movements to politicize and radicalize more (Yavuz, 2001).

These developments led to the foundation of the PKK in 1984 by Abdullah Ocalan, a leftist Kurdish student at Ankara University Faculty of Political Science. Ocalan spent nearly four years studying theories of revolutionary activities in history. He also spent much intellectual effort structuring a political party (Criss, 1995). The PKK was established as a separatist organization advocating an independent Kurdish state. Its

human resources mainly consisted of people from the lower side of the wealth spectrum, which does make sense considering that it is a Marxist-Leninist movement. The PKK was addressing the young and poor part of the Kurdish population and claiming that the Kurdish struggle was a class struggle. According to the founding ideology of the PKK, the Kurdish population was under the oppression of four colonial countries (Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria), and the Kurdish people had to unite in order to establish a separate independent Kurdish state (Bacik & Coskun, 2001). According to Kelly,

In essence, the PKK pledged to liberate the Kurdish minority from the Turkish domination by establishing an ethnic homeland called Kurdistan. This ideological change significantly improved the PKK's capacity to recruit young people in rural areas and expanded its logistical support networks into neighboring Iraq and Syria. (2012)

C. ARMED STRUGGLE OF THE PKK UNTIL THE CAPTURE OF ABDULLAH OCALAN (1984–1999)

The PKK officially started its armed struggle against the Turkish state on August 15, 1984, with two attacks against military bases in Semdinli and Eruh, killing one soldier and injuring 12, including civilians. The PKK started to use guerilla tactics against the security forces of the Turkish state in order to destroy the existence of the state, thus liberating the Kurdish region. The tactics of the PKK during this period were very harsh, claiming thousands of lives. The PKK systematically used terrorist actions against the government and civilian targets, and the state responded with force, killing many on the other side. The nation-state doctrine and the security-oriented policies of the government led to oppressive measures against the Kurds and deepened the problem. The government proclaimed a state of emergency, and the region was ruled under some kind of martial law for nearly 20 years. Additionally, volunteer villagers were trained and given arms by the military to fight against the PKK. The PKK responded violently again; these volunteers, their families, and even tribe members were punished severely by the PKK guerillas. There was increasing violence during this period. The Turkish state was still pursuing its nation-state doctrine and trying to oppress Kurdish identity by denying its existence. Another factor was political instability of the state. There were coalitions in

power, but all coalition governments were secondary political actors because the primary and most powerful political actor was still the military (Unal, 2014).

During the end of 1980s and the beginning of 1990s, the number of attacks against Turkish military and civilian targets, including volunteer guardians, increased in number, and the geographical landscape of the conflict expanded. The mountainous fields provided a suitable environment for guerrilla warfare tactics (Gunes, 2013). It is important to note that the PKK is responsible for the deaths of many Kurds who were pro-state or trying to remain neutral. After a while, the number of guerrillas and supporters of the PKK approached 10,000. They kidnapped children, taking them to the mountains and coercing them to join the PKK forces. The young were uneducated, unemployed, and denied the chance to choose. Once they became militants, the PKK used their families for logistical support. Villagers helped the PKK find food, clothing, and shelters either because they were frightened or as a reaction to the oppressive policies implemented by the state. While all this was happening on the ground, the central government in Ankara still did not realize the seriousness of the problem. The state still considered the PKK not an ethnical separatist movement, but just a group of outlaws (Criss, 1995). Nevertheless, the situation was becoming more severe every day. For example, in 1994, 1,031 soldiers and 37 police officers were killed by PKK attacks (Kibris, 2011).

Especially after the second half of 1993, the PKK's attitudes changed. In addition to violent methods, the PKK also started to utilize diplomatic and political tools to coerce the Turkish state. Ocalan was aware that the European forces were uncomfortable with the current situation in Turkey, and he wanted to show them that it was the Turkish state that committed human rights violations, not the PKK. So, the PKK started an international propaganda campaign against the Turkish state, blaming it for every single bad thing that had occurred in the region. Whenever a person was killed for any reason, like vendettas, love murders, honor killings, and even the PKK's internal executions, it was characterized as an act of the state (Criss, 1995). In accordance with its new tactics, the PKK proclaimed a truce in 1993. Its aim was to consolidate its support from the

Kurdish population and to coerce the Turkish government to go on the defensive. Even though the Turkish public and the press paid significant attention to this truce, Ankara did not respond positively and carried on routine military operations against the PKK. The one-sided truce was broken by the PKK in a violent attack against off-duty Turkish soldiers in which 33 of them were killed. This attack affected the opinions of regular Turkish citizens drastically and created deep feelings of mistrust between the Turkish and the Kurdish populations (Brown J. , 1995).

Ocalan, the leader of the PKK, was hosted and supported by the Syrian government due to political disagreements between Turkey and Syria. In 1998, Turkish government officials started to threaten Syria overtly because of the continuation of its support to the PKK. Given the fact that Turkey was closely allied with the United States and Israel, Syria could not afford to confront Turkey because there was no Soviet Republic to balance this alliance. Furthermore, the Turkish government located massive troops on the Syrian border; Syria understood that the threats of Ankara were credible and withdrew its support for the PKK by forcing Ocalan to leave for Moscow. After traveling to a few other countries, he was caught and brought to Turkey by a joint operation of the CIA and the Turkish Special Forces on February 16, 1999, in Nairobi, Kenya (Yavuz, 2001).

D. DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENTS IN TURKEY AND THE PKK'S RESPONSE (1999–2009)

Turkey experienced a significant period of democratization between the years of 1999 and 2004, inspired by the EU. Turkey's candidacy to the EU was approved in December 1999 in a summit in Helsinki. It was declared that "Turkey is a candidate state destined to join the Union on the basis of the same criteria as applied to the other candidate states" (Yavuz, 2001). The Turkish government started working intensively on making its legal system consistent with the EU criteria and amended its constitution in 2001. The Turkish government enacted eight legislation packages in order to have the necessary legal infrastructure (Tezcur, 2010).

These packages included several important steps, such as an end to capital punishment; further liberalization of laws concerning political parties, press, and associations; improvement in regulations of imprisonment and custody; promotion of broadcasting and education in Kurdish; recognition of the legal standing of the European Court of Human Rights; establishment of civilian control over the military; narrowing of the scope of the military courts; annulation of the State Security Courts; granting of greater rights to non-Muslim minorities; and restriction of the extant Anti-Terror Law. There was also another democratization package in May 2004 that helped the liberalization of the constitution. In addition to these reforms, creation of a wider public space led to a more liberal discussion of the Kurdish problem. Limited packages of amnesties for the low-ranking PKK militants were also proclaimed in 1999, 2000, and 2003. The Justice and Development Party (AKP), which came to power in the 2002 elections, officially announced that it would take steps for the acknowledgement and advocacy of Kurdish cultural identity. One of these steps was the broadcast of state TV in Kurdish for the first time in June 2004. On August 12, 2005, Prime Minister and AKP Leader Recep Tayyip Erdogan publicly recognized Kurdish reality and condemned past oppressive state policies. As a result, the EU opened membership negotiations in December 2004, and negotiations started on October 3, 2005 (Tezcur, 2010).

The PKK had to reduce its activities in this period due to the capture of its leader and the democratic reforms by the government. In August 1999, the PKK took its militants out of the Turkish–Iraq border and proclaimed a permanent truce. In the next few years, PKK activism diminished significantly until the AKP started to gain more and more political support within the Kurdish population. In order to defy the political achievement of the AKP, the PKK modified and fortified its urban organization called KCK (Kurdish Communities Union) and continued its attacks against military and civilian targets beginning in 2004 (Bacik & Coskun, 2001). In 2004 and 2005, the organization committed bomb attacks against civilian targets in tourist-attracting places like Istanbul and Kusadasi (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2005). The PKK was the armed branch of the broader concept of the KCK. It was more like an alternative state system, an umbrella including its own defense forces, extortion in the name of taxes,

tribunals, etc. (Roth & Sever, 2007). The KCK tried to spread the message to the Kurdish population that it was the only political actor in the Kurdish territory, even attempting to act as an arbitrator among tribes when they had a conflict. The KCK illustrates a good example of the new strategy of the Kurdish political movement, using armed struggle and political tools together to reach its aim (Ozeren, Sever, Yilmaz, & Sozer, 2014). All these decisions were made by the imprisoned leader Ocalan, as he has continued to lead his organization by sending messages via his attorneys.

After 2009, instructed by Ocalan, the PKK declared periods of cease-fires. In this period, the organization kidnapped Turkish soldiers and then released them, again with directions from the incarcerated leader (Arango & Arsu, 2013). By doing so, the PKK aimed to coerce the government to negotiate with it as an official entity. Furthermore, another goal of the PKK was to legitimize Ocalan as the absolute leader of the Kurdish political movement (Unal, 2014).

E. NEGOTIATIONS AND PEACE TALKS (2009–PRESENT)

Negotiations with the Kurdish political movement were initiated in 2009 by the AKP under the name of the Kurdish Initiative. These negotiations were met with resistance from the opposition parties from the very beginning. In this process, the PKK agreed to forsake its original demand of a separate Kurdish state and to settle in the Turkish state with vast cultural and political rights including autonomy of local governments (Synovitz & Zibari, 2013). It is important to note that at the beginning, the negotiations were kept secret from the public because of deep feelings of sorrow and anger within the society (Howe, 2013). Unfortunately, there were incidents that affected the process negatively; in October 2009, the PKK brought some militants to surrender from Habur Gate, and these militants were welcomed with big demonstrations organized by the Kurdish political movement. Even moderate Turkish citizens were deeply irritated by this strategic move of the Kurdish political movement. After a few weeks, the Turkish Constitutional Court banned the Democratic Society Party (DTP), the Kurdish political party, because of having organic relations with the PKK. Meanwhile, many Kurdish people were being arrested for participating in KCK activities, including journalists,

politicians, academics, and students. The violence of the PKK was still going on against military targets. Despite the existence of obstacles, negotiations with Ocalan were still being carried out between the imprisoned leader Ocalan and the National Intelligence Organization (MIT; Gunter, 2013).

By September 2013, the process was still ongoing, although neither side truly trusted the other. The Turkish government accused the PKK of not being sincere; they were supposed to withdraw the guerrillas out of the Turkish border area, but according to the government, they just withdrew 20 percent, including the wounded, old, and incapable. On the other hand, the PKK was slowing down the peace process and threatening to stop the cease-fire unless democratization packages were enacted. The government declared a democratization package at the end of September 2013, allowing private schools to educate in Kurdish, restoring names of cities and villages to their original Kurdish names, and permitting utilization of the letters X, Q, and W to write in Kurdish; however, the package was not satisfactory for the PKK, and it stopped the withdrawal of the guerrilla forces (Gunter, 2013).

As mentioned previously, there are a lot of obstacles to peace. Neither side fully trusts the other, and always suspects that the other side might cheat. The Turkish and the Kurdish populations are full of doubts about the honesty of each other as well as their political leaders, and people are prone to believe conspiracy theories. But luckily, political leaders use relatively moderate language to mitigate the tension and relax the political environment. They tend to build mutual trust slowly, step-by-step, with every step leading to a more powerful cooperation (Gokpinar, 2013). Kurdish politicians at least pretend to believe that the AKP is sincere in solving the Kurdish problem (Diyarbakir, 2013). They are aware of the fact that Erdogan, leader of the AKP, has put his political career at stake and has taken a great risk to solve the biggest problem of Turkey. He has put aside hawkish discourses and has adopted a conciliatory tone of speech (Turkey and the PKK: Peace at Last?, 2013). That is because both sides know well that this is a historical chance, and a possible failure in the negotiations might end up with a new cycle of conflict that would have devastating consequences for the region

(Parkinson & Albayrak, 2013). Besides, there are hawkish wings within both of the sides and these wings have the potential to break down the negotiations. So, “a comprehensive conflict-resolution strategy by broader political and social change” is essential in order for the process to continue through peace (Skinner, 2013).

F. CONCLUSION

The low-intensity conflict in the southeastern part of Turkey has cost too much for the people of the area. This cost has become far higher than affordable for Turks as well as for Kurds. The world has changed a lot in the last two centuries, and the young Turkish state has not been able to adapt itself fully to the modern world while building a new secular nation-state from the ashes of a great empire. Both the Turkish and the Kurdish sides have made serious mistakes due to the failure to understand the nature of the problem. Political leaders and official state doctrine have failed to understand or have chosen to deny the demands of the Kurds regarding their identity. Legitimate demands were responded to with unnecessarily violent measures. The state doctrine has presented itself like a holy book, with zero tolerance to change or criticism. Political demands about recognition of Kurdish identity were oppressed by every possible means of the state. Even though there were politicians with good intentions who could perceive the essence of the problem, the system would not let them take bold steps.

On the other hand, the armed wing of the Kurdish political movement has engaged in cruel and violent activities that no state could tolerate. The PKK has always claimed a monopoly in the defense of Kurdish rights and freedoms. It has not accepted any rivals or partners that might wish to pursue the same goal with different means. The PKK has utilized violent methods to deter any possible threat to its monopoly, even if that threat was another group of Kurdish intellectuals and the PKK chose to destroy those groups when deterrence did not work. Moreover, the PKK carries the responsibility of the deaths of hundreds of innocent civilians, including women, children, and even babies.

There is an excitement within both the Turkish and the Kurdish people about the conflict resolution process. People can feel that peace is not far; it can be smelled, but it

cannot be tasted yet. There are still too many obstacles on the road, and a solid will for peace is necessary to clear all those obstacles. After fighting for more than 30 years and suffering from tens of thousands of losses, it is not easy to let the hard feelings go and build bridges of trust, but luckily the situation is not that bad in the Turkish case. Apart from political leaders, society is not too polarized and the Turkish and the Kurdish people do not antagonize each other. A significant number of the Kurdish people do not live in the southeast of Turkey; they live in big cities like Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir. These people living in major cities have families and jobs, meaning that they are in close relation with the state. Furthermore, there are many marriages between people from Turkish and Kurdish origins; the two nations have blended with each other for centuries. Considering all the facts, it is possible for Turkey to overcome its biggest problem in the foreseeable future and to continue its economic and cultural development. A powerful Turkish republic, having resolved the Kurdish conflict, can increase its influence in the region and act as an island of stability in one of the most unstable geographies of the world.

III. ETHNIC CONFLICT IN THE TURKISH CONTEXT AND COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS FOR ETHNIC CONFLICT RESOLUTION

A. ETHNIC CONFLICT IN THE TURKISH CONTEXT

Ethnic conflict is one of the most common types of conflict that the contemporary world witnesses. The underlying reasons for these conflicts are varied; it is not plausible to apply certain paradigms to every ethnic conflict in the world, since this kind of oversimplification cannot provide sufficient explanation to “why violent conflicts have broken out in some places, but not in others, and it cannot explain why some disputes are more violent and harder to resolve than others” (Brown M. E., 1996, p. 12). Brown (1996) defines ethnic conflict as “a dispute about important political, economic, social, cultural, or territorial issues between two or more ethnic groups, where one of these would form the dominant ethnic core of the nation controlling the state.” In this chapter we analyze three conflict resolution efforts to identify if these negotiations follow a definite pattern. Conclusions from these case studies are applied to Turkey’s Kurdish conflict with a view to confirm their viability in relation to ongoing negotiations between the Turkish government and the PKK.

B. THE CHANGING NATURE OF THE KURDISH IDENTITY

Turkey’s conflict with its Kurdish population should be identified as an ethnic conflict, and the resolution to this conflict should be an ethnic one (Barkey & Fuller, 1998). This problem stems from the authoritarian roots of the Turkish state, which goes back to the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman Empire had been ruled by an absolute monarchy for several centuries. Even though reform attempts during the last century of the Empire, mainly the *Tanzimat* movement in 1839, helped to take steps towards democracy, these attempts did not result in a western-style democracy. In the transition period from the Ottoman Empire to the Turkish Republic, the key elites and the leading intellectuals of the Empire acted together to create the Turkish nation, of which the dominant core was the Turkish ethnic group (Kirisci & Winrow, The Kurdish Question

and Turkey: An Example of Trans-State Ethnic Conflict, 1997). As explained in the previous chapter, the authoritarianism did not reduce after the establishment of the Turkish republic (Gunter, 1997). The following human rights abuses were committed by the Turkish republic (Gunter, 1997):

- Torture and suspicious deaths of prisoners in detention
- Disappearances and extrajudicial killings of opposition politicians, human rights activists, journalists, and Kurdish nationalists
- Government infringements on the freedoms of speech, press, and association
- Denial of due process to persons under the jurisdiction of state security courts and in the state of emergency region
- Destruction of Kurdish villages by the Turkish military
- Suppression of Kurdish culture

These grievances the Kurdish people suffered paved the way for major social, political, and cultural transformations in the Kurdish identity. In other words, the political violence implemented by the Turkish state against its Kurdish population caused the rebuilding of the Kurdish self on individual and collective levels. Besides, violence and aggression towards ordinary Kurdish citizens did not come only from the state side. In addition to the state, the PKK also engaged in violent activities against Kurdish civilians who did not actively support the PKK and its struggle. At the end of the day, almost every single Kurdish citizen became the victim of violence from one side or another. As a result of this process of fear of both the state and the PKK, the Kurds became active political entities as opposed to their more passive stance in the past (Aras, 2014).

C. THE POLITICAL MOBILIZATION OF THE KURDISH MASSES IN TURKEY

Significantly, the nature of the conflict is not between two rival and mobilized people, contrary to most of the similar cases in the world. In the Turkish case, the conflict is between the state and a people who are in the process of political mobilization. It is no secret that one can find various anti-Kurdish discourses within the Turkish community, and one could argue that these kinds of discourses are more visible than in the past. The stereotyping of Kurdish migrants in the western cities as ignorant and cultureless people,

benefit scroungers, disrupters of urban life, invaders, and separatists is an especially important problem (Saracoglu, 2011). However, we argue that the level of anti-Kurdish sentiments and stereotyping are not widespread enough to be labeled as a political mobilization within the Turkish people compared to the mobilization that the Kurdish people have been experiencing as an increasing phenomenon over the last two decades. The collective actions taken by the Kurdish people, which are indicators of the population's mass mobilization, is rapidly increasing both in number and in frequency. It also shows that through the process of collective mobilization, the Kurdish people are redefining the meaning of themselves and the society they are living in (Westrheim, 2014). These characteristics of the Turkish-Kurdish conflict and the acceleration of the mobilization of the Kurds over time are to be kept in mind by the policymakers while trying to resolve the conflict (Barkey & Fuller, 1998).

D. ETHNIC CONFLICT RESOLUTION—A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

Negotiating with violent groups and organizations has been a complicated process. Divergent interests of governments and these violent organizations offer poor chances for the success of the peace process. Many scholars argue against negotiations, as they give legitimacy to the terrorists and undermine governments by making both parties equally important stakeholders. According to them, talks can disrupt the negotiating governments' political process and even set a dangerous example for other groups to get their demands met through violent means (Neumann, 2007). Negotiating with terrorists can legitimize these violent groups, but this process offers an alternate course of action (Toros, 2008). Because of this, governments have engaged such organizations in peace process dialogues, accepted legitimate demands of these groups, granted autonomy to the regions, and allowed political representations. The peace process, although a complicated process, has succeeded in a few cases and has failed in others. The British government conducted successful negotiations with the Irish Republic Army (IRA) throughout the 1990s, and after a series of negotiations, violence was replaced by political activity. The Spanish government engaged separatist group Basque Homeland and Freedom, or Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA), in dialogues and successfully

put an end to nearly a half-century-old separatist movement. On the other hand, ethnic conflict in Colombia, which started in 1964, is still unresolved despite efforts of the government to negotiate with the guerilla groups (e.g., Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia [FARC] and National Liberation Army [ELN]).

This chapter focuses on the negotiations and process with Basque, IRA, and Colombian ethnic groups with a view to identify the conditions under which the peace process can succeed. The case studies of Colombian guerrilla groups are analyzed as to why the negotiations have not succeeded. Conclusions from these case studies, if commonalities are found, help us to formulate policy recommendations for the Turkish-Kurdish conflict.

1. Resolution of the Basque Conflict

The Basque country is a name that refers to a geographical location on the shores of the Bay of Biscay and on the northern and southern sides of the western Pyrenees that separate France and Spain (Idoiaga, 2006). Presently this area is politically divided into three regions: Basque and Navarre are in Spain, while the northeastern part (Iparralde) is in France. The Basque Autonomous Community (BAC) in Spain is divided into three Basque Provinces (Guipuzcoa, Alava, and Vizcaya), which have their own administrative structures. The population of Spain's Basque region is 2.193 million, and it has witnessed violence since 1968.

The Basque people have maintained their identity for centuries, and people of this area continued to show a desire for autonomy. The Basque country has been able to maintain a certain degree of autonomy under all regimes; however, relations between the Basque region and central government in Spain have not been comfortable. The Spanish government has tried to bring the region under central control; however, the Basque community has tried to maintain autonomy. This tension worsened during military confrontations in the Carlist Wars in the 19th century and the 1930s Spanish Civil War (Idoiaga, 2006). After seizing power in 1936, General Francisco Franco suppressed the Basque system of governance, as he believed in one unified Spanish state. Suppression of

Basque identity for four decades under Franco's rule created a sense of resentment in the Basque people. Franco's rule did not eradicate Basque Nationalism from the Basque community; rather, it was fueled due to the grievances of this region.

After Franco's death in 1975, the Spanish state approved the constitution for Spain in 1978, guaranteeing the protection of rights to all regions including the Basque country. Despite these guarantees, Basque nationalists were skeptical about the efforts of the Spanish government and asked the Basque community to abstain from constitutional referendum. They were able to keep approximately 55 percent of the Basque electorate away from this referendum (Idoiaga, 2006). The Spanish government engaged moderate Basque leaders in the dialogue in 1979 and agreed on a statute of autonomy for the Basque region. This statute was approved through a referendum, which helped in forming a regional parliament (Ben-Ami, 1991).

A group of Basque nationalists that considered other nationalists as not effectively protecting the culture, rights, and traditions of the Basque region formed an armed group in 1959 named Basque Homeland and Freedom, or Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA). This group also had reservations from the other nationalist groups for being too submissive to Franco's regime and not protecting the interests of the Basque region. This radical nationalist group inflicted material damage as an armed struggle to force the government to obey their demands (Ben-Ami, 1991). Franco's government refused to discuss the demands of the ETA. In 1968, this group had its most valuable target, Admiral Luis Carrero Blanco, the president of the Spanish government. From there on, the ETA has caused nearly 1,000 deaths and has wounded even more. Its violent activities have been against political representatives, government officials, judges, security personnel, and various other sectors of the population (Idoiaga, 2006).

Despite the deep roots of nationalism in the Basque community, people of the Basque region started to oppose violent activities of the ETA and demanded alternate methods to pursue their aims (Funes, 1998). This forced the ETA to adopt a negotiating strategy, and it started accepting the political parties to negotiate with the Spanish government for their demands. Confidence-building initiatives of the governments

created a split in the Basque community, which turned a sizeable population in favor of the actions of the government. A U.S. Institute of Peace special report (2006) showed that a reasonable percentage of Basque people were in favor of Spain's control over the area, while others wanted modifications in autonomy to the region. These negotiations and peace processes changed the mindset of all principal actors, the Spanish government, the Basque government, the ETA, and its supporting political parties.

Consequently, Basque conflict changed from a violent phase to a non-violent political phase, increasing the chances of peace in the region. The Spanish government exploited the plurality of the Basque society to break the nationalist front. According to Beck (2008), the nationalist front broke after the 1998–1999 cease-fire, which alienated radical nationalism from two big nationalist parties (Beck, 2008). Flexible strategies set by both sides in contemplating new formulas of shared sovereignty and compromise ensures a broader consensus and long-term solution to the problem. In the Basque case, all principal actors considerably revised their political claims over territory and sovereignty. According to Idoiaga (2006),

This new approach for finding a solution to the Basque conflict is particularly relevant to the international debate about formulating creative and modern solutions to similar conflicts over identity and sovereignty. A successful outcome to the process would deepen the trend begun by many others in search of complex political solutions that transcend the classic understanding of the nation state. (p. 7)

2. Peace Process with the Irish Republic Army

The roots of the conflict in Northern Ireland go back to the Norman invasion of Ireland in the 12th century, which brought it under the loose political control of the king of England. During the late 16th century, England tightened control over Ireland by suppressing all rebellions, and colonizing the region. Replacing local chiefs with English ones moved large numbers of the English and Scottish populations to Northern Ireland. Migrants were predominantly Protestants, and natives were mostly Catholics. In 1800, England abolished the Irish parliament and formed the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland. This apparently stable system would develop many problems in the near

future. The Irish Catholic movement started in 1820 and protested against civil rights abuses. These movements gained momentum in the next 40 years by a series of movements demanding national rights (Coakley, 2010). From 1880, these movements demanded Irish autonomy due to social grievances led by the Irish Nationalist Party. England was all set for the concession of autonomy for Ireland, but its impact was foreseen on the British Empire, and hence was not approved. Protestant settlers were against these demands of the Irish people and confronted them politically. A clash between these two positions of status-quo and autonomy continued to result in a stalemate. Failure of the Irish National Party to deliver politically and assert on the demands of people for about 40 years made room for more radical forces to jump in. Another nationalist movement, Sinn Fein, filled the vacuum and became the voice of Irish people in 1918. Sinn Fein also maintained a militant wing, which waged a campaign of civil disobedience and guerrilla warfare for three years, from 1919–1921, pressuring England for substantial autonomy of Ireland. England declared Ireland an “Irish Free State” in 1922 (Coakley, 2010).

This arrangement of the Irish Free State, and the division of Ireland even before it was done by Britain into Northern and Southern Ireland, did not satisfy Sinn Fein. Moreover, Sinn Fein had reservations about the links between Ireland and Great Britain. Northern Ireland enjoyed autonomy under the UK and formed its parliamentary institutions. The Unionist party was in majority over the nationalist party. In Northern Ireland, Protestants were the majority and tried to maintain their hegemony over Catholics. Catholics were sidelined by discriminatory practices in employment, unfavorable treatment in local elections, more shares for Protestants in security forces, and severe punishments for minor violations (Whyte, 1983). When the conflict started in 1969, the main agenda of Catholics was civil rights. Nationalism was not the focus of Catholics at this point (Rose, 1972).

The civil rights movement in 1968 led to formal concessions by the Northern Ireland government. Consequently, this movement showed the state’s vulnerability to the Catholics, and Protestants also acknowledged the threat of Catholics. On a political front,

the Catholics' nationalist party had failed to deliver, which stood for Irish unity. The nationalist party was subsequently replaced by the civil rights movement, the Social Democratic and Labor Party (SDLP). The new name of the party was striking, as it attracted both communities (McAllister, 1978). The balanced approach of the SDLP's leadership on the issues of partition, their rights, and power-sharing placed it in a favorable position to shape the future of Northern Ireland. The majority of the Catholic voters leaned towards the SDLP, but it had to deal with the militant challenge from within the party.

Most of the elements of Sinn Fein had been absorbed in southern Ireland; few elements still stuck to their original demand of unity to reject both northern and southern states. In early 1970, both military and political wings (i.e., Sinn Fein and the IRA) began their political and violent campaigns (Coakley, 2010). The IRA's violent activities against British security forces increased in the mid-1970s and continued through the 1980s. By the early 1990s, it was clear that the British could not defeat the IRA and the IRA could not expel the British from Northern Ireland. The political wing of the IRA, Sinn Fein, led by Gerry Adams, gained extreme importance during this time and began to challenge the electoral dominance of the SDLP. All these activities forced the British to dissolve the Unionist government in 1972. The erosion of Protestant power opened the alternatives for its party members to join the other side's moderates or radicals (Coakley, 2010).

Despite the violence from both sides, the peace process continued through overt and covert connections between the British and the political wing of the IRA (i.e., Sinn Fein). Gerry Adams, who led Sinn Fien from 1983, was convinced that only negotiations could put an end to this conflict. Putting an end to violence in the form of cease-fires in 1994, 1996, and 1998 engaged all stakeholders in negotiations. After the dissolution of its government in 1972, the British realized that the old system in Northern Ireland would not work. That system was based on the classic lines of the majoritarian Westminster Model. It became clear to the British that the new government had to be formed on the formula of power-sharing by giving proportional representation to all the groups.

Secondly, the previous system was not friendly to the Republic of Ireland where cooperation of all stakeholders was hard to achieve due to divergence of interests.

The peace process for the Northern Ireland conflict started with the Sunningdale agreement in 1973. This agreement of power-sharing did not succeed completely but added a new dimension to the formulation of government by proportional representation. In 1982, another initiative was made by devolving power to Northern Ireland. The Anglo-Irish agreement in 1985 was a relative success that addressed the grievances of the Catholics to some extent. The 1998 peace agreement was also the result of extremely complicated negotiations. According to Coakley (2010), “three features of the process leading to the agreement are of particular interest: the inclusive character of participation, the significance of informal discourse and the degree of reliance on external mediation” (p. 40). The peace process in Northern Ireland was shaped by many factors, including pressure from the United States and the EU, war weariness, and the will of all stakeholders to solve the problem and allow political discourse to work.

3. Peace Process between the Colombian Government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia

The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) started to form in 1964, almost a decade after the establishment of the military regime of the Gustavo Rojas. But the group did not claim the name of FARC until 1966, when it decided to be mobile and reach out to the other areas of the country. Documents of this organization argued that the political situation worsened under the military regime and had grievances about the military campaigns against leftist subversives and extremely polarized circulation of wealth. Getting inspiration from the Cuban revolution, FARC’s main strategy was violent actions to get its voice heard (Lee, 2012). It perceived that the national forces of Colombia would submit to this organization owing to widespread violence and would subsequently seize the country. While FARC decided to arm itself along the lines of the Cuban revolution, initially it totally negated the ideas of opening political fronts with the government. By 1979, the FARC was able to dominate few areas in the southern and central regions of the country (Lee, 2012). In the 1980s, FARC not only encouraged but

also got involved in the production of cocaine in the areas dominated by it; hence, it came into the limelight. In 1985, the FARC formed a political party named the Patriotic Union (UP). It did not disarm, but accepted the initiative of the government to enter into mainstream politics of the country. In the 1985 elections, FARC had encouraging results, but from 1986–1991, political violence, which claimed 2,000–4,000 lives of UP political workers, made it seem as though there was no place for UP in mainstream politics of the country. Colombia witnessed the response of FARC to the failure of UP in the form of increased crimes, enhanced military actions, and rough negotiations.

By 1990, FARC was in better control of southern Colombia and demanded official recognition from the Colombian government. The government accepted FARC's demand and established a demilitarized zone in southern Colombia with a view to solidify peace talks with FARC. The government's step made FARC believe that this organization was inching towards success and it was possible to overthrow the government (Rochlin, 2002). FARC maintained law and order in the area it controlled and helped peasants by facilitating cocaine production, and as a result got support of the locals. By 1998, FARC had grown considerably. It used the demilitarized zone for guerrilla training and its narcotics business. The use of the demilitarized region for anti-state activities gave the Colombian government justification to launch an operation to get the territory under the control of government in 2002. This act of government resulted in increased military attacks on security forces.

FARC focused on violent activities and became one of the strongest violent groups in the region, but it could not develop a matching political approach (Lee, 2012). Most of the political statements of this organization are critiqued on the state's policies rather than giving its own roadmap for the future. It does not enjoy a good reputation in the country because of the violent activities carried out by the group. Moreover, other problems which are usually associated with FARC, such as kidnapping and narcotics trafficking, make it further prone to losing popular support. Consequently, FARC's connection to criminal and violent activities made it a questionable partner for any other political party seeking success in elections (Lee, 2012).

The Peace process between FARC and the Colombian government has gone through many phases. After assuming office in 1982, President Belisario Betancourt started the peace initiative, which resulted in convincing FARC to participate in the country's mainstream electoral process. As a result, FARC formed its political party named UP, but did not end armed struggle. This peace process could not live long, as FARC groups ambushed a regular infantry company of Colombian Army, leaving 26 soldiers and a civilian dead in June 1987. This event put an end to the peace process. The assassination of UP candidate Bernardo Jaramillo in 1990 gave FARC another reason to raise the level of violence in the country.

Alliance of other militant groups with FARC has also been a hindrance in the peace process. In 1990, groups like the National Liberation Army (ELN) also joined FARC in violent activities. This complicated the problems of the Colombian government as it sought to negotiate, as taking every group on board according to their terms was difficult. Splinter groups in such alliances can easily ruin the peace process by carrying out activity during the negotiations or even after the signing of the peace pact. FARC's source of income has been mostly dependent on drug trafficking and kidnappings. So FARC had become a franchise for any indecent activity. Groups in rural areas can use FARC's name for its own motives.

E. DO NEGOTIATIONS FOLLOW A PATTERN?

These three case studies discussed the origin of the conflict and efforts to resolve them. Peace negotiations worked for resolving the IRA conflict, have somewhat succeeded in the resolution of the Basque conflict, but did not make a headway in the Colombian FARC case. One cannot argue that these problems were the same, but underlying issues were addressing the grievances of an ethnicity that resorted to violence to get its point of view heard. Despite these differences, what made the IRA and the Basque conflict succeed and why is the FARC conflict not yet resolved? What is the pattern of peace process followed in all three cases, is it similar, and can the successful model be applied to the Turkish-Kurdish problem? We make an effort in succeeding

paragraphs to identify the pattern of peace negotiations adopted in these case studies, and then it is analyzed in the context of Turkey's Kurdish problem.

Does international pressure play a significant role in resolving any ethnic issue? It is hard to argue that international pressure helps in resolving the conflict; rather, sometimes it is counterproductive due to a clash of interests. In the case of the IRA, Britain had EU pressure to resolve the issue, and the economy of the UK did not guarantee the support of the United States. So the UK had to resolve the issue owing to this pressure. In the case of the Basque conflict, there was hardly any third party involved. International efforts to help in resolving the Basque conflict were limited (Idoiaga, 2006). However, the international environment after the attacks of 9/11 made it hard for the ETA to justify its violent activities. The assistance of the United States in helping Colombia control the FARC conflict has been rather counterproductive, as FARC accused the government of being "too subservient to U.S. wishes" (Lee, 2012). These anti-U.S. sentiments are best exploited by such organizations, especially in rural areas, to muster local support.

It is obvious that the support of the international community can be a facilitator for the resolution of any ethnic conflict. However, the literature on conflict resolution shows that the role of a third party may vary according to "the nature of the conflict, the stage of the conflict (escalation, peak, de-escalation, or reconciliation), the level of violence, and the nature of the society in which conflict takes place" (Celik & Rumelili, 2006). There are two main international actors, the EU and the United States, that have the motives and the means to actively participate in Turkey's Kurdish conflict. In the Turkish case, the involvement of these two actors as mediators decreases the chance of success of the negotiation due to the lack of trust towards these actors within the Turkish population.

Since the beginning of the 2000s, European political actions have led to a significant level of skepticism in the eyes of the Turkish people. Prior to 2002, European concerns about the integration of Turkey into the EU were mainly about Turkey's problems regarding democracy and human rights. After 2002, with the government of the

newly-founded Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi [AKP]), Turkey started an extensive reform process according to the Copenhagen criteria. As Turkey approached the completion of these criteria, the major actors of the EU started to raise their voices, overtly stating their doubts about Turkey's belonging to the political project of the EU. As a result, the anti-European arguments within the Turkish population became more prominent, and the Turkish people started to think that no matter how accomplished Turkey becomes in terms of the European criteria, the EU is a Christian club and they will never allow Turkey to be a member (Tocci, 2008). Due to these reasons "shaky credibility of the political management of contractual relations and contamination of contractual relations with political precepts" diminish the potential of the EU to solve conflicts (Tocci, 2008). Therefore, the EU is not perfectly suited to act as a mediator in the process of the resolution of the Turkish-Kurdish conflict.

Feelings of mistrust and skepticism within the Turkish people are not only towards the EU. Actually, the Turkish popular perception of the United States is worse. Studies showed that while 52 percent of the Turkish people had favorable opinions of the United States in 2000, this percentage decreased to 23 percent in 2005 (Pew Research Center, 2005). Two years later, we see that this number falls even more, to 9 percent (Pew Research Center, 2005). There are socio-political explanations to this situation that are beyond the scope of this study. However, the strong negative feelings that were adopted by a significant portion of the Turkish people against U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East are evolving into a permanent anti-American view. Therefore, there is a considerable chance that anti-Americanism may become a constant feature of the Turkish political discourse in the near future (Grigoriadis, 2010). That is why, according to our point of view, the United States cannot be an effective mediator in resolving the Turkish-Kurdish conflict.

Politics is another key factor in bringing an end to an ethnic conflict. Bringing the armed group into the political stream is often considered a first step towards the peace process. In a time of crisis, the political visionaries are needed to find a solution to the problem. The problem is further accentuated if a certain group is left out. In Spain,

various organizations and political parties were banned on the accusation of siding with terrorist organizations. However, Sinn Fein under Gerry Adams was encouraged to participate in the peace process, and FARC was encouraged to participate in the political process through the political party, UP. Involvement of all groups in the political process gives them the opportunity to share ideas and eventually exposes them in case of radical thought processes. The concept of power-sharing by giving proportional representation to the political parties of these organizations can help, as it worked for the IRA and the Basque.

On the lessons learned from those examples, Turkey's best option is to isolate the violent radical elements and gain the support of the moderate factions of the Kurdish political movement in promoting the feelings of being a part of a democratic and unified country. In this regard, we consider the PKK as the radical component of the Kurdish political movement. Thus, Turkey should embrace the legal representatives of the Kurdish people and treat them as equal partners for the resolution of the conflict while excluding the PKK if the latter does not give up its arms and violent methods. There are serious issues regarding this kind of political course of action because of the organic ties between the Kurdish political movement and the PKK. In the Kurdish political movement, the political wing that is called the Peoples' Democratic Party (Halkların Demokratik Partisi [HDP]), acts only as the civilian propaganda unit of the movement rather than determining the main policies of the movement. The major power is still held by the PKK, which still maintains its oppressive rule over the remaining factions of the movement (Aydinli & Ozcan, 2011). Besides, during the solution process, the PKK has not presented any credible indicator regarding its intention to give up armed struggle once permanent peace is achieved. But overall, we come to the conclusion that a more inclusive approach in the process of policymaking in terms of subgroup rights may reduce the strength of the Kurdish ethno-nationalism and bring it to the mainstream (Mousseau, 2012).

Another factor that contributes to the success of the peace process between a government and an armed group is the internal structure of the terrorist organization. This

factor is the main reason for the failure of the peace process with FARC, because over a period of time it has become an organization of criminal groups. FARC, over a period of time, got involved in criminal activities and the drug trade and became reasonably powerful to recruit the locals to work for it on daily wages rather than ideology. (Mousseau, 2012). It consisted of many splinter groups. These splinter groups can destroy the peace process by independent actions. In Ireland, Gerry Adam enjoyed better control over the organization, and his decisions were rarely questioned. By the late 1980s, most of the IRA leadership was convinced that the solution laid in negotiations. At this time, the considerable size of the IRA was not ready to replace bullet with ballot, but leadership played a vital role in convincing the rank and file members (Neumann, 2007).

In the case of the PKK, the situation is no different. It is no secret that the PKK engages in criminal activities such as drug trafficking, human trafficking, smuggling, extortion, and money laundering in order to acquire financial means and to maintain its human resources in a wide geography (Roth & Sever, 2007). This geography primarily includes the Middle East, Turkey, and Europe, and the PKK is believed to control a significant amount of drug production in this territory (Hutchinson & O'Malley, 2007). The PKK derives most of its revenue from this control over drug production and trafficking in association with other major criminal organizations (Makarenko, 2004).

This deviation of the PKK from its original founding principles poses a huge obstacle to the solution process in Turkey. It is hard for the PKK to give up these criminal activities because these activities supply a considerable amount of financial sources and bargaining power to the Kurdish political movement. Since the political wing of the Kurdish political movement does not have any authority on the PKK, it is highly likely that the Kurdish political leaders will have a hard time convincing the PKK to stop its criminality. Even the Kurdish political leaders may be reluctant in the process of decriminalization of the PKK to keep the leverage of having an armed organization vis-à-vis the Turkish government. As a result, the Kurdish political leaders need to take initiative to isolate the whole Kurdish political movement from criminal activities.

Otherwise, the extremist camps in both the Turkish and the Kurdish populations can easily take advantage of this situation and use it to sabotage the negotiations.

Finally, the tradition of compromise and understanding is of utmost importance. Governments cannot forcefully implement their strategy over a community that has already developed a sense of deprivation; similarly, violent organizations cannot impose their will with the gun. Both sides have to negotiate to a point acceptable to both. Britain and Spain both agreed to the formula of power-sharing; however, compromise cannot be like the Colombian government, where the government agreed to hand over the demilitarized zone to the FARC. This impulse may be well-intentioned, but it can turn out to be counter-productive. Today's information age, where the public can be reached instantly through print and electronic media, will help in rejecting the violent activities of the terrorist organization, as it was difficult for the Basque to justify its violent acts after the 9/11 attacks. In the next chapter we view the arbitration between Turkey's government and the PKK from the perspective of game theory with a view to ascertain the security level of both sides and workable options leading to a peaceful solution of the problem.

IV. APPLICATION OF GAME THEORY IN THE TURKISH-KURDISH NEGOTIATIONS

A. INTRODUCTION

In this chapter we apply game theory to Turkey's Kurdish problem to determine the best strategic moves available to players of this strategic game. The two players are defined as the Turkish government and the PKK. Game theory enables examination of the "best" strategies for each player to play according to the definitions and rules in game theory. In our approach, we use the Nash arbitration method, which is a negotiation method when communications are allowed. To use this method, we additionally need to find the prudential strategy for both the players. Strategies of both the players in response to an opponent's movement are analyzed to find the way forward. The game solutions under prudential strategies are the security levels that are used as status quo points in the Nash arbitration method.

B. THE GAME QUESTION THAT WILL BE EXAMINED

What kind of strategic moves do both parties have in response to each other? Does it help if the government encourages the increase in political activities by lifting the ban on political parties and empowering local government bodies in the Kurdish area? What are the options available to the PKK in response to the decisions of the government?

C. STRATEGIES AND PAYOFFS OF THE PLAYERS

Table 1 shows the strategies of both the players and the expected outcome.

Table 1. Strategies of Players and Outcomes

Available Strategies		PKK	
Government	Available Strategies	Challenging Writ of the Government (C)	Political Participation (D)
	Increase Political Activities (A)	AC	AD
	Increase Military Operations (B)	BC	BD

The possible outcomes of the game are:

AC: The Turkish government increases political activities, and the PKK continues to challenge writ of the government.

BC: The Turkish government increases military operations, and the PKK continues to challenge the writ of the government.

AD: The Turkish government increases political activities, and the PKK enhances political participation.

BD: The Turkish government increases military operations, and the PKK resorts to political participation.

While setting up the payoffs and the structure of the game, it is necessary to predict the numerical values based on the authors' research and professional experiences; therefore, numerical values can be viewed as subjective. Besides, in order to apply game theory to a real-world situation, it is required to make certain assumptions. This study assumes that both players are rational and both try to maximize their payoffs. The game payoffs from the Turkish government's point of view are shown in Table 2.

Table 2. Game Payoffs for the Turkish Government

Game Payoffs—Turkish Government	
4 – Best (AD)	The Turkish government increases political activities, and the PKK enhances political participation.
3 – Next Best (BD)	The Turkish government increases military operations, and the PKK resorts to political participation.
2 – Least Best (BC)	The Turkish government increases military operations, and the PKK continues to challenge the writ of the government.
1 – Worst (AC)	The Turkish government increases political activities, and the PKK continues to challenge the writ of the government.

The game payoffs from the PKK's point of view are shown in Table 3.

Table 3. Game Payoffs for the PKK

Game Payoffs - PKK	
4 – Best Choice (AC)	The PKK continues to challenge writ of the government, the Turkish government increases political activities
3 – Next Best (AD)	PKK resorts to political participation while the Turkish government increases political activities
2 – Least Best (BC)	The PKK continues to challenge the writ of the government while the Turkish government increases military operations
1 – Worst (BD)	The PKK resorts to political participation while the Turkish government increases military operations

According to the game values of both sides, the game shown in Table 4 can be set up.

Table 4. Game Values of Both Players

Participants		PKK	
	Available Strategies	Challenging Writ of the Government (C)	Political Participation (D)
Government	Increase Political Activities (A)	1,4	4,3
	Increase Military Operation (B)	2,2	3,1

Nash Equilibrium

Blue arrows show the strategic moves of the Turkish government according to the movement of its opponent PKK, whereas red arrows show those of the PKK. Table 4 shows that the Turkish government has no dominant strategy, which means that the actions of the Turkish government will be determined in response to the movement of the PKK. On the other hand, the PKK has a dominant strategy to continue challenging the writ of the government. No matter what kind of policy the Turkish government implements, the strategy of the PKK will not change. The PKK will choose to increase violent actions under any circumstances. The Nash equilibrium is at BC (2,2) where the Turkish government increases military operations and the PKK continues to challenge the writ of the government. Nash equilibrium is the point where no player is able to improve unilaterally, which means without harming its opponent. Table 4 also shows the possible outcome of this game without communication, which is BC (2,2), if both players play conservatively.

Figure 1 shows the Nash equilibrium in relation to the pareto optimal line.




Figure 1. Nash Equilibrium and Pareto Optimal Line

The Nash equilibrium is not on a pareto optimal line. Better solutions lie along the pareto optimal line. In other words, unless there is a way to communicate between the players, at the end of the game, the Turkish government is going to increase military operations, and the PKK is going to continue its violent actions. As a result of this outcome, the Turkish government will spend more and more resources to stop the PKK from terrorism and will suffer more from military and civilian losses. The PKK, on the other hand, will try to be more active under greater military and political pressure from the Turkish government. The strategic moves of the Turkish government can be analyzed to see if a threat, promise, or their combination can work to deter the PKK from carrying out violent activities.

D. STRATEGIC MOVES

If the Turkish government takes initiative and moves first, then the likely outcome of the game can be seen in Table 5.

Table 5. Turkish Government's First Move

Turkish government moves first	Outcome of the game
If A, then C.	(1,4)
If B, then C.	(2,2)
Turkish government chooses BC, and this does not change outcome of the game.	(2,2)

If the Turkish government is able to force the PKK to move first, then the game can result in the outcome seen in Table 6.

Table 6. PKK Moves First

PKK moves first	Outcome of the game
If C, then B.	(1,4)
If D, then A.	(4,3)
PKK chooses AD, and this changes the outcome of the game.	(4,3)

The Turkish government wants the PKK to play D so it will threaten to hurt the PKK if strategy C is adopted. This can be seen in Table 7.

Table 7. Turkish Government Threat Strategy

Turkish government's threat strategy	Outcome of the game
Normally, if C, then B.	(2,2)
If C, then A.	(1,4)
The threat hurts the Turkish government and benefits the PKK. So there is not a threat, and the outcome of the game will not change.	(2,2)

The Turkish government wants the PKK to play D, so it will make an attempt to convince the PKK to play D by making some promise that is beneficial for the PKK. This can be seen in Table 8.

Table 8. The Turkish Government's Promise Strategy

Turkish government's promise strategy	Outcome of the game
Normally, if D, then A.	(4,3)
If D, then B.	(3,1)
The promise hurts them both, so the promise will not work.	

The Turkish government can attempt to combine the threat and promise to force the PKK to play D. Can it work? This is shown in Table 9.

Table 9. Turkish Government's Threat and Promise Combination Strategy

Turkish government's combination of threat and promise strategy	Outcome of the game
Threat, if C, then B.	(2,2)
Promise, if D, then B.	(3,1)
So the combination of threat and promise does not work either.	(2,2)

E. PRUDENTIAL STRATEGY AND SECURITY LEVEL

There is no strategic move for the Turkish government to deter the PKK from challenging the writ of the government. Moreover, no player could improve without hurting the other. So, both players will try to maximize their own payoff and to minimize the opponent's payoff. Now the prudential strategies and security levels of both players are analyzed. This is shown in Tables 10 and 11.

Table 10. Security Level of the PKK

Participants		PKK	
	Available Strategies	Challenging Writ of the Government (C)	Political Participation (D)
Government	Increase Political Activities (A)	4	3
			
	Increase Military Operation (B)	2	1

The security level of the PKK is determined by analyzing its payoffs. Blue arrows show the movement of the Turkish government, and red arrows show the movement of the PKK. Table 10 shows that the Turkish government is trying to minimize and the PKK is trying to maximize its payoffs. In this case, both players have a dominant strategy. The Turkish government always chooses to increase the military operations, and the PKK continues to challenge the writ of the government. Also, there is a Nash equilibrium at point 2, which means that the value of the game for the PKK is 2. Because there is a dominant strategy for the PKK, its prudential strategy is equal to its dominant strategy, which is the continuation of violent actions.

Table 11. Security Level of the Turkish Government

Participants		PKK	
	Available Strategies	Challenging Writ of the Government (C)	Political Participation (D)
Government	Increase Political Activities (A)	1	4
			
	Increase Military Operation (B)	2	3

To find the security level and the prudential strategy of the Turkish government, payoffs of the Turkish government are shown in Table 11. This time the government will try to maximize and the PKK will try to minimize the payoffs of the government. In this

case, there is no dominant strategy for the Turkish government, but the PKK has a dominant strategy to continue violence. Again, there is a Nash equilibrium at point 2. This means that the value of the game for the Turkish government is 2, and its prudential strategy is to increase military operations.

Game theory application suggests that the Turkish government has no dominant strategy in the game. Its strategy mainly depends on the PKK's moves. In contrast, the PKK has a clear dominant strategy to continue violence. If both the players play without communication, the end result will be the expected outcome of the game BC (2,2), according to which the government will increase military operations and the PKK will continue challenging the writ of the government. This is what has continued for the last 30 years and has yielded no results. An increase in military action will further increase the grievances of the Kurdish people, and the PKK will exploit it to its advantage. When the government is left with limited options to deter the PKK from challenging the writ of the government, then what can be the way forward to break this deadlock? Will it be opening the channels of communication and engaging the PKK in dialogue? This option seems viable and can put an end to the violence that has affected not only the Kurdish area, but the whole country, for last three decades. The success of negotiations cannot be predicted; however, it will provide a clear opportunity for the government to directly target the concerns of the deprived community. The time of negotiations will not only put violence on hold, but can also serve as a measure to convince the leadership of the Kurdish community to focus on the political aspects and raise their voices through the political process.

These actions are likely to change the payoffs and setting of the game. Negotiations can provide both sides with other options rather than just two strategies. Bargaining and arbitration can help in finding a solution with consensus. With compromise, each side has the chance to increase its payoffs. Conflicts in the modern world are too complicated, and the nature of ethnic conflicts is even more difficult. It is also a general experience that such conflicts cannot be solved only by military means.

Game theory helps us to see the game very clearly, even though real-life situations cannot be completely simplified to mathematical equations.

F. INTERVAL SCALING

1. Turkish Government

Both the Turkish government and the PKK's preferences can be put into a 1–10 scale, with 1 being the worst outcome and 10 being the best. The next best and least best outcomes are then placed on the scale appropriately to reflect the extent to which one outcome is better or worse than the others. This is shown in Tables 12 and 13.

Table 12. Turkish Government Interval Scaling

Worst									Best
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
AC				BC		BD		AD	

Table 12 represents the Turkish government's interval scaling, which can be interpreted as under:

a. Worst (2)

The worst outcome is AC (The Turkish government increases political activities, and the PKK resorts to violent activities.). The Turkish government increases political activities but is unable to woo the PKK leadership to political participation. The PKK can propagate this to its favor to control the populace through violent actions, further decreasing the Turkish government's influence in the area.

b. Least Best (5)

The least best outcome is BC (The Turkish government increases military operations, and the PKK continues violence.). The PKK is able to harm the Turkish security forces through violence, but the Turkish government is still able to conduct

kinetic operations against the PKK. The Turkish government may face a loss of international and domestic support, increased costs, and loss of personnel and equipment from a protracted conflict. This outcome is rated as 5 on the interval scale, better than the worst outcome, but still worse than the next best outcome.

c. *Next Best (7)*

The next best outcome is BD (The Turkish government increases military operations, and the PKK resorts to political participation.). Because of targeted military operations, the PKK is unable to achieve its goal of maintaining the militant wing with its political setup. In contrast, when the PKK resorts to political participation, it will be in an advantageous position as far as gaining local support, as it can play the victim of the Turkish government's aggression. Due to the risk of eroding popular support, this outcome is rated as a 7. This outcome is two points better than BC since there is less violence, as the military will only target violent elements. Violent elements are harder to see since they are not conducting kinetic operations, although it is more difficult for the PKK to recruit for the violent activities.

d. *Best Choice (10)*

For Turkey, the best outcome is AC (political activities versus political participation), as there is no violence. The Turkish government can then work to gain domestic and international support and ultimately plan for bringing reforms in the area. This outcome is the best possible outcome for Turkey and results in a larger gain than the next best outcome. The Turkish government is able to promote a message of peace and is less likely to alienate the local populace.

2. PKK

Table 13. PKK Interval Scaling

Worst									Best
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
BD			BC			AD			AC

a. Worst (1)

The worst outcome is BD (The Turkish government increases military operations, and the PKK resorts to political activities.). The PKK is unable to fight back or recruit effectively. Violent activities are reduced, and militant capabilities of the PKK are significantly decreased. The PKK is at a serious disadvantage due to the Turkish government's military actions.

b. Least Best (4)

The least best outcome is BC (The Turkish government increases military operations, and the PKK continues with violence.). The PKK is at a disadvantage due to military action in the area but is able to fight back by creating a continuous threat for the security forces. The PKK's leadership is targeted and replaced with less experienced personnel. The PKK is still able to recruit but will struggle to grow as an organization. This outcome is rated as a 4, better than the worst outcome, but worse than the next best outcome.

c. Next Best (8)

The next best outcome is AD (political activities versus political participation). The PKK is able to spread its ideology freely without the threat of military action in the area. The PKK is able to influence the local populace and radicalize individuals, although the Turkish government has a comparative advantage with the promotion of a moderate message, since neither side is committing violent acts against the other.

d. Best Choice (10)

For the PKK, the best outcome is AC (The Turkish government increases political activities, and the PKK continues to challenge the writ of the government.). The PKK is able to damage the Turkish security forces' capabilities, promote its cause, restrict access, and control the local populace. Since there is not as large a difference between the best and next best outcomes (10 versus 8), the PKK would most likely be less willing to risk the fall from 8 to 4 for the chance to get to its best outcome of a 10.

G. SECURITY LEVELS AND PRUDENTIAL STRATEGIES ON INTERVAL SCALE

Tables 14 and 15 show the security level of the PKK and the Turkish government after putting the values of the game on an interval scale.

Table 14. PKK Security Level on Interval Scale

Participants		PKK	
	Available Strategies	Challenging Writ of the Government (C)	Political Participation (D)
Government	Increase Political Activities (A)	10	8
		↓	↓
	Increase Military Operation (B)	4	1

Table 15. Turkish Government Security Level on Interval Scale

Participants		PKK	
	Available Strategies	Challenging Writ of the Government (C)	Political Participation (D)
Government	Increase Political Activities (A)	2	10
		↓	↑
	Increase Military Operation (B)	5	7

I. CONCLUSION

By evaluating both the Turkish government's and PKK's strategic moves through the lens of game theory, both players should recognize that the best solution can only come through communication. Without communication between the two players, the game will always result in kinetic operations versus violence, which has continued for the last three decades. Although the model is extremely simplified compared to the complexity of the conflict, it still manages to demonstrate the best solution, the next best solution, and the fair solution for the Turkish government and for the PKK. The fair outcome will never occur if both players attempt to minimize each other, as this will result in the least best outcome for each player. Therefore, based on the examination of the game, the authors of this study recommend that each player cooperates to achieve a fair solution by resorting to a political solution to the problem.

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V. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

There are several possible ways in which the Kurdish problem could play out in Turkey. On one extreme side of the spectrum of possible solutions is the total repression of the ethnic identity of the Kurds by the Turkish state. On the other extreme side is the foundation of an independent Kurdish state. It is obvious that the first extreme possible solution is neither probable nor realistic, nor morally acceptable, of course. The history of the Kurdish problem in Turkey suggests that such an attempt would further radicalize the problem. Besides, it would be impossible for the Turkish state to sustain policies of denial and assimilation of the Kurdish identity considering Turkey's economic and democratic stability and international image (Barkey & Fuller, 1998). On the other side of the spectrum, an independent Kurdish state does not seem to be a pareto optimal solution, as discussed in the previous chapter. From the Turkish perspective, the state would never accept this kind of a solution and would take every possible measure to prevent it, including the use of force. The Kurdish point of view also negates total separation because the Turkish and the Kurdish populations are socially, culturally, and economically intertwined by socialization, marriages, and business relations. Therefore, it could be argued that it is in the best interest of the Kurdish people to stay a part of Turkey and to benefit from the country's resources (Barkey & Fuller, 1998).

Moreover, as discussed in Chapter IV, the negotiation set based on the security levels of both sides excludes the two extreme options. This means that the arbitration should take place somewhere between these two extreme ends of the wide spectrum of solutions. The best solution can be found on the pareto optimal line. If both sides continue their traditional practices (i.e., violence and military operations), the result will be locked on the Nash equilibrium. However, if channels of communication are opened and both sides negotiate to find a peaceful solution to the problem, an enduring peace can be established. Below are our recommendations for policy implications based on our analysis of similar cases in England, Spain, and Colombia and the application of game theory to the Turkish case given previously in this thesis.

A. DEMOCRATIZATION

Both historical and game theoretic analyses suggest that further democratization is the most important single element of a possible solution in the Turkish-Kurdish case. If a political solution is to be found to the Kurdish issue, it is clear that representatives of the Kurdish people must be in the Turkish parliament. These representatives should be treated with respect as equal partners for building peace in the region. Any legal or constitutional obstacles that legitimate Kurdish politicians may face should be dismantled, including the banning of Kurdish political parties. On the other hand, the political wing of the Kurdish political movement should take the initiative and have its own agenda instead of merely acting as a propaganda unit of the armed wing.

The fact that there is a growing consensus for peace within the Turkish and the Kurdish populations is a great advantage for the resolution of the conflict via mainstream political courses of action. The difference between the Turkish case and the Spanish case is clearer when it comes to the sustainability of the peace process. For example, during the negotiations between Spain and the ETA in 1970s and 1980s, the process was especially fragile due to violent acts from the ETA and the strong objections of the military (Barkey & Fuller, 1998). Positively, and by contrast, in the Turkish case, the Kurdish political movement has reduced the utilization of violence significantly, though violence has not terminated completely. Further, the Turkish military does not raise its voice against the peace process and generally follows the perspective of the political leaders. In the process of finding political headway, the radical faction in the Kurdish community needs to be isolated. Political parties should be allowed to operate with their clear agenda and manifesto; however, strict checks and balances are required on the armed groups of these parties. Any action against the criminally violent Kurd group should not be allowed to be considered as an action against the Kurdish community as a whole. Here the media can also play an important role in harmonizing the society.

Game theoretic analysis suggests that the Turkish-Kurdish arbitration is not a zero-sum game. One side's gain does not mean the other side's loss. Representatives of

the Turkish and the Kurdish people should always keep in mind that there is a negotiation set where each player is able to move without hurting the other player.

B. ECONOMIC GROWTH

There is no doubt that the economy is another key factor in the Kurdish issue. As we mentioned in Chapter II, one of the reasons for the rise of the radical, violent factions of the Kurdish political movement was the lack of economic development in the Kurdish area. People of the area suffered in an environment of armed conflict with poverty, unemployment, and lack of education for decades. Many had to migrate to the major cities in the western parts of Turkey to have a better standard of living. Even though these migrants increased their living conditions to a degree, because of their lack of education, most of them found employment as some version of unskilled labor and formed the lowest level of the social strata.

With the process of democratic arbitration, the state should take advantage of the environment of peace to increase the economic development of the region. Evidence from the previous IRA, ETA, and FARC cases suggests that the ethnic minority group can overcome the feelings of being the underdog provided they benefit equally from the country's resources. Here, we should note that the Kurdish political movement has a vital role to play during the process of economic development. In the past, there have been numerous cases where the attempts of the state to build factories, schools, and construction projects were thwarted by the PKK using violence such as kidnapping the workers, murdering the teachers, and committing arson. In order to prevent such things from occurring, the Kurdish political movement should appreciate and actively support every kind of positive economic development step from the Turkish state.

Another step to eliminate grievances and woo local support in favor of the government is to keep a quota for the Kurdish community in federal jobs with relaxed standards. This will not only turn individual families in favor of the Turkish government, but will also have a long-lasting impact on the community as a whole. This step will also

hinder the recruitment of the PKK and will provide an incentive for the locals who want to contribute to the development of the country.

C. AUTONOMY

The concept of “autonomy” is a controversial one since its meaning is vague; one cannot determine the extent of the concept when one side of the conflict is demanding autonomy. Most of the time, the term autonomy includes territorial claims. The side of the conflict that demands autonomy wishes to obtain a certain amount of territorial control within a specific region. However, the context of autonomy is not limited to territorial claims; it is also possible to talk about cultural autonomy, where members of a certain cultural group hold full control of their cultural life. The most important dimensions of this control involve language and education.

In the example of the ETA and the FARC, it is possible to see examples of territorial autonomy. Nevertheless, if we compare these cases to the Turkish-Kurdish case, granting a strong territorial autonomy to the Kurdish political leadership does not seem like a viable option. The example of the ETA, where the Basque region has its own parliament, elections, and flag, cannot be transferred to the Kurdish case. The most important reason for that is the Kurdish people are highly dispersed within Turkey, contrary to the Basque people in Spain. In the example of Colombia, the government had to leave total control of a certain area to the FARC. This is also far from being a desired option for the Turkish state and the Kurdish people. Game theory analysis suggests that total autonomy of the region is not in the best interest of the players. The Turkish state would never consent to let go of its presence in the region considering the highly unstable structure of the Middle East. Besides, it would not be preferable for the Kurdish people to be deprived of the country’s resources.

As a result, we argue that a mixture of territorial and cultural autonomy should be granted to the Kurdish political leaders while not threatening the territorial integrity of the Turkish state (Kirisci & Winrow, 1997).

D. MULTICULTURALISM

Our final recommendation for the resolution of the Kurdish conflict in Turkey is establishment of a multicultural society structure. We wish to emphasize that multiculturalism does not only include the Turkish and the Kurdish people. That is, the Turkish state should provide a multicultural environment for every single citizen.

The definition of a multicultural society is not limited to but includes equal access to the country's facilities, resources, and sectors such as education and the market economy, equal access in participating in political activities, and making sure that no subgroup of the population is left out by the state (Kirisci & Winrow, 1997).

We are aware of the fact that these conditions are easier to advocate than to achieve and there is a wide range of options within each condition. Moreover, every single condition has the potential to contain new challenges. Nonetheless, past examples from different countries and rational reasoning demonstrate that the Turkish state should create the feelings of belonging, trust, and unity among the components of its diverse people. Taking into account the highly unstable dynamics of Turkey's geography and the strategic goals that Turkey aims for, there is no other viable way forward for Turkey than establishing and stabilizing a peaceful environment in its southeast region. This is the only chance for Turkey to become a major political and economic actor both in the region and in the world.

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