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**PHASES OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM: TARGETING THE
EVOLUTION OF AL-SHABAAB**

by

Richard S. Jordan
Nathaniel B. Van De Venter

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Thesis Advisor:
Second Reader:

Leo Blanken
Anna Simons

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EVOLUTION OF AL-SHABAAB**

Richard S. Jordan
Lieutenant, United States Navy
B.A., California State University, Fullerton 1997

Nathaniel Van De Venter
Lieutenant, United States Navy
B.S., United States Merchant Marine Academy, 2006

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requirements for the degree of

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Approved by: Leo Blanken
 Thesis Advisor

Anna Simons
Second Reader

John Arquilla
Chair, Department of Defense Analysis

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ABSTRACT

The events of September 11, 2001, and the reactions that followed sparked a surge in international terrorist organizations, resulting in increased threat to U.S. national security. Although military operations have had some short-term successes against violent, extremist organizations (VEOs), they are an insufficient long-term counter-extremism strategy. It is apparent that a new approach and new way of analysis are necessary. We examine the problem by focusing on Al-Shabaab, a VEO in Somalia, with attention to its stages of development. Using unclassified sources, we apply three theoretical frameworks to determine whether deterrence might be effective as a countervailing strategy at each stage. For Phase One, beginning before the organization's establishment, we look at historical and cultural context. Phase Two analyzes formation and growth from the perspective of social-movement theory, and Phase Three employs a structural perspective, using organizational-design theory, to the VEO in its mature form. Conclusions are drawn, based on deterrence theory, for each stage in the VEO's evolution. This research provides a foundation by which policy and strategy makers may gain insight into the seams, gaps, strengths, and weakness of VEOs as they change over time, and where deterrent strategies may be applied to advantage.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AIAI	al-Ittihaad al-Islamiya
AI	al-Islah
AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
ARPCT	Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counterterrorism
ASWJ	Ahl al-Sunna wa- Jam’a
AQ	Al-Qaeda
AU	African Union
BBC	British Broadcasting Company
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
DOD	Department of Defense
EGP	evolutionary growth process
GDP	gross domestic product
HCO	Humanitarian Coordination Office
HVT	high-value targets
ICU	Ittihad al-Mahakim al-Islamiyah “Islamic Courts Union”
IED	improvised, explosive device
JI	Jamaaca Islaamiya
KDF	Kenyan Defense Force
KFR	kidnap for ransom
MAD	mutually assured destruction
MUIS	Majma Ulimadda Islaamka ee Soomaaliya

NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NSA	non-state actor
PPM	political-process model
RMM	resource-mobilization model
PSYOP	psychological operations
SASC	Senate Armed Services Committee
SIC	Sharia Implementation Council
SMT	social-movement theory
SNA	Somalia National Army
TFG	Transitional Federal Government
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNOSOM	United Nations Operation in Somalia
U.S.	United States
USAFRICOM	United States Africa Command
VEO	violent, extremist organization
WMD	weapons of mass destruction

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I. THE EVOLUTION OF A VIOLENT, EXTREMIST ORGANIZATION

On March 26, 2015, General David M. Rodriguez briefed the United States Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) on U.S. Africa Command's (USAFRICOM) current trends, strategic approach, long-term objectives, immediate priorities, and future requirements. General Rodriguez informed the committee that "Africa continues to present a broad spectrum of opportunities and challenges to the United States and our allies and partners."¹ The general indicated that the regional security threat and primary source of conflict in Somalia was the violent, extremist organization (VEO) Al-Shabaab. While noting recent tactical successes, Rodriguez advised that this VEO remains a persistent threat, despite unilateral, interagency, and multinational partner efforts. Military operations have had some short-term success against VEOs in the Horn of Africa, but have proved an insufficient long-term counter-extremism strategy.² It has become apparent that new approaches to the problem of Al-Shabaab, and VEOs generally, are necessary.

This thesis looks at the VEO problem in the Horn of Africa—specifically, at Al-Shabaab, based primarily in Somalia. For deeper understanding of the VEO phenomenon and the role of deterrence, we analyze Al-Shabaab's progress as an organization, finding three phases in its development and ascertaining whether deterrence is likely to be an effective strategy in each. We created a model unlike current approaches, which breaks this evolution into three phases and provides a much more intuitive and tailored deterrence solution in each phase. This thesis explores the degree to which the use of such tailored, multi-disciplinary approaches gives the U.S. additional leverage over the VEO challenge.

¹ David M. Rodriguez, General, USA, Commander United States Africa Command, *2015 Statement of USAFRICOM before the Senate Armed Services Committee* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 26 March 2015), 1.

² Rodriguez, *2015 Statement of USAFRICOM*, 1–19.

A. THE RATIONALE FOR A NEW APPROACH

The novel approach we take was motivated by three factors. First, we sought new solutions to an intractable problem that has been exhaustively analyzed from conventional perspectives. Second, it seemed logical to examine VEOs according to the way they naturally evolve. Finally, instead of focusing wholly on deterring a VEO from acts of destruction, we sought ways to prevent its coming into existence by forestalling the movement before it gains identity and strength. In conjunction with this goal, we reexamine the utility of deterrence and coercive diplomacy against VEOs across our three phases.

B. A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR DETERRENCE

This research presents a framework comprised of models for studying VEOs; the framework uses an appropriate theory for each phase of a VEO's evolution and applies deterrence theory throughout. Deterrence is not the quintessential solution to complex problems, but it is an important strategy, the potential of which has been untapped due to common misperceptions.³ It is generally agreed that deterring VEOs early requires less coercion later, but more foresight, and that doing so incurs substantial risks. This research finds, counter-intuitively, that it may actually be better and more effective to deter organizations when they are mature, as there are significant problems with using deterrence or coercion too early. Responses and deterrent signals should not be driven by crisis or exigency, but by forethought, with a clear understanding of context and of whom and what to deter. Moreover, allowing a VEO's true colors or ideology to play out may ultimately benefit antiterrorism by allowing a population to move past its initial enthusiasms and reconcile itself to the existing government—at the same time undermining the probability that similar organizations will gain support in the future.

³ We use the term “deterrence” throughout as signifying both the standard definition from traditional deterrence theory (to discourage somebody from taking action or prevent something from happening, especially by making somebody feel afraid or anxious) and a more flexible definition, which includes, concept, research program, political issue, influencing, shaping and prevention efforts. For more detail, refer to Jeffrey W. Knopf “Three Items in One: Deterrence as Concept, Research Program, and Political Issue,” in *Complex Deterrence: Strategy in the Global Age*, ed. T.V. Paul, Patrick Morgan, and James Wirtz (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009).

C. METHODOLOGY

The application of deterrence strategies to VEOs has largely been dismissed due to both misperceptions and the conviction that deterrence has already failed. President George W. Bush addressed the topic of deterrence and terrorism during his 2002 West Point graduation speech.

For much of the last century, America's defense relied on the Cold War doctrines of deterrence and containment. In some cases, those strategies still apply. But new threats also require new thinking. Deterrence—the promise of massive retaliation against nations—means nothing against shadowy terrorist networks with no nation or citizens to defend...We cannot defend America and our friends by hoping for the best. We cannot put our faith in the word of tyrants, who solemnly sign non-proliferation treaties, and then systemically break them. If we wait for threats to fully materialize, we will have waited too long.⁴

The first difficulty with that position is that it ignores a VEO's evolution and growth over time. This thesis posits that there is ample opportunity to implement deterrence early on, before any high-profile attacks. Moreover, a VEO's successful carrying out of an attack does not mean deterrence is no longer useful. In all likelihood, the original deterrent was lacking, due to improper communication or misunderstanding of the costs and benefits from the enemy's perspective. Finally, even if these potential deterrents are evaluated as nothing more than a form of coercive diplomacy or compellence, there remain numerous indirect ways that deterrence may be useful—for example, in deterring governments from bad decisions or a populace from joining the terrorist cause. Our thesis is limited to a single organization, in view of the detailed analysis required; we chose Al-Shabaab as a representative Islamist VEO that is mature enough to have produced the data needed.

Among our conclusions is that U.S. national strategy may be exacerbating the VEO problem around the world. The U.S. has grown accustomed to applying force in regional conflicts without regard to context, failing to account for an organization's

⁴ George W. Bush, *President Bush Delivers Graduation Speech at West Point*, West Point, New York: Office of the Press Secretary, June 1, 2002.

emergence, evolution, and reason for existence. This ill-informed strategy is then likely to retard the natural progression of internal problem-solving within a region, creating reliance and helplessness.


D. ORGANIZATION

Our research is laid out in the following way: in Chapter II, we introduce a new model, which we call the “evolutionary growth process” (EGP) of a VEO. This model describes three phases, to be viewed through contextual, social-movement, and organizational lenses. First, we establish the cultural context in “Phase One”. Next, we borrow social-movement theory (SMT) to examine “Phase Two” and organizational-design theory to examine “Phase Three.” Chapter III covers the cultural and historical context of Somalia. In Chapters IV, V, and VI, we apply the model framework to pinpoint when, where, and how best to apply deterrence throughout the phases of the EGP of a VEO. Chapter VII presents conclusions and recommendations.

II. THE EVOLUTIONARY GROWTH-PROCESS MODEL

For this research, we developed a new model to examine more thoroughly the problem of VEOs and how best to deter them. In this chapter, we explain our model, and then break it down by discussing each of its three constituent phases and the literature regarding the theories employed.

There are many types of life cycles, and they all begin and end. Rather than look at the full trajectory of the VEO life cycle, we focus on the stages from preconception to maturity, which we call the “evolutionary growth process,” or EGP. The EGP is divided into three phases, as depicted in Figure 1. The initial phase, Phase One, is the period before the VEO’s inception, when malcontent begins to create disequilibrium; in other words, an opportunity arises for change in a system. Phase Two sees the emergence and initial growth of a reformatory movement, and Phase Three is the period of peak VEO power and activity, when the organization has built a distinctive organizational structure.



We consider deterrence across all the phases of an entity’s EGP. To develop what we need to know about Phase One, we examine historical and cultural context. Context is

clearly also important throughout the EGP. Because Phase Two focuses on inception, we use social-movement theory as our analytical tool. In Phase Three, organizational-design theory provides the primary lens of analysis. The breakdown into discrete phases is somewhat artificial, as the context and duration of phases will differ from one VEO to the next. However, this structuring is conducive to discussion and insight by enabling us to borrow analytical tools from different disciplines. We now turn to the specific issue area we wish to explore—deterrence theory—or, more specifically, how our EGP framework enhances one’s ability to apply the logic of deterrence theory to the problem of VEOs.

A. DETERRENCE THEORY

Because deterrence is discussed throughout the thesis, we will begin by first reviewing what deterrence is, the literature regarding deterrence, and the deterrence models from which we draw.

Deterrence is a strategy by which states or entities attempt to manipulate the decisions of others, by various means, to achieve specific goals. As defined by John Mearsheimer, “Deterrence, in its broadest sense, means persuading an opponent not to initiate a specific action because the perceived benefits do not justify the estimated costs and risks.”⁵ Deterrence policy received its first modern update with the advent of nuclear weapons. In 1954, U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles presented a doctrine of deterrence built around a theory of punishment of the aggressor, or violator, of a given norm.⁶ The atomic bomb was a new technology that demanded a reexamination of how state actors engage in conflict and precipitated a successful restructuring of deterrence at the international level. As an alternative to direct conflict, states turned to strategies of nuanced political negotiations to coerce or intimidate adversaries into compliance. If a dispute escalated beyond talking, states might choose to pursue a proxy war to resolve a conflict, using conventional means but avoiding direct, force-on-force encounters that might trigger a nuclear conclusion.⁷ In essence, deterrence is a simple equation of

⁵ John Mearsheimer, *Conventional Deterrence* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983), 14.

⁶ Lawrence Freedman, *Deterrence* (Cambridge, UK : Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2004), 145, 8–9.

⁷ Thomas C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (New Haven, CN: Yale University Press, 2008), 7–8, 34, 190.

weighing costs and benefits; in order for deterrence to be successful, the costs must outweigh the benefits. Further, deterrence moves the locus of “action” from the battlefield (war fighting) to the mind of the opponent. Deterrence is not about “winning” as much as it is about influencing the opponent through a form of communication that may, at times, involve the application of force.

Scholarly research on deterrence theory during the Cold War era progressed in stages, which Robert Jervis describes as “three waves.” The first wave, during the early nuclear era, relied on massive use of force; the second, in the late 1950s, focused on bipolar international relations; and the third wave, in the 1970s, explored positive inducement rather than the threat of force.^{8,9}

Today, deterrence has fallen on hard times. Far from the being cornerstone of U.S. policy, as it was during the Cold War, “deterrence today looks very much like yesterday’s solution to yesterday’s dominant problem.”¹⁰ Jeffrey Knopf labels today’s attitude as the “fourth wave of deterrence” theory, which emphasizes dissuading VEOs and rogue governments through both denial and punishment.¹¹ Research on the fourth wave, as Knopf points out, broadens the focus to include non-military options of retribution, including diplomatic, economic, and informational coercion.¹²

1. The Question of Deterring VEOs

On the question of deterring VEOs, a clear divide has emerged. On one side are scholars and pundits who believe that NSAs cannot be deterred.¹³ As Paul Davis and Brian Jenkins assert in a RAND study, “The concept of deterrence is both too limiting

8 Robert Jervis, “Deterrence Theory Revisited” *World Politics* 31, no. 02 (1979): 289–324.

9 Freedman, *Deterrence*, 21.

10 Colin S. Gray, “Maintaining Effective Deterrence,” Strategic Studies Institute, Aug 2003, v. <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub211.pdf> (Accessed Aug 7, 2014).

11 Knopf, Jeffrey W. “The Fourth Wave in Deterrence Research.” *Contemporary Security Policy* 31, no. 1 (2010): 18.

12 Knopf, “Fourth Wave in Deterrence” 18.

13 Freedman, *Deterrence*, 24.

and too naive to be applicable to the war on terrorism.”¹⁴ President George W. Bush in the 2002 *National Security Strategy* reinforced this notion, saying, “Traditional concepts of deterrence will not work against a terrorist enemy.”¹⁵ In contrast, some cite lessons from behavioral logic, arguing that the modus operandi of VEOs is similar to that of criminal organizations and therefore VEOs may be deterred via traditional criminological deterrence means.^{16,17} The more clear, proportional, and consistent the punishment, the more effective acts of deterrence will be.¹⁸

2. The Three Pillars of Action

The cleavage between these schools of thought appears to be based on divergent interpretations of three human factors, which Robert Trager and Dessilava Zagorcheva call the three pillars: rationality, motivation, and communication (or the return-address problem).¹⁹

a. Rational Self-Interest

Michael R. Geerken and Walter R. Gove observe, “Deterrence theorists usually begin with a model of man as profit maximizer, that is, as a calculator of profit from estimates of gain and cost resulting from the projected act”²⁰—in other words, they assume that human beings are rational in their choices. Robert Pape believes terrorists are rational actors, and his study provides empirical evidence that suggests suicide terrorist attacks do produce some level of concession from their adversaries.²¹ Jeffery Berejikian

¹⁴ Paul K. Davis and Brian Michael Jenkins, *Deterrence and Influence in Counter terrorism: A Component in the War on al-Qaeda* (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2002), xviii, 19.

¹⁵ George W. Bush, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, September, 2002), 15.

¹⁶ Freedman, *Deterrence*, 124.

¹⁷ Ariel Merari, “Deterring Fear: Government Responses to Terrorist Attacks,” *Harvard International Review* 23, no. 4 (Winter, 2002), 26–31.

¹⁸ Freedman, *Deterrence*, 8.

¹⁹ Robert F. Trager and Dessislava P. Zagorcheva, “Deterring Terrorism: It can be done,” *International Security* 30, no. 3 (Winter, 2005), 87–123, 87.

²⁰ Michael R. Geerken and Walter R. Gove, *Deterrence: Some Theoretical Considerations*, *Law & Society Review*, Vol. 9, No. 3 (Spring, 1975), 497.

²¹ Robert Pape, *Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism*, Random House, 2005.

disagrees; in his view, decision makers “are apt to overweigh losses with respect to comparable gains, and tend to be risk averse when confronted with choices between gains while risk acceptant when confronted with losses.”²² As rationality pertains to VEOs, it should be viewed from the perspective of the VEO’s ordered preferences, not one’s own. While the literature on the rationality of VEOs is divided, we believe that understanding an organization’s ordered preferences may assist in perceiving its rationality, which might otherwise be overlooked if the possibility of ratiocination among VEOs is dismissed.

b. Motivation

States often misunderstand the context and motivation behind VEO strategies and thus adopt deterrents that fail.²³ The influence of key players in an organization is a factor often ignored by those convinced that terrorists cannot be deterred. Among most studies focused on suicidal attackers, VEOs have broad regional objectives that are achieved through strategy, whether this is implementing sharia law, establishing a caliphate, or forcing regime changes that increase their power. In this sense, VEOs use rational and normative reasoning very deliberately to achieve strategy—this is manifested, for example, in choosing where and whom to attack (and on what scale) and how to exploit the media. Although a few terrorists may behave irrationally, the majority calculate the cost–benefit ratio of their decisions carefully. The mere fact that VEOs are organized and can operate with some degree of success suggests that most participants are rational and can thus be influenced.²⁴

²² Jeffrey D. Berejikian, “A Cognitive Theory of Deterrence,” *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 39, No. 2 (Sage Publications, Ltd., Mar., 2002), 165.

²³ Loren Thompson, “What if Deterrence Doesn’t Work Anymore? Five Reasons to Worry,” *Forbes* (August 18, 2014).

²⁴ Robert F. Trager and Dessislava P. Zagorcheva, “Deterring Terrorism: It can be done,” *International Security* 30, no. 3 (Winter, 2005), 87–123, 88; Bowen, *Deterrence and Asymmetry: Non-State Actors and Mass Casualty Terrorism*, 54–70, 62; Colby, “Expanded Deterrence: Broadening the Threat of Retaliation,” 43–59, xi.

c. Communication

For a deterrence strategy to work, the rational actors involved must be able to communicate, understand the perceptions of the parties involved, and be able to anticipate likely reprisals.²⁵ In essence, deterrence requires a deep understanding of the enemy. Deterrence is stage setting: “by announcement, rigging the trip-wire, by incurring the obligation—by waiting.”²⁶ Unacceptable behaviors are defined, potential punishments are communicated by the state, and the warning is followed up with a demonstration of resolve to show the threat is real.²⁷ In general, deterrence is an interaction between two parties, in which one signals the other not to act in some predefined manner; the signal is credible only if the adversary knows he has the power to follow through. Thus the concept of signaling is integral to conflict prevention, particularly of large-scale conventional or nuclear war.²⁸

The difficulties of signaling VEOs are obvious. While states can reach VEOs almost anywhere on the globe, several factors make deterring or influencing them nearly impossible. First, a VEO hierarchy is often decentralized and dispersed over large areas of land. The difficulty of identifying leaders, decision makers, and logisticians, as well as operators and their precise locations, makes it problematic to avert their actions. VEOs may change their structure organizationally, based upon pressures from the international community. They tend to evolve “towards more networked organizational forms but can manifest hierarchical, blended and networked features”²⁹ that allow flexibility, decentralization, and the ability to operate with impunity, especially in failed or ungoverned territory. Second, VEOs are often dispersed among civilian populations and deliberately operate from their midst. Finally, due to labeling practices, nascent VEOs

²⁵ Freedman, *Deterrence*, 26–29.

²⁶ Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, 71.

²⁷ Frank P. Harvey and Patrick James, “Deterrence and Compellence in Iraq,” in *Complex Deterrence: Strategy in the Global Age*, ed. T.V. Paul, Patrick M. Morgan, and James J. Wirtz (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009), 223–224.

²⁸ Andrew Scobell, “Show of Force: Chinese Soldiers, Statesmen, and the 1995–1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis,” *Political Science Quarterly* 115, no. 2 (2000), 227–245.

²⁹ Robert Bunker J, “Defeating Violent Non-state Actors,” *Parameters* 4, no. 43 (2013), 59.

may be labeled as terrorist organizations early on, which immediately limit official communications by some entities.³⁰

3. The Two Categories of Deterrence

The concept of deterrence is divided into two main categories: deterrence by punishment and by denial. According to John Mearsheimer, “there is a well-known distinction between deterrence based on punishment, which involves threatening to destroy ... and deterrence based on denial, which requires convincing an opponent that he will not attain his goals.”³¹

a. Deterrence by Punishment

Since the fall of the Soviet Union—and increasingly after 9/11—most states have employed an active, constant, eye-for-an-eye response to challenges from non-state VEOs.³² It has been argued that in asymmetric conflicts between sovereign countries and rogue VEOs, deterrent effects are likely limited.³³ To combat this nontraditional deterrence problem, some nations, including the United States, have adopted a preemptive stance, attempting to attack the enemy before he can strike.³⁴ To the extent that military actions trend towards a strike-first mentality, deterrence is being replaced by preemption. Emphatically, preemption is not deterrence.

Striking an adversary first is not deterrence, and often results in negative unintended consequences. Deterrence by the threat of punishment involves communicating a realistic threat that is equal or more important to the enemy than the potential benefits to be gained by carrying out the activity contemplated. In the case of

30 Bunker, “Defeating Violent Non-state Actors,” 57–65.

31 John Mearsheimer, *Conventional Deterrence*, 1st ed. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1983, 14–15.

32 Lawrence Freedman, *Deterrence* (Cambridge, UK : Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2004), 1–5.

33 Wyn Q. Bowen, “Deterrence and Asymmetry: Non-State Actors and Mass Casualty Terrorism,” *Contemporary Security Policy* 25, no. 1 (April, 2004): 61–62.

34 David P. Auerswald, “Deterring Nonstate WMD Attacks,” *Political Science Quarterly* 121, no. 4 (2006): 546.

VEOs, potential punishment is the deterrence that often keeps these organizations from carrying out violent, extremist acts.

The literature describing VEO deterrence by punishment covers the spectrum from non-military punishment to large-scale military operations and nuclear retaliation.³⁵ But without a nation or population to defend, non-state VEOs have no responsibility for the consequences of their actions and are not constrained to respond to the misery they induce. Indeed, they may rely on the suffering of the innocent as a component in a rational strategy.

b. Deterrence by Denial

Deterrence by denial is a defensive strategy that denies (hardens) the prospective attacker targets and means (e.g., WMDs, popular support) and most importantly marginalizes gains or desired outcomes to discourage terrorist acts.³⁶ Sovereign countries can expect comparatively reliable deterrent results by refining national security and decreasing soft-target exposure to VEOs. However, this is a constant, resource-demanding practice, similar to the eye-for-an-eye, experimental offensive use of military power, and does not preclude VEOs from choosing to exploit soft targets instead.³⁷ As long as a VEO's political motivations remain undeterred, the threat endures.

4. Compellence and Coercive Diplomacy

Compellence and coercive diplomacy differ slightly from deterrence. Lawrence Freedman distinguishes between deterrence and compellence as the difference between saying “they should not act for fear of consequences or must act for fear of consequences.”³⁸ Thomas Schelling explains that compellence “usually involves initiating an action (or an irrevocable commitment to action) that can cease, or become

35 Daniel Whiteneck, “Deterring Terrorists: Thoughts on a Framework,” *The Washington Quarterly* 28, no. 3 (Summer, 2005), 187–199, 194–195; Gerald M. Steinberg, “Rediscovering Deterrence After September 11, 2001,” *Jerusalem Letter/Viewpoints* No. 467 (2001), <http://www.jcpa.org/jl/vp467.htm> (Accessed October 23, 2015).

36 Trager and Zagorcheva, “Deterring Terrorism: It can be done,” 87–123, 91, 99.

37 Bowen, “Deterrence and Asymmetry: Non-State Actors and Mass Casualty Terrorism,” 61–62.

38 Freedman, *Deterrence*, 26.

harmless, only if the opponent responds.”³⁹ Compellence requires much more active coercion than does deterrence, often requiring active military force or diplomatic measures such as sanctions. The accomplishment or failure of deterrence is contingent upon the achievement of coercion.

Compellence and coercive diplomacy, as they relate to VEOs, are used to attempt to compel a VEO to stop terrorism already underway. Deterrence, on the other hand, aims to prevent VEOs from undertaking these activities in the first place. It is commonly asserted that if one is resorting to compellence or coercive diplomacy, then deterrence has failed. However, this calculus is misleading, in that it appears to assume that deterrence is no longer useful or possible once attacks have begun.

For foreign policy and deterrence to be effective, a high level of commitment and understanding of the enemy’s ordered preferences is required. This starts with a clear definition of America’s vital national interests. “It is the nation’s interest that must drive foreign policy, not abstract notions of values and morality, which clearly are defined differently by different administrations.”⁴⁰ Lowther and Lucius’s article “Identifying America’s Vital Interests” lays out a logical and compelling argument for a “transition from a value-focused foreign policy to an interest-focused foreign policy.”⁴¹ Reexamining the basics may contribute to deterrence by supporting signaling that is consistent, credible, and able to withstand pressure. We now turn to the three phases of the EGP, and lay out the logic of deterrence that can be crafted for each successive phase.

B. THE LOGIC OF DETERRENCE UNDERSTOOD AT EACH PHASE

Each phase of the EGP offers a unique perspective on VEOs. We use theories from social science and organizational design that we believe provide insight into aspects of a VEO that traditionally are overlooked.


³⁹ Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, 72.

⁴⁰ Adam B. Lowther and Casey Lucius, “Identifying America’s Vital Interests,” *Taylor & Francis*, 2013. 156–66.

⁴¹ Lowther, “Identifying America’s Vital Interests,” 156–66.

1. Phase One: Culture and Context


The framework and concept we use in Phase One draws from anthropology and can only be informed by the region or country's specific context and history. A cursory surface-level understanding is insufficient for applying effective deterrence. The primary focus in Phase One is to understand the cultural and historical context that leads to a population being aggrieved, as shown in Figure 2. By understanding and successfully deterring these contributing factors, the opportunity for VEOs to form and organize no longer exists. In essence, by preventing the factors that lead to an aggrieved population it may be possible to prevent a VEO from ever existing.



2. Phase Two: Social-Movement Theory

Most social movements fail, but a sizable number have successfully changed the fabric of their societies (for example, America's independence movement, civil rights, etc). We use social-movement theory to explore Phase Two of Al-Shabaab's evolutionary growth process, as shown in Figure 3. Although social movements have myriad goals, they all vie for finite resources (supporters, money, and information) and

stem from some type of systemic or structural strain (the cause) followed by the society's rise (the effect) against the status quo (emergence).



a. Definitions

Social movements are defined as special-interest groups, resistance movements, political parties, or terrorist organizations organized to change a status quo they deem unjust.⁴² Karl-Dieter Opp contends, “Political protest has become a legitimate way and is widely used to influence the decision of governments and other organizations.”⁴³ Sidney Tarrow states in *Power in Movement* that contentious politics happen “when collective actors join forces in confrontation with elites, authorities, and opponents around their

42 This chapter uses the National Research Council of the National Academies’ 2002 terrorism definition, articulated in *Terrorism: Perspectives from the Behavioral and Social Sciences*. “Terrorism is the illegal use or threatened use of force or violence, with an intent to coerce societies or governments by inducing fear in their populations, typically with political and/or ideological motives and justifications, and an ‘extra societal’ element, either, ‘outside society in the case of domestic terrorism or ‘foreign’ in the case of international terrorism.”

43 Karl-Dieter Opp, *Theories of Political Protest and Social Movements: A Multidisciplinary Introduction, Critique, and Synthesis* (New York: Routledge, 2009), xiii.

claims or the claims of those they claim to represent.”⁴⁴ Additionally, “a resistance movement is defined by the Department of Defense as an organized effort by some portion of the civil population of a country to resist the legally established government or an occupying power and to disrupt civil order and stability.”⁴⁵ A common theme in the definition of social movements is that of political phenomena pursued with the intention of changing the status quo.⁴⁶ In this thesis, we define a social movement as a homogeneous coalition striving towards a common goal through contentious politics, military action, and social methods. Simply put, social movements, as we are using this term, foster rebellion against the state, in the form of political protest.

b. *The Political-Process Model*

The political-process model (PPM) was selected because it fits well with the study of VEOs and provides insight for DOD planners to deter, disrupt, or neutralize groups before they can take root in society.⁴⁷ The PPM is overlaid on the EGP as illustrated in Figure 4. Doug McAdam notes that there are three critical components in movement formation: expanding political opportunities, indigenous organizational strength, and cognitive liberation.⁴⁸ Maryjane Osa observes, “Many empirical studies confirm these factors are associated with the incidence of social movements.”⁴⁹ When these components combine with a broad socioeconomic process, conditions become ripe for social movements to emerge.⁵⁰

44 Sidney Tarrow, *Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics*, Third ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 4.

45 U.S. Joint Staff, Joint Publication 3–05 Special Operations (WashingtonDC: Government Printing Office, (16 July 2014), GL-10.

46 Doug McAdam, *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930–1970* (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1982), 40.


47 The PPM is an alternative to popular social-movement theories such as the resource-mobilization model (RMM), which suggests that the formation of social movements relies on acquiring resources and mobilizing members to achieve stated goals.

48 McAdam, *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency*, 40.

49 Mario Diani and Doug McAdam, *Social Movements and Networks: Relational Approaches to Collective Action* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 77.

50 McAdam, *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency*, 40.

Figure 4. The Political-Process Model



Adopted from: Doug McAdam, *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930–1970* (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1982), Chapter 3.

(1) Broad Socioeconomic Process

A broad socioeconomic process, or “system strain,” influences the chance of movement emergence and enhances the bargaining power of the aggrieved population. McAdam refers to this dynamic as a “broad socioeconomic process.” Widespread dissatisfaction with political, economic, or social conditions raises awareness of injustice, thereby motivating people to revolt against the situation. Social movements develop through a confluence of connected events that are dispersed over space and aggregate over time.⁵¹ For example, events may include civil war, a national identity crisis, contested governance, civilians as the target of violence, extreme poverty, violation of human rights, famine, social injustice, and/or a political elite that accumulates undue wealth and power. These broad socioeconomic conditions may spawn social movements to meet the needs of the people.

⁵¹ McAdam, *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency*, 40.

(2) Political Opportunity

Political opportunity is the ability of an opportunistic challenger to rally supporters to a common cause and advance their collective political views against an incumbent government. For example, there are open societies that allow their population to voice grievances (political opportunity), closed societies that violently dissuade collective action (limited political opportunity), and failed states that have little, if any, control over their population (unlimited political opportunity). Doowan Lee defines political opportunity as the “consistent, but not necessarily formal or permanent signals to social or political actors that either encourage or discourage them to use their internal resources to form collective action.”⁵² Lack of trust in government, suspicion towards the political elite, international intervention, and ambitious political parties create opportunities for a social movement to fill political voids. Political opportunity can also be found in the political landscape itself.

(3) Indigenous Organizational Strength

McAdam cites indigenous organizational strength as the ability of a social movement to leverage a local community’s resources, thus enabling collective action. This “conversion potential” is essentially converting portions of the aggrieved population into an active protest movement. A social movement’s conversion potential depends on linking multiple groups of like-minded individuals into a base of support sufficient for collective action. Conversion potential is linked to mobilization, which is a function of four critical factors: membership, communication-network infrastructure, incentives, and leadership.⁵³

(4) Cognitive Liberation

The final characteristic of McAdam’s PPM, cognitive liberation, originates in social psychology. McAdam suggests that while political opportunity and indigenous


⁵² Doowan Lee, “A Social Movement Approach to Unconventional Warfare,” *Special Warfare* 26, no. 3 (July-September, 2013), 30.

⁵³ McAdam, *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency*, 43–44.

organizational strength may be present, they alone do not precipitate insurgency.⁵⁴ Cognitive liberation refers to the message or narrative that a social movement uses to enlighten or propagandize people on the events and circumstances around them, explaining who is to blame and how they (the social movement) can help. In other words, social movements use cognitive liberation to establish a compelling narrative of shared grievances and to then propose solutions, clear goals, and a rationale for collective action.

3. Phase Three: Organizational-Design Theory

Progressing from Phase Two (social-movement emergence); Phase Three of the EGP framework focuses on the bureaucratic aspects of an organization. This phase is shown in Figure 5. The open-systems model in organizational-design theory offers insights into an organization's success or failure based on how well it relates to its circumstances and environment. Comprehending these factors is useful in understanding how organizations should operate to be most effective and for providing policymakers with operational recommendations for undermining VEO success.



⁵⁴ McAdam, *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency*, 48–50.

a. Organizational Design

Henry Mintzberg argues that the structure of an organization should not be chosen at random; “rather, they should be selected according to internally consistent groupings. And these groupings should be consistent with the situation of the organization.”⁵⁵ If an incorrect structure is used that does not match the environment, an organization will not operate successfully, and this can lead to organizational failure. The “design” of an organization encompasses a variety of aspects; those examined here are its boundary, mission or goals, inputs, internal transformation processes, outputs, feedback, and environment. The open-systems model provides broad insights for deterring any organization.

b. The Open-Systems Model

An open system is a set of interrelated and interdependent parts arranged to accomplish a mission or purpose. David Hanna asserts that open systems are “dependent on their environment in order to survive and are, therefore, open to influence and transactions with the outside world as long as they exist.”⁵⁶ Garrath Morgan explains, “Organizations are open systems that need careful management to satisfy and balance internal needs and to adapt to environmental circumstances.”⁵⁷ These interdependent parts consist of the boundary, mission and goals, inputs, internal transformation processes, outputs, feedback, and environment, as illustrated in Figure 6.⁵⁸


55 Henry Mintzberg, “Organization Design: Fashion or Fit?” *Harvard Business Review*, 1981, 2.

56 David P. Hanna, *Designing Organizations for High Performance* (Reading, Mass: Addison-Wesley Pub. Co., 1988), 8.

57 Gareth Morgan, *Images of Organization: The Executive Edition*, 1st ed., Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications Inc., 1998, 44.

58 Hanna, *Designing Organizations for High Performance*, 8.

Figure 6. The Open-Systems Model



Adapted from: David P. Hanna, *Designing Organizations for High Performance* (Reading, Mass: Addison-Wesley Pub. Co., 1988), 18.

A boundary is the imaginary line that delineates a specific organization from others that may compete for resources, support, and information towards the overall mission and goals. An open system's boundary is permeable, allowing it to interact with and receive feedback from the environment. Hanna argues that boundaries are critical for an open system's continued existence, because they set one organization apart from another.⁵⁹ A mission is essentially a long-term organization's overall reason for being—the reason a group works together to achieve a common ideological purpose.⁶⁰ Operative goals are the tasks or activities an organization must perform to fulfill its mission or purpose. Operative goals are short-term, day-to-day, specific and measurable outcomes.

Inputs are the resources, materials, information, and energy from the environment required for an organization's survival that may be transformed into outputs. Transformation is the process by which inputs are taken from the environment and

⁵⁹ Hanna, *Designing Organizations for High Performance*, 9.

⁶⁰ Daawa is from the long-standing growth of Wahhabi-influenced Salafi preaching in Somalia, a religious outlook that arguably makes the step to armed Salafi-jihadism ideologically easier.

changed into outputs. Transformation is where the central work of an organization occurs, resulting from interaction among the three core processes of a group. Hanna defines a core process as “something directly related to the purpose.”⁶¹ The first core process pertains to tasks, the activity needed to fulfill a mission or purpose. The second involves individuals as they focus their efforts on the fulfillment of a core task, and the third, the group process, is the formation of links between individual participants and core tasks. How well an organization performs as a group is a function of how well leadership balances core processes, divides tasks, communicates goals, and exploits individual talents and goals with respect to the mission. Outputs are what an organization exports back into the environment, with the expectation of successfully achieving the overall mission. These outputs reveal what an organization believes will help attain its goals.

Feedback is information received from the environment, providing the data needed to assess whether transformative processes are on target with operative goals and mission accomplishment and allowing the organization to morph and adjust in response. A successful organization will continually refine its structure, internal processes, outputs, and responses, to avoid entropy.⁶² To operate effectively—and, indeed, to survive—an organization depends on inputs such as people, money, resources, and information. Hanna argues, “The environment provides the inputs, must accept the outputs, must support the purpose, and provides feedback to the system.”⁶³ According to Daft, “the organizational environment is defined as all elements that exist outside the boundary of the organization and have the potential to affect all or part of the organization.”⁶⁴ The environment includes the country of origin, surrounding culture, diaspora, third-party supporters, competitors, and opposition.

61 Hanna, *Designing Organizations for High Performance*, 12.

62 Africa Briefing, Somalia: *Al-Shabaab –It Will be a Long War*, Nairobi/Brussels: International Crisis Group Africa Briefing No. 99, 2014, 9–12.

63 Hanna, *Designing Organizations for High Performance*, 9.

64 Richard L. Daft, *Essentials of Organization Theory & Design*, 8th ed., Mason, Ohio: Thompson South-Western, 2004, 48.

c. Organizational Structure

Organizational structure refers to the ordered arrangement of members, featuring various levels of authority, modes of coordination, job differentiation, and levels of training. The organizational structure functions within environments that may vary in complexity and may lack the stability needed to achieve organizational goals. Henry Mintzberg offers six basic organizational configurations, each based on one primary coordinating mechanism and one key component of the organization

Essentially, every organization has two core functions: division of labor and work coordination, as presented in Table 1.

Table 1. The Six Types of Organizational Structure

Type of Structure	Coordinating Mechanism	Key
Simple Structure	Direct Supervision	Strategic Apex
Machine Bureaucracy	Standardization of Work	Technostructure
Professional Bureaucracy	Standardization of Skills	Operation Core
Adhocracy	Mutual Adjustment	Support Staff
Divisionalized	Standardization of Output	Middle Line
Missionary	Standardization of Norms	Ideology

Mintzberg observes, “Every organized human activity, from the making of pots to the placing of a man on the moon, gives rise to two fundamental and opposing requirements: the division of labor into various tasks to be performed, and the coordination of these tasks to accomplish the activity.”⁶⁵ This thesis focuses on both the divisional (matrix) and missionary type structures; because Al-Shabaab has bureaucratized their organizational structure to match that of a decentralized divisional organization and also because ideology is a key facet of Islamist organizations such as Al-Shabaab.

⁶⁵ Henry Mintzberg, *The Structuring of Organizations*, (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1979), 2.

(1) Matrix Structure

Richard Daft's matrix structure like Mintzberg's divisional is a hybrid structure that has "a strong form of horizontal linkage in which both product and functional structures (horizontal and vertical) are implemented simultaneously."⁶⁶ Richard Daft suggests that for a matrix organization to succeed, "Managers in key roles have specific responsibilities. The key roles are top leaders, matrix-bosses, and two-boss employees."⁶⁷

Daft also suggests three conditions must be met for a matrix organization to function correctly. First, scarce resources, such as equipment, manpower, and money, must be shared across the organization's regional operations. Notably, Al-Shabaab is moderately sized, suggesting that not every region has enough members to assign to every full-time functional position. Second, according to Daft, each regional cell must possess authority equal to that of headquarters. This aspect creates two bosses for many members, but also beneficially decentralizes the organization. Finally, the environment must be both complex and uncertain, amalgamating a variety of influences and needs that affect the organization.⁶⁸ This fits Al-Shabaab, as we will see.

⁶⁶ Richard L. Daft, *Organization Theory and Design*, 6th ed. (Cincinnati, Ohio: South-Western College Publishing, 1997), 666.

⁶⁷ Daft, *Organization Theory and Design*, 6th ed., 666.

⁶⁸ Daft, *Organization Theory and Design*, 6th ed., 224–233.

III. SOMALIA: CULTURE AND CONTEXT

In this chapter, we review some features of Somalia's cultural and historical context in order to trace the conditions that resulted in the formation of Al-Shabaab. To begin, we review what has been said about Somalia's culture as pertinent to the development of Al-Shabaab. We then examine Somalia's history, dividing it into early, middle, and late periods. To provide a general understanding of the case before applying the three phases of the EGP framework in chapters IV, V, and VI.

A. CULTURE

After years of failed policies overseas, it should be apparent that understanding the culture and shared experience of a people matters. Many aspects of Somali culture can be gleaned from history, but equally important aspects may not be so obvious. The following cultural factors are those that scholars and others have found most important to consider when dealing with Somalis.

1. Kinship

The most elementary and important aspect of Somali culture and politics is kinship. The fabric of Somali culture is woven from tight patrilineal relationships defined by genealogies. Family bloodlines and clans are the very foundation of Somali culture and thus play a critical role in everything that involves the Somali people.⁶⁹ It is impossible for any American, Ethiopian, or other foreigner to grasp the complex history, context, and fluid inter- and intra-relationships among these lineages. The relationships are so elastic and complex that they even fluctuate based on who people happen to be interacting with at any given time.⁷⁰

In her book *Networks of Dissolution: Somalia Undone*, Anna Simons observes,


69 Ioan Myrddin Lewis, *A Pastoral Democracy A Study of Pastoralism and Politics Among the Northern Somali of the Horn of Africa*, London, New York, Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1961, 1, 2, 4, 29, 297; Walter S. Poole, *The Effort to Save Somalia*, Washington, DC: The Joint History Office, 2005, 5.

70 Lewis, *A Pastoral Democracy A Study of Pastoralism and Politics Among the Northern Somali of the Horn of Africa*, 1, 2, 4, 29, 297; – Poole, *The Effort to Save Somalia*, 5.

Traditionally Somalis had never had a social structure outsiders could see... [Furthermore] Somalis were also adept at reworking this structure, situationally... These were the facts that all outside judgments should have been based on, not who was allied with whom at the moment. Without context what could such associations mean anyway? After all, who was allied with whom today in Mogadishu could not predict how fallings-out might occur tomorrow, or new alliances be put together the day after.⁷¹

The five major clans, from largest to smallest as a percentage of the population, are the Hawiya, Issaq, Darod, Rahanweyn, and Dir.⁷² The approximate clan percentages and locations are identified in Figure 7.

Figure 7. Major Clan Distribution and Approximate Location



Adopted from: Mohammed, Abdul-Aziz. "Somalia and the 'Ugly Clan Federalism'." The African Executive. Accessed March 22, 2015.
http://www.africanexecutive.com/modules/magazine/article_print.php?article=8000.

71 Anna Simons, *Networks of Dissolution: Somalia Undone*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995, 203.

72 Sam Voron, "Somali Clans and their Percentage of the Population 2002," Somalia Amateur Radio, Accessed November 14, 2015, https://sites.google.com/site/somaliaamateurradio/somalia_population_maps

Clans and their subdivisions, or sub-clans, determine many of the coalitions, alliances, and treaties in Somalia. They also participate in insurgent groups and fuel many of their rivalries. Because of the supreme role that clans play in everyday life, they have an influence on insurgent groups. However, as violent mobile or foreign forces have entered the scene, clan elders have found their influence diminished, especially when confronted by young militants.

2. Pastoral Nomadism

Intimately associated with kinship is the second-most important cultural aspect of Somali life, pastoral nomadism. In the 1960s, approximately 80 percent of Somalis were seasonally migratory nomads who moved livestock wherever water and grazing was available.⁷³ Even today, nomads and semi-pastoralists constitute a significant portion of the population, and livestock accounts for about 40 percent of Somalia's gross domestic product (GDP).⁷⁴ Animals like camels, cattle, sheep, and goats, as well as anything associated with their survival, are of vital significance to the Somali people. Conflicts often arise due to disputes over grazing and water rights, contributing to clan and sub-clan feuds. Typically in nomadic settings, might makes right and arbitration is often governed or affected by the relative strength of the family or clan. The prevalence of nomadism "actively militates against the formation of stable territorial groups,"⁷⁵ centralized government, and accepted international borders.

3. Islam and Ancestral Pride

Somalis are a proud people—proud of their Arab Islamic ties and of their lineage, which is based on belief in an ancestry that traces back to Mohammad.⁷⁶ Somalia's official religion is Sunni Islam and the population is 99.8 percent Muslim, standing in

⁷³ Saadia Touval, *Somali Nationalism: International Politics and the Drive for Unity in the Horn of Africa*, 2nd ed., Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999, 13.

⁷⁴ "The World Factbook: Somalia." U.S. Government Printing Office. Accessed February 18, 2015. <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/so.html>

⁷⁵ Lewis, *A Pastoral Democracy A Study of Pastoralism and Politics Among the Northern Somali of the Horn of Africa*, 2.

⁷⁶ Touval, *Somali Nationalism: International Politics and the Drive for Unity in the Horn of Africa*, 15.

stark contrast to Somalia's neighbors, who are mostly either of the Christian or indigenous African faiths.⁷⁷ The Somalis' pride in their Islamic heritage has created an in-group bias. As a generalization, they see themselves as superior to others—which is manifested in an “us versus them” mentality.⁷⁸ A popular Somali saying illustrates the social hierarchy of strife.

Me and my clan against the world;
Me and my family against my clan;
Me and my brother against my family;
Me against my brother.⁷⁹

4. Hostility Toward External Influences

Ethiopia is historically Somalia's most enduring external enemy, as described below, but in general, Somalis disdain external influences, especially from non-Muslims. This rejection of outside advice can create a difficult environment for stability—and a problem only Somalis can solve.

5. A Global Network

Stemming in part from Somalia's strategic location on the sea, the Somali diaspora is flung to the far reaches of the globe and yet Somalis remain closely connected. Tight interpersonal relationships maintained via cellphone, radio, the Internet, travel remittances sent home from abroad, help keep social networks strong and the Somali economy afloat. Around the world, Somalis stay apprised of Somali affairs.⁸⁰

⁷⁷ “The World Factbook: Somalia.” U.S. Government Printing Office. Accessed February 18, 2015. <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/so.html>

⁷⁸ Touval, *Somali Nationalism: International Politics and the Drive for Unity in the Horn of Africa*, 84.

⁷⁹ Scott Peterson, *Me Against My Brother: At War In Somalia, Sudan and Rwanda*, Routledge, 2014. 1.

⁸⁰ Lewis, *A Pastoral Democracy A Study of Pastoralism and Politics Among the Northern Somali of the Horn of Africa*, 270.

6. Opportunism

The last cultural aspect important for analysis is the extraordinary opportunism of the Somali people. Nomadic life and simple survival have necessitated keen skill in exploiting possible advantages:

From within the Somali frame, whenever individuals were able to successfully gain goods that could be turned into money (or more goods or favors [such as aid shipments, arms, political contributions]), such windfalls renewed hope and reaffirmed the importance of being able, even staying poised to take advantage of opportunity; expectations could pay off.⁸¹

To sum it up in Somali form, “either be a mountain or lean on one.”⁸²

Understanding these cultural fundamentals, it should not be surprising that the two most admired and influential national heroes in Somalia are Ahmed ibn Ibrahim al Ghazi and Muhammad Abdullah Hassan. These elements help explain historic events and will continue to play an instrumental role in Somalia’s future.

B. SOMALI HISTORY

1. Early History

Evidence from archeological digs in the Horn of Africa suggests the region may have been inhabited in prehistoric times. However, the earliest recorded history relating to the Horn is found in ancient Egyptian inscriptions referring to the land of Punt or Pwenet as an early trading partner.⁸³ Though there is dispute as to the location of Punt, it is believed to cover an area southwest of Egypt, around the Red Sea, which today includes Eritrea, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Somalia, and the southern Arabian Peninsula.⁸⁴ The salient points are the suggestion of eastern-Arabic influence over a period of millennia

81 Simons, *Networks of Dissolution: Somalia Undone*, 200.

82 Peter J Schraeder, *United States Foreign Policy Towards Africa: Incrementalism, Crisis and Change*, New York: Cambridge University Press, January 1994, 114.

83 Touval, *Somali Nationalism: International Politics and the Drive for Unity in the Horn of Africa*, 8.

84 Ian Shaw and Paul Nicholson, *The Dictionary of Ancient Egypt*, British Museum Press, London. 1995, 231.

and of ancient Somalia as a strategic region, inclined to trade, between the Middle East and Africa.

Arabia and Persia heavily influenced the Horn of Africa, not only via immigrants who settled in the region, but also through the spread of religion and culture. In the early 10th century, traders, explorers, and immigrants, primarily Arabs, began to establish coastal settlements, trading posts, and eventually ports and towns along the Indian Ocean coast. With trade and cultural influences came a new religion, Islam, which remains a fixed part of Somali culture to this day. Beginning with settlements that eventually formed a loose federation, local dynastic sultanates arose and enjoyed prosperity until the 15th century, when they were subdued by pressure from interior nomads who interfered with trade.⁸⁵

Owing to declining economic trade and a consequent inability to support the growing population, the 16th century saw a period of intense unrest.⁸⁶ A series of wars was directed at Ethiopia, as a Somali from the Darod clan, Imam Ahmed ibn Ibrahim al Ghazi, gained political power by urging a disparate Islamic-majority population into a holy war against Christian Ethiopians to the west.⁸⁷ Although some consider it an obligation within Islam to conquer Christians and spread the teachings of Mohammed, the timing makes it clear that the motivation of this “holy war” was political—an effort to gain wealth, land, and power to prop up a failing region. Forced conversions were but a bonus. With help from the Portuguese in 1543, Ethiopia defeated Ahmed, thus ending the threat of Moslem conquest. Since the 16th century, smaller wars between Ethiopia and its Moslem neighbors have continued.⁸⁸

⁸⁵ Touval, *Somali Nationalism: International Politics and the Drive for Unity in the Horn of Africa*, 9–18.

⁸⁶ Touval, *Somali Nationalism: International Politics and the Drive for Unity in the Horn of Africa*, 49.

⁸⁷ Touval, *Somali Nationalism: International Politics and the Drive for Unity in the Horn of Africa*, 49.

⁸⁸ Touval, *Somali Nationalism: International Politics and the Drive for Unity in the Horn of Africa*, 50.

2. Middle History

Local and regional control under Arabic sultanates gave way to foreign entanglements and colonial control in the 19th and 20th centuries, as areas of the Horn were leased, bought, and divided by European interests.

The opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 altered the geopolitical composition of the region yet again; by bolstering trade with Europe, India, and the Far East, the shores of the Red Sea increased in strategic importance.⁸⁹ This elevated status attracted European colonizers and created new openings for sultans and warlords, who had proven adept opportunists over time, to use every change to their political advantage, whether against a rival clan or enemy or in pursuit of personal interests. The “scramble for Africa” began, and although there were other powers carving up Africa from 1881–1914, Italy, France, and Britain were the major colonial powers in the Horn. Ethiopia, the sole independent empire in the region, was the only non-colonial power involved in the scramble, and Egypt’s withdrawal from the area during this period renewed Ethiopian aspirations for the Ogaden region. Local sultans continued to manipulate these foreign powers to advance their own interests, leasing and selling parcels of land to the Italians and exploiting the British and others in their maneuvers against rivals.

In 1895, Sayyid Muhammad Abdullah Hassan returned to British-controlled Somaliland. Also known as the “Mad Mullah,” he complicated affairs among clans, colonialists, and Ethiopia for the following two decades.⁹⁰ Provoked by foreign incursions and annoyed at Somalis who rejected his teachings, he led a holy war initially directed at moderate Sufi Muslims, but later against Ethiopians and the British as well.⁹¹ The dervish movement was eventually crushed, and the division of Somalia resumed.⁹²

89 Touval, *Somali Nationalism: International Politics and the Drive for Unity in the Horn of Africa*, 33.

90 Robert L. Hess, “The ‘Mad Mullah’ and Northern Somalia,” *The Journal of African History* 5, no. 3 (1964): 418.

91 Hess, “The ‘Mad Mullah’ and Northern Somalia,” 420.

92 Hess, “The ‘Mad Mullah’ and Northern Somalia,” 424.

93, 94 “Somalis were divided among five different political entities: Italian Somaliland, British Somaliland, French Somaliland (Djibouti), Ethiopia, and Kenya.”⁹⁵

In *Somali Nationalism*, Saadia Touval explains that “three factors contributed to the development of national consciousness among Somalis.”⁹⁶ The most important was resentment against harsh and oppressive colonial governments, followed by religious antagonism towards non-Moslem, alien governments and the attempts of outside governments to undermine their rivals by encouraging Somali nationalism.⁹⁷ These influences ripened into a political movement at the end of World War II. In 1960, four months after the end of the British protectorate, the former British Somaliland united with the former Italian Somalia to form the Somali Republic.⁹⁸

3. Late History

Like another former colony, Eritrea, Somalia lacked independent, civil-society organizations;⁹⁹ and with its vast majority of nomadic people, the new nation also lacked the benefit of real and enduring governmental checks and balances. These inadequacies allowed opportunistic, power-hungry leaders to arrogate control and militated against progress. The people granted the government leeway in the first flush of independence, as a constitution was created, and democracy attempted, but this grace period lasted less than a decade.

93 Touval, *Somali Nationalism: International Politics and the Drive for Unity in the Horn of Africa*, 1.

94 Lewis, *A Pastoral Democracy A Study of Pastoralism and Politics Among the Northern Somali of the Horn of Africa*, 267.

95 Touval, *Somali Nationalism: International Politics and the Drive for Unity in the Horn of Africa*, 1.

96 Touval, *Somali Nationalism: International Politics and the Drive for Unity in the Horn of Africa*, 61–62.

97 Touval, *Somali Nationalism: International Politics and the Drive for Unity in the Horn of Africa*, 61–62.

98 Touval, *Somali Nationalism: International Politics and the Drive for Unity in the Horn of Africa*, 84, 108.

99 Kidane Mengisteab and Yohannes Okbazghi, *Anatomy of the African Tragedy : Political, Economic, and Foreign Policy Crisis in Post-Independence Eritrea*, Trenton, NJ: Red Sea Press, 2005, 282.

Somali Islamism can be traced back to three 1960s social movement organizations: *Waxada al-Shabab al Islami* (Islamic Youth Unity), *Jama'at Ahl al-Islami* (Al-Ahli), and *Munadamat al-Nahdah al Islamiyah* (the Organization of Islamic Renaissance), all of which were formed to influence Somali politics at this vulnerable and impressionable time.¹⁰⁰

Following the assassination of the democratically elected Somali president Abdirashid Ali Shermarke in 1969, Mohamed Siad Barre positioned himself as military dictator and president through a bloodless military coup.¹⁰¹ Barre repealed the constitution and democracy and replaced many in the government with people loyal to his inner circle. Throughout his 21-year reign, Siad Barre used various means to rally or distract the Somali people, to include internal clan divisions. He strengthened ties to the Arabic world, a region most Somalis identify with affectionately, and secured partnership with the Arab League in 1974.

A few years later, in 1977, confronted with failing policies and falling support, Siad Barre invaded the Ogaden region of Ethiopia. War succeeded for a time in distracting the Somali people, until the Soviets dropped aid to Somalia and backed Ethiopia to victory in 1978. Following defeat and the declining support for the dictator, a shakeup and a new constitution were attempted. Two of the most prominent Islamist combatant groups (*Waxada al-Shabab al Islami* and *Jama'at Ahl al-Islami*) merged and formed Al Ittihad Al Islamiya (AIAI) in 1984. AIAI's goal was the removal of Siad Barre and the establishment of an Islamic state, but Barre used force to maintain power. His power declined substantially over the next decade, as he was seen by some to be supporting particular clans, which incited clan conflicts and eventually led to civil war. In January 1991, Siad Barre was thrown out of power by rival factions. The anarchy and lawlessness that ensued from the collapse of the government has continued, partly as a result of endless foreign intervention.¹⁰²

100 Stig Jarle Hansen, *Al Shabaab in Somalia: The History and Ideology of a Militant Islamist Group*, 2005–2012 Oxford University Press, 2013), 15.

101 Walter S. Poole, *The Effort to Save Somalia*, Washington, DC: The Joint History Office, 2005, 5.

102 Poole, *The Effort to Save Somalia*, 5.

A theme has emerged in Somalia: as outside influence comes in to exacerbate problems, the political elites receive ample opportunity to plunder. This was clear with Sayyid Muhammad Abdullah Hassan as well as with Siad Barre. Saadia Touval, in *Somali Nationalism*, summarizes the problem:

Thus, the present involvement of external powers in the Horn of Africa is motivated by their varying interests and also has been encouraged by the weaknesses of the territories in the region and their need for political and economic support. The involvement of foreign powers in the Horn should not be surprising. Yet it is not conducive to peace. It aggravates regional tensions.¹⁰³

Ultimately, Touval argues, the difficulties in Somalia need to be resolved by Somalis. By 1989, many expatriates' advice for Somalia was to leave Somalis alone for twenty years to sort out their own problems.¹⁰⁴

Even at the outset of Operation Restore Hope, there were those who saw the final outcome. In December 1992, just before the first U.S. Marines landed at Mogadishu, ambassador Smith Hempstone sent the state department a cable, entitled "The Somali Tarbaby," that proved remarkably prescient:

"Somalis ... are natural-born guerrillas. They will mine the roads. They will lay ambushes. They will launch hit-and-run attacks.... If you liked Beirut, you'll love Mogadishu. To what end? To keep tens of thousands of Somali kids from starving to death in 1993 who, in all probability, will starve to death in 1994 (unless we are prepared to remain through 1994)? ... I have heard estimates ... that it will take five years to get Somalia not on its feet but just on its knees.... Finally, what will we leave behind when we depart? The Somali is treacherous. The Somali is a killer. The Somali is as tough as his country, and just as unforgiving.... We ought to have learned by now that these situations are easier to get into than to get out of, that no good deed goes unpunished.'

The joint staff's attitude, while never so pungently phrased, was roughly the same as Hempstone's, opposing the decision to carry out a major ground intervention in November 1992.¹⁰⁵

103 Touval, *Somali Nationalism: International Politics and the Drive for Unity in the Horn of Africa*, 180.

104 Simons, *Networks of Dissolution: Somalia Undone*, 202.

105 Poole, *The Effort to Save Somalia*, 69.

In 1992, Somalia's political situation once again became intertwined with foreign intervention, first by the U.S., then shortly after by the UN, under the rationale of humanitarian assistance. "For the United States, the cost came to 32 killed in action, 172 wounded and \$1.3 billion spent through 30 June 1994."¹⁰⁶ By September 1994, "Somalia had reverted to a political state not far from the anarchy of 1992."¹⁰⁷

Under Siad Barre, VEOs never flourished. It was only in the chaos following his ouster, and the prolonged civil war that Islamism revived. Many internally-sponsored attempts at transitional governments were attempted after the civil war, but none were effective. The Islamic courts emerged in this vacuum.

The first Islamic court was founded as early as 1993 in the capital city of Mogadishu.¹⁰⁸ By March 2000, there were eleven individual courts and a Sharia Implementation Council (SIC) was organized. The courts served to adjudicate intra- and inter-clan issues. Chairman Sheikh Ali Dheere led the SIC and Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys served as secretary general (AIAI military commander). Each individual court contributed 80 men to build the court's military security apparatus. Hassan Dahir Aweys took control of the security component.¹⁰⁹ As they began to consolidate their reach and authority, some opportunistic Somalis in a radical faction of the Islamic courts attempted to co-opt the popular movement for their own political ends. They ramped up their rhetoric against Ethiopia, which was seen as meddling in Somali politics through their active (yet requested) support of the TFG. Though the majority of those in the Islamic courts disagreed with the rogue element advocating war, they could not change what happened next.

Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States, followed by the United Nations a month later, branded AIAI a terrorist organization, for its

¹⁰⁶ Poole, *The Effort to Save Somalia*, 69.

¹⁰⁷ Poole, *The Effort to Save Somalia*, 67.

¹⁰⁸ Hansen, *Al Shabaab in Somalia: The History and Ideology of a Militant Islamist Group*, 50.

¹⁰⁹ Angel Rabasa, "Radical Islam in East Africa," RAND January 1, 2009, 45–47, Accessed January 22, 2015. <http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG782.html>.

association with Al-Qaeda.¹¹⁰ In a report to Congress, Ted Dagne relayed that many ICU and AIAI leaders had grown weary of “old” leaders’ decisions and created a new organization in 2003 called *Harakat Al-Shabaab Al-Mujahedeen*.^{111, 112}

Since Siad Barre’s ouster in 1991, warlords had administered local security in many parts of Somalia and crime had spiraled out of control. In 2006, the courts united to form the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) and began to run the warlords out of town.¹¹³ In response to their decline in power and to resist the growing influence of the ICU, local warlords and businessmen formed the Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism (APRCT). The APRCT was soon heavily supported by the CIA. The APRCT led the CIA to believe that the ICU was a radical Islamic organization dedicated to terrorism.¹¹⁴ In turn, the ICU “started to represent an alternative power system when they united to face a common enemy, the U.S.-backed [APRCT].”¹¹⁵ Eventually, members of the ICU attacked what they perceived to be the Western-backed, anti-Islamic APRCT and Ethiopian-backed TFG.

Ethiopia, mindful of historical Somali Islamic invasions, joined the new U.S. global war on terrorism in yet another entanglement with Somalia. Within six months of the ICU’s establishment, and upon the request of the TFG, a U.S.-backed Ethiopian invasion took place. The initial goal had been to support the TFG. However, the effort quickly shifted towards destroying the ICU and any potential terrorist elements within it. In essence, the invasion of 2006 was reminiscent of the colonial interference of the 1900s. Ethiopia’s TFG-requested intervention was soon used as a recruiting tool for the

¹¹⁰ Stanford.edu, “Mapping Militant Organizations: Al Ittihad Al Islamiya,” Stanford University, <http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/99?highlight=AIAI> Aug 15, 2015.

¹¹¹ Ted Dagne, “Somalia: Current Conditions and Prospects for a Lasting Peace,” Congressional Research Service, 2010. 5. Accessed February 1, 2015. <http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/150770.pdf>

¹¹² Gartenstein-Ross, Daveed. “The Strategic Challenge of Somalia’s Al-Shabaab: Dimensions of Jihad.” *The Middle East Quarterly* 16, no. 4 (Fall 2009), 25–36.

¹¹³ Malinda S. Smith, *Securing Africa: Post-9/11 Discourses on Terrorism* (Burlington, VT: Assignee Publishing Company, 2010), 184–185.

¹¹⁴ Mary Harper, *Getting Somalia Wrong? Faith, War and Hope in a Shattered State*, London | New York: ZED Books, 2012, 36–38.

¹¹⁵ Harper, *Getting Somalia Wrong? Faith, War and Hope in a Shattered State*, 80.

formation of a new VEO. Foreign interference gave the radical Islamic movement exactly what it needed to gain popularity; with this support, the radicals were able to wage a protracted campaign against U.S.-backed Ethiopia. This preventable movement was the beginning of Al-Shabaab.

4. Al-Shabaab

After Ethiopia's invasion and military routing of the ICU, many of its moderate leaders and members fled to neighboring countries. This left behind the radical military wing of the ICU, Harakat Al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen, henceforth referred to as "Al-Shabaab," which split from the ICU in December 2006 to form its own organization.¹¹⁶ According to Rob Wise,

The Ethiopian occupation of Somalia ... would fuel the development of al Shabaab's ideology, recruitment, operational strategy, and partnerships, transforming the group from a small, relatively unimportant part of a more moderate Islamic movement into the most powerful and radical armed faction in the country.¹¹⁷

On January 8, 2007, for the first time since 2004, the TFG occupied the capital city of Mogadishu and, in March, the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) deployed to Somalia to assist the TFG and protect key infrastructure.¹¹⁸ During this occupation Somali volunteers swelled the ranks of Al-Shabaab, which grew in size from approximately 400 fighters into the thousands. They were motivated by the nationalist narrative that Ethiopians must be driven out of the country. Fighting their way south from Mogadishu, Al-Shabaab fighters conquered and held large portions of southern Somalia. They would continue to use guerilla tactics to defend and fight the Ethiopian military, the

116 Jonathan Masters and Mohammed A. Sergie, "Al-Shabab," Council on Foreign Relations, (March 13, 2015). Accessed December 3, 2015, <http://www.cfr.org/somalia/al-shabab/p18650>.

117 Rob Wise, "Al Shabaab" *Center for Strategic & International Studies* (July 2011): 4.

118 Stephanie Hanson and Eben Kaplan, "Somalia's Transitional Government," Council on Foreign Relations, (May 12, 2008). Accessed December 4, 2015, <http://www.cfr.org/somalia/somalias-transitional-government/p12475>.

African Union (AU), and TFG forces.^{119, 120} According to Wise, “following the initial invasion, [A]l Shabaab began a campaign of guerrilla raids, bombings, and assassination attempts against Ethiopian forces in the southcentral region.”¹²¹ Along the way, Al-Shabaab implemented its version of Sharia law, and nationalism and Islamic ideology became its central narrative theme.¹²²

As Al-Shabaab maintained and held territory in southern Somalia, including the key port of Kismayo, it organized basic governmental services, such as policing, welfare, and general law and order.¹²³ Al-Shabaab approached the clan system carefully, never operating in isolation from clan dynamics and using its intimate knowledge of clans to advantage. For instance, it specifically appealed to politically inferior and underrepresented clans, who in turn contributed fighters. Additionally, Al-Shabaab leveraged the privileged position of men within traditional society and exploited marriage conventions to seal alliances.¹²⁴ Al-Shabaab continues to routinely use the clans to push out territorial rivals and maintain influence in key areas.

Al-Shabaab’s interactions with Al-Qaeda (AQ), which began around 2008, have contributed significantly to its formulation of extremist ideology and have brought in financial and technical assistance. Al-Shabaab draws on the expertise and technical prowess of foreign fighters, and its close ideological ties with AQ have enabled Al-Shabaab to expand beyond Somalia and improve its tactics, ideology, and strategy.^{125, 126} Al-Shabaab’s emir, Ahmed Abdi Godane, who fought with AQ in Afghanistan, made overtures to AQ through public and private statements increasingly after 2008, signaling

119 Jonathan Masters and Mohammed A. Sergie, “Al-Shabab,” Council on Foreign Relations, Accessed December 3, 2015, <http://www.cfr.org/somalia/al-shabab/p18650>.

120 Wise, “Al Shabaab,” 2–7.

121 Wise, “Al Shabaab,” 5.

122 Wise, “Al Shabaab,” 5.

123 Christopher Harnisch and Katherine Zimmerman, *The Terror Threat from Somalia: The Internationalization of Al Shabaab*, Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 2010, 14.

124 Africa Briefing, *Somalia: Al-Shabaab—It Will be a Long War*, 13–14.

125 U.S. Government, *Guide to the Analysis of Insurgency* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government, 2012).

126 Wise, “Al Shabaab,” 6–8.

a desire to cooperate more closely, especially in the recruitment of foreign fighters, to build support for the global jihad.¹²⁷

Owing to concerns over Al-Shabaab's extremist influence in East Africa, the U.S. Department of State classified Al-Shabaab a terrorist organization on February 29, 2008.¹²⁸ In January 2009, AMISOM Ugandan, Kenyan, Djiboutian, Burundian, and Sierra Leone forces remained as peacekeeping forces, even as Ethiopian troops withdrew from Mogadishu. On July 11, 2010, Al-Shabaab conducted its first global terrorist attack, killing 74 persons in Kampala, Uganda.¹²⁹ In August 2010, AMISOM partnered with TFG forces to lead a counteroffensive to take back territory from Al-Shabaab; but Al-Shabaab continued to control significant pockets across south-central Somalia, particularly in rural areas. While even today Al-Shabaab continues to maintain the tactical initiative through ambushes, IED attacks, and targeted killings, troops loyal to the central government have degraded its ability to fight conventionally. The central government has attempted reconciliation and amnesty programs with some success, but core Al-Shabaab fighters continue to oppose the "illegitimate" government.

In February 2012, Al-Shabaab officially pledged allegiance to AQ, following a four-year-plus courtship, in an effort to gain legitimacy and additional resources and strengthen global jihadism.¹³⁰ According to AQ emir Ayman al Zawahiri, the "jihadi movement is growing...despite the fiercest Crusader campaign in history launched by the West against Muslims."¹³¹

Even as Al-Shabaab has lost territory, it has infiltrated all walks and stations of Somali life, including some in the TFG.¹³² The government's seemingly endless political

127 Africa Briefing, *Somalia: Al-Shabaab—It Will be a Long War*, 12.

128 Rice, Condoleezza, "Designation of Al-Shabaab as a Foreign Terrorist Organization," *Department of State* 73, no. 53 (February 26, 2008).

129 Sudarsan Raghaven, "Islamic Militant Group Al-Shabaab Claims Uganda Bombing Attacks" *The Washington Post*, July 12, 2010, sec. Africa, 1.

130 Bill Roggio and Thomas Joscelyn, "Shabaab Formally Joins Al Qaeda," Public Multimedia, Inc., Accessed November 20, 2015. http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2012/02/shabaab_formally_joi.php.

131 Roggio, "Shabaab Formally Joins Al Qaeda."

132 Africa Briefing, *Somalia: Al-Shabaab—It Will be a Long War*, 12.

transitions, pervasive corruption, and instability have afforded political and social opportunities for Al-Shabaab to undermine TFG legitimacy. Nevertheless, Al-Shabaab's areas of control were further reduced in 2012 by the loss of the critical port city of Kismayo, a major source of revenue for the organization.

Al-Shabaab has refined its approaches and learned from its mistakes. Many of its actions were initially unpopular with Somalis, including the strict application of sharia law, summary justice, and terrorist attacks, particularly against unarmed civilians. The organization's ability to govern at the local and grassroots level has provided tangible benefits in mediating local clan disputes, improving religious education, and strengthening local institutions of governance.¹³³


Since the American intervention (Operation RESTORE HOPE) in 1992, the U.S. has taken a limited military approach to combatting Al-Shabaab. The strategy is primarily based on gathering actionable intelligence and carrying out lethal targeting of Al-Shabaab leaders, planners, and organizers through drone strikes and special-operations raids. While several senior leaders have been killed (most recently Ahmed Godane in 2014), Al-Shabaab has shown resilience to lethal targeting, quickly replacing commanders and identifying informants who supply actionable intelligence. Ultimately, Al-Shabaab remains a problem.

¹³³ Africa Briefing, *Somalia: Al-Shabaab—It Will be a Long War*, 20.

IV. PHASE ONE: CONTEXT APPLICATION

“A stitch in time saves nine,” runs the adage. The meaning is simple: when you find a fault, mend it early, before the damage grows. This chapter explores whether a similar logic might apply to VEOs. Is the U.S. missing opportunities to defuse threats before they come to a head? Historical and cultural context is often overlooked in foreign policy decisions, which favor a shortsighted focus on the present. The resulting lack of context has at times sabotaged not only the U.S., but all parties involved. Context cannot be overemphasized as the foundation for decision making; in particular, a grasp of context will likely produce superior results in deterrence, where knowing what binds and divides a population is critical in calculating costs and benefits and evaluating the feasibility of solutions.

In Chapter III, we examined important features of Somalia’s culture and history to trace the conditions that led to the rise of Al-Shabaab as indicated in Figure 8. Conducting a historical and cultural survey invariably yields insights; and at Phase One, it is the only thing we have to work with to determine whether anything could have been done to deter Al-Shabaab from ever forming.



A. DETERRENCE

It must be noted that there are vital prerequisites to deterrence. At minimum, deterrence requires commitment and an understanding of the enemy's ordered preferences. Therefore, before deterrence can be applied at any phase of the EGP, the level of commitment must be thoroughly understood by all actors.

To apply deterrence theory, we make the assumption that U.S. foreign policy reflects an understanding of clearly defined vital national interests. However, even with the benefit of this supposition, if applied at this early phase deterrence faces some difficulties. There are four primary difficulties we foresee in using deterrence at Phase One of the evolutionary growth process.

1. Problems in Phase-One Deterrence

The first problem is that deterrence requires foresight, and problems that potentially could be deterred simply have not materialized to the point of visibility or interest. Yet, a general, vague deterrence is expensive and often ineffective against specific threats, like setting a mouse trap without the incentive of bait. The bait—or the piece of deterrence that makes it effective—must be chosen based on the ordered preferences of the adversary. Foresight is required to see problems brewing and analyze the context of each situation before making calculations—or potentially grave miscalculations.

The second issue is not with deterrence per se, but the confusion of deterrence with pre-emption. In the case of Al-Shabaab, the U.S.'s pre-emptive effort to back Ethiopia and remove the ICU before it became a problem actually created the problem the U.S. wished to prevent.^{134, 135}

¹³⁴ Jon Rosenwasser, "The Bush Administration's Doctrine of Preemption (and Prevention): When, How, Where?" Council on Foreign Relations. Accessed November 15, 2015. <http://www.cfr.org/world/bush-administrations-doctrine-preemption-prevention-/p6799>.

¹³⁵ Korwa G. Adar and Peter J. Schraeder, *Globalization and Emerging Trends in African Foreign Policy*, edited by Adar, Korwa G., Peter J. Schraeder, Vol. II. Lanham: University Press of America, 2007, 204, 210.

Third, it is difficult to know whether a deterrent succeeded in this phase. This is a practical problem, if something never happens; it is difficult to know whether a deterrent had any effect whatsoever.¹³⁶ The potential to inadvertently deter good and necessary changes is the last difficulty in Phase One. Because the U.S. most often deals with problems in weak, unstable regions, attempts to deter bad things from happening may have the consequence of preventing necessary changes from occurring. The unforeseen outcomes of deterrence may regrettably contribute to continued instability. Once again, any real-life evidence would be nearly impossible to quantify or neatly test; the best that can be done is simply to be aware of these problems while exploring solutions.¹³⁷

2. Costs and Benefits

The two primary components of the deterrence equation are costs and benefits: for the target, the cost of carrying out a plan needs to outweigh the benefits for deterrence to be effective. Another way to evaluate the costs–benefits relationship is to reduce or eliminate the benefits, which in turn would reduce or eliminate the costs necessary to deter them. At Phase One, in which there is no specific entity to deter, we look at the historical and cultural context of the region for projected costs–benefits analysis of potential threats and likely responses. Context provides a more accurate picture not only of potential threats to the population, but also the population’s likely response.

Current U.S. policy appears to obsess over the costs side of the deterrence equation, when denying benefits or opportunity may be more important. For example, in Somalia, threats lead to change, change leads to opportunity, and opportunity, as we have seen, can lead to a VEO. Thus, one way to deter VEO formation is to prevent change. If a VEO is not a congealed movement or organization at this early phase, then preventing change necessarily prevents its from becoming so. To prevent change, the population needs to be contented or distracted. In a scenario where the population is content—basic needs are met, the people have a way to voice their grievances, and get them addressed,

¹³⁶ Vesna Danilovic, “The Sources of Threat Credibility in Extended Deterrence,” *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 45, no. 3 (June, 2001): 341–369.

¹³⁷ Such general deterrence scenarios are notoriously difficult to test adequately. See Robert Jervis “Rational Deterrence: Theory and Evidence.” *World Politics* 41, no. 2 (January, 1989): 183–207.

and clans and individuals feel fairly well represented—in all likelihood change will not occur and VEOs will not emerge.

Mastering historical and cultural context may allow the U.S. to see not only the characteristics that lead to change, but also where solutions might come from. In Somalia, flashpoint issues have included:

- social and economic problems
- non-representative government incapable of arbitrating fairly and fulfilling basic functions
- military invasion
- foreign interference, especially by Ethiopia and non-Muslim nations.

No outside solution has ever been accepted in Somalia over the long term.

“Good” deterrence in this phase might be to strengthen a healthy and popular governmental system or not interfere at all. However, U.S. if we look at U.S. foreign policy in Somalia in 2006 what do we see? A foreign, infidel country (Ethiopia), intervening to prop up a government that had failed the people and, at the same time, rejected a solution that was derived from the people (ICU). If Ethiopia and U.S. had not intervened, the best outcome may have been that Somalis solved their own problems; the worst would have been deterioration into the chaos currently faced today, but without U.S. and Ethiopian costs incurred and no one but Somalis themselves to blame.

However, in cases when intervention is deemed necessary during this phase of the EGP, based on predefined vital national interests, deterrence strategy must take into account context and should focus on deterring threats to the population. By this means, the population does not become aggrieved, therefore preventing phases one and two from coming to pass, and ultimately, the VEO from ever existing.


If the U.S. had prevented the Ethiopian invasion, co-opted the popular ICU movement, and empowered the moderate majority, a different outcome might well have occurred. Alternatively, the U.S. might have prevented an invasion and helped the TFG to co-opt or formalize the popular ICU instead of trying to destroy it; this could have breathed life into the TFG and looked like a Somali only internal solution. Regardless of

when actions are taken in Phase One, or during any phase, for that matter, they must be informed by the local context, and to the extent possible be perceived as organic solutions.

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V. PHASE TWO: SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY APPLICATION

This chapter applies social-movement theory (SMT) to Phase Two of the EGP model illustrated in Figure 9. Al-Shabaab is not normally considered a “social movement,” but it behaved like one in growing to be the robust terrorist organization observed today. Our approach exploits this neglected aspect of the group’s dynamics. Phase Two emerges from the latent conditions explained in Chapter III, beginning with a grievance that spreads into a movement bent on altering the phase-one environment. The key in Phase Two is to limit the potential of a social movement developing into a VEO.



First, Islamic social movements are categorized according to ideological goals to assist strategists in selecting and co-opting moderate social movements and deterring or neutralizing radical movements. Next, we categorize the Islamic social movements specific to Somalia, distinguishing political from Salafi-jihadi organizations. Third, we use the PPM to explain factors leading to Al-Shabaab’s development, suggesting where and how to apply deterrence in Phase Two. Finally, we summarize insights in order to better understand Al-Shabaab and Somali VEOs in general.

A. TYPES OF ISLAMIC SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

Islamic social movements are categorized as missionary, political, and radical (*Salafi-jihadi*).¹³⁸ Missionary social movements work for the spread of Islam and avoid politics—for that reason, they are not described here (for discussion, see *Guide to Islamist Movements*, edited by Barry Rubin).¹³⁹ Rather, this research focuses on the political and radical Salafi-jihadis. Political Islamic organizations focus on governance and rule of law according to Islamic doctrine. By contrast, the fundamental Salafi-jihadi purpose is to radically remake the fabric of society, via terror and the implementation of strict sharia law.

Sociologists use many typologies, variables, measures, and indicators to catalog social-movement goals. One notion, proposed by David Aberle, is based on a study of the Navajo of the southwestern United States, in which he categorizes social movements based on their predominant ideological rationales for change and offers the typologies of alternative, redemptive, reformatory, and revolutionary.¹⁴⁰

- Alternative movements develop with the principle goal of partially changing a people's cultural values (e.g., NewEnergyMovement.org).
- Redemptive movements seek a total change in individual behavior (e.g., Alcoholics Anonymous).
- Reformatory movements pursue a partial change in society to remedy social injustices or inequalities (e.g., the NAACP).
- Revolutionary movements, the focus of this research, seek a total structural transformation of society (e.g., Al-Shabaab).

B. SOMALIA ISLAMIC MOVEMENTS

The primary political organizations in Somalia are Harakat al Islah (AI), Ahl al-Sunna wal-Jam'a (ASWJ), and Majma Ulimadda Islaamka ee Soomaaliya (MUIS). All adhere to a somewhat moderate version of Islam, as compared to the radical Salafi-

138 Merriam-Webster defines a jihad as, "a holy war waged on behalf of Islam as a religious duty; also: a personal struggle in devotion to Islam especially involving spiritual discipline, a crusade for a principle or belief."

139 Barry Rubin, ed. *Guide to Islamist Movements*, Vol. 1, New York: M.E. Sharp, 2010, 24–26.

140 Simone Flynn, "Types of Social Movements," *Sociology Reference Guide* (2009), 26–31.

jihadis. These groups' focus varies from providing basic social functions, such as weddings, religious instruction and education, to humanitarian services, social promotion, and denouncement of radicalism.¹⁴¹

Al-Islah's primary focus over time has been humanitarian aid, educational offerings, social promotion, and denouncing the more "radical" movements. ASWJ, was specifically founded to counter radical jihadi trends and focus more on moderate Sufi-Islam. For example, "ASWJ has taken up the role of monitoring the rise of extremism in central Somalia; the group has closed several mosques after accusing clerics of being too extreme."¹⁴² Additionally, Sheikh Omar Mohamed Farah, a leader in the group, has explained that, "we are fighting in the name of God to eliminate those who are propagating a misinterpretation of this religion in the country."¹⁴³ The third of the moderate groups, MUIS, is led by Shaykh Ahmad Abdi Dhi'isow. Its primary function is to conduct basic social functions such as weddings and religious education. MUIS's political goal is to rule Somalia based on the Shafi'i school of sharia law.¹⁴⁴ These three moderate Islamic organizations fill a critical role in mobilizing youth and provide an alternative to Salafi-jihadi organizations.

Salafi-jihadi organizations, in contrast, survive on a commitment to violence and revolutionary Islamist goals. This is especially true for the movement known as Jamaaca Islaamiya (JI). Stig Hansen traces this particular organization's roots to Somali students who returned from Saudi Arabia heavily influenced by Wahhabi preaching, which teaches a literal interpretation of Islam dating back to the 18th century and focuses on

¹⁴¹ Rubin, *Guide to Islamist Movements*, 24–26.

¹⁴² Stanford.edu, "Mapping Militant Organizations: Ahlu Al-Sunna Wal Jam'a," Stanford University, <http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/109> Aug 15, 2015).

¹⁴³ "Somalia-Security Ahlu Al-Sunna Wal Jama'a, Somali's Sufi Defense Force. "International News Safety Institute, http://www.newssafety.org/index.php?option=com_content&id=16460:ahlu-sunna-wal-jamaa-somalias-sufi-defence-force&catid=41:somalia-security&Itemid=100249 (accessed September 14, 2015).


¹⁴⁴ Rubin, *Guide to Islamist Movements*, 24–26.

“the jihad of self-sacrifice.”^{145, 146} A second radical group is al-Itihaad al-Islamiya (AIAI). AIAI is believed to be a Wahhabi nationalist movement.¹⁴⁷ AIAI and JI share a dramatic goal, as is typical of these social movements, namely, to transform Somalia into a caliphate under strict sharia law.¹⁴⁸

C. SOCIAL-MOVEMENT THEORY

This section uses the PPM from social movement theory to explain the factors leading to Al-Shabaab’s development, suggesting where and how to apply deterrence in Phase Two. Figure 10 fits Adam’s PPM to Al-Shabaab. Although social movements have myriad goals, they vie for finite resources (supporters, money, and information) and stem from some type of systemic societal strain (the cause) followed by the society’s rise (the effect) against the status quo (emergence).

Figure 10. The Political-Process Model as Applied to Al-Shabaab



Adapted from: McAdam, Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930–1970 (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1982).

¹⁴⁵ Stig Jarle Hansen, *Al-Shabaab in Somalia: The History and Ideology of a Militant Islamist Group*, 2005–2012 (Oxford University Press, 2013), 15–16.

¹⁴⁶ Abdi O. Dr Shuriye, “Al-Shabaab’s Leadership Hierarchy and its Ideology,” *Academic Research International* 2, no. 1 (2012), 280.

¹⁴⁷ Stanford.edu, “Mapping Militant Organizations: Al Itihad Al Islamiya.”

¹⁴⁸ Stig Jarle Hansen, *Al-Shabaab in Somalia: The History and Ideology of a Militant Islamist Group*, 2005–2012 (Oxford University Press, 2013), 20.

1. Broad Socioeconomic Processes

In the case of Al-Shabaab, dissatisfaction with political, economic, and social conditions aroused a widespread sense of injustice, motivating people to reject the status quo, or what McAdam refers to as the “broad socioeconomic process.” Social movements develop as a confluence of connected events dispersed geographically and aggregated over time.¹⁴⁹ For example, in 2001, the UN reported that the Somali people had experienced years of civil war, a national identity crisis, contested governance, civilians as the target of violence, extreme poverty, violation of human rights, famine, social injustice, and accumulation of wealth by the elite. Furthermore, the economic outlook was bleak, with persistent unemployment.¹⁵⁰ Assistance from outside Somalia was reported to disturb the country more than stabilize it.¹⁵¹ Additionally, Siad Barre’s policies helped galvanize Somali youth, creating a pool for Islamic recruitment. Responding to these broad socioeconomic conditions, many social movements arose to agitate or assist the people.

2. Political Opportunity

Political opportunity occurs when an opportunistic challenger is able to rally supporters for political views in opposition to the incumbent government. As an example, Iqbal Jhazbhay contends that the “U.S. has helped create a political situation in which extremists such as the Somali insurgent group Al-Shabaab and the Taliban in Afghanistan have become legitimate political players.”¹⁵² Essentially, as clan warlords took advantage of U.S. support to further their political interests,¹⁵³ the people’s mistrust of governance, suspicions among the political elite, and the resentment over intervention, and ambitious clans created opportunity for Al-Shabaab to fill the political void.

149 McAdam, *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency*, 40.

150 United Nations Development Program, *Somalia Human Development Report 2001*, United Nations, (2001).

151 Stig Jarle Hansen, *Al-Shabaab in Somalia: The History and Ideology of a Militant Islamist Group, 2005–2012* Oxford University Press, 2013), 5–6, 20–21, 34.

152 Smith, ed., *Securing Africa: Post-9/11 Discourses on Terrorism*, 71.

153 John L. Hirsch and Robert Oakley Collins, *Somalia and Operation Restore Hope: Reflections on Peacemaking and Peacekeeping* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1995), 84.

3. Indigenous Organizational Strength

Indigenous organizational strength is the ability of a social movement to leverage a local community's resources to achieve collective action. This "conversion potential" essentially means converting portions of the aggrieved population into an active protest movement. Al-Shabaab's conversion potential was realized by linking several groups of like-minded individuals into a more radicalized social movement.¹⁵⁴ Conversion potential can be further labeled as mobilization, which is a function of four critical factors: membership, communication-network infrastructure, incentives, and leadership.¹⁵⁵

a. Membership

The PPM suggests that, "movement participants (members) are recruited along established lines of interaction."¹⁵⁶ For Al-Shabaab, these linkages include clan relatives, colleagues, personal friends, clerics, and veterans. Members join Al-Shabaab for excitement, and, above all, for friendship with like-minded individuals. Social scientists refer to this principle as "homophily," as found in the saying, "birds of a feather flock together."¹⁵⁷ Essentially, individuals and clans are more likely to influence other individuals and clan members who share similar characteristics and behaviors. Demographic data shows that unemployed, dissociated, socially alienated, unmarried young men and widowed women join terrorist organizations seeking challenges, excitement, and above all homophily.¹⁵⁸

b. Communication-Network Infrastructure

Al-Shabaab uses established clan organizations (that is, a communication-network infrastructure) as a basis from which to recruit members. Al-Shabaab leaders used

¹⁵⁴ Dirk Baehr, "The Somali Shabaab Militias and their Jihadist Networks in the West," *KAS International Reports* (August, 2011), 30.

¹⁵⁵ McAdam, *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency*, 43–44.

¹⁵⁶ McAdam, *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency*, 44.

¹⁵⁷ Miller McPherson, Lynn Smith-Lovin, and James M. Cook. "Birds of a Feather: Homophily in Social Networks." *Annual Review of Sociology*, (2001): 415–444.

¹⁵⁸ Max Abrahams, "What Terrorists Really Want," *International Security* 32, no. 4 (2002): 86–89.

linkages between members of AIAI, ICU, and core Afghanistan veterans essentially fuse a large group of radical with a disgruntled Hawiye sub-clan the Haber-Gedir. Al-Shabaab was initially perceived as belonging to the Hawiye clan, because of its hostility toward the TFG, which was seen as Darood (different clan). Pro- and anti-clan rhetoric motivated many to join the movement.¹⁵⁹ According to Hansen, the “young Al-Shabaab was seen as a counterweight to the influence of the perceived Ethiopian-supported Majeerteen-Rahanwheh [clan] alliance.”¹⁶⁰ Furthermore, the horizontal ties that linked individuals and groups across geographic, ideological, and social boundaries were another reason to join.¹⁶¹ Interestingly, although Somalis self-identify proudly as being from specific clans, may also blame the clans for violence and the destruction of stability.¹⁶²

Al-Shabaab is held together thanks to a variety of legacy affiliations with previous organizations, clan loyalties, and Afghanistan war veterans. Al-Shabaab was assumed to transcend clan lines but in reality, it took advantage of the clan system by using existing clan structures and communication networks to pursue its political objectives.

c. Incentives

The third aspect of mobilization comes in the form of rewards (incentives)—interpersonal rewards for participation in the social movement. Due to astronomical unemployment in Somalia, many recruits join Al-Shabaab for financial rewards. The 2012 United Nations Development report estimates unemployment among all Somalis at 54 percent. Among 14- to 29-year-old males—a key demographic for Al-Shabaab recruitment—unemployment is a staggering 67 percent.¹⁶³ Al-Shabaab has an estimated

¹⁵⁹ Stig Jarle Hansen, *Al-Shabaab in Somalia: The History and Ideology of a Militant Islamist Group*, 2005–2012 Oxford University Press, 2013, 19, 31.

¹⁶⁰ Hansen, *Al-Shabaab in Somalia: The History and Ideology of a Militant Islamist Group*, 19, 31.

¹⁶¹ Paul Staniland, *Networks of Rebellion: Explaining Insurgent Cohesion and Collapse* (New York: Cornell University Press, 2014), 21.

¹⁶² Ahren Schaefer and Andrew Black, “Clan and Conflict in Somalia: Al-Shabaab and the Myth of “Transcending Clan Politics,” *Terrorism Monitor, the Jamestown Foundation*, IX, no. 40 (November 4, 2011), 7.

¹⁶³ United Nations Development Program, *Somalia Human Development Report 2012*, Nairobi: UNON, Publishing Services Section, 2012, XIX.

annual revenue in excess of \$70 million and pays its members exceedingly well.¹⁶⁴ Gerald Andae estimates salaries equivalent to \$500 monthly.¹⁶⁵ Non-material incentives are religious motivation and association with the organization's brand—some researchers observe that the “coolness” factor is a draw.¹⁶⁶ These incentives are meant to stimulate involvement in the global jihad.

d. Leadership

The final aspect critical to collective action is leadership. Successful organizations employ leaders who exhibit boundary-spanning qualities, bridging the gap between an organization's external environment and internal organizationally required resources.¹⁶⁷ For operational leaders to produce results and maintain respect from subordinates and superiors, they must understand the system they command. This faculty was evident among early leaders of Al-Shabaab, who developed keen awareness during their experience as senior members of AIAI and the ICU.¹⁶⁸

4. Cognitive Liberation

The final characteristic of the PPM is cognitive liberation—often referred to as framing. Cognitive liberation requires a message or narrative that resonates with an aggrieved population. This narrative should be credible and salient. Cognitive liberation should originate from trusted actors who can elicit collective action. The message should not resonate with the aggrieved population only, but be acknowledged by the whole society.¹⁶⁹ Before a movement emerges, cognitive liberation takes place when people

164 Itai Zehorai, “The World's 10 Richest Terrorist Organizations,” *Forbes International*, Accessed September 16, 2015, <http://www.forbes.com/sites/forbesinternational/2014/12/12/the-worlds-10-richest-terrorist-organizations/10/>.

165 Gerald Andae, “Al-Shabaab Lures Youths with Sh44,000 Pay Offer,” *Business Daily*, Accessed November 3, 2015, <http://www.businessdailyafrica.com/Al-Shabaab-lures-youths-with-pay-offer/-/539546/2487696/-/6q6mwsz/-/index.html>.

166 Hansen, *Al-Shabaab in Somalia: The History and Ideology of a Militant Islamist Group*, 38–39.

167 Michael L. Tushman, “Special Boundary Roles in the Innovation Process,” *Administrative Science Quarterly* 22, no. 4, (1977), 587–605.

168 Hansen, *Al-Shabaab in Somalia: The History and Ideology of a Militant Islamist Group*, 20, 39.

169 Della Porta and Diani, *Social Movements: An Introduction*, Second ed. (New York: Blackwell Publishing, 2011), 81–85.

perceive their situation (e.g., financial, political, or social) to be unreasonable or unfair and believe they can alter it through collective action. A good narrative includes diagnostic, prognostic, and action-mobilization frames.¹⁷⁰

It was imperative that Al-Shabaab establish an us-versus-them theme, specifically, that Al-Shabaab was “part of the global war between Western powers and Islam.”¹⁷¹ Al-Shabaab also needed to ground its message in Somali problems. The narrative was cobbled together by leveraging elements of Islam, images from the conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Palestine that depicted Islam as the real target of Western attack.¹⁷² Moreover, according to Al-Shabaab, the Ethiopians were led by “Christians” supported by United States crusaders and that these infidels were allied with TFG officials.¹⁷³ Al-Shabaab used the perception of political segregation, outside aggressors, and clan dynamics to vilify the TFG, indicating it was to blame for Somalia’s internal problems.

Al-Shabaab’s narrative also suggested that the exclusion of Hawyie clan members from senior political positions was intentional. Based more on perception than reality, Hawyie clan leaders believed that the TFG was dominated by the Darood and Rahanweyn clans. Members of Hawyie’s Haber-Gedir sub-clan believed the only option was to join forces with Al-Shabaab and expel the TFG leaders and Ethiopian and Western security forces. Al-Shabaab simultaneously boasted that it was the only entity creating jobs, something the apostate TFG was not doing. Al-Shabaab used every opportunity to vilify the TFG for lack of regional security—and to crow that by joining Al-Shabaab, Somalis would rid Somalia of apostates and crusaders. The message for youth was one of idealized martyrdom: if you join Al-Shabaab, you will be a hero.¹⁷⁴

170 David A Snow and Robert D. Benford, “Ideology, Frame Resonance, and Participant Mobilization,” *International Social Movement Research* 1, no. 1 (1988): 197–217.

171 Stig Jarle Hansen, *Misspent Youth: Somalia’s Shabab Insurgents* IHS Global Limited, [2008] 16–21.

172 Hansen, *Al Shabaab in Somalia: The History and Ideology of a Militant Islamist Group*, 31.

173 Hansen, *Misspent Youth: Somalia’s Shabab Insurgents*, 16–21.

174 Baehr, “The Somali Shabaab Militias and their Jihadist Networks in the West,” 29.

A summary of the Political Process Model is located in Table 2.

Table 2. PPM Specific to Al-Shabaab, Summarized

	Broad Socio-economic Process	Expanding Political Opportunity	Indigenous Organizational Strength	Cognitive Liberation
Also Known As	System Strain	Political Environment vulnerable to change, Contested Governance	Social Organizations, Clans, Community	Framing, Ideology
Definition	Dissatisfaction in society with political, economic, and social conditions raised the awareness of injustice, thereby motivating people to revolt from the status quo.	The ability of an opportunistic challenger, to rally supporters who desire to advance the political views against the incumbent government	The ability of a social movement to leverage local community's resources thus enabling collective action.	The message or narrative that the social movement attempts to use that enlightens people of the events and circumstances taking place around them, who is to blame, and how they (the social movement) can help.
Function	The factors which motivate people to protest.	Opportunistic challengers weigh the cost versus benefit of revolting against the existing political structure base on the perceived vulnerability to change.	Block recruitment from established organizations and informal associations to mobilize support.	Long-term strategic messaging that facilitates hopeless submission into oppressive action.
Examples	Civil war, national identity crisis, contested governance, civilians as the target of violence, extreme poverty, violation of human rights, famine, social injustice, etc.	Weak government, divided politics, contested governance	AIAI, ICU, Al-Qaeda, Afghanistan Veterans, Hawiye Clan, Local Mosques	Anti-Foreign Influence, Victimization, Vilification, Islamic Duty, Glory

Adopted from, Doowan Lee DA3800 Social Revolution and Unconventional Warfare

D. DETERRENCE

A deterrence strategy requires that values be understood, credibility be established, and that effective warning and clear communication be implicit within the threat. Max Abrahams, in “What Terrorists Really Want,” argues that current strategies to reduce the political usefulness of terrorism will not reduce terrorist behavior. People are assumed to participate in terrorist organizations because they are dedicated to achieving the organization’s political goals. Moreover, many social scientists suggest people join terrorist organizations primarily for social solidarity, and will act to preserve the organization’s existence, even if terror acts undermines the organization.¹⁷⁵

Homophily is strong in Al-Shabaab’s clan, sub-clan, and diaspora networks. For example, twenty-three Twin City Somalis joined Al-Shabaab to fight the TFG. All attended the same high school and college, at the same time. Moreover, they all joined

¹⁷⁵ Abrahams, What Terrorists Really Want, 86–89.

Al-Shabaab.¹⁷⁶ It is suspected that all these men attended the same Abubakar As-Saddique mosque as well.

One way deterrence can be applied to the case of homophily is via counter-narratives.¹⁷⁷ In the case of Al-Shabaab, the TFG should leverage information campaigns that vilifies Al-Shabaab and makes joining radical social movements such as Al-Shabaab taboo and uncool. Nina Tannenwald observes that a taboo has two elements: “its objective characteristics and its intersubjective, phenomenological aspect that is the meaning it has for people.”¹⁷⁸ This concept can be overlaid on joining or participating in radical social movements. First, it should be made clear that Al-Shabaab is the real cause of social unrest, insecurity, financial problems, and outsiders meddling in Somalia. Second, the prognosis should be communicated that participation in Al-Shabaab is illegal, dangerous, and potentially deadly. Third, messaging should focus on the people of Somalia, asserting that Al-Shabaab is not a national movement, its agenda is not in line with Islam, and it does not have Somalia’s best interests in mind. It should be explained that the only way outside actors such as Ethiopia and African Union (AU) peacekeepers will vacate Somalia is through a peaceful political settlement, and that they would not be in Somalia if it were not for Al-Shabaab. The TFG should also heap opprobrium and dishonor on those individuals labeled “terrorists,” consistent with Tannenwald’s observation that taboos become institutionalized over time.¹⁷⁹ This is a process that takes time. An additional challenge is that the fledgling TFG is already viewed as untrustworthy by many Somalis.

176 Laura Yuen and Sasha Aslanian, “Minnesota Pipeline to Al-Shabab,” Minnesota Public Radio, Accessed August 3, 2015, http://minnesota.publicradio.org/projects/ongoing/somali_timeline/.

177 David A. Snow and Robert D. Benford. “Ideology, Frame Resonance, and Participant Mobilization.” *International Social Movement Research* 1, no. 1 (1988): 197–217.


178 Nina Tannenwald, “Stigmatizing the Bomb: Origins of the Nuclear Taboo,” *International Security* 29, no. 4, (Spring 2005), 8.

179 Tannenwald, “Stigmatizing the Bomb: Origins of the Nuclear Taboo,” 13.

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VI. PHASE THREE: ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN APPLICATION

This chapter applies the contingency theory from organizational design, based primarily on the research of Mintzberg and Daft. We are treating Al-Shabaab as an open system, a set of interrelated and interdependent parts arranged to accomplish a mission or purpose as depicted in Figure 11.



A. OPEN SYSTEMS

As discussed in Chapter II, an open system consists of interdependent parts such as boundary, mission and operative goals, inputs, internal transformation processes, outputs, feedback, and environment, as summarized in Table 3.¹⁸⁰

¹⁸⁰ Hanna, *Designing Organizations for High Performance*, 8.

Table 3. Al-Shabaab as an Open-System, Summarized


	Boundary	Mission	Operative Goals	Inputs
Definition	A boundary is an imagined line that delineates a specific organization from other organizations that compete for resources, support, and information.	The mission is essentially the long-term organization's reason for existence.	Goals pertain to the tasks, daily, weekly, etc activities the organization must perform to reach its mission or purpose.	Inputs are the resources, raw materials, information, and energy from the environment required for the organizations survival.
Function	The boundary is what sets apart one organization from another. This includes the Organization's Goal, and transformation process, as well as different responses to environmental feedback.	This acts as the catalyst and motivation for people working together to achieve a common ideological purpose or Daawa.	Operative goals are the short-term day-to-day specific and measurable outcomes.	Inputs are the necessary ingredients the organization must have access to or face entropy.
Examples	Al-Shabaab, AlAI, ICU, Al-Qaeda, Hawiye Clan, TFG, U.S., etc.	Al-Shabaab's purpose (Jihad) is to establish a new Islamic State system of governance in Somalia based on exacting Sharia law, as well as the elimination of foreign influence.	Operative goals is the success of the suicide bomber killing a number of people. How effective is the media wing in recruiting foreign fighters.	The Somali population who are recruited to act as foot soldiers and coerced for intelligence information. Financial support comes from the practice of Zakat and Sadaqah, which fund operations. Intelligence information comes by way of the population from the local villages.

	Transformation Process	Outputs	Feedback	Environment
Definition	Environmental Inputs go through a transformation process which are turned into a new form or outputs.	The outputs are what the organization exports back into the environment with the expectation of successfully achieving the overall mission.	Feedback is response received from the environment providing information needed to assess if the organization is on target with operative goals and mission accomplishment.	All elements that exist outside the boundary of the organization and have the potential to affect all or part of the organization.
Function	The transformation process is where the work of the organization occurs.	Outputs are the product or services that an organization believes will help them attain their mission or purpose.	Leaders use feedback to alter the inputs, transformation process, and outputs. This feedback compares Al-Shabaab's purpose to the environmental needs.	To continue to operate effectively an organization must interface within their environment and competes against others for survival.
Examples	Maintenance on vehicles, Zakat and Sadaqah collection, religious information, weapons training, media outreach, etc.	Outputs come in the form of committed trained jihadists, killings of government officials, kidnapping foreigners, strongarming journalists, fixing humanitarian workers, as well terrorist attacks throughout Somalia, supply humanitarian aid to the population, conduct marriages, tax collection, etc.	Al-Shabaab adapts business concepts like creating interchangeable missions, redefining organizational structures, and formatting strategic alliances to run their organizations efficiently.	The physical environment is demarcated as the country of Somalia. Third-party supporters such as the clans, diaspora, Al-Qaeda, foreign fighters. Competition such as Harakat al Islah, Ahl al-Sunna wal-Jam'a, and Majma Ulimadda Islaamika ee Soomaaliya. Opposition such as the TFG, U.S. ANDSOM.

Al-Shabaab is an adaptable social organism that blends pragmatism and political acumen to stay alive, even in the face of battlefield setbacks and internal divisions.¹⁸¹ Understanding that Al-Shabaab and every other VEO operates within an open system can yield macro-level options for their defeat, we focus on aspects of the open system where deterrence is applicable: specifically, inputs, outputs, the environment, and feedback, as identified in Figure 12.

¹⁸¹ Africa Briefing, *Somalia: Al-Shabaab—It Will be a Long War*, 11.

Figure 12. Al-Shabaab Depicted in the Open-Systems Model



Adopted from: David P. Hanna, *Designing Organizations for High Performance* (Reading, Mass: Addison-Wesley Pub. Co., 1988), 18.

Al-Shabaab's inputs are the materials and energy it receives from the Somali environment and requires for survival. These inputs include recruits to act as foot soldiers, and intelligence, which comes by way of the local villages. Financial support comes from the practice of *zakat* and *sadaqah*, which is used to fund terrorist operations.¹⁸² Additional funding comes from the charcoal trade, port export taxes, and kidnap-for-ransom (KFR) operations.¹⁸³ Without these valuable resources, Al-Shabaab would wither.¹⁸⁴

Outputs are what Al-Shabaab exports back into the environment with the expectation of achieving its overall mission. These outputs come in the form of

¹⁸² Financial revenue received from the population is considered a religious duty "3rd Pillar of Islam" to give alms [zakat] or charity [sadaqa]. It is divided into two forms zakatul fitr and zakatul maal. The latter is the most important since it is payable on all types of sharia compliant profit-making businesses, as well as banks. This includes agriculture, livestock, produce, precious metals, and other materials. Zakat is due the first of the Islamic calendar month. Sadaqah is paid out of compassion and is entirely voluntary.

¹⁸³ Matt Bryden, "The Reinvention of Al-Shabaab: A Strategy of Choice Or Necessity?" *Center for Strategic & International Studies* (February 2014), 1–13.

¹⁸⁴ Hanna, *Designing Organizations for High Performance*, 23.

committed, trained jihadists who carry out the murder of government officials, foreigners, journalists, and humanitarian workers, as well as kidnappings and terrorist attacks throughout Somalia. Moreover, Al-Shabaab conducts civil activities through its humanitarian coordination office (HCO), including dissemination of aid and monitoring, regulating, registering, and taxing foreign-aid agencies.¹⁸⁵ These outputs are what Al-Shabaab believes will help attain its goal of establishing the Islamic State of Somalia, sharia law, and the elimination of foreign influence.

For Al-Shabaab to continue operating, it must interface with the environment and compete against others for survival. By definition, all elements outside Al-Shabaab have the potential to affect the organization.¹⁸⁶ This includes the physical environment, third-party supporters, competitors, and opposition, which are all central to the organization's survival or demise. The physical environment is demarcated as the country of Somalia and the main location where Al-Shabaab operates.¹⁸⁷ Third-party supporters include Somali clans, the diaspora, foreign fighters, and Al-Qaeda.¹⁸⁸ ¹⁸⁹ Al-Qaeda's leader, Ayman al Zawahiri, claimed Al-Shabaab was a branch of Al-Qaeda in June 2008.¹⁹⁰ Competitors include other social movements, such as Harakat al Islah, Ahl al-Sunna wal-Jam'a, and Majma Ulimadda Islaamka ee Soomaaliya, as well as the Somali government. Opposition groups include the TFG, the U.S., AMISOM, Kenya, and Ethiopia.¹⁹¹

Feedback is response received from the environment, providing information needed to assess whether the organization is on target with its operational goals. Leaders use feedback to alter inputs. This feedback compares Al-Shabaab's purpose to its

185 Ashley Jackson, "A Deadly Dilemma: How Al-Shabaab Came to Dictate the Terms of Humanitarian Aid in Somalia," Overseas Development Institute, Accessed October, 2015, <http://www.odi.org/comment/8066-al-shabaab-somalia-negotiations>.

186 Hanna, *Designing Organizations for High Performance*, 16.

187 "The World Factbook: Somalia," U.S. Government Printing Office, Accessed February 18, 2015, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/so.html>.

188 Africa Briefing, *Somalia: Al-Shabaab—It Will be a Long War*, 4–13.

189 Bryden, "The Reinvention of Al-Shabaab: A Strategy of Choice Or Necessity?" 1–13.

190 David Shinn, "Al-Shabaab's Foreign Threat to Somalia," *Foreign Policy Research Institute*, no. Spring, (2011), 207.

191 Africa Briefing, *Somalia: Al-Shabaab—It Will be a Long War*, 12.

environmental needs (which explains why the organization has changed its rhetoric, leadership, and operations over time) morphing and adjusting as appropriate and adjusting its structure, internal processes, outputs, and response to feedback to avoid entropy.¹⁹² According to S. V. Raghaven, “[Al-Shabaab] terrorists have shown extraordinary intelligence by adapting business concepts like creating interchangeable missions, redefining organizational structures and formatting strategic alliances to run their organizations efficiently.”¹⁹³


B. STRUCTURE

Al-Shabaab uses vertical linkages to coordinate activities from the top of the organization to the bottom. In the hierarchy shown in Figure 13, the reporting relationships are represented by vertical lines. This chain of command shows who reports to whom.

¹⁹² Africa Briefing, *Somalia: Al-Shabaab—It Will be a Long War*, 9–12.

¹⁹³ S. V. Raghaven and V. Balasubramanian, “Organizational and Structural Evolution-Lessons from Al-Qaeda,” *Indian Defense Review*, [21 Nov 2013].

Figure 13. Al-Shabaab's Hierarchy



Abdi Shuriye suggests as a structural arrangement of leadership, “Al-Shabaab is well organized with independent components.”¹⁹⁴ Al-Shabaab’s current leader is emir Ahmed Diriye Abu Ubaidah, who exercises overall command responsibility for the organization and balances power between functional and regional commanders.¹⁹⁵ He is supported by a ten-member leadership council, or shura, but can overrule their decrees if necessary.¹⁹⁶ In addition to the shura is an executive council, or cabinet. This executive body is responsible for traditional functions such as media relations, military operations, and politics. Its purpose is coordination among commanders.¹⁹⁷ Equal in authority with day-to-day executive leaders are the regional commanders, who are permitted to execute area operations as they see fit.

¹⁹⁴ Shuriye, “Al-Shabaab’s Leadership Hierarchy and its Ideology,” 275.


¹⁹⁵ Emir is the Arabic word for leader.

¹⁹⁶ Africa Briefing, *Somalia: Al-Shabaab—It Will be a Long War*, 7.

¹⁹⁷ Daft, “Essentials of Organization Theory & Design,” 208.

There are also special teams within the organization, such as the *Amniyat*, sometimes referred to as *Amniyaad*. The Amniyat chain of command is denoted by the dashed line in Figure 14.

Figure 14. Al-Shabaab's Hierarchy




The Amniyat, which is Shabaab's secret service, is a cross-functional team consisting of specially selected and highly trained loyal individuals who report directly to the emir. Amniyat is responsible for protecting its core leadership, carrying out assassinations, gathering intelligence, cross-border bombing missions, and integrating regional commanders to withstand dissolution of the group. According to Matt Bryden, "The Amniyaad has been developing the experience and skills necessary to wage a long campaign of assassination, intimidation, and terrorist attacks behind enemy lines—especially in the major towns."¹⁹⁸ The UN monitoring group considers the Amniyat as

¹⁹⁸ Bryden, "The Reinvention of Al-Shabaab: A Strategy of Choice Or Necessity?" 11.

Al-Shabaab's secret service, "which is structured along the lines of a clandestine organization within the organization, with the intention of surviving any kind of dissolution of Al-Shabaab."¹⁹⁹

In our view, Al-Shabaab is an amalgam of Daft's matrix structure and Mintzberg's missionary organization, meeting the three conditions of a matrix configuration as denoted in Figure 15.

Figure 15. Al-Shabaab's Missionary Matrix Organization



Al-Shabaab has scarce resources shared across geographical regions and is moderately sized, suggesting each regional command lacks enough members to assign them full-time functional positions.

1. Second, regional commanders have equal authority with functional commanders. The emir has decentralized Al-Shabaab to allow each regional commander responsibility for his area and authority to pursue

¹⁹⁹ "UN Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea: Somalia, 2013," Council on Foreign Relations, Accessed December 4, 2015, <http://www.cfr.org/somalia/un-report-monitoring-group-somalia-eritrea-somalia-2013/p31449>.

independent action without shura guidance.²⁰⁰ This creates two bosses for many members of Al-Shabaab, but also decentralizes decisions, making the organization difficult to monitor and target.

2. The environment is both complex and uncertain, which creates a variety of influences and requirements for Al-Shabaab.²⁰¹

A missionary organization is more than a sum of people, functions, and mission. The centrality of ideology to the terrorist organization such as Al-Shabaab is as important as it is complex. The integrating factor in the case of Al-Shabaab is Wahhabism,²⁰² which focuses on the jihad of self-sacrifice.²⁰³ In pursuing its jihad of establishing an Islamic State of Somalia, under sharia law, and eliminating foreign influence,²⁰⁴ Al-Shabaab exploits member's commitment to further their collective cause through martyrdom.

C. DETERRENCE

Because the open-systems model is applicable to many organizations, we view the model as a kind of macro organizational-design lens.

1. Macro-Level Strategies

Because the open-systems model as applied to organizations was developed as a holistic approach to determining organizational effectiveness, numerous facets of the model can be reverse engineered and re-armed to help in the destruction of an organization. We concentrate on inputs, outputs, environment, and feedback because they provide the most readily accessible avenues of substantial change.

Of these four facets, inputs such as population, intelligence, and resources (e.g., financial or weapons) may present the richest targets for deterrence strategies. For instance, many youth in Somalia are out of a job, and Al-Shabaab promises regular

²⁰⁰ Elijah OS Odhiambo et al., "Al-Shabaab Terrorists Propaganda and the Kenya Government Response," 125–126.

²⁰¹ Daft, "Essentials of Organization Theory & Design," 224–233.

²⁰² Wahhabism teaches a very literal interpretation of Islam dating back to the 18th-century. Reformer Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab. Wahhab suggested that Islam had been corrupted and he denounced 1,000 years of Islamic Scholarship.

²⁰³ Shuriye, "Al-Shabaab's Leadership Hierarchy and its Ideology," 280.

²⁰⁴ Seth G. Jones, "The Terrorist Threat from Al-Shabaab," RAND Corporation, October 3, 2013, 1.

pay.²⁰⁵ One indirect method to consider is Paul Kapur's strategy of punishing the "third-party" to deter financiers, weapons suppliers, and sympathizers, rather than target the elusive terrorists themselves.²⁰⁶ A good place to start is with the smuggling rings of southern Somalia, specifically, the illicit sugar and charcoal trades that fund Al-Shabaab operations. Tom Keatinge advises, "To take out Al-Shabaab, one need look no further than charcoal."²⁰⁷

Financial inputs fuel an organization, but the lifeblood is the people. Without finances, a popular contextual message, or a mission, there are no recruits; without recruits, no intelligence, work, outputs, innovation, growth, and certainly no long-term survival or relevance. VEOs require multiple monetary inputs; without them, the organization dies.

As a VEO, Al-Shabaab relies on inputs from the environment and transforms them into outputs or operations needed for organizational survival (e.g., KFRs, IEDs, and ambushes). VEO outputs vary drastically. Owing mostly to lack of power and control, a primary output is terrorism, with the goal of redressing grievances, messaging, deterrence, and gaining additional inputs in the form of funding (by kidnapping, piracy, killing competitors, robbery, and building notoriety and influence). However, successful VEOs also have public-service outputs.²⁰⁸ As Juan Castillo points out, violent terrorist organizations use non-kinetic principles and tactics that effect civilian populations for the purpose of eroding state power.^{209, 210} These outputs, such as building roads, schools, and institutions of justice, as well as providing basic needs and services, can help immensely.

205 Hansen, *Misspent Youth: Somalia's Shabab Insurgents*, 16–21.

206 Paul, *Complex Deterrence: Strategy in the Global Age*, 117.

207 Tom Keatinge, "Black Market: How the Charcoal Trade Fuels Al Shabab," *Foreign Affairs*, (November 18, 2014), 1.

208 Abdulkadir Khalif, "Al-Shabaab Militants Branch Out into Public Service Provision," Nation Media Group, Kenya, Accessed November 22, 2015.
<http://www.africareview.com/News/Al+Shabaab+militants+branch+out+into+public+service+provision/-/979180/1180580/-/wclv8rz/-/index.html#>.

209 Juan Castillo, "Cultural Irregular Warfare Strategic: Culture and Non-Kinetic Strategies Employed by Non-State Actors," *Canadian Army Journal* Issue 14, no. No 2 (2012): 28.

210 A "non-kinetic" strategy involves the use of subtle, non-coercive means for combating dark networks relevant to irregular warfare (IW).

They can also hurt a VEO if it fails to live up to its promises. In essence, VEOs are often competing with the government for control, legitimacy, and support of the population. Therefore, it is important to highlight their civil service failures along with their lawlessness and brutality.

It thus makes sense to consider a psychological operations (PsyOps) approach. The current psychological approach towards Al-Shabaab and similar VEOs seems to be aimed at convincing the population, typically without context, that the VEO is bad or wrong. The hope is that highlighting negative outputs will deter supporters and new recruits. There are two problems with this approach. The first is a lack of sufficient contextual knowledge and, in some embarrassing cases, ignorance of the local language. Obviously PsyOps in the wrong language is a problem. But so are contextual misfires. The second issue is that a superior alternative is not typically provided. A corrupt TFG backed by every competing neighbor and international entity that fails to deliver basic services is not an acceptable alternative from the Somali perspective.

Deterrence depends on the rational choices of actors making logical decisions to maximize self-interest.²¹¹ However, as Thomas Payne comments, “all too frequently, the assumption that challengers will behave rationally, which typically they do, at least in a limited sense, leads to an expectation that they will also behave reasonably, which often they do not.”²¹² The distinction between rationality and reasonableness is important. Potential VEO recruits, supporters, and active members who typically make rational decisions on a routine basis in daily life may make unreasonable decisions as to whether to stay or join, regardless of the logic. For example, it may be rational to further one’s survival by signing on with Al-Shabaab for money; it is not reasonable to believe that such an occupation is conducive to a long and satisfactory life or that a terrorist organization that enforces its will through horrific behavior today will offer wise and peaceful governance tomorrow.

211 Keith Payne, “The Fallacies of Cold War Deterrence and a New Direction,” *Comparative Strategy* 22, no. 5 (2003): 412

212 Payne, “The Fallacies of Cold War Deterrence and a New Direction,” 412.

Castillo notes, “Therefore, the objective of the PsyOp campaign would be to spread information, which influences sentiment against the violent Al-Shabaab organization (but also provides a better alternative).”²¹³ For example, Islamist radicals use religion to justify their actions. Co-opting non-radical clerics to deliver moderate fatwas to their followers will isolate radicals, making it more difficult for Al-Shabaab to succeed, due to loss of local support. The Somali government might sponsor commercials on television and radio and offer small rewards, coinciding with the release of moderate fatwas, that starve VEO popular support. However, care must be taken not to make it an “anti-Islamic” campaign, but rather, a campaign against those who hurt Somalia.

Environment and feedback are tied to each other and relate closely to the inputs and outputs of an organization. Since, by definition, the environment includes all elements outside the organizational boundary that may affect the organization, the TFG, al-Qaida, the U.S., the diaspora, clans, and the economy are all part of the environment. Understanding these aspects of the environment, a valid deterrence strategy would co-opt or support competition and opposition to deter supporters.

Feedback is the result of a combination of output, environment, and stakeholders, who, in this case, are the population. Affecting change through feedback is not a quick process, but by changing the environment and how VEO outputs are perceived, an organization learns either to maintain its outputs or change them. An organization must change in response to feedback or its survival is in jeopardy. Therefore, changing the population’s perception of VEOs will eventually force these organizations towards less violence or their demise.

2. Micro-Level Strategies

Organizational structure varies from one organization to the next, based on its mission and operational environment. Therefore, any insights specific to Al-Shabaab’s structure will likely only apply to similarly structured organizations. Since Al-Shabaab represents a radical Islamic VEO operating within a weak or failed state, the structural

²¹³ Castillo, “Cultural Irregular Warfare Strategic: Culture and Non-Kinetic Strategies Employed by Non-State Actors,” 28.

insights derived may also be applied to similar VEOs, provided the mission and environment are similar.

Al-Shabaab appears to use a hybrid combination of the matrix and missionary forms of organizational structure. Within the matrix structure, middle-line management is the key that allows for simultaneous coordination vertically and horizontally, focusing on both outputs and organizational functions. Al-Shabaab is structured in such a way that removing middle-line management or important regional or functional commanders will severely disrupt and potentially destroy the organization.

At the forefront of current U.S. targeting policy is killing top-level leadership—what deterrence theorists would call “deterrence by punishment” and what would say are the costs side of the deterrence equation. As one CIA report states, “the terrorist leadership provides the overall direction and strategy that links all these factors and thereby breathes life into a terror campaign ... the loss of the leadership can cause any organization to collapse.”²¹⁴ To explore the effectiveness of this kind of direct action endorsed by the CIA, we examined the assignation of four of Al-Shabaab’s top leaders, Aden Hashi Ayro, Saleh Naban, Fadil Harun, and Ahmed Godane. All of these individuals were high-value targets (HVT) and therefore candidates for kinetic strikes.²¹⁵

The effects of kinetic targeting against Al-Shabaab HVTs are consistent with the results found in “Attacking the Leader, Missing the Mark,” by Jenna Jordan. She concludes that “Terrorist organizations that possess characteristics such as bureaucratic forms of organization or substantial levels of communal support are more likely to survive attacks on their leadership than those that do not.”²¹⁶ In the case of the Al-Shabaab leaders studied, The *New York Times* reported that Ayro was killed by an

214 Central Intelligence Agency, *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, February 2003.

215 For the purposes of this study, the “kinetic” strategy involves military measures for the purpose of eliminating and physically destroying Al-Shabaab members or their supporters.

216 Jenna Jordan, “Attacking the Leader, Missing the Mark: Why Terrorist Groups Survive Decapitation Strikes,” *International Security* 38, no. 4 (2014), 38.

American missile strike in 2008.²¹⁷ Naban was killed by American commandos in a daring daylight raid in 2009. Harun was killed in Mogadishu in 2011. And the BBC reports that the principle leader, Ahmed Godane, was killed by U.S. airstrike in 2014.²¹⁸ Yet these strikes did not collapse the organization. Al-Shabaab has shown resiliency, quickly replacing commanders and identifying and getting rid of informants.

Our research supports Jenna Jordan's conclusions. Targeting senior-level leadership of a matrix-structured organization is inadequate because the decision making and functioning of the organization is decentralized down to the regional and functional commanders. Top-level leadership in these organizations can simply be replaced. If kinetic operations represent directed strategy, then targeting middle-line management (functional or regional commanders) of a matrix-structured organization would be more effective. Moreover, if it is possible to co-opt, pull, or split a group away from the parent organization, significantly more damage is inflicted.

Another feature to remember about Al-Shabaab's missionary structured organization is that it is centered on an ideology. An ideology is an underlying set of beliefs, values, understandings and norms. Edi Rama, prime minister of Albania suggests, "The threat from the radicalization of ideologies and particularly from violent jihadist extremism will not be defeated easily."²¹⁹ As Rama goes on to note, "Military force must be used. But in the end, to defeat ideology we must also win the battle for the minds and hearts of the next generation, because it is the power of their dreams that makes change an everyday reality."²²⁰ Once an organization's ideology becomes unpopular or unnecessary, the organization will inevitably entropy. That is why Al-Shabaab's ideology needs to be addressed.

217 Jeffrey Gettleman and Eric Schmitt, "U.S. Kills Top Qaeda Militant in Southern Somalia," The New York Times, Accessed Oct 10, 2015, <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/15/world/africa/15raid.html>.

218 Farouk Chothia, "Ahmed Abdi Godane: Somalia's Killed Al-Shabab Leader," BBC News Africa, Accessed October 10, 2015, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-29034409>.

219 Edi Rama, *To Defeat Extremism Requires Both Force and Dialogue*, Beyondbrics, New York: United Nations, 2015.

220 Rama, *To Defeat Extremism Requires Both Force and Dialogue*.

As with all evolving organizations, the focus of Al-Shabaab has changed since its inception. Its merger with Al-Qaeda, an influx of non-Somali fighters, and its violent push towards more radical goals provide opportunities for exploitation. These developments have taken the organization away from its initial broad, popular goals, creating a cultural divide within the organization and with the Somali population. This dual focus presents opportunities for undermining local support and eroding the recruiting base, thereby reducing all inputs.

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VII. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Is there a place for deterrence in a world of VEOs? The answer is, yes and no. We observe there is no place for deterrence in a world where a consistent, practical national strategy has been abandoned and replaced by political posturing. Deterrence must be backed by credibility, commitment, understanding, and patience to be effective—all of which is lost without a consistent, practical strategy. The possibility of deterrence is not dead, however, and can be revived as conditions allow. Our research examined the evolution of Al-Shabaab over three phases to determine how deterrence might have been employed. Below is a summary of our findings, followed by recommendations and suggestions for further research.

In Phase One, prior to the emergence of a VEO, effective deterrence must focus on understanding and improving social and cultural conditions, which, left unchanged, may lead to a social movement's birth. Any deterrence by punishment or denial in this phase will likely be weak and ineffective, because there is no specific entity to avert. For the U.S. to fully understand all the variables in play in every location around the world would be impossible, and to attempt deterrence of this magnitude would be costly and unreasonable.

The problems with deterrence in this phase are confusion between pre-emption and deterrence, which can lead to unforeseen consequences; the impossibility of quantifiable results by which to judge effectiveness; and the possibility of forestalling good or necessary progress. In essence, the only effective deterrents during Phase One are difficult to implement and fraught with problems.

During Phase Two, the social-movement phase, deterrence gains traction. There is now an entity to target and a specific population to assess, understand, and apply deterrent strategies against. As we have noted, a social movement requires three things: political opportunity, cognitive liberation, and indigenous organizational strength. If any of these three requisites is deterred, a social movement will not take off. However, if the social movement is already underway, the most important deterrent during the social

movement phase is to encourage organic, competing social movements that undermine the broad popular support the VEO is attempting to cultivate.

A VEO's primary objective during Phase Two is to gain supporters through broad popular messaging. Attempting to counter the VEO message as an outsider without cultural comprehension may be detrimental. Rather, an indigenous, credible, competing organization (e.g., ASWJ or MUIS) must contradict the VEO's message in a way that is appealing, factual, and demythologizing. The architects of deterrence must be careful not to project support for these competing organizations, lest their campaign be negated, derailed, or discredited. In Somalia, messages coming from foreigners fall on hostile ears.

During Phase Three, organizational maturity emerges. We discuss the twofold deterrent nature of organizational design, including macro principles that apply to any organization and those micro, organization-specific principles based on the structure of a given VEO. Broad concepts from the open-systems model of organizational design tell us that every organization requires inputs, outputs, symbiosis with the environment, and feedback. Although inputs such as people and resources are likely the most important part of a system, every element presents additional deterrence options. At the organization-specific level, Al-Shabaab is a combination of two structural arrangements, matrix and missionary. Understanding the concepts of a matrix structure tells us that pulling away its departments, whether functional or regional, will be much more effective at degrading and destroying the organization than targeting senior leaders. We also note that Al-Shabaab's missionary structure indicates that the ideology of the organization must also be defeated.

Defeating an ideology is not a quick process; it takes time, consistency, and patience. Local norms must be changed and the popularity of the ideology must be shown to be bankrupt. Excuses and blame-dodging must be eliminated. Without anyone to blame but themselves, the population can turn away from violent actions and destructive association with organizations such as Al-Shabaab, in effect making the VEO obsolete.

Although attempting to deter VEOs early may require less intimidation and force, this research suggests it may actually be more effective to deter VEOs in Phase Three, for

three reasons. First, applying the virtue of patience provides time to plan effective deterrents, based on the context. Second, a VEO typically grows narrower as it matures, due to its radical ideology and drive towards its true objectives. It may hijack broad, popular movements to gain popularity, but after taking control, narrow its focus to personal or organizational goals, creating distance from the population that may be fruitfully exploited. Finally, when a VEO's ideology is allowed to mature, the VEO will often manifest corruption, incompetency, and disorganized thinking, thereby motivating the population to move beyond it and embrace more practical and humane forms of governance. Rushing in to prevent certain actions and mold regions and nations early may delay the natural evolution of popular sentiment turning against the VEO.

The PPM model may be applied to the analysis of any VEO, promising a new way to effect deterrence throughout attention to the evolutionary growth process. However, such an assertion may incite controversy, insofar as it challenges the assumption that deterrence must be applied at or before VEO's inception. We find, on the contrary, that "later is better."

It is impossible to know how history would have unfolded had the U.S. entered World War II or any other world-changing conflict from its onset; but in fact, the U.S. did not intervene in World War II until our vital national interests were credibly threatened. U.S. restraint and adherence to a set of widely understood interests allowed the nation to enter with a strong hand, on its own timetable. There is an important lesson in that measured forbearance. The financial and moral burden the U.S. assumes worldwide today appears unsustainable to global adversaries, who accordingly position themselves to exploit new opportunities as political balances shift. The proliferation of new, more radical VEOs²²¹ suggests that U.S. approaches have not been effective. Our research leads us to conclude that it may be more efficacious to allow other nations latitude to create their own forms of order, however imperfect by U.S. standards, and allow their sociopolitical evolution to occur organically, as in our own struggle for

221 Carl Conetta, War & consequences: Global terrorism has increased since 9/11 attacks, Project on Defense Alternatives Briefing Memo #38, Cambridge, MA: Commonwealth Institute, 25 September 2006. <http://www.comw.org/pda/0609bm38.html>

independence. Only then—as required, and with a firm grasp of context—should the U.S. act to secure its national interests. It is important to allow emerging states the freedom to observe, borrow, incorporate, and adapt by trial and error. The best policy in the meantime is patience, example, and intervention only as truly necessary.

Ultimately, we recommend that the use of deterrence be understood as an equation of costs and benefits, and, in the case of VEOs, the focus shift from incurring costs towards denying benefits. Such an approach may yield a significant advance in achieving the ultimate strategic deterrent against VEOs: by exercising the strength, will, and resiliency to confront terrorist acts and deny the chaos and despair on which the terrorist thrives, the U.S. may subvert the adversary’s goal of manipulating mass behavior. Without the satisfaction of rational self-interest and tangible benefits to be gained from terrorist acts, there is no motivation to perform them, and costs become unnecessary.

One of the glaring tragedies of history is that structural impediments to progress and the poverty in intellectual and political leadership dialectically feed on each other. Even though researchers seem to have almost limitless ability to come up with multiple strategy designs for policy makers, the ability to supply readily usable operational prescriptions or practicable visions for how to overcome the leadership deficiency and create the necessary structural conditions for [better governance]... [These] may suffer from the same inadequacies that hobble the forces that we frequently criticize.²²²

For further study, the authors recommend a comparison of cases in which the U.S. intervened with nascent VEOs and where it did not, with outcomes examined according to the phase during which involvement began. We also recommend follow-up research on the time made available for contextual analysis, as to whether longer study tends to yield superior results. Additional research using the PPM model developed in this research may prove useful in understanding a variety of future conflicts.

We close with an Arabian story called “The Eighteenth Camel.”

²²² Mengisteab, *Anatomy of the African Tragedy : Political, Economic, and Foreign Policy Crisis in Post-Independence Eritrea*, 275–276.

Once upon a time, a father died and left seventeen camels to his three sons. When the sons read his last will and testament, they found that the eldest had been given half the total camels, the middle son was given a third, and the youngest was to receive one ninth.

As it was not possible to divide seventeen camels in half or seventeen by a third or by a ninth without killing one of the camels, the three sons began to quarrel. But before the fighting got out of hand, they sought the counsel of a wise man. The wise man read the will and after considerable thought, offered one of his own camels as a reward for seeking guidance. The one additional camel increased the sons' total to eighteen.

The wise man then read the father's will:

- Half of eighteen equals nine, so he gave the eldest son nine camels.
- One third of eighteen equals six, so he gave the middle son six camels.
- One ninth of eighteen equals two, so he gave the youngest son two camels.

Adding these up, nine plus six plus two equals seventeen, which leaves one camel extra. The wise man then took back his camel as payment for sage advice and departed, leaving the now satisfied brothers to return home.²²³

Sometimes a simple solution, such as seeing a situation but waiting till the time of best advantage, may be lost amid political, organizational, and individual competition, or through habitual disuse. To find real solutions, parties must be willing to apply new perspectives and solutions and cooperate to promote their legitimate and clearly defined interests. This research offers policymakers an eighteenth camel and urges practical and discerning application.

²²³ Andrew, Cohn, "The 18th Camel," Conscious Business Blog, Accessed June 5, 2015, <http://consciousbusinessblog.com/2013/06/03/the-18th-camel/>.

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