

ECOLE SUPERIEURE DE GUERRE

(France)

CONFERENCES ON THE TACTICS OF THE COMBINED
ARMS AND THE GENERAL STAFF

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THE DIVISION

I N T E L L I G E N C E
THE G-2 SECTION IN THE DIVISION

Translated as part of an
Individual Research Study

by

Thomas North,

Capt., F.A.

March, 1935

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This is a translation of a series of lectures
on Military Intelligence given at the Ecole
de Guerre. The translation work is excellent,
Captain North being well qualified in French.
The subject matter is excellent in particular
the historical examples used. In general the
doctrine is the same as that taught here.
The logical presentation (typically French) is
very vivid and convincing. The ~~work~~ translation
was a difficult one and Captain North made an
accurate but free translation, - a very difficult
operation.

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE

The French equivalent of the American Military terms: "Information" and "Intelligence" is the single term: "Renseignements".

Therefore this text conforms to the policy of translating "Renseignements" according to its context, the term "Intelligence" being employed to express the idea of digested "Information".

The basis for this discrimination is indicated in paragraph 2, "Military Intelligence" (C. & G.S.S., 1934): "Definition .. Military intelligence is the most complete ... information of an ... enemy or theater of operations, together with the technical, tactical, and strategic deductions drawn therefrom."

In extension of the same principle, the designation "Intelligence Service" has been employed in preference to "Information Service."

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1932

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INTELLIGENCE

THE G-2 SECTION IN THE DIVISION

I

Intelligence. Its importance.

Among the various elements upon which a military operation is based, our present Regulations place great emphasis upon Information of the enemy. For War is a matching of both force and skill, of soundly conceived plans whereby not only is victory ultimately to be won, but it must be gained as easily and as cheaply as possible. To this end it is essential that the commander be given the fullest information upon all pertinent matters in order that he may be able to make his decision in the light, as far as is possible, of complete knowledge of all sides of his problem.

Intelligence as an element in the Commander's decision.

Provisional Regulations concerning the Tactical Employment of Large Units state (Section III, Chapter I, Article 1) that the decision of the Commander is a function of several elements:

The Mission

The Available Forces

The Situation with respect to the enemy and to the neighboring Large Units

The aggregate of the other circumstances, such as terrain, communications, climate, etc.

Thus the importance of the factor "Enemy" is clearly invoked, and although the Regulations have not appraised the relative importance of the different elements which are listed, it is nevertheless reasonable that the situation with respect to the enemy should be considered as coming next in importance after the mission. The object of the Commander's decision is, of course, to execute the

mission assigned him, despite whatever obstacles may occur on the way. But, among them all is it not the Enemy who is really the essential obstacle, the obstacle which must be considered before all others, whether it be a question of attack or defense?

So, it is necessary to know what the enemy is doing. But still greater importance does knowledge of the enemy situation derive from these two facts: that among all the elements which influence the execution of the mission this is the only one which is essentially variable, being clouded in mystery --- and that the development of the enemy situation responds to a force beyond our control, to wit, the Enemy's Will, that great unknown force which it is our business to learn and to dominate.

The Enemy factor has been of importance at all epochs, but the difficulty of gaining knowledge of it has varied greatly. In olden days before the advent of long-range weapons, the Commander could take in the whole battlefield at a glance and with his own eyes see the dispositions and movements of his adversary. Thus he gained accurate and timely information and was enabled to make his decision and plan his maneuver promptly, according to the concept of his particular genius; for instance, Condé at Rocroi, Frédéric II at Leuthen, Napoleon at Austerlitz and Wagram.

When the increase in the ranges of weapons and the use of smokeless powder widened the theater of operations and brought about the emptiness of the battlefield, this method of Intelligence became impracticable. Herein lies the explanation why, during the years preceding the World War when aerial reconnaissance was still exceptional, there remained to the Commander virtually no means of knowing what his opponent was doing. Since the decision could not wait upon the arrival (which was by no means certain) of information gathered by indirect means, it had gradually become the habit to work in the dark, upon pure hypotheses, relying upon the battle to furnish such information as would throw light upon the situation. The danger of this procedure lay in that it led to the adoption of preconceived decisions involving the tendency to ascribe to the enemy a passiveness which was always unwarranted, instead of fore-

seeing what his line of action could be, and taking this into consideration in making the decision.

Nowadays the secrecy of the battlefield is no longer so inviolable. The advent of modern means of investigation, particularly aerial, has enabled us to lay it bare, at least in part. For this reason the collection of enemy information has assumed great importance and the study of the enemy situation has once more become a preponderant factor in the Commander's decision.

Intelligence as a factor in Security.

Provisional Regulations concerning the Tactical Employment of Large Units also state (Section III, Chapter II, Article 1) that Security is based upon information of the enemy and upon the disposition of the troops. It seems superfluous to build up in this text the justification for such axiomatic assertion; moreover, it has been dealt with in a previous conference. Lacking information of the enemy, the Commander has no security, no freedom of mind. We have but to remember the day of Beaumont (30 August 1870), when the French commander was totally unaware of the German Army's capabilities, and acted exactly as though there were no enemy in contact with him. Again, at the beginning of the World War when our Intelligence Service was not yet up to the mark, there took place the various encounters of the Battle of the Ardennes in which our Fourth and Third Armies suddenly found themselves at grips with German masses of which they had suspected neither the proximity nor the strength, and were forced to give way before they were able to accomplish their mission.

This brings out the double importance, in fact, the vital importance of Intelligence. We will now see how it is obtained and how it is utilized.

The Collection of Information and the Utilization of
Intelligence.

1. The Collection of Information.

At the outset it must be noted that the collection of information, if it is to produce any yield, must not be piecemeal, intermittent, nor cover a short period of time or a restricted area. It has begun during peace-time and tracks the enemy from the beginning until the end of hostilities. It is a continuous and methodically organized task.

It is evident that this task will vary in degree with the different echelons of command, and its scope will be proportionate to the extent of the sphere of action of the Commander concerned. To the Commander-in-Chief, Intelligence concerns political and economic questions, as well as purely military matters. As we go down the military scale the scope of Intelligence becomes more restricted and more localized.

With these generalities in mind, let us see how Intelligence will enter into the Commander's calculations.

Every commander who is given a mission receives at the same time from the higher authority who issues his orders a mass of Intelligence relative to the enemy with whom he is about to contend. This Intelligence, which must be supplemented by such data as the Commander himself may obtain, will constitute the ⁱinitial or basic enemy situation for the proposed operation. After giving due weight to this initial situation the Commander makes his decision and plans his scheme of maneuver.

Once this operation is decided upon, all efforts must be concentrated upon its successful consummation, despite the enemy. Accordingly, the Commander must anticipate what will happen.

The decision which he has just made will become effective at a more or less distant moment. Before it is carried out many things will have happened, and our knowledge of the enemy

will have been more or less profoundly modified. The Commander cannot rest satisfied with the initial situation. Knowing what the enemy was doing at the moment when he made his own decision, he must foresee what are those capabilities of his opponent which could possibly interfere with the execution of such decision.

He has but one method of reaching such conclusions, and that is to resort to hypotheses, as is customary in all experimental sciences. But it must be pointed out that this method involves the grave danger of following preconceived ideas, of seeing things only in a light favorable to his own concept. The Provisional Regulations concerning the Tactical Employment of Large Units warn of this danger of which the attendant disasters are limitless.

Therefore, by forcing himself to proceed in a purely objective manner, the Commander will consider what are the different plans of action which the enemy can adopt within an appropriate time and space, due regard being paid to the data given in the basic situation. Each of these plans of action will constitute an hypothesis and will be the subject of a separate study. In this manner the Commander will be led to compile a list of hypotheses, and he will thenceforward endeavor to reduce their number until he finally will give credence only to that one which events will have verified.

It is the systematically organized collection of information which enables him to effect this progressive and necessary elimination with a sure hand. In fact, it is essential to note that on such a matter our procedure can only be based upon data which are factual and not upon mere theories or simple guesswork.

History abounds with cases in which the enemy has actually adopted the course which to our eyes appeared the least probable and the least logical. It must be borne in mind that the enemy does not see the situation as we ourselves estimate it, that he is viewing it from a different angle, and that, moreover, he is so constituted as to react differently from ourselves and employs mental processes which are foreign to us.

In order to acquire those facts which will enable him to reduce his list of hypotheses, the Commander must therefore organize the collection of enemy information. He prepares a list, in relative order of importance, of all elements of information which it would be useful to obtain: these are called the Essential Elements of Enemy Information. Next, basing himself upon these Essential Elements, the Commander calls upon all of the means of investigation at his disposal by drawing up an Intelligence Plan, following a technique to be explained later.

What are the means of investigation at the Commander's disposal? They are, primarily, the troops, due regard being paid to their respective tactical and technical capabilities:-

The Air Corps, especially the aviation, executes distant reconnaissance and furnishes information which photography will confirm in detail.

This is completed by the information furnished by the Cavalry which has the faculty of obtaining contact information; it combs those parts of the terrain which escape the aviation and determines the apparent contour of the enemy.

The Infantry, in addition to mere contact, can make use of that most reliable and most important of all means of obtaining information---combat. The Commander profits by this, where necessary, in order to verify or complete the contact information.

The Artillery, through the organization of its ground observation and its specialized ranging sections, endeavors to determine accurately the details of the hostile artillery program.

Finally, the Signal troops may:

- by telephone intercept, tap conversations,
- by radiogoniometric posts and radio-intercept, pick up messages and locate enemy radio stations.

In addition to the troops there exist means of investigation which are responsible directly to the General Staff of the Large Units, such as interpreters, sections for studying captured documents, secret services, etc.

The Commander applies these different means of investigation,

by direct order if they are under his immediate control; through the commanders of the subordinate Large Units (which thus become information collecting agencies themselves); or, in the case of means of investigation which are not organically part of the Large Unit in question, by request upon the next higher echelon.

2. Utilization of Intelligence.

a. Interpretation.

Information collected by the various agencies which are applied by the Intelligence Plan will thus come in from all directions and will be as diverse in form as in nature. In this connection several points should be noted:-

No item of information, however insignificant it may appear at first sight, should be neglected. Taken in conjunction with other items gathered elsewhere, it may assume capital importance.

An isolated item of information possesses intrinsically no value; to be worthy of credence it must undergo a thorough critical examination, be compared with other information of the same nature, be evaluated.⁽¹⁾ For this reason the Commander, in spite of the confidence which this or that source of information may inspire, must be careful to avoid attaching off-hand any particular value to any item of information which it furnishes or making hasty deductions therefrom.

Finally, it should be observed that the information which reaches headquarters is almost never in a straightforward, coherent form which would permit it to be exploited immediately. Almost always the items are incomplete, imperfect, disconnected, and quite frequently they are contradictory. In this form the information is of no practical use and must be subjected to a transformation in order that value may be derived from it.

(1) It should be noted here that the evaluation of information approaches closely the methods used by historians in the study of historical documents. In both cases it is a matter of re-creating actual events in their true form. The two cases differ only in the conditions under which they are performed and, in our present case, in the necessity for rapid completion.

From the foregoing remarks it follows that the mass of enemy information which is collected should be subjected to a fourfold operation:

1. A material transformation (translation of documents, restitution of photographs, etc.)
2. A critical examination for the purpose of evaluation, whereby, figuratively speaking, a coefficient of credibility may be assigned to each item of information.
3. Verification, which consists in sorting and comparing the various items of information concerning the same subject.
4. A methodical coordination of the items retained, for the purpose of reconstructing the situation; a single synthesis which is the product, in clear and easily exploitable form, of the whole operation.

It is only through this methodical study, which, moreover, must be rapid and thorough ---- the process is called Interpretation of Information ---- that the Commander can obtain at regular intervals such knowledge of the enemy situation as will enable him to execute his scheme of maneuver intelligently.

b. Dissemination

Having established the enemy situation for a given moment, as we have just explained, we must bring it promptly to the attention of all those whom it might interest, that is, the next higher echelon, the neighboring units, and the subordinate echelons. This procedure is called Dissemination of Intelligence upwards, laterally, and downwards.

c. Utilization

The Intelligence will thus have reached all those for whom it is intended, in the shortest possible time and in such form that it can be immediately put to use. It is the responsibility of these recipients to profit by it as far as is appropriate by exploiting the valuable information which is brought to them and which, be it remembered, is of a practical and not of a theoretical nature.

3. The Operating Agency of the Commander on Intelligence Matters----
the G-2 Section. (1)

In all of the preceding discussion we have spoken of the Commander as though he were the sole functioning agency of command. This is merely a manner of expression for convenience in explanation. We know, of course, that in the exercise of his functions the Commander has certain assistants. Primarily it is his General Staff who prepare the data for his decision, interpret this decision into orders, and follow up the execution thereof.

In all that concerns Intelligence there is one section of the General Staff that specialized---G-2. (2) It is this section which prepares the Intelligence Plan, based upon the Essential Elements of Enemy Information, assembles the information obtained, performs the task of interpretation, and ensures that the resulting synthesis is disseminated. Provisional Regulations concerning the Collections and Interpretation of Information prescribe that all of these tasks shall be performed under the supervision of the Chief of Staff.

It is the duty of the Commander himself, at such times as he deems proper, to call for the items of information upon which the G-2 estimate has been based, in order that he may personally check this estimate and its conclusions. As a matter of fact, these conclusions are of too great importance for the responsible authority to delegate to anyone. The G-2 section does the work and suggests a conclusion; but the final responsibility rests with the Commander.

(1) Refer to the General Staff course for details of the organization and interior functioning of the G-2 Section.

(2) In units not provided with a General Staff the agency charged with these duties is the Intelligence Officer. He will be discussed in the following chapter.

4. Collaboration between G-2 and G-3 Sections.

We are thus led to say a word about the close collaboration which should exist between the G-2 and the G-3 Sections of the Staff. Provisional Regulations concerning the Collection and Interpretation of Information state in paragraph 10 that the utilization of Intelligence is characterized by the issue of the 1st part of Operations Orders, under the stamp of the G-2 and G-3 Sections. This clearly invokes collaboration between these two Sections. Such collaboration is, of course, both indispensable and logical.

It is indispensable for the same reasons as make enemy information necessary. It is logical because of the interdependent nature of the work of the two Sections: G-2 tracks the enemy's actions; G-3 prepares our own; there is a close relationship between these opposing actions; hence it is essential that this relationship be reflected in the working of the two offices.

Under no circumstances, therefore, should the chief of the G-2 Section be kept in ignorance of the intentions of the Commander of the Large Unit; he must not be thought of as a staff specialist working apart, whose opinions merit but minor weight. Even though the Commander's concepts are but in embryonic form, even though they will never be executed, it is necessary that G-2 be informed of them. It is only in this way that his activities can be continuously applied in a useful direction and that the information necessary to the decision can be collected in good time.

III

The G-2 Section in the Division.

1. Its origin.

When we entered the war in August 1914 only the Army G-2 Sections were equipped with an organization and with documentary information permitting them, with the opening of hostilities, to perform the services which were expected of them. In the Corps the G-2 Sections had but inadequately trained personnel and

a rudimentary procedure. As for the Divisions, they had no G-2 Section at all.

At this period the Division General Staff, in so far as concerned Intelligence, had merely the simple rôle of transmitting agency; furthermore, it usually happened that even this modest part was badly performed. The cause must be sought not only in the lack of instructions from higher authorities but also in the inadequate education of the mass of the officer Corps in the importance of enemy information and the necessity for gathering it. So no further attention was paid to the information of very real value, and in some cases even of vital importance, which was obtained by contact down at the lower infantry and cavalry units, and which was never passed up through the successive echelons towards the Army G-2 Section, the sole agency at this epoch which was qualified to ensure its utilization. Again, how many of the staffs of the Corps and Divisions, and even of Brigades or mere regiments, were content to get along upon the Intelligence Reports issued by Army, with never a thought of enlightening themselves through information furnished by contact or collected from the inhabitants!

It is easy to see that Army could furnish only situations of a general nature, dating, moreover, from several days back; these were therefore already obsolete, particularly at this epoch when the situation changed so rapidly.

The following example, selected from among many others, illustrates very clearly what has just been depicted:

During the morning of 21 August 1914 the advanced elements of the 6th Division (III Corps) reached the heights south of the Sambre River, a few kilometers southwest of Charleroi. No contact had as yet been made with the enemy. It was known only that Sordet's Cavalry Corps was operating out in front. The billeting area of the Division was covered by outposts, of course, and exits from localities were being carefully blocked.

Within the regiments practically nothing was known as to the enemy. It was known that Liège had fallen, and also that our

cavalry had made numerous contacts with the German cavalry. No thought was given to the possibility of the presence of important infantry elements north of the line: Meuse River - Sambre River.

Now on this very day, the morning of 21 August, an Intelligence Report from the Fifth Army, dated the evening of 17 August reached the various units. It was therefore already three days old -- which, incidentally, gives some idea of the slowness of dissemination downwards. This document confirmed on all counts the opinion mentioned above, concluding that there were present in the Belgian plain some enemy elements which were practically all mounted. (1) In forwarding it to the troops the commanders of the Large Units down the scale had added instructions with a view to the possibility of contacts with hostile cavalry and stating the necessity for being prepared for such eventuality.

In one of the regiments of the Division (2) this Report had barely been read and commented upon when the following two incidents occurred in the village of Jamioulx, where it was billeted:

Firstly, some Belgian civilians who had been encountered in the street and who were returning from a visit to one of their relatives who was an officer in the Belgian Army, stated that the day previous, 20 August, they had seen enemy columns, including troops of all three arms and of a strength which they did not hesitate to estimate at some ten thousand men, passing through the town of Tirlemont and moving towards the west. They added that the country was swarming with German troops.

From the map it can be seen that Tirlemont is barely fifty kilometers distant from Charleroi. Inasmuch as the facts dated from the previous day it could be deduced that the command was at that very moment practically in contact with German forces of considerable strength. Naturally this deduction was compared with the official opinion which had been read a few moments beforehand and which sounded so different a note, the date of its issue being incidentally overlooked. Thus some disquietude was occasioned (1) Intelligence Report No.11, 17 August 1914. This document estimated the approximate strength of German infantry troops who had crossed the Meuse River north of Liège at 1 brigade.

(2) 28th Infantry, belonging to the 11th Brigade.

but it occurred to nobody to follow this matter of conscience to the immediate conclusions to which it pointed: a report to higher authority, reinforcement of security measures, and active search for enemy information through contact which might be joined at any moment.

There was less inclination in this direction for the reason that almost at once there occurred another incident which seemed to lend color to the official thesis. One of the posts placed at the exits of the village, close to the edge of a forest, was alerted by an enemy cavalry reconnaissance patrol which made contact but did not press forward. The presence of these scouts did not particularly worry the local commander who, insofar as enemy information was concerned, continued in that same belief in which he had been nursed since the opening days.

One can therefore understand his amazement when, a few hours later, the whole Division was turned out; the next day, 22 August occurred the battle of Charleroi!

This example brings out clearly that at the time of the opening of the campaign, attention was not at all directed towards enemy information, at least in the subordinate units. To learn the enemy situation they counted solely upon the Army. Even when, as in this case, there was a palpable contradiction between official Intelligence -- already out-of-date -- and information, collected directly from sources which seemed above suspicion, which had the merit of being quite fresh, credence was given only to the former while the latter was neglected without even taking the trouble to pass it on to higher authority or to make an attempt to verify it. An entire education was lacking!

The long months of stabilization provided the opportunity for the correction of these errors and for the complete and rational organization of the intelligence service in the various command echelons.

After much experimenting, the Regulations concerning the Collection and Study of Enemy Information, published 2 June 1916 by GHQ and supplemented by the Annex of 24 November 1916, enunciated a real doctrine. Henceforward the Corps G-2 Sections

were organized on a sound basis and were given the requisite means; they were to approach the Battle of the Somme with the hope of being able to play a useful part therein.

In the Divisions nothing was as yet provided. It was to be during the course of this six months' battle that the necessity for a divisional agency for the collection and coordination of information was to become evident. Yet the whole war was to go by before the utility of a well-equipped ^{Divisional} G-2 Section would be admitted without question by all.

2. Present G-2 organization in the Division.

At the present time the Division at war-strength has the following means at its disposition for Intelligence purposes:

a. In the G-2 Section

A General Staff officer who is responsible for the section in general, the organization of the collection of enemy information, its assembling, interpretation and dissemination. (1)

An officer interpreter charged with interrogating prisoners, studying documents, and, in general, all that concerns the enemy order of battle.

The chief of the topographic section who studies aerial photographs and keeps up to date the special maps concerning the enemy.

(1) Regulations concerning the Organization and Functions of the General Staff in the Field, dated 28 May 1924, prescribe (par.96) that, unlike the higher staffs, the distribution of the General Staff officers in the Division is not a matter of definite assignment. Here all officers should be prepared to handle matters concerning any of the different sections. It goes on to state that it is the duty of the Chief of Staff to take the necessary measures so that this interchange may be effected when necessary. The same Regulations also specify (par 100) that because of the type of intimate liaison involved by the collection of information and the direction of operations in the Division, the officers of G-2 and G-3 do their work together.

b. Information Collecting Agencies.

As has been shown, these are the troops, acting either under direct orders or in response to calls upon the Corps.

c. The Division also has a unit of specialized ground observation, responsible directly to G-2.

3. Operation of the Division G-2 Section. (1)

All that has been set forth in the preceding chapter concerning the general process of Intelligence work, viz. collection, assembling, interpretation, dissemination, utilization, can be applied in general to the Division G-2 Section. However, in order to bring out the functioning of this agency in a more life-like manner, let us examine a concrete case taken during a period of open warfare.

General Situation. (Analagous to that of the German right wing during the days preceding the Battle of the Marne).

The Blue Second Army is vigorously pursuing Red forces which are retiring in a generally southern direction. The Marne was crossed during the evening of 3 September after fairly brisk engagements with Red rearguards. The forward movement continued during the 4th, and, at the end of the day, combat was renewed in order to seize the crossings of the Surmelin valley. At nightfall the VII Corps (right Corps of the Second Army) has obtained a foothold on the plateaux south of the stream, its right (west) 13th Division along the line: Le Breuil (incl) - Orbais (incl); its left (east) 14th Division along the line: Suizy le Franc (incl) - Montmort (incl).

We propose to follow the functioning of the G-2 Section of the 13th Division during the 24-hour period beginning at dark, 4 September.

(2) For details of the mechanical functioning and of the tasks of the G-2 Section, refer to the General Staff course.

A. Initial Situation.

Maps: Meaux NE, SE; Chalons NO (NW), SO (SW), 1:80,000.

Situation of the 13th Division, 4 September, 7:00 PM.

Bivouacked in the area: Le Breuil - La Ville sous Orbais - Orbais - Suizy le Franc (excl) - Ignny le Jard - Nesle le Repos - La Chapelle Monthodon.

Division C.P.: Comblizy.

Advance elements are holding the line: Fransauges (2.5 km. southwest of Breuil) - Les Thomassets Fe. (2 km. southwest of La Ville sous Orbais) - Champdonnant Fe. (1 km. southwest of Orbais) - Les Angloux Fe. (1.5 km. south of Orbais). This is the line along which the combat of the afternoon of 4 September ended.

On the west flank of the 13th Division is the 18th Division (IX Corps), with C.P. at Courthièzy (4km. southwest of Dormans) and on the east flank is the 14th Division (VII Corps), with C.P. at St. Martin d'Ablois (6 km. southwest of Epernay).

At 7:00 PM the Operations Order of the Commanding General of the VII Corps for 5 September has not yet reached the Division. However, it is reasonable to expect that the mission of pursuit will remain unchanged and that the 13th Division will continue its movement southwards. Therefore, without further delay, the Commanding General of the 13th Division summons his G-2, and in the presence of the Chief of Staff he asks him for an estimate of the enemy situation on the front of the Division.

Enemy Situation, 4 September, evening.

G-2 presents the following verbal estimate based upon all of the information collected during 4 September:

For several days the 13th Division has been opposed by the 6th and 5th enemy Divisions (III Corps) which have been operating side by side. It was once more with elements of the 6th Division that our own advanced elements were in contact this afternoon at the crossing of the Surmelin Creek. However, during the engagement we were able to identify in the eastern part of our zone of action certain elements belonging to the Reconnaissance Detachment of the 19th Division (X Corps). Inasmuch as this Division has been regularly operating for several days to the right (east) of the

III Corps, the presence on our front of elements belonging to it would seem to indicate that the axis of the enemy retreat has been deflected towards the southwest.

Furthermore, three prisoners -- stragglers -- belonging to the 153d Infantry Regiment (53d Division) were captured while our troops were passing through the Bois du Breuil. They stated that their Division had moved southwards. It should therefore be in second line, behind the 5th and 6th Divisions. This ^d deduction agrees, moreover, with information in our hands previously, and with information furnished during the course of the day by the aviation who reported important movements to the south in the area Montmirail - Esternay. No sign of any works has been noted other than those used this afternoon by the defenders of the south bank of the Surmelin Creek.

During the course of the day the enemy artillery fires have been generally in light concentrations and at very long ranges. However, these fires have been accurately adjusted.

Conclusion

From what has been set forth it would seem that the enemy's withdrawal is continuing in the general direction: south-south-west, under cover of small elements which offer resistance at the principal stream lines. It can be felt that these delaying actions are becoming more obstinate each day. Nevertheless, although the enemy has on the front of this Division considerable forces which have retained their good order, there is no ground for crediting him with any immediate intention of taking the offensive.

The mission of the 13th Division for 5 September.

The Operations Order of the VII Corps for 5 September, accompanied by the Intelligence Report, reaches the C.P. at Comblizy at 9:00 PM.

The mission of the 13th Division for to-morrow is to move, in conjunction with the neighboring Large Units, to the south of the Petit Morin Creek into area : Charleville - La Villeneuve lez Charleville, with advanced elements holding the line :

southeast corner of the Foret du Gault - Lachy. The zone of advance is indicated on the attached overlay. (1).

The Intelligence Report presents conclusions which are similar to those of the Division G-2, and indicates even more definitely that there is no reason to anticipate a change in the enemy's attitude.

The decision of the Commanding General of the 13th Division.

In order to arrive at his decision, the Commanding General of the 13th Division may take the following factors into consideration:

(1) The mission with which he has just been charged.

(2) The following positive facts:

the enemy has offered vigorous resistance;

he has remained in contact;

he has important effectives.

(3) The conclusions drawn by G-2 forecast no change in the enemy's attitude.

Let us analyse the mental process of the Division Commander based upon these data.

In order to accomplish his mission it is first necessary that the Division move its mass beyond the Surmelin Creek, that is to say that it seize the high ground: Fontaine Chacun - woods east of this place - Hill 234 (west of La Chapelle sous Orbais). This is its first objective.

Next it must gain possession of the wooded strip: Fontaine au Bron - Bois du Thoult - Bois de Fromentières, which commands the approaches to the valley of the Petit Morin Creek.

The hypothesis

What are the enemy capabilities?

His attitude can be any one of the following:

- (a) He can continue yesterday's resistance on the same ground.
- (b) He can withdraw
- (c) He can take the offensive

(1) Omitted from original document (translator's note)

a) If, on the morning of the 5th, the enemy attempts to continue his resistance of the preceding day, it would be necessary for us to take some positive action beginning at 6:00 AM with a view to overcoming it. The objective of such action would be the plateau north of Fontaine Chacun and would be executed by the Infantry regiment on the right (west) in first echelon, the 113th Infantry, supported by all of the artillery of the Division. The attack would be covered on the west by the 18th Division in the direction of the valley of the Rû de Margny, and on the east by the left regiment in first echelon of the Division in the direction of La Blandinerie Fe.

b) If the enemy withdraws, as is expected, the Division must be prepared to move out at daybreak (5:00 AM) and to push forward to the south as rapidly as possible, making the following bounds:

1st bound: Margny - Fontaine Chacun - wood to the east of this place.

2d bound : Fontaine au Bron - southern edges of the Bois du Thoult and B. de Fromentières.

3d bound : the plateaux south of the Petit Morin.

c) Finally, an enemy attack is always possible although improbable. We have seen that the enemy had the necessary means. To meet it if the occasion should arise, it would be necessary for the outposts to cover the development of the Division and for all of the artillery to be prepared to open fire at daybreak.

To reduce the list of hypotheses.

In order to sift out this group of solutions and to be able to decide upon his scheme of maneuver intelligently, it is essential that the General receive the following information at the appropriate time in each instance:

I. During the night

What is the enemy doing on the front of the Division? Is he remaining in place? Is he withdrawing? Is he being reinforced? Information to arrive by 3:00AM, 5 September, at the latest.

II. After daybreak.

Two possibilities must be considered:

(a) If the enemy has maintained contact

(1) How is he occupying the plateau: Margny - Fontaine Chacun?
Strength of enemy forces (infantry, artillery) ?

Are there any reserves immediately available behind the front, particularly in the area Fontaine Chacun - wood to the east.

Information to arrive by 6:30 AM.

(2) Are there any movements on the roads leading northwards from the vicinity of the Petit Morin (Boissy le Repos, Le Thoult)?

Is the vicinity of the Petit Morin occupied?

Information to arrive by 7:00 AM.

(b) If the enemy has broken contact

(1) Has he left any forces in the area : Fontaine Chacun - wood to the east?

Information to arrive by 5:30 AM.

(2) Are there any signs of the presence of the enemy on the following axes:

Buisson Fleuret (3 km. southwest of La Ville sous Orbais)
- Margny - Fontaine Chacun - Janvilliers - Fontaine au Bron - Boissy le Repos - Le Bout du Val - Charleville.

Bièvre (2 km. southwest of La Chapelle sous Orbais) - Fromentières - La Morlière (south of Bois du Thoult) - Le Thoult - Corfélix - Les Culots - La Villeneuve lez Charleville.

Information to arrive not later than:

7:00 AM - as far as the the Rau de la Fontaine Noire.

9:00 AM - as far as a transverse line through Fontaine au Bron - southern edges of the Bois du Thoult and B. de Fromentières.

10:00 AM - as far as the Petit Morin.

12:30 PM - as far as a transverse line through Charleville - La Villeneuve lez Charleville.

The task which the Division Commander has thus just completed constitutes the designation of the Essential Elements of Enemy Information for the Division. On this subject the following two remarks should be made:

(1) The mission which was assigned to the 13th Division for 5 September, and which reached the C.P. at Comblizy at 9 PM on the 4th, as we have said, consists in the movement of the Division to the south so as to reach the plateaux south of the Petit Morin upon completion thereof. We have also shown that the execution of this mission involves a first phase consisting in the occupation of the high ground : Fontaine Chacun - wood to the east. Now it is evident that the measures which must be taken in order to execute this first part of the mission depend upon the attitude which the enemy will have adopted on the morning of 5 September, and it would seem logical for the General to wait until he was certain about this point before making his decision. But this he cannot do. As a matter of fact, the time involved in putting the Division's machinery to work (preparation and transmittal of orders, and execution of preparatory movements) precludes any waiting for the arrival (which is uncertain) of information before mounting the operation and making the requisite dispositions.

The General is thus obliged to make his decision beforehand, relying entirely, in so far as enemy information is concerned, upon the conclusions of his G-2 whose important role is thus thrown into sharp relief. Yet in his own mind the decision which he makes remains subject to modification; potentially it should be adaptable to any of the possible variations so that it may be definitely shaped when the information which comes in during the night has been digested. We can thus appreciate the great importance of the information required in paragraph I of the Essential Elements of Enemy Information, and of the limiting hour fixed for its arrival.

It can thus be seen that it happens very frequently in the Division that Intelligence can not be used in the conception of the scheme of maneuver because of the short space of time within which decisions must be made; but it plays its part thereafter in definitely orienting this conception and shaping it into its final form.

(2) Paragraph I of the Essential Elements of Enemy Information thus particularly concerns the initial orientation of the scheme of

maneuver. Paragraph II concerns the execution of the maneuver according to either of the two cases considered, that is, if the enemy has remained in contact or has broken it off.

The information which is demanded and which is to conform to a liberal time-schedule will enable us to push towards the accomplishment of the mission, while avoiding all chance of surprise.

It is important to note here that the possibilities envisaged by the Commander in preparing this time-schedule do not go far beyond the area immediately behind the front. His reason is that the situation may change too rapidly for it to be worth his while to concern himself any further afield. This bears out what was said in Chapter I concerning the scope of the collection of information in the respective command echelons. In the Division during open warfare the collection of information, which is organized at the end of the day, should not be planned much beyond the night and the following morning. It can then be resumed in the light of the new situation which will have arisen.

The Intelligence Plan (See Annex No. 1)

As has been stated earlier, the Essential Elements of Enemy Information which have just been designated involve a corresponding Intelligence Plan which constitutes their practical application. As we know already, this consists in distributing the tasks among the various information-collecting agencies of the Division. While it is not desired to prescribe a fixed method, let us suggest that we prepare a form with four columns as has proved useful in practice, thus:

1st column: transcribe the Essential Elements of Enemy Information, word for word.

2d column: indicate the limiting hours fixed for the arrival at the Division C.P. of the information to be collected.

3d column: indicate the respective agencies designated to collect this information.

4th column: method of activating these agencies.

In the actual case under consideration our Intelligence Plan would be presented in the form annexed hereto. As soon as this form

has been prepared by the G-2 Section the Staff operations mentioned in column 4 can be carried out.

C. Activities of the G-2 Section during 5 September.

We have thus organized the system of collection of enemy information which is indispensable to the conduct of the operation. From now on this information will come in to the Division from the most diverse sources; the agencies activated by the Intelligence Plan will furnish the largest proportion, a part will come from the rear, and a part from the neighboring Large Units. All of this information, after undergoing the necessary evaluation, will be utilized without delay.

For the G-2 Section there thus exists a source of continuous activity of which we will try to give some idea by following the events in their chronological order. For clearness in presentation and simplicity of explanation we will adopt a tabular form, thus:

Time of receipt:	Source	Information	Utilization
<u>Night 4-5 September</u>			
2:00 AM:Infantry:	About 1:15 AM	two raids	: The hypothesis of a
:	:	were executed, one by the	: withdrawal seems to be
:	:	113th Inf. on Buisson	: substantiated.
:	:	Fleuret, the other by the	: Orders given with a
:	:	213th Inf. on Mondibault	: view to this eventuality
:	:	Fe. Both found nothing.	: become effective at
:	:	:	: 4:30 AM.(1)
:	:	:	: The Reconnaissance
:	:	:	: Detachment passes the
:	:	:	: line of observation of
:	:	:	: the outposts in the vic-
:	:	:	: inity of ^{les} Angloux Fe. and
:	:	:	: pushes towards Bièvre.
:	:	:	: The outpost battalions
:	:	:	: move small elements to-
:	:	:	: wards the high ground:
:	:	:	: Fontaine Chacun - La
:	:	:	: Blandinerie Fe.

(1) In order not to lengthen this example unnecessarily, we do not go into details as to tactical dispositions, referring thereto only to the extent that they closely affect the point of view which we are studying here.

Time	:	:	:
of	:	Source	:
receipt:	:	Information	:
	:		Utilization

Day, 5 September

5:10 AM:Reconn- : The plane which was flying : The hypotheses of
:aissance:over the area : Fontaine :enemy resistance, or
:plane :Chacun - La Blandinerie Fe. :attack on our initial
: : - Fe. des Puisarts estab- :positions can be set
: : lished liaison with the :aside.
: : Reconnaissance Detachment. : The mass of the Div-
: : The high ground south of :ision begins its move-
: : the Surmelin is free of the :ment. (Disposition:
: : enemy. :one West groupment,
: : :one East groupment,
: : :a reserve.)
: : :
: : :
: : :
8:00 AM: : : Division C.P. opens
: : :at Orbais.
: : :
8:30 AM:Reconn- : "Fromentieres, :
:aissance: 8:00 AM :
:Detach- : Reached the highway: Fro- :
:ment. :mentieres - Vauchamps at :
: : 7:30 AM. Drove back enemy :
: : cavalry patrols at the cross :
: : ings of the Rau. de la Font- :
: : aine Noire. :
: : Enclosed are papers found :
: : on an enemy non-commissioned :
: : officer, killed, belonging :
: : to the Reconnaissance Detach :
: : ment of the 53d Division." :
: : :
: : The documents mentioned in- : These documents are
: : clude: :at once examined by G-2
: : a. a map, 1:80,000, of the :and by the interpreter.
: : area between the Marne and : a probably is the
: : the Seine, marked in colored :route of the reconnais-
: : crayon with an itinerary: sance to be made by the
: : Le Thout - Bois de Froment- :party to which the non-
: : ieres - Bievre - wood east :commissioned officer
: : of Fontaine Chacun - Janvil- :belonged.
: : liers. :
: : :
: : b. a personal note-book in : b and c.--Identifica-
: : which are found various :tion of interest to the
: : items, such as: :Division.
: : The 53d Division from the : These documents may
: : opening of hostilities; at :also be of value to the
: : first it formed part of a :higher echelons. They
: : detached Group of Divisions, :will therefore be sent
: : now it is apparently attach- :on to the Corps at once.
: : ed to the III Corps. :
: : Various notes taken in con- :
: : nection with his duties. :
: : :
: : c. private letters of which :
: : the addresses show the num- :
: : ber of the regiment and the :
: : squadron, as well as the :
: : postal area of the Division. :
: : :
8:30 AM:Corps : "In the area: Boissy le Re- : Upon reading this in-
:Aviation:pos - Le Thout - Corfelix, :formation the General
: : small suspected groups have :commanding the Division
: : been noted on the spurs :decides that the main
: : south of the Petit Morin. :body of the command
: : A battery of artillery in :will not pass the line:
: : position southeast of La :hill 232 (northeast of

Time of receipt:	Source:	Information:	Utilization:
		:Pommerose (2Km. southeast of Boissy le Repos). Another battery near the wood north of Le Bout du Val. No movement on the roads north of the Petit Morin."	:Janvilliers) - hill 227 (1 Km. northwest of Fromentieres) - bridge over Rau. de la Fontaine Noire (600 m. southeast of Bièvre), until further orders.
10:00AM:Reconn-	: "The Reconnaissance Detach-	: aissance:ment has reached the southern:	: plane. exits of the Bois du Thoutl
	: (Message:and B. de Fromentieres. It	: dropped:has dismounted and seems to	: at Div. have engaged the enemy.
	: C.P.) : I am remaining in liaison	: with it."	
11:00AM:Infantry:	: "Hill 232 (northeast of:	: Janvilliers),	
	: (C.O. of: 10:15 AM	: the West:	
	: Group- : Considerable small-arms fir-	: ment:ing in the direction of the	
	: Bois du Thoutl. Large cal-	: iber shells on Janvilliers	
	: and Fromentieres."		
11:30AM:Reconn-	: "La Morliere,	: 11:00 AM	
	: aissance:	: Have been stopped since	: Because of the importance
	: Detach- : 10:00 AM on the spurs north	: of the Petit Morin by strong	: at the end of the message
	: ment:and very accurate fire of	: automatic weapons which seems	: to meet the prisoner. He
	: to be coming from the high	: ground south of the creek.	: reaches him at Bièvre,
	: Fontaine au Bron, La Morl-	: iere, Les Ptes. Censes, are	: The prisoner belonged to
	: receiving bursts of small	: caliber shells. I am hold-	: a small detachment command-
	: ing the line: hill 200 (north:	: west of Trosnay) - hill 200	: ed by a non-commissioned
	: (1 Km. southeast of La Morl-	: iere) - hill 206 (south of	: officer which had been sent
	: Les Ptes. Censes).	: I have pushed an advanced	: on observation towards hill
	: element towards Le Thoutl; it:	: has succeeded in reaching the:	: 206 (south of Les Ptes.
	: group of houses north of the	: Petit Morin near the chateau,	: Censes).
	: but has failed to reach the	: bridge which is under heavy	: Their orders were that in
	: heavy fire.	: Captured a prisoner of the	: case the enemy approached
	: 153d Infantry at Bourgogne	: (north of Le Thoutl). Am	: they were to open fire as
	: sending him to you via Fro-	: mentieres - Bièvre."	: soon as he was seen, and
			: then to withdraw towards
			: Le Thoutl, firing a red
			: rocket.
			: The 153d Inf. Regt. forms
			: part of the 53d Div. The
			: 2d Bn., to which the pris-
			: oner belonged, was billet-
			: ted last night at Corfèlix.
			: He thinks that the 3d Bn.
			: of the same regiment is
			: disposed further to the
			: left (west).
			: This information is taken
			: to the Division Commander
			: at once, and is then trans-
			: mitted by telephone to the
			: Corps Staff. The prisoner
			: himself will be sent on
			: there as soon as possible.

Time of receipt:	Source	Information	Utilization
11:45AM:			The Division has resumed its advance so that the leading elements of its groupments have reached the general line: north edge of Bois du Thoult and B. de Fromentieres. C.P. moves to Bievre (O.P. on hill 234).
Noon	C.O. West Groupment	Inhabitants of Fromentieres who have been questioned state that during all of the past night columns of infantry and artillery passed through the village; they came from the north and continued towards Le Thoult.	
12:30PM:	Reconn- aissance plane (drop- ped message)	An intelligence sketch marked with rings in colored crayon scattered over the area: Soigny - Le Bout du Val - La Pommerose - hill 209 (southwest of Corfelix), and the following notes: "Suspected points: probably small infantry elements, well-concealed. A battery in action south of Le Bout du Val. Dismounted cavalry elements, south edge of wood south of Les Culots. Impression that enemy occupation along the Petit Morin and to the south thereof is in small force. Reconnaissance Detachment positions unchanged. Enemy Pursuit patrol operating over the valley of the Petit Morin has interfered with me during the mission. You will receive photographic prints of the area covered by this sketch during the afternoon."	
1:00 PM:	Reconn- aissance Detach- ment	"La Morliere, 12:30PM I am still holding the line mentioned in my last report. No advance towards Petit Morin is yet possible because of heavy and accurate fire of automatic weapons. The hostile resistance is based upon machine-guns. There are but few troops on my front. Artillery fire slight. The enemy is holding the villages in the valley as well as the spurs south of the creek. Several enemy planes are flying lengthwise over the valley of the Petit Morin."	

Time of receipt:	Source:	Information:	Utilization:
1:30 PM:	The 13th Division	has closed up on the transverse line: <u>Fontaine au Bron</u> - northern edges of the <u>Bois du Thoult</u> and <u>B. de Froment-ieres</u> . The three groupments of 75's have gone into position as follows: one near the west corner of the <u>Bois du Thoult</u> , the two others in the area: hill 228 (east of <u>Bois du Thoult</u>) - <u>La Grange au Pretre Fe.</u> The Division Commander, accompanied by the Divisional Infantry and Artillery Commanders and by an officer of the G-2 and G-3 Sections respectively, is on hill 228. He orders that the two forward groupments advance, supported by all of the light artillery, in order to gain contact with the enemy and drive him back. Axes of advance: West Groupment: <u>Fontaine au Bron</u> - <u>Boissy le Repos</u> . East Groupment: <u>La Grange au Pretre Fe.</u> - <u>Les Ptes. Censes</u> - <u>Le Bout du Val</u> - <u>Le Thoult</u> - hill 209 (west of <u>Les Culots</u>). One battalion in each groupment to remain in reserve until further orders. The third infantry regiment (13th) will be held along Route Natle. No. 33 for the time being. The 155mm howitzers will reconnoiter for positions in the area southeast of <u>Janvilliers</u> from which they will be able to support the infantry as far as the line: <u>Charleville</u> - <u>La Villeneuve lez Charleville</u> . The balloon will be prepared to ascend in the same area. Division C.P. will open at <u>Fromentieres</u> (southeast) at 3:00PM; O.P. : hill 228.	
2:00 PM:	18th Div:	The Reconnaissance Detachments of the (Adjacent Div.: 18th Div. and of the IX Corps have been stopped along the valley of the <u>Petit Morin</u> by heavy fire of automatic weapons: coming from the spurs to the south. 1 man killed, belonging to the 153d Inf: (3d Bn.), identified at <u>Bergeres sous Montmirail</u> .	
4:00 PM:	C.O. East Groupment	" <u>Les Ptes. Censes</u> , 3:40 PM. Forward elements of my two first-line battalions have reached the line: wood on hill 200 (1 km northeast of <u>Trosnay</u>) - <u>Bourgogne</u> - <u>La Briqueterie Fe.</u> , where they have caught up with elements of the Reconnaissance Detachment. By infiltration through the woods in the <u>Bourgogne</u> draw, some groups have been able to reach the first houses in <u>Le Thoult</u> . Cannot continue advance without stronger artillery support."	
4:10 PM:	C.O. West Groupment	The West Groupment has reached the top of the slopes of hill 200 (800 m. north-west of <u>Trosnay</u>), under similar conditions to those reported above, but cannot continue its progress.	
4:15 PM:	Staff	About 3:00 PM the elements forming the Officer right flank of the 14th Div. advancing on liaison with the 213d Inf. were also stopped in the area: <u>Bois du Reclus</u> - the Div.: <u>Talus St. Prix</u> . However, they were trying to push their right (west)	

Time of receipt:	Source:	Information	Utilization
		(14th) forward in the general direction of on the <u>Soizy aux Bois</u> , taking advantage of left, CP: the covered terrain. at <u>Champ</u> : A prisoner from the 153d. Inf. (1st <u>aubert</u> Bn.) has been identified near <u>Le</u> <u>Reclus</u> .	
4:30 PM:	Corps	Photographic prints mentioned in the 12:30 PM dropped message arrived at the C.P. The suspected points indicated there- in can be clearly distinguished. No defensive works. No troops visible. Since 3 PM the villages of <u>Janvill-</u> <u>iers</u> and <u>Fromentieres</u> have been receiv- ing periodic bursts (every 20 minutes) of large caliber shell (150 mm) which seem to come from very long range. The day is well along; only three hours of daylight remain. If the Division Commander wishes to mount an operation before nightfall he must lose no time in making his <u>decision</u> . He therefore asks his G-2 officer to make him a brief estimate of the situation of the enemy now opposite the Division. The G-2 officer makes the following verbal estimate: "The hostile troops which are now halting our advance belong to the 53d Division, whose presence in second line was already known to us. This Division seems to be spread over a wide front. I estimate that the strength of the forces opposed to us is about two batt- alions of infantry, 1 reconnaissance detachment, and 1 light artillery groupment. The reconnaissance detachment seems to be the only reserve im- mediately available. The 5th, 6th and 19th Divisions which were previously in line seem to have withdrawn, mainly towards the south. <u>Conclusion</u> : there is but a screen, widely dispersed, well equipped with automatic weapons, but lacking in depth and re- serves.	
4:45 PM:		After a rapid study of the terrain the General commanding the 13th Division, accepting the conclusion of his G-2 section, decides to make an effort before nightfall to break through the enemy screen. The operation will <u>make</u> its main effort along the line: <u>Le</u> <u>Thoult</u> - hill 208 - <u>La Pommerose</u> , employing two infantry battal- ions of the east groupment supported by two groupments of 75mm guns and all of the 155mm howitzers. Time of attack: 6:45 PM.	

Let us assume that the operation succeeds and gives the valley of the Petit Morin to the 13th Division by the end of the day.

In addition, the operation will have furnished the G-2 section with valuable information which will enable it, about 9:00 PM, to prepare the end-of-the-day estimate of the situation upon exact data.

This estimate will show the enemy order of battle, the activity of his various arms, and the nature and location of his reserves. Upon approval by the Chief of Staff, and with a copy of the daily Intelligence Map annexed, it will form an Intelligence Summary for the Corps (dissemination upwards); as a matter of fact the essential parts of this summary will be transmitted by telephone.

This end-of-the-day estimate constitutes the new basic situation for the 24-hour period about to begin, during which the activities of the G-2 section will be repeated along the general lines which we have indicated.

4. Transmission of Enemy Information within the Division: Intelligence Officers and Advance Information Center.

Information acquired by combat and contact, often dearly bought, must be enabled to pass up through the various command echelons with the minimum of delay, if it is to be of use. From the Division upwards this is a simple matter.

On the other hand, between the Division and the front difficulties accumulate; for instance, there are the various chances of loss (1), uncertainty in transmittal, difficulty or even impossibility of moving around.

To remedy these conditions and to ensure that information shall be transmitted with the greatest possible certainty and rapidity, two agencies have been established in the forward

(1) Among the chances of loss may be noted not only the frequent carelessness of forward echelons with respect to information, but also the tendency, mentioned in the Provisional Regulations concerning the Collection and Interpretation of

area, with this transmittal as their primary function:

Intelligence Officers in the regiments,

The Advance Information Center of the Division.

a. Every regiment of infantry and cavalry is authorized in the field one Intelligence Officer whose mission, under the regimental commander's authority, is to organize the collection of information in the regimental zone of action and then to gather, assemble, and transmit to the next higher echelon all such information as reaches him.

b. This information is sent not to the command post of the Division but to a special agency belonging thereto but placed close to the front---the Advance Information Center. (2) The functions of this agency are:

to collect all information from the front and to ensure its transmittal to the rear, and also to the other authorities interested, in order of urgency;

to serve as a transmitting agency for orders coming from the rear, in case of absolute necessity;

Moreover, it should check up on the arrival at their destination of all documents which it transmits.

It can thus be seen that the functions of the Advance Information Center are complicated and delicate. It is therefore essential that it be commanded by an officer who is both au courant of the commander's plans, and also expert on the subject of Intelligence, since he must perform a certain amount of evaluation before transmitting the information.

It is also quite evident that in order to function efficiently the Advance Information Center must find available a well-installed communications system. For this reason the Advance Information, on the part of certain individuals in the chain to form "personal collections" of documents. Such practices, it is hardly necessary to remark, are strictly forbidden.

(2) For reasons of simplicity we have not alluded to this organization in the concrete example set forth above, nor to the various methods of transmitting the information.

Information Center should normally be established side by side with the Advance Message Center, the latter actually being placed under the command of the Chief of the Advance Information Center. (1)

IV

Conclusion.

Training of Division G-2 Officers.

The Qualifications necessary for G-2 work.

The matter which has been covered in the preceding text has brought out the great importance nowadays of the collection of Information and utilization of Intelligence in the Division. It would seem that this importance will continue to increase. Who can say, indeed, whether under certain peculiar conditions, particularly the intensive development of camouflage, we might not even be in danger of the almost total failure of present methods of investigation, especially at the opening of a campaign? In such an eventuality there would be no alternative but to resort to combat as the virtually exclusive means of obtaining information; henceforward the role of the Division would become preponderant.

Surely it is proper to ask ourselves if our present Divisions are adequately equipped for the task which would devolve upon them, especially as to competent personnel! And, by the way, it must not be forgotten that the G-2 section is non-existent in the Division in peace-time. It must be built from the ground up during exercises or maneuvers, so that it is not unreasonable to fear that we may suffer all of the unfortunate consequences which inevitably result from improvisation.

It is important, also, that thought be given to the manner in which those officers will be trained who will have to deal with G-2 matters in the Divisions; so much the more since, as we have seen, specialization is prohibited therein and all of the

(1) Regulations concerning Liaison and Communications in the Field

(Section I, Chapter 1).

Division Staff Officers must, therefore, receive the necessary special instruction.

It is true that Provisional Regulations concerning the Collection and Interpretation of Information provide in par. 58 that such training is to be carried on by the Corps. But it is reasonable to ask if, as the years go by and those officers who were trained in the school of experience disappear, those same Corps staffs will possess instructors competent to carry on this training.

Nevertheless, it is essential that in each command echelon the G-2 section have qualified officers who not only are trained in their particular duties but who also possess those intellectual and moral qualities which the practice of Intelligence work requires. ^e Clauswitz has thus defined these qualities: "What must be required of officers dealing with Intelligence is a certain discernment which can come only from sound judgment and a profound knowledge of men and of matters." Which means, does it not, that G-2 officers must be men of positive and logical mentality, officers of more than average experience and cultivation.

In order to perform efficiently all of the series of operations involved in the collection and interpretation of enemy information, these qualities are necessary:

imagination, so that hypotheses may be formulated;
coolness, and a critical faculty, in order to perform the necessary evaluation;
an open mind which permits it to weigh its own concepts;
accuracy, not only in thought but in expression, which enables estimates to be stated in a manner perfectly clear and so that they may be easily utilized. (1)

We might add to this already formidable list of qualifications that the work of the G-2 section must be governed by those two cardinal virtues: Reliability and Truth.

(1) From "The Role and Method of work of G-2 Sections" by Major Bernis (Revue Militaire Francaise, 1926).

Amplifying one of Napoleon's maxims, Marshal Foch has written that when the moment for action arrives and a plan must be prepared, it is essential that this be based upon reports which are certain and which are correct at that moment. There is but one way of arriving at such certainty in the G-2 Sections, and that, as we have seen, is to apply to their tasks a procedure which is purely scientific, guarding carefully against any conclusion based upon sentiment or probabilities.

To sum up, confidence in Intelligence, education in the specialized work which it involves, and the application to this task of complete honesty in mental processes, are the essential qualities which every Division staff officer should strive to acquire.