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
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**GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA**

"RENO" V

**WORKING DRAFT
OF
OUTLINE PLAN
FOR
OPERATIONS OF THE
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA
1944-1945**

8 MAY 1944

DRAFT NO. 6

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COPY NO. 2

MEMO V
OUTLINE PLAN
FOR
OPERATIONS OF THE
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA
TO INCLUDE THE REOCCUPATION OF
THE PHILIPPINES

5 MAY 1944

MEMO V
OUTLINE PLAN
FOR
OPERATIONS OF THE
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA
TO INCLUDE THE REOCCUPATION OF
THE PHILIPPINES

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MEMO V

COLLID PLAN

FOR

OPERATIONS OF THE

SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA

TO INCLUDE THE REOCCUPATION OF

THE PHILIPPINES1. CONCEPT.

a. OPERATIONS IN THE PACIFIC, 1944.

(1) The Joint Chiefs of Staff have designated the FORMOSA-LUZON-CHINA area as the strategic objective of operations in the PACIFIC during 1944 and early 1945 in order to support the Chinese war effort and establish bases for a final assault upon JAPAN. They have decided to establish forces in the FORMOSA-LUZON-CHINA area by advances from present positions through the MARIANAS, CAROLINES, PALAU and MINDANAO as follows:

(a) Establishment of control of the MARIANAS-CAROLINES-PALAU area by forces of the Pacific Ocean Areas:

1. By neutralization of TRUK, and occupation of the Southern MARIANAS during June 1944.

Objective, to secure control of sea communications in the Central PACIFIC by isolating and neutralizing the CAROLINES, and by establishing sea and air bases for operations against Japanese sea routes and for long-range air attack against the Japanese Homeland.

2. By occupation of PALAU during September 1944.

Objectives, to extend our control to the eastern approaches to the PHILIPPINES and FORMOSA, and to establish a fleet and air base and forward staging area for the support of operations against MINDANAO, FORMOSA and CHINA.

(b) Occupation of MINDANAO by forces of the Southwest Pacific Area, supported by the PACIFIC Fleet, target date 15 November 1944.

Objective, to establish air forces to reduce and contain Japanese forces in the PHILIPPINES preparatory to a further advance to FORMOSA, either directly or via LUZON, and to conduct air strikes against enemy installations in the F.E.I.

(c) Occupation of FORMOSA, or occupation of LUZON should such operations prove necessary prior to the move on FORMOSA, target date 15 February 1945.

The Commander-in-Chief, Southwest Pacific Area, is assigned responsibility for planning LUZON operations.

- (2) The Joint Chiefs of Staff have also indicated that certain very long-range elements of the 20th Air Force may be employed from Northwestern AUSTRALIA against targets in the N.E.I. in the event that necessary bases are unavailable in the Southern MARIANAS.

b. STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES, SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA.

Under the above concept of PACIFIC operations, the strategic objectives of the Southwest Pacific Area are:

- (1) To establish necessary land, naval and air bases in the Southern PHILIPPINES.
- (2) To re-establish U.S. sovereignty in the PHILIPPINE ISLANDS.
- (3) To support operations into the FORMOSA-CHINA coast area by destroying or containing hostile forces in the PHILIPPINES, and providing such air, naval and logistic support as may prove necessary.
- (4) To reduce the hostile war-making power by air operations against installations in the N.E.I.

c. TASKS.

Present

The tasks assigned the Southwest Pacific Area by the Joint Chiefs of Staff are:

"Complete the isolation of RABAU and KAVIENG with minimum commitment of forces."

"Assist in the neutralization of TRUK and PALAU."

"Following HOLLANDIA, with available forces, conduct operations along the NEW GUINEA coast and such other operations as may be feasible in preparation for support of the PALAU operation and the assault on MINDANAO."

Eventual

Eventual tasks to complete attainment of strategic objectives will presumably be:

Seize MINDANAO by waterborne and airborne operations, and establish land, naval and air bases for support of subsequent operations to seize the LUZON-FORMOSA-CHINA coast area.

Re-occupy LUZON, establish bases as necessary and provide air and naval support for operations into the FORMOSA and CHINA coast areas.

Destroy hostile installations, sources of war materials and shipping in the BORNEO-N.E.I. area.

d. ANALYSIS OF TASKS.

This outline plan embodies operations along the NEW GUINEA axis preliminary to the occupation of PALAU and MINDANAO, the seizure of MINDANAO, and the reoccupation of the Northern PHILIPPINES, under the assumption that the latter operation proves a necessary preliminary to penetration of the FORMOSA-CHINA coast area. Support by the full resources of the PACIFIC Fleet throughout PHILIPPINE operations is assumed.

Initially, an advance is required northwestward from HOLLANDIA with forces made available by J.C.S. 713/5 to seize air bases necessary for

fully effective support of PALAU operations and general support of MINDANAO operations. Thereafter, seizure of additional bases is necessary to provide land-based direct air support and flank protection for the attack upon MINDANAO.

While hostile garrisons along our line of advance are at present comparatively weak, and MINDANAO is partly controlled by our own guerrillas who operate extensive intelligence and communications nets, the enemy is actively consolidating his positions throughout the area. Garrisons are being reinforced by major elements of the Japanese army as rapidly as shipping permits, air bases are being augmented and stocked and advance naval facilities increased. While our ability to isolate a given objective and bring overwhelming forces to bear upon it will continue, we may anticipate that as his consolidation progresses, seizure will require more elaborate and sustained support as well as greater assault forces. Our operations into MINDANAO become a race against hostile defensive development, with the earliest practicable establishment of control over PALAU and HAINAN a factor of major importance.

Destruction of hostile air and light naval forces in LUZON and establishment of bases for support of FORMOSA-CHINA coast operations will require occupation of the Central Plains area of the Island, including MANILA. Subsequent establishment of air elements at the extreme north in the vicinity of APARRI will probably also prove necessary. The occupation of LUZON will bring about complete destruction of Japanese forces throughout the Islands and redeem our National pledge to the PHILIPPINE people.

Air action all along the line of contact is required to destroy hostile war materials at the source and in transit in the BORNEO-N.E.I. area.

Throughout these operations, the isolation of RABAU and KAVIENG must be maintained with minimum forces.

e. SCHEME OF MANEUVER.

(1) General.

The general scheme of maneuver is to advance our land-based bomber line westward along the land masses of Western NEW GUINEA and intervening islands to the PHILIPPINES by successive occupation of the minimum bases required. Steps are coordinated with operations in the MANDATES to provide, in each instance, necessary land-based air support for subsequent operations. Hostile strength is by-passed wherever practicable and our flanks protected essentially by air action,

In the PHILIPPINES, air forces and advance naval bases are established in order to extend the range of air and naval action and provide the support required for successful penetration by United Nations forces into the FORMOSA-CHINA coast area.

Destructive air attacks are employed to soften up and gain air superiority over hostile air bases endangering our next advance. Hostile naval forces and shipping are destroyed along the line of advance, preventing reinforcement or supply of enemy air and naval forces within range and of objectives under attack. Ground forces are displaced forward by water and air, covered by naval and/or air forces, to seize and establish bases in each successive objective. Air and naval forces are established and the process repeated to successive objectives. Intermediate hostile installations by-passed are neutralized or contained by air, land and sea action. Air attacks are delivered by the most effective combination of land-based

and ~~air~~ ~~bases~~ ~~available~~ at the time. When ~~air~~ ~~bases~~ ~~are~~ ~~available~~ in sufficient force to provide unassisted direct air support of landing operations, the number of objectives is decreased and the length of the beach correspondingly extended.

(2) The operations divide as follows (see Annex 1).

Phase I

An advance northwestward along the north coast of NEW GUINEA to seize and establish in the GOROKA BAY area the bases required initially for support of operations to seize PALAU and subsequently for support and flank protection of operations to occupy MINDANAO.

Phase II

Continuation of the advance northwestward to seize in the HUPAK area the bases required for land-based direct air support and flank protection of operations to occupy MINDANAO. Air bases in the ARAFURA SEA area are occupied if required to implement these operations.

Phase III

Occupation of MINDANAO and establishment of bases for the reoccupation of LUZON and for air operations in the Northern BORNEO area.

Phase IV

(As directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff)

Reoccupation of LUZON and establishment of bases necessary for support of attack upon the FORMOSA-CHINA coast area.

Continuing Commitments

Maintenance of the neutralization of RABAU and KAVIENG with minimum forces, until occupation becomes more economical.

Air operations against hostile installations, sources of war materials and shipping in the BORNEO-N.E.I. area.

(3) Sequence and Timing.

The above sequence is based largely upon dispositions and capabilities and is subject to change dependent upon hostile reaction and the measure of success attained in operations in the MANDATES and along the NEW GUINEA-MINDANAO axis.

Timing is dependent upon availability of means and progress of hostile consolidation.

Flexibility is attained, to take advantage of enemy weakness, by elimination of objectives or phases.

The timing of operations given below is based upon decisions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and availability of means as outlined in J.C.S. 713/5 and WD radiogram 9171/12 March:

Phase I	-	May - July 1944
Phase II	-	August - October 1944
Phase III	-	November - December 1944
Phase IV	-	January - June 1945

(4) Major Combat Elements Required.

Minimum estimates of requirements in major units, air groups and amphibious lift are shown in Annex 3.

f. LOGISTIC ARRANGEMENTS.

Logistic support for offensive operations is provided from intermediate and advance bases along the NEW GUINEA-MINDANAO axis, that for neutralization operations in the BOUGAINVILLE-NEW IRELAND area from bases along the SOLOMONS axis. Major amphibious operations are launched from mounting areas maintained on the north coast of NEW GUINEA and in the South Pacific Area.

Task forces establish supply points for support of local garrisons in newly-occupied areas. Initially, supplies are obtained from bases now established or under construction, while as operations progress, ports and supply bases are advanced by corresponding bounds.

Heavy ships are employed for concentration of troops and for movement to forward areas where port or lighterage facilities are adequate. Amphibious craft are used for the forward movement from concentration areas of assault elements with accompanying or immediately following equipment and supplies. Upon completion of the assault phase, heavy ships are utilized to advance the supporting elements, service troops, materials and supplies necessary to complete the consolidation and to establish ports and bases. Bulk petroleum products are transported forward to intermediate bases in small tankers to locations where the tactical situation permits installation of bulk storage.

Assault units are in general rehabilitated in place, and every effort is made to eliminate rearward movement of troops and equipment.

As intermediate and advance bases are developed in forward areas, trans-PACIFIC shipping is diverted directly thereto in increasing volume.

For proposed logistic establishments, see Annex 5.

2. OPERATIONS.**PHASE I****a. TASK.**

Advance northwestward along the north coast of NEW GUINEA to seize and establish in the **SEELVINK BAY** area the bases required initially for support of operations to seize **PALAU** and subsequently for support and flank protection of operations to occupy **MINDANAO**.

b. ANALYSIS OF THE TASK.

Air bases are required in **SEELVINK BAY** to defeat hostile attempts to establish an effective defense in Western **NEW GUINEA** and the **MOLUKKAS**, and to neutralize hostile air and naval forces in the **HALMAHERA** area during **PALAU** operations. These same bases are required during the **MINDANAO** operation for staging purposes, and by air forces charged with protection of the western flank. Suitable sites are under active development by the enemy on **BIAK ISLAND** and in the **NOEMFOOR-MANOWARI-MOEMI** triangle. Our entry into **SEELVINK BAY** will require establishment of an intermediate fighter base for direct air support and convey cover.

Operations to occupy the necessary bases must be conducted by forces allocated to the Southwest Pacific Area by J.C.S. 713/5.

c. SCHEME OF MANEUVER (see Annex 2a).**(1) WAKDE, May 1944.**

A preliminary landing operation from **HOLLANDIA** establishes an advance fighter base in the **WAKDE** area to provide close air support and cover for subsequent operations to seize **BIAK ISLAND**. Direct air support and convey cover for the **WAKDE** operation are provided from **HOLLANDIA** airdromes.

(2) BIAK ISLAND, June 1944.

As soon as adequate direct air support and convey cover become available, an overseas landing operation from **HOLLANDIA** seizes hostile airdromes on **BIAK ISLAND**. Direct and general air support are provided from Northern **NEW GUINEA** airdromes, general support from the **DARWIN** area. Naval support is provided by the 7th Fleet.

The necessary air and light naval bases are established to maintain neutralization of hostile forces in the **VOGELKOP** and **MACCLUER GULF** areas and provide for long-range operations into **HALMAHERA** by attack bombardment. Advance staging areas and naval facilities are developed for support of subsequent operations into the Northern **VOGELKOP** and **HALMAHERA**.

(3) BISMARCK-BOUGAINVILLE.

In order to reduce air and naval elements committed to containing operations, mopping up on **BOUGAINVILLE ISLAND** is continued to a point where hostile forces are beyond capability of conducting or facilitating air and/or naval interference with our operations. Air and naval blockade of the **RABAU-NEW IRELAND** area are continued.

d. ESTIMATE OF PRINCIPAL COMBAT ELEMENTS REQUIRED (see Annex 3).

(1) Land Forces.

1-2/3 Divs

<u>COM Reserve</u>	<u>Garrison</u>	<u>Total</u>
3 Divs (1 immediately available) 1 Regt Preht	9-2/3 Divs	14-1/3 Divs 1 Regt Preht

^IIncluding assault force reserves.

(2) Air Forces. ^{XX}

Assigned elements 5th Air Force
 " " 13th Air Force
 " " RAAF Command
 " " 7th Fleet
 U.S. Naval and Marine land-based elements assigned for operations against the KARAKL-KAVIENG area.

^{XX}Shore-based, including rear-area protective elements.

(3) Naval Forces.

<u>Direct Support</u>	<u>Amphibious Lift</u>
7th Fleet	NAKDE, 2/3 Div BIAX, 1-1/3 Divs

e. LOGISTIC SUPPORT.

For location of bases for logistic support, see Annex 5b.

PLAN II

a. TASK.

Seize in the HALMAHERA area bases required for land-based direct air support and flank protection of operations to occupy MINDANAO. Air bases in the ANATARA SEA area are occupied if required to implement these operations.

b. ANALYSIS OF THE TASK.

Advance into MINDANAO from the Line PALAU-GEELVIRK BAY requires neutralization of the threat to our operations from hostile bases in HALMAHERA and MOROTAI as well as establishment of intermediate staging fields to permit employment of airborne forces. Possession of such fields also permits augmentation of carrier-based direct air support by land-based fighters and the employment of land-based attack bombardment against hostile naval forces in the MOROTAI PASSAGE and Eastern GREENS SEA. Although occupied by the enemy, fields on Northern HALMAHERA and/or MOROTAI offer the most satisfactory fulfillment of these requirements. Other sites are handicapped by limited capacity and/or less suitable geographical locations.

Seizure of Northern HALMAHERA direct from bases at HOLLANDIA and GEELVIRK BAY requires an intermediate step to deploy the necessary land-based direct air support at suitable points in the Northern VOGELKOP or WAIGEO ISLAND. If occupied, the SELE STRAIT area brings with it oil fields with a potential yield of 10,000 barrels daily.

In event material hostile land-based air opposition develops in the Eastern M.E.I., it may prove necessary to establish air forces in the KAI and YAMBEAR Groups to neutralize the AMBOI area and support our advance westward of the VOGELKOP.

c. SCHEME OF MANEUVER (see Annex 2b).

(1) Northern VOGELKOP, August 1944.

Airdromes and light naval bases are established on the northern coast of the VOGELKOP or on WAIGEO ISLAND, as reconnaissance and the hostile situation at the time indicates, by an overseas landing operation from HOLLANDIA with advance elements staged at BEKI ISLAND. Direct air support is provided from GEELVIRK BAY, general support from Northern NEW GUINEA and BAWEN airdromes.

Air and naval elements are established for flank protection and direct support of operations to seize objectives in the MOROTAI-Northern HALMAHERA area.

(2) HALMAHERA, September 1944.

Airdromes and light naval bases in HALMAHERA and MOROTAI are seized or neutralized by an overseas landing operation from NEW GUINEA bases. The operation is coordinated with seizure of PALAU by Pacific Ocean Area Forces. Direct air support is provided by carrier-based elements or from the VOGELKOP, general support from Northwestern AUSTRALIA and Northern NEW GUINEA. Naval support is provided by the 7th Fleet.

Air and naval elements are established in the MOROTAI-Northern HALMAHERA area for flank protection, support and staging of airborne elements in subsequent operations to occupy MINDANAO.

(3) ARAFURA SEA, August 1944.

In event hostile strength in the Eastern S.M.I. requires advance of our water line into the BUNA SEA area to implement operations northward of the VOGLKOP, amphibious forces are moved from Northern ILE UENIA, and the KAI and TAMAKAI Groups are seized by amphibious operations employing Australian forces. Direct air support and cover are provided by land-based elements from HILTON and ANSON LAND airbases. Naval support is provided by the 7th Fleet.

Air elements are promptly established for support of operations into the HAINANSEA area.

Diversions of amphibious lift to this operation will either require provision of lift for Northern VOGLKOP and HAINANSEA from extra-theater sources or involve a corresponding delay in these operations.

d. ESTIMATE OF PRINCIPAL COMBAT ELEMENTS REQUIRED (see Annex 3).(1) Land Forces.

<u>Assault</u> ^X	<u>ORG Reserve</u>	<u>Garrison</u>	<u>Total</u>
VOGLKOP-HAINANSEA, 3 Divs	6 Divs (3 including ^X)	8-2/3 Divs	19-2/3 Divs
ARAFURA SEA, 2 Divs			

^XIncluding assault force reserves.

(2) Air Forces.^{XX}

Assigned elements	5th Air Force
"	13th Air Force
"	RAAF Command
"	7th Fleet

U.S. Naval and Marine land-based elements assigned for operations in the BAKUL-KAVING area.

^{XX}Shore-based, including rear-area protective elements.

(3) Naval Forces.

<u>Strategic Support</u>	<u>Direct Support</u>	<u>Amphibious Lift</u>
U.S. PACIFIC Fleet, incident to PALAU operations.	7th Fleet.	Western VOGLKOP, 1 Div HAINANSEA, 1-1/2 Divs ARAFURA SEA, 1 Div

e. LOGISTIC SUPPORT.

For location of bases for logistic support, see Annex 5e.

a. TASK.

Occupy MINDANAO and establish bases for the reoccupation of LUZON and for air operations in the Northern BORNEO area.

b. ANALYSIS OF THE TASK.

Occupation of MINDANAO requires combined airborne and overseas landing operations on a major scale to seize the necessary beachheads and quickly secure the portions of the island vital to our purposes. Our major objective areas are the north-central plateau VALENCIA-CAGAYAN area as a base for attack aviation operations into LUZON, the DAVAO area as a naval and logistic base and the coastal area COTABATO-MALABANG for heavy bombardment bases and overland operations to occupy the road net of the island. SURIGAO, Zamboanga, JOLO and ZAMBITANI are required later to control entrances to the waters to the northwest.

The existing guerrilla organizations are capable of material assistance in our operations. Prompt and ample seaborne reinforcement and supply of initial assaults are mandatory. Airborne operations to quickly seize our inland objectives and permit employment of air transport on a major scale to supplement seaborne movement, are essential to prompt isolation of principal hostile forces from each other and for speedy development of air bases for support of subsequent operations. These airborne operations become feasible upon establishment of adequate staging bases along the line from Western NEW GUINEA.

c. SCHEME OF MANEUVER (see Annex 2c).

(1) MINDANAO, 15 November 1944.

Beachheads in the COTABATO-MALABANG and SARANGANI BAY areas of MINDANAO are seized by overseas landing operations with massed carrier-based air support, employing the combined amphibious and naval forces available at that time. These operations are accompanied by airborne movement to activate inland fields seized in conjunction with guerrilla forces. Fighters are flown in to these fields and to airdromes established on the coast, to relieve carrier-based forces and maintain air superiority over the island. Landing forces advance as rapidly as practicable to the support of airborne forces and establish control of the road net and airdromes of the area SARANGANI-CAGAYAN, ILIGAN-MALABANG-COTABATO. Thereafter, DAVAO is reduced by combined overland and short-range landing operations, supported by the Fleet. Remaining hostile centers of resistance are then reduced in detail.

Amphibious lift is employed in the initial movement of ground echelons of air units with their operating supplies.

Logistic and naval bases are promptly developed at DAVAO while air forces are established in the COTABATO-MALABANG and the VALENCIA-DEL MONTE areas. Preparations are expedited for the advance upon LUZON.

The SULU ARCHIPELAGO is occupied by minor consolidation operations and air forces are established for operations against hostile installations in Northern BORNEO.

(2) RABAU-NEW IRELAND.

When blockade has reduced resistance in RABAU and NEW IRELAND to a point where it is more economical to occupy than to maintain containing forces, these areas are taken over by Australian forces and hostile remnants mopped up.

d. REQUIREMENTS OF MINIMUM COMBAT RESERVE REQUIREMENTS (see Annex 5).

(1) Land Forces.

<u>Assault</u> ^x	<u>USMC Reserve</u>	<u>Guards</u>	<u>Total</u>
MINIMUM, 5 Divs Inf 1 Div AB 1 Rgt Front 1 Rgt Cav 2 Rgts Inf (Philippine), less 2 Bns 1 Div (Asst), RARAU	3 Divs Inf	6-1/3 Divs Inf	16-1/3 Divs Inf 1 Div AB 1 Div (Asst) 1 Rgt Front 1 Rgt Cav 2 Rgts Inf (Philippine), less 2 Bns

^xIncluding assault force reserves.

(2) Air Forces.^{xx}

Assigned elements - 5th Air Force
 " " 13th Air Force
 " " RAAF Command
 " " 7th Fleet
 Supporting " 7th Air Force (from PALAU)
 U.S. Naval and Marine land-based elements for rear-area operations in the RARAU-NEW ENGLAND area.

^{xx}Including rear-area protective elements.

(3) Naval Forces.

<u>Strategic Support</u>	<u>Direct Support</u>	<u>Amphibious Lift</u>
U.S. Fleet, as directed by J.C.S., to ensure non-interference by hostile fleet elements and to provide major carrier-borne direct air support of the operations.	7th Fleet (reinforced)	6 Divs, overseas landing operations. 1 Div, short-range equipment.

e. LOGISTIC SUPPORT.

For location of bases for logistic support, see Annex 5d.

PHASE IV
(as directed)

a. **TASK.**

Reoccupy **LUZON** and establish bases necessary for support of attack upon the **FORMOSA-CHINA** coast area.

b. **ANALYSIS OF THE TASK.**

Reoccupation of **LUZON** requires amphibious operations along familiar lines to seize initially the Central Plain and **MANILA** areas. Extensive bases will be required for the support of the attack into **FORMOSA** and **CHINA**. Existing airfields and base facilities can be readily improved to permit initiation of **VLR** bombing of **JAPAN**.

c. **SCHEME OF MANEUVER (see Annex 2d).**

(1) **VISAYAS, January 1945.**

Preliminary operations can probably be initiated from **MINDANAO** during January 1945 to seize advance airdromes in the **VISAYAS** and the **SAN BERNARDINO STRAIT** area of Southern **LUZON** for support of operations into the vital areas of that island. Troops and air and naval support for these preliminary movements are provided from **MINDANAO** Occupation Forces, augmented by 1 division from the **HALMAHERA** area. Operations into the **VISAYAS** are visualized as airborne, with seaborne logistic support. An amphibious operation into the **SAN BERNARDINO STRAIT** area is mounted from **DAVAO**.

(2) **LUZON, February 1945.**

The scheme of maneuver depends upon the forces available and the disposition and strength of the enemy at that time. **MANILA** and the **LUZON** Plain are initial objectives, followed by the seizure of airdrome areas in the extreme northern portion of the island.

Bases are established as required for support of the attacks into **FORMOSA** and the Central **CHINA** coast. Naval and air operations from **LUZON** sever Japanese shipping routes in the South **CHINA** SEA.

(3) **Strategic Bombing Operations.**

Strategic bombing operations, which have been conducted from Northwest **AUSTRALIA** throughout preceding phases, are extended to Northern **BORNEO** and into the South **CHINA** SEA, from the **SULU ARCHIPELAGO** and fields activated by minor operations on **PALAWAN**. **VLR** operations against **JAPAN** and hostile installations in **KOREA** and North **CHINA** may be initiated after relatively easy improvement of Central and Northern **LUZON** air base facilities.

d. **ESTIMATE OF PRINCIPAL COMBAT ELEMENTS REQUIRED (see Annex 3).**

In view of profound changes in the **PACIFIC** situation which are certain to occur prior to the event, it is considered impracticable at this time to make specific estimates of forces required. The following should be regarded only as a guide to planning:

(1) Land Forces.

<u>Assault^x</u>	<u>GRQ Reserve</u>	<u>Garrison</u>	<u>Total</u>
PANAY-LEGASPI,	1 Div Inf	6-1/3 Divs	18-1/3 Divs Inf
3 Divs Inf	2 Divs Inf (available		1 Div AB
1 Div AB	in May)		1 Rgt Preht
1 Rgt Preht			2 Rgts Inf
LUZON,			(Filipino),
6 Divs Inf			less 2 Bns
1 Div AB			
1 Rgt Preht			
2 Rgts Inf			
(Filipino),			
less 2 Bns			

^xIncluding assault force reserves.(2) Air Forces.^{xx}

Assigned elements	5th Air Force
" "	13th Air Force
" "	RAAF Command
" "	7th Fleet
Attached	7th Air Force (operating from MINDANAO)

^{xx}Including rear-area protective elements.(3) Naval Forces.

<u>Strategic Support</u>	<u>Direct Support</u>	<u>Amphibious Lift</u>
U.S. Fleet, as directed by J.C.S., to ensure non-interference by hostile fleet elements and provide major carrier-based air support.	7th Fleet (reinforced)	8-1/4 Divs plus PANAY follow-up.

e. LOGISTIC SUPPORT.

For location of bases for logistic support, see Annex 5c.



5 Div 2nd
1 " AB
1 Regt Pacht
2 " 2nd (Phil)

March - June
III
Jan - Feb
5 Div 2nd
1 " AB
2 Regt 2nd (Phil) - 2 Bns

FEB 45

VII - Dec
4 Div 2nd
1 " CW
1 Regt Pacht
1 " CW
2 " 2nd (Phil) - 2 Bns

JAN 45

15 NOV

I
July - Oct 1944

SEPT
2 Div
1 Div
AUG
JUNE


AUG

JUNE
CENTRAL
PACIFIC
FORCES

SEPT
CENTRAL
PACIFIC
FORCES

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA

To Accompany G-3
Operations Report No. _____




ANNEX I

INDEX V

PHASES OF OPERATIONS

OBJECTIVES



OCCUPIED



CONTINGENT




INITIALLY BY PASSED

OPERATION CONDUCTED IN EVENT
HOSTILE STRENGTH IN EASTERN
NEW GUINEA REQUIRES SUCH SUPPORT
FOR OPERATIONS WEST OF NEW GUINEA

CURRENT
OPERATION

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA

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ANNEX 2-4
RESO V
PHASE 1
MAY - JULY
1944

INDEXED

OBJECTIVE AREA AND ASSAULT ELEMENT

JUNE

AMPHIBIOUS OPERATION TARGET DATE AND MOUNTING AREA

REHABILITATION AND TRAINING

GARRISON



TOP SECRET

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA

To Accompany G-3
Operations Report No. _____



FORM V
PHASE III
NOV - DEC
1944

LEGEND

- OBJECTIVE AREA AND ASSAULT ELEMENT
- AMPHIBIOUS OPERATION TARGET DATE AND MOUNTING AREA
- REHABILITATION AND TRAINING
- GARRISON
- AIRBORNE OPERATION



- 25
- 43
- 37
- 1 CAV
- 32
- 11 AB
- 503 PRCHT
- 1 PHIL
- 2 PHIL (-2 Bn's)
- 112

- (1 CAV)
- (32, 11 AB)
- HQ RES
- 24
- 93
- 11 AUST
- 7 AUST

- 6 AUST
- 9 AUST
- 2 AUST
- 12 AUST
- 3 AUST (-1 BRIG)

WITHDRAWN
IF KAT-TANIMBAR
OCCUPIED


CONTINGENT

SULU SEA
CONSOLIDATION
OPERATION



GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA

To Accompany G-3
Operations Report No. _____



SCALE IN NAUTICAL MILES
ANNEX 2-4
PHASE V
PHASE IV
JAN-JUNE 1945

- 40
- 24
- 41
- 38
- AMERICAL
- 93
- 11(AB)
- 503(PHCT)
- 1 PHIL
- 2 PHIL(-2 HNS)

- OBJECTIVE AREA AND ASSAULT ELEMENT
- CONTINGENT OBJECTIVE
- AMBITIOUS OPERATION
TARGET DATE AND MOUNTING AREA
- REHABILITATION AND TRAINING
- GARRISON
- AIRBORNE OPERATION

WITHDRAWN IF
KAT-TAKIMBAR OCCUPIED

~~TOP SECRET~~

ESTIMATE OF PRINCIPAL COMBAT ELEMENTS REQUIRED

MAJOR UNITS

AMPHIBIOUS LIFT*

AIR FORCES

	Assault*	GHQ Res	Garrison	Total
PHASE I - May-July	1-2/3 Divs	3 Divs 1 Rgt (Frcht)	9-2/3 Divs	14-1/3 Divs 1 Rgt (Frcht)
NAKOE-BIAK -	1-2/3 Divs U.S.	2 Divs U.S. 1 Div Aust 1 Rgt (Frcht) U.S.	4 Divs U.S. 4-2/3 Divs Aust	
PHASE II - August-October	5 Divs	6 Divs 1 Rgt (Frcht)	8-2/3 Divs (Equivalent)	13-2/3 Divs 1 Rgt (Frcht)
Northern VOGELKOP- HALMAHERA -	3 Divs U.S.	5 Divs U.S. 1 Div Aust 1 Rgt (Frcht) U.S.	4-2/3 Divs U.S. 4 Divs Aust	
ARAFURA SEA** -	2 Divs Aust			
PHASE III - November-December	7 Divs 2-1/3 Rgts 1 Rgt (Frcht)	3 Divs	8-1/3 Divs	11-1/3 Divs 2-1/3 Rgts 1 Rgt (Frcht)
MINDANAO -	5 Divs (Inf) U.S. 1 Div (AB) U.S. 1-1/3 Rgts (Inf) Fil 1 Rgt (Cav) U.S. 1 Rgt (Frcht) U.S.	3 Divs U.S.	2-1/3 Divs U.S. 6 Divs Aust	
RABAUL -	1 Div Aust			
PHASE IV - January-June 1945	10 Divs 1-1/3 Rgts (Inf) Fil 1 Rgt (Frcht)	3 Divs	6 Divs 1 Rgt (Cav)	19 Divs 2-1/3 Rgts 1 Rgt (Frcht)
PANAY- LAGASPI -	3 Divs (Inf) U.S. 1 Div (AB) U.S. 1 Rgt (Frcht) U.S.	1 Div (Inf) U.S. 2 Divs (Inf) U.S. (Available May)	2 Divs U.S. 4 Divs Aust 1 Rgt (Cav) U.S.	
LUZON -	6 Divs (Inf) U.S. 1 Div (AB) U.S. 1 Rgt (Frcht) U.S. 1-1/3 Rgts (Inf) Fil			

Transport	Escort
Lift, equivalent of 2/3 Div, 1-1/3 Divs, successively, to float maximum of 28,000 personnel, 25,000 long tons.	
3 APA 1 AKA 5 APD	32 LST 40 LCI 20 LCT
	37 DD/DE/PF Minor escort and control craft.
Lift, equivalent of 1 Div, 1-1/2 Divs, successively, to float maximum of 33,000 personnel, 33,000 long tons.**	
4 APA 1 AKA 4 AK 4 EC2	5 APD 32 LST 60 LCI 25 LCT
	34 DD/DE/PF Minor escort and control craft.
Lift, 6 Divs for MINDANAO, 1 Div for RABAUL, concurrently, to float maximum of 159,000 personnel, 212,000 long tons.	
65 APA 26 AKA 15 AP 18 AK 18 APD	7 LSD 199 LST 165 LCI 128 LCT
	28 CVE 135 DD/DE/PF Minor escort and control craft.***
Lift, 8-1/2 Divs, including minor consolidation operations, to float maximum of 201,000 personnel, 256,000 long tons.	
80 APA 30 AKA 15 AP 18 AK 18 APD	7 LSD 213 LST 210 LCI 102 LCT
	26 CVE 234 DD/DE/PF/SC/PC/YMS

	5th AF	13th AF	7th Fleet	RAAF & NEI	Total
HB	4	2-1/4			6-1/4
MB	2	1		1-3/4	4-3/4
L & DB	3			1	4
F (D)	6	2		4	12
F (N)	2/3	1/3			1
TC	4-1/2	3/4			5-1/4
Photo-Recco	2	1	1	3/4	4-3/4
					38 Groups

Assumptions:

- a. Naval and Marine shore-based air elements are assumed to be available for air garrison to provide search and anti-submarine patrol in the BISMARCKS-Northern SOLOMONS area.
- b. Carrier-based air forces of the PACIFIC Fleet are available for general and direct support of PHILIPPINE operations. They are also required for support of HALMAHERA operation if Northern VOGELKOP is by-passed.

*Includes Task Force Reserves.
**Contingent.

*Notes:

- a. Initial allocation of operational vessels, training and normal maintenance not included.
 - b. Gunfire support groups undetermined pending designation of landing areas and information concerning hostile defenses.
- **ARAFURA SEA Operation will require augmentation of available lift by 1 Div or involve a corresponding delay in subsequent operations.
- ***Escort, RABAUL Operation, 20 SC/YMS/PC, assisted by IT and VP.

MAJOR UNITS


COMBAT DIVISIONS and SEPERATE REGIMENTS

ANNEX 4-A
RENO V
EMPLOYMENT
OF
COMBAT ELEMENTS
MAJOR UNITS

STATIC
GARRISONS

LEGEND

- Division 1st Cav
- Rehabilitation and Training
- GHQ Reserve
- Active Garrison and Minor Operations
- Assembly Area and Approach
- OPERATION IN WHICH UNIT IS COMMITTED
- Amphibious Assault
- Airborne Operation.
- Intra-Theater Movement
- Extra-Theater Movement US



° EMPLOYMENT MAY PERTAIN TO ANY DIVISION COMMITTED IN MINDANAO

* ARAFURA SEA OPERATION

UNIT	CURRENT DISPOSITION	PHASE I					PHASE II			DISPOSITION JUNE, 1945	LOCATION OF MAJOR UNITS
		GEELVINK	NORTHERN VOGELKOP	(CONTINGENT) ARAFURA	HALMAHERA	MINDANAO	VISAYAS	LUZON			
43rd Inf Div	New Zealand	Vitiaz Area				X	Mindanao(3)		Luzon		
37th " "	Bougainville	Vitiaz Area				X	Mindanao(3)		Mindanao(3)		
25th " "	New Caledonia		Vitiaz Area			X	X(3)		Visayas(3)		
3rd N.Z. "	Treasury-Green Is	Withdrawn, N.Z.									
93rd Inf "	Guadalcanal to Bougainville	Bougainville				Hollandia		X	Luzon		
40th " "	Guadalcanal to New Britain	New Britain				Finschhafen		X	Luzon		
Americal "	Bougainville							X	Luzon		
1st Mar Div	New Britain to Guadalcanal	Withdrawn, POA									
1st Cav "	Manus					X	Mindanao(3)		Mindanao(3)		
24th Inf "	X	Hollandia						X	Luzon		
41st " "	X	X	Wakie-Biak					X	Luzon		
31st " "	Oro		X		Vogelkop				Vogelkop		
6th " "	Milne	Hollandia			X	Halmahera			Halmahera		
32nd " "	Saidor-Aitape	Aitape-Biak	Aitape			X	X(3)		Visayas(3)		
33rd " "	Finschhafen				X	Halmahera	X	Legaspi	Luzon		
38th " "	Enroute from U.S.	Finschhafen						X	Luzon		
11th AB "	U.S.	Nadzab				X	X	X	Luzon		
158th Inf CT	Arawe & Kiriwina	X	Biak						Geelvink		
112th Cav Rgt	Arawe	Finschhafen				X	Sulu		Sulu		
503rd Prcht*	Nadzab					X	X	X	Luzon		
1st Phil "	U.S.	Finschhafen	New Britain			X		X	Luzon		
2nd " "	U.S.	Finschhafen	New Britain			X		X	Luzon		
6th Aust Div	Atherton			X	Kai-Tanimbar			Australia	Australia		
7th " "	"					X	Bismarcks		Bismarcks		
9th " "	"			X	Kai-Tanimbar				Kai-Tanimbar		
3rd " "	"								Australia		
5th " "	Saidor & Madang	Madang	Hansa			Wewak		Hollandia	Hollandia		
11th " "	Madang		Hansa			Bismarcks			Bismarcks		
12th " "	Darwin								Darwin		
4th " "	Merauke		Withdrawn								
2nd " "	Perth							Withdrawn			

NOTES:


- (1) All contingent operations are assumed to be carried out.
- (2) "X" indicates employment in assault phase of operation.
- (3) Assumed designation --- may be any division committed in MINDANAO.

RECAPITULATION, June 1945

U. S. Divs:	
Luzon.....	9
Visayas.....	2
Mindanao.....	2
Halmahera.....	1
Vogelkop.....	1
	15
U. S. & Phil. Rgts:	
Luzon.....	3
Mindanao.....	1
Geelvink.....	1
	5
Aust Divs:	
Australia.....	4
Bismarcks.....	2
New Guinea.....	1
Arafura.....	1
	8

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA

To Accompany G-3
Operations Report No. _____



REMO V
DEPLOYMENT OF AIR GROUPS
PHASE I

HOLLANDIA
1 Fighter Group
2 T.C. Groups
2 PB2Y Squadrons

WAKDE
1 Fighter Group
Staging for 2 Heavy Groups
1 PB4Y Squadron

AITAPE
1 Fighter Group
1 LB Group

SAIDOR
1 Fighter Group
1 Light LB Group
2 Medium Bomb Groups

BIAK
3 Heavy Bomb Groups
2 Medium Groups
2 Light LB Groups
5 Fighter Groups
1 Photo Group
1 Recce Group
1 T.C. Group
1 PB4Y Squadron
1 Night Fighter Squadron

MANUS
2 Heavy Bomb Groups
1 LAB Squadron
2 Fighter Squadrons
2 PB2Y Squadrons


GLOUCESTER
2 Fighter Squadrons

TANIMBAR
Garrison can be drawn
from DARWIN plus
Naval Units from
SOPAC.

MERAUKE
1 Fighter Squadron

SOUTH PACIFIC
Navy and Marine Air
Units plus detach-
ments from 13th
A/F as requested.


DARWIN
1 Heavy Bomb Group
plus RAAP
2 Medium Bomb Group
2 Fighter Groups
2 PB2Y Squadrons





GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA

To Accompany G-3
Operations Report No. _____



SCALE IN NAUTICAL MILES

ANNEX 4-C-2

RENO V

DEPLOYMENT OF AIR GROUPS

PHASE IIa

MAPIA

Radio Range Facilities
and emergency crash
landing strip.

BIAK

- 3 Heavy Bomb Groups
- 2 Medium Groups
- 2 Light LB Groups
- 5 Fighter Groups
- 1 Photo Group
- 1 Resco Group
- 1 T.C. Group
- 1 PB4Y Squadron
- 1 Night Fighter Squadron

MANUS

- 2 Heavy Bomb Groups
- 1 LAB Squadron
- 2 Fighter Squadrons
- 2 PB2Y Squadrons

AYU

- 2 Fighter Groups
- 1 Light Bomb Group
plus staging for
two heavy Groups
or the equivalent
if available.

SAIDOR

- 1 Fighter Group
- 1 Medium Bomb Group

WAKDE

- 1 Fighter Group
- Staging for 2 Heavy Groups
- 1 PB4Y Squadron

GLOUCESTER

- 1 Fighter Squadron

SOUTH PACIFIC

Navy and Marine Air
Units plus detach-
ment from 13th
A/F as requested.

HOLLANDIA

- 1 Fighter Squadron
- 2 T.C. Groups
- 2 PB2Y Squadrons

TANIMBAR

- 2 Fighter Groups
- 1 Medium Bomb Group

NEW GUINEA

AITAPE

- Medium Bomb Group
- Light Bomb Group

NADZAB

- 2 T.C. Groups


DARWIN

- Heavy Bomb Group
plus RAAF
- 2 PB2Y Squadrons
- 1 Fighter Squadron



GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA

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SCALE IN NAUTICAL MILES

ANNEX 4-C-3

RENO V

DEPLOYMENT OF AIR GROUPS

PHASE IIb

HALMAHERA
2 Heavy Bomb Groups
1 LAB Squadron
3 Medium Bomb Groups
2 Fighter Groups
1 Photo Group
1 Recco Group
1 PB4Y Squadron
Facilities for 10 T.C. Groups plus Glider echelon.
1 Night Fighter Squadron

AYU
2 Fighter Groups
1 Light Bomb Group plus staging for 2 Heavy Groups or the equivalent if available.

MAPIA
Radio Range facilities and emergency crash landing strip.

BIAK
3 Heavy Bomb Groups
2 Light Bomb Groups
5 Fighter Groups
1 Photo Group
3 T.C. Groups
1 PB4Y Squadron
1 Night Fighter Sq
2 PB2Y Squadrons


MANUS
2 Fighter Squadrons
2 PB2Y Squadrons

TANIMBAR
2 Fighter Groups
1 Medium Bomb Group
1 1/2 Heavy Bomb Groups
2 PB2Y Squadrons

WAKDE
1 Fighter Group


NEW GUINEA HOLLANDIA
1 Fighter Sq
2 T.C. Groups

DARWIN
1 Fighter Sqdn



GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA

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SCALE IN NAUTICAL MILES

ANNEX 4-C-4

RENO V

DEPLOYMENT OF AIR GROUPS

PHASE III

MINDANAO

5th A/F

- 3 Heavy Bomb Groups
- 3 Medium Bomb Groups
- 4 Light Bomb Groups
- 8 Fighter Groups
- 1 Photo Group
- 1 Recco Group
- 2 Night Fighter Squadrons
- 2 PB4Y Squadrons
- 1 PB Squadron
- 2 PB2Y Squadrons
- 1 1/2 T.C. Groups

HALMAHERA

13th A/F

- 2 Heavy Bomb Groups
- 1 LAB Squadron
- 3 Medium Bomb Groups
- 2 Fighter Groups
- 1 Photo Group
- 1 Recco Group
- 1 Night Fighter Squadron
- 1 T.C. Group

MANUS

Naval Fighter Squadrons
2 PB2Y Squadrons


Line of Communications
HALMAHERA to HOLLANDIA
as required.
1 T.C. Group

TANIMBAR

- 2 Fighter Groups
- 1 Medium Bomb Group
- 1 1/2 Heavy Bomb Groups
- 2 PB2Y Squadrons

DAUWIN

1 Fighter Squadron



PANAY
 13th A/F,
 reinforced by 5th A/F.
 2 Heavy Bomber Groups
 1 LAB Squadron
 1 Medium Bomb Group
 5 Fighter Groups
 1 Photo Recce Group
 1 Recce Group
 4 Light Bomb Groups
 10 T.C. Groups

MINDANAO
 5th A/F
 3 Heavy Bomb Groups
 3 Medium Bomb Groups
 5 Fighter Groups
 1 Photo Group
 1 Recce Group
 2 Night Fighter Squadrons
 2 PB1Y Squadrons
 1 PV Squadron
 2 PB2Y Squadrons
 3 T.C. Groups

HALMAHERA
 1 Heavy Bomb Group
 1 Medium Bomb Group
 1 Fighter Group
 2 PB2Y Squadrons
 1 T.C. Group


MANUS
 Naval Fighter Squadrons
 2 PB2Y Squadrons

Line of Communications
 HALMAHERA to HOLLANDIA
 as required.
 1 T.C. Group

TANIMBAR
 1 Fighter Group
 2 PB2Y Squadrons

DARWIN
 1 Fighter Squadron

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
 SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA
 To Accompany G-3
 Operations Report No. _____



SCALE IN NAUTICAL MILES
 ANEX 4-6-5
 RENO V
 DEPLOYMENT OF AIR GROUPS
 PHASE IVa

125



Heavy Bomber Group, 5th AF
 3 Heavy Bomb Groups
 3 Fighter Groups
 1 Photo Recon Group
 2 FBT Squadrons
 1 Recon Group
 Other units in progression.

PALAU
 13th A/F, reinforced by 5th A/F
 2 Heavy Bomb Groups
 1 LB Squadron
 1 Medium Bomb Group
 3 Fighter Groups
 1 Photo Recon Group
 1 Recon Group
 1 Light Bomb Group

INDONESIA
 3 Medium Bomb Groups
 2 Fighter Groups
 1 Night Fighter Squadron
 1 PV Squadron
 2 FBT Squadrons
 3 T.O. Groups

Palau
 1 Heavy Bomb Group
 1 Medium Bomb Group
 1 Fighter Group
 2 FBT Squadrons

PHILIP
 1 Naval Fighter Squadron
 2 FBT Squadrons

Line of Command
 13th A/F, reinforced by 5th A/F
 as required

1 Fighter Group
 2 FBT Squadrons

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
 SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA

To Accompany G-3
 Operations Report No.



SCALE IN NAUTICAL MILES

1:50,000

LIST OF

CONTENTS OF THIS REPORT

PAGE NO.

1 Fighter Squadron



ANNEX 5-a

RENO V

LOCATION OF BASES
FOR LOGISTIC SUPPORT
INITIAL MAIN
SUPPLY BASES

LEGEND

- ⊙ Army Main Supply Base.
- Army Intermediate Supply Base.
- Army Advance Supply Base.
- + Army Task Force Supply Point.
- ⊙ Naval Supply and Heavy Repair Base.
- ⊙ Naval Supply and Light Repair Base.
- ⊙ Naval Lion.
- ⊙ Naval Cub.
- ⊙ Minor Naval Facilities.
- ⊙ Air Depot.
- ⊙ Supply Base, Australian Army Only.

~~TOP SECRET~~

ANNEX 5-b

RENO V

LOCATION OF BASES
FOR LOGISTIC SUPPORT

PHASE I

LEGEND

- ⊙ Army Main Supply Base.
- Army Intermediate Supply Base.
- Army Advance Supply Base.
- + Army Task Force Supply Point.
- ⊕ Naval Supply and Heavy Repair Base.
- ⊗ Naval Supply and Light Repair Base.
- Ⓢ Naval Lion.
- Ⓜ Naval Cub.
- Ⓡ Minor Naval Facilities.
- ⊕ Air Depot.
- Proposed.

~~TOP SECRET~~



Darwin
□ Ⓡ ⊕

Cairns
○ ⊗



ANNEX 5-c

RENO V

LOCATION OF BASES
FOR LOGISTIC SUPPORT

PHASE II

LEGEND

- ⊙ Army Main Supply Base.
- Army Intermediate Supply Base.
- Army Advance Supply Base.
- + Army Task Force Supply Point.
- ⊕ Naval Supply and Heavy Repair Base.
- ⊗ Naval Supply and Light Repair Base.
- ⚓ Naval Lion.
- ⚓ Naval Cub.
- ⚓ Minor Naval Facilities.
- ⊕ Air Depot.
- Proposed.

TOP SECRET

Darwin
□ ⊕ ⊕

Cairns
○ ⊗

ANNEX 5-d

RENO V


LOCATION OF BASES
FOR LOGISTIC SUPPORT

PHASE III

LEGEND

- ⊙ Army Main Supply Base.
- Army Intermediate Supply Base.
- Army Advance Supply Base.
- + Army Task Force Supply Point.
- ⊕ Naval Supply and Heavy Repair Base.
- ⊗ Naval Supply and Light Repair Base.
- ⊕ Naval Lion.
- ⊕ Naval Cub.
- ⊕ Minor Naval Facilities.
- ⊕ Air Depot.
- Proposed.

~~TOP SECRET~~



Darwin
□ ⊕ ⊕

Cairns
○ ⊕



ANNEX 5-e

RENO V

LOCATION OF BASES
FOR LOGISTIC SUPPORT

PHASE IV

LEGEND

- ⊙ Army Main Supply Base.
- Army Intermediate Supply Base.
- Army Advance Supply Base.
- + Army Task Force Supply Point.
- ⊕ Naval Supply and Heavy Repair Base.
- ⊗ Naval Supply and Light Repair Base.
- Ⓜ Naval Lion.
- Ⓝ Naval Cub.
- Ⓜ Minor Naval Facilities.
- ⊕ Air Depot.
- Proposed.

Darwin
□ Ⓜ ⊕