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U.S. FLEET MARINE FORCE, PACIFIC.


SPECIAL ACTION REPORT, IWO JIMA
CAMPAIGN.

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A.G. No. 01866

V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS LANDING FORCE

- IWO JIMA -

Special Staff Section Reports
(Cont'd)

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Appendix 2 - Report By Naval Gunfire Officer

Appendix 3 - Report By Air Officer

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Naval Gunfire Report

Appendix 2 to Annex CHARLIE to Special Action Report IWO JIMA Campaign

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Ser. 0187B

V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS LANDING FORCE,
In the Field.

30 May 1945.

3d Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

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From: The Naval Gunfire Officer.
To : The Commanding General.
Subject: Special Action Report, IWO JIMA Campaign.
References: (a) VAC Top Secret ltr dtd 24Oct44 and FMF Pac
Top Secret Ser 00080 dtd 26Oct44.
(b) ComPhibsPac Top Secret Ser 000209 dtd 15Nov44.
Enclosure: (A) General Plan of Fires D-Day.

1. TRAINING

(a) SHORE FIRE CONTROL PARTIES.

Training of the Shore Fire Control Parties attached to the 3d, 4th, and 5th Marine Divisions was carried out under the supervision of the Naval Gunfire Section, Headquarters, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific. This training included the following:

(1) Instruction in the gunnery installations of combatant ships in a course especially prepared for instruction of Naval Gunfire Liaison Officers and Spotters by the PACIFIC Fleet Gunnery and Torpedo School. The application of naval gunnery techniques and installations to the shore bombardment problem was stressed.

(2) Observation and spotting of all types of Naval Gunfire in Shore Bombardment Exercises at KAHOO LAWE Island, T. H.

(3) Observation trips aboard ships conducting Shore Bombardment Exercises.

(4) Advanced training in the technique of Shore Fire Control Parties, including Command Post Exercises in which simulated prearranged fires, communications and problems of night illumination were stressed.

(b) TROOPS.

Command Post Exercises were held in battalions, regiments, divisions and corps, stressing the capabilities and coordination of Naval Gunfire, Air and Artillery. This training had a marked effect on the maximum utilization of all weapons in support of the Corps throughout the operation.

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(c) COMBATANT SHIPS.

The program of Shore Bombardment Exercises carried out under the supervision of the Commander Cruisers and Destroyers, U. S. PACIFIC Fleet, in cooperation with Headquarters, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, resulted in the fact that all except a very few of the fire support ships involved in the operation had fired the required Qualification Courses, with great resultant improvement in, and standardization of, shore bombardment technique.

(d) REHEARSALS.

Four rehearsals were held in the HAWAIIAN Area and two in the SAIPAN-TINIAN Area, as indicated below:

13 to 15 January	Shore Fire Control Parties were boated, but were not landed.
15 January	Shore Fire Control Parties landed and established communications with assigned fire support ships.
15 to 16 January	Shore Fire Control Parties landed, established communications and conducted simulated fire missions with assigned destroyers.
17 to 18 January	Assigned destroyers, LCS(L)s and LCI(M)s supported a simulated landing on KAHOO LAWE Island with actual gunfire support. The gunfire support plan employed was as similar to the plan for the actual landing at the objective as possible, stressing the placement of ships in the boat lanes and the delivery of fire over the heads of troops in boats and LVTs, the rolling barrage, and the 4.2" mortar fire from LCI(M)s. After the completion of the simulated landing, the Shore Fire Control Parties of the 4th and 5th Divisions were landed on the shore bombardment range. Battalion Spotter Parties set up observation posts while Liaison Officers attached to battalions; regiments, and divisions set up in the appropriate Command Posts. Corps gunfire control was established

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aboard the supporting destroyer squadron flagship. The exercise was tactical. All types of call fires, including air bursts, white phosphorus, and 1200 foot-second powder were fired; after dark, night illumination fires were delivered and adjusted for maximum illumination. The following morning a pre-King Hour preparation was delivered. Approximately 1800 rounds of five inch ammunition was fired in this exercise.

12 to 14 February

This was the first opportunity for many of the assigned fire support ships to be present during a rehearsal. Because of the lack of suitable landing beaches in the SAIPAN-TINIAN Area, it was necessary to land Shore Fire Control Parties in advance in order that Communication Drills might be conducted with the fire support ships which were initially assigned for the operation. Conferences between the Shore Fire Control Parties and assigned fire support ships, which had been found so desirable in the past, were consequently not feasible. Reports from Shore Fire Control Parties indicate that this lack of conference prior to the operation was a definite liability.

(e) CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

(1) That, in order to standardize training with use of the extensive facilities available in the PEARL HARBOR Area, personnel of the Shore Fire Control Parties be returned to the Naval Gunfire Section, Headquarters, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, for retraining and reforming between each operation in which their organization is involved.

(2) That the successful coordination of Naval Gunfire, Air and Artillery was largely due to the indoctrination of all command levels of the Corps, as a result of extensive command post exercises.

(3) That a conference between each Shore Fire Control Party and the assigned fire support ship is vital and should be carried out in every case, even if Communication Drills must be curtailed.

CONFIDENTIAL2. PRELIMINARY BOMBARDMENT

(a) PLANNING.

(1) The initial plan for preliminary bombardment, as set forth in the Concept, provided for one Cruiser Division to bombard the objective beginning on Dog Minus Eight Day to be joined on Dog Minus Three Day by seven OBBs and six CAs or CLs. Based on a preliminary study of the number of targets at the objective, V Amphibious Corps on 24 October, recommended that ten days of bombardment by one Cruiser Division plus three OBBs be arranged. (Reference (a)). The Commander, Amphibious Forces, U. S. PACIFIC Fleet, stated in reply to this recommendation that "limitations on the availability of ships, difficulties of ammunition replacement and loss of surprise interpose serious obstacles to meeting your recommendation". He stated further that the objective would be bombarded by one Cruiser Division on 15 December and at irregular intervals thereafter, and that three days of bombardment by the designated ships would provide for delivery of more major calibre ammunition than had been requested by V Amphibious Corps (Reference (b)).

(2) On 8 November a study of the objective indicated a substantial increase in enemy defenses. Based on this study, V Amphibious Corps submitted a recommendation for a total of nine days of preliminary bombardment with all available heavy ships. Unfortunately, due to the strategical situation which limited the number of heavy ships available, and limitations of ammunition supply for those assigned, no additional preliminary bombardment over and above the three days already planned was made available for the period immediately preceding the landing.

(3) Further changes in ship's availability necessitated the substitution of NEW YORK, TEXAS, ARKANSAS, TENNESSEE, IDAHO, and NEVADA, plus WASHINGTON and NORTH CAROLINA on Dog Minus One Day only, for various previously assigned ships.

(4) A special bombardment by INDIANA plus Cruiser Division FIVE was executed about Dog minus Thirty with unknown results. The allotment of WASHINGTON and NORTH CAROLINA for bombardment on Dog Minus One Day was cancelled.

(b) DEFENSIVE INSTALLATIONS.

(1) Enemy defenses located on IWO JIMA are believed to have been the most elaborate in construction, the most numerous in density and the best integrated into an overall defense

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plan of any so far encountered in the PACIFIC. This was probably the result of the following factors:

- a. A high priority in the assignment of construction materials for defense, combined with the relatively short distance from the JAPANESE homeland.
- b. The relative ease of digging in because of the sand and soft rock which made up most of the terrain.
- c. The excellence of the enemy defense plan.

(2) All types of defensive installations were encountered, ranging from massive reenforced concrete casemates for coastal defense guns to small concrete pillboxes. These defenses were so located as to be mutually supporting, and affording only relatively narrow sectors of fire for maximum protection. Firing ports of installations along the beaches were so located as to deliver flanking fire only, so that these ports were invisible from seaward. Camouflage was extensively and cunningly employed, utilizing planted grass, sand, brush, and other vegetation. This rendered the detection of installations most difficult until considerable firing had been done to strip away the camouflage.

(3) Coast defense guns, blockhouses and covered artillery emplacements were constructed with reenforced concrete walls and overheads ranging from three to five feet in thickness. Blockhouses and covered artillery emplacements were located so as to gain maximum visibility. They were constructed in two or three compartments to localize damage. Lookout towers were built on top of the blockhouses with speaking tubes giving communication with the weapons position. Installations were dug deeply into the ground so that maximum protection was afforded. Dirt, rocks, and sand covered the walls and overhead, leaving only the firing ports unprotected.

(4) Six inch guns were used for coast defense, while blockhouses and covered artillery emplacements contained one or two of the following weapons; or combinations thereof:

- a. 12 cm Short Barrel Cannon
- b. 47 or 37 mm Antitank Guns
- c. Single or Twin Mount 25 mm AA Machine Guns

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Pillboxes were used for light machine guns. Walls and overhead cover consisted of one to two feet of reenforced concrete. Because of their small size, they were extremely difficult to pick out from seaward. In order to afford all around fields of fire, AA gun positions were of the conventional circular pit type and were consequently easier to discover. Personnel shelters for crews were deep and roomy, giving immunity against casualties except in the case of a direct hit from a large caliber shell or bomb.

(5) The following table shows the number of defensive installations listed as priority Naval Gunfire targets. The two lists show the increase of targets from October, 1944, to approximately Dog Minus Fifteen Day.

	<u>October Study</u>	<u>D-15 Study</u>
Coast Defense Gun	8	6
Dual Purpose AA Gun	37	41
Automatic AA Gun	189	203
Blockhouse	2	37
Pillboxes	37	316
Covered Artillery	4	70
Open Artillery Emplacement	22	8
Covered Structure	6	15
Total	305	696

In addition to these targets, there were many trench systems, mortar positions, caves, command posts, radio and radar stations, as well as a number of unidentified installations.

(c) FINAL PLAN FOR PRELIMINARY BOMBARDMENT.

(1) The plan finally adopted called for a three day preliminary bombardment with ammunition and firing times allotted as shown below:

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<u>SHIP</u>	<u>AMMUNITION ALLOTTED</u>	<u>AMMUNITION CARRIED</u>	<u>FIRING TIME Hrs.Mins.</u>	<u>A AND B PRIORITY TARGETS</u>
TENNESSEE	1000	1050	18 - 15	72
IDAHO	1000	1291	18 - 45	48
TEXAS	850	1030	18 - 30	56
NEW YORK	850	1041	19 - 15	53
NEVADA	1000	850	19 - 30	56
ARKANSAS	850	1428	17 - 45	39
CHESTER	990	1200	17 - 30	17
SALT LAKE CITY	900	1200	17 - 30	59
TUSCALOOSA	990	990	18 - 30	167
PENNSACOLA	990	1190	17 - 45	80
VICKSBURG	2760	2760	18 - 30	77
Totals:	12180	14030		
6-OBBs	5550 (Major Caliber)	6690 (Major Caliber)	201-45	724
			Average time 18 hrs. 20 min.	
4-CAs	3870 (8" caliber)	4580 (8" caliber)		
1-CL	2760 (6" caliber)	2760 (6" caliber)		

(2) Each ship was assigned an area of responsibility which was to remain in effect throughout the bombardment. These areas are indicated in Figure 1.

(3) Ships were to engage targets in accordance with the following priority system:

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PRIORITY A: Installations which threaten ships, aircraft, and UDT Operations.

1. Any Battery Opening Fire on Ships or Aircraft.
2. Coast Defense Guns.
3. AA Guns
4. Covered or Open Artillery Emplacements where presence of weapons was confirmed.
5. AT Guns.

PRIORITY B: Installations threatening the Landing Force in the Ship to Shore Movement.

1. Blockhouses
2. Covered Artillery
3. Pillboxes
4. CPs, Unidentified Installations, Earth Covered Structures, Machine Guns, Areas of Heavy Growth.

PRIORITY C: Installations which can oppose the troops after the landing, such as caves, near the beaches, radio radar stations, ammunition storage, fuel dumps, and bivouac areas.

(4) Qualified air observers of the 12th, 13th, and 14th Marines, after having been trained in naval gunfire control procedure in the HAWAIIAN Area and thoroughly briefed on the target, were placed aboard battleships and cruisers to assist in air spotting. Observers were placed aboard the:

NEVADA
NEW YORK
IDAHO
PENSACOLA
TENNESSEE
CHESTER
SALT LAKE CITY
BILOXI
SANTA FE
TEXAS
ARKANSAS

(d) BOMBARDMENT ON DOG MINUS THREE DAY

(1) The primary gunfire mission on this day was

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the destruction of highest priority targets; ie., CD and AA guns. Firing was scheduled to commence at 0700 from ranges above 12,000 yards, closing to a 6,000 yard minimum as minesweeping operations cleared the fire support areas. Because light mist and rain rendered visibility very poor, ships were unable to open fire until about 0800, and firing was interrupted repeatedly throughout the day when both ships' spotters and air observers were unable to observe. In addition, even when visibility permitted, the OS2Us spotting for their parent vessels were unable to get below 3,000 feet without receiving intense fire from light AA positions; while at or above this altitude, spotters had difficulty in identifying targets and bringing accurate fire on them. As a result of visibility conditions the scheduled firing was abandoned and ships were directed to fire when visibility might make accurate fire possible.

(2) The results of the day's firing are impossible to assess because of lack of photo coverage and the visibility conditions which make difficult accurate reports from ships and planes. It is believed that generally very little major destruction was accomplished. The four-gun CD battery at the base of MOUNT SURI-BACHI was not destroyed by TENNESSEE, (which fired only fourteen rounds at this target throughout the day, presumably because of lack of visibility), nor was the two-gun battery located in 219A, although it also received some 30 rounds of main battery fire from PENSACOLA. From fragmentary reports, light AA seemed somewhat reduced in intensity on the morning of Dog minus Two indicating some damage to AA positions.

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Ship	No. of Targets Fired Upon	14"	12"	8"	6"	5"	Total Length of Time Ship Fired	Firing Time of Main Btry	Firing Time of Secon- dary Btry
							Hr-Min	Hr-Min	Hr-Min
TENNESSEE	69	127				305	5 51	3 22	1 18
NEVADA	81	240				603	5 11	2 16	3 2
IDAHO	13	85				15	8 29	2	4
TEXAS	19	124				200	3 31	2 11	-----
NEW YORK	56	194				125	4 45	1 33	1 23
ARKANSAS	50		163			21	2 45	2 30	10
TUSCALOOSA	12			44		35	2 12	30	2 6
SALT LAKE CITY	27			210		42	7 6	8 51	-----
PENSACOLA	52			196		31	3 53	3 40	4
CHESTER	34			275		100	4	3 57	1 20
VICKSBURG	56				248	0			
	471	770	163	725	248	1477	4 hr. 46 min	3 hr. 5 min.	1 hr. 11 min.
							average	average	average

NOTES: High number of targets fired upon is the result of area coverage in which all targets in area were counted as being fired upon. Firing times of main and secondary batteries are actual count of minutes ship was delivering fire. This eliminates time lost to "Check Fire", "Suspend Fire" or shift of targets.

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(c) BOMBARDMENT ON DOG MINUS TWO DAY.

(1) The plan for this day called for ships which were assigned areas of responsibility on and near the eastern beaches to close to about 3,000 yards, beginning at 0700, and fire destructive, deliberate fire until UDT operations on the eastern beaches necessitated a withdrawal in order that UDTs and their supporting ships might approach the beach. Ships firing on and in the vicinity of the western beaches were to fire from medium ranges so as to remain out of the line of ricochets. Upon completion of UDT operations off the eastern beaches at about 1230, ships assigned the western beaches were to close the range and execute deliberate destructive fire until about 1430, when UDT operations on the western beaches were to commence. During this period, ships assigned to the eastern beaches remained clear of the line of fire executing medium range bombardment. After 1430 ships assigned to the western beaches withdrew to allow UDTs and their supporting ships to close the western beach. Ships assigned to the northern areas of responsibility were scheduled for about six hours of bombardment, firing from medium ranges in order to permit minesweeping operations and to avoid ricochets.

(2) The plan was generally adhered to although ships were slow in closing the range; UDT operations on the east beaches took longer than anticipated, thus further limiting the time for close range destructive bombardment. The comparatively complicated movement schedules described above and the necessity of keeping major caliber fire at least 1,000 yards from the beaches to prevent interference with UDT operations, also severely limited the amount of time for short range bombardment. Although visibility conditions were excellent and both ships and air spotters were clearly able to observe their assigned target areas, both ships' report and photo assessment indicated very little destruction on this day. The battery at the foot of MOUNT SURIBACHI delivered heavy fire on LCI(G)s and supporting destroyers, while the battery in 219A delivered, at about 0930, heavy fire on PENSACOLA, with resultant casualties and damage. Based on incomplete reports, light AA seemed to be considerably reduced on the morning of Dog Minus One, indicating continuing damage on such installations. As indicated below, ammunition expenditures and overall firing times were generally met.

(3) The UDT operations on the eastern beaches are particularly worthy of comment, since either the movement of the LCI(G)s supporting positions 2,000 yards from the beach either was mistaken by the enemy as a landing attempt, or "trigger happy" individuals in enemy gun crews opened fire without orders. In either

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case, the enemy opened fire from defensive positions so that twelve LCI(G)s supporting the UDTs were all hit by enemy fire, much of it three to six inch caliber, causing extensive casualties and severe damage. Supporting destroyers, as well as battleships, delivered supporting fires, but because of smoke and dust on the beach, they experienced difficulty in picking out enemy weapons. The heavy volume of fire, in addition to a white phosphorus smoke screen materially reduced the volume of enemy fire. A hitherto undiscovered four-gun battery situated in IDAHO's area was disclosed in TA 166VW on top of the bluff in a position which enfiladed the entire landing beach. This discovery of additional enemy defensive positions as well as this full realization of the heavy fire power the enemy was able to bring to bear, was of paramount importance. Officers conducting the preliminary bombardment were impressed far more by this development than by negative results of photographic assessment of the day's firing; it brought home the large amount of damage yet to be inflicted on the enemy installations, and impressed all concerned with the absolute necessity of placing the bulk of remaining fire power in the vicinity of the preferred landing beaches.

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Ship	No. of Targets Fired Upon	14"	12"	8"	6"	5"	Total Length of Time Ship Fired Hr-Min	Firing Time of Main Btry Hr-Min	Firing Time of Secun- dary Btry Hr-Min
TENNESSEE	76	249				1323	10 24 3	45 6 31	
NEVADA	41	224				976	6 42 3	25 4 40	
IDAHO	27	173				640	11 22 3	18 2 49	
TEXAS	57	242				439	7 14 4	35 3 32	
NEW YORK	47	261				187	6 33 4	14 1 23	
ARKANSAS	11		605			226	6 34 5	9 1 55	
TUSCALOOSA	43			431		645	8 8 5	17 - -	
SALT LAKE CITY	53			344		409	8 17 4	11 3 13	
PENSACOLA	31			227		275	3 32 1	52 1 54	
CHESTER	36			223		151	7 36 2	58 54	
VICKSBURG	55			222		145			
	477	1149	605	1147		5416	7 hr. 46 min. average.	4 hr. 4 min. average.	2 hr. 11 min. average.

NOTES: Same as DOG MINUS 3 DAY.~~CONFIDENTIAL~~




FIGURE 1

Areas of Responsibility
D-3 and D-2

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(f) BOMBARDMENT ON DOG MINUS ONE DAY.

(1) Because of the above mentioned lack of destruction resulting from the preceding bombardments in the vicinity of the preferred landing beaches, the V Amphibious Corps Naval Gunfire Officer with Amphibious Group 1, recommended that a maximum concentration of bombardment be placed on and near the preferred landing beaches; the recommendation was approved by the Commander, Amphibious Group ONE. The schedule for Dog Minus One Day was accordingly abandoned and the following plan substituted. In order to increase the fire power on the main landing beach area, NEW YORK was assigned a part of NEVADA's and IDAHO's areas along the landing beach, VICKSBURG took over NEW YORK's area in the vicinity of AIRFIELD NUMBER TWO, and TEXAS was assigned VICKSBURG's area plus the coast defense battery in 219A. ARKANSAS took over TEXAS' area as well as her own on the west beaches. This arrangement placed the fire of four battleships and one heavy cruiser on, and in close vicinity to, the main landing beach as had previously been recommended. Ships delivering this fire were directed to close the range as early as practicable and to execute maximum destruction. All unexpended ammunition allotted for the preliminary bombardment was to be expended if practicable.

(2) This plan was generally followed. Visibility conditions were fair with occasional light rains which reduced the effectiveness of ships' spotters. From midmorning throughout the day, clouds at an altitude of about 1500 feet hampered the work of air spotters; however AA fire was light, permitting air spotters to get below the cloud layer and spot effectively.

(3) Ships lay to off the eastern beaches at ranges of 1,800 to 3,000 yards. The Commander, Task Force 52, (Commander, Amphibious Group ONE) issued orders that the four-gun batteries at the foot of MOUNT SURIBACHI, (TA 132KL) and at the top of the quarry at 183VW would be positively destroyed by TENNESSEE and IDAHO. TENNESSEE fired for four and three quarters hours, expending 333 rounds; IDAHO fired for the same length of time, expending 280 rounds. In addition to the 4-gun C.D. battery already mentioned IDAHO uncovered and destroyed three casemated guns of approximately three inch caliber during this firing. Actual destruction of the C.D. battery was most difficult to ascertain so that firing probably continued long after the guns had been put out of action. Photographs, indicating very heavy damage, confirm this.

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(4) For the remainder of the day IDAHO and TENNESSEE fired on high priority targets in their assigned areas. NEVADA and NEW YORK fired on blockhouses and pillboxes with main battery, utilizing five inch batteries on caves, hulks, and small installations. 40mm was used against enemy personnel in the open who from time to time attempted to leave their damaged installations.

(5) Ships assigned other areas carried out their firing at long ranges in accordance with the original plan.

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
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DOG MINUS 1 DAY

Ship	No. of Targets Fired Upon	14"	12"	8"	6"	5"	Total Length of Time Ship Fired Hr-Min	Firing time of Main Btry Hr-Min	Firing Time of Secon- dary Btry Hr-Min
TENNESSEE	73	436				427	9 19	4 14	3 32
NEVADA	57	470				338	9 52	5 19	5 48
IDAHO	32	343					11 17	6 8	2 13
TEXAS	31	195				207	5 37	5 30	1
NEW YORK	22	586				387	9 42	9 14	7 10
ARKANSAS	45		436				8 14	7 36	- - -
TUSCALOOSA	47			289		112	4 39	2 21	36
SALT LAKE CITY	56			545		63	10 14	6 54	16
PENSACOLA	63			355		58	6 47	6 46	2 27
CHESTER	27			275		111	8 10	6 43	1 20
VICKSBURG	47				1382	29			
499		2030	436	1464	1382	1732	8 hr.	6 hr.	2 hr.
							23 min.	12 min.	26 min.
							average.	average.	average.

NOTES: Same as DOG MINUS 3 DAY.

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The number of targets destroyed or damaged by the preliminary bombardment cannot be accurately determined until the results obtained from JICPOA intelligence teams have been analyzed. The photo coverage of the front and flanks of the main landing beaches was not complete, nor were the photos clear enough to determine all destruction or damage. For this reason API results undoubtedly indicate less destruction and damage than was actually accomplished.

Based on various sources including examination of installations, photographs, statements of SFCP personnel, and POW reports, the following target destruction and damage is believed to have been accomplished on and adjacent to landing beaches.

The four coast defense guns at the base of SURIBACHI were destroyed on D-1, (although API results indicated only two damaged) as were the seven coast defense guns at the top of the quarry in target area 183UV which had fired on D-2 at the LCI(G)s with such telling effect. Two additional guns to the east of the quarry were also destroyed. As far as is now known no high velocity gun remained capable of delivering direct fire on boats or the landing beaches on D-day.

All blockhouses in the 5thMarDiv zone of action were destroyed or damaged. At least one substantial covered artillery emplacement containing one short barreled 12cm cannon was undamaged. This gun was sited for firing on the 4thMarDiv beaches.

In the 4thMarDiv zone, at least two blockhouses are known to have been intact as well as one large covered artillery emplacement. Therefore, of the 37 blockhouses on the main landing beaches, it is reasonably established that almost all of these were destroyed or damaged.

Pillboxes, due to their small size and consequent difficulty of identification and of obtaining direct hits, were more difficult to destroy or damage. In the 4thMarDiv zone up to 400 yards inland from the beach, approximately 70% of the pillboxes were destroyed or damaged. From 400 yards inland to the eastern edge of No. 1 airfield about 30% were destroyed. In the 5thMarDiv zone the majority of pillboxes were destroyed.

Light anti-aircraft guns located on or near the beach areas were all slightly damaged. The percentage of these weapons that were still capable of firing is unknown. However, light anti-aircraft fire on D-Day was lighter in volume than on any previous day. Undoubtedly this was partially due to the heavy D-day firing.

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Heavy anti-aircraft guns (4.7 DP guns) was lighter in volume than on any previous day. The 5 gun battery in the 5thMarDiv zone was slightly damaged but apparently did not fire during Dog-Day. The cluster of dual purpose guns in 184XY, which were located in an excellent position to fire on the ship to shore movement apparently were either damaged by preliminary bombardment or neutralized by Dog-day fires, since ships reports indicate that these guns did not fire on Dog-day.

The 4 mortar battery at the western base of SURIBACHI was destroyed and abandoned by its crew; however a battery of 4-150mm mortars located near the Eastern base of SURIBACHI was not destroyed.

Mortars located on the North flank in the 4thMarDiv zone were not discovered during the preliminary bombardment. In this connection the impossibility of locating mortar positions during preliminary bombardment must be expected, due to their small size, ease of camouflage, and the fact that the mortars would not fire during this period.

The final results of the preliminary bombardment must be lumped with the Dog-day fires, for the enemy resistance encountered is a sure measure of their combined effectiveness. As pointed out later in section 3(h) and (i), resistance from direct fire weapons in and immediately adjacent to the landing beach was light compared with what might have developed had less damage or destruction been accomplished.

(g) CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

(1) Conclusions.

a. That the preliminary bombardment accomplished its major task; i.e. destroyed or damaged the majority of the beach defenses and allowed a landing to be made.

b. That the preliminary bombardment did not destroy or damage vital enemy installations and weapons which could have been destroyed had more time or ships been available. Specifically, the installations referred to are the pillboxes and covered emplacements between Airfield No. 1 and 2 (TAs 182A to J inclusive and MNORS), and those to the East and West of Airfield No. 2 (TAs 181EJ, 183A to J inclusive, 184AF, 198OTY, 199A to X inclusive, 200AFGKLPWXY, 201U, 216QPVMX). The capture of this terrain was a long and costly process extending over a period of about 8 days. Had additional bombardment time been available, this vital area could

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have been captured more quickly and at a lighter cost. It is fully realized that the broken terrain in the 4thMarDiv zone, as well as in the Northern portion of the island was such that destruction of all the defensive installations could not be readily accomplished with naval guns, nor was such destruction expected. But the areas outlined above were largely accessible to direct fire at relatively short ranges, a most favorable condition for destruction.

c. That the employment of Amphibious Group I to direct the preliminary bombardment was of major importance and vitally contributed to the efficiency of the bombardment conducted. The success of preliminary bombardment to a large measure hinges on adequate photo coverage with accurate damage assessment provided by trained photo interpreters.

d. Based on photo interpretation, the value of the bombardment by ships prior to D-3 Day, is not apparent, nor does the effect of heavy bombardment aircraft over a lengthy period appear productive of appreciable destruction of specific installations, and did not compensate fully for the additional preliminary Naval Gunfire requested.

(2) Recommendations.

a. That the time allotted for preliminary bombardment in future operations be based on a careful analysis of the vital targets to be destroyed, and that such analysis provide for the probability of increase of targets at the objective, both by construction and through the uncovering of camouflaged installations. In this connection, the value of heavy bombardment aviation should not be over emphasized.

b. That ships executing bombardments for the purpose of assisting future landing operations operate under the direction of the O.I.C. of the Amphibious Support Group designated to control the preliminary bombardment.

c. That Amphibious Support Group be designated to conduct preliminary bombardments in future operations, and that the Landing Force Naval Gunfire Officer accompany this group in the capacity of a Landing Force representative.

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(1) Summary of the Plan.

In the gunfire plans previously drawn for the capture of the MARIANAS and other PACIFIC Islands, gunfire had lifted from the beach area to a distance of approximately 1000 yards inland and to the flanks in order to insure a margin of safety for assault elements. On SAIPAN this had resulted in failure to cover many enemy weapons within this beachhead area. Heavy casualties had resulted from this lack of adequate coverage as well as from the failure to cover artillery in positions more remote from the beaches. Since VAC and the 4thMarDiv had participated in the SAIPAN operation, it was strongly felt by these organizations that the Dog-Day plan must include the closest practicable fire support for our troops after the landing in order to neutralize enemy weapons as long as possible and reduce casualties. It was felt that some casualties among our own troops were acceptable in order to get the closest possible fire support.

A rolling barrage patterned after that delivered by artillery, was deemed most suitable for supplying that close support. With the assistance of the 4thMarDiv assistant operations officer (who was the division's former naval gunfire officer), a rolling barrage plan was drawn up based on the probable rate of advance of our own troops. This plan was designed to keep the close limit of the fire 400 yards from our own troops, assuming a pattern size of 200 yards from the 5" batteries which were to execute the plan. The terrain inland from the landing beaches lent itself to this scheme since it was clear of vegetation and was a positive slope for an average distance of 500 yards inland. This would facilitate spotting as well as provide an additional overhead clearance factor. However, the prevailing winds were known to blow directly into the line of fire and it was anticipated that spotting would be complicated by smoke and dust from our own fall of shot, obscuring the impact area. The use of VOF spotting aircraft and WP projectiles used as marker slavs was expected to partially overcome this difficulty.

In order to position sufficient ships off the landing beaches so that adequate neutralization fire could be provided, it was necessary to place ships in boat lanes as indicated in the schematic drawing "General Plan of Fires D-Day". It was expected that this placement of ships would complicate the ship to shore movement but this was acceptable to VAC and ComPhibsPac in view of the necessity for the fire support.

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It was planned to commence firing with the main batteries of the heavy ships at H-140. This fire was to be directed at targets of opportunity within assigned areas of responsibility with particular attention to C.D. and AA batteries in order to cover the close approach of fire support ships and aircraft. An air strike was scheduled from H-55 to H-35 during which time the ships were to take their final positions for delivery of the close supporting fire. At H-35 ships firing on, and to the flanks of, the landing beaches were to fire air bursts to inflict maximum casualties on any exposed personnel manning trenches and open emplacements. As the leading wave of LVTs passed through the line of fire support ships (at about H-25) ships shifted to impact bursts with Mk 29 fuzes, concentrating on any enemy defenses located within their assigned area. At H-15 ships were to shift to 1200 foot/second powder and fire from the edge of the beach to a distance of 200 yards inland. The purpose of the 1200 foot/second ammunition was to give adequate clearance over the LCI(G)s and other support craft in the line of fire, as well as to give maximum clearance over the heads of troops. Thereafter the barrage was to lift in accordance with the schedule as shown in General Plan of Fire D-Day.

Fires on the flanks were planned so as to move laterally away from the landing beaches. Considerable attention was devoted, during the planning, to a determination of when to lift fire from the various blocks in the north flank. Many estimates of troop advance were made before a final decision to lift fire from the first block on the right flank at H plus 12 was agreed upon. This proved to be too early, as will be indicated later. On the left or southern flank, a particularly difficult problem was posed due to the conformation of SURIBACHI and to the troop scheme of maneuver in this zone. The 28th Marines, landing on BEACH GREEN ONE (the most southerly beach), planned to push BLT 1/28 directly across the island, while BLT 2/28 was to land at H plus 35, pivot and attack SURIBACHI. It was therefor necessary to keep the slopes of SURIBACHI and its base under fire so as to neutralize enemy weapons which could be brought to bear on BLT 1/28 as it moved across the island and until such time as BLT 2/28 could commence its attack on SURIBACHI. Initially it was planned to lift fire from the base of SURIBACHI at H plus 40 and from the slopes at H plus 60. Consideration of the absolute necessity of keeping this vital area neutralized until it could be taken under fire from infantry weapons dictated that the fire be scheduled to lift on order. This involved the delivery of accurate fire within 200 yards of the left flank of our own troops for an indefinite period.

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Previous experience had indicated the difficulty of establishing early SFCP-firing ship communication. Casualties to personnel and equipment, and trouble encountered in setting up the bulky TBX-8 or SCR 284 were problems that had to be taken into consideration. In order to provide an alternate means of communication, which would be able to function effectively soon after H-Hour, it was decided to boat NLOs in a "free" LVT equipped with a TCS radio. This radio was to be set on the SFCP-firing ship frequency. The NLO was supplied with SCR 300. The spotter landing with his team had an SCR 300 in addition to the team's organic radio. The SCR 300 was to be used to establish communications with the NLO afloat. This net was to operate until the spotter could set up and establish communications with the firing ship on the TBX-8 or SCR-284, at which time the NLO was to land and join the battalion.

It was felt that this plan would insure communication with the firing ship as early as possible and would provide the troops with a spotting agent if their attached spotter could not set up his larger radio or could not observe due to terrain conformation. This plan was approved by VAC and divisions were directed to make LVTs available for this purpose.

(b) GUNBOAT PLANS.

(1) LCS(L)

Ample supporting craft of the LCS(L) type were made available for fire support missions. Two units each composed of six LCS(L), were scheduled to fire 4.5" rockets for beach preparation and in close support of the landing.

In conjunction with two six-ship LCI(G) units they were to deliver rocket barrages from H-90 to H-45 on suspected inflammables along the landing beaches and were to support the ship to shore movement by salvos of rockets as the waves moved toward the beach.

The LCS(L) were to fire their first salvo in support of the leading wave at H-10 against the beaches. The second salvo was to be fired as rapidly as launchers could be reloaded against positions 300 to 500 yards inland.

Upon completion of the rocket salvos at about H-5, four boats of each LCS(L) unit were to take position off the northern and southern flanks of the beaches and support the battalions to which they were assigned by delivering 40mm fire.

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Four ships were assigned to BLT 3/25 on the north flank, two were assigned to BLT 1/28 and two were assigned to BLT 2/28, the south battalions. The gunboats came up on the frequency of the SFCP to which they were assigned and were available for call fire missions. A replacement NLO or spotter of the Marine division concerned was placed aboard the unit commander's flagship to assist in the location of targets of opportunity and to advise him on the troops scheme of maneuver.

(2) LCI(M)s.

Three six-ship units of LCI(M)s were scheduled to support the landings. Two units using Plan A (See FMF SOP MGF-1) were to deliver fire from H-35 to H-7 on the eastern slopes of SURIBACHI while the third unit, using the same plan was to fire on the high ground of the right flank.

At H-Hour the two units at the south flank were to cross the boat lane and follow the sixth wave toward shore. At H plus 20, when about 2000 yards from shore, all ships of these two units opened fire. An area approximately 2200 yards long and 1000 yards deep was covered. The ships closed to within 1000 yards of the beach and while lying to maintained fires 1800 yards inland until H plus four hours.

The third unit at H-7, shifted its line of fire eastward for safety reasons and at H plus 10 commenced neutralization fires which continued until H plus four hours.

(3) LCI(R) and LCI(G).

One LCI(R) unit consisting of nine ships was to deliver rocket fire against positions in the MOTOYAMA area. Their fire was to commence at H-135 and continue throughout the day.

The assigned plan called for the employment of two units of LCI(G)s each unit consisting of six ships. Due to casualties sustained during their support of UDT operations only three of these ships were available for supporting fires on Dog-Day.

Working in conjunction with the LCS(L)s they delivered supporting 4.5" rocket fire as has been indicated above.

(c) REPETITION OF FIRES.

In view of the impossibility of determining the rate

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of advance of our troops after the landing a means had to be proved to continue or repeat certain "blocks" of the barrage as dictated by actual troop advance.

Since the repetition of any blocks of fire had to be based on accurate and timely front line positions, and since the normal chain of communications would not provide such information in time to allow appropriate action to be taken, the Division Tactical Air Observers were directed to report the location of our front lines continuously direct to divisions over the SAO net. In addition the observer was to make positive recommendations for the repetition of fires whenever our troops appeared to lag behind the barrage. These decisions were to be based on the air observers knowledge of the naval gunfire barrage plan.

These air observers reports were received by the Division Naval Gunfire Officer, who in conjunction with the D-3, decided quickly whether or not to request repetition of a certain block or blocks of fire. If a decision was made to repeat fires, CTF 51 (controlling gunfire in the ELDORADO) was so requested over the gunfire control circuit.

In order to effect coordination between divisions in the repetition of fires, Corps maintained watch on the tactical air observers net of both the 4th and 5th MarDivs. Corps could rapidly determine the effect of a repetition of fires on the adjacent division, if such a request did not interfere with the adjacent division's movement; Corps would concur over the gunfire control. This information had to be passed over the gunfire control net since gunfire was controlled from the ELDORADO while the Corps staff was embarked in the AUBURN.

When concurrence from Corps was received, CTF 51 would direct the proper ships to repeat fires in the designated block or blocks and would state the duration of the repetition. After a repetition was delivered, the remaining schedule was adhered to as to the blocks of fires and their duration.

(d) VOF.

A squadron of specially trained air spotters made its first appearance controlling fires in the PACIFIC in this operation. The squadron was a veteran of EUROPEAN operations.

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Thirty-two pilots equipped with 24 FM-2 fighter type aircraft and 6 TBFs were available. The FM-2s were equipped with a two channel MF radio and a ten channel VHF set.

The unit trained with ships and SFCPs in the HAWAIIAN area. Their workmanlike performance during this training period indicated that the squadron would be a valuable asset during an operation. The squadron was capable of maintaining 8 VOF on station throughout Dog-Day and Dog plus 1. Thereafter 6 planes would be kept in the air for spotting missions.

On Dog-Day the aircraft were assigned to the assault battalions and to the destroyers firing the rolling barrage. Larger ships were expected to supply their own ship based observation planes.

Due to the necessity of pre-setting MF radios prior to take off it was necessary to assign definite frequencies to a definite group of planes and to make provisions for their proper assignment and relief.

The air spotter working with the SFCPs was considered an elevated spotting station. His mission was to work in close liaison with the SFCP and to bring fire on targets of opportunity in the zone of action of the assault battalion. Control of these fires was given to the SFCPs for safety.

(e) BRIEFING.

The plan as finally drawn was the product of virtually all echelons of command. The gunnery officers of PhibsPac and Com Grp II, the VAC gunfire officer and the Naval Gunfire Officers of the 4th and 5th MarDivs worked in close coordination. Questions were fully discussed and completely considered before they were incorporated into the plan. The plan itself was closely studied by all echelons and in its final form represented the efforts of all organizations, and three months of work.

It was realized that all hands had to know the plan completely. The assault troops who were to follow the barrage, the firing ships which had to maintain a complicated schedule of fire while keeping station in the midst of boats, had to be thoroughly familiar with all phases.

Briefing of our fire support ships was carried out at PEARL HARBOR, ULITHI and SAIPAN. The SFCPs were briefed at PEARL HARBOR and all assault forces were advised of the naval gunfire plan en-route to the objective.

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(f) EXECUTION OF FIRES - DOG DAY.

(1) Naval gunfire on Dog Day commenced at dawn. Ships fired in their assigned areas of responsibility or at specific targets within these areas from H-140 to H-55, lifted fires for the air strike, and then resumed fire at H-35. Ships assigned fire support stations in the vicinity of the boat lanes moved into position in these congested areas smoothly and promptly.

The weather was clear and bright with the wind blowing almost along, rather than into, the line of fire (as had been expected). Visibility conditions for spotting were consequently excellent.

LVT(A)s and boats moved from the line of departure to the beach receiving light small arms, mortar, and artillery fires. During the ship to shore movement, six of the eight SFCPs established communications with the assigned firing ships. Unfortunately, neither of the vital flank battalion SFCPs working with the VICKSBURG and SANTA FE were able to get into communication at this time.

Fires lifted from the first block of the barrage (200 yard strip along the beach) at H-3. Thereafter the fires continued to lift in accordance with barrage schedule (See diagram "General Plan of Fires D-Day") until repetition of fires was ordered by CTF 51, using the plan described in (c) above. The barrage as observed from seaward seemed to be accurately placed and to lift promptly at the required time. Ships had no apparent difficulty in maintaining their fires in the required block ahead of the troops by employing VOF spot and WP marker slaves. As the barrage progressed, troops lagged behind the fire due to enemy resistance encountered, and, as a result, it was necessary to repeat fires as indicated below.

The request for repetition included such information as blocks concerned, ship or ships concerned and time of commencement and duration of fire in the repeated block.

0934 - 5thMarDiv requests that series 1000 yards inland from its beaches be continued until H/45.

NOTE: It was too late to take action on this request, but ships did fire on specific targets in this area as directed by air spotters.

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- 0940 - NEVADA and BILOXI ordered to maintain fires in series 1200 yards inland in 5thMarDiv area until H/60.
- 1003 - NEVADA and BILOXI ordered to maintain fires in series 1200 yards inland in 5thMarDiv area until H/75.
- 1025 - 4thMarDiv requests repetition of fires in area 500 yards north of their right flank beach until H/105. VICKSBURG delivered the fire.
- 1043 - 4thMarDiv requests repetition of fires in area 1200 yards inland until H/120. NEWCOMB, TENNESSEE and H.L. EDWARDS delivered the fire.
- 1153 - 4thMarDiv requests repetition of fires in area 1200 yards inland until H/220. NEWCOMB, TENNESSEE and BENNIOM delivered the fire.
- 1342 - NORTH CAROLINA, IDAHO, INDIANAPOLIS, CHESTER, and TUSCALOOSA ordered to continue fires in their areas of responsibility until ordered lifted.

The SANTA FE maintained fires on the base of SURIBACHI on request of SFCs until about 1400; this fire being within 200 yards of our own troops. VICKSBURG maintained fires on the high ground north of the BLUE landing beaches.

Ships firing deep support missions in areas of responsibility outside of the barrage area maintained neutralization fires, except when specific targets were located by their plane or ships spotters. Tactical air observers reported many suitable targets in areas of responsibility which were relayed to general support ships for neutralization.

As in previous operations, SFCs established communications and fired their first mission at varying times. The first call fire mission was fired at H-Hour and the last SFC to gain communications and fire on Dog Day conducted a mission at H/270, although the assigned VOF plane fired missions considerably before this time.

Firing continued throughout the day with VOF spotters playing a very important role in call fires since the observation for SFCs was very limited.

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(2) SFCP - FIRING SHIP COMMUNICATIONS.

a. Time of contact with fire support ship and method employed.

The assault battalions succeeded in establishing communication with their supporting ships on Dog-Day at times ranging from H-30 to H/360.

BLTs 1/28, 1/23, 2/23, 1/27, 2/27 and 1/25, who made use of the TCS radio in the LVT, were able to gain contact at about H-30, while still afloat. The other assault elements, whose initial contact was to be made after reaching the beach, had varying success

BLT 1/27 was in communication at H/20, while BLT 2/28, which suffered loss of men and equipment in its Shore Fire Control Party, did not reach its ship until H/270. BLT 1/28 suffered similar losses and it was not until H/150 that they were in communication.

The methods of contact used differed as much as did the times. The Shore Fire Control Party personnel displayed a great deal of initiative and knowledge of communication channels in establishing radio contact with their fire support units, whose assistance was so desperately needed during Dog-Day.

In some cases the liaison officer remained off shore and observed fire from the LVT, passing the commands directly to the ship. In other instances, though afloat, he used his radio as a relay station and passed to the ship commands which had been given him by the spotter, who was ashore with an SCR 300.

Other units did not conduct any fires until the Shore Fire Control Parties were ashore and had set up their TBX radios. As has been stated earlier, the times at which this was accomplished varied among the battalions.

The most novel method was employed in RCT 25. After the Shore Fire Control Party had become ineffectual because of casualties, the Commanding Officer of BLT 3/25 passed commands over his SCR 300 net to the RCT 25 Command Post afloat. The Regimental liaison officer passed these on to the fire support ships concerned and effective Naval Gunfire was placed on enemy positions which were firing on the battalion.

The following table illustrates the Dog-Day communication of SFCP.

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(g) DOG-DAY EXECUTION OF GUNBOAT SUPPORT.

LCS(L)

This type of support craft carried out their assigned Dog-Day missions as specified in the Naval Gunfire plan.

Due to the loss of the LCI(G)s, which were destroyed or damaged during the UDT operation, it became necessary to make minor changes in the disposition of the LCS(L)s. To cover completely the assigned areas, the spacing of LCS(L)s was increased and each ship covered wider target area. No difficulty was experienced in accomplishing this, and, despite the absence of nine LCI(G)s, the assigned areas were well covered by 4.5" rocket fire.

The initial salvos were fired by these units between H-90 and H-45. Upon completion of these, the ships took stations and led the leading wave shoreward firing their two full salvos by H-5.

After delivering this fire, four ships from each unit took position on the north and south flanks and supported their assigned battalions by 40mm fire. Until communication was established with SFCs, their fire was directed by the replacement officers embarked in one LCS(L) of each unit.

The 40mm fire was directed against targets in the SURIBACHI and MOTOYAMA areas. The fire proved most effective and SFCs report that enemy small arms fire was considerably reduced when positions were covered by 40mm's.

Replacement spotters aboard these ships report that few actual call fires were requested. The SFCs contacted their assigned LCS(L)s and directed that 40mm fire which was in the process of being delivered be continued since it was proving an effective neutralizing agent.

The eight LCS(L) assigned to the flank units continued to fire close support missions throughout the day. During the night, four LCS(L) were assigned the flank battalions and continued to fire call fires with their 40mm's.

ASSAULT BATTALIONS COMMUNICATIONS ANALYSIS DOG-DAY
(Based on SFC Reports)

DATE	SFC	SCR 536	SCR 300	TCS*	TRX-8	Time of Landing on Beach	Time of First Mission	REMARKS
3/25	NLO	Contracted SFC at H-30	Bn CO to Reg. NLO in PC Boat at H-15		Reg. NLO to F.S. at H-120	H-130	H-120	Communications with F.S. never established. SFC suffered heavy casualties to personnel and equipment. NLO lost all equipment upon landing. Fire missions transmitted by Bn CO to Reg NLO at 1000 who in turn relayed to the VICKSBURG via TRX-8.
	SFC	Contracted NLO at H-30				H-14		Spotter suffered casualties to equipment and personnel upon landing and was ineffective until H-17 when he joined NLO party in Bn CP. Fire missions conducted by NLO using plane spot exclusively.
1/25	NLO		Contracted SFC at H-60	Contracted F.S. at H-60	Contracted F.S. at H-60	H-18	H-60	Spotter suffered casualties to equipment and personnel upon landing and was ineffective until H-17 when he joined NLO party in Bn CP. Fire missions conducted by NLO using plane spot exclusively.
	SFC	Contracted F.S. at H-90	Contracted NLO at H-60			H-18		
1/23	NLO	Contracted F.S. and SFC at H-60	Contracted SFC at H-60	Contracted F.S. at H-60	Contracted F.S. at H-17 Hrs.	H-17 Hrs.	H-170	SFC suffered casualties to equipment and personnel. NLO remained aloft in LVT and relayed spotter's requests. NLO used spotting plane extensively to locate and direct fire on targets.
	SFC	Contracted F.S. and NLO at H-60	Contracted NLO at H-60			H-18		
2/23	NLO		Contracted SFC at H-40	Contracted F.S. at H-60	Contracted F.S. at H-60	H-140	H-15	Casualties to SFC's TCS Jeep, SCR 300 and TRX-8 prevented continuous communication by spotter to F.S. and NLO. NLO's TRX-8 used from H-60 on. VOF used to conduct counter battery fire from H-15 throughout Dog-Day.
	SFC	Contracted F.S. at H-30	Contracted NLO at H-40			H-17		
1/27	NLO	Contracted SFC at H-30		Contracted F.S. at H-60		H-15	H-15	Casualties to personnel and equipment. VOF Spotting plane used to good advantage throughout day. First mission fired was targets in SURIBACHI Area.
	SFC	Contracted NLO at H-30			Contracted F.S. at H-20	H-12	H-20	Communication trouble throughout day. Rapid displacement of battalion and loss of equipment made SFC ineffective on Dog-Day.
2/27	NLO		Contracted Reg. and Div at H-15	Contracted F.S. at H-15		H-180		
	SFC	Contracted SFC 281 and Bn CO at H-12			Contracted F.S. and NLO at H-150	H-12		None fired on Dog-Day
1/28	NLO		Contracted SFC at H-30	Contracted F.S. at H-30		H-240	H-Hr	SFC suffered casualties to personnel and equipment. NLO fired first mission from offshore at enemy artillery emplacement.
	SFC		Contracted NLO at H-20		Contracted F.S. at H-150	H-12		
2/28	NLO		Contracted Div Gunfire Officer at H-30		Contracted F.S. at H-270	H-15	H-270	SFC experienced casualties to equipment and personnel. Unable to establish communications with F.S. Notified Div by SCR 300 and SFC 281 when committed was assigned the SAWA FE. When communications were finally established, the THOMAS E. FRASER was assigned for support.
	SFC					H-15		

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LCI(M).

The three units of LCI(M) followed the scheduled plan and delivered their fires on the flanks and in deep support. As was indicated above, these ships had definite areas to cover, and reports indicate that they effectively carried out their mission.

The mortar units fired a total of 17,400 rounds of 4.2" mortar shells in support of the landing, upon completion of their scheduled fires they withdrew from their beach area and replenished ammunition.

During the night of Dog-Day, two six-ship units delivered harassing fires as requested by Corps. Using Plan A, these units fired 24,000 rounds. Fires were kept about 1000 yards in front of our lines. Though the more northern unit was subjected to artillery fire from enemy positions, no withdrawal was made.

LCI(G) and LCI(R).

The three available LCI(G) delivered their scheduled 4.5" rocket fires in conjunction with the LCS(L) units. Upon completion of this mission, at about H-5, these ships withdrew from the beach area and were not used further on Dog-Day.

The LCI(R) unit delivered its schedule of fires on the MOTOYAMA Area. Fire commenced at 0645 and was maintained until 1300 when the supply of 5" SSR was exhausted. The unit had no further fire support missions during the operation.

(h) RESISTANCE ENCOUNTERED BY THE LANDING FORCE.

In order properly to assess the combined results of the preliminary and Dog-Day bombardments, it is necessary to examine the resistance actually encountered by assault troops. These reports of resistance are obtained from the SFCP personnel and are believed to be reasonably accurate.

RCT 25, landing on Beach BLUE, received small arms, mortar and artillery fire beginning at H-Hour and increasing in intensity after H plus one hour. Small arms and automatic weapon fire came from the high terrace and quarry on the north flank and from some pill-boxes about 200 yards inland and to the right front. Mortar and artillery fire seemed to be coming from the north and northwest. The resistance encountered by this RCT was the heaviest of any received by the landing force.

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RCT 23, landing on Beach YELLOW, received small arms, mortar, and artillery fire soon after landing. The small arms seemed to be coming from a few pillboxes and one intact blockhouse. After these installations were overcome, and some advance had been made, heavy machine gun fire was received from a group of pillboxes and a blockhouse at the foot of the Airfield No. 1. Mortar and artillery fire from the north flank increased in intensity after H-Hour.

RCT 27, landing on Beach RED, initially received little fire. Some small arms and mortar fire was received from the SURIBACHI area as well as some small arms fire from the front. The advance of this RCT was the most rapid and it is logical to assume that the initial resistance encountered by this RCT was the lightest on the front.

RCT 28, landing on Beach GREEN, initially received very little resistance; there was no artillery fire on the beaches, but intermittent mortar fire and some small arms fire was later received from the base of SURIBACHI and vicinity. This fire increased in intensity, and it is evident that the defenders were neutralized during the heavy bombardment, but regained some of their effectiveness when the supporting fires slackened.

(i) LOCATION OF CONTROLLING AGENCIES.

As has been previously mentioned, control of NGF and air support was exercised by CTF 51 on the ELDORADO while the Corps Commander and his Staff were located with CTF 53 on the AUBURN. This separation of the Corps Naval Gunfire Officer and the Gunnery Officer of CTF 51 introduced some confusion and misunderstanding, as well as considerable amount of additional transmissions over the NGF control circuit. However, NGF support did not suffer materially due to this separation of command agencies.

(j) CONCLUSIONS.

(1) That the Dog-Day bombardment, in conjunction with the destruction accomplished in the preliminary firing, enabled a successful landing to be made against one of the enemy's most heavily and skillfully defended possessions, with acceptable casualties.

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(2) That in spite of a particularly heavy area coverage in rear of the landing beaches, it was impossible to neutralize all artillery and mortars. This was partially due to the effectiveness of camouflage, and the protection afforded by carefully built emplacements. This prevented the discovery of these weapons, or when discovered, necessitated direct hits due to the excellent protection afforded.

(3) That the employment of a rolling barrage, with provision for a repetition of fires, if the troop rate of advance is not as fast as anticipated, should be employed whenever terrain conditions permit.

(4) That the use of 1200 foot/second powder is sufficiently accurate for overhead fire.

(5) That positioning of ships within boat lanes is feasible without excessive interference in the ship to shore movement. The positioning of ships within 500 yards is practicable.

(6) That the maximum employment of LCI(M) in Dog-Day bombardment is desirable due to large amount of fire power available, and the accuracy with which the fire can be delivered.

(7) That the use of LVTs equipped with TCS radios as offshore spotting stations offers a partial solution to the difficulty of establishing early SFCP-firing ship communications.

(8) That the use of replacement spotters and liaison officers in gunboat support craft adds greatly to the effectiveness of these craft.

(9) That the landing of SFCP spotters and their team in the 2d or 3d wave is generally too early, particularly where heavy opposition is expected, resulting in disorganization and casualties with no real gain in gunfire support.

(10) The introduction of VOF spotters, who were thoroughly trained in their duties, was a major contribution to the effectiveness of Dog-Day fires.

(11) To avoid confusion, the Corps and Attack Force Gunfire Officer should be on the same ship.

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(K) RECOMMENDATIONS.

(1) That the rolling barrage, with provision for a repetition of fires, be used whenever practicable and that in planning this barrage, an average rate of troop advance or below be employed for assignment of zones of fire.

(2) That maximum use of LCI(M)s be made in the Dog-Day bombardments.

(3) That the LVT be used by MLOs as offshore spotting stations until the spotter ashore has established communications with the firing ship; and that the spotter land with his team in the same wave as the battalion commander.

(4) That replacement SFCP officer personnel be provided by FMF, Pac as necessary to act as liaison officers and offshore spotters with gunboat support craft.

(5) That in future operations the Landing Force Naval Gunfire Officer and the Gunnery Officer of the Amphibious Staff in control of bombardment, be together.

4. FIRES SUBSEQUENT TO DOG-DAY

(a) COORDINATION OF AIR, NAVAL GUNFIRE, AND ARTILLERY.

In order fully to exploit the capabilities of all supporting arms, emphasis in training had been placed on coordination of Air, Naval Gunfire and Artillery. Through this training all echelons of command were cognizant of the value of the fire support available and took steps to insure its proper utilization. The procedure employed in planning prearranged fires was as follows: After receipt of the attack order by the infantry battalion all liaison officers and the battalion commander (or his representative) discussed the plan of attack and the employment of supporting arms for assisting the attack. Targets for night harassing fires and for the preparation were assigned with due regard to the capabilities of each. This plan was forwarded to regiment for approval.

In the regiment the same system was employed, i.e., a meeting of liaison officers and the commander. Battalion plans for employment of direct support artillery and ships were examined, and if satisfactory to the regiment, were approved; if not satisfactory,

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battalions were directed where to place their fires. Additional fire support over and above that available from direct support was requested from division through Artillery and Naval Gunfire staff officers. In many cases the necessity of spotters being able to observe prearranged fires in support of the attack was not taken into consideration, and ships delivered unobserved fires. The necessity of a spotter either on the ground or in the air to spot the fire of direct-support ships is self-evident if accuracy is to be obtained.

On division levels, final coordination was achieved by the Commander, or his representative, and the division Air, Naval Gunfire and Artillery Officers. Regimental requests for additional fires were examined and either approved or disapproved. If approved they were consolidated into the final division plan, along with fires desired by the division based on the latest intelligence information. For the most part targets were selected with the view of using the most suitable weapon for their destruction or neutralization. When divisions had a heavy support ship allotted, targets were directly assigned. In the later phases when no heavy ships were assigned to divisions, requests for all additional naval gunfire had to be made to Corps. The system of coordination used in the 3dMarDiv seems to offer considerable advantage and a description thereof is quoted:

"The basic means of coordination between supporting arms was to achieve close and lasting personal liaison on all levels. Targets were freely interchanged according to the method of attack best suited, and whenever operations were in progress or prospect, the Artillery, Naval Gunfire, and Air Officers were together or readily accessible to each other by wire. Plans for scheduled fires or pre-King Hour preparations were habitually prepared jointly, and so presented to the G-3, Chief of Staff and Commanding General. Much of the success achieved can be traced to the separate maintenance of a "Supporting Arms Tent", so called, adjacent to the G-3 section. In this center, wire communications converged from the division switchboard, from the similar 5thPhibCorps establishment, from the Division Artillery fire direction center and from Naval Gunfire and Air radio centrals. It was thus possible to establish any sort of communication necessary, and to plan without interruption while being within a few steps of the G-3 section."

After Corps was established ashore, the division requests for additional naval gunfire were received by Corps about 2400 to 0200

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over a direct telephone line. Prior to the Corps being established ashore, such requests were received on the AUBURN over the NGF control circuit. These requests were discussed in detail by the Corps NGFO with the Div NGFO concerned. In connection with this, it was the tendency of divisions during the early phases to request additional naval gunfire support on a large number of small target areas for the King-Hour Preparation. In view of the fact that usually only two or three heavy ships were available for such firing and since the preparation usually lasted about thirty minutes it was found uneconomical to fire on a relatively large number of small targets. This was due to the large pattern size of heavy ships, the length of time necessary to adjust the fire on the targets, and the inability of the ships to shift rapidly from one target to another without adjusting the fire on the new target. Divisions were afterwards requested to assign the relatively small target areas to Corps Artillery, whose smaller pattern size would allow more efficient coverage and to reserve large single target areas for the general support ships. When requests for fire exceeded the support available the decision as to what fires would be delivered was made by the Corps NGFO based on the location of the main effort, the type targets available for engagement and on directives from the Chief of Staff and the Corps Artillery Commander. These requests for King-Hour preparation fire and general support missions were passed to CTF 51 over the Naval Gunfire Control or overload radio circuit.

The plan for coordination of Air, Naval Gunfire, and Artillery on the Corps level provided for the Corps Air Officer, Corps NGFO and a representative of the Corps Artillery Commander to operate in one large tent, known as Supporting Arms. Here an up-to-date target information center was maintained for joint use. Direct lines to Division Air and NGF officers were provided, as well as a direct line to Corps Artillery F.D.C. The two gunfire radio circuits and SFCEP monitor were located here. The function of the Supporting Arms center, under the direction of the Corps Artillery Commander, was to coordinate all pre-arranged fires in support of the Corps as well as to pass information on air strikes which would involve restriction on artillery or naval gunfire.

The functioning of the Supporting Arms center was never completely effective because of lack of sufficient qualified representatives of Artillery, NGF and Air to permit continuous functioning. However, since division requests for naval gunfire and artillery were well coordinated, repetition of fires on the same targets was

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avoided. Further with the checking by the Corps NGFO with the Air Officer, who was always present, or with the Corps Artillery representative or Corps Artillery F.D.C., duplication of fires on the Corps level was prevented. It is also essential that the LFASCU be located near the Supporting Arms Center and that the closest liaison is maintained.

Small air strikes were delivered without checking naval gunfire and artillery. As a result very little restriction was placed on naval gunfire due to air operations. However, in some cases when restrictions were necessary, positive information was difficult to obtain concerning the exact time and duration of the air strike.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

While the effectiveness of the support furnished did not materially suffer in this operation, due to this lack of full coordination, it is felt that this was due to the limited area of the objective with a consequent restriction in the amount of gunfire support missions possible. In large target areas, positive means for coordination and distribution of targets among the Supporting Arms must exist at all times, and sufficient personnel must be provided to insure this.

(b) DIRECT SUPPORT.

(1) General.

IWO JIMA was ideally suited for the employment of direct support ships. Its small size combined with sufficient depth of water close inshore and its lack of reefs allowed ships to be positioned on both flanks and still be within range of any part of the island. As in the past the bulk of missions fired for battalions were furnished by destroyers, although all types of ships, including fast battleships and cruisers of Task Force 58 delivered call fires. Ships again demonstrated their cooperation, technical ability and ingenuity in the execution of their supporting missions.

The rugged terrain encountered, the enemy's skilful employment of well-concealed heavily constructed fortifications slowed the advance of our units and increased the demand for weapons which could aid the infantry's progress. The ships mobility enabled them to move into position and fire against targets in ravines, caves and reverse slopes which were inaccessible to artillery.

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In the early stages of the operation, when no ammunition limitations were set for call fires, some SFCPs expended excessive amounts in unobserved neutralization fires. While it is realized that front line units were receiving heavy mortar fire during much of this phase, and that area neutralization substantially reduced much of these fires, it is felt that the same results could have been achieved by using less ammunition. It is also felt that ammunition expenditure must be limited by higher authority, with the provision that, in case of emergency, additional rounds will be authorized.

Data compiled indicates that more call missions were fired and more naval ammunition expended on IWO JIMA than in any other previous campaign in the PACIFIC Theater. 53 DBs, 6 CLs, 8 CAs and 8 BBs executed gunfire support missions, and virtually all of these ships delivered call fire missions during the operation.

(2) Summary of Call-Fire Missions.

a. Purpose.

The majority of call fires delivered were placed against enemy positions which were immediately impeding the advance of our troops. Missions were fired for purposes of neutralization, destruction, harassment and illumination, in short, for every purpose which would aid the infantry in the execution of the attack.

Targets were as varied as the purpose; blockhouses, pillboxes, caves, gun positions, enemy troops, machine gun positions, storage areas, truck parks, water points and countless other targets of every conceivable type were taken under fire by naval guns.

b. Method of Observation.

Throughout the call fire phase, various methods of spotting were employed as dictated by the terrain. All divisions zones of action were characterized by a lack of observation. This was particularly noticeable in the zone of the 4thMarDiv. The SFCPs, who normally had control of the firing ships, were able to use all methods of observation and showed marked proficiency in selecting that which was most applicable to the situation. In broad terms, three agencies were used, i.e., ashore, afloat and aloft.

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The spotter observed most of the call fires although some missions were directed by the liaison officer.

Unit-commanders of platoons, companies and battalions had all received indoctrination in the method of calling for fires. In a number of instances during the operation these officers called for and successfully directed ships fire. The normal procedure was to pass commands to the N LO, using organic infantry communication channels, this officer would then relay the information to the firing ship in support of his unit. Though a slow process, it did enable fires to be delivered in areas where the spotter could not observe because of his location.

AFLOAT

Direct fire using shipboard spot was employed to a great extent. In the MARIANAS, the failure of spotters to take advantage of direct fire had been noted. In the intervening training period, SFCs were fully instructed in the use of this method, and it resulted in its increased employment at IWO JIMA.

Two general methods were used. The first was to send the ship a normal target designation followed by a complete description of its appearance. If the ship was still unable to identify the target, salvos were fired and spotted onto the positions. The ship would identify it in this manner and take it under direct fire.

This method was of continual utility especially in the zone of action of the 5thMarDiv where terrain conditions favored its employment. In the attack on SURIBACHI, the excellent direct fire furnished the 28th Marines broke up a number of counterattacks, neutralized machine guns and other positions and was a dominant factor in the early seizure of this part of the objective.

The second method of employing the fire support ships for direct fire missions was to place qualified observers aboard who would direct fires from seaward against enemy installations. This method was employed successfully by all three divisions. An excerpt from the report of the 3rd Division Naval Gunfire Officer is quoted below:

"For two days, a DD was employed in direct-fire shooting under the control of the Division Naval Gunfire Officer or his assistant,

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with additional SFCP control for safety. Due to the proximity of friendly troops, and the lines of fire (frequently pointed directly at our lines), it was not considered safe to conduct such missions unless under control of an embarked officer from the division. These missions were very useful in sealing off cave entrances and demolishing beach defenses which would otherwise have had to be attacked by infantry. Approximately twenty (20) caves were attacked with uniformly good results. The usual method of target designation was visual; however, smoke-grenades and mortar smoke were also employed by SFCP."

Previous mention has been made of the use of LVTs and gunboats as spotting stations. This function of the LVT ceased on Dog-Day, but gunboats were used throughout the operation.

ALOFT

As in all phases of gunfire support VOF aircraft played a most important part in the call fire phase. In many instances spotters ashore were denied observation of enemy targets because of the nature of the terrain encountered; it was in these circumstances that the spotting aircraft-SFCP teams proved its usefulness. Based on SFCP reports approximately 40% to 50% of the call fire missions were fired by VOF aircraft.

The normal method of employing these planes was to have them check in on the firing ship - SFCP net, at which time ships and SFCP would zero-beat to the plane's frequency. There were some instances of the planes and SFCPs failing to gain communication because of one or the other being off frequency. In such cases, the ship would employ two receivers, one adjusted to the plane, the other to the SFCP, in this way the ship was in communication with both and could relay any important transmissions.

The SFCP informed the plane of the zone of action in which he was working and either directed the plane to search for suitable targets, or designated targets which were invisible from the ground. Positive control of the firing rested with the SFCP for obvious safety reasons.

The technical ability of VOF spotters, their familiarity with the target area, their ability to recognize and bring fire on enemy positions rapidly and efficiently was an outstanding feature of

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the operation. They definitely increased the effectiveness of this phase of naval gunfire as attested to by SFCs and ships.

Battleship and cruiser planes were used in the same way whenever their ships were assigned to direct support and contact was possible. These planes also did much spotting of general support fires well in advance of our front lines. In such cases the SFCs were not in contact with them, since safety factors were not as stringent.

(3) Harassing Fires.

Direct support ships habitually fired an average of 100 rounds a night of harassing fire on targets located 1000 yards or more in advance of our front lines. These targets were selected after careful coordination with artillery. The procedure used in the selection is described in section 4(a).

Indirect fire was used in the majority of cases; the ship was spotted on to the target area by SFCs whenever observation permitted. When observation was not available indirect fire without spot was employed. On a number of occasions while engaged in night harassing missions, ships discovered enemy artillery and rockets firing and took them under direct fire.

(4) Prearranged Fires.

Direct support ships were used daily in pre King-Hour attacks. Specific target areas were selected in coordination with air and artillery as described in section 4(a).

These missions varied in duration and ammunition expenditure; however, the average fired was 100-125 rounds in a half hour period. These fires were for the purpose of neutralization.

The careful coordination of such fires with Corps and Divisional artillery, effectively neutralized the enemy defenses and allowed the infantry to advance.

(5) Night Illumination.

Night illumination was more extensively employed than ever before. Available information indicates that some 19000 rounds of stars were used over the 32-day period of the operation. As in the past, illumination was for the most part furnished by starshells, although some searchlight illumination was employed to excellent advantage. As has been customary, direct support ships furnished all illumination to front line troops.

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Until D/4 starshell expenditures were excessive due to the failure of corps, division, and regimental naval gunfire officers to exercise suitable control over spotters and liaison officers with the battalions. In addition, in the early phases there was little coordination of the illumination between adjacent units. Some Oboes and Charlies ascertained the number of stars aboard the supporting ship and then proceeded to expend the entire load carried. This excessive expenditure resulted in the necessity of limiting starshell expenditures to fifty per ship per night, after Dog plus four, because of the fact that the operation promised to be considerably longer than had been anticipated, and the consequent necessity of insuring an adequate supply to complete the operation. When it is considered that at this time some 11 or 12 ships were habitually assigned in direct support across the narrow Corps front this limitation did not seriously affect the illumination provided the front lines. In addition, in case of counterattack, authority to exceed this allowance was automatic.

Later this allowance was increased to 75 rounds per ship but the number of fire support ships in direct support were somewhat less. Finally, when only about six ships were furnishing direct support, this allowance was again increased to 100 per ship.

The desire of front line units for almost continuous illumination is understood, since perhaps the greatest morale factor provided by naval gunfire is the furnishing of effective illumination. It reduces the effectiveness of Jap infiltration tactics and prevents counterattacks from forming undetected. However, the expenditure of more than 6-8 stars an hour per ship is impracticable unless a consequent reduction in other types of support is accepted. In view of the fact that about 40 seconds of illumination is provided by a properly adjusted star shell, and that this illumination is effective over a regimental front (1000 Yards) starshell illumination at the rate of 6 per hour will provide about one minute of illumination for every five minutes of darkness. In addition if illumination is coordinated on a division basis, periods of darkness will be even further reduced. When it is considered that no counter attacks or infiltration to a large extent can take place in this small space of time, an increase in this rate is not deemed necessary.

The procedure used to prevent star shell cases from falling

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into our own front lines was the exercise of coordination by Corps. Divisions were directed to report the desired line of fire of their assigned support ships for star shell illumination to Corps. These lines of fire were plotted on the map and from the front line positions it was determined whether or not any starshell cases were likely to fall in our own front lines. Divisions were directed to change the line of fire of any ship likely to produce this condition. As a result of this coordination, no star shell cases were reported to have fallen in our own front lines throughout the operation.

When starshell expenditure was reduced, regiments and divisions used various methods of coordination in order to more efficiently employ available stars. These generally provided for one ship to illuminate at a time across a regimental front until its allowance was expended at which time the other ship took over the task of illumination for the regiment.

(c) GENERAL SUPPORT MISSIONS.

(1) General Plan.

The plan for employment of general support ships called for the use of one heavy ship to be assigned each division for the execution of deep support missions in the division zone of action. VOF planes were assigned when needed to replace the ship's own aircraft. The remaining heavy ships worked in areas of responsibility 1000 yards or more in front of our troops employing air spot. Their mission was to destroy specific targets assigned by Corps as well as to destroy or neutralize any other targets which were discovered in the ships area of responsibility.

All heavy ships were to be employed in harassing fires, which were coordinated with other supporting arms. The LCI(M) were to furnish the bulk of harassing fires 1000 and beyond our front lines.

(2) Pre-King Hour Preparation Fires.

Naval gunfire general-support ships habitually supported King-Hour attacks. The general plan followed was to supply divisional artillery to targets closest to our front lines, followed by Corps artillery and direct-support naval gunfire in the intermediate zone 400-800 yards from our own lines, and, finally

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general-support naval gunfire from main batteries of battleships and cruisers. These general-support fires would be used either to augment Corps artillery or would be fired in deeper areas.

In most cases two or three heavy ships were available daily. An allowance of 100-200 rounds of main battery ammunition was available for support of King-Hour attacks and about the same amount for general support missions throughout the remainder of the day.

Ships were assigned areas of responsibility and, within the areas, specific high-priority targets visible from seaward were assigned for destruction. Lists of other high-priority targets located inland were also supplied ships, and were to be placed under fire in order of their priority. Active enemy weapons enjoyed the highest priority, and ships were instructed to destroy them whenever they were discovered.

In the early phases of the operation, when ample heavy ships were available, a battleship or cruiser was assigned to a division for general support missions. This was particularly valuable in the first part of the campaign since it provided division with a rapid means of getting immediate fire on targets without having to go through a crowded radio channel to Corps. The Division Naval Gunfire Officer would establish communication with the ship on one of the available SFCP radio frequencies, and would brief the ship on this circuit.

In the later stages, heavy support units were reduced to less than four battleships or cruisers. General support ships were no longer assigned directly to divisions.

Targets well in advance of our infantry were selected and assigned to these heavier units whose missions was to destroy them. Thus when the troops did reach the positions, and safety requirements made heavy calibre fires impossible, the installations would have already been eliminated.

Some heavy calibre ammunition was fired extremely close (400-600 yards) to our front lines with excellent effect. An example of this was the performance of the IDAHO and PENSACOLA in delivering the pre-King-Hour fires on the morning of 23 February. The IDAHO expended 162 rounds of 14" H.C. within 400 yards of our lines. The PENSACOLA fired 390 rounds of 8" H.C. and brought

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her fires within 600 yards of our lines. Results were excellent and the success of an attack following the preparation is an indication of its effectiveness. For safety reasons a SFCP near the target area assigned was in contact with the ships during the delivery of this fire. If fires become dangerous to our troops, the spotter was to make necessary adjustments.

Although the majority of the defensive installations required direct fire for destruction, the concussion effect of large calibre naval projectiles reduced the effectiveness of the Japanese defenders even when their emplacements were not destroyed. The infantry was able to make substantial gains following such a preparation though it was necessary to take immediate advantage of these fires by rapid advance since the effect of such a bombardment wears off rapidly.

(3) Deep Supporting Missions.

A large amount of destruction of targets visible from seaward was accomplished by general support ships. This was particularly true in the 5thMarDiv zone on the north-west side of the island and in the northern part of the 3dMarDiv zone.

In addition many targets invisible from seaward were damaged or neutralized. Five inch fire cleared away camouflage and exposed new targets repeatedly, some of which were engaged by gunfire, others by air or artillery. The result of this destruction and damage substantially reduced the task of our infantry. Adequate photographic coverage immediately following such fires with a repetition after interpretation would do much to increase the value of deep support fires by naval gunfire, artillery and aerial bombing.

General support missions were last fired on 5-6 March, thereafter the tactical situation would not allow general support fires. Call fires continued until resistance ceased.

LIST OF GENERAL SUPPORT SHIPS USED

19-20 February

WASHINGTON
NORTH CAROLINA
IDAHO
WEST VIRGINIA
SANTA FE

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19-20 February

BILOXI
PENSACOLA
INDIANAPOLIS

20-21 February

WEST VIRGINIA
NORTH CAROLINA
TEXAS
NEVADA
BILOXI
SANTA FE
TUSCALOOSA
ASTORIA
PASADENA
BOSTON
WILKES-BARRE
SAN FRANCISCO
SALT LAKE CITY
TWIGGS

21-22 February

WEST VIRGINIA
IDAHO
PASADENA
WILKES-BARRE
SAN FRANCISCO
BOSTON
PENSACOLA

22-23 February

WEST VIRGINIA
IDAHO
SALT LAKE CITY
TUSCALOOSA
BRADFORD
SHANNON

23-24 February

WEST VIRGINIA
IDAHO
PENSACOLA
GUEST

24-25 February

WEST VIRGINIA
SALT LAKE CITY
TUSCALOOSA

25-26 February

VICKSBURG
PENSACOLA
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26-27 February

WEST VIRGINIA
TENNESSEE
TUSCALOOSA
SALT LAKE CITY

27-28 February

TENNESSEE
VICKSBURG
SALT LAKE CITY

28 February-1 March

WEST VIRGINIA
NEVADA
TENNESSEE
PENSACOLA
INDIANAPOLIS

1-2 March

TENNESSEE
VICKSBURG
SALT LAKE CITY
TUSCALOOSA

2-3 March

No general support
ships used.

3-4 March

No general support
ships used.

4-5 March

No general support
ships used.

5-6 March

NEVADA
TUSCALOOSA
SALT LAKE CITY

6-7 March

General support fires
ceased.

(d) EMPLOYMENT OF LCI TYPES AFTER DOG-DAY.

Subsequent to Dog-Day, LCI type support craft were used extensively to deliver call and harassing fire missions for our troops. Marked success was experienced with both the 40mm fires of LCS(L) in support of our flank battalions and with the mortar fire delivered to harass the enemy. These ships showed remarkable ability to provide needed fire support and their

employment was of definite benefit to our infantry.

The following is a brief resume of the operation after Dog-Day

LCS(L)

Dog/1. Four ships of both unit #3 and #4 furnished 40mm fire to the flank battalions. During the night four ships were detached to continue this support.

Dog/2. Throughout the day and night one LCS(L) supported the assault elements of RCT 28.

Dog/3. Four LCS(L) were assigned duty with the flank elements and were employed day and night.

After Dog/3 Various numbers of boats were made available to flank battalions for fire missions and to transport reconnaissance parties on searches of the cliff areas. The ships were used up to 8 March when all LCS(L) units departed.

LCI(M)

Dog/1. From 1242 to 1400 Mortar Support Unit #3 delivered a total of 6000 rounds of 4.2" ammunition into the southeastern coastal areas in an attempt to neutralize enemy artillery which was snelling our beaches. During the night two units delivered 12000 rounds of harassing fire on the same areas as were covered Dog-Day night.

Dog/2. One unit fired 540 rounds into the southeastern coastal region. At night two units were used to harass the areas in the northern portion of the Island.

Dog/3. One unit delivered harassing fires on the northern portion of the Island.

After Dog/3 Units continued their night harassing fires until our troops had reached a position which prevented further missions. Ships had been departing from the area almost daily and the last LCI(M)s were ordered out on 1 March.

LCI(R) and LCI(G)

LCI(R)s were not employed after Dog-Day

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LCI(G) were used together with the LCS(L) units and delivered 40mm fires for flank battalions.

Ammunition expended by LCI types exclusive of Pre Dog-Day fires was as follows:

4.2" Mortar	60,000 rds.
5.0" SSR	9,500 rds.
4.5" Rockets	8,000 rds.
40mm	116,000 rds.

(e) AMMUNITION

(1) 5" common was employed with some frequency against located pillboxes and similar point-targets with which IWO JIMA abounded. Perhaps its most successful employment was in conjunction with 1200 f/s charges, when large angles of fall could be obtained, thus causing positive setback. The delay, combined with the reinforced ogive, made this type of projectile effective against many targets beyond the capabilities of AAC, especially small pillboxes and similar pieces of reinforced construction.

(2) 5" AAC as always, was the work-horse. In this operation however, it was not always usable with the best results, due to the strength of enemy fortifications, and to the fact that virtually all enemy personnel stayed below ground. Nevertheless, this type of shell accounted for the great majority of rounds fired, and was used against an infinity of targets.

(3) Intermediate and major caliber AP were rarely used although ample targets existed where its employment would have been particularly effective.

(4) Intermediate and major caliber HC were employed in the majority of general support or reinforcing missions, usually for the thickening and deepening of the intense pre-attack preparations.

(5) Air bursts was used to a negligible extent by SFCs although, on several occasions, VOF spotters employed it against open mortar positions with good results.

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(6) Impact bursts comprised the majority, due naturally to the overwhelming proportion of materiel and covered targets. Due to factors, the nature of which may only be hazarded, there appeared to be a disproportionate number of impact duds, many of which were rounds with steel nose-plugs.

(7) WP was, as usual, in much greater demand than could be supplied. It was uniformly used, and highly valued, as a casualty-producing agent, whereas the screening role was usually left to artillery smoke, of which the supply was more generous. Enemy prisoners indicate that it is one of our most-feared munitions. Current modification of WP rounds with the Mk 29 fuze give good results on impact, but it is believed that a WP round constructed on the same design as the 5" AAC - namely, with both time (Mk 18) and impact (Mk 29) fuzing would be most satisfactory.

(8) 40mm was used to excellent advantage by LCS(L) in firing on caves, enemy personnel in the open, and other targets visible from seaward.

(9) 1200 f/s charges- The outstanding performance of 1200 f/s i.v. charges should be emphasized, for it was with this type of ammunition, employing overhead fire, that, in the 3dMarDiv 5" fires were brought to within 75 yards of a supported battalion the troops of which had previously been warned. In other cases, this fire was brought within 100 yards, always with consistent performance, close grouping both in range and deflection. Targets attacked with these charges were in general those against which large angles of fall were desired, and results were comparable to those of overhead howitzer fire. It was noted, however, that some ships seemed reluctant or hesitant to deliver these fires, due apparently to inexperience in applying the necessary computer corrections for the differing trajectory and change in i.v.

Conclusions.

(a) That the doctrine for the employment of direct support ships is sound, but that Shore Fire Control Parties still need a more thorough understanding of the doctrine.

(b) That landing force units must realize that 6 - 8 starshells an hour for routine illumination is the most that may be expended except in emergency.

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(c) That a better system for coordination of star shell illumination must be developed, in order to more suitably employ available ammunition.

(d) That the contribution of VOF to both direct and general support fire missions was outstanding.

(e) That the doctrine for employment of general support ships is sound.

(f) That the employment of LCM(3) in night harassing fires as close as 1000 yards to our front lines is highly effective.

(g) That once again our combatant ships and special amphibious support craft have demonstrated their versatility technical ability, and a most high spirit of cooperation with the landing force, and in so doing, played a vital part in the seizure of IWO JIMA.

Recommendations.

(a) That Shore Fire Control Parties be more thoroughly indoctrinated in the technique of employment of direct support ships.

(b) That an SOP for star shell coordination be developed in the Division and Corps level.

(c) That a higher percentage of star shells be carried in ammunition re supply ships.

5. NAVAL GUNFIRE PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT.

(a) PERSONNEL

1. Composition of Parties.

a. Battalion Shore Fire Control Parties.

The organic JASCO table of organization, together with FMF PAC SPECIAL ORDER 86-44, provided for a battalion SFCP of two officers and eleven enlisted men.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~b. Regimental Liaison Team.

FMF Special Order 86-44 provided for an increase in the JASCO which supplied to each regiment a Naval Gunfire Officer and radio team.

The Naval Gunfire Section of FMF Pacific furnished experienced officers to JASCOs to act in this capacity.

c. Division Naval Gunfire Section.

FMF Special Order 86-44 provided for a Division Naval Gunfire Section composed of the Division Naval Gunfire Officer, the Division Naval Gunfire Liaison Officer and sufficient personnel to man the radio equipment.

As in regiments, the Naval Gunfire Section of FMF Pacific made available to JASCOs qualified officers to act as Division Naval Gunfire Liaison Officers.

d. Corps Naval Gunfire Section.

In FMF Special Order 86-44, Corps was authorized a Naval Gunfire Section.

The Naval Gunfire Officer of FMF Pacific was assigned to Corps as the Corps Naval Gunfire Officer. The regularly assigned Corps Naval Gunfire Officer and two Naval officers from FMF Pacific were also made members of the section for the operation.

Seven radio operators, one clerk and two drivers were provided by Special Order 86-44. During the course of the operation, Corps Signal Battalion furnished an experienced Staff Sergeant to act as team chief and provided four additional radio operators.

e. Miscellaneous Personnel.

Four (4) radar beacon teams were assigned to the 3d, 4th and 5th MarDivs. These teams consisted of two (2) enlisted men who had been thoroughly trained in the operation of the radar beacon. A team was assigned to the naval gunfire section of each regiment and a replacement team was attached to division naval gunfire sections.

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The 4th and 5th MarDivs were furnished two (2) Naval officers and two (2) Marine officers to act as replacements. These officers were employed as assistants on regimental and division teams, as observers aboard gunboats and later, as casualties occurred, were used as replacements.

In the absence of such replacement personnel, the 3dMarDiv ordered the shore fire control parties of the 3d Marines ashore and used them to replace casualties and as reliefs for the shore fire control parties of the 9th and 21st Marines.

f. Conclusions and recommendations.

The Table of Organization of the JASCO now provides a sufficient number of qualified radio operators to man the equipment which SFCs employ. However, these teams have consistently suffered heavy losses with the result that during the course of an operation trained personnel are not available to operate the communication equipment.

Wire and general duty men, though willing, have neither the technical knowledge of the radio equipment nor sufficient grasp of the gunfire situation to be of any great value as replacements for radio operators. Since SFCs are expected to function efficiently and continuously, provisions must be made to insure adequate replacements for casualties among their trained radio operators.

It is recommended that each JASCO be provided with a replacement pool of 12 radio operators, who would act as on-the-spot replacements for SFCs.

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It is also recommended that Division Naval Gunfire Officers and JASCO commanders insure that all enlisted personnel in the SFC Section be given training between operations in the upkeep, repair and operation of the radio equipment employed.

(b) EQUIPMENT.

(1) Radio and Telephone.

a. Battalion Shore Fire Control Parties.

The basic radio employed by the Shore Fire Control Parties was either the SCR 284 or the TBX-8.

Battalions of the 4thMarDiv were also furnished a jeep-mounted TCS but in many instances this set was destroyed or lost upon landing, and the TBX-8 was the primary means of communication between firing ship and Shore Fire Control Parties. No real difficulties were experienced because of this loss, and the teams functioned effectively without it.

The SCR-300 was used by all units and proved to be extremely useful as an intra-divisional set. Much administrative traffic was passed over it and in some instances it was used as a relay between spotter and liaison officer who passed the information to the firing ship over his larger radio with good results.

The 4thMarDiv also furnished their Shore Fire Control Parties with SCR 536s pre-set on spotting frequencies. When it was possible to assign a battalion this frequency for the larger set, the SCR 536 proved helpful in establishing direct contact with the ship, and was used by some SFCs on Dog-Day. However, since it was necessary to switch frequencies of battalions, it was not always possible to insure each battalion the use of a frequency on which its SCR 536 was set.

Battalions depended upon the wire communications of the infantry and in almost all cases had their own local from the battalions' switchboard.

b. Regiments

Regimental teams were furnished either SCR-284s or TBX-8s.

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The regimental teams were also furnished with SCR-300s. These sets proved most valuable to the regimental liaison officers since coordination of battalion fires, administrative traffic and other such messages could be handled over them.

The regiments, like the battalions depended upon the infantry's wire communication.

c. Divisions.

The Naval Gunfire sections of divisions used either TBX-8s, SCR-284s or the jeep mounted TCS as their primary radio after getting ashore. With the more stable set-up, communications of divisions was no serious problem and in all cases their equipment functioned well with only minor breakdowns.

Prior to landing the divisions used ship-board radio equipment to coordinate and control the fires of their battalions and regiments.

Divisions also were furnished SCR-300s, and had the same success with them as did the subordinate units.

Divisions had direct telephone communication with Corps over a direct wire to the Corps Naval Gunfire Officer. In addition, the regular infantry telephone system was available for their use.

d. Corps.

While afloat the Corps Naval Gunfire section employed the radio facilities of the Gunnery Department of ComPhib Grp 2. There was no difficulty experienced with any of this equipment and communications were excellent.

Two SCR-300s were set up on the Flag Bridge and contact with the 4th and 5th MarDivs was established on this circuit. Though reception was not always good, the set was invaluable in keeping the gunfire control channels free of much administrative traffic.

On D/5 days a section of the Naval Gunfire team of Corps went ashore with a TBX and an SCR-300. It was hoped that the TCS and SCR-193 belonging to the team, but loaded on other Corps shipping, would be ashore, but when the section arrived on the beach it was found that the equipment had not yet been unloaded, and it was not until D/8 that these radios were placed ashore.

The SCR-300 and the TBX were both set up and checked into the gunfire net, but it was felt that the Corps Naval Gunfire Officer should not come ashore until additional communications were available.

On D/6, two (2) TCS jeeps were borrowed from Signal Battalion and set up. They were dug in and remoted to the site of the Air, Artillery and Naval Gunfire center and communication established with them. The Corps Naval Gunfire Officer and the remainder of the team came ashore the following day on D/7. Two TCS-12s were set up and this equipment was employed throughout the rest of the operation with excellent results. An RBM receiver was available and was used to monitor spotting frequencies.

On D/13 days, a Mark IV transmitter receiver van was brought ashore and set up for the use of the Air, Artillery and Naval Gunfire center. In view of the satisfactory communication facilities already established, this equipment was not used.

Supporting Arms was furnished a local switchboard, with a line running through the Corps board and with direct lines to the Air, Artillery and Gunfire centers of the three divisions. This board was most valuable as it allowed immediate telephonic communication with division.

e. Conclusions.

The radio equipment furnished all echelons was sufficient and, considering the hard usage it received, worked exceptionally well. The need for a lighter, more compact radio still exists. The present sets, while adequate, are still far from that desired. The SCR-694 is again suggested by all units as the ideal radio for this work.

Difficulties were experienced with jeep-mounted equipment but most of these difficulties concerned getting the set ashore under adverse conditions. Once ashore the TCS and SCR 193 functioned well. This equipment should not be landed in any of the assault waves.

The TCS-12 as employed by the Corps Naval Gunfire section was a most satisfactory set. The transmitter and receiver units were both set up in the Supporting Arms tent. The operator could use either the head-set or the loud speaker and could make adjustments on either unit as was necessary. The fact that the operator was physically present and kept a continuous typed log proved of great help to the officer on watch since constant check on all traffic could be made.

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One RBM receiver is not sufficient to satisfactorily monitor spotting frequencies.

The SCR-300 was most useful. The set was indispensable during the early days of the operation before wire was in. Even after telephone communication was established it proved useful as a means of contact between units. It is desired that in future operations an SCR-300 Naval Gunfire Control channel be assigned for each division (as a division gunfire common frequency) and for Corps.

Wire communications were excellent and the direct line from Corps to divisions was used constantly. This direct line should be laid in all future operations.

Due to the small size of the island,-- and the relative ease of delivering indirect fires through designations by grid coordinates the radar beacon was not necessary and not used. In operations against larger land masses it will be of value.

Repair and replacement facilities were excellent. Division Signal Companies and JASCO performed yeoman service in repairing and replacing Shore Fire Control Party equipment, and results were most gratifying. Corps Signal Battalion was cooperative and helpful in performing the same function for the Corps team.

The equipment furnished all echelons was sufficient. Repair facilities were good.

f. Recommendations.

1'. A lighter, more compact field radio such as the SCR-694 be given the battalion Shore Fire Control Parties.

2'. An SCR-300 control frequency be assigned Corps and to each division.

3'. The use of Supporting Arms switch board with direct lines to divisions should be made SOR.

6. COMMUNICATIONS.

(a) RADIO

(1) Landing Force.

a. Frequencies.

Naval Gunfire was assigned a total of twenty (20) frequencies for control of gunfire. Eighteen of these were assigned battalions as spotting frequencies, one was used as the Naval Gunfire Control frequency and one was used as the control overload frequency.

Corps, divisions and regiments were the only Landing Force units which employed the Gunfire Control frequency. This channel was used for all operational traffic concerning fire support. Corps guarded the control overload. Administrative traffic and other lengthy transmissions including ammo reports were cleared on this circuit.

These frequencies proved sufficient in number, and little difficulty was experienced with interference from other circuits. The Gunfire Control frequency (3845 Kcs) did receive one interference from one of the Landing Force Command nets which was operating on 1918 Kcs. The interference was sporadic and did not hinder operations in any way. Japanese interference was encountered on some spotting frequencies but it was infrequent and caused no trouble.

VOF spotting aircraft were given eight of the spotting frequencies as their primary frequency, and four others were made available as their secondary. Since these frequencies were pre-set and not changeable while the planes were in the air, it was necessary that it be the battalions who made the necessary shift. There was no difficulty experienced with this method, although because of it, units were not able to keep the frequencies which had been assigned them on Dog-Day.

This procedure of shifting Shore Fire Control Party frequencies made the SCR 536s of the 4thMarDiv battalions unusable for contact between ship and shore. The radios were set on the frequency assigned for Dog-Day and it was necessary to change this in order to allow VOF to be employed.

The sets were still employed as relays between spotters and liaison sections.

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 Initially the 5thMarDiv had one SCR-300 channel while the 4thMarDiv had four. Corps at first monitored all these frequencies, but for purposes of control it was necessary that all units remain on one frequency. The channel of the 5thMarDiv was selected and all units concerned checked in on it. Thereafter it was used by all echelons down to and including regiments for control purposes.

b. Procedure.

Radio procedure on the whole was fair. The Gunfire Control frequency, which even under ideal conditions is an overcrowded and busy circuit, functioned fairly well.


It was noted on Dog-Day, and to some degree in the later days of the campaign, that many ships operators continue to break in on circuits when important transmissions are in progress.


c. Equipment.

See Section 5(b).

(b) WIRE.

Telephone communications were excellent and well maintained throughout the operation. See Section 5(b).


DONALD M. WELLER,
LtColonel, USMC,



- NOTE
1. Target "blocks" are designated by one or two digit numbers on letters.
 2. Times shown in each block are the times at which all fire was scheduled to be lifted from those areas.
 3. KEY TO COLORS
Red - 6", 8", 10", 14" & 16".
Broken Red - Mortar and Rocket areas.
Black - 5".
 4. Figures below ships represent ammunition allowances for D-Day schedule of fire.

GENERAL PLAN OF FIRES D-DAY
(Ammo Allowances & Areas of Responsibility)

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Air Report

Appendix 3 to Annex CHARLIE to Special Action Report IVO JIMA Campaign

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011/162

V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS LANDING FORCE
IN THE FIELD.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
30 April 1945.

From: The Air Officer.
To : The Commanding General.
Subject: Special Action Report, IWO JIMA Campaign.
Reference: (a) VACLF Staff Memo 5-45, dtd 10Mar45.
Enclosure: (A) Chronological summary of air support from D-Day through D plus 25.

1. INTRODUCTION:

(a) Air support for the IWO JIMA campaign was in most respects excellent but in some features fell below the desired level. Preliminary land-based air bombardment apparently failed to reduce defenses, disrupt communications, or affect the morale of the enemy to any appreciable extent. On the other hand, direct support rendered by carrier-based aircraft, and, in the latter stages of occupation by land-based P51 aircraft, more nearly approached the desired goal.

2. TRAINING

(a) During the rehabilitation and training period between the MARIANAS and the IWO JIMA campaigns, air liaison sections of the 3d, 4th and 5th Marine Divisions Joint Assault Signal Companies conducted air-ground training, utilizing facilities of aviation squadrons and units available. Aviation groups which were to participate in the assault of IWO JIMA were not available for joint training, nor were organized air support control units.

(b) Each of the three divisions employed in the operation conducted continuous schooling of tactical and gunnery observers, using attached VMO Squadrons and facilities of naval aviation units locally available for the aerial phases of training.

(c) Two rehearsals for the IWO JIMA operation were conducted; the first was held in the HAWAIIAN area, 13-17 January;

Appendix 3 to Annex CHARLIE to VACLF Special Action Report, IWO JIMA Campaign.

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the second in the MARIANAS during the period 12-13 February. Corrective measures were taken to overcome deficiencies observed.

(d) During the movement to the forward area, periodic command post exercises were conducted aboard the USS AUBURN, Landing Force Headquarters ship. Exercises were planned and supervised by section umpires, thereby integrating section work.

3.

PLANNING

(a) During the planning phase of the operation, requests were submitted to higher headquarters covering aviation requirements of VAC Landing Force. General application for preliminary area bombardment by land-based and carrier-borne aircraft was made. More detailed requests outlined the direct support requirements, defining areas and schedules of attack and numbers and types of aircraft.

(b) Other requirements forwarded to higher echelons concerned tactical air observers, artillery air spotters, photographic coverage, DDT spraying, propaganda leaflet drops, air delivery of supplies, air evacuation, and VMO employment.

(c) With some compromise, requests were honored and formulated in ComPhibsPac's Air Plan. In view of the limitations imposed by availability of escort carriers and the strategic employment of fast carrier groups, the Air Plan was considered to cover the landing force air support requirements adequately; there was one exception to this: failure to provide dusk to dawn flights over the target area for night observation, night adjustment of artillery and suppressing enemy fire by harassment.

4.

AIR OPERATIONS.

(a) Air operations during the campaign were generally as planned.

(b) After the capture of SAIPAN, land-based air attacks were directed against IWO JIMA with increasing frequency and strength. Further, in accordance with plan, daily land-based strikes and nightly harassing missions were conducted between D minus twenty and D minus three. During this period and throughout the operation, land-based aircraft made neutralization and interdiction raids against enemy bases within radius of action.

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(c) From D minus three to D Day, inclusive, one daily land-based strike, under control of Command Air Support Unit, was scheduled. But on D minus three and D minus one, weather prevented employment of land-based planes. On D Day the bombers arrived too late to give the pre-H-Hour coverage specified in the air plan; however, one flight arrived in time to deliver an attack upon designated areas north of East Boat Basin.

(d) Fast Carrier Force aircraft contributed greatly to the success of the operation, both by strategic raids against the JAPANESE EMPIRE and the RYUKYU ISLANDS and by supplementing close support operations of the escort carriers.

(e) From D Day to D plus three, inclusive, fast carrier forces supported our troops by furnishing numerous large strike groups in addition to augmenting support flights of the escort carrier group. During the night of D plus three-four, Task Force 58 departed for its second great attack on JAPAN.

(f) From D plus three to D plus seventeen, all direct air support was provided by escort carriers. On D plus seventeen, eight P51 aircraft of the 78th Fighter Squadron were employed very successfully in a strafing mission; from that day through D plus nineteen, close support missions were flown both by P51's based on IWO JIMA and by TBM's and FM-2's from escort carriers. The P51's flew all remaining close support missions, the last occurring on D plus twenty-three. Escort carriers left the target area on the night of D plus twenty.

(g) Between D-Day and D plus 24, a total of 341 bombing, rocket, strafing and napalm attacks were conducted in direct support of troops. Approximately 1,315 tons of bombs and rockets and 456 napalm bombs were expended during this period. In addition to strikes delivered, twenty-four photographic and seven DDT spraying missions were flown.

5. CONCLUSIONS:

(a) Preliminary bombardment by land-based aircraft did not produce the desired damage. Few installations showed evidence of destruction caused by high altitude bombardment.

Recommendation: Greater volume and frequency of low level precision bombing employing bombs and fuzings as dictated by the nature of the targets to be destroyed.

(b) In this operation as well as past operations, the success of close support groups varied directly with their familiarity with terrain and the procedure and tactics peculiar to close support. This was particularly noticeable as the campaign progressed. Accuracy and speed of delivery showed marked improvement as pilots developed such familiarity.

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Recommendation: Include close troop support in the training syllabus of all CVE air groups. It is further considered that the practice of designating air coordinators by seniority alone might better be supplanted by training and maintaining a group of highly qualified officers for this specialized task.

(c) The great amount of coaching and clearance observation passed between air liaison teams and the Air Support Control Unit for the control of close air support missions seriously overloaded the Support Air Request net.

Recommendation: Designate an alternate SAR frequency to handle air direction traffic between air liaison teams and air support control.

(d) In general, communications were good, but again the need for a light weight, crystal-controlled set of good range for air liaison parties was demonstrated.

Recommendation: Provide SCR 694's for air liaison parties.

(e) From experience gained, it becomes increasingly evident that a central agency is required for coordination and base control of VMO Squadrons employed in combat with the Corps.

Recommendation: Form and attach to Corps an operations section of VMO Group Headquarters.

(f) The lack of prior joint training and personal contact resulted in delays and misunderstandings among Air Liaison Parties, Air Support Control Units, and supporting pilots.

Recommendation: Establish a joint training center for the centralization and coordination of training of Air Liaison Parties, Air Support Control Units, and CVE Support Groups. Between operations all units involved in air support should be ordered to temporary duty with the training agency and should conduct unit and joint training until ordered to rejoin parent organizations. In this light, it is considered highly desirable that a qualified non-flying officer from each carrier of the fleet participate in the training and be thoroughly briefed in all phases of a pending amphibious operation prior to rejoining his carrier. This will establish an intelligence link with supporting carriers and, regardless of preliminary Fast Carrier employment, will permit the briefing of pilots on dates which eliminate the possibility of security compromise.

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(g) Although air support doctrine provides for the filtering of air requests by each echelon in the chain of command, in practice the establishment of priorities falls upon Air Support Control. It is common knowledge that the time required to deliver an air strike is influenced by various factors: Communications, nature of the target, distance of target from front lines, contour of front lines, rates of movement of front line elements, nature of the terrain, target designation, weather, ease with which flight can identify target, required briefing of flight leader and flight; further, the number of support missions that may be run simultaneously on a Corps front is greatly restricted by air space, control facilities, and other equally confining factors.

Recommendation: To establish responsibility for air support request filtering at the proper level of command, it is recommended that the number of unfulfilled requests from any battalion, regiment or division be limited to one. To carry out this procedure, it is suggested that each division be assigned an intra-division frequency, that division requests to Air Support Control be submitted over the Support Air Request net, and that observations and coaching traffic between front line battalion parties be handled on a previously designated alternate Support Air Request frequency.

(h) Again the need for and value of night flights over enemy areas was demonstrated. Front line reports were unanimous in evidencing cessation or diminution of enemy fire when our planes were overhead. The possible interference of such flights with the detection and identification of approaching enemy aircraft is recognized.

Recommendation: In future operations provide a regular schedule of night harassment, observation, and spotting flights from night carriers to be supplanted by land-based night aircraft as soon as practicable. Radar control and radar beacon checks for front line fixes should be investigated and exploited.

(i) Coordination of air, artillery and naval gunfire was greatly improved but still did not attain the desired goal.

Recommendation: Target assignments and volumes of fire should be under immediate control of a designated officer or his qualified representative who is in constant and immediate contact with the controlling officers representing artillery, naval gunfire and air. A target analysis, assessment and prediction section should be included in the coordination center. Air should be permitted a minimum of interference with other arms; this presumes a more specific recognition of past over-emphasis on the

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hazards of friendly artillery and naval gunfire to friendly aircraft and further recognition that quick exchange and dissemination of information, rather than suppression or negation of fires largely reduces these hazards.

B. F. PREWITT,
LtCol., USMC.

V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS LANDING FORCE,
IN THE FIELD.

30 April 1945.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CHRONOLOGICAL SUMMARY OF AIR SUPPORT FROM
D-DAY THROUGH D-PLUS TWENTY FIVE

DOG Day

Including pre-How-Hour strikes, twenty-six missions were flown, and although assessment was difficult, they were in general considered very effective. A total of 606 planes - 354 VF, 67 VB, 170 VT and 15 B-24's (only four of which attacked because of late arrival) - flew 765 sorties dropping 1,558 bombs which weighed 274,500 lbs. (248-500's, 130-250's, and 1180-100's). 104 napalms, of which it is estimated only 50% detonated, and 2254 rockets were also used.

Major Ray Dollins, senior observer of the 5thMarDiv, in a TBM was shot down and killed.

D Plus One

Thirty missions, including two photographic, were flown. A total of 610 planes - 334 VF, 94 VB, and 182 VT - flew 719 sorties dropping 439,120 pounds of explosives (315-500's, 146-250's, 1,076-100's, 2292 rockets, and 68 napalms. Fast carrier task forces augmented CVE strike groups with 203 VF, 93 VB, and 101 VT.

Captain Joseph Cook, 5thMarDiv observer in a VT was shot down but was rescued by a destroyer.

D Plus Two

Including three photographic, thrity missions were flown of which thirteeen were requested by ground units. Some missions were run very close to our troops with excellent results, although adverse weather conditions in the afternoon made close support difficult. A total of 738 planes - 352 VF, 99 VB, and 287 VT - (Fast carrier task forces provided 300 VF, 104 VB, and 167 VT) made 754 sorties dropping 491,620 pounds of explosives (512-500's, 206-250's, 580-100's, 2102 rockets, and 80 napalms).

D Plus Three

Twelve missions, including one photographic, were flown with excellent results before zero visibility halted air support at 1325K. Fast carrier forces furnished all except 39 of the 308 planes, which flew 389 sorties dropping 252,980 pounds of explosives (290-500's, 138-250's, 354-100's, and 448 rockets). 64 napalms were dropped of which only seven were reported to have detonated.

~~SECRET~~

D Plus Four

Availability of aircraft for direct support was materially reduced by the departure of TF 58 for its second attack on JAPAN, and by a full CVE schedule which included special survivor searches, heavy ASP and CAP and strikes against CHICHI JIMA. The resulting lack of aircraft available for direct support forced neglect of many important targets but thirteen missions, including one photographic, were flown by 99 planes which dropped 26,020 pounds of explosives (12-500's, 2-250's, 80-100's, and 192 rockets).

An OS2U crashed behind enemy lines killing the pilot and injuring Captain John A. Friday, Naval Gunfire Spotter. Captain Friday was rescued by a patrol of the 24th Marines.

D Plus Five

Twenty-two missions, including 3 photographic, were flown by 132 CVE planes in 144 sorties. A total of 48,160 pounds of explosives (26-500's, 120-100's, and 386 rockets) was expended.

One TBM carrying Captain Warren Wright, 5thMarDiv observer, was shot down, crashing about 1,000 yards off shore. A destroyer recovered Captain Wright's body.

D Plus Six

Twenty missions, including two photographic, were flown by 162 planes (including 9 B-24's from SAIPAN) in 176 sorties in which 96,100 pounds of explosives (95-500's, 270-100's, and 360 rockets) were expended. The B-24's dropped nine 500's each on an area north of our lines.

For the first time enemy aircraft made no attempts to attack our forces.

D Plus Seven

Between 0730K and 1230K, eleven missions were flown; however, bad weather necessitated canceling the strike schedule for the remainder of the day. 79 planes in 112 sorties dropped 44,960 pounds of explosives (30-500's, 110-100's, and 316 rockets).

Two OY-1's of VMO-4 were launched from the USS WAKE ISLAND and landed on South Field at 1005K. 1stLt. Olson was pilot of the first U. S. aircraft to land on IWO JIMA.

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D Plus Eight

Twenty-two missions, including one photographic, were flown by 182 planes (included 9 B-24's) in 204 sorties. 99,220 pounds of explosives (123-500's, 190-100's and 312 rockets) were expended.

Three OY-1's of VMO-4 landed from the USS SAGINAW BAY and USS MAKIN ISLAND. One OY, the first of Squadron VMO-5 came in from LST 776.

CASCU on USS AUBURN took over direct support control between 0800K and 1300K from CASCU on USS ELDORADO, and ran off a strike every 25 minutes for a total of 12 missions.

Three PBM's, the first of a group of search planes, landed.

D Plus Nine

Twenty-three support missions, including one photographic and the first DDT spraying, were flown by 200 planes in 252 sorties in which 57,800 pounds of explosives (78-500's, 16-250's, 100-100's, and 80 rockets) were dropped. Of 16 napalms dropped, only eight were seen to detonate.

Success of the first air delivery by parachute drop by C-47's from SAIPAN was limited by difficulties experienced in establishing and maintaining air-ground communication.

The remainder of the CVE-borne OY-1 aircraft landed at South Field.

The long range search program was furthered by the arrival of 15 additional PBM aircraft.

D Plus Ten

Twenty-two missions, including two photographic, were flown by 232 planes in 248 sorties in which 79,000 pounds of explosives (72-500's, 36-250's, 120-100's, and 370 rockets) were dropped. Again there was a large percentage of duds among the 28 napalms dropped.

Commander Landing Force Air Support Control Unit No. 1 assumed control of troop support aircraft at 0920K, and retained control for the duration of the operation.

A TBM carrying 1stLt. D. A. Timmer, 3dMarDiv artillery spotter was shot down, crashing behind our lines. There were no survivors.

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Four OY-1 aircraft from LST 776 were flown ashore.

Air delivery from SAIPAN continued with a mail drop.

D Plus Eleven

Twenty-two missions, including one photographic, one DDT spraying and two propaganda drops, were flown by 169 planes in 200 sorties in which 70,760 pounds of explosives (54-500's, 230-100's, and 346 rockets) were expended. Twelve out of 16 napalms ignited, the best percentage of the operation thus far.

Four thousand feet of runway on South Field were declared ready as Seabees continued work on the field under mortar and shell fire.

Another mail drop was made by transports from SAIPAN.

D Plus Twelve

Twenty-two support missions, and two photographic missions were flown by 155 planes in 230 sorties in which 88,260 pounds of explosives (72-500's, 213-100's, and 516 rockets) were expended.

Ten R4D's made parachute drops of critical supplies, chiefly 81mm mortar ammunition, on the airfield; and the first of the evacuation planes, five R4D's and one R5C landed.

D Plus Thirteen

Passage of a cold front with ceilings from zero to 1000 feet and visibility from 1/2 to 4 miles canceled all direct support. Nine transports, however, dropped supplies, and four others landed. Two TBM's sprayed DDT.

A B-29, 1stLt. Malo, pilot, on a return trip from JAPAN made an emergency landing, refueled and after minor repairs took off.

D Plus Fourteen

Close air support resumed with 18 missions, including one photographic, by 175 planes in 254 sorties. A total of 105,280 pounds of explosives (80-500's, 240-100's, and 688 rockets) was expended.

PB4Y search planes began to stage through South Field, and evacuation and supply planes continued to land.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~D Plus Fifteen

LFASCU ran twelve very close support strikes during the day, in addition to one photographic and one DDT mission. 162 planes in 203 sorties dropped 81,200 pounds of explosives (42-500's, 344-100's, and 430 rockets).

An OS2U from the USS SALT LAKE CITY crashed and burned behind our lines. There were no survivors.

The seadrome was discontinued and PBM search planes returned to SAIPAN.

Twenty-eight P-51's and twelve P-61's landed.

BrigGen. Ernest Moore, USAAF, arrived and assumed Island Air Command.

D Plus Sixteen

Although past the point at which close air support normally has been secured in previous operations because of constriction of enemy held territory and consequent proximity of friendly troops and targets, LFASCU delivered ten deliberate, closely-coordinated missions using 119 planes in 147 sorties. 76,060 pounds of explosives were dropped (67-500's, 170-100's, and 426 rockets). Of 40 napalms carried seven failed to release, and of the 33 dropped, seven were duds.

Twelve plane loads of casualties were evacuated in ten hours.

Three PB5-A's landed to commence air-sea rescue operations.

D Plus Seventeen

Despite difficulties imposed by closeness of targets and lack of direct observation, ten support missions were conducted. 122 planes in 160 sorties, dropped 71,280 pounds of explosives (66-500's, 180-100's, and 338 rockets). Of 26 napalms, 16 ignited, eight were duds, and two failed to release. Eight P-51's made an excellent strike on a strafing run.

A TBM carrying Lt. Rice, 5thMarDiv observer, was hit by anti-aircraft fire and made an emergency landing on the field. Lt. Rice suffered a shrapnel wound in the foot.

VMTB 242 landed.

Target CAP was taken over by the P-51's and P-61's.

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Enemy planes entered the area at night but did not attack. One of our night fighters made contact, but was eluded by violent evasive tactics.

D Plus Eighteen

With P-51's augmenting CVE planes, seventeen missions were flown. 141 planes in 172 sorties dropped 59,220 pounds of explosives (35-500's, 20-250's, 192-100's and 292 rockets). The precision low-altitude work of the P-51's was particularly pleasing to the ground troops.

Landing Force Headquarters announced that carrier planes no longer would be required for close support.

A B-29 made an emergency landing on South Field.

D Plus Nineteen

Six support missions were confined to the northern tip of the island, four of these by P-51's which dropped 38-500's, and two by VOF carrying 10 napalms. A seventh mission, flown by the VOF was directed against KANGOKU ROCK.

Five B-29's returning from a 300 plane raid on TOKYO made emergency landings on South Field.

D Plus Twenty

Three very effective missions were flown by a total of 15 P-51's which dropped 15,000 pounds of 500's. Support missions were controlled from radio jeeps, the LFASCU equipment having been secured for movement to another operation.

Air delivery of 1764 rounds of 60mm mortar illuminating ammunition was effected.

D Plus Twenty-One

Two missions were flown by P-51's. Eight planes in each, dropping 16,000 pounds of 500's, succeeded in destroying several installations and uncovering others.

During the day seven B-29's, in difficulty after a strike on NAGOYA, made emergency landings on the field; two B-24's, short of gas after a CHICHI JIMA strike, made night landings.

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D Plus Twenty-Two

No close air support.

A VMO-5 OY-1 carrying a 5thMarDiv artillery observer was shot down in enemy territory. The pilot, 2dLt. Leon Ellsworth, and observer, 2dLt. Guy Raines, were killed.

D Plus Twenty-Three

The last close support strike of the operation was run by five P-51's which dropped fire bombs (gasoline and diesel oil mixture) and strafed ahead of Third Bn, 27th Marines. One photographic mission was flown.


Nine B-29's made safe emergency landings.

D Plus Twenty-Four

A 5thMarDiv observer, Captain William Gillespie, working over enemy territory in a VMO-5 OY-1 was wounded in the foot by anti-aircraft fire.

D Plus Twenty-Five

Organized resistance on IWO JIMA was formally declared to have ceased at 1800K. The center airfield was declared operational.



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U 4-12

HEADQUARTERS A.G. No. 01867

AMPHIBIOUS CORPS LANDING FORCE

- IWO JIMA -

Special Staff Section Reports (Cont'd)

Appendix 4 - Report By Arty Officer (CO 1st Prov FA Group)

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Artillery Report

Appendix 4 to Annex CHARLIE to Special Action Report IWO JIMA Campaign

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0200B

8 May 1945

HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS, C/O FPO, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1st Endorsement to
CO 1st Prov FA Gp's
Special Action Report
IWO JIMA Campaign dtd
18 March 1945.

From: The Commanding General.
To : The Commandant, U. S. Marine Corps.
Via : Operational Chain of Command.
Subject: Special Action Report, IWO JIMA Campaign.

1. Corps Artillery performed efficiently and effectively throughout the operation and necessary control of Divisional Artillery was effected without difficulty through the Commanding Officer, 1st Provisional Field Artillery Group, who served in a staff capacity as Corps Artillery Officer.

2. A feature of the employment of Artillery in the IWO JIMA operation not noted in the report was that the bulk of the Artillery ashore was sited around Airfield No. 1. During the greater portion of the time Artillery was firing continuously (approximately 450,000 rounds fired during operation) at the same time Airfield No. 1 was being used for aircraft operation to capacity. This was also true even after Airfield No. 2 began operating. It is considered remarkable that no friendly planes were hit and that aircraft operations were not impeded by our artillery or vice versa. The method of control employed for the protection of planes taking off or landing was simply to have an individual of the firing unit placed to observe whether any aircraft were in the line of fire and to give warning if that were the case.

3. Several adverse comments concerning the conditions of the beaches and other supply matters were noted in the Supply and Logistics Section of this report. Although the beach conditions were probably not entirely satisfactory to the Corps Artillery, there were many other considerations, and this criticism of other units is considered to have no place in this report and is not concurred in. Also the beaching of vessels is a direct responsibility of the Naval Commander on recommendation of the appropriate troop commander.

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Special Action Report IWO JIMA Campaign.

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4. It is considered that the major lesson learned relative to the employment of artillery capable of destroying enemy fixed installations is the necessity for anticipating such requirements and taking all possible measures to effect such destruction before our front lines are so close as to make firing of heavy calibers impracticable. This can be effected by a more intensive utilization of deep support fires combined with low-level aerial photography to discover such installations before our troops are so close as to prevent the utilization of medium artillery and naval gunfire in the destruction.

H. SCHMIDT.

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APPENDIX 4 TO ANNEX C

TO VAC LanFor

SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

TWO JIMA CAMPAIGN

CORPS ARTILLERY OFFICER'S
REPORT

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DECLASSIFICATION OF WWII RECORDS. NOV 9 '78 *ap*

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HEADQUARTERS,
1ST PROVISIONAL FIELD ARTILLERY GROUP,
FLEET MARINE FORCE, PACIFIC,
C/O FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA.

APPENDIX 4 TO ANNEX CHARLIE TO V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS LANDING
FORCE SPECIAL ACTION REPORT, IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN.

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- (S) Aerial Observer Conduct of Fire Report.
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Headquarters, 1st Provisional
Field Artillery Group,
V Amphibious Corps
Landing Force.
In the Field.
18 March, 1945.

From: The Commanding Officer.
To: The Commanding General, V Amphibious Corps.
Subject: Special Action Report, Iwo Jima Campaign.

References: (a) FMF, Pac Gen Ord #66-44 (Confidential).
(b) Pac Fleet Confidential Letter 1CL 45.
(c) VAC Lan For Spl Ord #2-45.
(d) VAC Lan For Staff Memo #5-45.

Enclosures: (A) Roster of Personnel Participating.
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Howitzer Battalion.
(U) Special Action Report, Commanding Officer, 4th 155mm
Howitzer Battalion.

1. In accordance with instructions contained in references
(a), (b), (c) and (d) a Special Action Report on the Iwo Jima operation
is herewith submitted. The period covered by this report is that from
12 October, 1944 to 16 March, 1945.

Appendix 4 to Annex Charlie to V Amphibious Corps Landing Force Special
Action Report, Iwo Jima.

Corps Artillery Officers Special Action Report, Iwo Jima Campaign.

2. Narrative.

A. Introduction.

The 1st Provisional Field Artillery Group consisting of a Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, the 2nd and 4th 155mm Howitzer Battalions and the 473rd Amphibian Truck Co, USA attached, composed the Corps Artillery under the V Amphibious Corps Landing Force in the subject operation, and was assigned the mission of general support of that Force.

B. Organization and Planning Phase.

1. On 12 October, 1944 Fleet Marine Force, Pacific Special Order #49-44 activated the Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, 1st Provisional Field Artillery Group. Colonel J. S. LETCHER, U.S.M.C. was by the same order designated Commanding Officer of the Group and assumed command the same date. The following table shows attachment and detachment of units to and from this Headquarters during the period covered by the report.

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>ATTACHMENT DATE</u>	<u>DETACHMENT DATE</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
2nd 155mm How Bn	21Oct44*		Hawaii	
4th 155mm How Bn	21Oct44*		Hawaii	
10th 155mm Gun Bn	21Oct44*	Sailed from Hilo for Guam 15Jan45	Hawaii	FMF Pac Secret Dispatch 030439 Jan reverted unit to oper. control FMF up- on arrival Guam
12th 155mm Gun Bn	21Oct44*	"	Hawaii	" " " "
Rear Echelon, 5th 155mm How Bn	21Oct44*	Sailed from Hilo for Guam 16Dec44	Hawaii	" " " "
Rear Echelon, 11th 155mm Gun Bn	21Oct44*	"	Hawaii	" " " "
Rear Echelon, Hqtrs Btry, Corps Arty, VAC	21Oct44*	"	Hawaii	Reverted unit to operational control VAC by same dispatch. VAC Lan For G.C. #5-45 trans. to Garrison Force Iwo Jima.
473rd Amph Truck Co.	1Dec44	11Mar45	Hawaii	

* Authority Fleet Marine Force, Pacific Special Order #60-44.

Corps Artillery Officer's Special Action Report, Iwo Jima Campaign.

2. The Commanding Officer was designated Corps Artillery Officer for the V Amphibious Corps Landing Force on 21 October, 1944 and was ordered to report to the Commanding General, V Amphibious Corps for duty. He was at that time given the Mission of the 1st Provisional Field Artillery Group and the decision was announced that the Corps Artillery was to be composed of two 155mm Howitzer Battalions, the 2nd and 4th. This on 9 November, 1944 was confirmed by V Amphibious Corps in writing. The first readiness and mounting out date was set at or about 17 December, 1944. In view of this, immediate action was required in the organizing, equipping, and training of a Headquarters Battery for the Group. Further the task of molding the two separate battalions and the Headquarters into a smoothly functioning unit both operationally and administratively was demanded.

3. After a very brief study of the personnel needs for a Headquarters Battery performing both Group and Corps Artillery Headquarters functions it was evident that the Table of Organization as set forth in enclosure (A) to Fleet Marine Force, Pacific Special Order # 49-44, (10) Officers and (78) enlisted did not provide an adequate allotment of personnel to meet the requirements. The dual missions assigned the Group Headquarters made it manifest that additional Officers and men would have to be assigned the Headquarters in order for it to function in both capacities.

4. To arrive at the number of additional personnel required for this, it was necessary to make a study of certain conditions affecting the employment of Corps Artillery against Iwo Jima. First, there would be no displacements of either Corps or Divisional Artillery during the operation. Telephone lines to divisional artillery regiments and to Corps Artillery Battalions would be comparatively short. Batteries would be only approximately a half mile from the point where the ammunition would be landed on the beach. If the operation progressed as expected after the initial landing, it would be of short duration. Furthermore, the fact that all personnel required to form the Group Headquarters and to make any additions thereto would have to be taken from units of Corps Artillery, which were already understrength, acted to limit to the barest minimum the personnel assigned to the Group Headquarters. After all of the above considerations it was decided that fourteen (14) Officers and one hundred and fifteen (115) enlisted men would be required. Enclosure (O) sets forth the tentative Table of Organization as modified and submitted by this Headquarters for approval of Fleet Marine Force, Pacific. Accordingly on 1 November, 1944, these Officers and men were taken upon verbal authority G-1, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific from the units of Corps Artillery then present at Camp Tarawa, Hawaii (paragraph 1 above). The major portion coming from the 10th and 12th 155mm Gun Battalions. In addition, and after the formation of the Group Headquarters, the 2nd and 4th 155mm Howitzer Battalions were brought

Appendix 4 to Annex Charlie to V Amphibious Corps Landing Force, Special
Action Report, Iwo Jima.

Corps Artillery Officer's Special Action Report, Iwo Jima Campaign.

to full strength by transferring to them the necessary commissioned and enlisted personnel from those same units.

5. It can readily be seen from paragraph 1 above that during the major portion of the planning and training phase there was an added administrative burden upon the 1st Provisional Field Artillery Group in connection with the other Corps Artillery units present. Fleet Marine Force, Pacific General Order #50-44 was published on 18 November, 1944 designating 1st Provisional Field Artillery Group Headquarters and all attached units as Fleet Marine Force units and helped considerably to clarify administrative functions of this Headquarters.

6. Prior to the return of the Commanding Officer from Pearl Harbor on or about 25 October, the tentative draft of the artillery annex to the Corps Operation Plan was submitted. With minor changes this was approved as Annex FOX to Corps Operation Plan # 3-44. Based upon a study of all available intelligence data the following facts were noted:

- (a) Absence of reefs.
- (b) Excellent beaches suitable for all types of landing craft.
- (c) Limited exits from beaches.
- (d) Extremely limited position areas for artillery contemplated to be employed.
- (e) Absence of natural water supply for drinking and materiel maintenance.
- (f) Condition of soil in position areas making easy digging possible.
- (g) In view of enemy capabilities the necessity for great quantities of sandbags.
- (h) Lack of tall vegetation requiring artificial means of placing wire lines overhead.
- (i) Short supply hauls.
- (j) Short Communication lines.
- (k) Foreseeing extreme congestion and needs for strict sanitation measures.
- (l) Extremely short base for flash ranging from only satisfactory OP's on Mt. Suribachi.
- (m) Minimum temperatures of 45 degrees F.
- (n) Maximum range required 7,5000 yards.

Battalion Commanders and key staff personnel at Hawaii immediately embarked upon a study of the prospective target and the problems confronting them in conjunction therewith. On or about 1 December, 1944 the Commanding General, V Amphibious Corps by dispatch set back the amounting out date to mid-January, 1945. By 26 December, 1944, all plans and orders had been materialized and were ready for distribution.

Corps Artillery Officer's Special Action Report, Iwo Jima Campaign.

D-Day was now set for 19 February, 1945. While engaged in the planning phase the wealth of information made available to the organization by the intelligence section of the 5th Marine Division at Hawaii proved to be a considerable aid.

C. Training Phase.

1. The period of time available for training the Corps Artillery for the Iwo Jima operation was extremely short. At the commencement of the period equipment shortages particularly in the Headquarters Battery, seriously handicapped these activities. There was one fact which operated in favor of the standard of training strived for. Both Battalions had seen previous combat of a most recent nature. The 2nd participated in the Solomons, Gilbert and Marianas campaigns while the 4th had the Marshalls and Marianas to their credit. In view of the above it was decided to channelize training and emphasize the aspects that were felt to be of prime importance in the forthcoming operation. These were (1) Fire Direction in which stress was laid on rapid and accurate FDC procedure both in Battalion and Group to the ultimate end of efficient delivery of Group massed fire at any point on the Corps front, (2) Survey, (3) Gunnery with emphasis on securing highest possible efficiency and accuracy in firing Batteries, (4) OP and air observer conduct of fire with emphasis on rapid and accurate registration by precision methods, (5) Communication procedures to include effects of enemy jamming on radio circuits, (6) Flash ranging both short base (250 to 400 yards) and long base methods. A great deal of work was done in flash ranging with conditions paralleling those which would be obtained if OP's were established on Mt. Suribachi. This work was done under direct supervision of the Group 2 and satisfactory results were obtained with a base of 250 yards or better, (7) Training in defense against an enemy infantry and mechanized breakthrough.

In the furtherance of this training program two units of fire were made available and on or about 1 November, 1944 intensive training was begun. Numerous Battalion firing exercises, three Group firing exercises, one combined service practice with the 13th Marines, one Group CPX and one 48 hour continuous flash ranging exercise were conducted. During these periods the fires of the Battalions and the Group were successfully massed and at the conclusion of the period the state of training in all respects was excellent. Also during this period, Administrative, Intelligence, Fire Direction and Survey SOP's were prepared and published. Artillery regiments of 3rd, 4th and 5th Marine Divisions were placed on distribution list of any such material which would be of interest or concern to them in the prospective operation.

Appendix 4 to Annex Charlie to V Amphibious Corps Landing Force Special
Action Report, Iwo Jima.

Corps Artillery Officer's Special Action Report, Iwo Jima Campaign.

D. Equipping Units.

1. At the time of activation of the Group Headquarters Battery there was no Table of Allowances in existence for such a unit, and one of the first tasks before the newly formed staff of Group Headquarters was the outlining of a Provisional Table of Allowances. This action was immediately taken and AAA priority requisitions were submitted on that basis. In order to immediately provide transportation and other items of equipment vital to the launching of the intensive training program outlined, stocks of all Corps Artillery Battalions present at Hawaii were tapped.

2. The primary function of the Group 4 initially was that of insuring the expeditious equipping and supplying of the Headquarters and Headquarters Battery. But with the presence of the other Corps Artillery units, whose efforts at continuance of training coupled with their prospective departure for Guam prior to or coincident with that of 1st Provisional Field Artillery Group Units soon made it mandatory for the 4 section in Group to exercise coordination of ammunition supply, procurement functions, loading plans and movement in connection with mounting out of these units.

3. Headquarters Supply Service, Pearl Harbor, took prompt action on requisitions submitted 2 November, 1944 for the equipping of Headquarters and Headquarters Battery and commencing the latter part of November, 1944 material and supplies began to flow in. By the latter part of December, 1944 Headquarters Battery was 95% equipped while the two Howitzer Battalions were up to 98%. The few remaining items were secured by emergency air delivery and prior to departure on the operation there was no critical item lacking. For transportation, and supplies authorized for the operation see enclosures (H) & (R) respectively.

E. Mounting.

1. Early in December, 1944 the allotment of shipping for the 1st Provisional Field Artillery Group in the coming operation was announced. UP&T tables having previously been submitted. Six (6) LST's were assigned and enumerated by serial numbers, later materialized as LST 760, 779, 784, 788, 724 and 808. The plan evolved and executed in lifting the 1st Provisional Field Artillery Group was as follows: A firing battery on each ship, the first group of three ships being assigned to the 2nd Battalion and the second group of three to the 4th. Headquarters & Service Battery of the 2nd was split between 779 and 784 and in the 4th between 724 and 808. Group Headquarters Battery was split between 760 and 788. Information was received that the last group of three LST's were not scheduled to arrive at the target until D plus 1. Accordingly Group Headquarters & Headquarters Battery was broken down so that the Group Executive with staff section

Corps Artillery Officer's Special Action Report, Iwo Jima Campaign.

heads of the 2, 3 and 4 sections plus Communication Officer and Surgeon and sufficient key personnel to operate ashore were mounted in 760 to cover a possible landing on D-Day. Of the 50 DUKWS comprising the 473rd Amphibian Truck Co, USA, 8 were available to the Group for reconnaissance and were assigned 3 to each battalion and two to Headquarters. The remaining 42 were preloaded with infantry supplies to be landed on call. Having reached a decision on the general plan of loading, detailed plans were drawn up under the supervision of the Group 4, reproduced and distributed to all loading officers and Corps Transport Quartermaster. Responsibility for execution of same was placed on the firing battery loading officer for each ship. See enclosure (N) for loading plans.

2. The following table outlines the personnel embarkation by strength:

Ship	Unit	Officer			Enlisted		
		Marine	Navy	Army	Marine	Navy	Army
LST 760	Hq&HqBtry, 1st Prov FAGrp	9	2	0	57	3	0
LST 760	H&SBtry, 2nd 155mm How Bn.	0	0	0	0	2	0
LST 760	"A" Btry, 2nd 155mm How Bn.	7	0	0	150	0	0
LST 760	473rd Amphibian Truck Co.	0	0	1	0	0	27
LST 779	H&SBtry, 2nd 155mm How Bn.	5	0	0	66	4	0
LST 779	"C" Btry, 2nd 155mm How Bn.	5	0	0	138	0	0
LST 779	473rd Amphibian Truck Co.	0	0	1	0	0	25
LST 784	H&SBtry, 2nd 155mm How Bn.	7	1	0	62	4	0
LST 784	"B" Btry, 2nd 155mm How Bn.	6	0	0	149	0	0
LST 784	473rd Amphibian Truck Co.	0	0	1	0	0	23
LST 788	Hq&HqBtry, 1st Prov FAGrp.	4	0	0	56	1	0
LST 788	H&SBtry, 4th 155mm How Bn.	0	0	0	0	2	0
LST 788	"C" Btry, 4th 155mm How Bn.	5	0	0	141	0	0
LST 788	473rd Amphibian Truck Co.	0	0	1	0	0	35
LST 724	H&SBtry, 4th 155mm How Bn.	6	1	0	68	3	0
LST 724	"B" Btry, 4th 155mm How Bn.	7	0	0	136*	0	0
LST 724	473rd Amphibian Truck Co.	0	0	0	0	0	26
LST 808	H&SBtry, 4th 155mm How Bn.	7	0	0	70	5	0
LST 808	"A" Btry, 4th 155mm How Bn.	6	0	0	143	0	0
LST 808	473rd Amphibian Truck Co.	0	0	1	0	0	27
USS Auburn	Hq&HqBtry, 1st Prov FAGrp.	1	0	0	0	0	0
USS Saginaw Bay	Hq&HqBtry, 1st Prov FAGrp	1	0	0	0	0	0
USS Saginaw Bay	2nd 155mm How Bn.	1	0	0	0	0	0
USS Saginaw Bay	4th 155mm How Bn.	1	0	0	0	0	0
USS Wake Island	2nd 155mm How Bn.	1	0	0	0	0	0
USS Wake Island	4th 155mm How Bn.	1	0	0	0	0	0
LST 399	2nd 155mm How Bn.	1	0	0	3	0	0
USS Hendry	4th 155mm How Bn.	1	0	0	2	0	0
PA 66	473rd Amphibian Truck Co.	0	0	1	0	0	12
TOTALS.		82	4	6	1241	24	175

* 1 Enlisted man removed at Guam due to sickness.

Appendix 4 to Annex Charlie to V Amphibious Corps Landing Force Special
Action Report, Iwo Jima.

ARMED FORCES STAFF COLLEGE

Corps Artillery Officer's Special Action Report, Iwo Jima Campaign.

See Enclosure (A) for complete roster of personnel embarked and landed. Of all personnel embarked only one man did not reach the beach of Iwo Jima.

3. In order to expedite the lifting of this organization at Hilo, on or about 27 November, 1944 camp areas and a large outdoor storage area were procured there. Each unit including those to be mounted for Guam was allotted a space in this area. Those supplies arriving at Hilo by water, rations, fuel, ammunition, sandbags, telephone poles, water containers, etc., and which were not needed in the training camp were divided and placed in unit storage areas. As rapidly as organizational equipment could be released from the training camp it was also moved to the storage area. Prior to the arrival of the LST's at Hilo 7 units of artillery ammunition were preloaded on the tank decks to a height of 32 inches. An Officer representative from each Battalion was sent to Pearl Harbor to observe this loading in order to be thoroughly familiar with the disposition of the ammunition components in the ships. Of the ammunition components only the shells were palletized.

4. On 6 January, 1945 the first LST, 780, beached at Hilo. Before loading could commence, supplies for the 42 DUKW preloads had to be unloaded. The same was true in the 779 when it beached 2 days later. Loading then proceeded satisfactorily and by 1830, 10 January, 1945, all 3 LST's of the first group were loaded and under way for the rehearsal area. The average overall loading time for each ship was 30 hours. The second group of 3 LST's lifting the remaining part of Headquarters & Headquarters Battery and the 4th Battalion commenced loading on 20 January and were ready for sea mid day on the 21st. Average loading time 18 hours. The 4th Battalion did not participate in the rehearsal off Maui, T.H.

5. Prior to departure of the first half of the Group on 7 January, 1945, a group order was published temporarily attaching the rear echelon of Headquarters & Headquarters Battery, 1st Provisional Field Artillery Group to the rear echelon of 2nd 155mm Howitzer Battalion. 1st Lieutenant Paul A. Winn was designated Commanding Officer, rear echelon, of the Group and instructions pertaining to his duties and administrative functions in connection therewith were issued. On 10 January, 1945 the Commanding Officer embarked on the USS Auburn as Corps Artillery Officer with Commanding General, Landing Force, at Pearl Harbor and sailed for the rehearsal. By the latter part of December a liaison team each from 2nd and 4th Battalions had reported to the 5th and 4th Division Artillery Regiments respectively to remain with them throughout the remaining phases of the operation. The aerial observers, two from each Battalion and one from 1st Provisional Field Artillery Group, departed Hawaii on 15 January, 1945 for Ulithi where one from each battalion and one from the 1st Provisional Field Artillery Group embarked 4 February, 1945 on the USS Saginaw Bay. The remaining two embarked 9 February, 1945 on the USS Wake Island.

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F. Rehearsal and Transit.

1. The first rehearsal for the Iwo Jima operation took place off Maui, T.H. and was conducted during the period 12 to 17 January, inclusive. That part of Group Headquarters embarked with the 2nd 155mm Howitzer Battalion, the 2nd 155mm Howitzer Battalion and 1/2 of the 473rd Amphibian Truck Co., USA, were the only elements of the 1st Provisional Field Artillery Group to participate in this rehearsal. The only operations performed in the rehearsal by the Group was that of establishing and testing those primary radio circuits which would open at H minus 4 on D-Day. Satisfactory results were obtained. No equipment was landed. Neither were any Dukws launched, this action taken because of possible corrosion and deterioration of preloaded ammunition resulting from the drainage off the Dukws upon reembarking above the cargo. The LST's were not beached due to the existence of a reef off the landing beaches. Upon completion of the rehearsal, Tractor Group Charlie, of which LST's 760, 779 and 784 were a part, sailed for Kaneohe Bay, Oahu.

2. From 18 to 22 January the above group remained at anchor and all hands were able to get one shore liberty, with additional periods of recreation at Kaneohe Air Station. Beer and coca-cola were provided in satisfactory quantities during the organized recreation periods. Movies and sports were other added diversions. On 22 January Tractor Group Charlie sailed from Kaneohe, arrived at Eniwetok 3 February, departed 5 February and arrived at Saipan 10 February, departed 15 February and arrived at Iwo Jima 19 February.

3. LST's 724, 788 and 808 arrived at Pearl Harbor 23 January, departed 24 January, arrived at Eniwetok 6 February, departed 8 February, arrived at Guam 13 February, departed 16 February, arrived at Iwo Jima 20 February. From the above it can be seen that the two parts of the 1st Provisional Field Artillery Group sailed with different task groups. At all staging points in the voyage mail was received and distributed. This event was highly beneficial to the morale of the troops. All outgoing mail was turned over to the custody of the Fleet Post Office at Saipan and Guam in accordance with orders received from Commanding General, Landing Force, to be held there until released by dispatch from same authority some time after D-Day.

4. A second rehearsal was held off Saipan during the period 12-13 February. LST's did not participate but again it was possible to recheck communication channels. At this time certain liaison and communication personnel, one officer and two enlisted, members of the Corps Artillery Officer's party which had originally embarked on LST 760 were transferred to the USS Auburn.

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5. Commencing two days out from Pearl Harbor and continuing until D-Day every effort was bent toward thorough indoctrination of all personnel in all available information concerning the coming operation. Schools in computation, on flash range work, FDC procedure, first aid, sanitation and other pertinent subjects were held.

6. On 18 February, 1945, the following message from the Commanding Officer was read to all officers and men:

"This operation for the landing on and capture of the island of Iwo Jima will be perhaps the most difficult and dangerous operation which the Marine Corps has ever been engaged in. We will be victorious if each man does his duty to the utmost of his ability. Let every man's conduct be such that his country and his family will not be ashamed of him and that in after years he will always recall with pride the manner in which he conducted himself at Iwo Jima.

Good Luck and Good Shooting.

J. S. LETCHER."

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G. Assault Phase.

1. Early in the morning of 19 February, 1945 Tractor Group Charlie moved into position off the Island of Iwo Jima. Transfer of the remaining member, the Liaison Officer, for the Corps Artillery officers party to the USS Auburn was immediately accomplished. Radio communication on all channels required in pre-landing phase was established. No unit of Corps Artillery was landed this date. By 1800 all of 13th Marines were in position on the beachhead.

2. The following day the occupation of positions of the 14th Marines was completed and indications were that some of Corps Artillery units might be landed. The LST's 724, 788 and 808 in which the 4th Howitzer Battalion was embarked arrived in the transport area by 0900, and that unit checked into the required radio nets immediately. At about 1530 the preloaded DUKWS of the 473rd Amphibian Truck Company embarked on LST's 760, 779 and 784 were ordered into Yellow 1 beach. Orders to land Charlie Battery of the 2nd 155mm Howitzer Battalion on Red 2 and attaching same to 13th Marines came at 1600. That battery, embarked in LST 779, was in position laid and ready to fire under control of 4th Battalion 13th Marines with 1400 projectiles and 700 powder charges on hand at 1830. Reports from the beach, and conditions thereon, indicated that the problems of handling heavy equipment over it would be difficult. LST 779 during unloading operations of this night was hit by mortar fire, caught fire and retracted. On order from its Captain all 80-Octane gasoline (40 drums) was jettisoned.

3. Upon orders from Corps Artillery Officer reconnaissance elements of Group Headquarters (Group Executive, Group 2, Group 3, Group 4, Communication Officer and Survey Officer with small enlisted party) and 2nd 155mm Howitzer Battalion landed on the north end of Red 1 at 0740 and 0920 respectively 21 February, 1945. First glance showed wreckage, debris, miscellaneous equipment and extreme congestion on the entire beach. Bulldozers and tractors would be necessary to move all equipment up through the volcanic ash and sand to the high ground. To add to these problems was the intermittent falling of enemy mortar and artillery fire in the area. The Group 4 with radio communication was stationed on the beach to make necessary contacts and arrange clearances with the shore party commander and beachmaster. The tentative plan prior to disembarking of reconnaissance parties that morning had been to beach the 2nd Battalion LST's at 0900 and 4th Battalion LST's at 1100. This plan, however, never materialized that day. The only satisfactory exit for Corps Artillery from beach Red 1 or 2 was at the north end of Red 1 and all traffic to and from the beach was using this road.

4. The Group reconnaissance party, less Group 4, proceeded to the 13th Marines FDC, checked available position areas, obtained initial survey data and then selected on the ground a tentative position area for both the 2nd and 4th Battalions and a Group CP area

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(147 I). A rendezvous point at the road junction in target area 147 FG had previously been designated for the meeting of all parties. Accordingly the Group Executive met the 2nd Battalion reconnaissance party at the appointed place at 1000, issued the latest intelligence information allotted a position area and informed him of the probably delay in the beaching of LST's.

5. During the reconnaissance of the C.P. area one key Non-Commissioned Officer in the operations section of the Group was killed by Jap rifle fire from a bypassed blockhouse in that area. Due to difficult and congested beach conditions no further elements of Corps Artillery landed until 22 February. The period was spent extending survey control and installing what communications were possible with the limited equipment ashore. The excellent cooperation and consideration extended Group by the 13th Marines in providing local security and much needed items of equipment for initial establishment of this organization's CP pending arrival of LST's is a subject worthy of the fullest expression of gratitude.

6. Early on 22 February additional key personnel and communication equipment for Group Headquarters were ordered in by small boat from LST's 760 and 788. However, personnel from the latter LST was never permitted to disembark prior to the beaching of the 788. After several requests from, or passed through, the shore party commander on the 5th Division beaches, LST 760 with Able Battery of the 2nd 155mm Howitzer Battalion and one-half Group Headquarters was cleared and beached on Green 1. This at 1530. Able Battery, also attached to the 13th Marines, was in position and ready to fire at 1900. In view of delays and speculation as to when remaining Corps Artillery LST's would beach, a position area tentatively selected for one battery of the 2nd 155mm Howitzer Battalion had to be released to the 13th Marines who were now hard pressed to displace one battalion out of the congested beach area.

7. At 0920 on 23 February, 1945 the 4th 155mm Howitzer Battalion reconnaissance party reported in to the Group FDC. Their position area was assigned and all available information on intelligence survey and logistics was issued. LST's 788, 808 and 779 (for the second time) beached on Green 1 during this date and unloading proceeded satisfactorily. Both Battalions had accomplished on A.O. registration and at 1600 Group Headquarters took control, on authority from Commanding General, V Amphibious Corps, of all Corps Artillery ashore. By the same order Able and Charlie Batteries, 2nd Battalion, were detached from the 13th Marines and Corps Artillery status then became that of general support of V Amphibious Corps Landing Force. The 2nd and 4th 155mm Howitzer Battalions each had two batteries in position and ready to fire at that time, with approximately 3000 rounds of ammunition in the Group. By 1800 all of Group Headquarters personnel

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and equipment was ashore. At 1830 an advance reconnaissance party from the 12th Marines reported to the Group FDC. Possible position areas were indicated. Late in the afternoon of the 23rd the first OP on Mt. Suribachi was established by Charlie Battery of the 2nd 155mm Howitzer Battalion. Casualties in Corps Artillery to date, including those of 473rd Amphibian Truck Company, were 1 Officer missing in action, 3 enlisted men killed, 9 enlisted men wounded in action and 2 enlisted men missing in action.

8. Harassing missions were fired during the night of 23 February, 1945 and on 24 February a 30 minute preparation for the 4th and 5th Divisions was delivered from 0845 to 0915. The punch and effect of the massed fires of the medium artillery was immediately noted and from here on requests for Corps fires never ceased. Eleven Group missions and forty Battalion missions during the period 1800 23 February to 1800 24 February were fired. One Group mission caught two enemy batteries in the act of displacing and weapons and personnel were destroyed. This day LST 784 (which up to this time had been working on a damaged screw) and LST 724 beached on Red 1 and Green 1 respectively. From this time on the unloading operations smoothed out considerably and by 1600 all batteries of Corps Artillery were in position and firing. Average elapsed unloading time per LST was 3 1/2 hours (All six LST's were 100% unloaded 1800, 26 February, 1945). DUKWS of the 473rd Amphibian Truck Company were utilized both in unloading ships while beached and afloat. The Corps Artillery Officer had arrived at the Corps C.P. ashore at approximately 1500 and wire communication with him was immediately established. At 1200 this date the two Corps Artillery flash range OP's on Mt. Suribachi were manned by 2nd 155mm Howitzer Battalion parties and ready for flash range work, survey having already been completed on same. The timely occupation of these OP's produced immediate and excellent results, for that same night, 24 February, the Japs opened with medium caliber counterbattery fire and worked the Corps Artillery area over. One Howitzer of the 2nd 155mm Howitzer Battalion was knocked out while the 4th 155mm Howitzer Battalion suffered damage to two tractors. Two periods of shelling, one of 45 minutes early in the evening and one of about 2 1/2 hours in the early hours of the 25th, were experienced and each time, with flash cuts and surveillance, were fired upon until silenced.

9. Early the morning of the 25th a Liaison party from the 4th 155mm Howitzer Battalion was sent to the 12th Marines C.P. as Group liaison. For the attack of the 3rd Marine Division this date a battalion each from the 13th and 14th Marines was placed under 12th Marines control. That regiment was experiencing transportation difficulties in getting its materiel ashore, and as of 1530, 27 February, had its regimental Headquarters, 1st and 2nd Battalions complete, but

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only 5 guns in the 3rd and 2 in the 4th ashore. The last piece of the regiment was finally in position at 0900 1 March.

10. During the period 23 February to 1 March the firing activity of Corps Artillery was at its peak. There was sufficient ammunition then on hand to answer all calls with very light restrictions. The records on the evening of 25 February showed 16,800 rounds in battery dumps. The first ammunition resupply began arriving in position areas on the morning of 27 February. The major portion of all missions accomplished was counterbattery. The record day was 26-27 February in which 5,652 rounds were expended on 6 group missions and 62 Battalion missions. Each night harrassing missions were executed on the Corps front, a preparation was fired for the general King hour attack the next day and the remainder of the periods were devoted to counterbattery fires of guns, rockets, mortars, destruction fires on pillboxes, blockhouses, emplacements and neutralization and reinforcing fires for the light regiments. The Corps Artillery air observers operated from carriers until 1530 on 1 March at which time flights were commenced from airfield # 1.

11. The night of 28 February-1 March enemy artiller showed more than usual activity, commencing at 2400. Flash base locati showed new enemy positions indicating that our previous counterbattery fire had forced his displacement. At 0200 enemy fire scored a hit in the 5th Division ammunition dump approximately 100 yards from the Group FDC. At 0430 a direct hit by a 75 or 105 was sustained on the FDC temporarily disrupting communications. No casualties to personnel were received in the headquarters. However 90% of the wire in the Group dump was destroyed by fire. By 0525 the FDC was back in operation. From this and previous shellings it was evident that the enemy had good knowledge of Corps Artillery locations. But, since the ground afforded easy digging, the positions were well protected and the only problems to confront the artillery was maintainance of wire lines. Each shelling invariably caught the OP lines, Corps Headquarters lines and frequently Battalion and Divisional Artillery lines.

12. March 1, 2, 3 and 4 normal missions continued. Limitations on ammunition expenditure had to be imposed due to the re-supply flow not equalling or approaching that of demand. 3 March showed a definite decrease of enemy artillery activity particularly on our rear areas. On 5 March no preparation was required since a re-organization for a final push on the 6th was ordered. Plans were prepared for a TOT preparation the morning of 6 March in which 11 battalions including the two Corps battalions were to participate. It was fired in two phases: the first commencing 0750 to 0821 in front of 5th and 3rd Divisions and the second 0845 to 0921 across 3rd and 4th Divisions front. Corps Artillery fired 2,500 rounds and Division

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Artilleries expended a total of 20,000 rounds of 75 and 105 in this preparation. The infantry were unable to make any appreciable gains following this preparation. The enemy was holding virtually a fortress position composed of a series of mutually supporting blockhouses, pillboxes and caves interconnected by an elaborate system of communication trenches. In the midst of the preparation the Japs fired a counter-preparation with mortars and artillery.

14. From 7 to 11 March normal missions were fired but the number and type of Corps Artillery targets became more and more restricted. At 0030, 11 March enemy artillery renewed efforts to damage friendly artillery. His locations were immediately picked up, but except for one, were found to be too close to the front lines for Corps mission. A Group TOT was fired on the one which was within safe limits and silent. On the morning of the 11th another major preparation of 12 battalions this time under control of the 13th Marines, was fired on the 5th Division front. After 11 March the missions of Corps Artillery became almost entirely of a harassing nature. Effective 1600, 11 March the 473rd Amphibian Truck Company was detached and ordered to the island Command.

15. On 7 March, 1945, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific Special Order # 52-45 was received directing the transfer of 155mm Howitz material and certain personnel of the 2nd 155mm Howitzer Battalion and the 4th 155mm Howitzer Battalion to the 5th Marine Division and 4th Marine Division respectively upon completion of the Iwo Jima operation. The 4th 155mm Howitzer Battalion closed station and commenced effecting the above transfer at 1800, 14 March. The same day the 14th Marines secured and began reembarkation operations. At 1200, 15 March orders were received from Commanding General, V Amphibious Corps effective 1800 same date that functions of Corps Artillery Headquarters passed to Headquarters, 2nd 155mm Howitzer Battalion and to commence preparation for reembarkation of Headquarters & Headquarters Battery, 1st Provisional Field Artillery Group and 4th 155mm Howitzer Battalion aboard the S.S. Sea Runner for transportation to new base. At 1200, 16 March the 2nd 155mm Howitzer Battalion received orders to commence effecting the material and personnel transfer to the 5th Marine Division, and further, to prepare for reembarkation. Iwo Jima was announced secured at 1800, 16 March, 1945. The 2nd 155mm Howitzer Battalion embarked in the S.S. Santa Isabel and sailed with the other elements of 1st Provisional Field Artillery Group at 1000, 18 March, 1945.

16. To briefly summarize the activities of the 1st Provisional Field Artillery Group during the assault phase the following facts are enumerated. The first element of the Group (less 473rd Amphibian Truck Company) landed on Iwo Jima at 1620, 21 February, all communications were in and all weapons emplaced at 1600, 24 February. From 1600, 23 February when Group took control until 1800, 15 March, a period

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of 20 days, the mission of the 1st Provisional Field Artillery Group remained that of general support of the V Amphibious Corps Landing Force. Position areas remained unchanged throughout the operation. During the entire period Group Headquarters performed the functions of Corps Artillery Headquarters. Ammunition expenditures of all artillery units were: 1st Provisional Field Artillery Group 43795 rounds 155, 14th Marines 156598 rounds 75 and 105, 12th Marines, as of 14 March, 109441 rounds of 75 and 105, 13th Marines, as of 16 March, 129962 rounds of 75 and 105. Results of Corps Artillery fires are found under paragraph 3 E (5), page 27 of this report.

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3. Discussion, Comments and Recommendations.

A. Intelligence.

1. Observation.

a. Ground.

Mt. Suribachi provided the only satisfactory ground observation for Corps Artillery fires. A 182 yard flash base was established there and maintained until the island was secured. Due to the nature of the terrain, the O.P.'s established in the forward areas by the Division Artilleries were never able to observe more than 1000 yards beyond the front lines. Such observation was not suitable for deep supporting fires and therefore no other Corps Artillery O.P.'s were established. When close fires were requested surveillance on same was obtained by Division Artillery observers.

Results obtained from the flash base were most encouraging. Observer Right and Observer Left were intervisible and consequently could be oriented directly with the O-3200 m line running from Observer Right to Observer Left; azimuth of this line was 5641.5 m. Each O.P. was equipped with an azimuth instrument, stop watch, an SCR 610 and a telephone. The O.P. teams were under direct control of the Group-2 section at the flash central. Radio communication was constantly ready to replace wire. Frequently within 3 minutes from the time both O.P.'s obtained an A reading on enemy flashes the final plot was dispatched to the FDC. Often previous API information confirmed these plots. Results of the fire for effect were obtained by flash cuts on the left most burst of the concentration. An O.P. on Kama or Kangoku Rock would have provided fair observation for one end of a long base with the other on Mt. Suribachi, but the rocks were not secured until very late in the campaign.

Observation difficulties were ever present with the smoke, dust and fires over the front. Frequently the Japs started fires behind or in front of their gun positions prior to opening fire in order to hinder friendly observation. Wire communication problems were continuously present due to enemy shelling. Camouflage of enemy positions was superb, thereby making detection doubly difficult. The practice of firing but a few rounds at a time and then removing weapons into caves and enclosures was an effective trick employed by the Japs.

Examination of records show that flash base operations obtained accurate location of 50% of all active enemy artillery of a calibre larger than 70mm. Had the Corps Artillery been equipped with sound ranging material to supplement and confirm flash operations the enemy would rarely have escaped retribution. Division Artillery

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lery intelligence worked very closely with that of the Corps Artillery, however, and interchange of all information, including that from Dodar plot, by artillery regiments enabled timely and effective fires to be delivered on the major portion of enemy artillery. See enclosure (M) to this report for observation and sound posts.

b. Air.

Aerial observation was indispensable in this operation. Without it many targets would have remained undetected and very few observed fire missions would have been possible. Aerial observers were employed for all types of fire missions including registrations adjusted time K and precision adjustments. Because of positions on reverse slopes, and masks interfering with artillery fire a goodly number of targets located could not be subjected to effective artillery fire.

Observers were artillerymen trained in aerial observation and aerial free gunnery under the supervision of the Group Air Liaison Officer, who selected four (4) observers for this operation.

Missions were flown from carriers from 1400, 22 Feb. to 1800, 23 Feb. A TBM-3 was used on these flights; missions averaged 4.5 hours each; altitude over the target area varied from 800-2000 feet, and only light inaccurate AA fire was encountered. It was found necessary to descend to 300 feet over a target to identify an active installation.

Aerial Observers began operations from airfield number 1 at 1530, 1 March. Until 1230, 13 March, OY planes were used; at that time, due to the loss of a 5th Division OY plane, a TBM was made available to Corps Artillery. Flights with the OY plane averaged 1.8 hours; altitude from 800-2000 feet; no AA fire was encountered. When deemed safe, single passes as low as 100 feet were made to identify objects in caves and other well camouflaged positions.

After 1 March, when aerial observers became land based, a detailed intelligence report was submitted daily to the Group-2. Vital items of intelligence were reported at once to the Group-2.

For results of firing by air observers in operation, see enclosure (S), Aerial Observer Conduct of Fire Report.

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2. Maps and Photographs.

The following maps and photos were issued to this organization for the operation:

Special Air and Gunnery Target Maps, IWO JIMA, with Target Area Grid, scale 1/5000, 1/10000, 1/20000.

Special Terrain Maps, IWO JIMA, without Target Area Grid, scale 1/10000, 1/20000.

Special Air and Gunnery Target Map, IWO JIMA, scale two (2) inches equals one (1) nautical mile.

Special Aerial Mosaic, IWO JIMA, scale 1/10000, without Target Area Grid.

Special Aerial Mosaic, IWO JIMA, scale 1/5000, with Target Area Grid.

Relief Map, IWO JIMA, scale 1/7000.

Rubber Relief Map, IWO JIMA, horizontal scale 1/5000.

Beach Diagrams Southeastern and Southwestern beaches, IWO JIMA, from photographs 4 July 1944.

G-2 Special Study, IWO JIMA, VAC.

Photographs:

Vertical overlapping strips, high and low level obliques suitable for stereo study.

3. Enemy Artillery Action and Effectiveness.

For enemy artillery action and effectiveness, see enclosure (C). That, however, can not possibly be 100% complete for the operation as a whole. The landing beaches and the area occupied by the 14th Marines were continually harassed and because limited space prevented adequate dispersion of personnel and equipment, abnormal casualties in that regiment resulted. The shell and mortar fire from the Japs effectively prevented full scale occupation of position on D-day by the 14th Marines. After the artillery once gained a degree of protection in well dug-in emplacements, the effectiveness of Jap artillery on materiel was minor.

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4. Tactical Employment of Enemy Artillery.

Employment of artillery by the Japs in this campaign as compared to previous ones showed a marked improvement. In a comparison of his tactical use of fires and maneuvers with our own, particularly in the massing of fires, he is still inferior. But aside from employment in mass he displayed some noteworthy ability, and respect for same is now definitely on the uptrend. Gunnery was good as indicated by observed adjustment of fires. When locations of weapons and installations were known, fires were placed there, not once but many times. It appears that he sacrificed fields of fire on weapons for camouflage and protection, but with the number of artillery pieces available he still might have not made a bad decision. As always he is an accomplished camoufler. His attempts at versatility are not to be overlooked. Weapons of all types and calibers were employed. Artillery was constantly maneuvered, making our efforts to locate same more difficult. Revving Guns were daily evident. The largest number of weapons employed as a fire unit appeared to be a battery. Numerous occasions when our own preparations would seemingly devastate the entire front, he replied with a counter-preparation of artillery and mortars. He employed or paralleled our tactics of interdiction and harassing fires at night. Artillerymen appeared well trained and disciplined in view of persistent return fire immediately following and sometimes even during our counterbattery fire. Time fire was employed, but it is not known whether fired by field artillery weapons or by dual purpose AA. Rockets were extensively employed but the degree of efficiency and accuracy did not approach that of his artillery.

5. Types of material used by enemy artillery.

a. Mobile.

<u>Model</u>	<u>Caliber</u>
94(1934)	37mm Gun
01(1941)	47mm AT Gun
92(1932)	70mm How
38(1905)	75mm Gun
90(1930)	75mm Gun
38(1905)	120mm How

b. Fixed:

93(1933)	25mm twin mount DP Gun
93(1933)	25mm single mount DP Gun
10(1921)	3 inch DP Gun 4.7 inch DP Gun 10cm twin mount DP Gun in turret mount
3(1914)	14cm CD Gun

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c. Mortars, mobile:

3(1928)	81mm mortar
97(1937)	81mm mortar
97(1937)	90mm mortar
97(1937)	150mm mortar

d. Mortar, fixed:

300mm (12 inch) mortar Spigot type.

e. Rocket positions:

10(1935)	Bomb thrower, rocket motored.
	20cm (8 inch) rocket.
	30cm (12 inch) rocket; 550 pound bomb body with a rocket motor attached.

6. Liaison.

Liaison Officers with V Amphibious Corps, 2 section, 3 section, 12th, 13th and 14th Marines provided excellent and reliable sources of intelligence information.

7. Miscellaneous.

a. The 2d 155mm Howitzer Battalion provided all metro data for the Group after 1600, 23 February.

b. Metro resume for the operation is found on page 8 of enclosure (T).

8. Recommendations. It is recommended that:

a. All units, particularly infantry, be thoroughly schooled in the elements of a shelling report. The more complete the report, the more effective will be the action.

b. Corps publish on D-day a damage assessment report of pre D-day naval gunfire and bombing on enemy artillery. Corps Artillery is primarily interested in remaining active enemy artillery. Delayed intelligence only serves to confuse. Following this report, a daily report as of a certain time of two parts (1) damage assessment on old targets (2) new targets appearing since previous report, all based on a daily API coverage.

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c. The Iwo Jima Air and Gunnery Target folder containing 1000 yard grid square coverage be expanded to include 4 such squares on a 1/10,000 scale. This item was extremely valuable to aerial observers, but orientation of so small an area from the air at times was difficult.

d. The VMO pilots receive just prior to the operation a basic observation course with the view to indoctrination in trajectories of artillery and naval guns and the capabilities and limitation of each. Also that an SOP be published indicating who is in command over the target area, pilot or observer, and the status of each.

e. The equipping, organization and training of the sound and flash unit in the Corps Artillery Headquarters & Headquarters Battery be given a high priority for future operations.

f. The Corps 2 section in its daily report of enemy artillery installations include when the artillery installation was last observed to be firing or otherwise active.

B. Firing.

1. Survey.

(a) General plans were made prior to embarkation for the artillery survey to be used on the Iwo Jima operation. The 1st Provisional Field Artillery Group was to act as Corps Artillery for the operation, but since the Group had no organic or attached survey or flash and sound ranging personnel, the 13th Marines was designated to establish survey control. The 13th Marines had a Coast and Geodetic Survey Officer and since they were the division artillery of an assault division they would have a higher priority in landing.

In planning for the operation it was decided to use the intersection of a narrow-gauge railroad and an unimproved road on Red Beach 1 for the Corps I.P. with the line Corps I.P.-North-east tangency of the island as the direction line. Upon landing the 13th Marines survey party found that the planned Corps I.P. had been demolished and could not be located. Point Airport was located by inspection and coordinates taken from the map. The Corps I.P. was located from this point by short base offset.

(b) The coordinates of the Corps I.P. and Corps AB line were published by Group to all survey units as they came ashore. The 13th Marines, since they had established control, were already tied into the Corps control. Upon landing the survey elements of the 2nd 155mm Howitzer Battalion reconnaissance party tied into the survey control, using points 13th I.P. and Station Airport. The 14th Marines survey team tied into the Corps I.P. directly by traverse. The 12th Marines were furnished surveyed points in their general position area, and they tied into the survey control by traverse from the 2nd 155mm Howitzer Battalion I.P. All units located their own regimental I.P.'s. The control was carried as far forward as the tactical situation permitted. All units used the Corps AB line to compute their base angle.

(c) The survey for the 1st Provisional Field Artillery Group was executed by the 2nd 155mm Howitzer Battalion survey team. Point 13th I.P. was used, and the 2nd 155mm Howitzer Battalion I.P. was established by traverse from it, using Point 13th I.P. Point Airport for direction. Station Bomb was located by triangulation from the 13th I.P. and Point Airport. The 4th 155mm Howitzer Battalion I.P. was located by traverse from the 2nd 155mm Howitzer Battalion I.P., and direction was taken from the line 2nd 155mm Howitzer Battalion I.P. Station Bomb. The Corps Artillery Flash Range O.P.'s on Mt. Suribachi were located by triangulation from the 2nd Battalion I.P. and Station Bomb.

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(d) Distribution of all survey information was made as soon as possible. All units were instructed to turn in all survey information to the Group Survey Officer, who passed on this information when called upon; in addition to the periodic mimeograph sheets distributed. The following units were included on the distribution lists: VAC Engineering Officer, ISCOM Engineering Officer, 135th AAA Group, 12th Marines, 13th Marines, 14th Marines, 2nd 155mm Howitzer Battalion and the 4th 155mm Howitzer Battalion.

(e) The survey control for this operation was considered quite satisfactory. On more than one occasion either two or more regiments and Corps Artillery, or a regiment and Corps Artillery, were successfully massed.

Survey and map locations varied somewhat as indicated in part 2 to Enclosure (K). Vertical control carried from the water's edge by two different units indicated a difference of nine or ten yards from map altitude. The map check points showed that the difference horizontally and vertically between map and survey were not constant, and a single correction could not be used.

(f) See Enclosure (K) for overlay of major survey control, and Appendix 1 to Enclosure (K) for coordinates, altitude and description of stations.

2. Fire Adjustment:

(a) Adjustment of the observed fires of Corps Artillery was principally by air observers.

(b) The adjustment of fire was also accomplished by Flash Range, sound range, Corps observers, and Division Artillery forward observers.

(c) All registrations were made by air observers using forward observer precision methods and the Marine Corps spotting system. Time corrections were obtained in addition to range deflection corrections. All destruction missions, whether adjusted by aerial observers or by Divisional Artillery forward observers, were precision adjustments. Fire for effect was made with a single piece or with a battery with a converged sheaf, using T105 (concrete-piercing) Fuze, or Fuze M51A3 set for delay.

(d) All adjustments, except the precision adjustments, were bracket-type adjustments. The Corps aerial observers and the forward observers of the Division Artillery used standard forward observer methods of adjustment. Counter-battery fires at night were sometimes adjusted by flash or sound range; if not adjusted, the flash base or sound range gave surveillance on the fire for effect, and any corrections needed were made and the fire for effect repeated.

Because of the poor terrestrial observation, very few adjustments were made with axial, small T or large T methods. What few missions were conducted from O.I.'s were fired with axial bracket adjustments. Excellent results were obtained.

(e) Preparations and harrassing missions were fired as K-transfers with latest weather applied. The flash base, however, was used to give surveillance on some of the harrassing missions, and the air observer gave surveillance on all preparations. Shell Allo (W1) was used to aid in adjustment occasionally.

(f) The following is a breakdown of missions fired (this does not include preparations or harrassing fires):

TYPE OBSERVATION	NO. OF MISSIONS
Air Observer	132
Flash Range	46
Sound Range	15
F.O. or O.I.	47
Unobserved	188
TOTAL MISSIONS	428

3. Fire Direction:

(a) Firing Chart: The firing chart was a battle map, the 1/20,000 Special Air and Gunnery Target Map of Iwo Jima, prepared by the 64th Engineer Topographical Battalion, USAFICTA, dated November, 1941. A position area survey was established in the two battalions, using control furnished by the 13th Marines. Map locations of check points were used in the computation of base angles, and map altitudes were used for vertical control.

(b) Communications: In the Group FDC there was a BD-72 switchboard. Through this direct lines were run to the FDC's of the 2nd and 4th 155mm Howitzer Battalions and the three regiments. Fire missions and requests for reinforcement were handled over these circuits. In addition, two radio nets were available as alternate means of communication. One of these radio nets was used for the transmission of airstrike data.

(c) Gunnery:

(1) All registrations were, as previously stated, made by air observers. Deflection, range and time corrections were determined. Registrations were usually made just prior to dark each day. All fires delivered were K-transfers with latest weather applied.

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(2) Reenforcing Fires: When a battalion of the Group or one of the artillery regiments requested reenforcement, a battalion (or battalions) was (were) assigned to reenforce, and was (were) connected by telephone to the adjusting battalion. The adjusting battalion controlled the mission from that time until its completion, with the Group FDC listening-in only. Upon completion of adjustment the adjusted altitude was computed and reported by the adjusting battalion. This data was used by the reenforcing battalion in fire for effect. This system worked very satisfactorily. Since all units were tied to a common survey I.F. and direction line, the Corps battalions could reenforce any unit on request. This was done repeatedly. On one occasion a 13th Marines' air observer caught two batteries of artillery in march order and displacing. A light battalion was adjusted on the target and Corps was requested to reenforce. Corps assigned the two medium battalions to reenforce, and the 13th Marines also assigned two light battalions to reenforce. Adjustment was completed and five battalions massed for effect. The guns, prime movers and personnel were destroyed.

(3) Preparations: Corps battalions habitually reenforced the divisions during the King-hour preparations each day. Since there were only two medium battalions of Corps Artillery and there were three divisions in the line, some coordination was necessary in order to both reenforce the divisions and also fire the Corps missions. Each night after receipt of the attack order for the next day, the Division Artillery would, by telephone or overlay, submit their requests for fires to be delivered in support of the attacks in their zones of action. These were then assigned to the battalions in the schedule of fires. This system worked very satisfactorily.

(4) Harrassing and Defensive Fires: Each night the latest intelligence data was studied for suitable harrassing targets. These included enemy C.F.'s, O.F.'s, assembly and bivouac areas, dumps, important communication routes, and all known active batteries, AA positions and rocket-launcher sites. In addition, the Divisions submitted their harrassing fire requests for targets they wished Corps to hit during the night.

(5) Attack of Targets: In the attack of enemy batteries both battalions were assigned the mission whenever possible. The enemy artillery was seldom active during the day, but became very active at night. The fire for effect was usually fired E-C apart, and if both battalions were assigned the target, the method of fire was TOT. One battalion was then assigned the mission of harrassing the battery for the remainder of the night. The next day the air observer was assigned the target, and if any guns remained in the area, they were destroyed by precision adjustments. In destruction

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missions Fuze T105, (concrete-piercing) and Fuze M51A3, set for delay, were used with excellent results. Very little time fire was used. This was due to the fact that the enemy was well-entrenched in pill-boxes, bunkers, caves, and other fortress-type emplacements.

(6) Conclusion: The fires of Corps Artillery were maneuvered and accurately placed in the area where needed at all times. This was possible because of the narrow front of the Corps and the excellent survey control that was established. The Corps Artillery could thus maneuver and mass its fire with any Division Artillery at any time.

4. Liaison:

The Corps Artillery maintained normal liaison. Liaison with the Corps Commander was maintained through the Commanding Officer, 1st Provisional Field Artillery Group, who was at the Corps C.F. at all times. In addition, one officer maintained liaison between the Corps-2 and the Corps Artillery-2, and two officers maintained liaison with the Corps-3. The liaison with the Corps operations section was primarily for the purpose of coordinating air, artillery and naval gunfire. A liaison party was at each Divisional Artillery FDC, and in addition to performing the normal liaison, aided in the promulgation of information on air-strikes.

5. The enemy was extremely well-entrenched and defended a series of fortified positions. He pursued a passive defense throughout, preferring to remain in pill boxes, bunkers, block-houses, and other heavy-type fortifications, until death. His artillery generally consisted of field pieces, AA Artillery, large-calibre mortars, and rocket launchers. These weapons were well-concealed, and, except for the AA guns, were kept under cover in large caves or block-houses when not in use. This made our counter-battery work very difficult and reduced the effectiveness of our fires. A great percentage of Fuze Delay and T105 (concrete-piercing) fuze was fired. Very little time fire was used. Following are the results of the Corps Artillery fires:

TARGETS	TOTALLY DESTROYED	PARTIALLY DESTROYED	EXCELLENT EFFECT
Enemy Batteries	4	-	3
Enemy Guns of Unidentified Calibre	15	2	14

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TARGETS	TOTALLY DESTROYED	PARTIALLY DESTROYED	EXCELLENT EFFECT*
Enemy 15cm. Guns	3	-	1
Enemy 8 in. Naval Guns	1	-	-
Enemy 5 in. Naval Guns	1	1	1
Enemy AA Guns	13	2	2
Enemy Rocket-Launchers	5	-	10
Enemy Mortar Batteries	4	1	6
Enemy Tanks	3	-	1
Enemy Ammo & Fuel Dumps	11	-	3
Enemy Blockhouses	14	10	1
Enemy Bill Boxes	9	1	7
Enemy Trucks	16	-	-
Enemy Gun Emplacements	-	8	5
Enemy Troop Concentrations	-	-	20
Enemy Command Posts	-	-	2
Enemy Truck Parks	-	-	2

* Exact assesment of damage other than excellent effect was not reported.

6. Targets were located by practically every known means. Target locations were reported by aerial observers, flash range, sound range, forward observers, AFI work, normal intelligence channels, and the normal 3-section liaison.

7. For ammunition expended, by type fire mission, see Enclosure (FOX).

8. For ammunition expended by item, see Enclosure (GEORGE).

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9. Comments and Recommendations.

(a) All phases of the Gunnery as executed by the Corps Artillery battalions were excellent.

(b) The Corps battalions fired approximately 200 concentrations each, and the light artillery of the divisions fired many more. The plotted concentrations, special grid and intelligence overprint all combined to make the firing chart a mass of confused and unreadable detail. For this reason the firing chart had to be changed frequently. It is recommended that additional maps be provided for artillery units for use as firing charts in future operations, without the intelligence overprint. The intelligence data contained in the overprint is of no use on the firing chart, but is of definite value for the situation map that is kept in the Fire Direction Center.

(c) The lack of medium divisional artillery was acutely felt in the Iwo Jima operation. Neither the 75mm pack howitzers nor the 105mm howitzers were capable of destroying the type of fortifications found on Iwo Jima. This resulted in Corps Artillery being called upon to execute many missions that normally would fall to the general support battalion of Divisional Artillery. Even the 155mm howitzers in Corps Artillery found it difficult to destroy some of the blockhouses that were brought under fire. The T105 fuze ultimately accomplished the mission, but often as many as ten or twelve direct hits were required to destroy the target. It is recognized that plans are now completed for the equipping of one battalion of Divisional Artillery with medium artillery, and also that in the future Corps Artillery will consist of four 155mm Gun battalions. It is recommended that provisions be made so that 8-inch howitzers and 155mm howitzer material be readily available to Corps Artillery. This is in excess of the 155mm Guns of the now organic 155mm Gun battalions. This recommendation does not contemplate a change in the table of organization of the four 155mm Gun battalions, but will provide a pool of 155mm howitzers and 8-inch howitzers from which to draw should the nature of the terrain in which an operation is to take place, together with the defenses that might be expected, warrant this substitution. In the Iwo Jima Operation, the 8-inch howitzers would have proven invaluable for the destruction of the heavy fortifications encountered there. Its small probable error, heavy projectile, and all-around versatility would have accomplished the many missions in less time and with the expenditure of less ammunition than was required by the 155mm howitzers that were employed. It is felt that the Corps should not tie itself to a fixed material of 155mm Guns, but should be prepared to meet the needs of any operation at the commencement of the planning phase. Thus

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during the planning and training phase of future operations the Corps Artillery Officer could select that weapon which would best accomplish the Corps Artillery mission, after due consideration had been given to the beaches, terrain features, and enemy forces and defenses that would be encountered.

(d) In this operation, as in previous operations, reports of short rounds were received from time to time. All such reports were thoroughly investigated and an officer sent to the scene of the reported short rounds. In every case investigated by Corps the reported short rounds were proven to be enemy artillery. However, the reports of short rounds received were in all cases incomplete. This resulted in delays and in many cases the unnecessary lifting of artillery fires. It is therefore recommended that all units be indoctrinated to make complete reports, to include particularly the exact time, caliber, type fires (WP, HE or time), direction of fire, and the method of fire, so that investigation can be made effectively.

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G. Communications.

1. The communication plan for the operation was in accordance with normal procedure for Corps Artillery. Communications during all phases was very good.

2. (a) Wire lines were established as rapidly as the situation permitted. All construction was overhead on 2" X 4" poles carried for this purpose. No difficulty was experienced in protecting the wire lines from wheeled or tracked vehicles. Enemy shellings caused numerous failures of telephone communication. These were quickly repaired and no serious communication interruption occurred.

(b) Two wire laying 1-ton, 4 X 4 trucks were carried for Group Headquarters. These were supplemented by two 1-ton 4 X 4 trucks, borrowed from other sections, which made possible the rapid installation of wire lines. Without these larger vehicles wire installations would have been greatly impeded. While on this specific operation, the need for a vehicle such as the Cargo Carrier M-29C was not acute, it would have been invaluable in the initial phase.

(c) Prior to departure of this unit for the staging area the Telephone Central Office Set TC-4 authorized had not been received, and it was necessary to substitute three switchboards type SD-72. These did not adequately fill the needs for the main switchboard. The connection of three such switchboards in multiple tends to slow connections and resultant poor service.

(d) It is recommended that one (1) Telephone Central Office Set TC-12 be authorized for each Corps or Group Artillery Headquarters. This equipment would be used in the Fire Direction Center to replace the multiple connection of one (1) switchboard SD-72 and one (1) switchboard SD-71. The need for immediate connections, frequent conference calls, and the number of lines to be terminated requires equipment designed for the task, such as is the Telephone Central Office Set TC-12.

(e) Insulators IN-53 were used in the construction of wire lines and proved very satisfactory. It is recommended that an allowance of two thousand (2000) be authorized for Corps or Group Artillery Headquarters. The Bracket IF-57 and Insulator IN-25 were authorized in the T/A for this organization but were not carried on this operation. It was considered that the bulk and limited usefulness of these items precluded their efficient employment in artillery wire line construction.

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(f) Fifty (50) lance poles FC-2 were supplied this unit; these were insufficient. It is recommended that an allowance of five hundred (500) be authorized for Corps or Group Headquarters and an allowance of one hundred (100) for each Gun or Howitzer Battalion.

(g) It is recommended that wire vehicle allowance be authorized as follows for Corps or Group Headquarters:

2 Truck, 1-ton, 4X4
2 Truck, 1-ton, 4X4
2 Cargo Carrier, M-290.

3. (a) All radio nets required by plan were established on D-Day when radio silence was lifted. The VHF channel assigned for observation was used as a voice command channel during ship to shore movement and performed very satisfactorily. Upon establishment of units ashore the normal Command Net opened and this channel was used for unloading operations. Upon completion of this phase it reverted to primary function and another VHF channel was then made available for further unloading and 4-section activities.

(b) The Fire Mission Net (Model MZ, Radio Equipment) operated excellently during the entire operation. It is felt that a set of greater power output is required for this net due to occasional communication difficulties attributed directly to insufficient power output for the task.

(c) The Air-Ground Net (Model MZ, Radio Equipment) operated very satisfactorily. This net was operated at the Fire Direction Center, each Battalion and a ground set on the airfield.

(d) Minor difficulties in the form of interference was experienced on VHF channels. This was due to nearby location of stations on adjacent channels.

(e) The Remote Control Unit, RM-29A, is not suitable in its present form for satisfactorily controlling the transmitter from a remote point. It is recommended that a modification be incorporated in this equipment which will enable the operator at the remote point to have control of the transmitter.

(f) It is recommended that the four (4) Radio Equipments, Model MZ, authorized for a Group Headquarters, be replaced with two (2) Radio Equipment SCR-193, and three (3) Radio Equipment, Model MZ.

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4. (a) The Message Center of this organization operated continuously from D-day. Difficulty was encountered due to the lack of an adequately-trained Message Center Chief. It was necessary to select a non-commissioned officer of the communication section who had "some" message center experience in order to have proper supervision and coordinated function with the overall communication system. This arrangement worked very well and all functions of the message center were carried through effectively.

(b) The Shackle Code was the only cryptographic aid used, and this proved very effective.

5. The only materiel failures were those experienced by one battalion with their Radio Equipment Model MZ. This was largely attributed to the length of time these sets had been in service (two years combat service). The repair facilities of the V Amphibious Corps Signal Battalion and the 8th Field Depot Signal Company were available and used, resulting in no serious communication failure.

6. Materiel losses during all phases of the operation were as follows:

(a) One (1) Radio Equipment, Model MZ; during ship to shore movement.

(b) 35 Wire W-110B on DR-4; miles.
25 Wire W-110B on DR-5, miles.
2 Control Units, COL 23270, remote for
Model MZ, Radio Equipment.

The above equipment was destroyed when a nearby friendly ammunition dump was set afire by enemy action.

7. See enclosures (D) and (E) for final circuit diagram and radio net.

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D. Supply and Logistics.

1. General.

(a) Supplies were distributed equally among all six LST's with the exception of LST 808 which did not have any fuel or water due to the LCT carried on the deck (see enclosure "N").

(b) Responsibility for unloading each LST rested directly and completely with each firing battery loading officer.

(c) Unloading was directed by the Group-4 through each Battalion-4. Orders were for all First Provisional Field Artillery Group supplies to be taken from each LST to the respective battalion position areas for later redistribution by the Group-4. Preloaded Corps supplies were to be taken to a common Group Headquarters dump. From time to time Corps supplies were issued to assault elements of both 4th and 5th Marine Divisions and to batteries of this group. (An accounting was made by the Group-4 to the C-4, VAC in a letter dated 4 March, 1945).

(d) Redistribution was later affected so that each unit in this command received its share based on the Administrative Order to the Operations Plan.

(e) The Corps Quartermaster supplied all of this organization's requirements throughout the operation with the exception of sand bags and water during the first 15 days.

2. Supplies authorized and landed.

(a) With the exception of the following, all supplies authorized were landed (see enclosure "R"):

<u>Amount</u>	<u>Unit</u>	<u>Description</u>	<u>Reason for Losses</u>
40	55-gal. Drums	80 Octane Gasoline	Jettisoned from LST 779 by order of CO during shelling.
250	Cases	Cal .30 ammunition	Dukws (2) sunk.
300	5-gal. Cans	Water	Dukws (3) sunk.
475	Cases	"C" Rations	Dukws (3) sunk.
12	55-gal. Drums	6 Diesel Oil, 6 80 Octane Gasoline	Dukw (1) sunk.

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3. Equipment authorized and landed.

(a) With the exception of the following all equipment authorized was landed (see enclosure "H").

<u>Quantity</u>	<u>Description</u>	<u>Reason for Losses</u>
10	Dukws, 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ -ton 6X6	Sunk.
5	Dukws, 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ -ton 6X6	Broached.
2	Truck, $\frac{3}{4}$ -ton 4X4, Radio.	One in dukw that sunk. One in dukw that broached.

4. Equipment and Supplies lost; or destroyed due to Enemy Action during the Campaign.

(a) Supplies.

- (1) Rations: 632cs. "C" Ration.
4cs. "B" Ration (asst'd)
- (2) Water: 850 gals.

(b) Equipment,

- 1 Tractor, TD-18 w/angle dozer.
- 1 Tractor, TD-18 w/winch.
- 1 Trailer, 6-ton Athey.
- 35 Wire W-110, DR-5 on reel, reels.
- 1 Sight Mount, M25.

(c) Ammunition.

300 powder charges.

5. Ammunition Authorized and landed.

(a) Seven units of fire plus vehicle preloads were unloaded from each LST, a total of 26370 rounds.

(b) First resupply shipment arrived and unloaded.

- 10440-H.E. projectiles.
- 5484-M3. Propelling Charge (Green bag)
- 7118-M4A1. Propelling Charge (Grey bag)

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11088-M51A3 Fuze, SQ-D
1825-M55 Fuze, Time.
6000-CP105 Fuze, Time.
19200-Primers.

(c) Second resupply shipment arrived and unloaded:

8590-H.E. projectiles.
2693-M3 Propelling Charge (Green Bag).
1764-M4A1 Propelling Charge (Grey Bag)
7600-M51A3 Fuze SQ-D
9600-Primers.

6. Comments and Recommendations.

(a) Mounting out supplies were extremely well planned and entirely adequate, with the exception of sand bags. Each battalion could have profitably utilized 100,000 bags while Headquarters Battery required 40,000.

(b) The resupply shipments of ammunition were sufficient but the execution of the unloading left much to be desired. (See paragraph 3 E (3), page 40, unloading difficulties.)

(c) Palletizing of 155mm projectiles is the best way to handle ammunition if the proper unloading equipment is available, such as jumbo cranes, cherry pickers, "A" Frames, LST cranes, tractors, Athey trailers and dump trucks.

(d) Powder packed in metal cases and palletized reduces losses in the ship to shore movement and speeds unloading, if the proper unloading equipment as indicated in paragraph (c) above is available. On LST's, where no water runs are ordinarily involved, the clover leaf packing suffices.

(e) 50-55 gallon drums are an excellent means of bringing adequate water supply ashore for men and guns, due to the fact that we have the heavy equipment to handle them.

(f) It appeared that Red Beaches one and two and Green Beach could have been better organized during the period 20 to 25 February.

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(1) Apparently there was very little liaison between the Commander Landing Forces, the channel control vessels and the beach masters. Conflicting orders and countermanded orders resulted in LST's and LCT's

(a) Not beaching.

(b) Not beaching on the best available beach.

(c) Beaching and retracting.

(2) Although woven wire mesh and marston matting were available in large quantities and were critically required for efficient unloading of heavy equipment, supplies and ammunition, there were apparently few real efforts to lay same.

(3) Continued traffic snarls indicated that very little traffic control was effected. There were some attempts to remedy this situation by 23 February, but by that time things were out of hand and it was too late.

(4) Very little apparent control was exercised over shore party personnel. Critically needed sandbags, marston matting and heavy dunnage were side tracked by shore party personnel for "foxholes". Frequent pleading with the men over the loudspeaker to return these was indicative of the situation.

(5) Lack of early salvage operations on beached small boats, Dukws and LVT's resulted in lost equipment, lost supplies, less room to beach small craft, LST's, LSM's and general disorganization of the beach, all of which stopped vital unloading.

(6) Due to the apparent disorganization indicated in the preceding paragraphs it is recommended that the following steps which are now covered in current S.O.P.'s be more rigidly adhered to in order to insure rapid and effective handling of equipment and supplies on the beach in the future.

(1) That only the Landing Force Commander order ships ashore. That only the channel control vessels indicate on which beach the ships are to land. That only the beachmaster order the ships where to beach on his particular beach.

(2) That the beaches be organized and prepared for unloading prior to any attempt to unload heavy equipment.

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(3) That traffic control personnel and premade traffic signs be landed and organized prior to the major unloading.

(4) That military police be landed if necessary to control the disposition of such critical supplies as sandbags, matting and heavy dunnage.

(5) That salvage crews and equipment be landed immediately to maintain accessibility to the beaches and exits from the beaches.

(h) That heavy leather gloves be an item of issue to all ammunition handlers.

(i) That ear plugs or blast helmets be issued for the gun crews. Several instances of ruptured ear drums were noted.

(j) That conveyor rollers without stands be issued on the basis of thirty per battalion. This item was of extreme value in moving projectiles from the pits to the howitzers.

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E. Transport Quartermaster - Comments and Recommendations.

1. Time required to load.

(a) The average time required to completely preload (including shoring and flooring) seven units of fire of 155mm ammunition and components aboard LST's of this command by a trained twenty man C.B. working party, was 30 hours.

(b) The average time required to load supplies, equipment and personnel aboard LST's of this command was 30 hours. The shortest time required was 12 hours (nothing on main deck) and the longest time required was 36 hours (time consumed unloading last minute supplies sent down aboard LST's).

(c) Two factors definitely contributing to the efficiency, ease and speed with which LST's were loaded were:

(1) Preloading all supplies on the proper ships on the ground by use of LST serial numbers prior to the arrival of the ships.

(2) Loading the main and tank decks simultaneously by means of the attached Dukw company which hauled drums and other heavy supplies alongside the LST's for the main deck crane to lift aboard. This left the tank deck available for loading at all times.

2. Time required to unload.

(a) The average total elapsed time required to unload ammunition, supplies, equipment and personnel from LST's of this command was 35 hours. The shortest time required was 20 hours, the longest was 79 hours.

(b) The movement and/or threatened movement of the LST's from the beach during reported enemy air raid, harassing gunfire and mortar fire reduced considerably the efficiency of unloading. It is recommended that the mission of the LST's be clarified so that threatened enemy air action and harassing fires do not result in retracting or attempted retracting by LST's. It is suggested that only actual air raids and/or concerted and well directed enemy shell fire be the only cause for leaving the beach.

(c) The beach on Iwo Jima required definite preparation before heavy equipment and supplies were landed. It was found that ramp extension mat 22' x 12' which was aboard every LST

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was far superior to woven wire mesh or marston matting because both rolling stock and tracked vehicles were able to negotiate this mat without tearing it up.

(d) The attached Dukw company aided immeasurably in unloading the LST's while they were still in the transport area and was also extremely effective in unloading drums, rations and organizational equipment on the beach. It is recommended that a portion of a Dukw company be allocated to Corps Artillery to expedite unloading in the future.

3. Difficulties Encountered in Unloading.

(a) Dukws.

(1) Because of the fact that LST's stayed so far out from the beach 10 Dukws were sunk in the heavy sea either being launched or being taken back aboard.

(2) The Dukw Company Commander did not have a clearly defined mission for his company in the Iwo Jiam operation, specifically regarding his employment following initial unloading of preloads.

(3) The preloaded Dukws were not expected on the beach. The Corps Shore Party Commander was not ashore when the Dukws arrived. Time and vehicles were lost deciding what to do with the supplies.

(b) Ammunition resupply.

(1) The Corps commandeered all Dukws and put them under a central control. Following this the drivers were not instructed where the 155mm ammunition dumps were. Only those who had been hauling for Corps Artillery knew their whereabouts. As a result components were found in almost every dump on the island.

(2) All unit ordnance officers and working parties were ordered off the resupply ship thereby cutting off

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the flow of such information to the Group-4 as (a) where working parties, guides and radios were required on the beach, (b) what type of equipment would be needed to unload what type of landing craft, (c) the amount of ammunition sent ashore, (d) the amount that remained aboard, (e) general unloading plan aboard including ammunition priorities.

(3) Because of the above the Group-4 was not able to keep the Corps Artillery Officer fully advised of the ammunition resupply status.

4. It is recommended that:

(a) LST's or LSM's be substituted for liberty ships in 155mm ammunition resupply.

(b) The Corps Artillery echelon be in direct charge of unloading its own ammunition.

(c) The attached Dukw company remain under control of Corps Artillery until ammunition resupply has been insured.

(d) Specifications of LST's be kept corrected to date. Only by actual measurements were loading plans able to be accurately prepared.

(e) Information of any additional personnel and equipment to be embarked on assigned ships be supplied when ships are assigned.

(f) A qualified TQM NCO be an addition to the T/O for the 4 section of Group.

(g) That at least 1/3 of Corps Artillery be loaded in AK's regardless of how good the beaches are. A change of plan may require landing of these weapons where beaching of LST's would be impossible.

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F. Administration.

1. A breakdown of personnel of Headquarters, 1st Provisional Field Artillery Group and attached units who landed on Iwo Jima is as follows:

	OFFICERS			ENLISTED		
	USMC	USN	USA	USMC	USN	USA
Headquarters and Headquarters Battery	15	2		113	4	
2nd 155mm Howitzer Battalion	33	1		568	10	
4th 155mm Howitzer Battalion	34	1		559	10	
473rd Amphibian Truck Company			6			175
TOTALS	82	4	6	1240	24	175

2. A complete roster of personnel of the 1st Provisional Field Artillery Group and attached units participating in the operation on Iwo Jima is submitted as Enclosure "A".

3. A complete roster of casualties, during the operation on Iwo Jima, of the 1st Provisional Field Artillery Group and attached units is submitted as Enclosure "B".

4. Morale of troops.

(a) An issue of post exchange items consisting of cigarettes, candy, and toilet articles was obtained for distribution on the LST's during the period in transit.

(b) Pocket editions of all types of reading material and games was also made available to the men.

(c) Mail was distributed at each staging point.

(d) The first mail received on Iwo Jima was 26 February. This factor alone was highly influential to the morale.

(e) All units were authorized to commence cooking B rations on 28 February, construction of fly proof galleys having been completed.

(f) Water supply for bathing was limited on this operation and did to a minor degree effect morale.

5. Comments and Recommendations.

(a) It can now be said from experience that even the T/O as shown in Enclosure (C), much less that authorized by Fleet Marine Force, Pacific Special Order #49-44, is insufficient personnel to handle both Group and Corps Artillery Headquarters functions. The need, over and above the strength of the recommended

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T/O, was mainly felt in officer personnel, particularly the 2 and 3 sections. Three officers are necessary for each section to maintain a continuous watch. Also, the Corps Artillery Officer requires at least two officer assistants at Corps Headquarters to perform the functions of coordination in air, naval gunfire and artillery. However, since orders for the disbanding of the Group Headquarters have been published and since employment of a Group Headquarters in a similar capacity in future operations is not immediately contemplated no further discussion need be made.

(b) It is recommended that an administrative SOP be published for subsequent operations with sample forms enclosed so that there can be a uniformity and completeness to information submitted from subordinate units.

(c) It is recommended that each H^Uitzer section be increased by two (2) men. Over prolonged periods of firing necessitating working in shifts this is mandatory.

6. The following is a list of the Commendations and Citations recommended for personnel of 1st Provisional Field Artillery Group and attached units (Except for 473rd Amphibian Truck Company):

(a) Headquarters and Headquarters Battery,
1st Provisional Field Artillery Group:

Legion of Merit:

Lieutenant Colonel Marvin H. Floom, (05111), USMC.
Lieutenant Colonel Douglas E. Reeve, (05404), USMC.
Major Earl J. Rowse, (07175), USMC.
Major William G. Winters, Jr., (07909), USMC.

Navy-Marine Corps Medal:

Captain Frank P. Shearer, (09834), USMCR.
Private Alvin Y. Lanier, (975849), USMCR.
Private First Class Ivan E. Perlman, (536284), USMCR.

Bronze Star:

Major Melvyn A. Estey, (05601), USMCR.
Captain John S. Reamy, (07104), USMC
First Lieutenant John N. Kowalchyk, (018439), USMCR.
First Lieutenant George A. Wrisley, Jr., (017537),
USMCR.

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(b) 2nd 155mm Howitzer Battalion:

Legion of Merit:

Captain Earl N. Lewis, (011096), USMCR.

Silver Star:

Warrant Officer Donald V. Smith, (033198), USMC.
Sergeant John L. Hurd, (337386), USMCR.
Private First Class Samuel J. Mcff, (480055), USMCR.
Private First Class Harlan E. Fagg, (324243), USMC.
Pharmacist Mate Third Class Charles A. Bader,
(861-56-71), USNR.

Air Medal:

Second Lieutenant Gilbert N. Brooks, (031628),
USMCR.
Second Lieutenant John A. Warner, (033038), USMCR.

Bronze Star:

Major David W. Swanson, (07392), USMCR.
Captain Clarence W. Leck, (014713), USMCR.
Captain Morris V. Shively, (010957), USMC.
First Lieutenant George F. Marion, (018145), USMCR.
First Lieutenant Dale M. Clark, (016091), USMCR.
First Lieutenant James E. Brown, (019625), USMCR.
First Lieutenant Stanley P. Bulkowski, (010467),
USMC.
First Lieutenant Clyde C. McDougale, (018156), USMCR.
First Lieutenant Robert H. Loughman, (018451), USMCR.
First Lieutenant Elmer L. Sellers, (019593), USMCR.
Lieutenant (jg) John W. Overstreet, (126999), USNR.
Second Lieutenant Walter H. Johnson, (042689), USMCR.
Sergeant Virgil L. McCaulley, (294210), (CP), USMC.
Corporal Robert E. Lance, Jr., (306633), (CP), USMCR.
Corporal John S. Barry, (335165), (CP), USMCR.
Private First Class Asa R. Johnston, (504873), (CP),
USMCR.
Private First Class Ernest (n) Pairis, (875922),
(CP), USMCR-SS.
Corporal Inis "E" Edmisson, (316083), (CP), USMC.
Private First Class Clifford E. Bradshaw, (929313),
(CP), USMCR-SS.
Sergeant Edward M. Kalis, (359750), (QM-Mech), USMCR.

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Corporal Glen A. Provost, (335682), USMCR.
Private First Class Clyde W. Goodwin, (330390), USMC.
Private First Class Robert L. Kline, (336023), USMC.
Gunnery Sergeant John A. Grivich, (304498), USMCR.
Platoon Sergeant John D. Cox, (349727), USMC.
Pharmacist Mate Third Class Loren G. Ausderau,
(608-95-22), USNR.
Pharmacist Mate Third Class Frank T. Austin,
(826-24-99), USNR.
Private First Class Eugene J. Cousin, (517406), USMCR.
Private First Class Gilbert E. Hild, (330266), USMC.
Private First Class Thomas E. Stegman, (486534), USMCR.
Corporal Henry M. Hickman, (333519), USMC.
Private First Class Guy G. Judd, (346706), USMC.
Corporal Arthur L. Krambeer, (339826), USMCR.
Corporal Stanley F. Fortuna, (404864), USMCR.
Sergeant Edwin (n) Burdette, (339863), USMCR.
Corporal Raymond S. Van Winkle, Jr., (330391), USMC.
Private First Class Robert W. Brown, (459003), USMCR.
Private First Class Carmine (n) Sandangelo, (864164),
USMCR-SS.
Private First Class Anthony R. Holloway, (892376),
USMCR-SS.
Sergeant John W. Turley, (316663), USMC.
Private First Class James A. Stewart, (467977), USMCR.
Sergeant Charles "C" Carey, (331257), USMCR.
Corporal "J" "D" Mankin, (410472), USMCR.
Corporal Alton T. Rodenberg, (489181), USMCR.
Private First Class George M. Baldwin, (331255), USMCR.
Platoon Sergeant Charles J. Klima, (328756), USMC.
Platoon Sergeant Alfred G. Freels, (296806), USMC.
Sergeant Anthony L. Bahar, (339842), USMCR.
Sergeant Robert G. Unger, (337816), USMC.
Sergeant John S. Booth, (339757), USMCR.
Corporal Francis N. Clavin, (341163), USMCR.
Corporal Joe N. Harold, (340717), USMC.
Sergeant Walter J. Hill, (336129), (CP), USMC.
Sergeant Cameron C. Funk, (338846), USMC.
Corporal William A. Heerde, (320589), (CP), USMC.
Sergeant Juventino V. Rodriguez, (335978), (QM-Mech),
USMC.
Private First Class Arthur A. Ashton, (349400), USMC.
Sergeant Thomas A. Novak, (285525), (EP), USMCR.
Corporal Charles (n) O'Reilly, (336421) (OP), USMCR.
Gunnery Sergeant George W. Stafford, (288437), USMC.
Sergeant Lee H. Abraham, (315014), USMC.
Sergeant Joe E. Churich, (346713), USMCR.

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Sergeant Paul L. Nealy, (314277), USMC.
Corporal Roy N. Cooper, (339721), USMCR.
Sergeant Arthur T. Brown, (349775), (CP), USMC.
Sergeant Leon H. Painter, (298157), (QM-Mech), USMC.
Sergeant Dennis "E" Thompson, (252853), USMCR.
Private First Class Lloyd V. Griffith, (817416), (CP),
USMC-SS.
Private First Class Salvatore (n) Carbone, (473202),
(CP), USMCR.
Private First Class Clarence H. Zang, (331540), (CP),
USMC.
Private First Class James A. Berard, (474576), (CP),
USMCR.
Private First Class Joseph A. Roses, (466590), (CP),
USMCR.
Private First Class Daniel T. Jones, (819475), (CP),
USMC-SS.

Letter of Commendation with ribbon:

Second Lieutenant Walter (n) Chrapla, (041300), USMCR.
Second Lieutenant William T. Paull, (042680), USMCR.
Field Cook Craig E. Anderson, (376971), USMC.
Platoon Sergeant Phillip A. Anderson, (346187), USMCR.
Platoon Sergeant William R. Berhow, (303274), USMC.
Corporal Dickie (n) Cavallere, (349713), (QM-Mech),
USMC.
Sergeant John W. Eggleston, (303467), (CP), USMC.
Technical Sergeant William C. Eller, (324210), (C),
USMCR.
Corporal John L. Foley, (365347), (CP), USMC.
Corporal James (n) Francavilla, (349720), USMCR.
Corporal Joel T. Jackson, (335467), (CP), USMC.
Corporal Max A. Jasso, (329474), USMCR.
Technical Sergeant James A. Lieberknecht, (287606),
(CP), USMCR.
Staff Sergeant Charles F. Pyeatt, (295195), (QM-MT),
USMC.
Corporal "F" "E" Sealey, (290312), (QM-Mech), USMC.
Corporal Allen H. Ingram, (312300), USMC.
Corporal John D. Bernatis, (349420), USMC.
Technical Sergeant Rulon P. Draper, (303403), (C),
USMC.
Corporal Donald R. Garton, (334234), USMC.
Platoon Sergeant Arthur C. Larson, (335933), USMC.
Sergeant Joseph H. Mashek, (335458), USMC.
Corporal Edward B. Matusiak, (339802), USMCR.
Corporal Richard H. Norrell, (339823), USMCR.

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First Sergeant Fred C. Palmer, (314267), USMC.
Private First Class William W. Bailles, (340722), USMC.
Corporal Robert P. Glick, (308593), (CP), USMC.
Corporal Silas M. Kemp, (335843), USMC.
Corporal Chester A. Maus, Jr., (333960), USMC.
Corporal Thomas M. Moore, (347933), USMC.
Sergeant Zigmund J. Skupski, Jr., (266608), USMCR.
Corporal Roger M. Johnson, (329544), USMC.
Corporal Ernest A. Kirk, Jr., (333963), USMC.
Corporal Maxwell C. Weaver, (336093), USMCR.
Chief Cook Martin C. Weis, (342119), (C), USMCR.
Private First Class Raymond L. Spriggs, (294636), USMC.
Private First Class Judson T.M. Williams, (335365),
USMC.
Corporal Francis W. Winstoerfer, (342001), USMCR.
Corporal Bobbie G. Campbell (351855), USMC.
Private First Class Cecil C. Woolbright, Jr., (321659),
(CP), USMCR.
Corporal Joe M.M. Jiminez, (349615), USMC.
Private First Class Arthur C. Shrivcs, (346710), USMCR.
Corporal Ernest B. Canon, (340887), USMCR.
Corporal Rudolph J. Cummings, (312464), USMC.
Corporal Stanley L. Horn, (335564), USMC.
Corporal Milton R. Plasner, (304186), (CP), USMCR.
Corporal Paul L. Sine, (351849), USMC.
Technical Sergeant Alex J. Tarin, (297111), (C), USMC.
Corporal Eugene L. Wieser, (325588), (CP), USMC.
Corporal James R. Ettinger, (337375), USMC.
Corporal Charlie G. Frazier, (351168), USMC.
Corporal Emmett L. Gilliland, Jr., (318630), (CPO),
USMC.
Corporal Henry N. Godin, (297710), (QM), USMC.
Sergeant Jesse J. Johnson, Jr., (339783), USMCR.
Corporal Kenneth C. Lake, (337394), USMCR.
Corporal Harold F. Maciolck, (334221), USMC.
Private First Class Vincent P. Moranda, (335734), USMC.
Corporal Charlie R. Perry, (335643), USMCR.
First Sergeant James R. Van Hekken, (274955), USMC.

(c) 4th 155mm Howitzer Battalion;

Legion of Merit:

Major Joe H. Daniel, (07742), USMC.

Bronze Star:

Major Marvin R. Burditt, (07241), USMCR.

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Captain Shuman B. Worrell, (09909), USMCR.
Captain Harold C. Montgomery, (011570), USMCR.
Lt.(jg) "A" Merton Baker, (183434), USNR-MC.
Captain Paul W. Splittorff, (014162), USMCR.
Captain Edward E. Jones, Jr., (012557), USMCR.
Captain George A. Adams, Jr., (012884), USMCR.
Captain Charles C. Jacobs, Jr., (011497), USMCR.
First Lieutenant Joseph "M" Trencor, Jr., (027079),
USMCR.
Second Lieutenant Eugene C. Neitge, (032960), USMCR.
Warrant Officer Ferdinand J. Bergman, (030105), USMC.
Sergeant Robert L. Ballew, (307811), USMCR.
Corporal Charles Y. Barr, (452041), USMCR.
Private First Class John S. Blain, Jr., (484349),
USMCR.
Sergeant Michael J. Brombolich, (459018), USMCR.
Sergeant Angelo Caccosso, (479433), USMCR.
Private First Class John R. Copisky, Jr., (539977),
USMCR.
Private First Class Ralph Cornett, (842121), USMCR.
Private First Class Arley E. Cox, (475952), USMCR.
Corporal James C. Dahlberg, (314679), USMCR.
Sergeant Arthur G. Dallman, (298238), USMC.
Private First Class Marion E. Davis (880630), USMCR.
Sergeant James A. Dean, Jr., (301041), USMC.
Private First Class Joseph J. Di Geronimo, Jr.,
(439640), USMCR.
Corporal Anthony C. Di Matteo, (314679), USMCR.
Platoon Sergeant Benjamin F. Dutton, (211029), USMC.
PhM3/c Harold E. Eivins, (321-82-30), USN.
Gunnery Sergeant Lawrence G. Ferguson, (260729),
USMC.
Private Kenneth M. Garner, (955818), USMCR.
Corporal Edgar L. Garrigan, (529812), USMCR.
Private First Class Albert V. Geiger, Jr., (428599),
USMCR.
Private First Class Duane E. Hammond, (865727), USMCR.
Platoon Sergeant Robert R. Hanks, (337358), USMC.
Corporal John H. Hart, (489122), USMCR.
Corporal Victor V. Hart, (464892), USMCR.
Platoon Sergeant Arthur L. Herboltzhimer, (377913), USMCR.
Private First Class Rollin T. Hickman, (519434),
USMCR.
HAL/c William T. Holmstrom, (762-35-99), USNR.
Corporal Hict K. Jackson, (488252), USMCR.
Corporal John E. Jenkins, (800054), USMCR.

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Corporal Donald T. Lavender, (475491), USMCR.
Corporal Noble E. Lewis, (446359), USMCR.
Private First Class John J. Loines, (401447), USMCR.
Private First Class Edward E. McCollough, (426656),
USMCR.
PhM/c Robert H. Moreland, (295-87-48), USN.
Corporal Robert J. Moss, (504546), USMCR.
Corporal Hugo J. Motroni, (305950), USMCR.
Corporal Richard L. Place, (850817), USMCR.
Sergeant Eugene J. Pomas, (377967), USMCR.
Sergeant Joseph S. Ramcy, (427709), USMCR.
Corporal Neal E. Roberts, (506636), USMCR.
PhM/c Charles W. Sanders, (668-41-08), USN.
Corporal Doren J.G. Smith, (356399), USMC.
Sergeant Louis W. Southwick, (476327), USMCR.
Sergeant Dick C. Starkey, (341079), USMCR.
Corporal Edward A. Stransky, (472585), USMCR.
Private First Class Harold K. Stoner, (481201), USMCR.
Private First Class William F. Threadgill, (830742),
USMC.
Sergeant Ernest Tregoning, (338115), USMCR.
Corporal Frederick M. Walker, (390019), USMCR.
Sergeant Dot W. Watson, (325841), USMC.
Private First Class Harold T. West, (500832), USMCR.
Sergeant Orville E. Westphal, (254432), USMC.
Sergeant Hoyle N. Collins, Jr., (509558), USMCR.
*Corporal Jack A. Williams, (481276), USMCR.

* Posthumous.

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G. Medical

1. General.

a. The medical section of Headquarters Battery, 1st Provisional Field Artillery Group consists of a medical officer (Lieut. Comdr.) and four Hospital corpsman (one Chief Pharmacist Mate, and three Pharmacist Mates second class). The functions of this section have been two-fold, first the medical care of the personnel of Headquarters Battery, and second, the supervision and coordination of the medical and dental activities in the battalions comprising this artillery group. Medical Administration has not been handled in a manner similar to a regimental medical section. Each battalion medical section has independently cared for its own administration and supplies. This is in accord with the functionings of all line sections in this Headquarters, who have essentially only tactical coordinating powers over the Group artillery battalions. However, for all intents and purposes, other than medical administration, this Medical Section acts in the same capacity as a regimental medical section.

b. All personnel, both commissioned and enlisted, were physically examined before embarking for combat. Dental problems were cared for and all personnel were dentally fit at the embarkation date. All personnel were immunized against plague, typhus fever and cholera. All received precombat tetanus booster shots. Where indicated typhoid booster shots, yellow fever booster shots and revaccinations with cowpox were given. Officers and enlisted personnel of the 473d Dukw Co. Army received medical care and the above listed immunizations during the period while attached to this organization, prior to date of embarkation. Dental care for this personnel was supplied by the 230th Army Station Hospital.

c. At least one complete uniform per man and officer, minus underwear, was impregnated with Insecticide Repellant (Dimetyphthalate) before debarkation date. Classes in First Aid, field field sanitation and personal hygiene were given all hands. Special instruction on these subjects were given to the hospital corpsmen.

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d. Medical supplies were obtained direct from the Medical Section of the 6th Base Depot on NMS Form 4. The following Field Medical Units were issued this organization: Units #1, #3, #5A, #6, #7, #9, #10, #11A, #12, #15, #19, #20. Human Blood plasma and brandy on a per capita basis along with general medical supplies were also issued. All personnel were given and instructed in the contents and use of the individual jungle kits. Insecticide repellent individual 2.oz. bottle and D.D.T. individual 2'oz. can was included in each kit.

2. Embarkation.

a. Medical officer and three pharmacists mates were aboard an LST with one-half the Headquarters Battery personnel. One pharmacist's mate was aboard another LST with the remaining personnel of this battery.

b. All medical gear was preloaded on an ambulance jeep and trailer with the exception of a sea bag, filled with emergency medical supplies. This was made ready for initial landings.

3. Aboard Ship.

a. No sickness of a serious nature was encountered aboard ship.

b. Sanitary conditions of heads, living quarters, messes, galloys, cooks and messmen were maintained at a high level throughout the voyage. However, the one corpsman of this organization who was aboard the LST 788 reported that some sanitary conditions aboard this vessel were very poor. Heads particularly were frequently stopped up and left unrepaired for as long as 2-3 days in certain instances. Living quarters, messes, galloys, cooks and messmen, however, were in satisfactory condition aboard this vessel.

4. Debarkation.

a. One corpsman was debarked along with reconnaissance party on 21 February, 1945. The medical officer and one corpsman landed on call with emergency medical gear on 22 February. One corpsman debarked on the evening of 22 February when LST 760 beached. He drove the ambulance jeep with medical equipment and gear into battery position. The remaining corpsman debarked on 23 February with the remainder of battery troops when LST 788 beached.

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b. No losses of personnel or material were incurred during the period of debarkation.

5. Ashore - Assault Phase.

a. Temporary emergency first aid station was set up in Battery position area on 22 February. Semi-permanent installations were set up on 23 February in the center of the position area. Avenues of exit to the beach evacuation installations were excellent. The sick bay consisted of a dugout 26 feet long, 10 feet wide and 7 feet deep. All walls were sand bagged and held in position by scrap iron rods. The over head was boarded and covered with a layer of sand bags. The interior was divided into 3 sections with a common passage way. Space was available for treatment of casualties, including sufficient room for 8 stretcher cases. The overhead was covered with a tarpaulin as protection against the elements and for purpose of black out. Security was furnished by the Battery security section.

b. Evacuation - All evacuations were made direct to the beach evacuation depots by jeep ambulance. This procedure was adequate.

c. Casualties treated.

1. Number, 10 (ten).
 - a. Retained, 3 (three).
 - b. Evacuated, 6 (six).
 - c. Died, 1 (one).
2. Eye cases, 2 (two), chest cases 1 (one), superficial fragment wounds, 6 (six), Hemorrhage case, through and through bullet wound right subclavian artery, 1 (one).
3. Walking wounded, 8 (eight).
4. Stretcher cases, 2 (two).

d. Sanitation.

1. Sanitation crew - two men per battery.
Sanitation kit - one per battery.
Prefabricated heads - two per battery.
Wire screening - Two rolls per battery.
2. Food - K rations initially followed by type B and type C rations.

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3. Water - Obtained from embarkation area and chlorinated, transported in 50 gallon drums, water trailers. Arrived in excellent condition.
- e. Disposal of dead.
 1. Immediate transportation of our dead to 5th Marine Division cemetery.
 2. No enemy dead encountered.
- f. No epidemic diseases encountered.
- g. No dental services required.
- h. No civilians encountered.
- i. No prisoners of war cared for.
- j. Medical Organization.
 1. Present setup is suitable for this type of organization.
 2. Suggested change - none.
- k. Medical personnel.
 1. Adequate. No changes suggested.
- l. Field Medical Equipment.
 1. All issued units minus the following were carried: Units # 19 and # 20.
 2. No pilferage or losses.
 3. a. Units # 1 and # 3 are inadequate. Recommend general issue to medical personnel of field uniforms with numerous pockets to replace units.
b. Units # 5A and #5B-#11A and #11B as such are inadequate for combat use. A portable combination sick call and surgical chest was designed and constructed in this organization. Only portions of necessary

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medical supplies were picked out of these units and carried along in chest #11A as a back up.

- c. Unit # 8 - Combat Splints. As such are inadequate. They should be replaced by plywood splints in sufficient numbers to all organizations.
- d. Unit # 14 - Cumbersome and difficult to handle for Battalion use. Should be replaced in Battalion by an increased allowance of unit # 9. Unit # 14 has most efficient use in medical companies, beach and shore parties.
- 4. Resupply obtainable from 5th Marine Division Medical Section. None required.

m. Medical Supplies.

- 1. Sufficient supplies for thirty (30) days was carried.
- 2. Pilferage and losses - none.
- 3. Supplies in general were adequate. Some shortages were noted namely:
 - (a) Availability of serum albumin (human) to all combat units.
 - (b) Allotment of at least one 2 oz can of DDT powder per capita.
 - (c) Increase in amount of clothing impregnate to do up at least two complete uniforms.

n. Motor Vehicles and Rolling Stock.

- 1. One jeep ambulance and trailer carried.
- 2. Losses - None.
- 3. Embarked preloaded with medical gear. Maintained by motor transport section of Battery.
- 4. Adequacy - Excellent.
- 5. Improvements - None.

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- o. Quartermaster Equipment and supplies -
Adequate.
 - p. Malaria and epidemic control equipment and supplies. Not carried on this operation.
- 6. Ashore - after completion assault phase.
 - a. Hospitalization - adequate.
 - b. Medical and quartermaster supplies and equipment - adequate.
 - c. Sanitation - excellent.
 - d. Food and water - excellent as to quality and quantity.
 - e. Sickness, epidemic or unusual diseases in troops or native population - None.
- 7. Recommendations.
 - a. Measures to be taken to demand early and adequate sanitary discipline of all units in the field. i.e. Instructions, portable heads and action.
 - b. Medical equipment and supplies as noted under topics l & m.

Corps Artillery Officer's Special Action Report, Iwo Jima Campaign.

H. Transportation and Ordnance.

1. The transportation authorized for this particular operation was completely adequate.

2. The atney trailer model #BT 301-4 is far superior to the model #BT 898-8 with the pair of wheels forward.

3. The allowance of bulldozers in this operation was adequate and proved to be invaluable. The necessity for getting all equipment below ground surface immediately was obvious, and without the bulldozers this could never have been done.

4. It is recommended that each battalion and group headquarters be equipped with 2 cargo carriers M-29C (weasel) for wire laying.

5. It is recommended that a compromise 19 grain primer be manufactured. 17 grain primers resulted in 5% to 10% misfires and 21 grain primers caused excessive erosion in the obturator spindle plug.

6. The Table of Allowance of spare parts for the 155mm Howitzer are inadequate. It is recommended that the allowance per battery be increased to:

- 16 firing pins.
- 16 gas check pads.
- 12 obturator spindle plugs.
- 2 obturator spindle, primer vent, cleaning tool.
- 2 breech block thread files.
- 24 bulbs, light for night lighting devices.

7. It is recommended that charge propelling M4A1 (Gray bag) replace propelling charge M4 (white bag).

8. It is recommended that Table of Allowance of spare parts and accessories per Battalion for the following items be increased to:

- 2 Sights, panoramic, M12.
- 2 Sight mounts, M25.

J. S. Letcher
J. S. LETCHER.

HEADQUARTERS AND HEADQUARTERS BATTERY
1ST PROVISIONAL FIELD ARTILLERY GROUP
FLEET MARINE FORCE, PACIFIC
C/O FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA.

ROSTER OF PERSONNEL

OFFICERS

BERGLUND, John W.	010659	Capt	USMCR
DAHL, James J.	032860	2dLt	USMCR
ESNEY, Melvyn A.	05601	Major	USMCR
FLOOM, Marvin H.	05111	LtCol	USMC
JONES, Prentice W.	012199	2dLt	USMC
KOWALCHYK, John N.	018439	1stLt	USMCR
LETCHER, John S.	04282	Col	USMC
REAMY, John S.	07104	Capt	USMC
SHEARER, Frank P.	09834	Capt	USMCR
SHELL, West, Jr.	032998	2dLt	USMCR
SOUDER, William H., Jr.	06700	Major	USMC
SUTTON, Eugene M.	024317	1stLt	USMCR
WINTERS, William G., Jr.	07909	Major	USMC
WOJCIK, Michael F.	011997	Capt	USMCR
WRISLEY, George A., Jr.	017557	1stLt	USMCR

ENLISTED

ALLEN, Edwin E.	841471	Corp	USMC
ANDERSON, Leslie H.	819434	Corp	USMC
ANDERSON, Raymond A.	262324	Sgt	USMCR
ARNISTON, Richard L.	831220	Corp	USMC
BASL, Emil G.	829644	FldCk	USMC
BLAIR, Murle E.	521349	PFC	USMCR
BOWE, Lawrence J.	872000	PFC	USMCR
BREAKSTONE, Charles S.	948533	PFC	USMCR
BREngle, Vincent D.	309090	Pvt	USMC
BRUNO, Louis J.	563756	Pvt	USMCR
CALANDRIELLO, Cona	262212	Pvt	USMCR
CATALFAMO, Charles W.	920669	Pvt	USMCR
CHANDO, Carl	439934	Corp	USMCR
CHEREWICK, Dan	455503	Corp	USMCR
CLAYTON, Dexter B.	931001	PFC	USMCR
CLOWERS, Raymond A.	425221	Corp	USMC
COLLEMACINE, Martin A.	589180	Sgt	USMCR
CONNOLLY, Thomas F., Jr.	926491	PFC	USMCR
COOK, Donald W.	392700	Corp	USMCR
COLE, John P.	301475	Sgt	USMC
CROCKETT, John	950866	Pvt	USMCR
CROUCH, "L" "C"	463662	Sgt	USMCR
DAVID, Myron H.	520350	Corp	USMCR
DAVIS, Joseph H.	416945	PFC	USMCR
DE GRAVE, Arthur R.	559544	Pvt	USMCR
DELANEY, Troy	825422	Pvt	USMCR
DE ROCHE, Roland E.	377607	PFC	USMCR

Enclosure (A) to Appendix 4 to Annex Charlie to V Amphibious Corps
Landing Force Special Action Report, Iwo Jima.

(over)

ROSTER OF PERSONNEL

ENLISTED (Cont'd)

DETHMERS, Arnold E.	507195	PFC	USMCR
DINNING, John H.	492661	PFC	USMC
DODDS, Eddie L.	929378	PFC	USMCR
DOIGE, David B.	469953	Corp	USMCR
DORSEY, Boyd K.	307725	StfSgt	USMC
DOUGE, Thomas A.	383359	Corp	USMCR
DRISCOLL, Roger E.	942346	PFC	USMCR
DUCHARNE, Albert T.	257484	SgtMaj	USMC
DULASH, Michael A.	920082	PFC	USMCR
EARLE, Robert H.	269788	TSgt	USMC
EGAN, William J.	413809	PFC	USMCR
ENCHEBEN, Alfonso W.	502885	Corp	USMCR
ERICKSON, Frank J.	535156	PFC	USMCR
EVERHARD, Walter L.	847223	Pvt	USMCR
FALLACARO, Domenico	523925	PFC	USMCR
FERGUSON, Stephen W.	901440	Pvt	USMCR
FIELDS, Clarence W.	280454	TSgt	USMC
FitzGERALD, Roy F.	807743	PFC	USMC
FRANCE, William P.	976633	PFC	USMCR
GARNER, Ralph A.	895196	PFC	USMCR
HERMAN, Thomas F.	948625	Pvt	USMCR
HILTON, Walter	281146	Pvt	USMC
HINES, Henry C., Jr.	354704	Sgt	USMC
HUDGINS, Pete W.	256278	PlsSgt	USMC
JOYCE, Richard J.	503843	Corp	USMCR
KEMOE, Ray E.	310117	Sgt	USMCR
KEDZIOR, Bernard S.	260703	Corp	USMC
KESLING, Jackson S.	854379	Pvt	USMCR
KNISER, Richard W.	494078	Corp	USMCR
LAHERDOLA, Lawrence G.	929832	Pvt	USMCR
LANIER, Alvin Y.	975849	Pvt	USMCR
LA POINTE, Francis C., Jr.	861578	PFC	USMCR
LAWSON, Howard L.	281030	Corp	USMC
LAWSON, Don C.	920332	Pvt	USMC
LE PAGE, William E.	527336	PFC	USMCR
LINDNER, Gene M.	926752	PFC	USMCR
LOSIENIECKI, Robert J.	531042	PFC	USMCR
MADDEROM, Orville W.	339789	Sgt	USMCR
MEDICA, Paul L.	924784	PFC	USMCR
MEIER, Harry F.	489642	PFC	USMCR
MILLER, Carl E.	294574	Corp	USMC
MINOR, Theron L.	247285	PFC	USMCR
MORGAN, Robert D.	411381	PFC	USMC
MURPHY, Franklin B.	808741	PFC	USMCR
NACHTESHEIM, Henry J., Jr.	840098	Corp	USMCR
NELSON, Olaf C.	226121	1stSgt	USMC
NICHOLS, John E.	418141	Corp	USMC
ONOFER, John J.	844435	PFC	USMCR
OSBORN, Robert A.	475807	StfSgt	USMCR
PERLMAN, Ivan E.	536284	PFC	USMCR
PARKNEY, Robert J.	451649	Sgt	USMCR

Enclosure (A) to Appendix 4 to Annex Charlie to V Amphibious Corps
Landing Force Special Action Report Two Jima.

ROSTER OF PERSONNEL

ENLISTED (Cont'd)

POWELL, Herbert V.	539307	PFC	USMCR
RANS, George F.	916035	Pvt	USMCR
REISS, Harry H.	920151	PFC	USMCR
REHWICK, George W.	934542	Pvt	USMCR
REUSS, Julius A.	925265	PFC	USMCR
RHEAULT, Richard A.	556728	PFC	USMCR
ROTH, Richard J.	421916	PFC	USMCR
ROTHERMEL, Leland E.	350839	PFC	USMC
RUSSELL, William A.	882060	PFC	USMCR
SAMS, Kenneth	305034	Sgt	USMCR
SAMS, Lacy D.	918386	PFC	USMCR
SALISBURY, Leroy J.	439747	PFC	USMCR
SCHLOM, Melvin	308377	PFC	USMC
SCHROTTKE, Theodore W.	385296	Corp	USMC
SERAFIN, John	401377	Corp	USMCR
SHANAHAN, John F.	913054	Pvt	USMCR
SMITH, Donald H.	547482	Pvt	USMCR
SMITH, Leon M.	385117	Corp	USMCR
SMITH, Virgil L.	519076	PFC	USMCR
SPARKMAN, Cecil E.	918155	PFC	USMCR
SPOWIS, William P.	475489	PFC	USMCR
SWEDELL, George J., Jr.	466618	PFC	USMCR
STEVENS, John, Jr.	942738	PFC	USMCR
SWAFFIELD, Harmon H.	487482	PFC	USMCR
TAYLOR, Thomas N.	893908	PFC	USMCR
THOMPSON, Loy C.	557811	PFC	USMCR
VALENTINE, August, Jr.	398174	Sgt	USMCR
VARONE, Francis	524381	PFC	USMCR
VOLLMER, Raymond G.	494400	PFC	USMCR
WALTON, Robert A.	251395	MTSgt	USMC
WEINER, Joseph	385769	Corp	USMC
WINESETTE, William S.	955926	Pvt	USMCR
WOODING, Jack W.	281996	TSgt	USMC
ZAMADSKY, Wesley N.	443238	PFC	USMCR
ZIRKE, Carl, Jr.	910027	PFC	USMCR

U. S. NAVY

OFFICERS

BYRNE, William L.	318607	Lt(jg)(ChC)	USNR
MILLER, George J.	110998	LtComdr(MC)	USNR

ENLISTED

BJORSON, Andrew H.	666-87-06	PhM2c	USNR
KATLAVEL, Jack R.	295-49-42	CPhM	USN
MAXWELL, James E.	564-59-66	PhM2c	USNR
NEIDA, Frederic C.	627-19-30	PhM2c	USNR

 Enclosure (A) to Appendix 4 to Annex Charlie to V Amphibious Corps
 Landing Force Special Action Report, Iwo Jima.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~:

Headquarters, Second One Fifty-five Millimeter Howitzer Battalion
First Provisional Field Artillery Group, Fleet Marine Force Pacific,
In The Field:

March 5, 1945

BATTALION ROSTER
"Hq&Serv" Battery

<u>NAME</u>	<u>JACKET</u> <u>NUMBER</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>SERVICE</u>
ROWSE, Earl J.	07175	Major	MC
ELDER, Alexander A.	07344	Major	MCR
HOOVER, James R.	012561	Capt	MCR
LEWIS, Earl N.	011096	Capt	MCR
BULKOWSKI, Stanley P.	010467	1stLt	MC
BROWN, James E.	019625	1stLt	MCR
CLARK, Dale M.	016091	1stLt	MCR
DE CARO, Gabriel J.	023592	1stLt	MCR
MARION, George F.	018145	1stLt	MCR
MEYERS, Dale D.	017316	1stLt	MCR
STEIN, Siegmund M.	016927	1stLt	MCR
WALSH, David J.	018268	1stLt	MCR
BROOKS, Gilbert N.	031628	2ndLt	MCR
PAULL, William T.	042680	2ndLt	MCR
WARNER, John A.	033038	2ndLt	MCR
SMITH, Donald V.	033198	WO(MT)	MC
OVERSTREET, John W.	126999	Lt(jg)(MC)	USNR

	<u>SERIAL NO.</u>		
ADAIR, Joe C.	500791	PFC	MCR
ANDERSON, Craig E.	376971	FldCk(C)	MC
ANDERSON, Eugene E.	359882	FMCorp	MC
ANDERSON, Phillip A.	346187	PlSgt	MCR
ANDING, Chester E., Jr.	936357	Pvt(CP)	MCR-SS
ARRAND, Michael C.	323255	Corp(CP)	MC
AURICCHIO, Antonio (n)	535886	PFC	MCR
AVALLONE, Raymond A., Jr.	513673	PFC	MCR
BACON, LeRoy E.	554003	Pvt	MCR
BANZHAF, Howard B., Jr.	525389	PFC(CP)	MCR
BAREFOOT, William T.	933539	PFC(CP)	MCR-SS
BARRY, John S.	335165	Corp(CP)	MCR
BARLAGE, Wendell A.	445129	PFC	MCR
BARTLETT, Robert E.	547096	PFC(CP)	MCR
BARTON, Floyd M., Jr.	810395	ACK(C)	MC-SS
BATEMAN, James M.	434267	PFC(CP)	MCR
BERHOW, William R.	303274	PlSgt	MC
BERNHARD, Joseph A.	490069	Corp(CP)	MCR
BJERKE, Orval H.	928385	Pvt	MCR-SS
BOTHWELL, Bill A.	456692	Corp	MCR
BRADSHAW, Clifford E.	929313	PFC(CP)	MCR-SS

ENCLOSURE (A)

"Hq&Serv" Battery (Cont'd)

<u>NAME</u>	<u>SERIAL NO.</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>SERVICE</u>
BREHMER, Frank W.	558492	PFC(CP)	MCR
BROWNE, Robert R.	511435	PFC	MCR
CAMPBELL, Raymond R.	851896	Pvt	MCR-SS
CARAVEO, Edward B.	830131	PFC	MC-SS
CARMACK, Ivy C., Jr.	458744	PFC(CP)	MCR
CARRAWAY, Ernest D.	930351	PFC(CP)	MCR-SS
CAVALLERO, Dickie (n)	349713	Corp(QM)	MC
CHAFFEE, James L.	272519	StfSgt(EP)	MC
CHRISTIAN, Wade W.	424022	PFC	MCR
COOVER, Richard W.	864783	PFC	MC R-SS
COX, James G.	818417	PFC	MC-SS
COX, John D.	349727	PlSgt	MC
DEES, John M.	377986	PlSgt(OP)	MC
DEIMEL, Robert B.	283055	Pvt	MC
DEIST, Milzor W., Jr.	800942	PFC(CP)	MC-SS
DE MARTINO, Frank S.	844555	PFC	MC-SS
EDMISSON, Inis "E"	316083	Corp(CP)	MC
EGGLESTON, John W.	303067	Sgt(CP)	MC
ELLER, William C.	324210	TSgt(C)	MCR
FILLON, Stanley H.	816696	PFC	MC-SS
FOLEY, John L.	365347	Corp(OP)	MC
FORBES, John H.	446646	PFC(CP)	MCR
FORD, Jesse W.	248027	GySgt(OP)	MC
FRANCAVILLA, James (n)	349720	Corp	MCR
GERARD, Edward T.	381305	PvtCP)	MC
GILMORE, Jerel D.	820420	Corp	MC-SS
GOODWIN, Clyde W.	330390	PFC	MC
GREGORY, Dale T.	336193	Corp	MC
GRIVICH, John A.	304499	GySgt	MCR
GROWICK, Morris (n)	902407	Pvt	MCR-SS
GURNIK, Steve (n)	367595	PFC	MCR
GUSTIN, Adrian D.	334522	Corp	MC
HIETT, Walter N.	520635	PFC(CP)	MC
HINES, Clement S.	507691	PFC(CP)	MCR
HOUTS, Harold E.	294091	PFC(CP)	MC
HUCKE, Herbert R.	885287	Pvt	MCR-SS
HUFF, Edward A.	339629	Corp	MC
HUFFMAN, Fred R.	327475	PFC	MC
INGRAM, Allen H.	312300	Corp	MC
JACKEL, Carl J.	246493	MGySgt(OP)	MC
JACKSON, Joel T.	335467	Corp(CP)	MC
JASIUNAS, John P.	881996	Corp	MC-SS
JASSO, Max A.	329474	Corp	MCR
JENKINS, Raymond R.	337467	PFC	MC
JOHNSTON, Asa R.	504873	PFC(CP)	MCR
KAISER, Van L.	319303	PFC(CP)	MC
KALIS, Edward N.	339750	Sgt(QM)	MCR
KAZMIERCZAK, Arthur R.	346574	Corp	MC
KELLY, James N.	349623	SgtMaj	MCR
KEMPERS, Marion J.	940596	Pvt	MCR-SS
KEVRA, Alfred P.	304957	TSgt(C)	MCR

ENCLOSURE (A)
CONFIDENTIAL

"Hq&Serv" Battery (Cont'd).

<u>NAME</u>	<u>SERIAL NO.</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>SERVICE</u>
KIMSEY, Vale G.	303723	Corp (CP)	MCR
KLINE, Robert L.	336023	PFC	MC
KOLODZIEJ, Clarence L.	295676	Corp	MC
KUTCHER, John R.	469244	PFC	MCR
LANCE, Robert E., Jr.	306633	Corp (CP)	MR
LAWRENCE, John L.	315007	PFC (CP)	MC
LIEBERKNECHT, James A.	287606	TSgt (CP)	MCR
LIPPNER, Roberts A.	260749	PlSgt (OP)	MC
LIVINGSTON, Alfred III	316168	PFC (CP)	MC
MC CAULLEY, Virgil L.	294210	Sgt (CP)	MC
MC CLOUSKEY, Steven (n)	296841	Sgt	MC
MC NAMER, Herman S.	810058	Corp	MC-SS
MELKA, Leo M.	809712	PFC (CP)	MC-SS
MENCONI, Evo J.	270878	Sgt	MCR
MILLER, Max (n)	386676	PFC	MC
MITCHELL, Russell	298497	Sgt (EP)	MC
MORRISON, Douglas F.	449164	Corp	MCR
MURRAY, James D.	462741	Corp	MCR
NELSON, Edward L.	452180	PFC (CP)	MCR
OBERHANSLEY, Wayne A.	828686	Pvt	MCR-SS
OLSEN, Kenneth W.	506030	CCK (C)	MCR
OWENS, William T.	478331	Corp (CP)	MCR
PAIRIS, Ernest (n)	875922	PFC (CP)	MCR-SS
PAYNE, Lewis N., Jr.	336336	PFC	MC
PEER, Joseph S.	474607	Pvt	MCR
PETERSEN, Martin T., Jr.	332742	Sgt	MCR
PHILLIPS, Lloyd W.	480769	Corp	MCR
PHILLIPS, Warren R.	814356	PFC	SS-V
PROVOST, Glenn A.	335682	Corp	MCR
RADZINOWICZ, Walter (n)	834599	PFC	SS-V
REICHENBACH, Quehtin L.	892621	Corp (CP)	MCR-SS
PYEATT, Charles F.	295195	StfSgt (QM)	MC
REILLY, Bernard W.	325589	Corp (CP)	MCR
ROHDE, George A.	958671	Pvt	MCR-SS
ROMINE, John H., Jr.	934277	Pvt	MCR-SS
ROZELL, Charles A.	821121	PFC	MC-SS
SEALEY, "F" "E"	290312	Corp (QM)	MC
SKINNER, Russell M.	434206	PFC	MCR
SOARES, John P., Jr.	857640	Corp	MCR-SS
SPEAS, Claire R.	374835	PFC	MC
STANFORD, Jack (n), Jr.	321634	PFC (CP)	MC
STINSON, Jesse L.	316132	PFC	MC
ST JOHN, Harvey R.	309881	PFC (CP)	MC
STOCKS, Raymond A.	955707	ACK (C)	MCR-SS
STUMPF, Cecil L.	311338	PFC	MC
STUTTIG, Robert G.	486776	PFC	MCR
TAYLOR, Kenneth L.	271203	Corp	MC
THEALL, Francis A., Jr.	348405	PFC	MC
THOMAS, Benjamin N.	802411	PFC (OP)	MC-SS
TULLY, "C" "A"	325355	PFC	MC

ENCLOSURE (A)

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"Hq&Serv" Battery (Cont'd)

<u>NAME</u>	<u>SERIAL NO.</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>SERVICE</u>
TURLEY, David A.	488780	PFC(CP)	MCR
WARD, Levon D.	324224	Corp(CP)	MC
WARREN, William A.	330394	Corp	MC
WILDE, Leo F.	483351	Corp	MCR
WILLIAMS, Glen C.	300776	Sgt	MC
WILSON, James F., Jr.	352202	Sgt(ClfnPers)	MC
WOZNIAK, Henry M.	483133	PFC(CP)	MCR

U. S. NAVY ENLISTED

AUSDERAU, Loren C.	608-95-22	PhM3c	USNR
AUSTIN, Frank T.	826-24-99	PhM3c	USNR
BADER, Charles A.	861-56-71	PhM3c	USNR
BARAN, Joseph S.	652-67-65	PhM3c	USNR
CUMM, Kenneth W.	800-06-60	PhM3c	USNR
PAGAN, Faye E., Jr.	618-68-50	PhM2c	USNR
GRADITO, Levi F.	802-99-32	HALc	USNR
PRICE, James D.	372-25-05	PhM1c	USNR
WALSH, Raymond J.	600-74-82	PhM2c	USNR
WEISBLATT, Yale M.	712-47-70	HALc	USNR

Battery "A"

SWANSON, David W.	07392	Major	MCR
MC DOUGLE, Clyde C.	018156	1stLt	MCR
REEDER, Gordon W.	018519	1stLt	MCR
CHRAPLA, Walter (n)	041300	2ndLt	MCR
WADSWORTH, George (n), Jr.	033033	2ndLt	MCR
ZIMMERMAN, Walton M.	030484	2ndLt	MCR
TURNER, Joseph C.	038058	WO(Arty)	MC
ABEENE, Ivan A., Jr.	934525	Pvt	MCR
ADAMS, Louis F.	304139	PFC	MC
ADIE, John (n)	474397	PFC(CP)	MCR
ALLAN, Arden C.	331818	PFC	MC
ALLEN, Charles J.	824673	Pvt	MCR-SS
AMES, Polie L.	480049	PFC(CP)	MCR
AMICK, Roscoe "A"	818722	PFC(CP)	MC-SS
ARRINGTON, Ira B.	821030	Corp	MC-SS
ARETAKIS, Aristomenis A.	563623	Pvt	MCR
AVELLA, Peter S.	863209	Corp(CP)	MCR-SS
BACON, Glenn A.	430964	PFC	MCR
BAILES, William W.	340722	PFC	MC
BAILEY, Rex S.	801695	Corp	MC-SS
BALDWIN, George M.	331855	PFC	MCR
BARTH, Robert H.	528320	Pvt	MCR
BARTHOLOMEW, Raymond J.	343023	PFC	MC
BARTOLOTTA, Samuel N.	505226	PFC	MCR
BEACH, Otis L.	826696	Pvt	MCR-SS
BERNATIS, John D.	349420	Corp	MC
BETZ, Joseph E.	838046	PFC	MCR
BLANKENSHIP, Willis A.	298018	PFC	MC
BOLDEN, Carl N.	888647	PFC	MCR-SS

ENCLOSURE (A)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Battery "A" (Cont'd)

<u>NAME</u>	<u>SERIAL NO.</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>SERVICE</u>
BONDARENKO, Herbert (n)	832617	PFC	MC-SS
BOWEN, Elmer N.	321858	Pvt	MC
BROWN, Norman L.	810595	PFC	MC-SS
BROWN, Robert W.	459003	PFC	MCR
BRADY, Francis M.	951493	Pvt	MCR
BUMPAS, Meredith A., Jr.	936653	PFC(CP)	MCR-SS
BURCH, James R.	438849	PFC	MCR
BURDETTE, Edwin (n)	339863	Sgt	MCR
BUSH, Gordon B.	555822	Pvt(CP)	MCR
BUTLER, Raymond J.	348944	PFC	MC
CADY, Fred H.	887083	Pvt	MCR-SS
CARBAJAL, Gilbert A.	818434	PFC(CP)	MCR-SS
CAREY, Charles "C"	331257	Sgt	MCR
CARR, Leslie B.	325200	PFC(CP)	MC
CAVANAUGH, Charles A., Jr.	527935	Pvt	MCR
CEBULY, Frank J.	938646	Pvt	MCR-SS
CLINTON, Russell L.R., Sr.	949691	Pvt	MCR
COFFIN, William P.	472406	Corp(CP)	MCR
COUSIN, Eugene J.	517406	PFC	MCR
CONNOR, Lewis R.	957221	Pvt	MCR
CRADDOCK, Herbert W.	876022	PFC	SS-V
CRAFT, Wallace S.	878561	PFC	SS-V
CURRY, William (n)	976631	Pvt	MCR-SS
DAVIDSON, Canby L.	224599	GySgt	MC
DAVISON, Warren L.	827014	Pvt	MCR-SS
DAY, Raymond E.	963641	Pvt	MCR
DEMYAN, Andy J.	898382	PFC	MCR-SS
DEUEL, Richard E.	540624	Pvt	MCR
DILBECK, Pascal B.	334882	PFC	MC
DIPPERY, Robert H.	867758	Pvt	MCR-SS
DRAPER, Rulon P.	303403	TSgt(c)	MC
DUNCAN, George B., Jr.	856435	PFC	MCR
EITZER, Robert H.	510641	Pvt	MCR
EVANOFF, Dimitre J.	454502	ACK(C)	MCR
FAGG, Harlan E.	324243	PFC	MC
FEDERER, Bruce I.	316457	GySgt	MC
FORTUNA, Stanley F.	404864	Corp	MCR
FRANCESCHINI, James A.	419889	Corp	MCR
FRANECKI, Leo A.	507080	Corp	MCR
FRANK, Bernard M.	528646	Pvt	MCR
GARTON, Donald R.	334234	Corp	MC
GLICK, Robert P.	308593	Corp(CP)	MC
GILOMEN, William J.	366522	PFC	MC
GIVENS, Charles R.	338854	Corp	MC
GOIDA, Frank (n)	903607	PFC	MCR-SS
GORDON, Hugh J.	818099	Pvt	MC-SS
GRIFFIN, Charlie M., Jr.	399154	PFC	MC
GRIFFITH, Thomas L.	920372	Pvt	MCR-SS
GRISHAM, Clyde E.	366521	FltCk(C)	MC
HASSINGER, Jesse M.	519118	Corp	MCR

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Battery "A"(Cont'd)

<u>NAME</u>	<u>SERIAL NO.</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>SERVICE</u>
HICKMAN, Henry M.	333519	Corp	MC
HILD, Gilbert E.	330266	PFC	MC
HOGUE, Donald F.	819057	PFC(CP)	MC-SS
HOLLOWAY, Anthony R.	892376	PFC	MCR-SS
HOSKINS, Carl J.	407840	PFC	MCR
HOUG, Lawrence A.	813915	Corp	MCR-SS
HOWE, Fredrick O.	494772	PFC	MCR
HUNTSMAN, George E.	523196	Pvt	MCR
JANATA, Ernest	931761	ACK(C)	MCR-SS
JONES, Alfonso H.	809511	PFC	MC-SS
JUDD, Guy G.	346706	PFC	MC
KAVANAH, Thomas J.	805512	PFC	MC-SS
KEMP, Silas M.	335843	Corp	MC
KRAMBEER, Arthur L., Jr.	339826	Corp	MCR
KRASNER, John (n)	350850	PFC	MC
LABOSKY, John I.	480945	PFC	MCR
LAFFERTY, Jerome E., Jr.	805493	PFC(PC)	MC-SS
LARSON, Arthur C.	335933	PlSgt	MC
LAWLER, Harold J.	937621	PFC	MCR-SS
MANKIN, "J" "D"	410472	Corp	MCR
MARTIN, John K.	463517	PFC	MCR
MASHEK, Joseph H.	335458	Sgt	MC
MASSIE, Wallace (n)	976616	Pvt	MCR-SS
MATUSIAK, Edward B.	339802	Corp	MCR
MAUS, Chester A., Jr.	333960	Corp	MC
MC CLENNY, Charles W., Jr.	338856	Corp	MC
MC COLLOM, Hobert W.	946180	Pvt	MCR-SS
MC DONOUGH, Francis R.	519834	PFC	MCR
MC FARLANE, Everett A.	442826	PFC(CP)	MCR
MERLE, Jack G.	464884	PFC	MCR
MILLER, Donald R.	809240	PFC	MC-SS
MITCHELL, Robert	805471	PFC(CP)	MC-SS
MONETTE, John T.	832412	PFC	MC-SS
MOORE, Hillar C., Jr.	874000	PFC	MCR-SS
MOORE, Thomas M.	347933	Corp	MC
MORAN, Eddie E.	521033	PFC	MCR
MORGAN, James H., Jr.	462744	PFC	MCR
MORRISON, Richard K.	336987	PFC	MC
NEFF, Samuel J.	480055	PFC	MCR
NESS, VeRn R.	476531	PFC	MCR
NICHOLS, Frank W.	464849	Corp	MCR
NORRELL, Richard H.	339823	Sgt	MCR
ODELL, Lawrence C.	336368	ACK(C)	MC
ORTIZ, Charlie (n)	821115	PFC	MC-SS
PALMER, Fred C.	314267	1stSgt	MC
PATTERSON, George S.	864933	PFC(CP)	MCR-SS
PERRAULT, Harold J.	928318	PFC(CP)	MCR-SS
PFOHL, Carlton L.	546042	PFC(CP)	MCR
PIANELLI, Albert J.	863786	PFC	MCR-SS
FOLK, Frank C.	513973	PFC	MCR

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Battery "A" (Cont'd)

<u>NAME</u>	<u>SERIAL NO.</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>SERVICE</u>
PORTER, David E.	803641	PFC	MC-SS
PRICE, William H., Jr.	555020	Pvt (CP)	MCR
RODENBERG, Alton T.	489181	Corp	MCR
RUANE, James E.	896701	PFC	MCR-SS
SALVETER, Frank J.	913137	PFC	MCR-SS
SANDANGELO, Carmine (n)	864164	PFC	MCR-SS
SCANLAND, Stewart S.	912074	PFC	MCR-SS
SCARDINO, James N.	336022	Corp	MC
SKUPSKI, Zigmund J., Jr.	266608	Sgt	MCR
SMITH, John A., Jr.	464938	PFC	MCR
SOLTESZ, William (n)	497401	PFC	MCR
STACK, James T.	272215	PFC	MC
STAHL, Joseph H.	486498	Corp	MCR
STANFILL, Cleatus L.	271636	PFC	MC
STEGMAN, Thomas E.	486534	PFC	MCR
STEWART, James A.	467977	PFC	MCR
ST PIERRE, Reginald J.	470047	PFC(CP)	MCR
SWEENEY, Gerald E.	805607	PFC	MC-SS
TANCOS, Rudolph (n)	330652	PFC	MC
THOMAS, Donald F.	953871	Pvt	MCR-SS
THOMSON, Robert D.	818180	PFC	MC-SS
TIFTON, Henry L.	883157	PFC	MCR-SS
TOWNSLEY, Kenneth N.	522236	PFC	MCR
TURLEY, John W.	316663	Sgt(CP)	MC
VAN WINKLE, Raymond S., Jr.	330391	Corp	MC
WATKINS, Richard W.	519947	pFC	MCR
WHARTNABY, George M. III	872577	PFC	MCR-SS
WOOD, Ledger (n)	894778	PFC	MCR-ss

Battery "B"

LEEK, Clarence W.	014713	Capt	MCR
LOUGHMAN, Robert H.	018451	1stLt	MCR
KANE, Philip M.	026956	1stLt	MCR
BURNHAM, Rufus B., Jr.	031915	2ndLt	MCR
JOHNSON, Walter H., Jr.	042689	2ndLt	MCR
THURLOW, Donald W.	033027	2ndLt	MCR
ADAMS, Thomas E.	976620	Pvt	MCR-SS
ALLEN, Floyd J.	814142	PFC	SS-V
ALTIZIO, Patrick R.	806818	PFC(CP)	SS-V
ASHTON, Arthur A.	349400	PFC	MC
BAEK, James B.	555831	PFC(CP)	MCR
BAHAR, Anthony L.	339842	Sgt	MCR
BANFIELD, John F.	488178	PFC	MCR
BECK, Omer M.	356119	Corp	MCR
BIGCRAFT, James O.	522247	Corp	MCR
BLINN, John D.	509628	PFC	MCR
BOONE, Orval H.	820674	PFC	MC-SS

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Battery "B" (Cont'd)

<u>NAME</u>	<u>SERIAL NO.</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>SERVICE</u>
BOOTH, Jack Z.	802588	Corp	MC-SS
BOOTH, John S.	339757	Sgt	MCR
BRADBURY, William A.	814378	PFC	SS-V
BRANCH, Marion D.	317598	TSgt(C)	MC
BRAUER, Joseph P.	412687	PFC	MCR
BROWN, Arnold E.	326956	PFC	MC
BUERGEY, William L.	510996	PFC	MCR
BULLOCK, John W.	921228	PFC	MCR-SS
BURKE, Ernest M., Jr.	519467	PFC	MCR
CALABRESE, Carmelo R.	844663	PFC	MCR-SS
CAMPBELL, Bobby G.	351855	Corp	MC
CANON, Ernest B.	340887	Corp	MCR
CARMICHAEL, Elmer R.	896827	PFC	MCR-SS
CATARIUS, Walter A.	373169	Corp(OP)	MCR
CELLI, Herman	911784	Pvt	MCR-SS
CHANEY, Robert L.	831895	Corp(OP)	MC-SS
CLARK, Charles E.	494878	PFC	MCR
CLAVIN, Francis N.	341163	Corp	MCR
CLUTE, Jasper L.	830324	PFC(CP)	MC-SS
CONKLIN, Harold R.	473054	PFC(CP)	MCR
COOLEY, George W., Jr.	567201	Pvt	MCR
COX, Robert B.	801697	PFC	MC-SS
CRISWELL, Lawrence D.	475762	Pvt	MCR
CUMMINS, Rudolph J.	312464	Corp	MC
DAVIS, Foster E.	976126	PFC	MCR-SS
DI CARLO, Victor	547352	PFC	MCR
DOBBERSTEIN, August B.	345831	PFC	MC
DOBBS, Roy	270335	Corp	MC
DOCYE, James	879097	PFC	MCR-SS
FISSEL, Lawrence F.	811993	PFC	MC-SS
FLOWERS, Lester G.	534013	Corp	MCR
FREELS, Alfred G.	296806	PlSgt	MC
FROST, Robert E.	339791	Corp	MCR
FOX, George W.	336339	Pvt	MC
FUNK, Cameron C.	338846	Sgt	MC
GIBSON, Andrew J.	940788	Pvt	MCR-SS
GOUCAN, LeRoy F.	403292	PFC	MC
GRAHAM, Louis J.	554560	Pvt	MCR
HAROLD, Joe N.	340715	Corp	MC
HEERDE, William A.	320589	Corp(CP)	MC
HIDY, Joe	881751	PFC	MCR-SS
HILL, Charles R.	269169	Corp	MC
HILL, Walter J.	336129	Sgt(CP)	MC
HIGMAN, George R.	953978	Pvt	MCR
HODAL, Robert J.	531661	PFC	MCR
HOOTEN, James LeR.	815960	PFC	MC-SS
HORN, Stanley L.	335564	Corp	MC
INTEROMASSO, Joseph J.	886038	Pvt	MCR
IVANOSKI, Joseph	810160	PFC	MC-SS
JENSEN, George J.	424990	Corp(CP)	MCR

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Battery "B" (Cont'd).

<u>NAME</u>	<u>SERIAL NO.</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>SERVICE</u>
JEWELL, Ernest P.	331459	PFC	MC
JIMINEZ, Joe M.M.	349615	Corp	MC
JOHNSON, John L.	873184	PFC	MCR-SS
JOHNSON, Roger M.	329544	Corp	MC
JOHNSON, Walter	942254	PFC	MCR-SS
KAMINSKEY, George A.	934183	Pvt	MCR-SS
KEIFER, Hillary G.	816008	PFC	MC*SS
KEWLEY, Thomas LeR.	465694	PFC(OP)	MCR
KIRBY, James M.	526554	PFC	MCR
KIRK, Ernest A., Jr.	333963	Corp	MC
KLIMA, Charles J.	328756	PlSgt	MC
KUBICH, Francis A.	895547	PFC	MCR-SS
LACEFIELD, Lindon O.	868511	PFC	MCR-SS
LAURO, Andrew	886431	Pvt	MCR
LEA, Fred P.	201772	1stSgt	MCR
LITUS, John	901469	PFC	MCR-SS
LOCKHART, Carl L.	948091	Pvt	MCR
LUCKENBILL, Benjamin F., Jr	531477	PFC	MCR
MACHU, Clarence E.	820543	PFC	MC-SS
MACKEY, Cleo F.	941441	PFC	MCR-SS
MAGNER, Hugh R.	940388	PFC	MCR-SS
MANLEY, John P.	863161	PFC	MCR-SS
MAYFIELD, Charles D.	963694	Pvt	MCR-SS
MC COY, Ray J.	382341	Pvt	MCR
MC KAY, Vernis H.	868075	PFC	MCR-SS
MEISTER, William T.	516946	PFC	MCR
MERRILL, William K.	504906	Corp	MCR
MILLER, James W.	814319	PFC	SS-V
MILLER, Philip L.	892308	PFC	MCR-SS
MINENKO, Alexander	507575	ACK(C)	MCR
MORGAN, Ralph R.	875421	PFC	MCR-SS
MULLOY, Michael J.	438161	Corp	MCR
NATHAN, Robert I.	885723	PFC	MCR-SS
NELSON, Jack	817860	PFC	MC-SS
NELSON, Mervin D.	817560	PFC	MC-SS
NORD, Jerome A.	464815	Corp	MCR
NOVAK, Thomas A.	285525	Sgt(EP)	MCR
O'LEARY, William J.	520935	PFC	MCR
OLIVER, James J.	925976	Pvt	MCR
O'REILLY, Charles	336421	Corp(OP)	MCR
PAPE, Leroy E.	458717	Corp	MCR
PARSLEY, Clyde E.	464819	PFC(OP)	MCR
PATRUSKA, Anthony A.	873463	Pvt	MCR-SS
PEARL, Roland E.	456446	PFC	MCR
PENN, Charles D.	471725	Fldck(C)	MCR
PIAZZA, Francis A.	472416	PFC	MCR
PICARD, Arthur R.	808422	PFC	MCR-SS
POLLARD, Richard P.	466580	Corp	MCR
POLLEY, Charles R.	464846	PFC	MCR
QUAILE, Kenneth H.	941312	PFC(OP)	MCR-SS

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Battery "B" (Cont'd).

<u>NAME</u>	<u>SERIAL NO.</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>SERVICE</u>
RAMPHREY, George W., Jr.	884862	Pvt	MCR-SS
RAUPACH, Ray F.	939084	PFC (CP)	MCR-SS
REYNOLDS, Harry G., Jr.	820297	PFC	MC-SS
RHODES, William H.	566807	PFC (CP)	MCR
RICE, Lloyd A.	559656	Pvt (CP)	MCR
RICHARDSON, Perry A.	929654	PFC (CP)	MCR-SS
ROBESON, William S., Jr.	561819	PFC (CP)	MCR
RODRIGUEZ, Juventino V. Jr	335978	Sgt (QM)	MC
SCHELLHAMMER, Charles A.	483874	Corp	MCR
SHEARD, Everett H.	824684	Pvt	MC-SS
SHRIVES, Athur C.	346710	PFC	MCR
SIEBEL, John F.	500509	PFC (CP)	MCR
SOBO, Albert G.	501696	PFC	MCR
SPEISER, Clinton E.	869224	PFC	MCR-SS
SPRIGGS, Raymond L.	294636	PFC	MC
STASZEWSKI, Leonard W.	931652	Pvt	MCR-SS
SUMNERS, Frank J.	475295	PFC	MCR
SZUBRA, Kazimer E.	487545	PFC	MCR
TARTARO, Salvatore J.	455889	PFC	MCR
THOM, James C.	486520	Corp	MCR
TOMKO, John J.	489574	PFC	MCR
TRUSSELL, Byrd J., Jr.	500875	PFC	MCR
TSACOU MANGOS, James	964108	Pvt	MCR-SS
TUOMINEN, Urho E.	937942	Pvt	MCR-SS
UNGER, Robert G.	337816	Sgt	MC
WARREN, Harding C.	288649	PFC	MC
WEAVER, Maxwell C.	336093	Corp	MCR
WEIS, Martin C.	342119	CCK (C)	MCR
WHIPP, Lloyd L.	887890	PFC (CP)	MCR-SS
WILLIAMS, Judson T.M.	335365	PFC	MC
WILSON, Charles V.	889154	PFC	MCR-SS
WINISTOERFER, Francis W.	342001	Corp	MCR
WISNIEWSKI, Cheslaw F.	531695	Corp	MCR
WOOLBRIGHT, Cecil C., Jr.	321659	PFC (CP)	MCR
ZUELKE, Joseph H.	866519	PFC	MCR-SS

Battery "C"

SHIVELY, Morris V.	010957	Capt.	MC
NORTON, Frank B.	027014	1st Lt.	MCR
SELLERS, Elmer L.	019593	1st Lt.	MCR
SULLIVAN, John L.	027071	1st Lt.	MCR
COBURN, Carl G.	032854	2d Lt.	MCR
ABRAHAM, Lee H.	315014	Sgt	MC
AGNETTI, Guido J.	805603	PFC	MC-SS
AKERS, Virgil P.	456617	PFC	MCR

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Battery "C" (Cont'd).

<u>NAME</u>	<u>SERIAL NO.</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>SERVICE</u>
ANDERSON, John H., Jr.	474214	PFC	MCR
ATCHISON, William J.	515150	PFC	MCR
BERARD, James A.	474576	PFC(CP)	MCR
BROCK, Henry M.	515025	Corp(OP)	MCR
BROWN, Arthur T.	349775	Sgt(CP)	MC
CAMPBELL, Francis L.	452526	Pvt	MCR
CARBONE, Salvatore	473202	PFC(CP)	MCR
CHRISTIAN, Alton R.	524269	PFC	MCR
CHURICH, Joe E.	346713	Sgt	MCR
COLA, Domenic	824587	Pvt	MCR-SS
COLBERT, Norman	825480	PFC	MCR-SS
COMACHO, Joseph L.	295111	PFC	MC
CONWAY, Benedict E.	880625	PFC	MCR-SS
COOPER, Roy N.	339721	Corp	MCR
CRADDOCK, Onnie G., Jr.	960598	Pvt	MCR-SS
CRANDELL, Harry B.	509042	PFC	MCR
DEAN, Francis M.	349898	PFC	MC
DOCKERY, Clarence J.	857922	PFC	MCR-SS
DORN, Theodore	299239	Corp	MC
DUMPHY, Phillip E.	348339	Pvt	MC
ERBACH, John H.	519854	PFC	MCR
ERLE, John C.	918647	PFC	MCR-SS
ETTINGER, James R.	337375	Corp	MCR
FERET, George	455655	PFC(CP)	MCR
FORD, Iven J.	327334	PFC	MC
FRAZIER, Charlie G.	331168	Corp	MC
GILLILAND, Emmett L, Jr.	318631	PFC(CP)	MC
GODIN, Henry N.	297710	Corp(QM)	MC
GOOD, Joe T.	315227	Corp	MC
GOODE, Joe M.	476092	PFC	MCR
GRAGERT, Lloyd G.F.	894710	PFC	MCR-SS
GRAY, James D.	975541	Pvt	MCR-SS
GRIFFITH, Lloyd V.	817416	PFC(CP)	MC-SS
GRUBEN, Robert P.	800926	PFC(CP)	MC-SS
GUNTHER, George C., Jr.	351851	Fldck(C)	MC
HALE, Richard K.	340991	Corp	MC
HAYNES, Warren T.	889487	PFC	MCR-SS
HOOVER, Walter J.	813933	PFC	MC-SS
HOSSFELD, Robert E.	820738	PFC	MC-SS
HURD, John L.	337386	Sgt(EP)	MCR
JEROME, Donald C.	374434	PFC	MCR
JOHNSON, Jesse J., Jr.	339783	Sgt	MCR
JONES, Daniel T.	819475	PFC(CP)	MC-SS
KENNEDY, Joseph H.	851805	Pvt	MCR-SS
LAKE, Kenneth C.	337394	Corp	MCR
LEATH, George F., Jr.	947034	Pvt	MCR-SS
LONG, Robert Ler.	931722	PFC	MCR-SS
LUBAHN, William C.	521447	PFC(CP)	MCR
LUKEHART, Paul A.	836577	PFC	MCR-SS
MACIOLEK, Harold F.	334221	Corp	MC

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Battery "C" (Cont'd)

<u>NAME</u>	<u>SERIAL NO.</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>SERVICE</u>
MC BRIDE, Ralph E.	866319	Corp	MCR-ss
MC COY, Thomas F.	950187	Pvt	MCR
MC DONALD, Clyde H.	347447	PFC	MC
MC DONALD, Mithhell E.	813267	Corp	MCR-SS
MC KEE, Chesley LeR.	471683	PFC	MCR
MC LAIN, Daniel E.	858886	Corp	MCR-SS
MARTIN, Victor N.	953386	Pvt	MCR
MATTISON, Charlie B.	847179	Pvt	MCR
MEALY, Paul L.	314277	Sgt	MC
MERANDA, Vincent P.	335734	Corp	MC
MISIEWICZ, Henry E.	459671	PFC (CP)	MCR
MOTT, Ernest W., Sr.	945194	Pvt	MCR-SS
MUDZINSKI, Edward B.	886107	PFC	MCR-SS
MULHOLLAN, William O., Jr.	927340	Pvt	MCR-SS
MURRY, Robert E.	550479	Pvt	MCR
NEUZIL, Robert F.	940410	PFC	MCR-SS
NICHOLS, John H.	341999	PFC	MCR
NILES, Howard F.	500097	PFC	MCR
OELKE, Walter H.	860714	PFC	MC-SS
O'HARA, Thomas J.	366291	Pvt	MC
NUNEVILLER, Thomas H.	966438	Pvt	MCR
PAINTER, Leon H.	298157	Sgt (QM)	MC
PASZTERNAK, Michael F.	938679	PFC	MCR-SS
PAYNE, Robert D.	878149	PFC	MCR-SS
PERKINS, Doyle W.	945867	PFC	MCR-SS
PERRY, Charlei R.	335643	Corp	MCR
PETERSON, Marvin G.	511077	PFC	MCR
PETTY, Harold J.	867151	Corp	MCR-SS
PFLUGER, Kenneth J.	868983	PFC	MCR-SS
FISCITELLO, James (n)	880538	PFC	MCR-SS
PLASNER, Milton R.	304186	Corp (CP)	MCR
POLETIS, Andrew (n)	886151	PFC	MCR-SS
REAGAN, Thomas "G"	294225	PFC	MC
REES, James M.	308617	Pvt	MC
RICKMAN, "J" Richard	328601	Corp (CP)	MC
RITTER, Jessie A.	976623	Pvt	MCR
ROBERTS, William M.	467533	Corp	MCR
ROBINSON, Don F.	828460	Pvt	MCR
RODRIGUEZ, Joseph A.	535909	PFC	MCR
ROE, Gene L.	350785	PFC (CP)	MCR
ROEPKE, Robert E.	931692	Pvt (CP)	MCR-SS
ROGALSKY, Francis (n)	863694	Corp	MCR-SS
ROGERS, Truman A., Jr.	429767	PFC	MC
RONEY, Kerr L.	946369	Pvt (CP)	MCR-SS
ROSE, Charles W.	866645	PFC	MCR-SS
ROSES, Joseph A.	466590	PFC (CP)	MCR
RUCKMAN, Maurice E.	464885	Corp	MCR
SALSCHIEDER, John J.	476526	PFC	MCR
SHELL, Bobbie N.	531265	PFC	MCR
SCHLEMMER, Edward C.	946205	Pvt	MCR

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Battery "C" (Cont'd)

<u>NAME</u>	<u>SERIAL NO.</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>SERVICE</u>
SCHMALZER, Harry M.	882570	PFC	MCR-SS
SHACKLEY, Guy E.	294814	Sgt	MC
SHIMKUS, Tony A.	493977	Corp	MCR
SIMMONS, Dexter S.	941380	ACK(C)	MCR-SS
SIMON, Herman J.	818660	Corp	MCR-SS
SINE, Paul L.	351849	Corp	MC
SKRMETTI, Thomas J.	499644	PFC	MCR
SPARKS, Jack R.	455046	PFC	MCR
STAFFORD, George W.	288437	GySgt	MC
STROUD, Volley E.	297583	Corp	MC
STRUNK, Clyde C.	408271	Pvt	MCR
TARIN, Alex J.	297111	TSgt(C)	MC
TARNOWSKI, Joseph P.	466359	PFC	MCR
THOMPSON, Dennis "E"	252853	Sgt	MCR
TOWN, William B., Jr.	487541	PFC(CF)	MCR
VAN DYKE, Garrett (n)	954255	Pvt	MCR-SS
VAN HEKKEN, James R.	274 955	1stSgt	MC
VAN HORN, Lawrence B.	854482	ACK(C)	MCR-SS
VELVICK, Franklin LeR.	820742	PFC	MC-SS
VESTAL, Newell E.	335364	Corp	MC
VOSEFKA, Richard E.	909114	Corp(CF)	MC-SS
WALL, Harold McK.	465580	PFC	MCR
WALTERS, Frank J. "D"	828539	Pvt	MCR*ss
WALTERS, Leslie E.	326099	PFC	MC
WATSON, Ralph H.	309582	Sgt	MC
WHEELER, James L.	549150	Pvt	MCR
WIDDICOMBE, Darold E.	920436	Pvt	MCR-SS
WIESER, Eugene L.	325588	Corp(CF)	MC
WIGHT, Donald W.	499725	PFC	MCR
WILSON, Dewey V.	826638	Pvt	MCR-SS
WISNIEWSKI, William J.	479189	Corp	MCR
WOOD, Robert D., Jr.	874368	PFC	MCR-SS
WOOTON, Horace G.	277407	Corp	MC
WRIGHT, Robert G.	894573	PFC	MCR-SS
WRIGHT, Ural C., Jr.	824756	Pvt	MCR
ZAHN, Ivan E.	512715	PFC	MCR
ZALESKI, Stanley W.	489315	Corp	MCR
ZANG, Clarence H.	331540	PFC(CF)	MC
ZWACK, Harold D.	556824	Pvt	MCR

ENCLOSURE (A)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

F&S BATTERY, FOURTH 155mm. HOWITZER BATTALION,
FIRST PROVISIONAL FIELD ARTILLERY GROUP, FWT, PACIFIC,
C/O FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA.

5 March, 1945.

ROSTER OF PERSONNEL

PRIMARY

NAME	FILE OR SER. NO.	MILITARY SSN.	SPECIALIST DESIGNATION	SERVICE	RANK
BERGMAN, Ferdinand J.	036105	4801	Ord	MC	WO.
BUDDETT, Marvin R.	07841	1193		MCR	Maj.
DANIEL, Joe W.	07742	1193		MC	Maj.
FROST, Frank L.	028623	4801	Arty	MC	CWO.
GERB, Donn L.	013934	0600		MCR	1stLt.
HAMILTON, Hilton	020060	2900	Gen	MC	WO
HATCHER, Paul C., Jr.	013948	1193		MCR	1stLt.
KELLETT, Joseph C.	032925	1029		MCR	2dLt.
MARTELLO, Onofrio J.	015537	0350		MCR	1stLt.
MONTGOMERY, Harold C.	011570	4010		MCR	Capt.
PIERCE, Philip N.	013132	1193		MCR	Capt.
REEVE, Douglas E.	05404	1194		MC	Lt-Col.
SHERWOOD, Harry L., Jr.	020189	1029		MCR	1stLt.
SPLITTFORSE, Paul W.	014162	4000		MCR	Capt.
WORRELL, Shuman B.	09909	9301		MCR	Capt.
BAKER, "A". M., Jr.	183434		MC-V-(G)	USNR	Lt(jg)
ALGER, George P.	420088	060	(C)	MCR	ACK.
ARMSTRONG, Charles R.	499192	641	CP tp	MCR	PFC
BASOLO, Peter J.	948340	645		MCR	Pvt
BELMERKA, Joseph J.	828227	521		MCR	Pvt
BLAIN, John S., Jr.	484349	776	CP Rad	MCR	PFC
BLILEY, Robert A.	829604	641	CP tp	MCR	PFC
BORSH, Vernon G.	880411	641	CP tp	MCR	PFC
BOSSETTA, Joseph R.	510079	645		MCR	PFC
BRALEY, Byard C.	555018	521		MCR	Pvt
BRAVERMAN, Joseph	804515	645		MC	PFC
BUCKLEY, James M.	466518	776	CP Rad	MCR	PFC
CARLSON, Arthur F.	459829	641	CP tp	MCR	Corp.
CARTER, William W.	452160	645		MCR	Sgt.
CASE, Frank L.	948653	521		MCR	Pvt
CAUSEY, Carroll A.	838746	745		MCR	PFC
CHAMPITTO, Francis J.	873047	776	CP Rad	MCR	PFC
CHITMAN, James L.	558887	636		MCR	Pvt
CLARK, Berthal R.	432390	060	(C)	MCR	FldCk.
COLLIER, Noble	379410	014	QM Mech	MCR	Corp.

NAME	FILE OR SER. NO.	PRIMARY MILITARY SSN.	SPECIALIST DESIGNATION	SERVICE	RANK
COLLINS, Hoyle N., Jr.	509558	645		MCR	Sgt.
CONWAY, Harold E.	452705	641	CP tp	MCR	PFC
COPISEK, John R., Jr.	539977	745		MCR	PFC
CORNETT, Ralph	842121	641	CP tp	MCR	PFC
DAVIS, Marion E.	880630	014		MCR	PFC
DAVIS, Melvin M.	527942	645		MCR	Pvt.
DAY, Cecil E.	236906	584		MC	SgtMaj.
D'ELETTE, William J.	530767	204		MCR	PFC
DELPH, Dennis D.	819280	641	CP tp	MCR	PFC
DEMENT, Wordie L.	815295	373		MC	PFC
DIEFFENBACH, Erle R.	800677	645		MCR	PFC
DRABIK, Peter	851518	606		MCR	Corp.
DUNNAGAN, James L.	849291	645		MCR	Corp.
DUTTON, Benjamin F.	211029	585		MC	PlSgt.
ECKEL, Robert G.	938511	645		MCR	Pvt
EDWARD, James	804500	196		MC	PFC
ELLIS, James W.	423064	641	CP tp	MCR	PFC
ELSON, Roddy M.	838974	196		MCR	PFC
ERNST, Sidney W., Jr.	409575	275	PC	MCR	Sgt.
FINNIE, Thomas	468057	641	CP tp	MCR	PFC
GALIFER, Leonard	156495	812		MC	MGySgt.
GARRIGAN, Edgar L., Jr.	529812	645		MCR	Corp.
GRABLEY, Adolph	948607	645		MCR	Pvt
GRAY, Bruce W.	856779	922	OP	MCR	Corp.
GRILLI, Frank J.	807682	641	CP tp	MC	PFC
HAMILTON, Wayne E.	840894	345		MC	PFC
HARDY, Russell T.	437024	606		MCR	Corp.
HARPER, Glenn R.	816987	055		MC	PFC.
HAYES, Phillip T.	893912	521		MCR	PFC
HEBELS, James W.	547209	641	CP tp	MCR	Corp.
HECKMAN, Rollin T.	519434	606		MCR	Pvt
HINKLE, Fredrick C.	322669	641	CP tp	MC	PFC
HODGES, Marshall J.	481277	776	CP Rad	MCR	PFC
HOPKINS, Harold C.	424686	606		MC	Corp.
HOUSER, Earnest C.	858276	345		MCR	PFC
HULL, Thurman P.	947718	645		MCR	Pvt
HUBBARD, Arthur M., Jr.	903497	645		MCR	Pvt
HINKINS, John E.	800054	645		MC	Corp.
HOPKINS, Fred L.	397174	645		MCR	Corp.
JONES, Ernest E.	914232	645		MCR	PFC
KNAUB, Harry F.	966523	345		MCR	Pvt
KOUTSONIS, Alexander	465207	014		MCR	PFC
LANGLEY, Warren L.	812946	645		MC	Sgt.

NAME	PRIMARY		DESIGNATION	SERVICE	RANK
	FILE OR SER. NO.	MILITARY SSI.			
LASZY, Robert S.	839383	776	CP Rad	MCR	PFC
LATEIMER, James R.	905120	776	CP Rad	MCR	PFC
LAVALLEY, Orville W.	816529	606		MC	Coro.
LEE, James W.	920348	776	CP Rad	MCR	PFC
LEFRMANN, Vernon K.	811139	641	CP tp	MCR	PFC
LEUNG, Julius E., Jr.	800114	557		MC	PFC
LEWIS, Donald F.	525905	606		MCR	PFC
LEWIS, Lawson E.	255582	553	EP	MC	StfSgt.
LIEBERT, William C.	934526	645		MCR	Pvt
LOFFER, John F.	845278	501		MCR	Corp.
MAGOWAT, Lewis G.	814491	014		MC	PFC
MAGNAN, Richard C.	493631	501		MCR	Sgt.
MAYKASTAN, Leo J.	460524	913	OP	MCR	Corp.
MCCANN, John P.	841799	645		MCR	PFC
MALAYEK, Edward J.	880641	511	OP	MCR	Corp.
MARSALA, Joseph	298479	813	QM Mech	MC	StfSgt.
MASCI, Ralph	432132	745		MCR	PFC
MC CROSSIN, George K.	809036	641	CP tp	MC	PFC
MC MULLEN, Edwin P.	472573	645		MCR	Corp.
MERRY, Ceylon L.	526618	745		MCR	PFC
MICHAEL, Roger J.	459824	060	(c)	MCR	ACK.
MIKOLAJCZAK, Thomas A.	459996	345		MCR	Corp.
MILNER, James L. J.	411138	641	CP tp	MCR	Corp.
MILLER, Robert M.	390098	776	CP Rad	MCR	PFC
MINDLIRON, John F.	432601	645		MCR	Corp.
MILLS, Alexander	834453	641	CP tp	MCR	PFC
MICCHIANTI, Louis J.	513065	641	CP tp	MCR	PFC
MORAN, Harry D.	513147	524	CP	MCR	StfSgt.
MORFIS, Abraham R.	904582	521		MCR	Pvt
MARTIN, Leonard W., Jr.	502994	641	CP tp	MCR	Corp.
MASARD, Angelo R.	851851	521		MCR	Pvt
MATERNON, Roy L.	820307	776	CP Rad	MC	PFC
PIROG, Albin J.	254177	505		MCR	PlSgt.
PLACHARCZYK, Edward S.	390576	913	OP	MC	PlSgt.
POMAS, Eugene J.	377967	595	CP tp	MCR	Sgt.
PROTZMAN, Donald P.	405623	776	CP Rad	MCR	PFC
RAMEER, Glenn E.	834244	645		MC	PFC
RATLIFF, Doyle D.	335395	345		MC	PFC
RISNEY, Ralph R.	470458	776	CP Rad	MCR	Corp.
REYNOLDS, Henry E.	501914	641	CP tp	MCR	Corp.
ROBIDEAU, James J.	832357	645		MC	Corp.
ROGERS, Francis G.	531501	645	CP tp	MCR	PFC
ROSLER, Carl L.	476471	511	OP	MCR	Corp

NAME	PRIMARY		SPECIALIST	SERVICE	RANK
	FILE OR SER. NO.	SSN.			
RUGH, John W.	487006	174	CP Rad	MCR	Pvt
SANDBANK, Leo	472203	776	CP Rad	MCR	Corp.
SCHNEIBLING, Harry W.	476360	645		MCR	PFC
SCOTT, Charles W.	374059	803	FM	MC	Corp.
SCOTT, Douglas F.	306434	814		MCR	FlSgt.
SEAWRIGHT, Raymond L.	462832	606		MCR	Sgt.
SHARPE, Edwin W. III	526690	745		MCR	Pvt
SHELTON, Leslie T., Jr.	499677	645		MCR	PFC
SKINNER, John L.	286378	913	OP	MC	GySgt.
SKOCZEN, Henry J.	859011	645		MCR	PFC
SMITH, Doren J.G.	356399	196		MC	Corp.
SNIDER, James A.	530236	776	CP Rad	MCR	PFC
SPERBER, Jim F.	887125	645		MCR	Pvt
STOLLE, Norman C.	422365	345		MCR	PFC
STONE, Norman L.	285364	566		MC	Corp.
TERRY, Harry R.	521357	776	CP Rad	MCR	Pvt
THACKER, Ray E.	976639	521		MCR	Pvt
TOMPKINS, William O.	415114	776	CP Rad	MCR	PFC
TREMBLAY, Albert J.	222616	824	(C)	MC	TSgt.
TUNGER, Reynold H.	414229	060	(C)	MCR	ACK.
URELL, Harry	318593	645		MC	PFC
VAN ORSDOLL, Eugene G.	468391	641	CP tp	MCR	PFC
WALNER, Frederick M.	390019	783	CP Rad	MCR	Corp.
WALSH, Martin J.	451891	645		MCR	PFC
WATERMAN, Clyde J.	824230	204	QM Mech	MCR	Sgt.
WEST, Harold T.	500832	776	CP Rad	MCR	PFC
WHITE, Benjamin F., Jr.	387390	636		MC	PFC
WILSON, Robert B.	497530	645		MCR	Corp.
WINDFIELD, Lloyd, Jr.	398464	501		MCR	Corp.
WISKELSPECHT, Lawrence J.	469557	745		MCR	PFC
WISMER, Stanley J.	432881	405		MCR	Corp.
WOLVERTON, Keith G.	262142	821	QM Cler	MC	SupSgt.
WISONG, Carl B.	467263	345		MCR	PFC
ZION, LeRoy W.	819823	745		MC	PFC
ZMUDOWSKY, Edward W.	379083	345		MC	PFC

U. S. NAVY

ELVINS, Harold E.	321-82-30	HSN	PhM3c
FOISE, Weston E.	721-99-97	USNR	PhM3c
HECKER, Frank R.	609-08-83	USNR	HALc
HOLMSTROM, William T.	762-35-99	USNR	HALc
MC MINIMEN, William R.	202-82-65	USN	PhM3c
MOVELAND, Robert H.	295-87-48	USN	PhM1c

NAME	SERIAL NO.	SERVICE	RANK
NICHOLS, James D.	726-52-48	USNR	PhM3c
PRICE, Winston G.	882-55-52	USNR	VA1c
SANDERS, Charles W.	668-41-08	USN	PhM1c
SEGO, James W.	863-57-68	USNR	PhM3c

Hilton Hamilton
HILTON HAMILTON,
WO., USMC,
Commanding.

BATTERY "A", FOURTH 155MM HOWITZER BATTALION,
 FIRST PROVISIONAL FIELD ARTILLERY GROUP, FLEET MARINE FORCE, PACIFIC,
 C/O FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA.

6 March, 1945.

P E R S O N N E L R O S T E ROFFICERS

Name & File Number	Rank	Branch of Service	SSN
HOLMES, (018414), Miller P.	1st Lt	MCR	1193
JONES, (012557), Edward E., Jr.	Capt	MCR	1193
LINNENBOM, (018916), Victor J.	1st Lt	MCR	1193
NEITGE, (032960), Eugene C.	2d Lt	MCR	1193
PERPICH, (032970), Charles C.	2d Lt	MCR	1193
RAISIN, (021529), Herman S.	1st Lt	MCR	1193

ENLISTED

Name & Serial Number	Rank	Branch of Service	SSN
ACKLEY, (027369), Gordon E.	Pvt	MCR	521
ANDERSON, (474027), William K.	PFC (CP)	MCR	641
ARNOLD, (944175), Eugene E.	Pvt	MCR	521
BABIN, (932225), Franklin J.	PFC	MCR	521
BALDWIN, (818721), Galen M.	PFC (CP)	USMC	641
BALLEW, (307811), Robert L.	Sgt	MCR	539
BARAN, (800719), John J., Jr.	Corp	USMC	645
BARBRE, (412910), Harry E.	CCK(C)	MCR	060
BARNETT, (976627), Charles W.	Pvt	MCR	521
BELLOTTI, (803095), Virgilio	PFC	USMC	521
BENTLEY, (935163), Elbert M.	Pvt	USMC	521
BIBBS, (960376), Homer T.	Pvt	MCR	521
BISHOP, (947501), Jack G.	Pvt	MCR	521
BOILLAT, (899957), Elmer E.	PFC (CP)	MCR	776
BONMARITO, (851041), James J.	Corp	MCR	603
BOWDEN, (242321), Robert J.	Corp	USMC	870
BRICKLES, (812524), Donald L.	PFC	USMC	603
BROMBOLICH, (459018), Michael J.	Sgt	MCR	505
BROMLEY, (837709), Harold P.	PFC (CP)	MCR	776
BROWNING, (948037), Joe G.	PFC	MCR	521
BROZINA, (918651), John J.	Pvt	MCR	521
BRUCE, (803952), Albert R.	ACK(C)	USMC	060
BRUNO, (554042), Edward	Pvt	MCR	521
BURCHAM, (802464), Earl P.	PFC	USMC	603
BURLESON, (960130), William R., Jr.	Pvt	MCR	745
CAMERON, (462394), John C.	PFC	MCR	345
CARLSON, (365312), Willard B.	Corp (CP)	MCR	641
CLODFELTER, (955736), Thomas	Pvt	MCR	521
COFFEY, (935205), Sergius H.	Pvt	MCR	521
COHEN, (950101), Samuel	ACK(C)	MCR	060
COLLINS, (471045), James B.	Corp (CP)	MCR	641

PERSONNEL ROSTER (CONT'D)

6 March, 1945.

Name & Serial Number	Rank	Branch of Service	SSN
JORNMAN, (852728), Francis W.	PFC	MCR	521
JOX, (475952), Arley E.	PFC (CP)	MCR	641
JOYLE, (962674), William J.	Pvt	MCR	521
DRUMMEY, (554064), Gerald E.	Pvt	MCR	521
CRUZ, (258454), John A.	PlSgt	USMC	645
DE LUCA, (47 2687), Salvatore I.	PFC	MCR	345
DEMPSEY, (816612), Thomas E.	PFC	USMC	603
DOLAN, (927116), John J.	Pvt	MCR	345
DRAWHORNE, (816154), Thomas O., Jr.	Pvt	USMC	603
EDDINGS, (975613), Edgar R.	Pvt	MCR	521
EIBNER, (907867), John J.	PFC	USMC	521
ENOS, (846469), Joseph R.	PFC	MCR	606
ERNST, (909825), William L.	PFC	MCR	521
ESPOSITO, (962781), Dominic N.	PFC	MCR	521
FERGUSON, (260729), Lawrence O.	GYSgt	USMC	539
FRANGIPANE, (518299), Salvatore J.	PFC	MCR	645
FREEMAN, (497576), Clarence	PFC	MCR	603
GALITLICK, (509665), Merlin I.	PFC (CP)	MCI	641
GARNER, (955818), Kenneth M.	Pvt	MCR	244
GAUTHIER, (526133), John H.	PFC	MCR	603
GOIDFARB, (511577), Sanford H.	PFC	MCR	645
POPZELANCZYK, (897177), Eugene S.	PFC	MCR	606
GRANGER, (443647), John F.	PFC (CP)	MCR	641
HARRIS, (800707), Fayette F.	PFC	USMC	603
HAGER, (834912), Elmer L.	PFC	USMC	606
HAMMOND, (865727), Euane E.	PFC	MCR	345
HARBOUR, (894130), Donald C.	PFC (CP)	MCR	641
HAPMAN, (835349), Omar D.	Corp	USMC	606
HAUSER, (812729), Donald H.	PFC	USMC	603
HENDERSON, (830796), Doyal "D"	PFC	MCR	603
HENNING, (512926), Robert W.	PFC (CP)	MCR	776
HENSON, (847805), Wille D.	PFC	MCR	603
HERBOLTZHEIMER, (377913), Arthur L., Jr.	PlSgt	MCR	539
HIGGINBOTHAM, (491496), James D.	PFC (CP)	MCR	776
HODGES, (341101), Stanley L.	PFC	USMC	345
HOLLISTER, (526662), Fredrick W.	Pvt	MCR	603
HOUSTON, (488839), Douglas W.	Corp	MCR	505
HOWARD, (891988), "H" "C"	Corp	MCR	636
HENKINS, (280352), Robert	Sgt	USMC	645
JOHNSTON, (810449), Homer B.	PFC	USMC	345
JALISH, (930506), Louis M.	PFC	MCR	603
JOEGEL, (475891), Francis L.	Corp	MCR	405
JOHNICZNY, (558433), Stanley	Pvt	MCR	603
JOPP, (927909), Joseph S.	Pvt	USMC	521
JOZIEJA, (383135), Chester H.	Sgt	USMC	636
LAWSON, (852316), Bennie	PFC	MCR	606
LEWIS, (446359), Noble E.	Corp	MCR	539
LINDSAY, (929306), Stanley M.	PFC	MCR	603
LOINES, (401447), John J.	PFC	MCR	345
MACCHIO, (863169), John J.	PFC	MCR	603

PERSONNEL ROSTER (CONT'D)

6 March, 1945.

Name & Serial Number	Rank	Branch of Service	SSN
MANCINI, (845895), Rocco T.	PFC	USMC	745
MARTT, (948187), Elmer E.	Pvt	MCR	521
MASSEY, (947040), Belton V.	Pvt	MCR	521
MC COLLOUGH, (426656), Edward E.	PFC	MCR	345
MC GOVERN, (930223), Clarence T.	PFC	MCR	521
MESCHKE, (810954), Herbert O.	PFC	USMC	505
MEYER, (490705), Frederick	Pvt	MCR	745
MITCHELL, (411716), Carl J.	Pvt	MCR	606
MITCHELL, (369804), Jefferson L.	Corp(CP)	MCR	641
MOEGELE, (803762), Frederick	PFC	USMC	603
MORGAN, (326853), Kenneth D.	StfSgt(C)	USMC	824
MORRISON, (820533), Frank W.	Corp	USMC	603
MURRAY, (309189), Frederick B.	Pvt	MCR	606
NELSON, (905672), Emmeth B.	Pvt	MCR	345
NELSON, (475935), Terence P., Jr.	Pvt	MCR	745
NICHIA, (842723), James P.	Pvt	MCR	603
NORTHINGTON, (839519), William	PFC	MCR	244
NORTON, (308204), James J.	Corp(CM-Mech)	USMC	014
OSBORNE, (829627), Eulas J.	Pvt	USMC	603
PAOLETTA, (807791), Americo	PFC	USMC	603
PENN, (525741), Howard F.	Pvt	MCR	521
PENNEY, (281606), William A., Jr.	PFC	USMC	606
PETROWSKI, (520117), John S.	PFC	MCR	345
POOLE, (520864), Walter L., Jr.	PFC	MCR	603
PRUSSIN, (542564), Richard	PFC(CP)	MCR	641
RAMEY, (427709), Joseph S.	Sgt(CM-Mech)	MCR	014
RALSEY, (355367), Robert J.	Corp(EP)	USMC	800
RAUSCH, (356417), Richard A.	Corp	USMC	505
REDKER, (911407), Donald S.	Pvt	MCR	745
ROCHELEAU, (446491), William H., Jr.	PFC(OP)	MCR	913
RUIZ, (839555), Frank R.	Pvt	MCR	603
SANDERS, (851222), Harold H.	PFC	MCR	603
SCHMIDT, (283663), Louis C.	Sgt	USMC	533
SCHNIEDERS, (889083), Alfred G.	Pvt	MCR	521
SCHUB, (517354), Howard	PFC	MCR	645
SCHWETEL, (517871), Paul E.	PFC(CP)	MCR	641
SCHWEITZER, (385675), Emil A.	Sgt(CP)	USMC	555
SEARLES, (467253), Harry F.	Corp	MCR	505
SHOEMAKER, (47 5803), Oscar E.	Corp(OP)	MCR	913
SISS, (841300), Lenox L., Jr.	ACK(C)	MCR	060
SMITH, (413425), Arnold G.	Pvt	MCR	521
SOCKEY, (914033), Clennon E.	PFC	MCR	645
SPEARS, (343584), Samuel E.	Sgt	MCR	870
SPENCER, (521624), Charles D.	FMCorp	MCR	803
SQUILL, (527577), Eugene C.	PFC	MCR	606
STOKAS, (439546), John W.	Corp	MCR	505
STRANSKY, (47 2585), Edward A.	Corp	MCR	603
TAYLOR, (551096), Charles J.	Pvt	MCR	606
TEADGILL, (830742), William F.	PFC	USMC	014
TRACH, (904534), Nevin R.	Pvt	MCR	603

PERSONNEL ROSTER (CONT'D)

6 March, 1945.

Name & Serial Number	Rank	Branch of Service	SSN
TRUMP, (554904), Henry H.	PFC	MCR	521
TRUMFORE, (503571), Norman J.	PFC (CP)	MCR	641
VELMAN, (326119), Peter A.	PFC	USMC	645
WEAKS, (812062), Robert E.	PFC (CP)	USMC	641
WEAVER, (525359), Roland D.	PFC	MCR	603
WELCH, (807333), Richard M.	FldCk(C)	USMC	060
WEST, (419097), Harold E.	PFC (CP)	MCR	641
WHEAT, (906490), Owen R.	Pvt	MCR	603
WINKLER, (842077), John P.	PFC	MCR	745
WOLCOTT, (240916), John H.	1st Sgt	USMC	585
YCANUM, (858066), Ernest B.	Corp(CP)	MCR	641
ZIEGLER, (434434), John W.	Pvt	MCR	603

Edward E. Jones Jr.
 EDWARD E. JONES JR.
 Captain, USMCR,
 Commanding.

BATTERY "B", FOURTH 155mm. HOWITZER BATTALION,
 FIRST PROVISIONAL FIELD ARTILLERY GROUP,
 FLEET MARINE FORCE, PACIFIC,
 C/O FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA.

6 March, 1945.

ROSTER OF PERSONNEL.

NAME	FILE OR SER. NO.	STATUS	PRIMARY MILITARY SSN.	SPEC DESIG.	RANK.
ADAMS, George A. Jr.	012884	MCR	1193		Capt.
BAILEY, Lynn T.	334932	MC	022		PFC
BAKER, Robert L.	436293	MCR	521		PFC
BARR, Charles Y.	452041	MCR	505		Corp
BLANKENHEIM, Warren B.	849641	MC-SS	505		PFC
BODKINS, David F.	446933	MCR	929		PFC
BOLING, Emil H.	868914	MCR-SS	521		Pvt
BOWEN, Elmer E.	522872	MCR	606		PFC
BRODY, Gilbert E.	479109	MCR	913	(OP)	PFC
BROOKS, James W.	814204	MC-SS	645		PFC
BRYCE, David D.	397991	MCR	913	(OP)	Corp
BUTALA, Charles J.	380638	MCR	060	(C)	Cck
CACCESE, Angiolo	479483	MCR	539		Sgt
CALL, Clifford J.	291299	MC	606		Pvt
CARDWELL, Lane B.	815283	MC-SS	603		PFC
CHANEY, Cortland L.	555674	MCR	776	(CP)	Pvt
CLATTERBUCK, Charles E.	527579	MCR	603		PFC
COLE, Aubrey RE	830670	MCR-SS	776	(CP)	PFC
COOPER, Alfred B. Jr.	830916	MC-SS	345		PFC
CRITCHFIELD, Herman V.	814192	MC-SS	603		PFC
DALIMAN, Arthur G.	298238	MC	539		Sgt
DAUCH, Edwin G.	804499	MC-SS	244		PFC
DAVIS, Edward E.	013888	MCR	1193		Capt
DE MARZO, Alexander.	518107	MCR	603		PFC
DI GERONIMO, Joseph J. Jr.	439640	MCR	505		PFC
DUBEY, Eugene E.	851529	MCR-SS	603		PFC
EIDSON, William D.	899314	MCR-SS	645		PFC
FRBER, Jack L.	845515	MCR-SS	641	(CP)	PFC
FERGUSON, Robert, Jr.	971314	MCR-SS	345		Pvt
FLAUGHER, Norman D.	531705	MCR	603		Pvt
FORD, Arthur T.	960495	MCR-SS	521		Pvt
GANNON, Martin T.	383062	MCR	505		Corp
GANZ, Eligio.	868906	MCR-SS	641	(CP)	PFC
GARDESKI, William J.	900027	MCR-SS	641	(CP)	PFC
GARDNER, Clifford E.	976107	MCR-SS	603		Pvt
GARDNER, Gordon F.	825630	MCR-SS	521		Pvt
GARRIS, Willie B. Jr.	813407	MC-SS	603		PFC
GEIGER, Albert V. Jr.	428599	MCR	603		PFC
GEYELIN, Philip L.	031950	MCR	1193		2dLt

 Btry "B", 4th155mm.HowBn, 1stProvFldArtyG. Roster of Personnel.

NAME.	FILE OR SER. NO.	STATUS	PRIMARY MILITARY SSN.	SPEC DESIG.	RANK.
GOAD, Elvin H.	947151	MCR-SS	521		Pvt
GRACE, John E. Jr.	491507	MCR	641	(CP)	PFC
GRIFFEN, Charlie M.	957650	MCR-SS	345		PFC
GUEST, Richard G.	839621	MCR-SS	606		PFC
GUINN, Milton.	840405	MC-SS	800	(EP)	Corp
HAIMANN, Emanuel J.	834917	MC-SS	606		PFC
HAMILTON, Edward A.	276482	MC	645		Corp
HARPER, Ernest E.	884304	MCR-SS	521		Pvt
HARRISON, Lonnie R.	427720	MC	745		Pvt
HART, Francis H.	297146	MC	636		Sgt
HART, John H.	489122	MCR	539		Corp
HART, Victor V.	464892	MCR	766	(CP)	Corp
HASSEL, Arthur A. Jr.	510750	MCR	405		Corp
HERRINGTON, James B.	847276	MCR-SS	345		PFC
HIELSCHER, Dalton W.	016353	MCR	1193		2dLt
* HITTELL, Clarence A.	Sr. 932836	MCR-SS	521		Pvt
HOLMES, Edward H.	971060	MCR-SS	521		Pvt
HORNBERGER, James R.	4527033	MCR	060	(C)	FldCk
HORTON, George F.	835835	MC-SS	603		Corp
HORSEY, Warren "G".	848874	MC-SS	603		Corp
HUCKESTEIN, Joseph C.	491903	MCR	803		FMlc
INCE, John D.	843059	MCR-SS	606		PFC
JACKSON, Parker	960743	MC-SS	521		PFC
JENKINS, Van E.	310514	MCR-SS	521		Pvt
JOHNSON, Kenneth A.	907950	MCR-SS	521		Corp
JONES, George C.	955937	MCR-SS	603		Pvt
KEARNS, Herbert H.	955794	MCR-SS	645		Pvt
KEENAN, Edward B.	5085788	MCR	603		PFC
KELLEY, William R.	929128	MCR-SS	603		Pvt
KIRBY, Ben R., Jr.	497035	MCR	641	(CP)	PFC
KIRKILART, Vance R.	831983	MC-SS	606		PFC
KLICK, Vincent P.	881016	MC-SS	603		PFC
KLINE, William	842239	MC-SS	603		PFC
KNIGHT, James O.	288319	MC	745		Pvt
KOLBENSTETTER, Raymond	J. 358084	MCR	606		Corp
KOVACS, John G.	353627	MC	505		PFC
LACROIX, Marcel A.	826036	MCR-SS	745		Pvt
LAKEY, Elvin R.	506025	MCR	244		PFC
LANG, Amos P.	547336	MCR	521		PFC
LAVENDER, Donald T.	475491	MCR	539		Corp
LAWRENCE, George H.	966355	MCR-SS	745		Pvt
LE BLANC, Yvon J.	846 566	MC-SS	521		PFC
LEONHARD, John F.	473099	MCR	645		PFC
LEONIEWSKI, Edward J.	472528	MCR	606		PFC
LETHCO, Paul B.	299068	MC	824	(C)	TSgt
LEWIS, Ralph A.	450581	MCR	641	(CP)	PFC
LINDSEY, Walter W.	838744	MCR-SS	521		PFC
LUCAS, James C.	923496	MCR-SS	7 45		PFC

Btry "B", 4th155mm.HowBn, 1stProvFldArtyG. Roster of Personnel.

NAME.	FILE OR SER. NO.	STATUS	PRIMARY MILITARY SSN.	SPEC DESIG.	RANK.
LUCEK, Stanley R.	519560	MCR	606		PFC
MARINVILLE, Douglas E.	524013	MCR	645		PFC
MARSHALL, Edward W.	811266	MCR-SS	603		PFC
MASSARO, Joseph W.	966551	MCR-SS	521		Pvt
MC CARTHY, Robert W.	520373	MCR	603		PFC
MC GOWAN, George W.	554903	MCR	929		PFC
MC NAUGHTAN, Gordon K.	278908	MC	584		SgtMaj
MILLER, Earl L.	947385	MCR-SS	603		Pvt
MILLER, Raymond H.	531874	MCR	603		PFC
MITCHELL, Edward A.	952812	MCR-SS	603		Pvt
MOLLOY, Bernard T.G.	804274	MC-SS	300	(EP)	Corp
PERINE, Gordon C.	379925	MCR	595	(CP)	Sgt
PERSING, John R.	951511	MCR-SS	603		Pvt
PETERSEN, Donald W.	016396	MCR	1193		1stLt
PHIPPS, Charles J.	888111	MCR-SS	603		Pvt
PLANTES, Bartus T.	307217	MC	603		PFC
POCKARD, Dewey C., Jr.	529255	MCR	521		PFC
PRICE, Talmadge M.	815179	MC-SS	606		PFC
REPLEY, Donald L.	522953	MCR	521		Pvt
REED, Raymond W.	386349	MCR	060		PFC
RELLICH, Victor J.	509706	MCR	603		PFC
RICE, William L.	513148	MCR	641	(CP)	PFC
ROBERTS, Neal E.	506636	MCR	603		Corp
ROGASKY, John	525152	MCR	521		Pvt
ROSS, William W., Jr.	808045	MC-SS	603		PFC
ROUFF, Max L.	830184	MCR-SS	603		PFC
ROURKE, Cornelius A.	552053	MCR	603		PFC
SADLER, Albert W., Jr.	401903	MC	776	(CP)	PFC
SAWARYN, William B.	411932	MCR	603		Corp
SANICKI, Stephen	467785	MCR	645		PFC
SISK, Walter R.	839181	MCR-SS	603		PFC
SKINNER, John H.	812033	MC-SS	641	(CP)	PFC
SMITH, Irvin T.	489281	MCR	641	(CP)	PFC
SPEAR, Carl D.	916358	MCR-SS	603		Pvt
STAMMER, Clifford E.	457654	MCR	204		PFC
STONER, Harold K.	461201	MCR	244		PFC
TIDWELL, Norvan W.	458627	MCR	603		Corp
TOMSIK, Alfred H.	043805	MC	1102	(Arty)	W.O.
TREGONING, Ernest	338115	MCR	533		Sgt
TRICHE, Lloyd R., Jr.	494889	MCR	603		Pvt
VALDEZ, Andres F.	537174	MCR	603		PFC
VOCILKA, Stephen J.	801895	MC-SS	014		PFC
WAGNER, Jack R.	555726	MCR	521		Pvt
WEEDEN, Norman P.	017405	MCR	1193		1stLt
WEIDENBAUGH, Nelson C.	838725	MCR-SS	603		PFC
WELLS, Grant N.	455883	MCR	603		Corp
WESTPHAL, Orville E.	254462	MC	014	(QM) (Mech)	Sgt
WIESENAUER, Arthur	387493	MC	505		PFC

 Btry "B", 4th155mm.HowBn, 1stProvFldartyG. Roster of Personnel.

NAME.	FILE OR SER. NO.	STATUS	PRIMARY MILITARY SSN.	SPEC DESIG.	RANK.
WILLIAMS, Jack A.	481276	MCR	641	(CP)	Corp
WILLINGHAM, Billy M.	807418	MC-SS	641	(CP)	PFC
WILBACH, Frederick H.	859357	MCR	641	(CP)	Corp
WREN, William H.	934777	MCR-SS	603		Pvt
WRIGHT, Donald F.	532064	MCR	603		PFC
ZADIKOW, Harry S.	803296	MC-SS	641	(CP)	PFC
ZENTZ, Robert J.	455943	MCR	645		Corp
ZORNIG, Albert C.	818952	MC-SS	641	(CP)	Corp

* Embarked at Hilo, Hawaii, T.H. and debarked at Apra Harbor,
 Guam, M.I.

G. A. Adams, Jr.
 G. A. ADAMS, JR.,
 Capt, USMCR,

BATTERY "C",
FOURTH 155mm HOWITZER BATTALION,
FIRST PROVISIONAL FIELD ARTILLERY GROUP,
FLEET MARINE FORCE, PACIFIC,
C/O FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA.

ROSTER OF PERSONNEL

NAME	FILE NO. OR SERIAL NO.	PRIMARY MIL. SSN	SPECIALIST DESIGNATION	RANK
GENTT, Benjamin J., Jr.	032881	1193	MCR	2dLt.
JACOBS, Charles C., Jr.	011497	1193	MCR	Capt.
MC PHILLIPS, Bernard F.	016219	1193	MCR	1stLt.
ROACH, Joseph W.	023667	1193	MCR	1stLt.
TATUM, Frank P.	020065	1193	MC	1stLt.
TREMBER, Joseph M., Jr.	027079	1193	MCR	1stLt.

ENLISTED

ASPE, Leland H.	818771	803	FM MC	FM1cl.
ADAMSON, William L.	524079	603	MCR	PFC.
BAGGETT, Lawrence L.	835263	603	MCR	Corp.
BILLS, George G.	527570	606	MCR	PFC.
BARBER, Forest C.	367156	585	MCR	1stSgt.
BANK, Andrew J.	513586	060	MCR	Flack.
BIDDELL, Charles W.	418201	521	MCR	PFC.
BOOTHE, Frank D.	812140	641	CP-Tp MC	PFC.
BORGWARDT, Harvey H.	507283	345	MCR	PFC.
BROWN, John M.	859274	603	MCR	PFC.
BUFFI, Bernard	409127	603	MC	PFC.
BYLER, Robert O.	846764	603	MC	PFC.
CALLAHAN, Richard F.	836853	603	MC	PFC.
CARLSON, Marlin A.	8546 52	603	MCR	PFC.
CARPENTER, Robert C.	520455	776	CP-Rd MCR	PFC.
CARROLL, Elvin W.	554543	745	MCR	Pvt.
CASBY, Frank D., Jr.	414375	803	MC	PFC.
CHALIFOUX, Robert A.	467475	913	MCR	Sgt.
CLARKE, John R.	332931	645	MC	Corp.
COOK, Burr O.	473488	595	CP-WC MCR	Corp.
CORSBIE, Thomas L.	522797	521	MCR	Pvt.
CSEHI, William A.	517903	603	MCR	PFC.
CUNNIE, Allen G.	975551	521	MCR	Pvt.
DANILBERG, James C.	814679	645	MC	Corp.
DEAN, James A., Jr.	301041	539	MC	Sgt.
DE WISPELMERE, Frank L.	908893	603	MCR	PFC.
DIAS, Orlando	318700	603	MC	Pvt.
DI MATTEO, Anthony C.	518073	603	MCR	Corp.

ROSTER OF PERSONNEL

NAME	FILE NO. or SERIAL NO.	PRIMARY MIL. CGN	SPECIALIST DESIGNATION	RANK
DONAHOE, Ben G.	496896	345	MCR	PFC.
EDWARDS, Robert J.	800128	603	MC	PFC.
ERBS, Eldron U.	525615	776	CP-Rad MCR	PFC.
ESSARY, Jefferson D.	501055	603	MCR	PFC.
FITZGERALD, Raymond B.	810990	603	MC	Corp.
FONTE, Michael J., Sr.	920027	636	MCR	Pvt.
FOURMAN, Frederick W.	457533	603	MCR	PFC.
FRANKLIN, William, Jr.	489847	244	MCR	PFC.
FULLER, Richard F.	550400	606	MCR	Pvt.
GLACOLA, Vincent D.	518272	606	MCR	PFC.
GREEN, Ralph V.	482510	800	MCR	PFC.
HALL, William D.	830373	606	MC	PFC.
HANKS, Robert R.	337258	539	MC	Plsgt.
HARDY, George F.	873510	641	CP-Tp MCR	Pvt.
HAWKINS, Arthur E.	806606	603	MC	PFC.
HAYES, Francis J.	846460	603	MCR	PFC.
HENDERSON, Charles C.	493423	060	MCR	Chck.
HENNESSY, John F.	442521	745	MCR	PFC.
HEITHCOAT, Robert V.	294835	345	MC	PFC.
HIGGINS, John D.	344755	060	MCR	Ack.
HILADE, Leon "J".	832499	645	MC	PFC.
HUGHES, Roy, Jr.	514440	745	MCR	PFC.
HURT, Gilfred H.	909399	521	MCR	Pvt.
IMBURGIO, Salvatore J.	502525	603	MCR	PFC.
JACKSON, Hiet K.	488252	505	MCR	Corp.
JOHNSON, Merle C.	510612	641	CP-Tp MC	PFC.
JOSLIN, Francis A.	409108	641	CP-Tp MC	PFC.
KENDRICK, Warren	806267	603	MC	PFC.
KIDWELL, William F.	516231	606	MCR	PFC.
KOCHENASH, Peter	803219	641	CP-Tp MC	PFC.
KRAETZER, Alfred E.	506877	345	MCR	Pvt.
KUJAWSKI, Adolph F.	518371	745	MCR	PFC.
LANDIS, Lonnie H.	878471	641	CP-Tp MCR	Corp.
LESTER, Irwin E.	298540	641	CP-Tp MC	PFC.
LILLY, Isaiah "B".	976666	521	MCR	Pvt.
LEPPARD, Calvin S.	830674	636	MCR	Corp.
LITTELL, Delbert	815166	603	MCR	PFC.
LUCAS, Otto O.	947949	521	MCR	Pvt.
MARKLEY, Robert W.	491657	014	MCR	Corp.
MAYNARD, John R.	908128	641	CP-Tp MCR	Corp.
MC CRAY, Furman D.	975581	521	MCR	Pvt.
MC CRORY, Richard L.	421414	645	MC	PFC.
MC CULLEY, Nealy J.	890470	521	MCR	Pvt.
MC DONALD, Hilary A.	515073	603	MCR	PFC.
MC KAY, James H.	564915	521	MCR	Pvt.
MC KENZIE, James E.	957422	521	MCR	Pvt.
MC KIBBIN, Roger L.	449166	776	CP-Rad MCR	PFC.

ROSTER OF PERSONNEL

NAME	FILE NO. or SERIAL NO.	PRIMARY MIL. SEN	SPECIALIST DESIGNATION	RANK
METZ, Kenneth J.	474009	641	CP-Tp MCR	PFC
MILLEN, John E.	279546	824	MC	TSgt.
MONTANARO, Ernest P.	831981	521	MC	PFC
MOON, William R.	558902	521	MCR	Pvt.
MOORE, Horace	478562	014	MCR	PFC
MORRIS, Cyrus E.	424603	521	MC	Pvt.
MORRIS, Lawrence J.	955896	521	MCR	Pvt.
HOSS, Robert J.	504546	603	MCR	Corp.
MOTRONI, Hugo J.	805950	603	MC	Corp.
MUMML, Paul C.	554921	641	CP-Tp MCR	PFC.
MURPHY, John P.	416119	641	CP-Tp MCR	PFC.
MURPHY, Raymell J.	846968	606	MCR	PFC.
NERN, Paul K.	976676	521	MCR	PFC.
OKRAY, Anton J.	907990	521	MCR	Pvt.
O'ROURKE, Charles J.	410885	603	MCR	PFC.
ORTIZ, Joe	555699	521	MCR	Pvt.
OUELLETTE, Eugene G.	960843	521	MC	Pvt.
PALEY, Irving	427964	603	MCR	PFC.
PARKER, Robert L., Sr.	955754	521	MCR	Pvt.
PERLCE, William L.	499809	511	MCR	PFC.
PIZZIMENTI, Joseph D.	450837	641	CP-Tp MCR	PFC.
PLACE, Richard L.	850817	603	MCR	Corp.
PLUCH, Theodore J.	803148	345	MC	PFC.
PROELS, Edward G.	481355	606	MCR	Corp.
PRUITT, Emmett L.	475964	606	MCR	Corp.
PULLEN, Ben D.	927019	521	MCR	ACK.
RILSE, Alford D.	830230	603	MCR	PFC.
RHODEN, James B.	960615	521	MCR	Pvt.
ROBERTS, William E.	277542	060	MC	Pvt.
ROGERS, William D.	957546	645	MCR	Pvt.
ROSSI, Alfred P.	916381	603	MCR	PFC.
ROUSSEAU, Elmer G.	487760	641	CP-Tp MCR	PFC.
RUNZER, Clifford J.	505202	603	MCR	PFC.
RYAN, Franklin C.	873203	521	MCR	PFC.
SAGHATELLAN, Shar	515787	641	CP-Tp MCR	PFC.
SANTILL, Joseph D.	808936	521	MC	PFC.
SCALF, George A.	849792	405	MCR	Corp.
SCHEFFER, Raymond G.	285454	645	MC	PlSgt.
SHOOK, Robert E.	317550	022	MCR	Corp.
SLAKIS, George	947973	345	MCR	Pvt.
STROCHMAN, Paul S., Jr.	836268	603	MCR	PFC.
SKELING, Wilson J.	977857	521	MCR	Pvt.
SMALL, Lester H.	932393	521	MC	PFC.
SMITH, Phillip S.	551002	521	MCR	Pvt.
SMITH, Walter I.	810455	645	MC	PFC.
SOUTHWICK, Louis W., Jr.	476327	539	MCR	Sgt.
STEEFORD, Frank K.	465198	636	MCR	Sgt.

ROSTER OF PERSONNEL

NAME	FILE NO. or SERIAL NO.	PRIMARY MIL. SGN	SPECIALIST DESIGNATION	RANK
STINKY, Dick C.	341079	539	MCR	Sgt.
STEED, Charles E.	937985	521	MCR	Pvt.
STRICKLAND, "R". "H".	945182	521	MCR	Pvt.
SULLIVAN, John A.	800548	603	MC	PFC.
SWANLEY, John A., Jr.	435029	745	MCR	PFC.
TAYLOR, Charles E.	834987	641	CP-Tp MC	PFC.
TAYLOR, Samuel R.	960281	521	MCR	Pvt.
THACKER, Charles R.	835033	521	MCR	Pvt.
TREKLER, Harold L.	815323	603	MC	PFC.
TURNBULL, James E.	465457	244	MCR	PFC.
WALLACE, Sterling W.	976653	521	MC	PFC.
WINTER, Henry P.	455951	645	MCR	PFC.
WATSON, Dave H.	826881	745	MCR	Pvt.
WATCOB, Dot W.	32584k	539	MC	Sgt.
WETZEL, Warron Q.	425481	603	MCR	Corp.
WILLIAMSON, Paul M.	951479	745	MCR.	Pvt.
WOODY, James D., Jr.	837273	521	MCR	PFC.
WOODYARD, Randolph E.	870113	603	MCR	PFC.
WULF, Louis P. III	433543	521	MCR	PFC.
ZIMMERMAN, George D.	521659	776	CP-Rad MCR	PFC.

CHARLES C. JACOBS, JR.,
CAPTAIN USMCR,
COMMANDING.

473RD AMPHIBIAN TRUCK COMPANY (TC)

COMPANY ROSTER

OFFICERS

<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>SERIAL NO.</u>
BUSCH, Edward A.	1stLt.	01570223
ETRO, Francis P.	2ndLt.	01946724
MORRETT, Charles O.	2ndLt.	01946341
NIEMELA, Axel H.	1stLt.	0920744
SCHWABL, Robert P.	Capt.	0455553
WEILL, George B.	1stLt.	0349090

ENLISTED PERSONNEL

ALEXANDER, Ezell R.	T/4	34039627
ANDERSON, Fred (n)	T/5	36566766
ARNETT, Kenneth M.	T/5	35706886
ARRINGTON, Wilbur B.	T/4	32793909
ATKINSON, Raymond H.	Pvt.	14104616
AUSBROOK, Thomas L.	Cpl.	38481592
BARANCO, Raymond M.	Pvt.	38382920
BARDEN, Veron E.	T/5	34309319
BARNARD, Elmo (n)	T/5	34672477
BARRS, Lottice M.	Pvt.	38481606
BENTON, Willie (n)	T/5	38481704
BLOCKSON, Joseph P.	T/5	35788607
BONNER, John (n), Jr.,	Pvt.	38566376
BONNER, Reuben L.	Pvt.	38347514
BOWENS, Herman (n)	T/5	38535385
BRADLEY, Elbert (n)	T/5	38481724
BRANCH, Herbert G.	StfSgt.	33791941
BRIGGS, James (n)	T/5	34251883
BRIGGS, Nolen(n).	T/5	38504667
BROOKS, William P.	StfSgt.	38153684
BRYANT, Jesse(n).	T/5	38566854
BURKS, Philmore (n)	Pfc.	38481583
CAMPER, Lemel (n).	T/4	38590922
CARLISLE, Clarence E.	T/5	38481649
CARPENTER, George A.	T/4	33598177
CARTER, L. C.	T/5	38535319
CARTER, Samuel J.	T/5	35732767
CARTWRIGHT, Ulysses G.	T/5	42080552
CHAPPELL, Arthur (n)	T/5	33649655
CHERRY, Elijah (n)	Cpl.	34791241
CHILDS, Fred D.	T/5	32872243
CLARDY, Walter (n)	Pvt.	38566888
COGHILL, Derman P.	T/5	33739130
COLBERT, Obed E.	Cpl.	38566524
COLE, Clayton J.	Cpl.	36794754

 Enclosure (A) to Appendix 4 to Annex (C) to VAC LanFor Special
 Action Report, Iwo Jima Campaign.

 473RD AMPHIBIAN TRUCK COMPANY (TC) (CONT'D)

COLEMAN, John (n)	T/5	32360754
COLON, Santiago (n)	Sgt.	32993077
COOK, Donald (n)	T/5	36593758
COOK, Walter W. Sr.,	T/5	33763992
COOKE, Vance P.	T/5	34654065
CRAIG, J. C.	T/5	38481764
CRAWFORD, Eddison (n)	T/5	38481745
CRAWFORD, Elbert (n)	Cpl.	34719507
CROCKETT, Henderson (n)	T/5	38547409
CROSS, Leon (n)	Pfc.	38535048
CROSSLANA, Milbert A.	Sgt.	35892160
DANA, William H. Jr.	StfSgt.	38129148
DANIELS, Eddie M.	T/4	39420011
DANIELS, John (n)	Pvt.	14173544
DAVENPORT, Robert L.	T/5	38535169
DAVIS, Edmond P.	T/5	33644368
DAVIS, Parker R.	Pvt.	32794728
DEBOUSE, Everett (n)	Pfc.	38590105
DIXON, E. M.	Pfc.	38481515
EDWARD, Rosker (n)	Pvt.	34654557
EGGLESTON, Carl L.	T/4	33598436
ELLIS, Rufus M.	Pvt.	38565993
FERGUSON, Edward (n), Sr.	Pvt.	38481818
FERGUSON, Lonnie C.	Pvt.	38481543
FERRELL, James B.	T/5	32754484
FIELDS, Jessie (n)	T/5	38481600
FIELDS, William O.	StfSgt.	35559502
FLENOURY, C. L.	T/5	38481505
FRANCOIS, Lionel G.	StfSgt.	32082134
FULLER, Bruce A.	Pvt.	34126500
GAINES, Homer H.	T/5	35559526
GALLOWAY, Cornelius (n)	T/5	38535077
GARDNER, Lloyd B.	T/5	38481707
GLOVER, Veon (n)	T/5	38535372
GOODMAN, Vernon (n)	StfSgt.	35558816
GREASHAM, Nathaniel (n)	Pvt.	38566857
GREEN, Alonzo S.	Pvt.	32986190
GREEN, Loranzo (n)	Pfc.	38590222
GRIMES, Allen A.	Pvt.	33068428
HARDEN, Edward H.	T/5	38535337
HARDIE, Willie (n)	Pvt.	38481701
HARDING, Eugene J.	T/5	37516097
HARRIS, Charlie L.	Pvt.	38535034
HARTS, Jake (n)	Pfc.	34654450
HARVEY, James H.	Pvt.	34151332

 473RD AMPHIBIAN TRUCK COMPANY (TC) (Con'd)

HAYS, Lester (n)	Pfc.	34346422
HENSON, Marcellus A.	T/5	38532325
HICKS, Chester A.	T/5	38566879
HOGUE, Lacey (n)	Pfc.	33192232
HOLMES, Fred E.	Pvt.	38566865
HOLMON, John I.	Pvt.	38535600
HOOVER, Albert V.	Pvt.	38195927
HOPWOOD, John E.	Pfc.	38535362
HOWARD, Arittie (n)	T/5	38481844
HOWARD, Thomas J.	Cpl.	38598605
HUGHES, Ernest W.	S/Sgt.	42006016
HUMPHREY, Davis C.	T/5	38535348
HUNT, McKinley (n)	Pfc.	38590627
JACKSON, John L.	T/4	35772488
JACKSON, Thears W.	Pvt.	38481698
JACKSON, William (n)	Cpl.	38566562
JACKSON, Willie L.	T/4	33641283
JAMERSON, Dan (n) Jr.	Pvt.	37509939
JAMERSON, Robert E.	Pvt.	39717496
JAMES, Henry L. Jr.	Pvt.	38566867
JENKINS, Oliver (n)	T/4	32069934
JOHNSON, Bernard (n)	T/5	33730425
JOHNSON, Charles R.	S/Sgt.	33084326
JOHNSON, Collie R.	S/Sgt.	33731612
JOHNSON, Dan (n) Jr.	Pvt.	38535327
JOHNSON, Thomas H.	Sgt.	38535619
JONES, Albert (n)	Pfc.	38347554
JONES, David B.	T/5	33793657
JONES, Howard R.	Pvt.	31427677
JORDAN, Roman T.	Pvt.	38535063
KEYS, Charlie	T/5	38590540
LACEY, James H.	T/5	42019819
LACY, Willard (n)	T/5	38347413
LANGRUM, Napoleon (n)	T/4	38481850
LARUE, Earl B.	Pvt.	38481245
LATIMER, Frank A.	Pfc.	38566553
LEWIS, Walter (n)	T/4	42100053
LOVEST, Bivens (n)	Cpl.	38482391
MACK, James L.	Pfc.	38535329
MC CLENDON, Nathaniel (n)	T/5	38481790
MC KENZIE, David A.	Pvt.	38481569
MC KNIGHT, Willie (n)	Pvt.	38346535
MC NAIR, George (n)	Cpl.	34206755
MC PHAIL, Thomas (n)	T/5	38481591

 Enclosure (A) to Appendix 4 to Annex (C) to VAC LanFor Special
 Action Report, Iwo Jima Campaign.

473RD AMPHIBIAN TRUCK COMPANY (TC) (Con'd)

MILLER, Clarence H.	T/Sgt.	37523168
MITCHELL, Lawrence C.	T/5	38482402
MITCHELL, Sammie C.	T/5	38535094
MITCHELL, William L.	Pvt.	38535779
MONROE, Clarence (n)	Pfc	34251493
MOORE, Volton T.	Pfc	38506558
MOOREHEAD, Leonard (n)	T/5	38794472
MORGAN, Willie D.	T/5	38535370
MORRIS, Leonard (n)	Pvt.	38481588
MORRIS, Rufus (n)	Pvt.	38794328
NOBLES, Hardin (n)	Sgt.	38535608
OLDHAM, John D.	Pvt.	37627614
PARKER, J. C.	T/5	38535165
PEMBERTON, Marshall (n)	Pfc.	38481821
PERRY, Burney L.	Sgt.	38566540
PHILLIPS, Melvin L.	Cpl.	38346631
PRATT, Eddie (n)	Pvt.	38535254
PROCTOR, Irvin R.	Pfc.	38566432
PRUITT, Billy J.	Sgt.	38535172
RANDLE, A. B.	T/5	38481578
RICHARDSON, Christian (n)	Pvt.	38481608
RICHARDSON, Cullen H.	T/5	38481631
ROBINSON, Samuel (n)	Pvt.	38535368
ROGER, Grady	T/5	38535364
SANDERS, Tom (n)	Pvt.	38589884
SAUNDERS, Floyd W.	Pvt.	35225483
SCOTT, Johnnie A.	Pvt.	34309470
SCOTT, Warren (n)	Cpl.	34097220
SIMMS, Henry L.	T/5	38347470
SMITH, Enid (n)	Pvt.	38565339
SMITH, James A. Jr.	T/5	34673672
SMITH, Ruben A.	Pvt.	38306323
SMITH, Sammie L.	Pvt.	38565446
STEELE, Benjamin (n)	S/Sgt.	32035183
STEEMER, John H.	Pvt.	38361021
SYKES, Robert (n) Jr.	1stSgt.	32069957
TAYLOR, Robert (n) Jr.	Pvt.	34148367
TELLIE, Willie L.	Pvt.	38566384
TRICE, Charles L.	T/4	42051957
VANDERVALL, Reginald (n)	T/5	20266839
WEBB, Thomas H.	Pvt.	34675907
WELLINGTON, Norris (n)	Pvt.	37612426
WEST, Howard (n)	S/Sgt.	36391675
WHITE, Charles C.	Pvt.	36790615
WHITE, Charles O.	T/5	34659822
WHITE, John J.	T/4	33641298
WILLIAMS, Eddie L.	T/4	34753891
WILLIAMS, Leroy (n)	Cpl.	33641062
WILLIAMS, Leroy E.	Pvt.	39420005
WILSON, Silas (n) Jr.	Pfc.	38509835
WOODWARD, Robert L.	T/4	35804699

HEADQUARTERS AND HEADQUARTERS BATTERY,
1ST PROVISIONAL FIELD ARTILLERY GROUP.

CASUALTIES

<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>SER. NO.</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
<u>KILLED IN ACTION</u>				
MADDEROM, Orville N.	Sgt., USMCR	339789	21Feb45	Gunshot wound right axills. Buried 5th Marine Division Cemetery, Iwo Jima, Volcano Islands on 25 February, 1945, in Lot #1, Row #2, Grave #27.

WOUNDED IN ACTION

SOUDER, William H. Jr.	Maj., USMC	06700	25Feb45	Wounded by shell fragment in right foot, lateral. Returned to duty same day.
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SICKNESS

BASL, Emil G.	Fldck, USMC	829644	8Mar45	Received 1st and 2nd degree burns on both hands while on duty in galley. Returned to duty same day.
COOK, Donald W.	Cpl, USMCR	392700	8Mar45	Received shell fragment wound in left scapula #2584 while near a rubbish fire in which an undetected shell burst.
RHEAULT, Richard H.	Pfc. USMCR	556728	26Feb45	Ulcer cornea developed in right eye. Was evacuated to beach. Destination unknown.

Enclosure (B) to Appendix 4 to Annex (C) to VAC LanFor Special Action
Report, Iwo Jima Campaign.

Headquarters, Second One Fifty-five Millimeter Howitzer
Battalion, First Provisional Field Artillery Group, Fleet Marine
Force, Pacific, In The Field

March 19, 1945

CASUALTIES

KILLED IN ACTION

<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>SER. NO.</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
GERARD, Edward T. Jr.	Pvt, USMC	331306	21Feb45	Gun shot wound, multiple. Buried in 5th Marine Division Cemetery Iwo Jima, Volcano Islands in Plot #1, Grave #173, Row #9.
MITCHELL, Russell C.	Sgt, USMC	298497	21Feb45	Gun shot wound, multiple. Buried in 5th Marine Division Cemetery Iwo Jima, Volcano Islands, Plot #1, Row #2, Grave #29
PETERSON, Marvin G.	Pfc, USMC	511077	21Feb45	Gun shot wound, multiple. Buried in 5th Marine Division Cemetery Iwo Jima, Volcano Islands, Plot #1, Row #10, Grave #197.

DIED OF WOUNDS RECEIVED IN ACTION

WHIPP, Lloyd L.	Pfc, USMC	887890	15Mar45	Gun shot wound upper left chest, on 12Mar45. Evacuated Hosp #1 same date. Died of wound on 15 Mar45. Body interred Iwo Jima. No further information known.
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WOUNDED IN ACTION

(over)

BROWN, Arthur T.	Sgt, USMCR 349775	1Mar45	Gun shot wound upper left chest. Evacuated 5th Marine Division Hospital thence to USS SOLACE. Destination unknown.
BURDETTE, Edwin (n)	Sgt, USMCR 339863	1Mar45	Shrapnel wounds right cheek. Treated Battalion Sick Bay. Returned to duty.
CARBONE, Salvatore (n)	Pfc, USMCR 473202	21Feb45	Shrapnel wound in left cheek. Treated in Battalion Sick Bay. Returned to duty.
CRANDELL, Harry B.	Pfc, USMCR 509042	21Feb45	Shrapnel wound in right cheek. Treated in Battalion Sick Bay. Returned to duty.
GRIFFITH, Lloyd V.	Pfc, USMC 817416	21Feb45	Shrapnel wound midline fronto-parietal suture. Treated Battalion Sick Bay. Returned to duty.
HILD, Gilbert E.	Pfc, USMC 330266	1Mar45	Shrapnel abrasion upper left arm. Evacuated to Field Hospital, Ship and destination unknown.
LAKE, Kenneth C.	Cpl, USMCR 337394	21Feb45	Shrapnel wound left submaxillary triangle of neck. Treated Battalion Sick Bay. Returned to duty.
WISJENICZ, Henry E.	Pfc, USMCR 459671	21Feb45	Shrapnel wound right side and right arm. Treated Battalion Sick Bay. Returned to duty.

NELSON, Edward L.	Pfc, USMCR 452180 21Feb45	Gun shot wound compound fracture left humerus. Evacuated via Field Hospital by ship to U.S. Army Hospital #148, APO 244.
NOBLELL, Richard B.	Sgt, USMCR 339823 24Feb45	Shrapnel wounds, lower left back and left thigh. Evacuated via Field Hospital ship and destination unknown.
ORTIZ, Charlie (n)	Pfc, USMC 821115 1Mar45	Shrapnel wound in right frontal region. Evacuated via Field Hospital, ship and destination unknown.
PIANELLI, Albert J.	Pfc, USMC 863786 24Feb45	Shrapnel wounds face, back and legs. Evacuated via Field Hospital, ship, and destination unknown.
RODRIGUEZ, Joseph A.	Pfc, USMCR 535909 25Feb45	Shrapnel wound left knee. Treated Battalion Sick Day and returned to duty.
VAN WINKLE, Raymond S. Jr	Cpl, USMC 330391 24Feb45	Shrapnel wound right cheek. Treated Battalion Sick Day and returned to duty.

DISEASE

ANDERSON, John H., Jr.	Pfc, USMCR 474214 26Feb45	DU (Catarrhal Fever). Evacuated. Destination unknown.
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GORDON, Hugh J.	Pvt, USMC 818099	8Mar45	DU (Pneumonia) Sick in 5th Marine Division Hospital. Returned to duty on 10 March, 1945.
MAGNER, Hugh R.	Pfc, USMCR 940388	2Mar45	Tenosyuoeruois right index finger. Evacuated. Destination unknown.

SICKNESS

ATCHISON, William J.	Pfc, USMCR 315150	2Mar45	Contusion left index finger. Treated Battalion Sick Bay. Place on light duty for three (3) days.
CONNOR, Lewis R.	Pvt, USMCR 957221	2Mar45	Contusion left middle finger. Treated Battalion Sick Bay. Place on light duty one (1) day.
CURRY, William (n)	Pvt, USMCR 976631	26Feb45	Smashed left index finger in breach block. Evacuated via Field Hospital, ship, and destination unknown.
DAVIDSON, Canby L.	GySgt, USMC 224599	28Feb45	Slight concussion and possible fracture of the Cerebra when struck by case of rifles parachuted from friendly plane. Evacuated via field hospital, ship, destination unknown.
GRAFFITH, Lloyd V.	Pfc, USMC 817416	11Mar45	Multiple shrapnel wounds from explosion while building fire, possibly fuze set off by heat of fire. Evacuated. Destination unknown.

HUCKMAN, Henry M.

Cpl,USMC 333519 2Mar45

Laceration of
scalp by falling
pole. Treated
Battalion Sick
Day. Place on
one (1) day light
duty.

NICHOLS, Frank W.

Cpl,USMGR 464849 27Feb45

DU(Obstructive
Tonsillitis).
Evacuated, via
Field Hospital,
ship, and dest-
ination unknown.

TULLY, "C" EA

Pfc,USMC 325355 4Mar45

DU(Appendicitis).
Sick in Battalion
Sick Day. To
duty on 7 Mar 45.

HEADQUARTERS,
FOURTH 155mm HOWITZER BATTALION,
FIRST PROVISIONAL FIELD ARTILLERY GROUP,
FLEET MARINE FORCE, PACIFIC,
C/O FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA.

CASUALTIES

<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>SER.NO.</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
<u>KILLED IN ACTION</u>				
WILLIAMS, Jack A.	Cpl.USMCR	481276	27Feb45	Killed in action by enemy fire. Buried in 5th Marine Division Cemetery, Iwo Jima, Volcano Islands, on 28 February, 1945, in Plot #2, Row #14, Grave #573

WOUNDED IN ACTION

ACRE, Leland H.	FM1cl,USMC	818771	27Feb45	Shell fragment. Not evacuated. Returned to duty.
COPISKY, John R., Jr	Pfc.USMCR	539977	24Feb45	Wounded by grenade fragments. Evacuated to Hospital Ship APA #106. Destination unknown.
DEAN, James A., Jr.	Sgt.USMC	301041	1Mar45	Wounded by enemy shell. Not evacuated. Returned to duty.
FERGUSON, Lawrence O.	GySgt.USMC	260729	1Mar45	Wounded by enemy shell fragments. Not evacuated. Returned to duty.

SICKNESS

DE MARZO, Alexander (n)	Pfc.USMCR	518107	10Mar45	Fractured toe. Evacuated. Destination unknown
FERGUSON, Robert (n) Jr.	Pvt.USMCR	971314	1Mar45	Combat Fatigue. Evacuated to VAC Dispensary. Returned to duty 2 March, 1945.
FROST, Frank L.	CWO,USMC	028623	28Feb45	Combat Fatigue. Evacuated. Destination unknown.

SICKNESS (Continued)

POCLE, Walter L., Jr.	Pfc. USMCR	520864	14Mar45	Injured by shell fragments while disassembling a Japanese 25mm. shell despite previous warnings to the contrary. Evacuated and destination unknown. Own Misconduct.
ROUFF, Max L.	Pfc. USMCR	830184	4Mar45	Acute Conjunctivitis. Evacuated to VAC Dispensary. Returned to duty 14 March, 1945.
SMITH, Irvin T.	Pfc. USMCR	489281	14Mar45	Varicoccle. Evacuated to 5th Marine Division Hospital. Returned to duty 15 March, 1945.

473rd Amphibian Truck Company TC

CASUALTIES

<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>SER.NO.</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
WEILL, George B.	1stLt.	USA 0349090	22Feb45	On 22 February, 1945 Lt Weill and
CROCKETT, Henderson (n)	T/5,	USA 38347409	22Feb45	T/5 Crockett were launched from an LST and headed for shore. In an attempt to fix rudder cable, the heavy surf swamp- ed the rear hatch dislodged T/5 Crockett. As the dukw began to sink Lt Weill in an attempt to abandon the dukw was caught in the machine gun mount and went down with the dukw. Neither Lt Weill or T/5 Crockett were seen after the dukw went down. This accident was witnessed by S/Sgt William Dana, USA, who reported.

SICKNESS

BONNER, John (n) Jr.	Pvt.	USA 38566376	22Feb45	Almost drowned at sea. Returned to duty 26 February, 1945.
CHERRY, Elijah (n)	Cpl.	USA 34791241	20Feb45	Broken arm in an attempt to secure a tire on dukw.
VANDERVALL, Reginald(n)	T/5.	USA 20266839	6Mar45	Both thighs shot by own men when taken for an enemy.

 Enclosure (B) to Appendix 4 to Annex Charlie to V Amphibious Corps
 Landing Force Special Action Report, Iwo Jima.

Summary of Shelling Reports

Reported by	Location of Observer	Azimuth of Crater	Time	Area Shelled	Damage	No. Rds. Type of Fire	No. Type & Caliber of Guns	Remarks Estimated Location
Hq. Btry 1st Prev. F.A. Gp.	147 I		<u>22Feb45</u> Single rds through hours of darkness <u>23Feb45</u>	147 I	None	No. of rds undetermined	Mortar	Unknown
Hq. Btry 1st Prov. F.A. Gp	147 I		0950 to 1010 <u>24Feb45</u>	147 I	None	6-10 Mortar	4 Mortars	Unknown
13th Mar.	148		app. 0040	148 beaches	Unreported	Time Fire	Unreported	Undetermined
2nd 155MM How Bn	163 Y	North-east	1200	163 T	One (1) gun 4th Bn 13th temporarily knocked out. No damage to 2nd.	Unknown (1) rd in area of re-porting unit.	Possibly 70mm gun	Undetermined
2nd 155MM How Bn	163 Y	North-east	2100 to 2120	163 X, T, Y 164 K 147 I	1-155MM How temporarily knocked out in 147 I. 3 casualties evacuated	approx. 40 rds.	5"	216 D, J

enclosure "C" to Appendix 4 to Annex Charlie to VAGUE Special action report IWO JIMA Campaign

Summary of Shelling Report

Reported by	Location of Observer	Azimuth of Crater	Time	Area Shelled	Damage	No. rds. Type of Fire	No. Type & Caliber of Guns	Remarks Estimated Location
14th Mar.			<u>24Feb45</u> app. 1000	14th Mar. area.				199 N
14th Mar.			1022	14th Mar. area.			A. guns	219 L
13th Mar.			1610	13th Mar. area.				201 C
Hq. Btry 1st Prov F.A. Gp	147 I	N.J.	2110 to 2135	147 I	None	app. 30 rds.	Caliber 12-15 CM guns	199 I, 234 V, W. 216 G.
14th Mar.			2120	GP 4th Div.				199 I, 234 V, W 216 G.
4th 155MM How Bn			2100 to 2125	147 W, W, S, W, E, A.	1 Bull-dozers & 1 tractor destroyed	app. 45-55 rds harassing 14 CM	2 guns DP 14 CM 25mm A guns	216 Q, R, S, T 199 C, D, E, I
Hq. Btry, 1st Prov. F.A. Gp	147 I	N.	<u>25Feb45</u> 0200 to 0245	147 I	None	20 rds.	Med. Arty	216 A.

enclosure "C" to appendix 4 to Annex Charlie to VACB Special action report two rds.

Summary of Shelling Report

Reported by	Location of Observer	Azimuth of Crater	Time	Area Shelled	Damage	No. Rds. Type of Fire	No. Type & Caliber of Guns	Remarks estimated location.
Hq. Btry 1st Prov. F.A. Gp	147 I	N	<u>25 Feb 45</u> 0900 to 0915	147 I	Minor damage to jeep	4-12 rds.	app. 75mm	
Hq Btry, 1st Prov. F.A. Gp	147 I	N	1245 to 1300	147 I	None	3-4 rds.	app. 75mm	
2nd 155mm How Bn	163 Y	N.W.	0150 to 0220	164 K 163 T, Y 147 I	Water dump destroyed	30 rds	2 guns 5"	216 D
2nd 155mm How Bn	163 F		2100	163 A, X	1-50 cal. MG damaged	1 rd.		Area shelled was actually forward of this Bn.
13th Mar.			2300	5th Div. CP area			Heavy guns	
Hq Btry, 1st Prov. F.A. Gp	147 I		2000	147 I	None	2 rds	Light arty	
			<u>26 Feb 45</u>					
2nd 155mm How Bn	164 K	N.W.	1500	164 K	None	1 rd. a. ind.	app. 5"	Unknown
Hq Btry, 1st Prov. F.A. Gp	147 I	N	1835	147 I	None	2 rds	Mortar	217 K
2nd 155mm How Bn	163 Y	N.W.	1835	164 G, V	None	4 rds	possibly 81mm Mortar	

enclosure "C" to Appendix 4 to Annex Charlie to VAGLF Special action report IWO Jima Campaign (continued)

Summary of Shelling Report

Reported by	Location of Observer	Azimuth of Crater	Time	Area Shelled	Damage	No. rds. Type of Fire	No. Type & Caliber of guns	Remarks Estimated Location
Hq Btry, 1st Prov. F.A. Gp	147 I	N	<u>27 Feb 45</u> 0330 to 0415	147 I	None	Undetermined	Large cal. 2 guns	216 Q
VAC			0410	163 O	None	Undetermined no. of rds.	guns or rockets	216 Q
2nd 155mm How Bn	163 Y	N.E.	1630	163 O	None	Undetermined no. of rds.	app. 150M	Firing on airfield #1 216 D&J
2nd 155mm How Bn	163 Y	N.E.	1835	164 G&V	None	4 rds.	possibly 81mm Mortar	Apparently firing on airfield #1
4th 155mm How Bn	147 O		0340 to 0440	147 M, R	1 enl killed 15% rats ions dump of H&S Btry destroyed.	app 100 total; 35 of which fell in Bn area	2 guns app. 14 CM	Mature of fire harrasing TA 217 determined from compass direction.
Flash Range OP's	Mt. Suribachi		<u>28 Feb 45</u> 0440	VAC CP area				216 G,H
FDC, 1st Prov. F.A. Gp			0610	Western Beaches		Rockets		202 P

enclosure "C" to Appendix 4 to Annex Charlie to VACLF Special action report IWO Jima Campaign (continued)

Summary of Shelling Report

Reported by	Location of Observer	Azimuth of Crater	Time	Area Shelled	Damage	No. Rds. Type of Fire	No. Type & Caliber of Guns	Remarks Estimated Location
VAC			28 Feb 45 2215	VAC-CP area		6 rds rockets or shells	large rockets or heavy guns	216 D
155mm How Bn	163 Y	N.J.	0830	164 P, U 147 D	None	4 rds	possibly 81mm Mortar	
4th 155mm How Bn	147 O	N	2230 to 2255 <u>1 Mar 45</u>	147 S	None	10-12 rds	Unknown	Harrassing Location unknown
Hq Btry 1st Prov F.A. Gp	147 I	N	0150 to 0450	147 I	Minor losses in wire & retentions. 5th Ammo Dump destroyed. HDC tent- porarily knocked out	8-10 rds	Heavy arty 2 pieces	216 G. No. of rds. difficult to estimate due to explosion of ammo dump
2nd 155mm How Bn	163 Y	N.J.	0145 to 0430	164 K 147 I 163 F, Y	3 personnel casualties "A" Btry 147 I	undetermined	app. 150M	As above

enclosure "C" to appendix 4 to annex Charlie to VACIE Special action Report IWO Jima Campaign (continued)

Summary of Shelling Report

Reported by	Location of Observer	Azimuth of Crater	Time	Area Shelled	Damage	No. Rds. Type of Fire	No. Type & Caliber of Guns	Remarks Estimated Location
4th 155mm How Bn	147 O	N	<u>1Mar45</u> 0200 to 0500	147 S	2 enl casualties minor wounds	65-70 rds in vicinity of Bn area	14 CM	as above
Hq Btry 1st Prov. F.A. Gp	147 I	N	1100 to 1200	Ship off west beach	Minor or none		Caliber 12-15CM	215 G
Flash Range OP's	Mt. Suri-beach		1615	East Boat Basin			Mortars	
2nd 155mm How Bn	163 Y	N.W.	2000	164 G	None	3 rds	possibly 81mm Mortars	
AO Corps	Airfield #1		1135	Airfield #1			Mortars	202 PQ 185 G
AO Corps	Airfield #1		1340	Airfield #1			Mortars	202 Q 185 G
AO Corps	Airfield #1		1920	Airfield #1				218 D
2nd 155mm How Bn	164 R		1230	164 E, S	None	4 rds	possibly 81mm Mortars	185 G or 202 Q poss. firing at Airfield #1

enclosure "C" to Appendix 4 to Annex Charlie to VACLF Special action Report IWO JIMA Campaign (continued)

Summary of Shelling Report

Reported by	Location or Observer	Azimuth of Crater	Time	Area Shelled	Damage	No. Rds. Type of Fire	No. Type & Caliber of guns	Remarks Estimated Location
AO Corps	Airfield #1		<u>3 Mar 45</u> 0742	Airfield #1		3 rds		218 D
AO Corps	Airfield #1		<u>4 Mar 45</u> 1135	Airfield #1		3 rds	5" gun	218 D
AO Corps	Airfield #1		<u>5 Mar 45</u> 1340	Airfield #1		3 rds	aa gun	184 J
AO Corps	Airfield #1		0755	Airfield #1		6 rds 3" guns		185 J
26th Mar.			1440		1 casualty WIA	1rd	large caliber	
24th Mar.			<u>7 Mar 45</u> 0950	164 C, D, J 184 X, Y Airfield #1 General over all forward areas	Unre- ported	Rockets	Rockets	235 F, G, J. Duds & tail assemblies only. No explosions reported.

Enclosure "C" to Appendix 4 to Annex Charlie to VACLF Special Action Report IWO Jima Campaign

Summary of Shelling Reports


Reported by	Location of Observer	Azimuth of Crater	Time	Area Shelled	Damage	No. Rds. Type of Fire	No. Type & Caliber	Remarks Estimated Location
2nd 155mm How Bn	163 Y 163 T 147 I 164 K	From compass direction 630	<u>11Mar45</u> 0115 to 0430	163 Y, T 147 I 164 K	None	15-20 rds	4.7 in	Some air bursts WP shells 1 delay fuze
Hq Btry 1st Prov F.A. Gp	147 I		0030 to 0430	147 I	None	3 rds	Caliber 12-15 CM	Superquick fuze large fragments 235 B, C
OP Mt. Suri-bachi	Mt. Suri-bachi		0030 to 0430	Mt. Suri-bachi north through airfield #2	Undeter- mined Reported		Caliber 12-15 CM 4 guns	Reported only HE shells. Out in several targets. 1st at 235 B, 3 other guns in immediate vicinity.
5th Div			<u>12Mar45</u> 1340			Mortars or Heavy Arty		
3rd Bn 28th Mar.			<u>13Mar45</u> 2010	217 C		4 rds Mortar or Arty	4 guns or Mortars	219 X; this TA was behind lines of 3rd Div; 12th Mar fired on this Dodar plot; On 14 Mar AO's & Infantry patrol were unable to locate guns in this area.

Enclosure "C" to Appendix 4 to Annex Charlie to VAOIF Special Action Report IWO JIMA Campaign (continued)

IPROV. F. A. GRP
ENCLOSURE "D"

CIRCUIT DIAGRAM

TWO T1MA VOLCANO ISLANDS




RADIO NETS

ENCLOSURE (E)

1ST PROVISIONAL FIELD ARTILLERY GROUP

IWO JIMA, VOLCANO ISLANDS.



ENCLOSURE (FOX)

AMMUNITION EXPENDED BY TYPE FIRE MISSIONS

TYPE OF MISSION	TOTAL RDS EXPENDED 1ST PROV FLD ARTY GRP
Counter-battery Missions	10,280
Preparations	15,677
Harassing Fires	10,558
Registrations	797
Miscellaneous Missions	6,483
TOTAL	43,795

Enclosure (F) to Appendix 4 to Annex Charlie to V Amphibious Corps
Landing Force Special Action Report, Iwo Jima.

CONSOLIDATED AMMUNITION EXPENDITURE REPORT

Period Covered

From: 21Feb45

To: 16Mar45

	<u>2nd155mmHowBn</u>	<u>4th155mmHowBn</u>	<u>Total</u>
HE	22175	19100	41275
WP	1175	1345	2520
M3	12939	12340	25279
M4A1	10521	7619	18140
M4	126	250	376
M51A3 & M51A4	20694	17533	38227
M55A3 & M55A1	2268	1975	4243
CP 105	920	405	1325

Enclosure (G) to Appendix 4 to Annex Charlie to VAC Lan For
Special Action Report Iwo Jima Campaign.

ENCLOSURE "H"
TO
FIRST PROVISIONAL FIELD ARTILLERY GROUP
SPECIAL ACTION REPORT
11 Oct 44 - 15 Mar 45

A. FIRST PROVISIONAL FIELD ARTILLERY GROUP
TOTAL VEHICLES EMBARKED FOR DETACHMENT OPERATION

	TRACTOR TD-18	TRACTOR TD-14	TRUCK 1-ton 4x4,	cargo	TRUCK 1-ton 4x4,	radio	TRAILER, 6-ton	Athey	TRUCK 2 1/2-ton 6x6	TRUCK 1-ton 4x4	TRAILER 1-ton	TRAILER 1-ton	155MM Howitzer	TRAILER 1-ton water	AMBULANCE 1-ton	TRAILER 1-ton	stockroom	TRUCK 1-ton 4x4 w/hoof	DUKW	TRUCK 3/4 ton 4x4	TRUCK 2 1/2 ton Gas	TRAILER 1-ton greasing	TOTALS
Hdqtrs Btry																							
1st Prov Fld																							
Arty Gp., FMF																							
Pacific	1	7	3						2	2	6	2		2	1								31
2nd 155MM How Bn	10	6	9	3					7	9	11	7	12	4	1	1					1		81
4th 155MM How Bn	10	6	9	3					7	8	10	5	12	4	1	1		1			1		78
4/3rd Amph Tr Co																							
USA., attached																							
to 1st Prov Fld																							
Arty Gp									1		1			1				50	1	1			55
TOTALS	20	1	19	26	6				17	19	28	14	24	11	3	2		1	50	1	1	2	245

B. Number of vehicles embarked for each firing battery:

- 1 1/2-ton 4 X 4, w/1-ton trailer.
- 2 1/2-ton, 4 X 4, (TCS) (1 only w/1-ton trailer).
- 2 1-ton 4 X 4, (1 w/300-gal. water trailer & 1 w/1-ton trailer).
- 2 2 1/2-ton 6 X 6.
- 2 TD-18.
- 1 TD-18, w/angle dozer, w/6-ton Athey trailer.

C. Number of vehicles embarked for each "H&S" battery:

- 3 1/2-ton 4 X 4, w/1-ton trailer.
- 2 1/2-ton 4 X 4, (TCS) (1 only w/1-ton trailer).
- 2 1-ton 4 X 4, w/1-ton trailer.
- 1 2 1/2-ton 6 X 6, w/300 gal. water trailer.
- 1 1-ton 4 X 4, (RUGF or 608 mounted).
- 1 1/2-ton 4 X 4, ambulance.
- 1 TD-18 w/angle dozer, w/1-ton trailer.
- 1 Spare parts trailer.
- 1 1-ton grease trailer.

ENCLOSURE "H"
(continued)

D. Number of vehicles embarked for Group Headquarters Battery




- 7 1/2-ton 4x4, cargo.
- 8 1/2-ton radio jeep.
- 2 1-ton 4x4, cargo.
- 2 2 1/2-ton 6x6.
- 3 1-ton trailer (1 Improvised water trailer).
- 1 500-gal. water trailer.
- 5 1/2-ton trailers.
- 1 1/2-ton, ambulance.
- 1 TD-14.

NOTE:

1 1-ton trailer was allowed but not taken by the 4th 155mm
Howitzer Battalion.

ENCLOSURE "H"

TO
APPENDIX-4 TO ANNEX-C
TO
VAC, LanFor
SPECIAL ACTION REPORT
IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN.





1ST PROV FLD ARTY GROUP
OVERLAY OF FIRES AND POSITION AREAS
1/10,000 SPECIAL AIR AND GUNNERY TARGET MAP
IWO JIMA VOLCANOE ISLANDS


OFFICIAL
Sanitization

NOTE: CONCENTRATIONS SHOWN ARE CORPS ONLY


ENCLOSURE ITEM TO APPENDIX 4
TO ANNEX CHARLIE
YAC LANFOR SPECIAL ACTION REPORT
IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN








STATION LOCATED BY
RADAR 14TH MAR
BRAND -50-
HILL -30-
#1 -30-
BOMB CORPS ARTY
ALL OTHER TRIANGULATION
STATIONS WERE LOCATED BY THE
13TH MARINES



1ST PROV FLD ARTY GROUP
ARTY SURVEY CONTROL
19 FEB 45 to 15 MAR 45
1/10,000 SPECIAL AIR AND GUNNERY TARGET MAP
IWO JIMA VOLCANO ISLANDS

LEGEND
IP TRIANGULATION STATION
OP TRAVERSE
BASE LINE



OFFICIAL
Anten

ENCLOSURE KING TO APPENDIX 4
TO ANNEX CHARLIE
VAC LANFOR SPECIAL ACTION REPORT
IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN


PART TWO TO ENCLOSURE KING

Comparison of Map and Survey Locations.

Station	Map	Survey	Description and Remarks
Pole	(78.594-74.072) alt. 107	(78.669-74.212) alt. 124.3	Pole on control tower on airfield #2.
Plateau	(76.825-73.783) alt. 70	(76.970-73.838) alt. 96.1	Plateau.
Pole	(78.134-74.344) alt. 129	(78.243-74.407) alt. 132.6	Pole on hill in TA 200-F
Radar	(78.911-74.344) alt. 130	(79.006-74.210) alt. 138.4	Jap Radar Station east of airfield #2.
Emplace- ment.	(78.628-74.396) alt. 107	(78.745-74.434) alt. 128	Earth-covered struct- ure at northeast end of airfield #2
Hump	(78.670-76.260) alt. 107	(78.731-76.424) alt. 119	Table-top hill with vertical sides.
Hat	(79.610-76.140) alt. 110	(79.685-76.241) alt. 132	-do-
Stick	(79.630-75.390) alt. 105	(79.710-75.466) alt. 125	-do-
Dome	(80.310-75.035) alt. 103	(80.402-75.108) alt. 131	-do-

Part 2 to Enclosure King to Appendix 4.

76
77



INTELLIGENCE OVERLAY
MAJOR ENEMY INSTALLATIONS - FIXED + MOBILE
COMPILED BY - CORPS ARTILLERY - 19 FEB-15 MARCH 45
SOURCE - A.P.I., OBSERVATION, P.O.W. and
CAPTURED DOCUMENTS

SPECIAL AIR and GUNNERY TARGET MAP of
IWO JIMA - VOLCANO ISLANDS
SCALE - 1::10,000

KEY
O - MORTARS
+ - COVERED ARTY.
⊕ - COAST DEFENSE
EE - OPEN ARTY.
⬢ - BLOCKHOUSE
⬢ - A.A. or D.P.
⬢ - PILLBOX
□ - C.P.
- STORES
R - ROCKETS
NGT - NAVAL GUN TARGET
⊙ - A.T. GUN
C - CAVE
Δ - O.P.

ENCLOSURE "L"
TO APPENDIX 4 TO ANNEX CHARLIE
TO VACLF SPECIAL ACTION REPORT
IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN

- OFFICIAL -

W. A. Estey
Major U.S.M.C.R.

4-2

GROUND OBSERVATION ON CORPS FRONT

77

76

FLASH RANGING
D DAY: 19 FEBRUARY 1945
INSTALLATION 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
I
J
K
L
M
N
O
P
Q
R
S
T
U
V
W
X
Y
Z

SOUND RANGING

1st Grp.
13th Regt.
13th Regt.
"
"
13th Regt.
"
14th Regt.
"
"
13th Regt.
"
14th Regt.
"
13th Regt.
"
"
"

C
D+13-D+25

E
D+13-D+25

V
D+18-D+25

F
D+13-D+25
Y
D+18-D+25

U
D+13-D+17

S
D+10-D+21

R
D+10-D+21

T
D+8-D+12

Q
D+12-D+17

N
D+3-D+10

M
D+3-D+10

P
D+10-D+21
D+15-D+17

L
D+3-D+10
D+5-D+14

J
D+4-D+7
D+3-D+11

H
D+2-D+3

G
D+2-D+3

B

A

D+5-D+25 - 1st Grp.
D+5-D+12 - 13th Regt.
D+4-D+13 - 14th Regt.

KEY

OBSERVATION
POST

SOUND RANGE
STATION

HQ. 1st PROV. T.A. GRP.

13th MARINES

14th MARINES

81

72

SPECIAL AIR AND GUNNERY TARGET MAP OF IWO JIMA
SCALE: 1:10,000

ENCLOSURE: "M"


TO APPENDIX 4 TO ANNEX CHARLIE TO VACL
SPECIAL ACTION REPORT IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN
OFFICIAL

Major M. J. 2nd 2nd 2nd 2nd


ENCLOSURE "N"
TO
FIRST PROVISIONAL FIELD ARTILLERY GROUP
SPECIAL ACTION REPORT
11Oct44 - 15Mar45

1. General Loading Diagram LST


A. TANK DECK



B. MAIN DECK



C. Side View




ENCLOSURE "N"
TO
APPENDIX-4 to ANNEX-G
TO
VAC, LanFor
SPECIAL ACTION REPORT
IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN

ENCLOSURE "N"
(continued)


2. Specific Loading Diagram and Logistical Plan LST No. 766
("A" Btry 2nd 155mm Howitzer Battalion and 1/2 Group Headquarters)

A. Diagrams

1. TANK DECK



2. MAIN DECK



B. Transportation Embarked

- | | |
|---|--|
| 1-DUKW (7) | 13-TRUCK, 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ -ton 6x6, w/1-ton trailer. |
| 2-DUKW (2) each w/radio jeep and "A" frame. | 14-TRUCK, 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ -ton 6x6, w/155mm Howitzer. |
| 3-TRUCK, $\frac{3}{4}$ -ton 4x4, radio, w/ $\frac{1}{4}$ -ton trailer. | 15-TRACTOR, TD-18, w/155mm Howitzer. |
| 4-TRUCK, $\frac{1}{4}$ -ton 4x4. | 16-TRUCK, 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ -ton 6x6, w/155mm Howitzer. |
| 5-TRUCK, $\frac{3}{4}$ -ton 4x4. | 17-TRUCK, 1-ton 4x4, w/improvised water trailer. |
| 6-TRUCK, $\frac{3}{4}$ -ton 4x4, w/ $\frac{1}{4}$ -ton trailer. | *18-TRUCK, $\frac{3}{4}$ -ton 4x4, radio. |
| *7-TRUCK, $\frac{3}{4}$ -ton 4x4, w/ $\frac{1}{4}$ -ton trailer. | *19-TRUCK, $\frac{3}{4}$ ton 4x4, w/ $\frac{1}{4}$ -ton trailer. |
| *8-TRUCK, $\frac{3}{4}$ -ton 4x4, radio, w/ $\frac{1}{4}$ -ton trailer. | *20-TRUCK, $\frac{3}{4}$ -ton 4x4, radio. |
| 9-TRACTOR, TD-14 | *21-TRUCK, $\frac{3}{4}$ -ton 4x4, radio. |
| 10-TRUCK, 1-ton 4x4, w/1-ton trailer. | *22-TRUCK, $\frac{3}{4}$ -ton 4x4, ambulance. |
| 11-TRACTOR, TD-18, w/155mm How. | *23-TRUCK, 1-ton, w/300-gal water trailer. |
| 12-TRACTOR, TD-18, w/angle dozer. w/6-ton Athey trailer. | |

*Denotes: topside.

ENCLOSURE "N"
(continued)

<u>C. Ammunition (155mm Howitzer) Embarked</u>		<u>No. of Rounds</u>
Stowed on tank deck and topside		4200
Stowed on 6-ton Athey trailer		<u>275</u>
Total		4475
<u>D. Supplies Embarked</u>		<u>No. of Rations</u>
*1. Rations for men aboard		15939
Corps rations		<u>5888</u>
Total		21827
2. <u>Water</u>	<u>No. of Containers</u>	<u>Gals.</u>
Drums (55-gal)	66	<u>3630</u>
Expeditionary cans		
Dukw preloads	233	1165
Corps Troops Expeditionary water cans	400	<u>2000</u>
Total		6795
3. <u>Petroleum Products</u>		<u>No. of Drums (55-gal)</u>
Mogas 80-octane		40
White Gas unleaded (67-octane)		21
Diesel Oil (50-cetane)		60
Kerosene		2
Lube Oil SAE 10		1
Lube Oil SAE 30		3
Lube Oil SAE 50		<u>1</u>
Total		128
4. <u>Ammunition (Small Arms)</u>		<u>No. of Cases</u>
Cal..50, AP		110
Cal..50, Incendiary		110
Cal..50, Tracer		90
Cal..30, carbine		23
Cal..30, M-1		16
Cal..45, Pistol		1
Rifle Grenades		3
Shells Mortar, 81mm HE		66(clover)
Links, f/cal..50 MG		123
Hand Grenades		50
5. <u>Miscellaneous</u>		<u>Amount</u>
Lumber, 2"x4"x20', f/telephone poles		84 poles
Sandbags		5600 bags

<u>E. Organizational Equipment</u>	<u>Cu.Ft.</u>
Stowed on tank deck ("A" Btry and GpHqtrs)	266


ENCLOSURE "N" TO APPENDIX-4
(continued)

ENCLOSURE "N"
(continued)


3. Specific Loading Diagram and Logistical Plan LST No. 779
("C" Btry. 2nd 155mm Howitzer Battalion and $\frac{1}{2}$ Battalion Headquarters)

A. Diagrams

1. TANK DECK



2. MAIN DECK



B. Transportation Embarked

- 1-DUKW (8)
- 2-TRACTOR, TD-18, w/angle dozer
- 3-TRUCK, $\frac{1}{2}$ -ton 4x4, radio
- 4-TRUCK, $\frac{1}{4}$ -ton 4x4, w/ $\frac{1}{4}$ -ton trailer
- 5-TRUCK, $\frac{1}{2}$ -ton 4x4, radio, w/ $\frac{1}{2}$ -ton trailer.
- 6-TRUCK, $\frac{1}{2}$ -ton 4x4, radio, w/ $\frac{1}{4}$ -ton trailer.
- 7-TRUCK, $\frac{1}{2}$ -ton 4x4, w/ $\frac{1}{4}$ -ton trailer.
- 8-TRUCK, 1-ton 4x4, w/1-ton trailer.
- 9-TRACTOR, TD-18, w/155mm How.
- 10-TRACTOR, TD-18, w/angle dozer, w/6-ton Athey trailer.
- 11-TRACTOR, TD-18, w/155mm How.
- 12-TRUCK, 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ -ton 6x6, dump, w/155mm How.
- 13-TRUCK, 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ -ton 6x6, dump w/155mm How.
- *14-TRUCK, 1-ton 4x4, w/1-ton trailer.
- *15-TRUCK, 1-ton, cargo, w/1-ton water trailer (300-gal)
- 16-TRUCK, $\frac{1}{2}$ -ton 4x4, ambulance w/ $\frac{1}{4}$ -ton trailer.
- 17-TRUCK, 2 $\frac{1}{4}$ -ton 6x6, cargo, w/1-ton trailer.
- 18-TRAILER, 1-ton stockroom.
- 19-TRAILER, 1-ton, greasing.
- *Denotes: topside.

ENCLOSURE "N" TO APPENDIX-4
(continued)

ENCLOSURE "N"
(continued)

C. Ammunition (155mm Howitzer) Embarked

	<u>No. of Rounds</u>
Stowed on tank deck and topside	4200
Stowed on Athey trailer	<u>275</u>
Total	4475

D. Supplies Embarked

*1. Rations

Rations for men aboard	15939
Corps Rations	<u>5888</u>
Total	21827

2. Water

	<u>No. of Containers</u>	<u>Gals.</u>
Drums (55-gal)	66	3630
Expeditionary Cans (Dukw Preloads)	233	1165
Corps Water, Expeditionary Cans	400	<u>2000</u>
Total		6795

3. Fuel

	<u>No. of Drums (55ga)</u>
Mogas, 80-Octane	40
White Gas, unleaded (67-Octane)	21
Diesel Oil (50-Cetane)	60
Kerosene	2
Lube Oil SAE 30	3
Lube Oil SAE 50	<u>1</u>
Total	127

4. Ammunition (Small Arms)

	<u>No. of Cases</u>
Cal..50, AP	110
Cal..50, Incendiary	110
Cal..50, Tracer	90
Cal..30, Carbine	23
Cal..30, M-1	16
Cal..45, Pistol	1
Rifle Grenades	3
Links, f/cal..50 MG	123
Hand Grenades	50

5. Miscellaneous

	<u>Amount</u>
Lumber, 2"x4"x20' f/telephone poles	84 poles
Sandbags	5600 bags

E. ORGANIZATIONAL EQUIPMENT

	<u>Cu. Ft.</u>
Stowed on tank deck "C" and "H&S" Batteries	1262
2nd 155mm Howitzer Battalions.	


ENCLOSURE "N" TO APPENDIX-4
(continued)

ENCLOSURE "N"
(continued)


4. Specific Loading Diagram and Logistical Plan LST No. 784
("B" Btry, 2nd 155mm Howitzer Battalion and 1/2 Battalion Headquarters)

A. Diagrams

1. TANK DECK



2. MAIN DECK



B. Transportation Embarked

- | | |
|--|---|
| 1-DUKW (5) | 11-TRACTOR, TD-18, w/angle dozer,
w/6-ton Athey trailer. |
| 2-DUKW (3) on w/radio jeep
one w/"A" frame. | 12-TRACTOR, TD-18, w/155mm Howitzer |
| 3-TRUCK, 1/4-ton 4x4, radio,
w/1/4-ton trailer. | 13-TRUCK, 2 1/2-ton 6x6, w/155mm
Howitzer. |
| 4-TRUCK, 1/4-ton 4x4, radio,
w/1/4-ton trailer. | 14-TRACTOR, TD-18, w/155mm
Howitzer. |
| 5-TRUCK, 1/4-ton 4x4, radio,
w/1/4-ton trailer. | *15-TRUCK, 1-ton, 4x4, w/1-ton
trailer. |
| 6-TRUCK, 1/4-ton 4x4, w/1/4-ton
trailer. | *16-TRUCK, 1-ton 4x4, w/1-ton
trailer. |
| 7-TRUCK, 1/4-ton 4x4. | 17-TRUCK, 1-ton 4x4, w/water
trailer (300-gal) |
| 8-TRUCK, 1/4-ton 4x4. | 18-TRAILER, 1-ton water
improvised. |
| 9-TRUCK, 1-ton 4x4, w/1-ton
trailer. | *Denotes: topside. |
| 10-TRUCK, 2 1/2-ton 6x6, w/155mm How. | |

ENCLOSURE "N" TO APPENDIX-4
(continued)

ENCLOSURE "N"
(continued)

C. Ammunition (155mm Howitzer) Embarked

No. of Rounds

Stowed on tank deck and topside	4200
Stowed on Athey trailer	<u>275</u>
Total	4475

D. Supplies Embarked

No. of Rations

*1. Rations

Rations for men aboard	15939
Corps Rations	<u>5888</u>
Total	21827

2. Water

No. of Containers

Gals.

Drums (55-gal)	66	3630
Expeditionary Cans (Dukw Preloads)	233	1165
Corps Water Expeditionary Cans	400	<u>2000</u>
Total		6795

3. Fuel

No. of Drums (55 Gal)

Mogas (80-Octane)	40
White Gas, unloaded (67-Octane)	21
Diesel Oil (50-Octane)	60
Kerosene	2
Lube Oil SAE 10	1
Lube Oil SAE 30	<u>3</u>
Lube Oil SAE 50	1
Total	128

4. Ammunition (Small Arms)

No. of Cases

Cal..50, AP	110
Cal..50, Incendiary	110
Cal..50, Tracer	90
Cal..30, Carbine	23
Cal..30, M-1	16
Cal..45, Pistol	1
Rifle Grenades	3
Shells, Mortar 60mm	66 (Clover)
Links, f/50 cal. MG.	123 lvs)
Hand Grenades	50

5. Miscellaneous

Amount

Lumber, 2"x4"x20' f/telephone poles	84 poles
Sandbags	5600 bags

E. ORGANIZATIONAL EQUIPMENT

Cu. Ft.


Stowed on tank deck ("B" Btry, and "H&S" Btry, 2nd 155mm Howitzer Battalion)	
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ENCLOSURE "N"
(continued)


5. Specific Loading Diagram and Logistical Plan LST No. 788
("C" Btry 4th 155mm Howitzer Battalion and 1/2 Group Headquarters).

A. Diagrams

1. TANK DECK



2. MAIN DECK



B. Transportation Embarked

- | | |
|---|---|
| 1-DUKW (8) | 13-TRUCK, 1-ton, w/1-ton trailer. |
| 2-TRACTOR, TD-18, w/angle dozer, w/6-ton Athey trailer. | 14-TRUCK, 1-ton 4x4, w/water trailer (300-gal). |
| 3-TRUCK, 1/4-ton 4x4, radio. | 15-TRACTOR, TD-18, w/fr. winch & 155mm Howitzer. |
| 4-TRUCK, 1/2-ton 4x4, w/1/2-ton trailer. | 16-TRACTOR, TD-18, w/fr. winch & 155mm Howitzer. |
| *5-TRUCK, 1/4-ton 4x4, w/1/4-ton trailer. | 17-TRUCK, 2 1/2-ton 6x6, w/155mm How. |
| *6-TRUCK, 1/4-ton 4x4, w/1/4-ton trailer. | 18-TRUCK, 2 1/2-ton 6x6, w/155mm How. |
| 7-TRUCK, 1/4-ton 4x4, w/808 radio. | *19-TRUCK, 1/4-ton 4x4, radio. |
| 8-TRUCK, 1/4-ton 4x4, w/808 radio. | *TRUCK, 3/4-ton 4x4, w/1/4-ton trailer. |
| 9-TRUCK, 1/4-ton 4x4, w/1/4-ton trailer. | *TRUCK, 2 1/2-ton 6x6, w/water trailer (300-gal). |
| 10-TRUCK, 1/4-ton 4x4, cargo. | *TRUCK, 2 1/2-ton 6x6, AmphDUKW. |
| 11-TRUCK, 2 1/2-ton 6x6, w/water trailer (300-gal). | *TRUCK, 2 1/2-ton 6x6, gas. |
| 12-TRUCK, 1/4-ton 4x4, radio, w/1/4-ton trailer. | *Denotes: topside. |

ENCLOSURE "N"
(continued)

<u>C. Ammunition (155mm Howitzer) Embarked</u>		<u>No. of Rounds</u>
Stowed on tank deck and topside		4200
Stowed on Athey trailer		<u>190</u>
Total		4490
 <u>D. Supplies Embarked</u>		 <u>No. of Rations</u>
<u>*1. Rations</u>		
Rations for men aboard		15939
Corps Rations		<u>5882</u>
Total		21827
 <u>2. Water</u>		 <u>No. of Containers</u>
Drums (55-gal)	66	<u>Gals.</u>
Expeditionary Cans		3630
Dukw Preloads	233	1165
Corps Water		
Expeditionary Cans	400	<u>2000</u>
Total		6795
 <u>3. Fuel</u>		 <u>No. of Drums (55gal)</u>
Mogas (80-Octane)		40
White Gas, unleaded (67-Octane)		21
Diesel Oil (50-Cetane)		60
Kerosene		2
Lube Oil SAE 30		3
Lube Oil SAE 50		<u>1</u>
Total		127
 <u>4. Ammunition (Small Arms) Embarked</u>		 <u>No. of Cases</u>
Cal..50, AP		110
Cal..50, Incendiary		110
Cal..50, Tracer		90
Cal..30, Carbine		41
Cal..30, M-1		52
Cal..45, Pistol		1
Rifle Grenades		3
Links, f/50 cal. MG.		123
Hand Grenades		50
 <u>5. Miscellaneous</u>		 <u>Amount</u>
Lumber, 2"x4"x20' f/telephone poles		84 poles
Sandbags		5600 bags
 <u>E. ORGANIZATIONAL EQUIPMENT</u>		 <u>Cu.Ft.</u>
Stowed on tank deck ("C" Btry 4th 155mm		
Howitzer Battalion and 1/2 1st Prov Fld Arty Gp)		311

ENCLOSURE "N" TO APPENDIX-4
(continued)


ENCLOSURE "N"

(continued)


6. Specific Loading Diagram and Logistical Plan LST No. 724
("B" Btry 4th 155mm Howitzer Battalion and 1/2 Battalion Headquarters)

A. Diagrams

1. TANK DECK



2. MAIN DECK



B. Transportation Embarked

- | | |
|--|--|
| 1-DUKW (8) | 9-TRUCK, 2½-ton 6x6, w/water trailer (300-gal). |
| 2-TRACTOR, TD-18, w/angle dozer w/6-ton Athey trailer. | 10-TRUCK, ½-ton 4x4, radio, w/½-ton trailer. |
| 3-TRUCK, ½-ton 4x4, radio, w/½-ton trailer. | 11-TRUCK, 1-ton, RUGF. |
| 4-TRUCK, ½-ton 4x4, radio. | 12-TRACTOR, TD-18, w/fr. winch & 155mm Howitzer. |
| *5-TRUCK, ½-ton 4x4, w/½-ton trailer. | 13-TRACTOR, TD-18, w/fr. winch & 155mm Howitzer. |
| *6-TRUCK, ½-ton 4x4, w/½-ton trailer. | 14-TRUCK, 2½-ton 6x6, w/155mm How |
| 7-TRUCK, 1-ton 4x4, w/1-ton trailer. | 15-TRUCK, 2½-ton 6x6, w/155mm How |
| 8-TRUCK, 1-ton 4x4, w/water trailer (300-gal) | *16-TRUCK, 1-ton 4x4, w/1-ton trailer. |
| | *17-TRAILER, 1-ton, 2-wheel stock-room. |
- *Denotes: topside.

ENCLOSURE "N" TO APPENDIX-4

(continued)

ENCLOSURE "N"
(continued)

C. Ammunition (155mm Howitzer) Embarked
 Stowed on tank deck and topside
 Stowed on Athey trailer
 Total

No. of Rounds
 4200
 190
 4390

D. Supplies Embarked

*1. Rations

Rations for men aboard
 Corps Rations
 Total

No. of Rations
 15939
 5838
 21827

2. Water

Drums (55-gal)
 Expeditionary Cans
 (Dukw Preloads)
 Corps water
 Expeditionary cans
 Total

<u>No. of containers</u>	<u>Gals.</u>
66	3630
233	1165
400	2000
	6795

3. Fuel

Mogas 80-Octane
 White gas unloaded (67-Octane)
 Diesel Oil (50-Cetane)
 Kerosene
 Lube Oil SAE 30
 Lube Oil SAE 50
 Total

No. of Drums (55gal)
 40
 21
 60
 2
 3
 1
 127

4. Ammunition (Small Arms)

Cal. .50, Ap
 Cal. .50, Incendiary
 Cal. .50, Tracer
 Cal. .30, Carbine
 Cal. .30, M-1
 Cal. .45, Pistol
 Rifle Grenades
 Link, f/50 cal. MG
 Hand Grenades
 Cal. .30, MG.

No. of Cases
 110
 110
 90
 41
 16
 1
 3
 123
 50
 36

5. Miscellaneous

Lumber, 2"x4"x20' f/telephone poles
 Sandbags

Amount
 84 poles
 5600 bags

E. ORGANIZATIONAL EQUIPMENT

Stowed on tank deck (4th 155mm Howitzer
 Battalion, "B" Btry and "H&S" Btry)


CuFt
 947

ENCLOSURE "N"
(continued)


7. Specific Loading Diagram and Logistical Plan LST No. 808
("A" Btry and $\frac{1}{2}$ "H&S" Btry 4th 155mm Howitzer Battalion)

A. Diagrams

1. TANK DECK



2. MAIN DECK



B. Transportation Embarked

- | | |
|--|--|
| 1-DUKW (5) | 11-TRUCK, 1-ton 4x4, w/1-ton trailer. |
| 2-DUKW, one w/radio | 12-TRUCK, $\frac{3}{4}$ -ton 4x4, (TCS), w/trailer. |
| 3-TRACTOR, TD-18, w/angle dozer. | 13-TRACTOR, TD-18, w/fr. winch & 155mm Howitzer. |
| 4-TRACTOR, TD-18, w/angle dozer, w/6-ton Athey trailer. | 14-TRACTOR, TD-18, w/fr. winch & 155mm Howitzer. |
| 5-TRUCK, $\frac{1}{4}$ -ton 4x4, (TCS) | 15-TRUCK, 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ -ton 6x6, dump & 155mm Howitzer. |
| 6-TRUCK, $\frac{1}{2}$ -ton 4x4, w/ $\frac{1}{2}$ -ton trailer | 16-TRUCK, 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ -ton 6x6, dump & 155mm Howitzer. |
| 7-TRUCK, $\frac{1}{4}$ -ton 4x4 (TCS) | 17-TRUCK, 1-ton 4x4, w/water trailer. |
| 8-TRUCK, $\frac{1}{4}$ -ton 4x4, w/ $\frac{1}{2}$ -ton trailer. | 18-TRUCK, $\frac{1}{4}$ -ton 4x4, ambulance. |
| 9-TRUCK, 1-ton 4x4, w/1-ton trailer. | 19-TRAILER, 1-ton 2-wheel lubricating. |
| 10-TRUCK, $\frac{3}{4}$ -ton 4x4, w/ $\frac{1}{2}$ -ton trailer. | |

ENCLOSURE "N"
(continued)

C. <u>Ammunition (155mm Howitzer) Embarked</u> Stowed on tank deck and topside. Stowed on Athey trailer. Total	<u>No. of Rounds</u> 4200 <u>190</u> 4390												
D. <u>Supplies Embarked</u>													
*1. <u>Rations</u> Rations for men aboard Corps rations Total	15939 <u>5888</u> 21827												
2. <u>Water</u> Expeditionary Cans Dukw Preloads Corps water Expeditionary cans Total	<table border="0" style="width: 100%;"> <tr> <td style="width: 30%;"><u>No. of containers</u></td> <td style="width: 40%;"></td> <td style="width: 30%; text-align: right;"><u>Gals.</u></td> </tr> <tr> <td></td> <td></td> <td style="text-align: right;">1165</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="text-align: center;">233</td> <td></td> <td style="text-align: right;"><u>2000</u></td> </tr> <tr> <td style="text-align: center;">400</td> <td></td> <td style="text-align: right;">3165</td> </tr> </table>	<u>No. of containers</u>		<u>Gals.</u>			1165	233		<u>2000</u>	400		3165
<u>No. of containers</u>		<u>Gals.</u>											
		1165											
233		<u>2000</u>											
400		3165											
3. <u>Fuel</u> None													
4. <u>Ammunition (Small Arms)</u> Cal. .50, AP Cal. .50, Incendiary Cal. .50, Tracer Cal. .30, Carbine Cal. .30, M-1 Cal. .45, Pistol Rifle Grenades Link f/cal. .50 MG Hand Grenades	<u>No. of Cases</u> 110 110 90 23 16 1 50 123 50												
5. <u>Miscellaneous</u> Lumber, 2"x4"x20' f/telephone poles Sandbags	<u>Amount</u> 84 poles 5600 bags												
E. <u>ORGANIZATIONAL EQUIPMENT</u> Stowed on tank deck													
	<u>CuFt.</u> 1084												

NOTE: The asterisk (*) all throughout this enclosure designates the following amount of rations in days loaded aboard each LST.

10 days "B"	2 days "D"
10 days "10-1"	2 days "SplAssault"
5 days "K"	20 days "PX"
5 days "C"	

ENCLOSURE "N" TO APPENDIX-4
(continued)

PROPOSED T/O

HEADQUARTERS & HEADQUARTERS BATTERY
FIELD ARTILLERY GROUP.

Designation: Headquarters & Headquarters Battery 1st Prov FA Grp.

1	UNIT	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
		Group Headquarters				Btry Hqtrs			
		Hqtrs Section	Intell Section	Opr & Fire Dir Ctr	Com Section	Hqtrs Section	Intell Section	Local Sec Section	TOTAL BTRY
2	Colonel	1							1
3	Group Commander	(1)							1
4	Lieutenant Colonel	1							1
5	Executive Officer	(1)							
6	Major		1	1					2
7	Gp-2		(1)						
8	Gp-3			(1)					
9	Captain	2	1	1	1				5
10	Gp-1, Btry CO	(1)							
11	Gp-4	(1)							
12	Asst Gp-2, Liaison Officer		(1)						
13	Asst Gp-3			(1)					
14	Communication Officer				(1)				
15	Lieutenants		1	1					2
16	Asst Gp-2, Air Observer		(1)						
17	Asst Gp-3, Survey Officer			(1)					
18	TOTAL COMMISSIONED	4	3	3	1				11
19	Warrant Officer				1		1		2
20	Ordo & Btry MunO						(1)		
20A	Communication (CP)				(1)				
20B	TOTAL WARRANT				1		1		2
21	Sergeant Major (584)	1							1
22	1st Sergeant (585)					1			1
23	Gunnery Sergeant			1					1
24	Operations (814)			(1)					
25	Technical Sergeant				1				1
26	Communications Chief (CP) (542)				(1)				
27	Supply Sergeant (821)	1							1
28	Platoon Sergeant		1						1
29	Intelligence (621)		(1)						

Enclosure (O) to Appendix 4 to Annex Charlie to VAC LanFor Special
Action Report, Iwo Jima Campaign.

**HEADQUARTERS & HEADQUARTERS BATTERY
FIELD ARTILLERY GROUP.**

Designation: Headquarters & Headquarters Battery, 1st Prov FA Grp.

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
		Group Hqtrs				Btry Hqtrs			
		Hqtrs Section	Intell Section	Opr & Fire Dir Ctr	Comm Section	Hqtrs Section	Maint Section	Local Sec Section	TOTAL BTRY
30	Staff Sergeant	1	1		3		1		6
31	Clerical (501)	(1)	(1)						
32	Mess (C) (824)						(1)		
33	Radio Chief (CP)(595)				(1)				
34	Field Wire Chief (CP)(595)				(1)				
35	Radio Repairman (CP)(174)				(1)				
36	Sergeants	2		2	3		2	1	10
37	Clerk (Oper)(814)			(2)					
38	Clerk, Classification Spl(275)	(1)							
39	Demolition (EP)(533)							(1)	
40	Field Wire Chief (CP)(595)				(1)				
41	Mechanic, motor (QM)(014)						(1)		
42	Message center chief(CP)(674)				(1)				
43	Property (870)						(1)		
44	Clerk (QM Cler)(821)	(1)							
45	Radio Chief (783)				(1)				
46	Field Cook (C)(060)						1		1
47	Corporals	5	2	2	9	1	1	3	23
48	Clerk (405)	(1)							
49	Camouflage (EP)(800)							(1)	
50	Clerk Liaison (405)(631)	(1)				(1)			
51	Clerk, Message Center (CP)(667)				(1)				
52	Clerk, postal (056)	(1)							
53	Machine Gunner (605)							(2)	
54	Clerk (QM Cler)(821)	(2)							
55	Intelligence Clerk		(1)						
56	Clerk, Operations (814)			(2)					
57	Draftsman (EP)(076)		(1)						
58	Mechanic, automotive (QM)(014)						(1)		
59	Operator, Radio (CP)(775)				(4)				
60	Operator, Switchboard(CP)(650)				(1)				
61	Wire Team Chief (CP)(641)				(3)				
62	Assistant Cook (C)(060)						2		2
63	Privates & PFC's	4	1	3	35		8	15	66
64	Clerk (055)	(1)		(1)					
65	Clerk, message center(CP)(667)				(2)				
66	Driver, truck (929)	(3)	(1)	(2)				(1)	

HEADQUARTERS & HEADQUARTERS BATTERY FIELD ARTILLERY GROUP.

Designation: Headquarters & Headquarters Battery, 1st Prov FA Grp.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
	Group Hqtrs				Battery Hqtrs			
	Hqtrs Section	Intell Section	Opr & Fire Dir Ctr	Comm Section	Hqtrs Section	Maint Section	Local Sec Section	TOTAL BTRY
67	Barber (022)					(1)		
68	Machine gunner (605)						(6)	
69	Operator, radio (CP) (775)			(10)				
70	Field Linemen (CP) (641)			(20)				
71	Messenger (CP) (675)			(2)				
72	Mechanic's Helper, auto (014)					(1)		
73	RIFLEMEN (745)						(8)	
74	Other duty (521)					(6)		
75	TOTAL ENLISTED	14	5	8	51	2	15	114
76	TOTAL MARINE CORPS	18	8	11	52	2	16	126
77	Commissioned, Medical Corps	1						1
78	Lieutenant Commander	(1)						
79	TOTAL COMMISSIONED, U.S. NAVY	1						1
80	Chief Pharmacist's Mate	1						1
81	Pharmacist's Mate, 1st Class	1						1
82	Pharmacist's Mate, 2nd Class	1						1
83	Pharmacist's Mate, 3rd Class	1						1
84	TOTAL ENLISTED, U.S. NAVY	6						6
85	TOTAL NAVAL PERSONNEL	7						7
86	AGGREGATE	25a	8	11	52	2	16	133
87	Carbine, .30 cal. M1	25a	8	11	52	2	16	133
88	Guns, Machine. cal.50. Brow. M2						4	4
89	Rifle, automatic .30 cal.						4	4
90	Tractor, medium w/angledozer					1		1
91	Trailer: 1/2 ton, 2 wheel, cargo	3	1	1	4			9
	1 ton, 2 wheel, cargo			1	1	1		3
	300 gal water trailer					1		1
	1 ton, 2 wh, grease com.					1		1
92	Truck: 1/2 ton, 4x4	3	1	1	4			9
	1/2 ton, 4x4 radio eqptd (SCR608)				6			6
	1/2 ton, 4x4 radio eqptd (TCS)				3			3
	1/2 ton, 4x4 ambulance comp.	1						1
	1 ton, 4x4 cargo			1			1	2
	2 1/2 ton, 6x6 cargo				1	1		2

a. Included 2 reserve for medical personnel when required in accordance with Rule of Land Warfare.

- (C) Commissary Branch
- (CP) Communication Personnel
- (EP) Engineer Personnel
- (QM) Quartermaster Personnel

Enclosure (P) to Appendix 4 to Annex Charlie to VAC Lan For Special Action
Report, Iwo Jima Campaign.

STAFF FUNCTIONS OF THE CORPS ARTILLERY OFFICER

1. On 20 October, 1944, the Commanding Officer of the 1st Provisional Field Artillery Group was ordered to report to the Commanding General, V Amphibious Corps. Upon reporting, he was informed by the Commanding General, V Amphibious Corps that he would be the Corps Artillery Officer for the operation against Iwo Jima.

2. During the period from 20 to 27 October, 1944, the Corps Artillery Officer remained at V Amphibious Corps Headquarters. On the 21st, he was briefed concerning the plans for the operation against Iwo Jima. In his capacity as Corps Artillery Officer, he made several recommendations. First, that the Corps Artillery for the operation consist of 155mm Howitzer Battalions only. In view of the fact that the extreme range which would be fired by Corps Artillery would be only 7500 yards, the inclusion of 155mm Guns with the Corps Artillery would be undesirable due to their characteristics of weight, difficulty of loading, and comparative flatness of trajectory at short ranges. In view of this recommendation, and because of the availability of only two 155mm Howitzer Battalions, it was decided that the Corps Artillery for the operation would consist of the 2d and 4th 155mm Howitzer Battalions and the Group Headquarters. Because of personnel shortages in the Fleet Marine Force, the Group Headquarters would have to be organized by taking personnel from units of Corps Artillery, V Amphibious Corps.

3. The Corps Artillery Officer further recommended that the coordination of Artillery, Naval Gunfire and Air Support be accomplished as set forth in Annex Able of this enclosure. This method of coordinating Artillery, Naval Gunfire and Air Support was proposed at a conference held on 24 October, 1944, where the Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, the Commanding General, V Amphibious Corps, the Commander TF 51, and the Commander TF 53 were present with their staffs. The plan was tentatively adopted for further study. After a conference between the Corps Artillery Officer and the Commander Support Aircraft, held on 11 December, 1944, during which some additions to the plan were made, the plan was officially adopted.

4. On 25 October, 1944, the Corps Artillery Officer submitted a tentative Artillery Annex to the Corps Operations Order. With minor changes, this annex was approved as the Artillery Annex to the Corps Operations Order No. 344.

5. During the period from 20 October, 1944 until 1 January, 1945, the Corps Artillery Officer kept the commanding officers of the divisional artillery regiments apprised as to what he was doing to effect coordination of artillery matters by sending them copies of tentative procedures and inviting comment and changes thereto. In connection with the plan for the coordination of Artillery, Naval Gunfire and Air, he sent pads of forms containing the information given in paragraph 1-c of Annex Able to all divisional artillery regiments to facilitate the functioning of the plan of coordination.

ENCLOSURE (P) to APPENDIX 4

STAFF FUNCTIONS OF THE CORPS ARTILLERY OFFICER (CONT'D)

6. On 12 and 13 December, 1944, the Assistant Corps 3, the Corps Artillery Officer, the Naval Gunfire Officer and the Corps Air Officer visited the Fourth and Fifth Divisions, respectively. These Officers outlined to the division staffs and their officers, including battalion commanders and their executives, the plan which had been made and the manner in which Corps would function in regard to Corps Artillery, Naval Gunfire and Air Support. Matters which were placed before the officers of the divisions were the Plan for the Coordination of Artillery, Naval Gunfire and Air. (Annex Able to this enclosure). The limitations governing the use of artillery, naval gunfire and air support were discussed and in connection with this, the importance of the coordination of these weapons being accomplished in every echelon, battalions, regiments, divisions, and finally corps. It was emphasized that an infantry battalion commander should use the weapons available to him in close support of his troops in the following order: first, his infantry weapons, mortars, rocket launchers, etc., and his direct support divisional artillery; second, the Corps Artillery; third, naval gunfire; fourth, Air support. The risks to his own troops by using Corps Artillery, Naval Gunfire and Air Support for close support were emphasized by pointing out the characteristics of Corps Artillery weapons, Naval Gunfire and Air Support which tend to render them generally unsatisfactory for close support of infantry. The fact that during the Iwo Jima operation there would be only 32 airplanes available for support missions every 90 minutes, and that this meant that each of two operating divisions could only rightfully expect two 8-plane strikes to be delivered in support of the division every 90 minutes, was emphasized with the hope that battalion commanders would realize that air support is an ace-in-the-hole weapon to be called for only when no other weapon can obtain the desired results. Finally, it was propounded as a guiding principle that the mission of the Corps Artillery, Naval Gunfire and Air Support is to assist the divisions and that when a request for the use of those weapons was made by an element of a division that it would be granted if possible, because it would be assumed that the man on the ground making the request knew what was required and had found his divisional weapons unsuited or inadequate for it. Only when the use of the requested weapon would interfere with the activities of another division or was not available would it be refused.

7. On 19 and 21 December, 1944, the Assistant Corps 3, the Corps Artillery Officer, the Naval Gunfire Officer and the Corps Air Officer, with key personnel from each of their sections, again visited the Fourth and Fifth Divisions, respectively. On these dates CPX's were held with each division. The members of the Corps Staff felt they had gained great benefit from these exercises, because the exercises enabled them to function together as they would in battle. The exercises enabled the command group of battalions, regiments and divisions to practice the coordination of artillery, naval gunfire and air support in each command echelon. The exercises also brought out matters which could be cleared up by discussions and critiques, rather than having these matters arise for the first time when the Corps was in action.

8. During the rehearsal, the Corps Artillery Officer, embarked upon the Landing Force Command Ship, sent out warnings of simulated air strikes as required by the provisions of Annex Able to this report. The communication, using

ENCLOSURE (P) to APPENDIX 4

STAFF FUNCTIONS OF THE CORPS ARTILLERY OFFICER (CONT'D)

one of the ship's radios on a frequency of 2862 worked excellently and battalions in all cases received notice of air strikes in less than ten minutes after the data concerning them was given by the Air Officer to the Corps Artillery Officer. The Commander Air Support was embarked upon a different ship, but an alternate Commander Air Support was embarked upon the Landing Force Command Ship and operated in the same room as the Corps Artillery Officer. When the alternate Commander Air Support was in charge of supporting aircraft coordination with artillery was much improved over the times when the Commander Air Support handled it from another ship. It is believed that in future operations the Commander Air Support should be on the ship in which the Landing Force Commander is embarked.

9. On D-day the Corps Artillery Officer began the coordination of artillery and air support as soon as the divisional artillery was landed and continued to do so until the termination of the operation. The procedure as set forth in Annex Able to this enclosure was found to be satisfactory and was not changed in any respect during the operation. Despite the fact that for a great part of the operation fourteen (14) battalions of artillery were firing on the island, which has a very limited area, none of our strike planes was hit by our own artillery fire and at no time was artillery fire suspended for a period of time greater than was necessary for an announced strike to be made. It is believed that the system set forth in Annex Able to this enclosure is the best that has been devised to date for attaining coordination of artillery fire and supporting aircraft strikes. It requires the minimum of personnel and equipment for its operation and it functioned satisfactorily during the operation which lasted twenty-five days and during which approximately 440,000 rounds of artillery shells were fired and two hundred thirty-four strikes were made by approximately 3100 planes acting as supporting aircraft.

10. The Corps Artillery Officer daily at about 1600 received information of the current situation from the Chief of Staff and the plans for the next day's attack. From this information and considering the ammunition available, he made recommendations to the Chief of Staff concerning the employment of Corps Artillery. These recommendations included the number of rounds to be used for the night harassing fires, the number of rounds for preparations and supporting fires during the following day, and the proportion of each to be made available to each division and to be used for the Corps missions. When these recommendations were approved the Corps Artillery Officer wrote the artillery paragraph of the Corps Order and immediately notified all divisional artillery regiments how many rounds the Corps Artillery would have available for the support of their divisions. This early notification enabled the divisions to immediately start planning the use of this support without having to wait until the Corps order was received.

11. The Corps Artillery Officer, after consultation with the Corps Air Officer, recommended to the Chief of Staff what period of time should be allotted for air strikes which would interfere with artillery preparations for the attack, and if the recommendation was approved it was embodied in the Corps order so that Division air officers would know the time during which their requested strikes would have to be executed, and divisional artillery officers would know when their preparation fires would have to be suspended or otherwise limited because of air strikes.

ENCLOSURE (P) to APPENDIX 4

STAFF FUNCTIONS OF THE CORPS ARTILLERY OFFICER (CONT'D)

12. At 0700 each morning the Corps Artillery Officer, with fires plotted on the map, showed the Chief of Staff and the Commanding General what harassing fires had been executed by Corps Artillery during the previous night and what fires would be delivered for the preparation for the attack. He also gave a resume of counterbattery and other missions fired during the night.

13. Prior to the operation it had been planned and hoped that in every echelon (battalions, regiments, divisions and Corps) that thorough coordination of artillery, naval gunfire and air support could be accomplished, in order to assure the most efficient use of these weapons and prevent duplication of effort. However, during the operation it was soon discovered that time was insufficient to allow each echelon to fully coordinate all weapons. From the time when the order was issued for the next day's attack until all plans had to be complete and in the hands of the agency which was to execute them was a period of time insufficient for complete coordination in all echelons. However, each echelon planned the use which it desired for supporting weapons as best as it could in the time available, and it is felt that, in general, there was not a great deal of duplication of effort or loss of efficiency in the use of different supporting agencies. The coordination in Corps consisted only in deciding and letting divisions know as soon as possible when artillery fire would be limited because of air strikes, and in the Naval Gunfire and the Corps Artillery Officer deciding where fires of general support ships and Corps Artillery firing on Corps targets would be placed. The coordination of Naval Gunfire with artillery was largely accomplished in the divisions, since most of the Naval Gunfire was delivered by ships assigned for direct support missions to each division. No effort was made to rearrange division plans because such a rearrangement would have inevitably resulted in the changed plans reaching the divisions at too late an hour to be executed.

14. Daily at 1800 the Corps Artillery Officer submitted a summary concerning all artillery activities to the Artillery Officer on the staff of the Commanding General, Expeditionary Troops, Pacific, in order to keep that headquarters promptly informed concerning all artillery matters.

ENCLOSURE (P) to APPENDIX 4

COORDINATION OF ARTILLERY, AIR AND NAVAL GUNFIRE

1. a. In order to insure the maximum coordinated effort on the part of all arms engaged in close support of the ground forces, the staff procedures outlined herein are announced.

b. The basic concept governing the coordination of the several supporting arms is that in their employment on fire missions ashore, direct troop support aircraft, and naval vessels providing naval gunfire are, in effect, additional artillery with the Corps, in the one case airborne and in the other case waterborne. Accordingly it is considered that the Commanding Officer, Corps Artillery, in his staff capacity as Corps Artillery Officer, is the proper agent of the Corps Commander to perform the duty of coordinating air, naval gunfire and field artillery support of the landing forces. Succeeding paragraphs describe the procedure to be observed by the Corps Artillery Officer and others in effecting this coordination. In the application of these procedures it must be borne in mind that Commander Support Aircraft is not a subordinate of the Corps Commander, but furnishes air support pursuant to the requests of the latter or his subordinate commanders. The same situation exists in the case of Naval Gunfire support. Approval by the Corps Commander of an air mission expressed through the Artillery Officer is construed by Commander Support Aircraft as a request that the mission be executed by him.

c. With each Artillery Regimental Headquarters, afloat or ashore, there will be a liaison officer from Corps Artillery who will set up a radio transmitter and receiver on a frequency designated by Corps Artillery. On this receiver he will receive from the Corps Artillery Officer the following information of scheduled air attacks, and will transmit it to the Artillery Regimental Commander or his designated representative who will be responsible for disseminating it to all battalions under his command before the air attack takes place:

- (1) Serial number of the strike.
- (2) The time of the attack (from-to).
- (3) Coordinates of point of attack.
- (4) The direction of approach to the target.
(azimuth true bearing).
- (5) The direction of the pull out. (azimuth true bearing).
- (6) Number and type of plane.
- (7) Altitude of mission. (lowest point of flight).
- (8) Signal, if any, which will be given to signify end of attack.
- (9) Any other pertinent information.

No artillery battalions, except in cases of emergency, will open fire initially until they have checked into their Regimental radio net, or their communication system which the Regimental Commander will set up to be used to give them information of air attacks by our own forces.

d. Upon receipt of information concerning an air attack the Battalion Commander or his representative at the Fire Direction Center will determine whether fire from any batteries of his battalion will endanger aircraft making the attack and he will discontinue, or suspend, such fires that will endanger the airplanes making the attack until the attack is finished.

COORDINATION OF ARTILLERY, AIR AND NAVAL GUNFIRE (CONT'D)

e. It is hoped that the information concerning air strikes as stated in paragraph (c) above can be disseminated to all artillery battalions prior to the beginning of a strike, but it may frequently happen that when strikes are urgently required and are made by planes on station, that the information of the strike may not reach artillery units before the strike is made. For this reason it is necessary that all personnel at artillery batteries, and also observers, be instructed to be continually alert to watch for planes making strikes, and if they see that the planes will be endangered by the fire of their units, they will immediately order their units to cease firing while the strike is being made. All artillery personnel must positively understand that even though information concerning the strike does not reach them prior to the strike, they are not justified in continuing fire if they see that their fire is endangering the planes making the strike.

f. If it becomes necessary to limit the trajectory of or call off entirely supporting fires in an area to allow an air strike, either of the two following plans may be placed in effect by the representative of Corps Artillery and Naval Gunfire:

Plan VICTOR: While Plan VICTOR is in effect, Naval Gunfire, Artillery, mortar and rocket units adjust their fire so that no trajectories over 1100 feet altitude exist over stipulated areas. Under Plan VICTOR, the smallest area free of trajectories of over 1100 feet altitude is the area enclosed by a circle of 2500 yards radius whose center is the center of the target area. Air craft can safely operate over this area only as long as a minimum altitude of 1500 feet above sea level is maintained.

Plan NEGAT: While Plan NEGAT is in effect, Naval Gunfire, Artillery, mortar and rocket units adjust their fire so that no trajectories of any kind exist in or over stipulated areas. Under Plan NEGAT the smallest area free of trajectories is the area enclosed by a circle of 2500 yards radius whose center is the center of the target area.

- (1) EXAMPLE: "All Naval Gunfire and Artillery observe Plan Victor, Target Area 5135 BAKER 1020 to 1040" means "No Naval Gunfire nor artillery trajectories of over 1100 feet are allowed over a circle of 2500 yards radius whose center is the center of Target Area 5135 BAKER, from 1020 to 1040".
- (2) EXAMPLE: "All Naval Gunfire and Artillery observe Plan Negat, Target Area 5135 Baker 1020 to 1040" means "No Naval Gunfire nor artillery trajectories are allowed in or over a circle of 2500 yards radius whose center is the center of Target Area 5135 Baker, from 1020 to 1040".

COORDINATION OF ARTILLERY, AIR AND NAVAL GUNFIRE (CONT'D)

g. Prior to the commencement of an artillery concentration which is to be fired by two or more battalions, the common superior of the firing units concerned will inform the representative of Corps Artillery of the location of the target so that Commander Air Support can be informed, in order that he will not send a strike into the area where the fire is passing or falling.

h. The number of airplanes used for artillery and naval gunfire spotting will be considerable, probably twenty or more. If these planes are constantly flying over the target area they will seriously interfere with air strikes. In order to minimize this interference, spotting planes will, as much as possible without interfering with the carrying out of their missions, fly over the water surrounding the island and keep out of the air over the land.

i. Since it is believed that the possibility of enemy airplanes strafing attack on artillery positions is extremely remote, and in order to keep from shooting down our own planes due to mistaking them for enemy planes, it is ordered that no machine gun or small arms fire will be directed against planes unless the position of the units firing at the plane is actually attacked.

2. a. In order to lessen the risk of spotting planes being hit by projectiles by keeping maximum ordinates of trajectories below 2700 feet except when high angle fire is used, the following will be observed at all times:

b. All artillery will use low angle fire whenever it can be used to accomplish a mission. High angle fire will not be used except when the tactical situation prevents the use of low angle fire.

c. When firing the 155mm howitzer, charge 1 will not be used for ranges greater than 3500 yards, charge 2 for ranges greater than 4500 yards, charge 3 for ranges greater than 5500 yards, charge 4 for ranges greater than 6500 yards, charge 5 for ranges greater than 7000 yards, and charge 6 or 7 for ranges greater than 7500 yards.

d. All artillery spotters will be instructed to keep their planes above 2700 feet altitude when they are over the target area, unless it becomes impossible to adjust fire from that altitude. In such cases, they may fly at a lower altitude.

ENCLOSURE "R"
TO
FIRST PROVISIONAL FIELD ARTILLERY GROUP
SPECIAL ACTION REPORT
11Oct44 - 15Mar45

TOTAL SUPPLIES EMBARKED

A. Rations

<u>1. ORGANIZATIONAL</u>	<u>NO. OF RATIONS</u>	<u>CASES</u>	<u>CU. FT.</u>
"B" Rations	1350		1816
"10-1" Rations	16140	1614	2260
"C" Rations	8064	1008	1169.28
"K" Rations	8064	672	873.6
"D" Rations	9504	66	67.32
"PX" Rations	31200	156	446.16
"SplAssault" Rations	3312	138	82.8
 <u>2. CORPS TROOPS PRELOADS</u>			
"C" Rations	4800	600	696
"K" Rations	7200	600	780
"D" Rations	23328	162	165.24
 <u>3. DUKW PRELOADS</u>			
"C" Rations	<u>18000</u>	<u>2250</u>	<u>2610</u>
 <u>4. TOTAL</u>	<u>130962</u>		<u>10966.40</u>

B. Water (By containers and total gallons)

	<u>NO. OF CONTAINERS</u>	<u>GALS.</u>
1. ORGANIZATIONAL (55-gal. drums)	330	18150
2. ORGANIZATIONAL (300-gal. water trailers)	9	2700
3. CORPS PRELOADS (5-gal. cans)	2400	12000
4. DUKW PRELOADS (5-gal. cans)	1400	7000
5. TOTALS		<u>39850</u>

C. Fuel (By type and total)

<u>1. ORGANIZATIONAL</u>		
Mogas 80-Octane (55-gal drums)	199	10945
White gas unleaded (55-gal drums)	109	6000
Diesel Oil (55-gal drums)	303	16665
Kerosene (55-gal drums)	9	500
Lube Oil SAE 10 (9110) (55-gal drums)	1	47
Lube Oil SAE 30 (9250) (55-gal drums)	13	681
Lube Oil SAE 50 (9500) (55-gal drums)	5	243
Totals		<u>37061</u>

 Enclosure "R" to Appendix 4.



PREPARED FOR CINCPAC-CINCPAC
BY 54TH ENGR. TOP. BN. USAFPCBC NOV. 1944
PHOTOGRAPHY FROM NAVY SORTIES 19 AUG. AND 1 SEPT. 1944
HORIZONTAL CONTROL FROM A.M.S. L771 (FIRST EDITION 1943)

CAUTION: THIS MAP HAS BEEN COMPILED FROM AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHS WITHOUT ADVANTAGE OF
GROUND CONTROL OR RECONNAISSANCE; THEREFORE AZIMUTH AND SCALE ARE NOT
ACCURATELY DETERMINED. THEY ARE REPRESENTED AS ACCURATELY AS POSSIBLE
FROM AVAILABLE SOURCES OF INFORMATION. CORRECTIONS AND OTHER COMMENTS
SHOULD BE FORWARDED TO CINCPAC-CINCPAC, P.H.

POLYCONIC PROJECTION WITH 1000 YARD SPECIAL GRID

SCALE 1:10,000

CONTOUR INTERVAL 20 FEET

THIS CLASSIFICATION WILL BE CHANGED TO RESTRICTED IN COMBAT AREA
PRINTED ON HIGH WET STRENGTH PAPER
(HIGHLY DURABLE AND MOISTURE RESISTANT)

ENCLOSURE "R"
(continued)

<u>D. Ammunition</u>	<u>CASES</u>	<u>ROUNDS</u>
1. ORGANIZATIONAL ARTILLERY		26520
2. SMALL ARMS		
A. Cal..30, M-1	96	114000
Cal..30, Carbine	138	420000
Cal..50, AP	660	231000
Cal..50, Incendiary	660	231000
Cal..50, Tracer	540	180000
Cal..45, Pistol	6	1107000
Totals		
B. Hand Grenades (asst'd)	300	7500
3. DUKW PRELOADS		
A. Cal..30, MG	36	36000
Cal..30, M-1	36	43200
Cal..30, Carbine	36	108000
Totals		187200
B. Hand Grenades, hand fragmentation	100	2500
Shells mortar 60mm	66-bdles	1200
Shells mortar 81mm	66-bdles	396
E. Communication Poles (f/telephone lines)	<u>AMOUNT</u>	
Lumber, 2"x4"x20'	500 poles	
F. Sandbags	33600 bags.	

Enclosure "R" to Appendix 4 to Annex Charlie to VAC, LanFor Special
Action Report Iwo Jima Campaign.

AERIAL OBSERVER CONDUCT OF FIRE REPORT

The following missions were accomplished over IWO JIMA by the aerial observers firing the 1st Provisional Field Artillery Group, 12th Marines, 13th Marines and 14th Marines artillery:

Mission or Target	Number Observed & Reported	Number Fired Upon	Number Damaged	Number Destroyed
Registrations	54	54		
Adjusted Time K	16	16		
Arty Positions (occupied)	7	4	3	1
Gun Positions (suspected)	10	4	4	
MG emplacements (occupied)	26	9	3	6
20mm AA Guns	40	23	9	12
8cm DP Guns	29	20	10	10
12cm DP Guns	8	5	2	3
37mm AT Guns	2	2		2
81mm & 90mm Mortars	3	2		2
125 lb Rocket Launchers	4	3	3	
200mm CD Gun	1	1		1
Concrete Pill-boxes	84	7	6	1
Fuel Dumps	7	4		4
Ammunition Dumps	4	2		2
Vehicles	62	42	22	17
Tanks	29	10	4	4
Trenches (recently constructed)	11	4	4	
Troop Concentrations	19	7		
Supply Dumps	4	2	1	1
Caves w/suspected gun positions	40	28	17	4
Total Targets Reported.....	390			
Total Targets Fired Upon.....	179			
Total Targets Damaged.....	88			
Total Targets Destroyed.....	70			

Enclosure (S) to Appendix 4 to Annex Charlie to V Amphibious Corps Landing Force
Special Action Report, Iwo Jima.

Corps Artillery Officer's Special Action Report IWO JIMA Campaign

IWO JIMA OPERATION
SPECIAL ACTION REPORT
OF THE
SECOND 155MM. HOWITZER BATTALION,
FIRST PROVISIONAL FIELD ARTILLERY GROUP.

Enclosure "T" to Appendix A to Annex C to VAC LanFor Special Action
Report IWO JIMA Campaign

CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS,
2D 155MM HOWITZER BATTALION,
1ST PROVISIONAL FIELD ARTILLERY GROUP,
FLEET MARINE FORCE, PACIFIC,
C/O FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA.

SPECIAL ACTION REPORT
OF
IWO JIMA

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HEADQUARTERS,
2D 155MM HOWITZER BATTALION,
1ST PROVISIONAL FIELD ARTILLERY GROUP,
FLEET MARINE FORCE, PACIFIC,
C/O FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

From: The Commanding Officer.
To: The Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps.
Via: (1) CO, 1st Prov Fld Arty Group.
(2) CG, V Corps Artillery.
(3) CG, Fifth Amphibious Corps.
(4) CG, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific.
Subject: Special Action Report of the IWO JIMA operation.

References: (a) CMC restricted ltr 1975-50 over AO-96 nsh,
dated 10 May, 1943.
(b) FMF, Pac. Gen Ord No. 66-44.
(c) Group General Order 1-45.

Enclosures: (A) Roster of personnel participating.
(B) Roster of casualties.
(C) Summary of shelling reports.
(D) Circuit diagram (Final).
(E) Radio Net (Final).
(F) Summary of ammunition expenditure by type of
fire mission.
(G) Summary of ammunition expenditure by items
by days.
(H) Summary of transportation authorized.

1. The Special Action Report with the following enclosures, for the IWO JIMA operation is submitted by this battalion in accordance with instructions contained in references (a), (b), and (c).

2. Narrative account of the operation.

(A) Introduction:

The following is a comprehensive resume of the action of the Second 155mm Howitzer Battalion in the IWO JIMA operation.

(B) Planning Phase:

The planning phase of this operation commenced during early November, 1944. The Commanding Officer was advised that the battalion would participate in the IWO JIMA operation and informed that he had about five weeks in which to ready the battalion. Decisions as to the equipment to be taken were made, and information regarding the target was studied and disseminated downward as it became available and to the extent that such dissemination was considered desirable.

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Subject: Special Action Report of the IWO JIMA operation (Cont'd).

The Group operation order was received in late December, and the battalion order was prepared and distributed a few days later.

Meetings were held on 26 and 29 December during which Group staff officers discussed the forthcoming operation with all battalion staff officers, battery commanders, and executive officers, and air observers.

Loading plans based on the use of three LSTs were prepared in November, and remained basically unchanged. UP&T Tables were submitted during the last week of November.

(C) Training Phase:

The first week of November was devoted to intensive schools in appropriate subjects for all personnel.

Ammunition was allotted the battalion for training during the second week of November, and emphasis was placed on battery firing problems.

The last half of November was devoted largely to the training of the battalion as a unit, and was characterized by tactical firing problems, coupled with schools. The battalion participated in one combined shoot coordinated by Group.

During December training continued with battalion and Group firing exercises, examinations to determine the qualification of enlisted personnel, survey and flash-ranging exercises, gas mask drill, physical drill and exercise, first aid and sanitation classes. In connection with the latter the battalion received inoculation against various communicable diseases.

At the close of the training phase it was considered that the battalion was ready in every respect for the forthcoming operation.

(D) Equipping Units:

On the first of November the battalion was gravely handicapped by the lack of much vital equipment, particularly motor transport. During November the bulk of the requisitions which had been previously submitted were filled, and with the exception of a few items the battalion was fully equipped by 1 December, 1944.

The three LSTs on which the battalion embarked had as pre-loads 7 units of fire of 155mm ammunition as well as thirty days supply of rations, water, gasoline, and 6 units of fire of small arms ammunition.

Field jackets were carried by all hands, as well as two blankets per man. Gas masks were carefully inspected, and were waterproofed aboard ship. Protective clothing was carried by each battery. DDT powder was provided all hands, and men were carefully instructed in its use.

Subject: Special Action Report of the IWO JIMA operation(Cont'd)

(E) Mounting:

On Friday, January 5, 1945, the first convoy of personnel left Camp Tarawa, Hawaii, T.H., and arrived at Camp Haahea, Hilo, Hawaii, T.H.

At 1245, Saturday, 6 January, 1945, Battery "B" and detachment of H&S Battery left Camp Haahea and embarked aboard the LST #784 at 1345. The unloading of a quantity of cargo was begun at once, and was completed at 2330 the same date. At 0630, 7 January, 1945, the loading of cargo began, and at 2100 on the same date the loading was completed.

Battery "C" was similarly loaded on LST #779, and Battery "A" on LST #760. A detachment of H&S Battery was loaded aboard the LST #779, and loading of this ship was completed at 1300, 9 January, 1945. A detachment of the 1st Provisional Field Artillery Group was loaded aboard the LST #760, and this vessel finished loading at 1400, 9 January, 1945. The transport group to which the LST's embarking this organization belonged sailed from Hilo Harbor at 1600, Wednesday, 19 January, 1945.

(F) Rehearsal:

A rehearsal for certain units of the assault force was held off Maui during the week of 12 January, 1945. Elements of the battalion did not participate beyond coming up on one battalion and two group radio nets. The LST #784 did not participate in these exercises, inasmuch as she developed engine trouble on 11 January, and accordingly put into Pearl Harbor for repairs. She joined the remainder of the transport group at Kaneohe Bay, Oahu, T.H., on 18 January, 1945.

At 1000, Monday, January 22, the convoy sailed for Eniwetok Atoll, where it arrived at 1230, Saturday, 3 February. At 0800, 5 February, the convoy left for Saipan, Marianas Islands, where they arrived at 1130, 10 February. On 12 February the battalion participated in a rehearsal off Tinian by coming up once again on radio nets.

(G) The Assault:

IWO JIMA was sighted at 0640, Monday, 19 February, 1945.

At 1555, 20 February, 1945, the following message was received by the Battalion Commander from Group Headquarters: "Order Caustic Charlie in on Red 1 and report to Tricolor 6 at Tricolor CP (147-0X) Igloo desires Caustic Charlie in this date x Gypsy 779 being ordered into Red 1 x Caustic Charlie will be attached to Tricolor x Tricolor will have guide to meet him at Red 1."

This order was carried out and at 1630 LST #779 beached at Red 1. A guide from the 13th Marines met the ship, and "C" Battery was attached to the 4th Battalion, that Regiment, for operational control. A position area in TA 163-T(SW) was tied by survey into that Battalion. At 1655 unloading of

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Subject: Special Action Report of the IWO JIMA operation (Cont'd).

vehicles was begun. The unloading was carried out under adverse beach conditions, and occupation of position under enemy mortar, machine gun, and sniper fire. Tracked vehicles only could negotiate the beach, and it was necessary to pull all equipment up the steep loose sand bluff with tractors.

By 1840 all howitzers were in position, and 250 rounds of ammunition had been transported to the battery area. At this time the message "Well Done" was received by "C" Battery Commander from the Group Commander.

Throughout the night of 20-21 February the unloading of LST #779 continued. An ammunition dump was located at a point above the beach beyond which wheeled vehicles could travel unaided to the position area. Ammunition was unloaded by means of attaching two pallets of twenty projectiles each to a tractor or bulldozer and pulling them up to the dump. Powder and fuzes were stacked on top of the pallets. The "C" Battery Athey Trailer was pulled aboard the ship and loaded with loose rounds and powder and pulled direct to the position area. Pallets were broken at the dump and trucks loaded with loose rounds for the trip to the battery area. Despite the fact that beach conditions were most unfavorable, and regardless of constant mortar and sniper fire, all vehicles loaded on the tank deck, 1700 rounds of ammunition, and sufficient rations and water had been unloaded by 0430, 21 February.

At 0430, 21 February, the Japanese laid down a heavy concentration of either artillery shell or large caliber rifled mortar shell directly on the ramp of the LST and on the tracked vehicles on the beach. It was necessary to suspend unloading and the bow doors were closed. After the ship had received hits from the enemy fire, the Captain, at 0512, decided to retract from the beach, and unloading came to a halt. It was planned to return to the beach at daylight to continue work. During the shelling one LVT received a direct hit and was destroyed. The "C" Battery bulldozer received shrapnel hits and was put out of action. It was subsequently repaired by the battalion Motor Section.

At 0700 the Captain was headed for the beach to continue unloading when he was ordered to not go in by Admiral Hill. He was called aboard the AGC10 and the Admiral extended a "Well Done" to all hands. The LST #779 was the first LST to beach in the IWO JIMA operation.

At 0545, 21 February, "C" Battery had registered on Base and Check Points and was awaiting fire missions.

On this morning three men were killed and one wounded from H&S and "C" Batteries. The casualties occurred during an attempt to destroy an enemy pillbox. Four other men received shrapnel wounds on the same day.

Throughout the day the LST #779 endeavored to disembark sandbags and other supplies and to get H&S Battery personnel ashore who were aboard when the ship retracted, but Dukws were denied permission to come ashore by beachmasters.

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Subject: Special Action Report of the IWO JIMA operation (Cont'd).

The battalion reconnaissance party selected the following locations for installations; 163-Y, Battalion CP; 164-X(N), "B" Battery; 147-I, "A" Battery. It was decided that "C" Battery remain in its present area. Radio and wire communication was established to all tentative battery positions. The battalion survey officer commenced survey with original control taken from 13th Marines IP at (76.477-71.331), altitude 29 yards, and direction established by taking a tangent to the east side of the island. Several other points were located.

"C" Battery on the 21st, in addition to registering, fired harrassing missions, and a mission against a Japanese battery with good effect.

At 0600, Thursday, February 22, 1945, it was reported to Group that 142 enlisted USMC, 11 officers USMC, 2 enlisted USN, and 1 officer USN were ashore.

At 0817 the Battalion Commander was instructed by the Group Executive Officer to use available Dukw's for hauling supplies from ships as he saw fit, and that it was hoped to land the remainder of the battalion that afternoon.

At 1335 the Battalion Commander was advised by Bn-1 that LST #784 had a fouled screw, and that the time of beaching was indefinite. However FDC personnel from the 784 were put ashore by small boat that afternoon.

At 1530 on the same date LST #760, embarking "A" Battery beached on Green 1. This battery was attached to the 13th Marines for operational control, and was unable to occupy the area surveyed in previously, and went into position at (75.699-71.639), altitude 54.4 yards.

LST #779 attempted to beach but was denied permission by beach control.

At 2050 the Battalion Commander informed Group that he would be able to take control of the battalion by 1200, 23 February, 1945.

At 0825, 23 February, LST #779 beached on Green 1, and unloading continued until complete.

At 1530 the following message was sent to Group: "Charlie Battery established OP on MT SURIBACHI x Registered on Check Point #6 x Shot two gun installations and several pillboxes x".

On the same date at 1600 the batteries reverted to battalion control, although the FDC had been in actual control for some time.

On the 23rd, the battalion, less "B" Battery registered on CR #65, designated as Check Point #6; RJ 356 designated as Check Point #7. Unobserved fires were delivered on Japanese covered artillery emplacements, rocket batteries, and mortars.

Early on the morning of Saturday, 24 February, 1945, two Japs were killed by the local security section in TA 163-S.

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Subject: Special Action Report of the IWO JIMA operation (Cont'd).

LST's #779 and #760 completed unloading on this afternoon, and LST #784 beached at 1400. Unloading began at 1445.

The Battalion Survey section located two short base flash ranging OP's on MT SURIBACHI. They were surveyed from 2nd Battalion IP (76.354-72.091) and PT BOMB (76.354-71.811). OL (74.970-70.493), altitude 183 yards was manned by "C" Battery personnel, and OR (75.093-70.309), altitude 183 yards was manned by "A" Battery personnel.

"B" Battery was in position on the afternoon of February 24.

The Battalion received heavy enemy counter-battery fire during the night of 24-25 February. At 2100 about 40 rounds of enemy shell combed the battalion area. It is believed that this fire came from a 15cm dual purpose gun located in TA 234-RW. "A" Battery received two direct hits in a gun pit, igniting powder charges and wounding three men in the second section. The fire was extinguished by battery personnel. The howitzer was temporarily put out of action with a broken sight mount and burned tires and air hose connections. At 0150, Sunday, 25 February about 30 rounds fired from a similar weapon combed the battalion area. H&S Battery water dump was hit and 11 drums of water destroyed. There were some near misses on the FDC and Sick Bay. Several telephone lines were knocked out.

At 1730 on February 25, LST #784 completed unloading.

On 26 February the battalion fired 3016 rounds, which is the greatest number of rounds ever fired in one day in the history of the organization, surpassing even the record set during the Saipan operation.

At 1500, 26 February, one five inch dud fell on No. 2 gun position at "B" Battery during enemy counter-battery. There were no casualties.

On this same afternoon the Battalion Commander and reconnaissance party attempted to establish an OP on Hill 382, but were pinned down by Jap small arms fire.

At 1600 the No. 2 gun in "A" Battery was back in firing condition.

The same evening the battalion was taken under heavy calibre counter-battery, and destroyed two enemy 15cm guns located by sound ranging. They were located in TA 202-AF and TA 202-W(SW).

At 0800, 27 February, the "C" Battery OP on MT SURIBACHI was secured since profitable observation from there was no longer possible. At 0915 two 5 inch duds and a 100 pound bomb was removed from the area by bomb disposal personnel.

Throughout the 28th, 29th, and 30th firing continued on assigned missions.

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At 0300, 1 March, 1945, enemy counter-battery fire set fire to a 5th Marine Division dump. This fire burned all the next day, and during the early hours this battalion sustained damage and casualties from fragments of bursting ammunition. A fire was started at "A" Battery, and four men were injured. Several wire lines were destroyed. One large 105 fragment penetrated the roof of the FDC and destroyed a box containing documents.

At 1035, 1 March, the following message was received: "The Commanding General Expeditionary Troops expresses his complete satisfaction and results obtained by Corps Artillery in this operation x Keep up the good work x".

At 1300 an NCO received a wound in the chest as result of enemy sniper fire.

During the period from 2 March to 8 March the battalion continued to render fire support on assigned targets. On the latter date the following message was received from the Landing Force Artillery Officer:

"Following dispatch quoted for information: CG EXTROPAC this date asked me to extend to all artillery units of LANFOR his commendation and congratulation upon the excellence of preparation fires delivered on the morning of 6 March, 1945."

On 6 March orders were received from FMF, Pac. that the equipment of the battalion would be transferred to the 5th Marine Division at IWO JIMA, and that three officers and thirty-nine enlisted would accompany the equipment.

At 0115, 11 March, 1945, about 20 rounds of enemy shell of about 5 inch calibre were fired into the battalion area. Included were graze and air burst, as well as some white Phosphorous. Although there were near misses on some installations, and a fragment penetrated the FDC, there was no damage or casualties.

On the above date the Battalion Commander was advised that 19 March was the tentative date for the battalion's embarkation for the rehabilitation area. Plans were accordingly begun for this movement.

During the ensuing days, firing continued on profitable targets.

On 15 March, 1945 the Battalion Commander received the following order: "Caustic v Accurate. Effective this date 1800 Headquarters, 2nd 155mm Howitzer Battalion assumes Corps Arty control x Group FDC closes same time x 2nd 155mm continues general support reenforcing fires 13th Marines x Group Air Liaison officer, Liaison 12 temp attached 2nd 155mm Howitzer Bn x"

On 16 March this battalion fired its last preparation of the IWO JIMA operation. At 1045, 16 March orders were received to cease firing at 1200 and to make all necessary preparations to move aboard ship at 0800 the following morning. The transfer of howitzer materiel to the 1st Battalion, 13th Marines was completed at 1600, 16 March, 1945. All remaining bat-

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talion materiel except four (4) 1/4 ton (4x4) cargo jeeps was turned over to a rear echelon consisting of three officers and forty enlisted.

At 0800, 17 March, 1945 the battalion less the rear echelon and equipment commenced loading aboard the LST #761. At 1045 the LST #761 tied up alongside the USAT SANTA ISABEL and by 1330 all personnel and materiel were aboard the latter vessel. At 1045, 18 March the USAT SANTA ISABEL sailed for Guam.

Intelligence:

a. Enemy activity (artillery) against our own.

Some of the heaviest counter-battery fire experienced by this battalion in six operations was encountered in this campaign. As usual the fire was never more than by battery and there was no evidence of any massing of fire. On IWO JIMA, there were definite periods of shelling. The early hours of darkness and shortly after midnight seemed to be the most favorable times to the Jap. The 15cm dual purpose was generally the weapon used and the method and accuracy indicated that the fire was observed. Possibilities for the location of Jap observers could have been the KAMA ROCKS off shore, MT SURIBACHI, or on the spur running out from Airfield No. 2 in TA 182-P-K-L.

There were 13 reported instances of shelling in and about our battalion area, the most concentrated of which fell the night of 24 February and early morning of 25 February during which approximately 20 rounds of 15cm fell, temporarily knocking out No. 2 gun of "A" Battery (147-I) and causing three casualties in that battery and destruction of a water dump in H&S Battery area (163-Y). On 11 March an estimated 20 rounds, of what was later ascertained to be a 4.7 inch naval gun, fell in the battalion area. Some of the rounds were observed to be air bursts. There were no casualties or materiel damage in the battalion. The remainder of shellings encountered were not of such sustained firing.

The Jap rocket bomb was experienced for the first time. It did not inflict any damage or casualties in our area. Its weird sound easily distinguished it from other artillery fire and from the method of firing it was concluded that range adjustment was difficult if not entirely impossible. It seemed adjustable only to two range settings and its principle effect was one of concussion.

The ever present Japanese mortar was again encountered but it was generally firing in the forward sectors and did no appreciable shelling of our areas.

The use of demolition patrols as methods of counter-battery was not practiced to this battalions knowledge. There were small groups of enemy attempting infiltration from the south (MT SURIBACHI), but whether their mission was destruction of our artillery was not ascertained.

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The enemy employed their 40mm guns in firing air bursts over the landing beaches and the general position area of this battalion. The effect over the latter area was negligible.

b. Observation - Air and Ground.

1. Air.

The battalion furnished two air observers who flew under Group control. Initially they operated from carriers in TBM's and fired for both division and group artillery. They were furnished by Group with the latest target information gathered from API sources and in addition were directed by the Battalion FDC to targets from the overlay received periodically from Group 2 and Bn-2.

2. Ground.

The battalion established one OP on MT SURIBACHI on 23 February, and maintained it until 27 February when observation was cut off by the advance of our front lines. Several attempts were made to establish another battalion OP on Hill 382 but when the Hill was finally tenable it offered very limited observation.

Flash Range parties from this battalion manned both the OL and OR of flash ranging stations on MT SURIBACHI activities of these stations were coordinated by Group.

c. Maps and Photos.

The Battalion was furnished with sufficient copies of maps of various scales and good photo coverage of the target area prior to leaving the training area. These maps and photos were available for orientation and training enroute to the target.

The 1/20,000 Special Air and Gunnery Map was used as the Fire Chart. The contour lines in the north-eastern sector of the island were found to be slightly distorted but on the whole the map proved to be an excellent fire chart.

For situational purposes the 1/10,000 Special Air and Gunnery Map was found to be the most convenient and it is felt that it could have served excellently as a Fire Chart. It is felt that a terrain map showing no enemy installations would be more suitable for use as an Artillery Firing Chart.

d. Tactical employment of enemy artillery.

On this operation the enemy showed some signs of improvement in the tactical use of their artillery. As stated previously there was no definite evidence of an attempt to mass more than a battery on a target. During the most concentrated shelling it was observed that the enemy was making definite adjustments of up 50 yards, left 50 yards, then right 50 yards and in this method made a thorough coverage of the position.

On D+1 an apparent attempt at duplicating our Time on Target methods was observed in a concentration fired on the landing beaches. The weapons used were heavy rifled mortars or artillery:

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e. Types of materiel used by enemy artillery.
The following types of weapons are believed to have been used by the enemy in shellings experienced by this battalion:

15cm coast defense guns.
Mortars of various calibers.
40mm Anti-Aircraft guns.
70mm Howitzers.
4.7 naval guns.
Rockets of undetermined caliber.

f. Information from other units.
This battalion furnished a liaison officer and team who were assigned by Group to the 13th Marine Artillery Regiment. This liaison party forwarded its information on targets and front lines to Group who in turn passed information on targets, enemy activity and front line positions to this battalion.

g. Effectiveness of enemy artillery.
The shellings experienced by this battalion are outlined in Enclosure (C) to this report. The resultant damage may be summed up as follows: Twelve personnel casualties, one gun temporarily put out of action, one TD18 temporarily knocked out on the beach, and a water dump partially destroyed. Considering the amount of shelling in number of rounds the effectiveness of the enemy artillery could only be classed as fair.

h. Miscellaneous.
This battalion's metro section furnished the metro data for the units under Group control. Readings were taken each morning at daylight, at 1200 and at 1700. Additional readings were taken when necessary.

The following is a resume of weather information determined during the IWO JIMA operation:

Winds have been moderate coming generally from an easterly direction.

Temperature for operation was:

High.....79°
Average.....69°
Low.....66°

Pressure for operation was:

High.....30.02 inches
Average.....29.83 inches
Low.....29.64 inches

Relative humidity for operation was:

High.....100%
Average.....82%
Low.....65%

Air density given in percentage of standard for operation was:

High.....191%
Average.....98%
Low.....96%

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Communications:

FM sets used in the battalion, consisting of the SCR 608, 808, 609 and 610 radios, worked with excellent results, both in the pre-landing stage and in the actual operation. All cargo jeeps in the battalion were equipped with SCR 610 mountings so that occupants could have communication with the battalion at any time. All TCS jeeps (4) were equipped with SCR 610's. This provided the means of monitoring two circuits as well as providing a carrying place for the radios.

All FM sets had the battalion command frequency placed on the "A" channel. Stations checked in on this channel and if necessary were referred to an intra-battalion channel for further communication. Three 609's were maintained in the FDC for communication with the batteries for fire missions in case of wire failure. Each battery was contacted on a different frequency, thus permitting greater speed in the transmission of fire commands.

A BD 72 was installed in Radio Central with two lines to the FDC and a line to each of the radio vehicles used in H&S. These consisted of three TCS jeeps, an SCR 608 jeep, and a one ton truck containing a SCR 608 and a TCS. Any set desired was switched into the FDC to the operators there.

Generators on all radio equipped vehicles were detached and placed in waterproof bags instead of being covered with waterproofing for protection during the ship to shore movement. This proved to be an excellent expedient.

Wire lines were placed overhead on 2x4x20 foot poles. They proved very satisfactory in carrying the normal wire lines of the battalion. In this operation it was impractical to lay wire on the ground, impossible to string it on trees and impractical to lay underground.

The sound powered phones were the only item of equipment to provide trouble. The cable leading into the movable mouthpiece broke on 4 phones. EE8A's were finally installed in one battery on the gun-executive officer circuit.

SCR 536's were used satisfactorily by the survey section.

Enclosures (D) and (E) are wire and radio plans.

Firing:

a. Survey.

The reconnaissance elements of the 2nd 155mm Howitzer Battalion landed on D+2 and commenced survey. Original control was taken from the 13th Marines which located a Corps initial point at (76.477-71.331) TA 148-R, and took an azimuth of 67°37' to the east tangency of the island. They also located a 13th Marine I.P. (76.232-71.718) TA 148-G and located PT AIRPORT (76.435-71.695) TA 148-H.

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The 2nd 155mm Howitzer Battalion survey team then located PT BOMB (76.354-71.311) TA 148-B, and 2nd Battalion initial point (76.153-72.221) TA 164-B. Baker Battery survey team, using 3 orienting lines, from 2nd Battalion I.P., located Able Battery (76.123-72.303) TA 164-P, Baker Battery (76.036-72.522) TA 164-F, and Charlie Battery (75.837-72.205) TA 163-T. Base angles were then computed, using grid inter-sections (79-76) and (80-75) as base points.

Base angles were as follows:

:	:	Base Pt.	:	Base Pt.	:
:	:	(79-76)	:	(80-75)	:
:	:	:	:	:	:
:	:	ABLE BTRY	:	2383.2 mils:	:
:	:	:	:	2076 mils	:
:	:	:	:	:	:
:	:	BAKER BTRY	:	2211.1 mils:	:
:	:	:	:	1899 mils	:
:	:	:	:	:	:
:	:	CHARLIE BTRY	:	1244.7 mils:	:
:	:	:	:	954.7 mils	:

On D+3, Able Battery landed but was unable to occupy the surveyed position, so a new position area was surveyed in at (75.699-71.639) TA 147-I and the following base angles were computed. For Base Pt (79-76) 143 mils and for Base Pt (80-75) 3078 mils.

Able Battery place mark (75.684-71.644) TA 147-I was designated as 4th 155mm Howitzer Battalion I.P. and coordinates were furnished their Survey Officer. Baker Battery landed on D+6 and occupied their position.

On D+8, 2 flash-ranging O.P.'s were located on MT SURIBACHI. They were located by triangulation from 2nd Battalion I.P. and PT BOMB. O.P. left (74.970-70.443) TA 131-O was manned by Charlie Battery personnel and O.P. right (75.093-70.309) TA 132-P was manned by Able Battery personnel.

On D+8, 4 additional points were located: PT YANK (75.100-70.365) TA 132-P, PT WILLIAM (76.367-72.882) TA 164-B, PT RADAR (79.035-74.229) TA 164-O.

Also on D+8, the survey team carried control into the 90mm Anti-Aircraft unit using PT BOMB and PT YANK.

b. Fire Adjustment.

Artillery fire of this battalion was adjusted by air observers, observers on MT SURIBACHI, flash ranging O.P.'s, sound ranging units, and forward observers. The ground observation and flash ranging O.P.'s were able to conduct many missions initially, but were soon handicapped by limited visibility. During daylight hours, by far the majority of adjustments were performed in a highly satisfactory manner by the air observers. Targets and missions attacked by this method varied from check point registration and pinpoint adjustments to general area targets.

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For adjustments close to friendly troops division artillery forward observers conducted fire, their commands being sent directly to the battalion FDC. By this method supporting fire was brought in as close as 200 yards from our troops. Flash ranging and sound ranging gave excellent results especially during the hours of darkness. Sound ranging alone was credited with the destruction of two 15 centimeter guns in one night. Initial spots for all methods of adjustments were made by use of the target area squares or a shift from a known concentration. It was seldom necessary to shift more than 200 yards in range or deflection before firing for effect.

c. Fire Direction.

Fire direction of this battalion followed the principles laid down in FM 6-40 and latest changes thereto.

Registrations were completed at least once daily with metro messages available every four hours. All concentrations were fired using K-transfer methods corrected by latest weather. It was observed that there was a relatively uniform rate of increase or decrease in both range and deflection corrections, resulting from weather conditions.

Average Range K 440yds/1000. Average Deflection correction L8.

d. Liaison.

This battalion furnished a liaison party consisting of one officer and three enlisted to the 13th Marines. This party worked directly with 1st Provisional Group. This battalion had no opportunity to observe the effectiveness of liaison between the 1st Provisional Field Artillery Group and Division artillery.

e. Effect of artillery fire.

Against enemy troops and materiel in the open or in lightly protected positions the effect of our fire was devastating. In heavily reinforced pillboxes or bunkers the damage was hard to assess, but generally good effect was reported by observers. The usual method of attack for the latter type of mission was a precision adjustment, using concrete piercing or delay fuze for effect. By use of combined white phosphorus and high explosive against troops in foxholes or trenches maximum effect was obtained. White phosphorus shell was also used with telling effect in camouflaged areas and dumps, stripping the concealment and starting fires. Against tanks fire of our weapons was found to be excellent. Time fire was used against open emplacements and against targets on reverse slopes or gullies with excellent results.

f. Target location.

Targets were located by Air Observers, ground O.P.'s, flash ranging O.P.'s, forward observers, sound ranging units and from intelligence sources. Air observation was the primary means used for location and adjustment by this battalion. First Provisional Group coordinated other sources

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of information and assigned appropriate missions to the battalion. Sound ranging and flash ranging were especially good at night, many enemy weapons having been detected by these methods. This battalion established an O.P. and a short base flash range O.P. on MOUNT SURIBACHI but visibility was limited. Forward observers of division artillery found and reported many targets. F.O.'s from this battalion working for the 13th Marines located and fired on enemy targets.

- g. Enclosure (F). Summary of ammunition expenditure by type of fire mission.
- h. Enclosure (G). Summary of ammunition expended by item.

Supply:

- a. General methods and plan of distribution and regulation.

The 2nd 155mm Howitzer Battalion had no major supply problems or failures during the IWO JIMA operation.

All supplies were divided equally among the six LST's which were used to transport the personnel and equipment of the 1st Provisional Field Artillery Group. These supplies included a 30 day supply of rations, QM supplies, engineer, ordnance, and motor transport plus 7 units of fire.

This is the first operation in which this battalion was so loaded, and it is recommended that such a procedure be followed in the future. Experience on previous campaigns has shown that higher echelons, such as Corps Troops, have not been able to land supplies early enough to establish a source of supplies for all the various units under their command.

This battalion was ordered to load enough water to supply each man with five gallons per day for a period of 5 days. This allowance had to be cut down to one gallon per man per day on the actual operation because of the limited supplies available at the V AC water distillation unit.

- b. Supplies authorized and landed.

All authorized supplies were unloaded and distributed in the several battalion dumps without any major losses.

Because of the danger from enemy shelling, all fuel dumps were covered over with two feet of sand. A direct hit from enemy fire was sustained on one water dump, but loss was kept at a minimum because of careful dispersion throughout the battalion area.

It is generally agreed in this battalion that the new type "C" ration is superior to any of the other field rations. There is a minimum of waste, and enough variety to satisfy all hands for a short operation such as this one.

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c. Restrictions and limitations.

The area assigned to this battalion was badly congested, and dispersion was a difficult problem. To overcome this difficulty, many field expedients had to be hastily employed to ensure protection from the fairly regular enemy counter-battery fire. It was found that 30,000 sand bags carried by this unit were not adequate; it is suggested that 50,000 sand bags be allocated to a howitzer battalion in the future.

Lack of liaison between channel control vessels and beachmasters hampered the unloading of this battalion on several occasions. To cite one example, the LST #779 was ordered to beach twice by the channel control only to be denied the use of the beach by the beachmaster. Due to constant interruptions, it took this same LST over 72 hours to unload. Another LST, the 784 similarly loaded; took less than 22 hours once it was beached.

Administration:

a. Strength of personnel landed:

		USMC				USN	
BTRY	COMM OFF	WO	ENL		COMM OFF	ENL	
H&S	12	1	128		1	4	
"A"	6	1	150			2	
"B"	6		145			2	
"C"	5		142			2	
TOTAL	29	2	565		1	10	

NOTE: Three officers and three enlisted detached duty.

b. Enclosure (A). Roster of personnel participating.

c. Enclosure (B). Roster of casualties.

d. Commendations and citations recommended.

Legion of Merit:

Captain Earl N. Lewis, (011096), USMCR.

Silver Star:

Warrant Officer Donald V. Smith, (033198), USMC.

Sergeant John L. Hurd, (337386), USMCR.

Private First Class Samuel J. Neff, (480055), USMCR.

Private First Class Harlan E. Fagg, (324243), USMC.

PhM3c Charles A. Bader, (861-56-71), USNR.

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Air Medal:

Second Lieutenant Gilbert N. Brooks, (031028), USMCR.
Second Lieutenant John A. Warner, (033038), USMCR.

Bronze Star:

Major David W. Swanson, (07392), USMCR.
Captain Clarence W. Leek, (014713), USMCR.
Captain Morris V. Shively, (010957), USMC.
First Lieutenant George F. Marion, (018145), USMCR.
First Lieutenant Dale M. Clark, (016091), USMCR.
First Lieutenant James E. Brown, (019625), USMCR.
First Lieutenant Stanley P. Bulkowski, (010467), USMC.
First Lieutenant Clyde C. McDougale, (018156), USMCR.
First Lieutenant Robert H. Loughman, (018451), USMCR.
First Lieutenant Elmer L. Sellers, (019593), USMCR.
Lieutenant (jg) John W. Overstreet, (126999), USNR.
Second Lieutenant Walter H. Johnson, (042689), USMCR.
Sergeant Virgil L. McCaulley, (294210)(CP), USMC.
Corporal Robert E. Lance, Jr. (306633)(CP), USMC.
Corporal John S. Barry, (335165)(CP), USMCR.
Private First Class Asa R. Johnston, (504873)(CP), USMCR.
Private First Class Ernest (n) Pairis, (875922)(CP), USMCR.
Corporal Inis "E" Edmisson, (316083)(CP), USMC.
Private First Class Clifford E. Bradshaw, (929313)(CP),
USMCR-SS.
Sergeant Edward M. Kalis, (339750)(QM-Mech), USMCR.
Corporal Glen A. Provost, (335682), USMCR.
Private First Class Clyde W. Goodwin, (330390), USMC.
Private First Class Robert L. Kline, (336023), USMC.
Gunnery Sergeant John A. Grivich, (304499), USMCR.
Platoon Sergeant John D. Cox, (349727), USMC.
PhM3c Loren C. Ausderau, (608-95-22), USNR.
PhM3c Frank T. Austin, (826-24-99), USNR.
Private First Class Eugene J. Cousin, (517406), USMCR.
Private First Class Gilbert E. Hild, (330226), USMC.
Private First Class Thomas E. Stegman, (486534), USMCR.
Corporal Henry M. Hickman, (333519), USMC.
Private First Class Guy G. Judd, (346706), USMC.
Corporal Arthur L. Krambeer, (339826), USMCR.
Corporal Stanley F. Fortuna, (404864), USMCR.
Sergeant Edwin (n) Burdette, (339863), USMCR.
Corporal Raymond S. Van Winkle, Jr. (330391), USMC.
Private First Class Robert W. Brown, (459003), USMCR.
Private First Class Carmine (n) Sandangelo, (864164),
USMCR-SS
Private First Class Anthony R. Holloway, (892376), USMCR-SS.
Sergeant John W. Turley, (316663)(CP), USMC.
Private First Class James A. Stewart, (467977), USMC.
Sergeant Charles "C" Carey, (331257), USMCR.

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Subject: Special Action Report of the IWO JIMA operation (Cont'd)

Corporal "J" "D" Mankin, (410472), USMCR.
Corporal Alton T. Rodenberg, (489181), USMCR.
Private First Class George M. Baldwin, (331255), USMCR.
Platoon Sergeant Charles J. Klima, (328756), USMC.
Platoon Sergeant Alfred G. Freels, (296806), USMC.
Sergeant Anthony L. Bahar, (339842), USMCR.
Sergeant John S. Booth, (339757), USMCR.
Sergeant Robert G. Unger, (337816), USMC.
Corporal Francis N. Clavin, (341163), USMCR.
Corporal Joe N. Harold, (340717), USMC.
Sergeant Walter J. Hill, (336129), (CP), USMC.
Sergeant Cameron C. Funk, (338846), USMC.
Corporal Robert E. Frost, (339291), USMCR.
Corporal William A. Heerde, (320589), (CP), USMC.
Sergeant Juventino V. Rodriguez, (335978) (QM-Mech), USMC.
Private First Class Arthur A. Ashton, (349400), USMC.
Sergeant Thomas A. Novak, (285525) (EP), USMCR.
Corporal Charles (n) O'Reilly, (336421) (CP), USMCR.
Gunnery Sergeant George W. Stafford, (288437), USMC.
Sergeant Lee H. Abraham, (315014), USMC.
Sergeant Joe E. Churich, (346713), USMCR.
Sergeant Paul L. Mealy, (314277), USMC.
Corporal Roy N. Cooper, (339721), USMCR.
Sergeant Arthur T. Brown, (349775) (CP), USMC.
Sergeant Leon H. Painter, (298157) (QM-Mech), USMC.
Sergeant Dennis "E" Thompson, (252853), USMCR.
Private First Class Lloyd V. Griffith, (817416) (CP)
USMC-SS
Private First Class Salvatore (n) Carbone, (473202) (CP),
USMCR.
Private First Class Clarence H. Zang, (331540) (CP),
USMC.
Private First Class James A. Berard, (474576) (CP), USMCR.
Private First Class Joseph A. Roses, (466990) (CP), USMCR.
Private First Class Daniel T. Jones, (819475) (CP), USMC-SS.

Letter of Commendation with ribbon:

Second Lieutenant Walter (n) Chrapla, (041300), USMCR.
Second Lieutenant William T. Paull, (042680), USMCR.
Field Cook Craig E. Anderson, (376971), (C), USMC.
Platoon Sergeant Phillip A. Anderson, (346187), USMCR.
Platoon Sergeant William R. Berhow, (303274), USMC.
Corporal Dickie (n) Cavallero, (349713), (QM-Mech), USMC.
Sergeant John W. Eggleston, (303467), (CP), USMC.
Technical Sergeant William C. Eller, (324210) (C), USMCR.
Corporal John L. Foley, (356347) (CP), USMC.
Corporal James (n) Francavilla, (349720), USMCR.
Corporal Joel T. Jackson, (335467) (CP), USMC.

Subject: Special Action Report of the IWO JIMA operation (Cont'd).

Corporal Max A. Jasso, (329474), USMCR.
Technical Sergeant James A. Lieberknecht, (287606) (CP),
USMCR.
Staff Sergeant Charles F. Pyeatt, (295195) (QM-MT), USMC.
Corporal "F" "E" Sealey, (290312), (QM-Mech), USMC.
Corporal Allen H. Ingram, (312300), USMC.
Corporal John D. Bernatis, (349420), USMC.
Technical Sergeant Rulon P. Draper, (303403) (C), USMC.
Corporal Donald R. Garton, (334234), USMC.
Platoon Sergeant Arthur C. Larson, (335933), USMC.
Sergeant Joseph H. Mashek, (335458), USMC.
Corporal Edward B. Matusiak, (339802), USMCR.
Corporal Charles W. McClenny, Jr. (338856), USMC.
Sergeant Richard H. Norrell, (339823), USMCR.
Private First Class William W. Bailes, (340722), USMC.
Corporal Robert P. Glick, (302593), (CP), USMC.
Corporal Silas M. Kemp, (335843), USMC.
Corporal Chester A. Maus, Jr. (333960), USMC.
Corporal Thomas M. Moore, (347933), USMC.
Sergeant Zigmund J. Skupski, Jr. (266608), USMCR.
Corporal Roger M. Johnson, (329544), USMC.
Corporal Ernest M. Kirk, Jr. (333963), USMC.
Corporal Maxwell C. Weaver, (336093), USMCR.
Chief Cook Martin C. Weis, (342119) (C), USMCR.
Private First Class Raymond L. Spriggs, (294636), USMCR.
Private First Class Judson T.M. Williams, (335365), USMC.
Corporal Francis W. Winistoerfer, (342001), USMCR.
Corporal Bobbie G. Campbell, (351855), USMC.
Private First Class Cecil C. Woolbright, Jr. (321659), (CP)
USMCR.
Corporal Joe M.M. Jiminez, (349615), USMC.
Private First Class Arthur C. Shrives, (346710), USMCR.
Corporal Ernest B. Canon, (340887), USMCR.
Corporal Rudolph J. Cummins, (312464), USMC.
Corporal Stanley L. Horn, (335564), USMC.
Corporal Milton R. Plasner (304186) (CP), USMCR.
Corporal Paul L. Sine, (351849), USMC.
Technical Sergeant Alex J. Tarin, (297111), USMC.
Corporal Eugene L. Wleser, (325588) (CP), USMC.
Corporal James R. Ettinger, (337375), USMC.
Corporal Charles G. Frazier, (331168), USMC.
Corporal Emmett L. Gilliland, Jr. (318630) (CP), USMC.
Corporal Henry N. Godin, (297710) (QM), USMC.
Sergeant Jesse J. Johnson, Jr. (339783), USMCR.
Corporal Kenneth C. Lake, (337394), USMCR.
Corporal Harold F. Maciolek, (334221), USMC.
Private First Class Vincent P. Meranda, (335734), USMC.
Corporal Charlie H. Perry, (335643), USMCR.
First Sergeant James R. Van Hekken, (274955), USMC.

Subject: Special Action Report of the IWO JIMA operation (Cont'd)

Medical:

a. General.

Sanitary conditions aboard ship were inspected by the Battalion Medical Officer each day with special attention to the galley, food, water and heads. Conditions were continually satisfactory.

Evacuation - ashore.

Evacuation was originally to the beach evacuation stations and later to the 5th Marine Division Field Hospital. Both were satisfactory.

Sanitation ashore.

Two sanitary squad men in each battery were responsible for building and maintaining heads, garbage pits and helping to police area. Head space was one-hole per 20 men. Heads were burned out and limed two times daily. Urinals were placed in convenient spots around battery areas. Garbage pits were burned out two times each day.

General police call was held once per day.

Fly-proof galleys were in operation on D+10.

Battalion area was inspected each day by the Medical Officer or by a Pharmacist Mate First Class from the Battalion Aid Station.

Food consumed consisted of "C" and "X" rations supplemented by hot coffee and reinforced soups from galley each day.

Mess gear was sterilized in conventional 3-can method.

Chlorinated water was procured through the Quartermaster department and was adequate in amount.

Dead were turned over to the 5th Marine Division burial detail.

b. Preparation of personnel for combat.

On 15 December, 1944, all the medical gear had been collected and prepared for transport into combat. Screening physical examinations were given to all battalion personnel in order to insure that each man was physically qualified for the operation.

The Battalion Dental Officer examined all battalion personnel, giving treatment to those needing it, before the forward echelon embarked for combat. All hands were given, and completed, the courses of inoculations against Typhoid Fever, Typhus Fever, Bubonic Plague, Cholera, and Tetanus before embarking.

One suit of combat clothing for each man was impregnated with Dimethylphthalate according to directions supplied by Bureau Medical News Letter on D-5. This clothing included dungaree trousers, blouse, skivvy shirt and socks. DDT powder in the two ounce can was supplied to the battalion, one can for every two men, for personal use in dusting their clothing.

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Subject: Special Action Report of the IWO JIMA operation (Cont'd).

Medical Jungle Kits were issued each man, these kits including:

- SKAT - 1 bottle
- Sulfanilamide powder - packet
- Sulfadiazine tablets - 2 grains
- Water-purifying tablets - 1 bottle
- Salt tablets - 20 (1 bottle)
- Iodine - small cylinder
- Chap stick - 1
- Band-aids - 2

A course of lectures on the principles and rules of emergency first aid and field sanitation were given to all officers and men immediately preceding the embarkation date, by the Medical Officer.

Medical personnel were divided aboard the LST's so as to have maximum attention available for all battalion personnel during transit.

Suppressive treatment for Malaria was given to the men of "A" Battery under order of the Group Surgeon who was the Medical Officer aboard their vessel during transit. One man, not of "A" Battery, had a malarial attack during transit. He was actively treated and then suppression therapy continued throughout the campaign.

c. Personnel and organization.
Medical personnel consists of:

- 1 Medical Officer.
- 1 Dental Officer.

enlisted:

- 1 PhM1c.
- 2 PhM2c
- 5 PhM3c
- 2 HAlc

Two enlisted corpsmen received transfer orders after embarkation. They were put ashore in Pearl Harbor, T.H., and replaced by two dental technicians; 1 PhM2c and 1 PhM3c who had both received training for field combat duty. The Dental Officer was placed in the rear echelon.

Combat personnel was divided so as to have 2 corpsmen with each firing battery and 4 corpsmen and doctor in the Battalion Aid Station.

d. Medical Supplies.

Supplies consisted of Unit #1 for Medical Officer and 2 Unit #3's for each corpsman. Others included Unit numbers:

- 5A - 3 (1 per battery)
- 11A - 1
- 10 & 1 (Chemical Warfare)
- 16 - 1
- 12 - 1

Subject: Special Action Report of the IWO JIMA operation (Cont'd).

6-Splints - 4
7-Battle Dressings
96-Units of plasma were carried
Miscellaneous gear - Tent fly, camouflage net,
Medicinal Brandy, ambulance jeep and trailer, and 2 additional
sea-bags of battle dressings and bandages.

e. Medical report of operation.

4 - Killed in action
15 - Wounded in action
8 - Returned to duty
7 - Evacuated

Other caused:

6 - Evacuated
1 - DU Scarlet Fever.
1 - Compound fracture - left index finger.
1 - Obstructive tonsillitis.
1 - Concussion and DU Skull fracture.
1 - Tenosynovitis left index finger.
1 - DU Pneumonia.

Non-evacuated - sick - days.

Contusion left index finger - 3 days (1 case)
Contusion left middle finger - 2 days (1 case)
Carbuncle - left groin - 8 days (1 case)
Strained back - 2 days (1 case)
DU Appendicitis - 4 days (1 case)
Gastro-enteritis - 1 day
Contusion of back - 2 days (1 case)
Total sick days (22)
Cases of mild Diarrhea - 7 (only 1 day lost from
duty)

Treatment given to men of other organizations.

Died - 2
Gunshot wound left leg - 1 (not evacuated)
Severe lacerations right index finger - 1 (evac-
uated 5th Division Hospital)
Tenosynovitis left small finger - 1 (evacuated
5th Marine Division Hospital)

Motor Transport and Ordnance:

General:

This battalion had no major Motor Transport
or Ordnance failures. There were about 10% misfires on the howitzers
using the new 17 grain primers.

Due to experience on previous campaigns, the
Motor Transport and Ordnance Section was equipped to perform many
of the fourth echelon repairs. One TD18 tractor w/Angle-Dozer
suffered a direct hit from enemy artillery fire, and was repaired
in a matter of hours.

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Subject: Special Action Report of the IWO JIMA operation (Cont'd).

Carrying a spare parts trailer, welding equipment, and tire replacements are considered necessary to maintain the vehicles of this battalion.

3. Comments and recommendations.

(A) Administration:

1. Higher echelons should provide for the distribution of all officer-messenger mail at rehabilitation and staging areas. It is often impossible for the lower echelon to obtain transportation, either vehicular or water borne, to make necessary runs to higher echelons.

(B) Operations and training:

1. Practice landing involving Corps Artillery should be discontinued. Amphibious training, if any, for such units, should be done in training areas before embarkation aboard ship. Similarly it is recommended that naval exercises be conducted prior to embarkation of troops. This would permit troops to move directly from the point of embarkation to the staging area and the scene of operations with a minimum of time aboard ship, and a resulting increase in fighting efficiency.

2. Corps Artillery Battalions should have two spotting planes available at all times.

(C) Supply:

1. Heavy leather gauntlets should be issued to ammunition personnel. The gloves are an absolute necessity.

2. Dukw and LVT crews should be issued foul weather clothing since they must spend days at a time in the water.

3. Camouflage nets should be issued either thoroughly fire proofed or made from light wire with fire proofed garlands. The present nets are inadequate since they are easily destroyed and are a serious fire hazard.

4. An ear plug should be issued artillery units on the basis of 125 per battery. The excessive noise resulting from firing is a great handicap to personnel, as well as a source of danger due to the possibility of phone operators misunderstanding commands after long exposure to the loud reports.

5. Conveyor rollers without stands should be issued on the basis of thirty per battalion. These rollers have proven of extreme value in moving projectiles from the ammunition pits to the howitzers.

6. TBA allowance of sandbags should be increased to 50,000 per Corps Artillery battalion.

7. 155mm howitzer battalions should carry 30 days supply of all stores except clothing and 782 gear. This system has worked admirably in the recent operation.

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Subject: Special Action Report of the IWO JIMA operation (Cont'd).

8. Ammunition loaded on re-supply ships should be stowed so as to be readily available. Much time has been lost because of the necessity of shifting or unloading a large amount of miscellaneous cargo before ammunition could be reached. It is recommended that LST's be used for ammunition re-supply. Their use would greatly speed up re-supply by eliminating a great deal of ship to shore handling.

9. Short wheel base, 6x6, dump trucks were invaluable in this operation. They were capable of hauling six pallets of 155mm projectiles.

(D) Transport Quartermaster:

1. Where ammunition is loaded on the tank decks of LSTs it should be covered by at least three inches of heavy dunnage, well secured.

2. The alleyway in the center of the tank deck between the piles of preloaded ammunition should be heavily reinforced.

3. When the beaching of equipment on soft sand is contemplated it is absolutely essential that an adequate supply of durable matting be provided.

(E) Ordnance:

1. Gray bag powder charges only should be issued. Green and white bag charges should be obsoleted.

2. Through the use of the metal containers in which gray bag powder charges are provided it would seem feasible to return unused powder increments to the States for reworking.

3. Of the various types of protective coverings for rotating bands of 155mm projectiles which have been encountered, the only type which adequately performs its function is the all-metal stamping, secured by wire.

4. The 17 grain primer for 155mm howitzers has been found to be unsatisfactory, and gives 5% to 10% misfires. The 21 grain primer is also unsatisfactory because it causes heavy erosion in the obturator spindle plug. It is recommended that a primer of about 19 grains be adopted.

5. Athey trailers have proven invaluable, and it is recommended that two of the type which is not equipped with springs be provided each firing battery.

6. It is recommended that a pintle be provided on the blade of the TD18 bulldozer. By this means the dozer could push the 155mm howitzer from the rear, while a tractor pulled from the front, and the movement of the weapon through heavy sand would be greatly facilitated.

7. A personnel platform large enough to hold six men should be provided for attachment to the TD18 tractor.

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Subject: Special Action Report of the IWO JIMA operation (Cont'd).

8. 1/4 inch steel plate should be placed in front of the radiator and along the sides of the engine hood of tractors and bulldozers in order to protect these vital parts from damage from shell fragments.

9. The following device was employed and found advantageous in preventing the shifting of trails of 155mm howitzers when heavy charges were fired. A dead man was sunk in the ground under the tube, and a steel cable was affixed thereto. The ends of the cable were secured to the lifting eyes on the bottom carriage of the howitzer. After the first few rounds were fired the cable became taut, and further slipping to the rear was prevented.

(F) Medical:

1. More DDT powder should be made available in 2 ounce cans so that each man be so equipped, with a reserve supply of same available to quartermaster.

2. Sufficient Dimethylphthalate should be made available to impregnate at least two complete uniforms before combat.

3. The portable heads have been successful and it is recommended that such units be made readily available to all combat units.

4. Serum albumen should be made available to all battalion aid stations. Its compact size, simple preparation, and high degree of effectiveness would make it a valuable adjunct to the treatment of the severely wounded.

5. It is recommended that the Unit #1 for Medical Officers and Unit #3 for corpsmen be replaced by a combat uniform equipped with multiple patch pockets on vest, arms and legs and by a similarly constructed combat vest. The supplies in the above named Units are adequate but the packs are bulky, clumsy to carry, and it is nearly always necessary to empty the entire pack in order to remove the needed supplies for the individual patient, resulting in the loss of much valuable time and frequently lengthening the time of exposure to direct enemy fire of both patient and medical personnel.

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Subject: Special Action Report of the IWO JIMA operation (Cont'd).

(G) Signal:

1. The T/A allowance of BA40's should be doubled. The life of the BA40 is about half that of the BA39.
2. Message center personnel should be specifically provided for in the TO.
3. Lumber, 2x4x20, should be carried as standard equipment for erecting overhead wire lines.
4. Artillery spotting planes should be equipped with FM sets, such as the 609. If this were done the TCS radio could be completely dispensed with.
5. The T/A allowance of BA30's should be doubled. The firing batteries use large quantities of these batteries, for which no provision has been made in the T/A.

E. J. ROWSE

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Headquarters, Second One Fifty-five Millimeter Howitzer
Battalion, First Provisional Field Artillery Group, Fleet Marine
Force, Pacific, In The Field.

March 19, 1945

BATTALION ROSTER OF CASUALTIES

KILLED IN ACTION

GERARD, 381305, Edward T., Jr., Pvt(CP), "H&S", KIA 21Feb45, gun shot
wounds, multiple, TA-163-X(SE), body interred 5th Mar Div
Cemetery, Iwo Jima, Plot #1, Grave #173, Row #9. Not result
of own misconduct.
PETERSON, 511077, Marvin G., PFC, USMCR. Active Duty, "C", KIA
21Feb45, gun shot wounds, multiple, TA-163-X(SE), body in-
terred 5th Mar Div Cemetery, Iwo Jima, Plot #1, Row #10, Grave
#197. Not result of own misconduct.
MITCHELL, 298497, Russell C., Sgt(EP), "H&S", KIA 21Feb45, gun
shot wounds, multiple, TA-163-X(SE). body interred 5th Mar Div
Cemetery, Iwo Jima, Plot #1, Row #2, Grave #29. Not result of
own misconduct.

DIED OF WOUNDS RECEIVED IN ACTION

WHIPP, 887890, Lloyd L., PFC(CP), USMCR-SS, active duty, "B"
DIED 15Mar45, Corps evacuation hospital #1, gun shot wound upper
left chest 12Mar45, body interred Iwo Jima. Not result of own
misconduct.

WOUNDED IN ACTION (EVACUATED)

BROWN, 349775, Arthur T., Sgt(CP), USMCR, Active duty, "C", WIA
1Mar45, gun shot wound upper left chest, TA-199-R. Evacuated
via 5th Mar Div field hospital to USS SOLACE, destination un-
known. Not result of own misconduct.
HILD, 330266, Gilbert E., PFC, "A", WIA 1Mar45, shrapnel abrasion
upper left arm, TA-147-I(SW), evacuated by field hospital, ship
and destination unknown. Not result of own misconduct.
NELSON, 452180, Edward L., PFC(CP), USMCR, active duty, "H&S"
WIA 21Feb45, gun shot wound, compound fracture left humerus,
TA-163-X(SE), evacuated via field hospital by ship to U.S.
Army Hospital #148, APO 244. Not result of own misconduct.
NORRELL, 339823, Richard B., Sgt, USMCR, active duty, "A", WIA
24Feb45, shrapnel wounds, lower left back and left thigh, TA-
147-I(SE), evacuated via field hospital ship and destination
unknown. Not result of own misconduct.
ORTIZ, 821115, Charlie (n), PFC, USMC-SS, "A", WIA 1Mar45, shrap-
nel wound in right frontal region, TA-147-I(SW), evacuated via
field hospital, ship and destination unknown. Not result of
own misconduct.
PIANELLI, 863786, Albert J., PFC, USMC-SS, "A", WIA 24Feb45,
shrapnel wounds, face, back and legs, TA-147-I(SE), evacuated
via field hospital, ship and destination unknown. Not result
of own misconduct.

ENCLOSURE "B"

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BATTALION ROSTER OF CASUALTIES

WOUNDED IN ACTION

BURDETTE, 339863, Edwin (n), Sgt, USMCR, active duty, "A", WIA 11Mar45, shrapnel wounds, right cheek, TA-147-I(SW). Treated Bn Aid Station, returned to duty. Not result of own misconduct.

CARBONE, 473202, Salvatore (n), PFC(CP), USMCR, active duty, "C". WIA 21Feb45, shrapnel wound in left cheek, TA-163-T(SW). Treated Bn Aid Station and returned to duty. Not result of own misconduct.

CRANDELL, 509042, Harry B., PFC, USMCR, active duty, "C", WIA 21Feb45, shrapnel wound in right cheek, TA-163-T(SW). Treated Bn Aid Station and returned to duty. Not result of own misconduct.

GRIFFITH, 817416, Lloyd V., PFC(CP), USMC-SS, "C", WIA 21Feb45 shrapnel wound midline fronto-parietal suture, TA-163-T(SW). Treated Bn Aid Station and returned to duty. Not result of own misconduct.

LAKE, 337394, Kenneth C., Corp, USMCR, active duty, "C", WIA 21Feb45, shrapnel wound left submaxillary triangle of neck, TA-163-T(SW). Treated Bn Aid Station and returned to duty. Not result of own misconduct.

MISIEWICZ, 459671, Henry E., PFC(CP), USMCR, active duty, "C" WIA 21Feb45, shrapnel wounds right side and right arm. Treated Bn Aid Station and returned to duty. Not result of own misconduct.

RODRIGUEZ, 535909, Joseph A., PFC, USMCR, active duty, "C", WIA 25Feb45, shrapnel wound left knee. Treated Bn Aid Station and returned to duty. Not result of own misconduct.

VAN WINKLE, 330391, Raymond S., Jr. Corp, "A", WIA 24Feb45, shrapnel wound right cheek, TA-147-I(SE). Treated Bn Aid Station and returned to duty. Not result of own misconduct.

SICK (EVACUATED)

ANDERSON, 474214, John H., Jr., PFC, USMCR, active duty, "C", Evacuated 26Feb45 via field hospital, ship and destination unknown, DU (Catarrhal Fever).

NICHOLS, 464849, Frank W., Corp, USMCR, active duty, "A". Evacuated 27Feb45 via field hospital, ship and destination unknown. DU(obstructive tonsillitis).

MAGNER, 940388, Hugh R. PFC, USMCR-SS, active duty, "B". Evacuated via 5th Mar Div hospital, ship and destination unknown. Tenosynovitis right index finger. 2Mar45.

INJURED (EVACUATED)

CURRY, 978631, William (n), Pvt, USMCR-SS, active duty, "A". Evacuated 26Feb45 via field hospital, ship and destination unknown. Smashed left index finger in breech block. In line of duty.

DAVIDSON, 224599, Canby L., GySgt, "A". Evacuated 28Feb45 via field hospital, ship and destination unknown. Slight concussion and possible fracture of the Cerebra when struck by case of rifles parachuted from friendly plane.

ENCLOSURE "B"

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BATTALION ROSTER OF CASUALTIES (Cont'd)

GRIFFITH, 817416, Lloyd V., PFC(CP), USMC-SS, "C". Evacuated 11Mar45 via field hospital, ship and destination unknown. Multiple shrapnel wounds from explosion while building fire, possibly fuze set off by heat of fire. In the line of duty.

SICK

GORDON, 818099, Hugh J., Pvt, USMC-SS, "A", Sick in 5th Mar Div hospital 8Mar45 to 10Mar45. DU(Pneumonia).

TULLY, 325355, "C" "A", PFC, "E&S", sick in Bn Aid Station 4Mar45 to 7Mar45. DU(Appendicitis).

INJURED

ATCHISON, 315150, William J., PFC, USMCR, active duty, "C". Treated Bn Aid Station 2Mar45, put on light duty for three (3) days. Contusion left index finger.

CONNOR, 957221, Lewis R., Pvt, USMCR-SS, active duty, "A". Treated Bn Aid Station, Put on no duty one (1) day. Contusion left middle finger 2Mar45.

HICKMAN, 333519, Henry M., Corp, "A". Treated Bn Aid Station 2Mar45, put on no duty one (1) day. Laceration of scalp by falling tent pole.

ENCLOSURE "B"

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Hq, 2d 155mm How Bn.

SHELLING REPORT
RECORD

<u>DATE</u>	<u>TIME</u>	
24Feb45	1200	One round of approximately 70mm landed in 163-T temporarily knocking out one gun of the 4th Battalion, 13th Marines. No casualties or materiel damage to this battalion.
24Feb45	2100 to 2120	Approximately 40 rounds of 5 inch shells coming from a generally northeast direction landed in areas 163-T-Y, 164-K and 147-I. One gun of "A" Battery in 147-I knocked out - three casualties in the battery- two evacuated.
25Feb45	0150 to 0220	Approximately 30 rounds of 5 inch shells from a northeastern direction fell in areas 163-T-Y, 164-K and 147-I. A water dump was destroyed in 163-Y - no personnel casualties in battalion area.
25Feb45	2100	One round of undetermined caliber landed in 163-R. No casualties. One 50 cal. gun of "C" Battery outpost put out of action.
26Feb45	1500	One 5 inch dud from northeast direction landed in gun position in Baker Battery - 164-K. No damage.
26Feb45	1835	Four rounds of undetermined caliber (possibly 81mm mortar) landed in area 164-G-V. No casualties to battalion.
27Feb45	1630	Undetermined number of approximately 150mm landed in 163-O. No casualties to battalion.
27Feb45	1835	Four rounds of approximately 81mm mortars landed in area 164-F-G apparently trying to hit airfield. No casualties to battalion.
28Feb45	0830	Four rounds of approximately 81mm mortars landed in areas 164-P-U and 147-D. No casualties to battalion.
1Mar45	0145 to 0430	Undetermined number of enemy shells (possibly 15cm) landing intermittently in areas 163-T-Y, 164-K and 147-I. Large ammo fire in 148-F (threw great deal of shrapnel in entire area) causing three casualties in "A" Battery (147-I), grass fire and net fires. No damage to materiel.

ENCLOSURE "C"

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SHELLING REPORT (Cont'd)


<u>DATE</u>	<u>TIME</u>	<u>RECORD</u>
1Mar45	2000	- Approximately three rounds of mortar shells (81mm) landed in area 164-G. No casualties to battalion.
2Mar45	1230	Four rounds of approximately 81mm mortar landed on Airfield No. 1 in 164-R-S. Coming from direction of 185-G. No casualties.
11Mar45	0115 to 0430	Approximately 15 to 20 rounds of 4.7 inch landed in battalion area at 163-T-Y, 164-K and 147-I from a compass direction of 63°. Some rounds appeared to be an air burst of white phosphorous shells. No casualties or materiel damage to battalion.

ENCLOSURE (C)

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CIRCUIT DIAGRAM

of Telephone System of 2nd 155mm How. Bn.



Enclosure (D)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~


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RADIO NET

2nd 155mm How Bn.

IWO JIMA

TO 1st PROVISIONAL GROUP



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ENCLOSURE (E)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Hq, 2d 155mm How Bn,

BATTLE OF IWO JIMA

From 21 February to 16 March

SUMMARY OF AMMUNITION EXPENDITURE BY TYPE OF FIRE MISSION

GUNS:

Unknown Calibre -- 74 different concentrations. Effects generally excellent. 3 batteries and 10 guns known to be destroyed. In all cases where guns were fired upon they were silenced. 2011 rounds.

Anti-Aircraft -- 15 concentrations fired. In all cases guns were silenced and areas were neutralized. Five guns known to be destroyed. 777 rounds.

15cm 5 concentrations. 2 guns known to be destroyed. Information obtained from prisoner of war by intelligence. Good effect was reported on the rest. These guns were reported by sound range. 230 rounds.

77mm 1 concentration. One battery fired upon. Observation by aerial observer. 50% direct hits and area well neutralized. 30 rounds.

40mm 1 concentration. 1 gun known to be destroyed and excellent effect on the rest of the area. 24 rounds.

MORTARS:

38 concentrations. Effect generally very good. Number destroyed unknown as most of the concentrations were unobserved. Areas well neutralized. 761 rounds.

ROCKETS:

25 concentrations. Effect when observed usually excellent. Several known to be destroyed. In most cases they were fired at night there was no observation. Actual number destroyed undetermined. 819 rounds.

MACHINE GUNS:

2 concentrations. Effect was excellent. In both cases infantry had been unable to advance for quite some time. After firing on them the infantry was able to advance and take their objective. 78 rounds.

TROOPS:

25 concentrations. Effect very good and excellent. In most every case time fire was used and height of burst in nearly every instance was correct. The number of troops killed by this is impossible to estimate. 661 rounds.

BIVOUAC AREAS:

3 concentrations. Time fire was employed with excellent effect. Extent of damage to personnel and area not known. 73 rounds.

ENCLOSURE (F)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SUMMARY OF AMMUNITION EXPENDITURE BY TYPE OF FIRE MISSION (Cont'd).

DUMPS AND STORAGE: 9 concentrations. 2 fuel dumps set afire. Nature of other dumps not known. Good effect on most of them. 340 rounds.

STRONG POINTS: 2 concentrations. In both cases effect was not reported. 25 rounds.

TANKS: 4 concentrations. 2 tanks known to be destroyed. Ammunition fires started. A few of these tanks were dug in and used as artillery. Effect very good. 89 rounds.

BLOCK HOUSES AND PILL BOXES: 14 concentrations. Only partly destroyed. Several direct hits and 1 ammunition fire started. Good effect on all. 472 rounds.

MISCELLANEOUS: 3369 rounds.

PREPARATIONS: 7439 rounds.

HARRASSING FIRES: 5756 rounds.

REGISTRATIONS: 496 rounds.

ENCLOSURE (F)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Hq, 2d 155mm How Bn.

SUMMARY OF AMMUNITION EXPENDITURE BY ITEM BY DAYS

<u>DATE</u>	<u>HE</u>	<u>SMOKE</u>	<u>GREEN</u>	<u>GRAY</u>	<u>WHITE</u>	<u>M51A4</u>	<u>M51A3</u>	<u>CP</u>	<u>M55A1</u>
Feb 21	305		305				305		
22	550		550				442		
23	865	18	431	452		710		5	45
24	2197	112	2324	6		1201		44	39
25	2026	399	1815	610		2202			96
26	1761	58	1313	555		1720			235
27	2481	118	895	786		2543			441
28	1134	88		1222		1159		16	47
Mar 1	1282	28	81	1177	52	568	689	34	19
2	1251	17		1264	4	388	876		5
3	1385	47	73	1344	15	458	972	1	1
4	845	118	162	801		613	279	63	8
5	279	69	165	183		198	93	48	9
6	1934	57	1850	140	1	1292	622	59	18
7	184	4	179	9		114	9	46	19
8	671	21	569	123		222	457	6	149
9	435	5	187	253			176	50	214
10	812	4	27	789		265	816		
11	692	6	156	401		101	418	9	110
12	583	14	172	425		106	983	168	32
13	431	9	193	209		102	260	78	
14	240		195	45		72	126	60	42
15	492		492			99	118	173	102
16	658		658			35	105		516
BTRY									
"A"	6680	424	3966	3134	58	5989	170	365	713
"B"	7373	480	4525	3368	60	4296	1865	313	833
"C"	8122	271	4448	4019	8	3780	4594	242	722
TOTAL	22175	1175	12939	10521	126	14065	6629	920	2268

AVERAGE DAILY EXPENDITURE: 973 rounds.

ENCLOSURE (G)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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Hq, 2d 155mm How Bn.

SUMMARY OF MOTOR TRANSPORT AUTHORIZED

- 1 Ambulance, $\frac{1}{4}$ -ton, 4x4
- 6 Tractor, Heavy, w/front mounted winch.
- 4 Tractor, Heavy, w/angle-dozer.
- 10 Trailer, $\frac{1}{4}$ -ton, 2-wheel, cargo.
- 6 Trailer, 1-ton, 2-wheel, cargo.
- 1 Trailer, 1-ton, 2-wheel, greasing, complete.
- 4 Trailer, 1-ton, 2-wheel, water, 300 gallon.
- 1 Trailer, 1-ton, 2-wheel, stockroom, complete.
- 1 Trailer, 1-ton, 2-wheel, (water improvised).
- 3 Trailer, 6-ton, cargo (track laying), (Athey).
- 6 Truck, $\frac{1}{4}$ -ton, 4x4, cargo.
- 8 Truck, 1-ton, 4x4, cargo.
- 8 Truck, $\frac{1}{4}$ -ton, 4x4, radio equipped.
- 1 Truck, 1-ton, 4x4, radio equipped.
- 7 Truck, $2\frac{1}{2}$ -ton, 6x6, cargo.
- 12 Howitzer, 155mm, M1.

ENCLOSURE (H)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Corps Artillery Officer's Special Action Report IWO JIMA Campaign.

IWO JIMA OPERATION
SPECIAL ACTION REPORT
OF THE
FOURTH 155MM. HOWITZER BATTALION,
FIRST PROVISIONAL FIELD ARTILLERY GROUP.

Enclosure "U" to Appendix 4 to Annex C to VAC LanFor Special Action
Report IWO JIMA Campaign

IWO JIMA OPERATION
SPECIAL ACTION REPORT
OF THE
FOURTH 155MM. HOWITZER BATTALION,
FIRST PROVISIONAL FIELD ARTILLERY GROUP.

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HEADQUARTERS,
FOURTH 155mm. HOWITZER BATTALION,
FIRST PROVISIONAL FIELD ARTILLERY GROUP,
FLEET MARINE FORCE, PACIFIC,
C/O FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA.

26 March, 1945.

From: The Commanding Officer, Fourth 155mm. Howitzer Battalion, First Provisional Field Artillery Group, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific.

To: The Commandant, U. S. Marine Corps,

Via: (1) The Commanding Officer, First Provisional Field Artillery Group, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific.
(2) The Commanding General, V Amphibious Corps, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific.
(3) The Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific.

Subject: Special Action Report of Fourth 155mm. Howitzer Battalion, First Provisional Field Artillery Group, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, on IWO JIMA.

References: (a) FMF PAC, GenOrd No. 66-44.
(b) V AC LanFor SplOrd No. 2-45.
(c) Pacific Fleet Letter Confidential 101-45.
(d) First ProvFldArtyG GenOrd No. 1-45.

Enclosures: (A) Roster of personnel participating. (This has been incorporated in the Special Action Report of the First ProvFldArtyG).
(B) Roster of casualties.
(C) Summary of shelling reports.
(D) Circuit Diagram (Final).
(E) Radio Net (Final).
(F) Summary of ammunition expenditure by type of fire mission.
(G) Summary of ammunition expenditure by item.
(H) Summary of transportation authorized.

1. In accordance with instructions contained in the above references the following action report is submitted covering the period from 12 October, 1944, to 16 March, 1945.

A. INTRODUCTION.

The manner in which this battalion was employed on the subject named island is considered to be generally sound in all respects. Communications, fire direction survey, liaison, and observation have, in general, followed closely the doctrines, procedures, techniques, and methods taught at the Field Artillery School, Fort Sill, Oklahoma and the Field Artillery School, M.C.S., Quantico, Virginia.

Special Action Report of 4th 155mm. HowBn., 1st Prov Fld Arty G., FMF, Pac.,
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Supply and Motor Transport have been somewhat varied from usual techniques in accordance with the dictates of the particular situation. Accomplishment of assigned mission has, naturally, been the guiding principle in making any changes. For example, shipping space prohibited the taking of all organic transportation. Accordingly, those vehicles which would afford the most general utility were embarked.

Administration and medical care were carried out in accordance with current instructions and proved satisfactory.

B. PLANNING PHASE.

The planning phase started for this battalion on 1 November, 1944, and, as circumstances compelled changes in higher echelons, appropriate changes were made in plans for the battalion. Fortunately all changes were of a minor nature and ample time was available to execute them. No substantial changes were made after mounting on 21-22 January, 1945, except that on 21 February, the battalion tentative position area was changed from 164 Able Baker George to 147 Mike Nan. (See air and gunnery map of IWO JIMA 1:10000).

During the planning phase (1 November, 1944 - 22 January, 1945) the following factors were considered, and pertinent decisions were made based on information then available:

1. Personnel:

- a. Strength and composition of rear echelon.
- b. Determination of the mental attitude of the troops and morale in general.

2. Intelligence:

No particular planning in connection with intelligence. S.O.P. was to be rigidly followed and the battalion intelligence section trained to be aggressive and exert every effort to seek out intelligence from available sources.

3. Operations:

- (1) Based on available information, maps, photos, and stereo-pairs, the following was planned:
 - a. Position areas, O.P.'s, C.P.'s.
 - b. Survey.
 - c. Local Security.

4. Supply:

Relatively extensive and elaborate plans for supply were made during the planning phase. The plans were carried out practically to the letter and the efforts exerted in the planning phase paid dividends during the assault phase. More remarks in this connection are contained in G-6, page 13, below, but because of what is considered outstanding efficiency in battalion and Group 4-sections, it can be stated that supply was excellent and, except for circumstances beyond the control of battalion and Group, supply was the best observed by this unit to date.

Factors considered in the planning phase of supply (including ammunition) were:

- a. Method of loading and unloading.
 - b. Equipment necessary to unload.
 - c. Routes.
 - d. Destination.
5. Motor Transport:
Since motor transport was limited to certain vehicles due to prescribed shipping space the planning phase was primarily a matter of determining how to get the maximum efficiency in motor transport consistent with the:
1. Space allowed.
 2. Beaches and terrain inland.
 3. Nature of cargos.
6. Administration:
Administration was planned to be carried out in accordance with current instructions.
7. Medical Care:
It was planned to maintain the health of the command by:
- a. Pre-operation vaccinations and inoculations.
 - b. Emphasis on field sanitation.
8. Communications:
For the communication plan see enclosures "D" and "E" on pages 24, 25, and 26.

C. TRAINING PHASE.

To give a clearer picture of the training phase the following facts are pointed out. This battalion was activated on 1 March, 1944 as a 105mm. Howitzer battalion and participated in the Saipan-Tinian operations with this ordnance. Upon returning to the Hawaiian Area in August of 1944, the 105mm. Howitzers were turned in and the battalion equipped with 155mm. Howitzers. The 155mm. Howitzers were received on about 15 September, 1944.

Training was directed with two primary considerations in mind:

- a. The shift to heavier ordnance with its corresponding changes in tactical employment.
 - b. Lessons learned in the Saipan-Tinian operations.
- Early in November of 1944 orders were received to emphasize:
- a. Time Fire.
 - b. Direct Fire at stationery targets (caves).
 - c. Direct Fire at moving targets.

This order was complied with during service practice held on ranges at Hawaii. Particular attention was also given to reinforcing (and reinforced) missions. Approximately two units of fire was used during the training phase. Preceding and concurrent with service practice training also included

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1. Survey.
2. Fire Direction.
3. Service of the Piece.
4. Communications.
5. Motor Transport.
6. Local Security.
7. Chemical Warfare.
8. Supply.
9. Small Arms, Machine Guns, and Bazooka firing.
10. Field Sanitation and First Aid.

The usual difficult problem of training the battalion intelligence section was in evidence. The training consisted primarily of setting up a workable S.O.P. and also employing the Bn-2 and his personnel in flash ranging techniques. The intelligence section was also trained and equipped to prepare meteorological data.

Training in the care and maintenance of ordnance was rendered more difficult by the fact that this battalion did not have an artillery ordnance officer. To alleviate this condition permission was requested and granted to send ten (10) enlisted men and one (1) officer to the Ordnance Depot, Pearl Harbor for instruction. The course, lasting about five (5) days, was very beneficial but inadequate. It was an informal course.

Efforts to tighten up discipline were carried on throughout the training period with excellent results. These efforts were characterized by frequent close order drills and inspections and a rigid backing of military police.

D. EQUIPPING UNITS.

Following the return of this battalion from the Saipan-Tinian operations in August of 1944, requisitions were consolidated and submitted. The requisitions were extensive by virtue of three facts:

- a. The battalion was noticeably ill-equipped (particularly in motor transport) prior to the Saipan-Tinian operations.
- b. Much equipment had been worn out or destroyed in combat. Some had been lost in combat.
- c. New and different types of ordnance had been prescribed. Fullest cooperation and service was obtained in fulfilling requisitions, however, and by 1 November this organization was, for all intents and purposes, completely equipped.

New Equipment Included:

- a. Ordnance.
- b. Motor Transport.
- c. Communication Gear.
- e. Engineer Equipment.

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E. MOUNTING.

In accordance with plans this battalion mounted at Hawaii on 21-22 January, 1945 in three (3) LST's as follows:

Able Battery and $\frac{1}{2}$ H&S	-	LST 808 - 16 officers - 254 enlisted.
Baker Battery and $\frac{1}{2}$ H&S	-	LST 724 - 12 officers - 257 enlisted.
Charlie Battery and $\frac{1}{2}$ Group Hqs	-	LST 788 - 15 officers - 260 enlisted.

The above listed personnel included 2 officers and 76 enlisted men of the 473rd Amphibious Truck Co., Army of U.S.

Twenty-two DUKWs were preloaded with rations and water. Three were to be used for beaching the battalion reconnaissance party. One DUKW had a TCS radio jeep in it.

F. REHEARSAL.

This battalion did not participate in a rehearsal. In view of the heavy equipment, the loading problem, and the questionable value to be gained from it, it is considered that the decision not to rehearse this battalion was a correct one.

G. THE ASSAULT:

1. DEBARKATION AND OCCUPATION OF POSITION.

20 February, 1945: Arrived off IWO JIMA and at 0720 checked in with Group Headquarters. No developments concerning this battalion occurred this day.

21 February, 1945: At 1100 word was received that our tentative position area at 164 Able Baker George had been changed to 147 Mike Nan. (See special air and gunnery target map, IWO JIMA, 1:10000).

22 February, 1945: At 0730 three of the pre-loaded DUKWs (Army) were ordered to beach. Order was complied with and one (1) DUKW sank in the relatively heavy sea.

23 February, 1945: At 0700 orders were received for the battalion commander and reconnaissance party to beach on Green 1 and meet the Group executive officer at RJ 147 Item by 0900. (See special air and gunnery target map of IWO JIMA, 1:10000).

In launching the three DUKWs which carried the reconnaissance party the rudders on two of the DUKWs jammed, due, it is believed, to launching them bow first which was contrary to our recommendations. The DUKW with the still workable rudder took the other two in tow and proceeded through heavy seas to Green One beach.

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Within one hundred yards of the beach the tow line of the first DUKW severed and the two DUKWs with broken rudders were at the mercy of the heavy surf. Meantime, beach party personnel were signalling the reconnaissance party not to come in. There was no choice. The seas washed the DUKWs beachward and broached the two DUKWs. Personnel in the reconnaissance party jumped to safety after throwing their gear on the beach. The DUKWs eventually over turned and one TCS radio jeep was a complete loss along with other less important gear. The DUKW with the good rudder came in shortly and the reconnaissance party proceeded inland in accordance with orders.

Reconnaissance was made with the Group executive officer commencing about 1000. The LST's meanwhile, had been ordered to beach. Concurrent with the reconnaissance, survey, communication, local security and organization of position was inaugurated. By 1600 Able and Charles Batteries were in position. At this time Able had completed registration and a total of 440 rounds were in the battalion area. Baker Battery did not come in this day because, in spite of the efforts of the Group, LST 724 did not beach. Baker Battery reconnaissance personnel did, however, take all preliminary steps to ensure a rapid occupation of position, i.e., guides were posted, wire laid, some digging in was done and routes of entry decided upon.

24 February, 1945: Ammunition was hauled all night under the usual unpleasant conditions characteristic of night work in combat. As a result, dawn found 4800 complete rounds in the battalion position. LST 724 (Baker Battery) beached at 0800 and by 1300 Baker Battery was in position and ready to fire. The battalion fired missions throughout the day under quiet conditions until 2100 when several enemy shells landed in the area until 2200. No more enemy shelling was experienced until 25 February at 0200.

25 February, 1945: At 0200 the enemy resumed shelling the battalion area. Two tractors were hit directly and rendered useless. There were no personnel casualties. The battalion returned fire on what was believed to be the hostile gun which did not shell the area further that night. At 2145 LST 724 completed unloading. This amounted to the fact that in 60 hours the battalion had been completely moved into position with 12,000 rounds of ammunition. Considering the crowded beach conditions, heavy sand, and the weight of equipment and ammunition, this is considered to be a commendable accomplishment in logistics reflecting unusually fine planning by all echelons down to an including batteries. As a matter of fact, had LST 724 been beached with the other two LST's of this battalion, the unloading could have been completed in less than 40 hours. The debarkation and occupation of position was considered completed at this time.

2. TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT AND ORGANIZATION FOR COMBAT.

Tactically, the battalion fires were as follows:

- | | |
|--|--|
| <p>a. Effect Sought.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none">1. Destruction.2. Neutralization. <p>b. Form.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none">1. Concentrations.2. Barrages.(a) Rolling. | <p>c. Prearrangement.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none">1. Fire on targets of opportunity.2. Schedule fires. <p>d. Tactical Purpose.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none">1. Supporting fire.2. Artillery preparation.3. Counter battery.4. Harrassing fires. |
|--|--|

The battalion was organized and employed throughout the operation for centralized (Battalion) control. All missions were fired through or prepared by the battalion fire direction center. Many missions were, however, assigned by higher echelon, i.e., Group.

3. INTELLIGENCE.

a. Enemy Artillery Activity Against Our Own.

1. Shellings: This battalion was shelled as listed:

<u>Number</u>	<u>Time</u>	<u>Date</u>
1	2100-2215	2/24/45
2	0340-0440	2/27/45
3	2230-2255	2/28/45
4	0200-0500	3/1/45

2. No guns of the battalion were lost or incapacitated as a result of enemy artillery fire. The only actual damage caused was a few scratches on the tube of #4 gun of Charlie Battery.

3. Personnel Casualties: See enclosure "B", page 21.

4. Materiel Damage: See #9 below (Motor Transport and Ordnance), page 18 and enclosure "C" on page 22.

b. Tactical Employment of Enemy Artillery:

At the time the battalion area was shelled the Japs had little artillery remaining. The enemy shells which burst in the area possibly originated from the same position. Projectiles came from the same direction and landed with the same low angle of fall. It is thought that the Japs were firing individual guns with mobility limited to the entrance of caves. One forward observer reported seeing a gun being moved to and from an entrance to a cave in 216 Dog, and at a later date the battalion fired a counter-battery mission which destroyed an enemy gun in the same target area. (See special air and gunnery target map, IWO JIMA). Seemingly the Japs followed the course of keeping their artillery pieces stable and separated. During the period from February 23 to this date, studies of periodic reports and FDC work sheets indicated two (2) moves of Jap artillery to new positions. Most of the artillery moved was light, chiefly 75mm. One of the battalion aerial observers described most heavy enemy artillery as 'fixed in permanent emplacements scattered throughout a distinct position area.'

c. Types of Material Used by Enemy Artillery.

The battalion was shelled with high-velocity heavy artillery, 14cm dual purpose guns firing HE shells with point detonating fuzes. Shell fragments varied in size from tiny splinters to large jagged hunks of steel 18" long. The quick succession of shell bursts in the area indicated at least two (2) 14cm DP guns in operation in close proximity to one another. One officer in Able Battery reported time fire bursts to the rear of the battery and near OP personnel on Mt. Suribachi during the night of 24 February. 25mm. AA fragments were found in the position area after the shelling of 27 February.

d. Effectiveness of Enemy Artillery.

Front line reports indicated that when the Japs have observation their fire is accurate and effective, especially their time fire. Enemy shellings of the battalion area were relatively ineffective, except for harassing purposes. Shell bursts were scattered and intermittent. However, some coordination of fire was indicated through the fact that these intermittent bursts came in pairs. The fact that the shellings caused the damage reported might be attributed to the congestion of personnel and material in the position area. (See enclosure "C", page 22).

e. Observation.

1. Air.

(a) General: Battalion air observers began spotting missions on 22 February. During the period from 22 February to 28 February observation was conducted from carrier based TBM-3s. Observation from OY-1s based on airfield #1, IWO JIMA, began 1 March.

(b) Height of Observation: While flying in TBM-3s artillery fire control spotters conducted missions at altitudes varying from 800 to 2000 feet, depending on haze, dust and cloud conditions. Low passes for positive target identification were made at 300 feet. OY-1 spotting flights were usually conducted between altitudes of 800 and 2000 feet, with low passes being made at 200 and in some instances at 100 feet.

(c) Orientation and Target Identification: Observers had no trouble orienting themselves but mentioned some difficulty in spotting targets because of terrain conditions and excellent camouflage.

(d) Maps and Photos: Observers had access to the latest obliques and verticals of 1:20000 scale and gridded into target squares. They carried the M-square Special Air and Gunnery Target Map, IWO JIMA, 1:20000, and on return from a hop would identify map targets on the gridded photos.

(e) Communications: See #4 below (Communications), page 10.

(f) Duration of Hops:

1. With TBM-3s.....4.5 hours.

2. With OY-1s.....2.0 hours.

(g) Enemy Intervention: Only one instance of AA fire against the battalion AOs was mentioned. 2nd Lt. Joseph C. Kellett reported his TBM-3 had received some "ack-ack" on 24 February, but no casualties or damage resulted.

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on IWO JIMA. (Cont'd). 26 March, 1945.

(h) Miscellaneous: 50% of the targets fired on by the battalion were spotted by air observers. The battalion was assigned two other air observers to be available on call.

2. Ground.

This battalion established no flash range stations or OPs. However, four FO parties were sent to the 13th Marines for duty. 2ndLt. Charles C. Perpich and six men were sent on 7 March. This party observed 3 missions then returned to the battalion. At 1230, 12 March three FO parties left. 2ndLt. Charles Perpich, again, from Able Battery left with 7 men; 2ndLt. Dalton W. Hielscher from Baker Battery departed with 6 men and 2ndLt. Benjamin J. Gantt took 5 men with him from Charlie Battery.

f. Maps and Photos.

1. General.

Maps and photos pertinent to this campaign were sufficient for the battalion needs. However, it is felt that if landing and position area conditions had been adverse the 30 maps, scale 1:20000 and the 10 maps, scale 1:10000 would not have fulfilled all needs.

2. How Used.

(a) Maps:

- | | |
|------------|---|
| 1. 1:50000 | Used for briefing. |
| 2. 1:10000 | Used for situation maps. |
| 3. 1:20000 | Used by BCs, BExOs, FDC, Survey and Communications. |

(b) Photos:

1. Photos were used chiefly aboard ship for position area and general topographic study and orientation.
2. Verticals were not too good for stereoscopic analysis and were used little for locating and identifying enemy installations.
3. Blown-up obliques of the western beaches were excellent but served only in an informational capacity.
4. The latest photos on hand were dated 27 December, 1944, however, later photos would not have caused any changes in the battalion plan of operation.

g. Information from Other Units.

1. Group.

- (a) Front line situation.
- (b) Target Active and targets destroyed overlays.
- (c) A.P.I. results.
- (d) POW interrogation reports.

2. Artillery Liaison Officers.

- (a) Shellings in other areas to include general information such as damage and estimated caliber of enemy artillery, etc.
- (b) Location of front lines.
- (c) Friendly troop dispositions and sector lines.
- (d) Location of friendly CPs.
- (e) General troop activity and terrain conditions.

3. Meteorological data was efficiently and continually supplies by the 2nd 155mm. Howitzer Battalion and the 13th Marines.

4. D-2 reports were made available to the battalion by the 13th Marines, and the Group liaison officer made it possible for daily study of V AC situation map.

h. Miscellaneous.

1. Information pertinent to enemy artillery:

(a) It was reported that the Japs built fires either before or behind some of their artillery to conceal the muzzle flash from our flash range stations. This trick was reported on 25 February.

(b) The 23rd Marines reported on 23 February that the Japs were using flash range observation with good effects.

(c) Generally speaking, enemy artillery activity was conspicuously absent during battalion counter-battery missions, but on at least one occasion there were simultaneous exchanges of rounds.

4. COMMUNICATIONS.

General Plan.

From the time this battalion arrived at the target area, which was on 20 February, to the time the reconnaissance party left the ship, which was on 23 February, we had two radio nets in operation. One net was in communication with the next higher echelon (Group Headquarters) and the other net was in communication with the battalion. (See "plan prior to reconnaissance" of enclosure "E"-radio net on page 25). When the reconnaissance party was ordered ashore, the above communication plan was prepared to go into effect en route to the beach. This did not prove satisfactory due to the fact that the sea was rough causing salt water to be sprayed on the radios. Both nets were secured until we arrived at the battalion position area. Upon arriving at the battalion position area, communication was set-up with Group Headquarters on two radio nets: Group Command Able and Group Command Baker. The Battalion Command Net was also set-up so that communication could be had with the three LST's awaiting to be beached. While radio communication was being established, (See enclosure "E"-radio plan, page 26), wire was laid as rapidly as possible to the next higher echelon and also to the batteries. (See enclosure "D"-Circuit Diagram, page 24).

Failures.

Wire: Some trouble was encountered the first hour or two after occupying our position with lines on the deck, due to tractor vehicles running over them, but as soon as the lines were overhead wire communication stayed in until darkness when enemy shelling knocked out a few of our lines. Outside of this, wire communication was very good.

Radio: After the first few days considerable trouble was had with our TCS's and TBX radios. The TCS's had one or more of the following troubles: bad loading coils and rollers in transmitters which caused difficulty in loading; bad twelve volt generators; and bad voltage regulators. Operating the TCS from the remote position caused an excessive drain on the batteries and strain on the dynamotor, thus causing some trouble with those two named parts. The TBX's had the following failures; poor regulators on

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generators; inability to get sufficient load on set; and bad contacts on the send-receive switch. The RUGF radio had a bad antenna relay. The SCR 610's provided good service.

Message Center.

None.

Material:

None, except as described in "failures, radio", above.

5. FIRING.

a. Survey.

Survey control was initially established by the survey officer of the 13th Marines, according to the prearranged plan, and this point was marked as the Corps Initial Point. Direction was established from this point by taking a line tangent to the northeastermost part of the island visible from the initial point; the map azimuth of this line was assigned. From this point, control was carried inland, and certain other survey stations located, usually by short base. The survey officer of the 2nd 155mm. Howitzer Battalion carried control forward from these survey stations to battalion initial points. The survey officer of this battalion then ran a position area survey, thus tying in this battalion. Base angles were computed, using a previously selected check point, thus completing the survey. Later, additional survey control was run, to determine the average errors in the special air and gunnery target map, 1:20000. The average error was found to be eight (8) to ten (10) yards in vertical control, and seventy-five (75) to one hundred (100) yards in horizontal control.

b. Fire Adjustment.

Fire adjustment was handled by (1) air observation, (2) ground observation, (3) sound-ranging, and (4) flash-ranging.

(1) Air observation was most generally used. One air observer was kept on station during daylight hours, to work with both 155mm. Howitzers Battalions. Since a primary mission of this battalion was counter-battery fire, enemy guns or suspected gun locations were high priority targets. Other suitable targets were always taken under fire, however; these include truck parks, supply installations, troops, and caves. Bracket and precision missions were fired. When the target could be definitely pinpointed, precision fire was used until destruction was accomplished. All registrations were conducted by the air observers, using precision methods.

(2) Satisfactory ground observation was virtually impossible to obtain. Since the mission of this battalion was general support of the Corps, forward observers were not sent out from this battalion (except on two occasions, when a total of four teams were sent forward as reliefs for division artillery forward observer sections). Many missions were received through division artillery from forward observers, requesting reinforcing fires.

Forward observers also conducted many precision missions on pillboxes, blockhouses, and artillery pieces; one piece was usually allotted to such missions, and the quadrant elevation refined until destruction was completed. On occasion such fires were, at the request of the infantry unit concerned, brought to within one hundred yards of the front lines. Precision fire was conducted on two instances, from Mount Suribachi.

(3) Sound missions were conducted at night on several enemy pieces, the adjustments being conducted by the artillery regiments. One battery was generally used on these missions for effect, and one piece fired during the adjustment. Although the effect could not be definitely determined, on several occasions fire from the enemy pieces ceased after fire for effect.

(4) Flash-ranging stations were established by Group, on Mount Suribachi. When enemy flashes were observed, missions were assigned by Group. The expansion ratio for the flash-base was extremely small, and as a result the target could not be definitely located more closely than one hundred yards. However, by firing with range spread, a substantial area was covered, and in most instances the enemy pieces were either destroyed, or ceased firing.

c. Fire Direction.

Fire direction was as taught at the Field Artillery School, Marine Corps Schools, Quantico, Virginia, and the Field Artillery School, Fort Sill, Oklahoma. Due to the fact that sufficient check points were available, and registration was unrestricted, velocity error corrections were not used. Metro corrections were available about every three to four hours; registration was affected on at least one check point daily. Two complete fire direction teams were used.

d. Liaison.

Although liaison officers and sections were provided from this battalion, all liaison was between Group Headquarters and the artillery regiments. Liaison sections were usually composed of one (1) liaison officer, one (1) liaison sergeant, and two (2) radio operators. Each section carried one (1) TCS radio and one (1) SCR 610. This battalion furnished liaison sections to the 12th Marines, and the 14th Marines.

e. Effectiveness of Our Own Artillery.

It is believed that the 155mm. Howitzers were quite effective on the defenses found on IWO JIMA. Reports from forward observers and aerial observers indicate that fires were very effective on Japanese emplacements, where observation could be obtained. Precision fire was generally used on these targets, and fire for effect was continued at the adjusted quadrant elevation until destruction was effected. Where definite targets were reported, but observation was difficult, fire for effect was generally executed by the battalion. Examples of this type of mission are the enemy flashes reported by Group and Regimental flash-base teams, and sound-ranging stations.

f. Methods Used To Locate Artillery Targets.

Artillery targets were located by: (1) air observers, (2) forward observers, (3) observation posts, (4) flash-ranging, (5) sound-ranging, and (6) restitution of aerial photographs.

g. Summary of Ammunition Expenditure by Type of Fire Mission.

See enclosure "F", page 27 of this report.

h. Summary of Ammunition Expenditure by Item.

See enclosure "G", page 28 of this report.

6. SUPPLY.

1. General Methods and Plan of Distribution and Regulation.

This battalion procured sufficient rations to carry it through a thirty day period in the field, sufficient water for five gallons per man per day for a period of five days. There were sufficient general supplies embarked for a thirty day period in the field. Therefore, there was no problem of regulation or distribution by higher echelon to this battalion.

Distribution and regulation within the battalion was handled as follows: Prior to disembarkation each member of the organization was furnished with one days ration type "K", one days ration type "special assault", and one unit of fire for all small arms. After the landing was accomplished, rations and water were issued to the batteries of the battalion on a daily basis. The rate of issue on water being one gallon per man per day. After the position was organized more completely (3 days) "B" type rations were substituted for the original issues of "K"'s, "C"'s and 10in1's. Water issues were gradually increased as water became available from distillation units. A maximum of 4 gallons per man per day was reached after a period of fourteen (14) days.

2. Supplies Authorized and Landed.

A. Class I.

(1) Rations:

- (a) 5 days ration type "K".
- (b) 5 days ration type "C".
- (c) 10 days ration type 10in1.
- (d) 10 days ration type "B".
- (e) 2 days ration "D".
- (f) 2 days ration "special assault".
- (g) 20 days ration P.X.
- (h) 30 days fruit and fruit juices.

(2) Water:

- (a) 13,000 gallons of water.

B. Class II.

(1) Clothing:

- (a) 30 day replenishment on clothing authorized but not available for embarkation.

C. Class III.

(1) Motor Transport:

- (a) 6050 gallons 80 octane gasoline.

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(b) 2540 gallons 67 octane gasoline.

(c) 7370 gallons diesel oil.

(d) 220 gallons kerosene.

(2) Lubricants.

(a) 660 gallons SAE 30 motor oil.

(b) 600 pounds SAE 90 gear lubricant.

(c) 300 pounds chassis lubricant.

U. Class IV.

(1) Small Arms.

(a) 5 units of fire for small arms and grenades.

(b) 7 units of fire for 155mm. Howitzers MI. consisting of the following:

(1) WE M-107 11,340 (5) Fuzes M-51A3 10,080

(2) WP M-110 1,260 (6) Fuzes M-55A1 2,250

(3) Charges M-3 7,200 (7) Fuzes T-105 2,100

All of the above supplies were authorized and landed.

Restrictions and Limitations.

There were no restrictions placed on the supply section of this organization. However, the battalion was somewhat limited by the slowness of ammunition resupply. On some occasions the battalion was forced to slow its firing or completely expend its ammunition stock.

7. ADMINISTRATION.

(1) Strength of Personnel Who Landed On IWO JIMA.

BATTERY	OFFICERS	WARRANT	ENLISTED	TOTAL
H&S	12	3	140	155
"A"	6	0	143	149
"B"	6	1	134	141
"C"	6	0	142	148
USN	1	0	10	11
TOTAL	31	4	569	604

(2) Commendations and Citations Recommended.

Legion of Merit Medal:

Major Joe H. Daniel.

Bronze Star Medal:

Major Marvin R. Burditt.

Captain Shuman B. Worrell.

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Captain Harold C. Montgomery.		
Lt.(jg) "A" Merton Baker, MC-USNR		
Captain Paul W. Splittorff.		
Captain Edward E. Jones, Jr.		
Captain George A. Adams, Jr.		
Captain Charles C. Jacobs, Jr.		
First Lieutenant Joseph "M" Treneer, Jr.		
Second Lieutenant Eugene C. Neitge.		
Warrant Officer Ferdinand J. Bergmann.		
Sergeant Robert L. Ballew	307811	USMCR
Corporal Charles Y. Barr	452041	USMCR
Private First Class John S. Blain, Jr.	434349	USMCR
Sergeant Michael J. Brombolich	459018	USMCR
Sergeant Angiolo Caccesse	479483	USMCR
Private First Class John R. Copisky, Jr.	539977	USMCR
Private First Class Ralph Cornett	842121	USMCR
Private First Class Arley E. Cox	475952	USMCR
Corporal James C. Dahlberg	314679	USMCR
Sergeant Arthur G. Dallman	298238	USMC
Private First Class Marion E. Davis	880630	USMCR
Sergeant James A. Dean, Jr.	301041	USMC
Private First Class Joseph J. Di Geronimo, Jr.	439640	USMCR
Corporal Anthony C. Di Matteo	314679	USMCR
Platoon Sergeant Benjamin F. Dutton	211029	USMC
PhM3/c Harold E. Eivins	7321-82-30	USN
Gunnery Sergeant Lawrence O. Ferguson	260729	USMC
Private Kenneth M. Garner	955818	USMCR
Corporal Edgar L. Garrigan	529812	USMCR
Private First Class Albert V. Geiger, Jr.	428599	USMCR
Private First Class Duane E. Hammond	865727	USMCR
Platoon Sergeant Robert R. Hanks	337358	USMC
Corporal John H. Hart	489122	USMCR
Corporal Victor V. Hart	464892	USMCR
Platoon Sergeant Arthur L. Herboltzheimer	377913	USMCR
Private First Class Rollin T. Hickman	519434	USMCR
HAL/c William T. Holmstrom	762-35-99	USNR
Corporal Hiët K. Jackson	488252	USMCR
Corporal John E. Jenkins	800054	USMCR
Corporal Noble E. Lewis	446359	USMCR
Private First Class John J. Loines	401447	USMCR
Private First Class Edward E. McCollough	426656	USMCR
PhM1/c Robert H. Moreland	295-87-48	USN
Corporal Robert J. Moss	504546	USMCR
Corporal Hugo J. Motroni	805950	USMCR
Corporal Richard L. Place	850817	USMCR
Sergeant Eugene J. Pomas	377967	USMCR

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Sergeant Joseph S. Ramey	427709	USMCR
Corporal Neal E. Roberts	506636	USMCR
PhM1/c Charles W. Sanders	668-41-08	USN
Corporal Doren J. G. Smith	356399	USMC
Sergeant Louis W. Southwick	476327	USMCR
Sergeant Dick C. Starkey	341079	USMCR
Corporal Edward A. Stransky	472585	USMCR
Private First Class Harold K. Stoner	461201	USMCR
Private First Class William F. Threadgill	830742	USMC
Sergeant Ernest Tregoning	338115	USMCR
Corporal Frederick M. Walker	390019	USMCR
Sergeant Dot W. Watson	325841	USMC
Private First Class Harold T. West	500832	USMCR
Sergeant Orville E. Westphal	254462	USMC
Sergeant Hoyle N. Collins Jr.	509558	USMCR
*Corporal Jack A. Williams	481276	USMCR

*--Posthumous.

8. MEDICAL.

1. General.

Ten hospital corpsmen and one medical officer embarked for this operation. The battalion dental officer remained in the rear echelon. Two corpsmen were assigned to each firing battery and four to Headquarters and Service Battery with the medical officer. These personnel embarked with their respective batteries. Aboard ship adequate facilities were found for the treatment of the sick, and sanitary conditions were excellent. The corpsmen disembarked with their respective batteries at Iwo Jima. The corpsmen with the firing batteries established local aid stations from supplies carried ashore in a seabag, and the battalion sick bay was established in a large dugout in the Headquarters and Service Battery area. Casualties received primary treatment at local battery aid stations and were transported to the battalion sick bay for additional treatment and disposition. Casualties requiring evacuation were transported via ambulance to the nearest shore party evacuation depot. Daily sanitary inspection was held by the battalion medical officer. Fly proof heads were set up the first day ashore; and as soon as the tactical situation allowed their establishment, fly proof gallies were erected. No clandestine cooking was allowed, but until gallies were set up the men were allowed to warm rations in their container to be eaten directly from the can, and mess gear was not utilized. With the erection of the gallies mess gear was used by the men and the standard three cans of boiling water, one containing soap, were operated for sterilizing purposes. Grease and garbage disposal pits were built for each galley. No cases of contagious or infectious diseases developed and battle casualties were few. (See Enclosure "B", page 21).

2. Organization, Function, and Preparation of Personnel (Physical and Dental) for Combat.

All personnel were given precombat physical examinations in November, 1944. All personnel were checked dentally and in so far as time allowed all needed dental repairs made. Consideration was first given those in the worst dental condition. The battalion did not have a dental officer until November, 1944, therefore, due to inadequate time some of the men did not receive treatment of minor pathology. A refresher lecture in first aid and field sanitation was presented to the personnel. Vaccinations against typhus fever, cholera, and plague were received by all personnel; those needing booster doses of typhoid, small pox and yellow fever vaccine received the same, and all personnel received a precombat tetanus booster before embarkation. All personnel impregnated one set of utility clothes and socks with an emulsion of dimethylphthylate and soap as protection against insect infection.

3. Personnel and Supplies.

Attached to this battalion are, one (1) medical officer, one (1) dental officer (in rear echelon) and ten (10) hospital corpsmen. During this operation, two corpsmen were assigned to the three firing batteries and the remaining four worked with the battalion surgeon at the battalion sick bay in the Headquarters and Service Battery area.

Supplies and equipment consisted of the following:

- 1 Ambulance Jeep with trailer.
- 2 Tarpaulins.
- 1 Camouflage Net.
- 4 Water Cans (5 gals.).
- 1 Gas Can (5 gals.).
- 1 Sick Call Book.
- 1 Unit 5-A (medical equipment).
- 1 Unit 5-B (medical supplies).
- 2 Units combat Covers.
- 2 Unit Combat Dressings.
- 1 Unit 10 (gas decontamination).
- 1 Box, miscellaneous supplies and equipment.
- 2 Gas Stoves.
- 2 Gas Lamps.
- 4 Units Number 9 (stretchers).
- 4 Sea Bags filled with medical supplies.
- 1 Unit One.
- 9 Units Three.
- 1 Unit Four.
- 1 Unit 11-A (supplies).
- 1 Unit Blankets.
- 2 Cases Blood Plasma.

9. MOTOR TRANSPORT AND ORDNANCE.

a. Motor Transport.

(1) General.

The amount and type of transportation planned and authorized for the operation on IWO JIMA proved satisfactory. The 2½ ton 6X6 dump truck is not satisfactory as a prime mover for the 155mm. Howitzer in rough terrain, i.e., mud, hills, beaches or other than improved or partially improved roads. The TD 18 tractor is entirely satisfactory as a prime mover but, of course, provides no room for transporting troops. The 2½ ton 6X6 dump trucks provided an excellent means of transporting ammunition and other general supplies in that it could move into the battery area and simply dump it's load. Much man power was saved this way. All in all, the compromise of having some TD 18 tractors and some 2½ ton 6X6 dump trucks appears to be a solution in attacking a target with the characteristics of IWO JIMA. (See enclosure "F", page 29 "summary of motor transport authorized for operation"). All motor transport embarked provided excellent service. No breakdowns occurred. Direct hits on two (2) TD 18 tractors, however, ruined them. (See enclosure "C", "summary of shelling reports" on page 22).

b. Ordnance.

(1) General.

This battalion was equipped in accordance with current T.B.A. All pieces were put in position without mishap. Performance of all pieces throughout the operation was excellent. Inspection and cleaning was performed daily, and the bore sighting checked frequently. Replacement of parts were as follows: (a) firing pins-----25, (b) gas check pads-----12. One piece, #3144, leaked oil around the counter recoil piston head. A special tool was made to tighten the head and oil added. The piece was never out of action except for cleaning purposes, however, see section G, Ordnance, on page 20 below.

Piece #3157 Charlie Battery, received a small dent in the left side of the tube from an enemy shell fragment. The damage was negligible, no repairs necessary.

Ammunition was delivered to battery dumps and covered with 12" of soil to reduce destruction by enemy shelling to a minimum. (See section G, Ordnance, on page 20 below).

* * * * *

This battalion remained in one position all the time it was on IWO JIMA. The size of the island and the range of the Howitzers precluded the necessity of displacement. At 2145 on February 25, the debarkation and occupation of position was completed.

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Between this date and March 14, the activities of this battalion were as described elsewhere in this report. This battalion ceased firing at 1800 on March 14, 1945. At 1600 on March 15 the battalion ordnance, motor transport, and engineering gear was turned over to the Fourth Marine Division in accordance with orders.

At 1800 on March 16 this battalion loaded aboard the S.S. SEA RUNNER by LCM's beached at Green Beach. As personnel marched up the ramp of the LCM, it was announced that IWO JIMA had been declared secured as of 1800.

COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

General.

The comments and recommendations made herewith are submitted based only on the IWO JIMA operation. This is considered necessary because each target presents some characteristics peculiar to it and to attempt to cover all situations, all conditions of terrain, enemy defense, etc., would lead to confusion in making specific recommendations. For example, the transportation allotted to this battalion for the IWO JIMA operation is considered to be as satisfactory as shipping space allowed. On a larger land mass, necessitating displacements with consequent problems in supply movement, etc., the transportation allowed for the IWO JIMA operation might have introduced numerous problems.

It is with the above in mind that the following recommendations are made:

A. Administration.

1. Personnel. -- That each howitzer section be increased by two (2) men. That the battalion supply section be increased by four (4) men. The above recommendations are made for the reason that operating on a twenty-four (24) hour basis makes it necessary to work in shifts and unless properly manned the efficiency of howitzer sections diminishes after about forty-eight (48) hours. The increase in the supply section is considered necessary to preclude the ever existing necessity of calling on the firing batteries for working parties to maintain supply.

B. Intelligence.

No recommendations.

C. Operations and Training.

No recommendations. The operations and training of this battalion in conjunction with the First Provisional Field Artillery Group is considered to be the best observed to date.

D. Supply.

See "A" above of recommendations.

It is recommended that resupply of ammunition be by L.S.T. or a ship of similar design.

See "I" Medical below.

E. Artillery.

It is recommended that field artillery units be provided, in addition to the regular gunnery and target map, with maps which do not show enemy installations, to be used as firing charts, and that they be contoured in yards.

F. Transport Quartermaster.

No recommendations.

G. Ordnance.

It is recommended that spare parts per battery be increased to:

16 Firing pins.

16 Gas check pads.

12 Obturator spindle plugs.

2 Obturator spindle primer vent cleaning tool.

2 Breech block thread files.

4 Bore cleaning brushes (wire bristle).

24 Bulbs, light for night lighting devices.

That one special tool repair chest be provided each battalion.

That all protective covers for ammunition rotating bands be made of metal. It is recommended that ammunition be more carefully provided regarding squares (weight of projectile). The present variance causes much extra labor to tired gun crews.

H. Chemical.

No recommendations.

I. Medical.

Concussion from firing white and gray bag powder charges resulted in two (2) ruptured ear drums and was a source of much discomfort.

Practically all gun crews expressed the opinion that an ordinary commercial athletic supporter (Jock strap) would be a help. It is recommended that gun crews be issued helmets similar to the style issued to gun crews on naval 5" 25 caliber AA guns and also athletic supporters.

J. Signal.

It is recommended that a push-to-talk switch on the transmitter of the TCS radio be provided in order to prevent heating of the dynamotor and reduce wear on batteries.

That the TBX be provided with better contacts on the send-receive switch and with more water proof generators.

That a trip relay at the remote position instead of at the panel of the set (SCR 608 or 808) be installed on the RM-29, this to eliminate one radio operator.

K. Motor Transport.

It is recommended that the Athey trailer model #BT-8 be replaced with model #BT 301-4.

It is recommended that two (2) "Weasels" be provided the battalion for wire laying over difficult terrain.

L. Air Observer.

It is recommended that VMO pilots attend basic AO school in forward areas immediately prior to each operation in order to bring their efforts to a higher degree of cooperation and efficiency.


D. E. REEVE.

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ROSTER OF CASUALTIES

KILLED IN ACTION

NAME	RANK	SER.NO.	DATE	REMARKS
WILLIAMS, Jack A.	Corp(CP)	481276	27Feb45	USMCR, "B" Battery. Killed in action by enemy shell fire, not misconduct, interred in 5thMarDiv Cemetery #1, plot #2, row #14, grave #573, Iwo Jima Volcano Islands 28Feb45.

WOUNDED IN ACTION

COISKY, John R., Jr.	PFC.	539977	24Feb45	USMCR, H&S Battery, wounded by grenade fragments, Evacuated to hospital ship APA #106.
ACRE, Leland H.	FM1cl.	828771	27Feb45	USMC-SS, "C" Battery, wounded by enemy shell fragments, Not evacuated.
DEAN, James A., Jr.	Sgt.	301041	1Mar45	USMC, "C" Battery, wounded by enemy shell fragments, Not evacuated.
FERGUSON, Lawrence O.	GySgt.	260729	1Mar45	USMC, "A" Battery, wounded by enemy shell fragments, Not evacuated.

SICK AND EVACUATED

DE MARZO, Alexander	PFC.	518107	10Mar45	USMCR, "B" Battery, fractured toe, Evacuated to 5thMedBn., has not returned
FERGUSON, Robert, Jr.	Pvt.	971314	1Mar45	USMCR-SS, "B" Battery, combat fatigue, Evacuated to CorpsDisp. Returned to duty 2Mar45.
FROST, Frank L.	CWO	028623	28Feb45	USMC, H&S Battery, combat fatigue, Evacuated to beach evacuation station; has not returned.
ROUFF, Max L.	PFC.	830184	4Mar45	USMCR-SS, "B" Battery, acute conjunctivitis, Evacuated to CorpsDisp. Returned to duty 14Mar45.
SMITH, Irvin T.	PFC.	489281	14Mar45	USMCR, "B" Battery, varicocele, Evacuated to 5thMarDivHosp. Returned to duty 15Mar45.
POOLE, Walter L., Jr.	PFC.	520864	14Mar45	USMCR, "A" Battery, Inured by shell fragments, Evacuated to 5thMarDivHosp. Not returned. OWN MISCONDUCT. Injured while disassembling a Japanese 25mm. shell despite previous warnings to the contrary.

ENCLOSURE B.

SUMMARY OF SHELLING REPORTS

No.	Date	From	To	No., Type, Caliber of Guns	No. Rounds, Type of Fire	Damage	Estimated Location
1	2/24/45	2100	2125	2 guns; dual 45-55 rounds, intermittent purpose 14cm & scattered. Harrassing type of fire.	One (1) tractor and one (1) bulldozer ruined beyond repair.	Flash range picked up flashes in TAs 216Q-R-S-T & 199C-D-H-I.	
				XXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXXXXXX
				Unknown no. of AA guns, 25mm.	Unknown	None	Unknown
2	2/27/45	0240	0440	2 guns; dual 100 rds. estimated to purpose 14cm have fallen, of which 35 fell in battalion position area. All rounds scattered and fire of harrassing type.	Corp. Jack Williams, TA 217 - determined by "B" Battery, killed. 15% of supplies in battalion ration dump destroyed.	compass direction and similarity of position of gun flashes to flashes seen during previous shellings.	

ENCLOSURE C.


SUMMARY OF SHELLING REPORTS. (Continued).

No.	Date From To	No., Type, Caliber of Guns.	No. Rounds, Type of Fire.	Damage	Estimated Location.
3	2/23/45 2230 2255	Unknown	10-12 rounds fell intermittently in vicinity of battalion position area. Harrassing type of fire.	None	Unknown
4	3/1/45 0240 0500	No of guns un- 65-70 rounds fell in Gysgt. Lawrence Ferguson known. It is vicinity of battalion "A" Battery and Sgt. James believed the position area. Harr- A. Dean of "C" Battery guns were dual assing type of fire. were wounded in the hand purpose 14cm and face respectively.			Unknown


ENCLOSURE C.

CIRCUIT DIAGRAM OF 44155 NM HOW. 13V.
EFFECTIVE MARCH 6, 1945 TIME 1200

ENCLOSURE "D"




PLAN PRIOR TO RECONNAISSANCE



ENCLOSURE-E

Diagram illustrating the geometry of a beam with a central support and two end supports. The beam is labeled "STAND BY" and "BY C.M.D. 23.8". The distance between the two end supports is marked as "600". The distance from the central support to each end support is marked as "300". The beam is shown with a slight upward curve, and the central support is labeled "BY C.M.D. 23.8".



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on IWO JIMA. (Cont'd). 26 March, 1945.

Summary of Ammunition Expenditure By Type of Fire Mission.

<u>DATE</u>	<u>REGISTRATION</u>	<u>COUNTERBATTERY</u>	<u>HARRASSING</u>	<u>PREPARATION</u>	<u>OTHER</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
23Feb	38	523	92	299	55	1007
24Feb	20	1018	84	753	226	2101
25Feb	5	689	538	574	244	2050
26Feb	16	1317	582	910	245	3070
27Feb	16	568	336	1083	105	2108
28Feb	16	451	744		106	1317
1Mar	9	154	160	763	97	1183
2Mar	29	126	252	622	26	1055
3Mar			199	325		523
4Mar	29	112	164		28	333
5Mar	9	108	240	1346		1703
6Mar	19	98	72		55	244
7Mar		124	200	152		476
8Mar	23	134	216	272	11	656
9Mar	17	140	325	464	45	991
10Mar	15	66	102	296		479
11Mar	40		496	140		676
12Mar				240	146	386
13Mar					78	78
TOTALS	301	5628	4802	8238	1467	20436

ENCLOSURE F.

Special Action Report of 4th 155mm. HowBn., 1st Prov Fld Arty G., FMT, Pac.,
on IWO JIMA. (Cont'd). 26 March, 1945.

Summary of Ammunition Expenditure by Item.

Shell, FE, M-107	19,187.
Shell, WF, M-110	1,249.
Fuze, M51A3	18,101.
Fuze, M55A1	1,788.
Fuze, T1o5	547.
Propelling Charge, M3	13,005.
Propelling Charge, M4	450.
Propelling Charge, M4A1	6,981.

ENCLOSURE G.

Special Action Report of 4th 155mm. HowBn., 1st Prov Fld Arty G., FMF, Pac.,
on IWO JIMA. (Cont'd). 26 March, 1945.

List of Motor Transport Available For The IWO JIMA Operation.

6 $2\frac{1}{2}$ -3T. 6X6 P.M. (S.W.B)
1 $2\frac{1}{2}$ -3T. 6X6 (Cargo).
6 TD-18 Tractors (w/fwinch).
4 TD-18 Tractors (w/angle dozer).
3 6T. Tracklaying Trailers (Athey).
8 1T. 4X4 Cargo.
1 1T. 4X4 B.W.G.F.
6 $\frac{1}{2}$ T. 4X4 Cargo.
7 $\frac{1}{2}$ T. 4X4 Radio.
1 $\frac{1}{2}$ T. 4X4 Ambulance.
8 1T. 2w Trailers.
10 $\frac{1}{2}$ T. 2w Trailers.
4 300 gal. 2w Trailers.
1 2w Stockroom Trailers.
1 2w Lubricating Trailer.

ENCLOSURE H.