Designing Network Protocols for Good Equilibria
Abstract
Designing and deploying a network protocol determines the rules by which end users interact with each other and with the network. We consider the problem of designing a protocol to optimize the equilibrium behavior of a network with selfish users. We consider network cost-sharing games, where the set of Nash equilibria depends fundamentally on the choice of an edge cost-sharing protocol. Previous research focused on the Shapley protocol, in which the cost of each edge is shared equally among its users. We systematically study the design of optimal cost-sharing protocols for undirected and directed graphs, single-sink and multicommodity networks, and different measures of the inefficiency of equilibria. Our primary technical tool is a precise characterization of the cost-sharing protocols that only induce network games with pure-strategy Nash equilibria. We use this characterization to prove, among other results, that the Shapley protocol is optimal in directed graphs, and that simple priority protocols are essentially optimal in undirected graphs.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- May 25, 2009
- Accession Number
- ADA637877
Entities
People
- Gergory Valiant
- Ho-lin Chen
- Tim Roughgarden
Organizations
- Stanford University