

U.S. FLEET MARINE FORCE, PACIFIC.

SPECIAL ACTION REPORT, IWO JIMA
CAMPAIGN.

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AMPHIBIOUS CORPS LANDING FORCE

-IWO JIMA-

Special Staff Section Reports
(Cont'd)

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- Appendix 5 - Report By Engineer Officer
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Annex CHARLIE

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Engineer Report

Appendix 5 to Annex CHARLIE to Special Action Report IWO JIMA Campaign

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V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS LANDING FORCE
In the Field.

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U.S. Fleet 17 April, 1945.
Marine Force, Pacific

From: The Corps Engineer.
To : The Commanding General.

Subject: Special Action Report, IWO JIMA Campaign. [b4, 5]

Enclosures: (A) Water Distillation Data.
(B) Heavy Equipment Tables.
(C) Mine Situation Map.
(D) Road Map, IWO JIMA.
(E) 2d Separate Engineer Battalion Special Action Report.
(F) 62d Naval Construction Battalion Special Action Report.
(G) 2d Bomb Disposal Company Special Action Report.
(H) 2d Separate Topographic Company Special Action Report.

1. PLANNING PHASE:

(a) On 20 October, 1944, the Corps Engineer attended the V Amphibious Corps staff conference announcing the IWO JIMA Campaign. Copies of Joint Intelligence Center, Pacific Ocean Areas, Intelligence Study, the Engineer Study published by the Office of The Chief Engineer, USA, and preliminary copies of maps and aerial photographs were obtained. The information contained in these documents constituted the sole source of engineer intelligence. On the basis of this information, the Tentative Engineer Annex was written and submitted on 22 October, 1944. With the exception of a modification of the method of employment of the Bomb Disposal Company, this Annex was issued as Annex MIKE to Operation Order No. 3-44. The Annex to Operation Order No. 4-44 was submitted on the same date.

(b) Experience gained on this operation as well as those of the past, in this area, has shown that the available intelligence data is both insufficient and lacking in accurate technical detail needed for efficient engineer planning. In this campaign, a preliminary reconnaissance indicated the necessity for a complete modification of the engineer plan. Fortunately, enough varied equipment was available to overcome the unexpected terrain difficulties. The necessity for more detailed technical intelligence of

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IWO JIMA Campaign.

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the area of operation cannot be stressed too highly if engineer organizations are to be employed effectively.

(c) The following units were assigned to the Engineer Section for operational control:

- (1) 2d Separate Engineer Battalion.
- (2) 2d Separate Topographic Company.
- (3) 2d Bomb Disposal Company.
- (4) 156th Ordnance Bomb Disposal Squad.
- (5) 62d Naval Construction Battalion.

(d) Although the above organizations did not constitute an Engineer Group, it was necessary to employ them as such. Work within Corps areas necessitated a constant check on the working equipment in order that the assignment of missions could be made to that organization, having suitable equipment available. Corps Engineer battalions cannot be assigned area responsibility, but must be assigned missions dependent upon equipment availability if rapid progress is to be made. Only through group control can this be accomplished.

(e) Throughout the preliminary planning phase, the Engineer Section consisted of the Corps Engineer and three (3) enlisted men. This deficiency of personnel made detailed planning impossible. The section was augmented by two (2) majors, one (1) captain, one (1) lieutenant, and four (4) enlisted men prior to embarkation. For the operation, the operations officer of the 9th Naval Construction Brigade was attached to the Engineer Section for the assault phase. This procedure facilitated the making of decisions affecting the Base Development Plan that arose throughout the assault phase. It further enabled a more efficient transfer of Base Development responsibility from the Assault Forces to the Garrison Forces.

2. LOADING PHASE:

(a) The 2d Separate Engineer Battalion, and the 2d Separate Topographic Company were loaded at Guam in two (2) LST's and one (1) LSM. This space was adequate and to a very definite advantage in that the units landed rapidly and with all equipment under close control. The 2d Separate Engineer Battalion was immediately available for the assignment of missions.

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(b) The loading of the Naval Construction Battalions of both Corps and the Divisions occasioned difficulties. Each battalion comprised the normal P-1 component. Two (2) P-4 components were provided for airfield construction. The directive from higher authority required the loading in assault shipping of approximately 5000 measurement tons of each P-1 component and 1700 measurement tons of each P-4 component.

(c) In order to plan the loading and to reduce the component of superfluous elements a conference with the Officer in Charge, 9th Naval Construction Brigade and each battalion commander was called. At this conference, the Officer in Charge, 9th Brigade eliminated numerous items of low priority equipment and supplies from the components.

(d) Although the above procedure did much to reduce the bulk of the tonnage taken, the characteristics of numerous items of equipment were such as to adversely affect the combat loading of the ships. The requirements for construction battalion equipment for assault operations should be studied as carefully as those studies made by combat units. On the IWO JIMA operation amounts of equipment and supplies taken served only to increase the beach congestion and to limit the already over-taxed dispersal areas.

3. REHEARSAL PHASE:

(a) Corps Engineer units did not actively participate in the rehearsals.

4. OPERATIONS PHASE:

(a) Dates of Landing:

(1) 20Feb45-2d Bomb Disposal Company (1st Plt reports to 4th Div; 2d Plt reports to 5th Div).

(2) 21Feb45 - 2d Separate Engineer Battalion less LSM 143.

(3) 22Feb45 - 156th Bomb Disposal Squad, (Reports to Headquarters 2d Bomb Disposal Company).

(4) 22Feb45 - Corps Engineer.

(5) 23Feb45 - Engineer Section.

(6) 25Feb45 - 62d Naval Construction Battalion.

(7) 26Feb45 - 2d Separate Engineer Battalion LSM 143 w/5 officers - 50 enlisted men.

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(b) ROADS:

(1) The construction and maintenance of V Amphibious Corps Landing Force roads on the IWO JIMA Operation was, in most cases, simplified by the availability of pits of clay-sand soil as a natural surfacing material. One such clay pit was located in the 4th Division area, and one was located in the 5th Division area. Road construction and maintenance within the Corps area was assigned to the 2d Separate Engineer Battalion. As the 3rd and 5th Divisions moved forward, part of the divisional road system of these two divisions were taken over, maintained, and in some cases reconstructed by the 2d Separate Engineer Battalion. This additional maintenance work by the V Amphibious Corps Landing Force Engineer units enabled the division engineers to utilize their equipment in more forward areas. A total of 4.0 miles of roads were constructed, and 9.0 miles were maintained by the 2d Separate Engineer Battalion.

(2) On 24 February, 1945, a reconnaissance was conducted by the V Amphibious Corps Landing Force Engineer Section to determine possible access routes to the western beaches of IWO JIMA. Work on the first access road, to enable the utilization of Purple 2 Beach, was begun on 25 February, 1945, by the 1st Platoon, "A" Company, 2d Separate Engineer Battalion. This road opened Purple 2 Beach to traffic on 28 February, 1945. This access road was extended through the length of Purple 2 Beach and joined the access road cut down to the beach under the supervision of the 5th Engineer Battalion at the junction of Purple 1 and Purple 2. The 2d Separate Engineer Battalion also reconstructed and surfaced an existing tractor road giving access to Brown 2 Beach, previously used for the 3rd Marine Division water point. An existing Japanese road giving access to White 2 Beach was improved and widened. Two (2) loading ramps, one (1) on White 2 Beach, sized 39,000 sq.ft., and one (1) on Purple 2 Beach, sized 46,000 sq.ft., were constructed of clay-covered rock-fill to aid in loading or unloading operations. The western beach roads at the close of the operation consisted of surfaced access roads to White 2 Beach and Brown 2 Beach, a completed surfaced road-loop covering the entire Purple 2 Beach with an access road at each end of the beach, and surfaced, rock-filled loading ramps on Purple 2 Beach and White 2 Beach. During

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the initial phase of the operation, 1.3 miles of beach and beach access roads were constructed on the eastern beaches by the 2d Separate Engineer Battalion.

(3) The Marston Matting used on this campaign, jointed together to form flexible sections fifty (50) feet in length, proved to be an excellent item of equipment for assault operations.

(A) A minimum of six (6) miles of Marston matting, jointed into fifty (50) foot sections, carried as a Corps supply, should be available for use by assault units.

(c) AIRFIELDS:

(1) On 24 February, 1945, (D/5), it became apparent that the original plan assigning the 62d Naval Construction Battalion to rehabilitate Motoyama Airfield No. 1 would have to be modified, inasmuch as the 62d Naval Construction Battalion was still afloat and a landing strip was urgently needed for the operation of a VMO Squadron. The initial reconnaissance of the airfield by the 2d Separate Engineer Battalion indicated that the North-South strip was the portion that could be most easily repaired. Examination of bomb and shell craters of the airfield revealed a base fill of approximately 12 to 14 inches of quarried clay overlaid with hand-fitted sandstone blocks. Over this was a layer of compacted clay-sand soil. A portion of the airfield had been surfaced with asphalt and crushed stone forming an additional layer three (3) to four (4) inches thick. Because of the numerous small craters, it was decided that the entire field would have to be scarified, bladed, and rolled, with care not to disturb the under-surface of sandstone blocks. Fill would be required from the edges of the strip. The runways would have to be hand-picked to remove large fragments and duds, while a magnetic trailer would pick up the smaller splinters. Several mine fields of 63 kg aerial bombs with yardstick mines for detonators would have to be removed, and the area thoroughly sapped.

(2) The 2d Separate Engineer Battalion was assigned the task of rehabilitating a strip 1000' x 150' for VMO use, and had a runway 1500' x 150' filled, scarified, bladed and rolled, ready for operation by 1800, 25 February, 1945. With the first priority of airfield construction met, the complete rehabilitation of Airfield No. 1 continued. The 2d Separate Engineer Battalion was

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assigned the reconstruction of the North-South and Northwest-Southeast strips. The 62d Naval Construction Battalion was assigned the reconstruction of the Northeast-Southwest runway.

(3) Simultaneously with the reconstruction of Airfield No. 1, small amounts of equipment and men were made available to dig in Army Air Service units and facilities in the center, and around the perimeter of the airfield.

(4) Reconstruction went as follows, being interrupted only by darkness, or by mortar and artillery fire:

A. 2d Separate Engineer Battalion -
North-South Strip

25Feb45 - 1500' x 150' scarified, bladed and rolled.
26Feb45 - 2661' x 150' scarified, bladed and rolled.
26Feb45 - OY-1 planes operating from strip.
27Feb45 - Turning apron, scarified, bladed and rolled.
28Feb45 - Improvement of entire runway.
1Mar45 - First Fighter plane (F6F) lands.
4Mar45 - Completed rehabilitation of strip.

B. 2d Separate Engineer Battalion -
Northwest-Southeast Strip

27Feb45 - 1913' x 150' scarified, bladed and rolled.
28Feb45 - Turning apron, scarified, bladed and rolled.
1Mar45 - Improvement of entire runway.
4Mar45 - Completed rehabilitation of strip.

C. 62d Naval Construction Battalion -
Northeast-Southwest Strip

26Feb45 - 4000' x 150' cleared of shrapnel and duds.
1Mar45 - 4000' x 150' scarified, bladed and rolled.
4Mar45 - B-29 lands and takes off.

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11Mar45 - 5800' x 220' scarified, bladed and rolled.

12Mar45 - 5800' x 220' in heavy operation, and being maintained and sprinkled.

(5) The 62d Naval Construction Battalion had a section of the Northeast-Southwest runway 4000' x 150', ready for emergency use by 1 March, and by 7 March, when the battalion reverted from control of the Assault Force to that of the 9th Naval Construction Brigade, the strip had been enlarged to 5813' x 220'.

(d) WATER SUPPLY:

(1) Sea water proved the only practical source of drinking water on IWO JIMA. Though an occasional concrete shallow well, or rain catchment basin was encountered, neither of these types were of sufficient size to merit development. Beach areas were therefore utilized for water supply.

(2) Because of insufficient quantities of pumps and pipe, water points were, of necessity, located in already congested beach areas. Sites inland and above shore party activities were preferred, but generally impossible.

(3) Sump pits dug in beaches supplied water of approximately 137° Fahrenheit, but necessitated frequent cleaning of distillation units, because of Sodium Sulphate deposits. Engineer units placing intake valves and feeder lines into the surf, were frequently forced out of operation when intense wave action clogged intakes or washed feeder lines away.

(4) Insufficient storage facilities caused periodic shutdown of water distillation operations. Issues of water were irregular, and when storage capacity was reached, shutdowns were the only alternatives.

(5) Garrison Forces were issued approximately 50,000 gallons of distilled water. No provisions had been made for their own water distillation requirements during the assault phases. This situation necessitated considerable reduction in Corps Troops water rations until more distillation units could be echeloned ashore. The divisional Naval Construction Battalions, Corps Naval Construction

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Battalion, and 2d Separate Engineer Battalion furnished distilled water to the Garrison Forces during this period. Garrison Forces, who are included in the Assault Forces shipping, should make provisions to carry with their advance echelon sufficient personnel and equipment to insure an adequate water supply of their own.

(6) For water distillation statistics see "Approximate Water Distillation Data for IWO JIMA Campaign".

(c) BOMB DISPOSAL:

(1) The disposition of the 2d Bomb Disposal Company on this campaign, and its operation under the supervision of the Engineer Section, V Amphibious Corps Landing Force, proved very effective. Company headquarters, together with one (1) squad, remained in the immediate vicinity of the Corps Command Post on call. One (1) bomb disposal platoon was attached to the engineer battalion of each of the two (2) assault divisions. The third (3rd) platoon, which came ashore with the Corps Naval Construction Battalion, worked both with it and the 3rd Marine Division. Liaison between company headquarters and its dispersed platoons was excellent. No equipment was sent out on any engineering mission which did not receive ample support by bomb disposal personnel.

* (2) In many instances the services of bomb disposal personnel was requested for the purpose of removing unfired ammunition, both American and Japanese. Proper utilization of trained bomb disposal personnel does not include salvage of unfired ammunition.]

(3) Some difficulty has been experienced on this and other operations in the designation of both survey markers and duds with a red flag. Survey markers should be designated by a yellow flag.

(f) RELATIONSHIP OF CORPS ENGINEER ACTIVITIES AND CORPS SHORE PARTY ACTIVITIES:

(1) For the first time in V Amphibious Corps Landing Force operations, the missions assigned to Corps Engineer units and to the Corps Shore Party were separate and distinct in responsibility. All lateral roads within the beach areas were assigned to the Corps Shore Party for construction and maintenance, while Corps Engineer units were responsible for access roads to the island road system.

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(2) The disposition and availability of Corps Engineer units were such that all requests by the Corps Shore Party, for work within their areas, were complied with.

(g) RELATIONSHIP OF CORPS ENGINEER ACTIVITIES AND DIVISIONAL ENGINEER ACTIVITIES:

X I (1) Corps Engineer units were assigned specific missions within the Corps area, working at the same time in close conjunction with the divisional engineer battalions directly supporting their respective divisions. As the divisions moved forward, Corps Engineer units took over many of the rear area activities of the division engineer battalions, thus freeing equipment for construction work in more forward areas.

(2) In several instances, divisional engineer battalions requested Corps Engineer aid in the way of pieces of equipment and personnel. Divisions should request that a specific job be accomplished for them by Corps Engineer units, rather than requesting personnel and equipment to be used under their own direction.]

5. RECOMMENDATIONS:

(a) That Garrison Forces included in the Assault Force shipping make provisions for their own water supply equipment and operating personnel.

(b) That the operations officer of the senior Garrison Force Engineer unit remaining for base development construction at the objective be attached to the Assault Force for liaison and operational purposes prior to embarkation.

(c) That Supply Service, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific carry at least twenty (20) miles of the jointed type Marston matting as used on this campaign.

(d) That the Naval Construction Battalions attached to the V Amphibious Corps for operational control report sufficiently early so as to receive thorough basic training and indoctrination in all phases of Amphibious warfare.

(e) That the Engineer Section be organized as Provisional Engineer Headquarters Group for the period of operations.

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(f) That the Bomb Disposal Company work under the immediate control of the Engineer Section. Bomb Disposal Company platoons, however, may be initially assigned to assault divisions, for transportation, landing and initial control.

(g) That each Engineer unit responsible for water supply provide itself with sufficient water tanks to store a minimum of 1 1/2 times the combined water output of distillation units carried.

(h) That the relationship with respect to responsibility for construction work within the beach area as integrated between Shore Party Commander and Engineer in this campaign be adhered to in future operations.

6. CONCLUSION:

(a) Engineer operations on the IWO JIMA Campaign are considered a success. In the small, eight (8) square mile area there was a sufficiency of Corps Engineer organizations and an abundant supply of equipment. The type of soil on the island, with its rapid drainage, lightened greatly the task of constructing and maintaining the road nets; engineer operations were further facilitated in that no bridges were required. Above contributing features enabled Corps Engineer units to comply with all requests, no matter of what minor nature, and also made possible the amount of work done on Base Development.

W. R. LYTZ
W. R. LYTZ
LtCol. USMCR,
Engineer.

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V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS LANDING FORCE
In the Field.

17 April, 1945.

WATER DISTILLATION DATA FOR IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN

<u>DATE</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>	<u>2dSepBn</u>	<u>3rdEngBn</u>	<u>4thEngBn</u>	<u>5thEngBn</u>	<u>8thNCB</u>	<u>31stNCB</u>	<u>62NCB</u>	<u>133rdNCB</u>
25Feb45	Produced	3,735							
	Issued	535							
	Stored	3,200							
	Units Operating	4							
	Units not Operating	0							
26Feb45	Produced	2,250		3,500	1,800				
	Issued	1,750		3,500	1,800				
	Stored	3,700		---	---				
	Units Operating	4		5	1				
	Units not Operating	0		0	9				
27Feb45	Produced	750		10,000	4,415				
	Issued	3,150		6,500	3,715				
	Stored	1,300		3,500	2,500				
	Units Operating	4		12	5				
	Units not Operating	0		13	5				
28Feb45	Produced	1,900		13,285	3,855				
	Issued	2,200		12,685	5,555				
	Stored	1,000		4,190	800				
	Units Operating	4		13	5				
	Units not Operating	0		14	5				
1Mar45	Produced	2,885		12,090	7,540				
	Issued	2,585		6,000	5,340				
	Stored	1,300		500	3,000				
	Units Operating	4		14	10				
	Units not Operating	0		13	2				

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ENCLOSURE (A)

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17 April, 1945.

WATER DISTILLATION DATA FOR IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN (Cont'd)

DATE	REMARKS	2d Sep Bn	3rd Eng Bn	4th Eng Bn	5th Eng Bn	8th NCB	31st NCB	62d NCB	133rd NCB
2 Mar 45	Produced	3,205	12,800	16,720	6,450				
	Issued	2,280	11,000	14,220	6,450				
	Stored	2,125	2,300	3,400	3,000				
	Units Operating	4	12	16	10				
	Units not Operating	0	7	11	2				
3 Mar 45	Produced	3,265	11,800	15,160	6,350				
	Issued	4,190	11,100	10,060	5,850				
	Stored	1,300	3,000	8,500	3,500				
	Units Operating	9	12	16	10				
	Units not Operating	2	14	11	16				
4 Mar 45	Produced	5,975	11,100	17,300	14,295				
	Issued	6,125	11,100	18,155	17,795				
	Stored	1,150	3,000	7,645					
	Units Operating	7	24	17	16				
	Units not Operating	5	2	10	10				
5 Mar 45	Produced	9,150	9,700	15,685	25,290				
	Issued	7,300	11,200	18,130	19,440				
	Stored	3,000	1,500	5,200	5,850				
	Units Operating	13	24	17	23				
	Units not Operating	7	2	10	3				
6 Mar 45	Produced	7,735	19,200	18,970	21,415				
	Issued	7,735	20,200	20,670	24,265				
	Stored	3,000	500	3,500	3,000				
	Units Operating	12	24	18	23				
	Units not Operating	8	2	2	3				
7 Mar 45	Produced	8,340	13,500	18,860	26,030			2,800	6,500
	Issued	11,540	11,105	17,960	25,030			2,000	3,000
	Stored	200	5,500	4,400				500	3,500
	Units Operating	13	22	18	24			2	5
	Units not Operating	7	4	2	6			2	

WATER DISTILLATION DATA

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WATER DISTILLATION DATA FOR IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN (Cont'd)

17 April, 1945.

DATE	REMARKS	2d Sep Bn	3rd Eng Bn	4th Eng Bn	5th Eng Bn	8th NCB	31st NCB	62d NCB	133rd NCB
8 Mar 45	Produced	14,780	9,000	16,975	21,755	2,000	3,000	4,820	4,300
	Issued	8,480	7,000	15,675	20,155	1,500	3,000	2,800	3,300
	Stored	6,500	3,000	5,700	1,600	500	0	2,020	4,000
	Units Operating	14	18	18	13	1	3	3	5
	Units not Operating	6	6	2	7	0	2	3	1
9 Mar 45	Produced	16,015	17,030	18,070	20,855	1,200	3,500	2,000	5,000
	Issued	13,515	20,030	18,970	21,435	1,500	3,000	1,125	4,750
	Stored	9,000	4,500	4,800	1,000	200	500	875	250
	Units Operating	12	24	16	24	1	3	2	4
	Units not Operating	8	4	4	6	0	2	4	2
10 Mar 45	Produced	4,090	20,695	21,265	24,715	1,300	3,150	4,200	2,150
	Issued	12,090	18,695	19,490	24,215	1,500	2,770	3,060	750
	Stored	1,000	6,500	6,575	1,500	0	2,625	1,040	5,700
	Units Operating	12	23	18	25	1	2	3	4
	Units not Operating	8	5	2	5	0	3	3	2
11 Mar 45	Produced	9,130	-----	20,195	18,860	2,000	5,775	7,030	2,950
	Issued	10,130	-----	23,170	20,360	1,800	4,040	9,530	2,545
	Stored	0	-----	3,600	0	200	4,360	0	3,550
	Units Operating	13	-----	20	25	1	3	3	2
	Units not Operating	7	-----	4	5	3	2	3	4
12 Mar 45	Produced	25,910	7,000	12,995	29,200	1,500	3,600	3,600	2,875
	Issued	23,260	12,000	11,495	19,200	1,500	4,715	3,390	5,050
	Stored	6,250	1,500	1,500	10,000	200	3,245	1,670	1,375
	Units Operating	17	23	21	26	1	3	3	4
	Units not operating	3	5	3	4	3	2	3	2

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ENCLOSURE (A)

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17 April, 1945

WATER DISTILLATION DATA FOR IWO-JIMA CAMPAIGN (Cont'd)

DATE	REMARKS	2dSepBn	3rdEngBn	4thEngBn	5thEngBn	8thNCB	31stNCB	62dNCB	133dNCB
13Mar45	Produced	11,280	15,900	29,755	24,770	1,800	8,812	5,095	5,530
	Issued	10,530	15,900	25,805	32,770	1,800	4,072	3,735	5,280
	Stored	7,000	1,500	10,200	2,000	200	7,985	2,730	1,625
	Units Operating	17	22	24	24	1	4	4	4
	Units not Operating	3	6	3	6	3	1	2	2
14Mar45	Produced	16,460	21,600	23,580	28,700	1,800	5,400	4,725	6,255
	Issued	13,460	19,600	23,360	24,760	1,800	6,455	6,355	5,730
	Stored	10,000	3,500	9,925	6,000	200	6,930	1,100	2,250
	Units Operating	18	23	24	25	1	1	3	5
	Units not Operating	2	5	3	5	3	4	3	11
15Mar45	Produced	19,270	19,355	22,765	25,865	1,300	3,819	4,522	6,263
	Issued	11,370	19,855	23,690	29,615	1,500	6,524	5,322	6,950
	Stored	9,000	3,000	9,000	2,250	0	4,225	300	1,563
	Units Operating	13	20	22	25	1	4	4	6
	Units not Operating	7	8	5	5	3	1	2	0
16Mar45	Produced	10,540	19,495	22,485	24,205	3,500	8,476	5,271	6,782
	Issued	10,540	20,995	24,720	23,455	3,500	6,855	3,596	5,845
	Stored	9,000	1,500	8,765	3,000	0	5,845	1,975	2,500
	Units Operating	9	20	22	24	1	4	4	5
	Units not Operating	11	8	5	6	3	1	2	1
17Mar45	Produced	6,690	22,145	16,985	23,010	3,350	6,900	4,600	7,955
	Issued	7,690	22,145	22,580	17,510	2,850	8,975	4,709	5,355
	Stored	8,000	1,500	3,170	8,500	500	3,770	1,809	5,100
	Units Operating	12	21	12	25	1	4	4	6
	Units not Operating	8	7	5	5	3	1	2	0

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17 April, 1945.
WATER DISTILLATION DATA FOR IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN (Cont'd)

DATE	REMARKS	2dSeptBn	3rdEngBn	4thEngBn	5thEngBn	8thNCB	31stNCB	62dNCB	133rdNCB
18Mar45	Produced	8,930	23,700	---	23,150	2,700	8,640	4,670	5,182
	Issued	7,930	18,800	---	34,650	2,200	6,640	2,970	7,970
	Stored	9,000	7,500	---	2,000	1,000	5,770	3,500	2,312
	Units operating	12	22	---	26	1	4	4	5
	Units not Operating	8	6	---	4	3	1	2	1
19Mar45	Produced	4,145	28,900	---	25,865	3,000	8,775	4,135	7,693
	Issued	8,145	31,400	---	26,365	3,000	7,360	3,765	6,755
	Stored	5,000	5,000	---	1,500	1,000	7,185	3,865	3,250
	Units Operating	11	23	---	23	1	5	3	5
	Units not Operating	1	5	---	7	3	1	3	1
20Mar45	Produced	6,940	28,635	---	19,715	2,900	4,020	5,560	9,005
	Issued	5,940	30,365	---	20,215	1,900	2,820	5,085	7,130
	Stored	6,000	3,000	---	---	2,000	4,785	6,640	5,125
	Units Operating	11	23	---	18	1	1	4	4
	Units not Operating	1	5	---	12	3	4	2	2
21Mar45	Produced	6,025	18,800	---	13,000	3,500	7,747	5,175	6,535
	Issued	6,025	20,300	---	12,000	3,500	12,532	6,200	6,035
	Stored	6,000	15,000	---	1,000	1,000	7,470	5,615	5,625
	Units Operating	10	23	---	20	1	4	4	3
	Units not Operating	2	5	---	10	3	1	2	3
22Mar45	Produced	3,780	26,095	---	15,610	3,200	8,640	4,830	5,285
	Issued	5,780	23,295	---	12,610	2,700	7,740	7,125	5,785
	Stored	4,000	4,300	---	4,000	1,500	8,670	3,300	5,175
	Units Operating	10	21	---	20	1	4	4	3
	Units not Operating	2	7	---	7	3	1	2	3

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ENCLOSURE (A)

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17 April, 1945.

WATER DISTILLATION DATA FOR IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN (Cont'd)

DATE	REMARKS	2dSepBn	3rdEngBn	4thEngBn	5thEngBn	8thNCB	31stNCB	62dNCB	133rdNCB
23Mar45	Produced	2,950	26,855	---	9,820	3,200	8,640	4,900	6,450
	Issued	4,950	30,155	---	12,820	2,700	7,440	4,500	3,700
	Stored	2,000	1,000	---	1,000	1,500	8,670	3,700	7,875
	Units Operating	8	20	---	10	1	4	4	4
	Units not Operating	1	8	---	0	3	1	2	4

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V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS LANDING FORCE In the Field.

17 April, 1945.

MAJOR ITEMS OF ENGINEER EQUIPMENT LANDED AT IWO JIMA

ITEM	3rd Engr Bn.	4th Engr Bn.	5th Engr Bn.	2d Sep Engr Bn.	62d NCB.
Compressor, air, 60 cuft.			1		
Compressor, air, 105 cuft.	1	4	6	4	
Compressor, air, 210 cuft.					4
Cranes, Le Tourneau, 2-wheel				1	
Cranes, TV-9				1	
Crane, motorized, diesel driven, 12-ton					1
Crane, motorized, diesel driven, Model, 25NW-2-ton					1
Crane, 5-ton, diesel driven, crawler					2
Crane, 7-ton, diesel driven, crawler					1
Distillation plant, 1500-2000 gpd, 4-wheel, comp.	30	30			
Distillation plant, 1500-2000 gpd, 2-wheel, comp.	27				
Distillation plant, Badger, 83 gph				20	
Distillation units, Cleaver-Brooks, 5000 gpd	2				6
Ditcher, Barber Greene, gas driven					1
Equipment, reproduction, mobile:					
-Trailer, copying, 3-ton, 4-wheel			1	1	
-Trailer, darkroom, lithographic, 3-ton, 4-wheel			1	1	
-Trailer, darkroom, 3-ton, 4-wheel				1	
-Trailer, press, lithographic				1	
Generator, electric, 7-10 KVA, trailer-mounted	2		8		
Generator, electric, 7-10 KVA, skid-mounted				4	
Generator, set, 75 KW, diesel					1
Grader, road, leaning wheel type, 4-wheel	1	1	3	2	1
Grader, self propelled, w/scarifier	1	1	3	3	3
Floodlight, portable trailer, 500 watts					1
w/lamp, 5 KW, 1 ph, AC, gas driven					1
Mixer, concrete, portable, gas driven					2
Pump, centrifugal, 3", gas engine power					8

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MAJOR ITEMS OF ENGINEER EQUIPMENT LANDED AT IWO JIMA. (Cont'd).

	3rd EngBn.	4th EngBn.	5th EngBn.	2d SepEngrBn.	62d NCB
Pump, centrifugal, 2", gas engine power					18
Pump, fire, trailer, 500 gpm, complete w/fittings and 500' 2½" hose, gas driven					1
Propelling unit, inboard Chrysler, marine tractor, gas driven					2
Ripper, cable-operated, 2-wheel		1		1	2
Roller, tamping, sheepsfoot, dual drum					2
Roller, 3-wheel, 12-ton, gas driven					1
Roller, tandem, 5-8-ton, gas driven					1
Rooter, tractor-drawn, 3 tooth, cable-operated					1
Scraper, 4-wheel, front dumping, 12 cuyd., cable-operated					4
Scraper, 4-wheel, front dumping, 8 cuyd., cable-operated		2		6	4
Scraper, 3½ cuyd., back dumping		3			1
Shovel, 1½ cuyd., diesel, crawler, NW, Model 6					1
Shovel, Model 25 NW, diesel, ¾ cuyd., w/attachments	1			1	1
Shovel, gas, motorized, 3/8 cuyd., capacity, w/attachments	3	*3		2	
Water purification unit, portable	12	8	9	5	
Welding unit, electric, portable, 300 amperes, gas driven	2	1		3	4
Tractor:					
-heavy, w/dozer	12	*11	6	10	8
-heavy, w/power control unit	5	2		8	
-medium, w/dozer	4		14	3	8
-medium, w/dozer shovel		1			
-medium, w/power control unit, w/TD-9 tractor crane	4	*4	9		2
-crawler type, gas, w/bulldozer and winch		1			
-airborne		1			
Trailer:					
-1/4-ton, cargo					6

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MAJOR ITEMS OF ENGINEER EQUIPMENT LANDED AT IWO JIMA. (Cont'd).

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Trailer: (Cont'd)

	3rd EngBn.	4th EngBn.	5th EngBn.	2d Sep EngrBn.	62d NCB.
-1/2-ton, 2-wheel, dump		12			
-1/2-ton, 2-wheel, C.P. trailer			1		
-Arc Welder			4		
-1-ton, 2-wheel, cargo	14	9	10	6	4
-1-ton, 2-wheel, greasing	3	1		2	
-1-ton, 2-wheel, stockroom		1	1		
-1-ton, 2-wheel, water, 300 gallon	13	8	11	8	4
-Spare parts, 2-wheel				1	
-Convoy Luber, 1-ton, 2-wheel			4		
-Water, 750 gallon, 1-ton, 4-wheel			4	1	
-Repair, heavy, 2-ton, 2-wheel			1		
-2-ton, 4-wheel, cargo		2	2		
-2-ton, 4-wheel, stockroom	1	1	4	1	
-Pole truck					1
-3-ton, 4-wheel, water purification unit			1		
-5-ton, 4-wheel, machine shop, complete	1	1	2	1	1
-15-18-ton, machinery	1	1	4	6	
-Low boy, 25-ton					1
-Fire pump, 500 gpm, complete					1
-Floodlights, w/lights					1
-500 W. gas driven, grease trailer, complete					1

Trucks:

	3rd EngBn.	4th EngBn.	5th EngBn.	2d Sep EngrBn.	62d NCB.
-1/4-ton, 4x4	11	16	14	8	17
-1-ton, 4x4, cargo	4	12			1
-1-ton, 6x6, personnel					8
-1-ton, 4x4, reconnaissance			6	7	
-2 1/2-ton, 6x6, cargo dump					10
-2 1/2-ton, 6x6, cargo		3		1	4
-2 1/2-ton, 6x6, dump	30	21		30	21
-2 1/2-ton, fuel tank					1
-2 1/2-ton, 6x6, greasing					1
-2 1/2-ton, 6x6, tank, pressure distributor, 1000 gallon				1	

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MAJOR ITEMS OF ENGINEER EQUIPMENT LANDED AT IWO JIMA. (Cont'd).

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Truck: (Cont'd)

-2 1/2-ton, 6x6, wrecking

3rd EngBn.	4th EngBn.	5th EngBn.	2d SepEngBn.	62d NCB.
	1	1	1	


*Equipment assigned to 4th Pioneer Battalion for the operation:

Tractor, heavy, w/bull clam - 2

Tractor, light, w/crane (TD-9) - 3

Shovel, 3/8 cuyd. - 3

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SECOND SEPARATE ENGINEER BATTALION, FMF.,
In The Field.

25 March, 1945.

From: The Commanding Officer.
To : The Engineer Officer, V Amphibious Corps.
Subject: Special Action Report, IWO JIMA Campaign.

The battalion worked on the base development program of GUAM until 1 November, 1944, being released from Island Command operational control on that date. Maintenance of OROTE Field was continued until 11 November, 1944, for lack of an organization to relieve this battalion. Concurrently the battalion developed and moved into its base camp in the vicinity of YLIG Bay.

Commanding General, V Amphibious Corps, top secret letter #000353 dated 26 October, 1944, was received 4 November, 1944. Preparations for the IWO JIMA operation were made during the months of December, January, and February. This consisted of military training for all personnel, training of replacements as engineer equipment operators, reconditioning of equipment, and the drawing and servicing of new equipment. During this period road, building, and miscellaneous construction work was done on the V Amphibious Corps and Corps Artillery camp, GUAM, in accordance with verbal instructions of Forward Echelon, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific.

On 5 February, 1945, the Second Separate Topographic Company, V Amphibious Corps was activated by Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, Special Order Number 30-45, dated 26 January, 1945, from the personnel of Company "D" (Topographic), this battalion. Inasmuch as V Amphibious Corps Operation Plan Number 3-44 required the service of this company, control was retained for transportation and initial employment.

The organization selected for the operation in accordance with Commanding General, V Amphibious Corps Secret Serial #00051B of 10 January, 1945, is shown in Tables I and II. The Rear Echelon consisted of 21 officers and 140 enlisted men USMC and 1 officer and 3 enlisted USN.

On 9 February, 1945, LSM 143 was loaded at TALOFOFO Bay, GUAM. At 1300 this ship left TALOFOFO Bay for APRA HARBOR. On the same date, the loading of LST 247 was begun at TALOFOFO Bay. Loading was completed 10 February, 1945, and the ship left for

Enclosure E to Appendix 5 to Annex Charlie to VACLE Special Action Report IWO JIMA Campaign.

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Report IWO JIMA Campaign.

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APRA Harbor. On 10 February, LST 222 was loaded at TALOFOFO Bay. On leaving TALOFOFO Bay, 11 February, this ship's stern grounded. She was towed to APRA Harbor and placed in repair dock 13 February. On 14 February, it was determined that necessary repairs could not be effected in time, LST 222 was beached and personnel and cargo transferred to LST 725. This transfer was completed on 15 February.

The battalion sailed from APRA Harbor, GUAM, on 16 February, 1945, and arrived off IWO JIMA on 20 February, 1945. LSTs 725 and 247 were beached at about 1830, 21 February, 1945, the former on beach RED TWO, the latter on beach YELLOW ONE. Personnel and equipment on LST 725 were bivouaced in TA 148MN. Personnel from LST 247 were bivouaced in TA 164Y, equipment dispersed in TA 148MN. Unloading of LST 247 continued until 0130, 22 February, at which time the ship retracted from the beach to land at a more suitable ramp. LST 725 completed unloading at 0700, 22 February, in accordance with HQLanFor (Det via CTF 33/53) 202310BT and retracted from beach RED TWO. The battalion command post was established ashore at 1900, 21 February, in TA 148N. Unloading was conducted under mortar fire without material difficulty, although the congested condition and sandy footing of the beach gave some trouble. The battalion's equipment provided sufficient tracked vehicles and dozers to solve moving problems.

On 21 February, at 1728 the group of which LSM 143 was a member was attacked without warning off MINAMI IWO JIMA by five enemy suicide planes, three of which were destroyed. LSM 143 suffered no damage.

As the tactical situation on 22 February, did not require the use of equipment between the beaches and the combat divisions, it was used to aid the shore party work of the 5th Division. This work consisted of improving the EAST beach road, constructing minor access roads, bulldozing ramps for unloading ships, providing prime movers for hauling supply sleds and trucks, crane assistance to remove LCVP and other wrecks from beach and equipment assistance to the 5th Division Cemetery. Three enlisted were wounded by shell fire during the day. Personnel landed at beach YELLOW ONE were moved into TA 148MN. LST 247 re-beached on beach RED ONE approximately 0700, 22 February, to complete the discharge of fuel and rations. LST 725 was re-beached the morning of the 23rd to complete the discharge of cargo, fuel and rations, originally ordered to remain aboard, the battalion furnished the necessary working parties on the 22nd and 23rd.

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Report IWO JIMA Campaign.

Considerable mortar and artillery, and some sniper fire fell in the battalion area the morning of the 23rd, wounding six men at 0900, five of whom were evacuated. Four distillation units were set up on beach RED ONE. Heavy artillery and mortar fire fell in the battalion area from 0845 to 0200, the following day. One man was wounded by artillery fire at 1300 and evacuated.

Some mortar and sniper fire fell in the battalion area from 0715 to 1100, 24 February. On 24 February, the building of an access road to the WEST beach at TA 146Y and 147U was begun by "A" Company. This work subsequently was developed into a clay-rock ballast road along the beach from TA 146Y to 147C. The First Platoon, "A" Company, with equipment from the company was moved into TA 132A to facilitate construction work in TA 146Y and 147U. Revetting installations for the V Amphibious Corps camp was begun. Received verbal orders from Corps Engineer at 1500 to rehabilitate MOTOYAMA Field No. ONE for artillery observation planes. A reconnaissance party surveyed MOTOYAMA Field No. ONE to determine the rehabilitation requirements. The field was under continuous mortar and shell fire at the time. Some artillery and sniper fire was encountered in the battalion area from 1545 to 1600. One sniper was killed at about 1030 in TA 164Y. An excavation for enemy mining activities in TA 148N at the request of the 5th Division Shore Party was made with negative results.

On 25 February, V Amphibious Corps took over operational control on the Second Separate Topographic Company. Shore party work, Corps CP, 5th Division Cemetery, and WEST beach road construction continued. The EAST beach upper road TA 148P and 165S was begun. The First Platoon "B" Company, with equipment from all companies began the rebuilding of the N-S runway (TA 164W-TA 164N) to receive artillery observation planes. By 1600 a suitable strip 1500 feet by 150 feet was completed. The work consisted principally of removing duds and shrapnel, filling shell holes, grading and rolling. As the battalion brought no rollers, the rolling was done with two five ton and two ten ton steam rollers, Japanese equipment, salvaged on the field. Only one had power, the others were towed behind trucks. Considerable artillery, mortar, and sniper fire was met.

On 26 February, construction of WEST beach road, Corps CP, 5th Division Cemetery, distillation at RED beach continued. The EAST beach upper road was completed. The N-S runway of MOTOYAMA Field No. ONE was lengthened from TA 164I to 181X, and widened throughout. Artillery observation planes began

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operations from the field at 1000. A company of the 28th Marines assisted in removing shrapnel from the field. Considerable artillery fire was met, wounding one of the 28th Marines. One five ton tandem roller from the 62nd Construction Battalion with operators assisted in the rolling of the strip. LSM 143 was beached at beach GREEN, completed unloading personnel and equipment at 1500.

On 27 February, construction of WEST beach road, Corps CP, 5th Division Cemetery, distillation at beach RED ONE continued. At MOTOYAMA Field No. ONE the N-S runway was widened and maintained, shrapnel and dud removal continued, and grading of the NW - SE runway (TA 164C-164T) begun. Assistance in removing shrapnel was provided by the 386th Air Service Squadron USA. Considerable artillery and mortar fire fell on the field. The remainder of "A" Company was moved to TA 132A for work on the WEST beach development. The First Platoon of "B" Company was moved to TA 164W to facilitate airfield work.

On 28 February, construction of WEST beach road, Corps CP, 5th Division Cemetery, and distillation at beach RED ONE continued. Rehabilitation and maintenance of MOTOYAMA Field No. ONE was continued under intermittent mortar fire. The Repair Section, H&S Company was moved to TA 131E to establish proper repair facilities. Five Badger distillation units were received from V Amphibious Corps and three installed at WEST beach (TA 147C). Considerable artillery fire fell in the "A" Company area during the early morning hours. Heavy artillery fire and material from a burning dump fell in the same area throughout the night and following early morning.

On 1 March, construction of WEST beach roads, Corps CP, 5th Division Cemetery, MOTOYAMA Field No. ONE, distillation at RED and WEST beaches continued. Equipment assistance was furnished for Corps Evacuation Hospital Number One installations, TA 147U; and for unloading Corps material. At 1020, an F6F landed on the N-S runway, the first fighter to use the field. Surveys were begun in TA 132A and vicinity, originally with the view of determining the boundaries for battalion and Island Command occupancy, finally to locate roads in this portion of the island. Two Corps distillation units were installed at WEST beach.

On 2 March, construction of WEST beach road, Corps CP, 5th Division Cemetery, and distillation at RED and WEST beaches continued. One Corps distillation unit was installed at WEST beach. Grading NW - SE runway, MOTOYAMA Field No. ONE was completed,

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equipment continued on area grading for dispersal. Rather heavy shell fire was met in the afternoon, three enlisted men being wounded, two of whom were evacuated. A TBF landed at 1030.

On 3 March, construction of WEST beach road, Corps CP, 5th Division Cemetery, distillation at RED and WEST beaches, and area grading of MOTOYAMA Field No. ONE continued. One Corps distillation unit was placed in operation at WEST beach. Two TD-18 w/angle dozer and one 3/8 cu. yd. dragline rigged shovel were operated for the 5th Division. One self-propelled grader graded the connecting taxiway between MOTOYAMA Field No. ONE and TWO (TA 181X-199S). Four enlisted were wounded by artillery fire at 1500 on Field No. ONE. Three C-47s landed on the N-S runway at 1035.

On 4 March, the Battalion CP, H&S Company (less the Repair Section), "B" Company (less one platoon), and "C" Company were moved to TA 132A. Construction of WEST beach road, Corps CP, 5th Division Cemetery, distillation at RED and WEST beaches, and area grading of MOTOYAMA Field No. ONE continued. A Navy Liberator landed at MOTOYAMA Field No. ONE at 1320 and a B-29 at 1500. Work on MOTOYAMA Field No. ONE was secured at the close of the day. Seven Corps distillation units were installed at WEST beach.

On 5 March, construction of WEST beach roads, Corps CP, 5th Division Cemetery, distillation at WEST beach water point, and area grading of MOTOYAMA Field No. ONE continued. Construction was begun on the 3d Division water point road (TA 164B 163D). Four TD-18 were assigned to Corps Shore Party to assist in unloading ships. The water point at beach RED ONE was discontinued, the four distillers therefrom being moved to WEST beach. The construction of a traffic road (TA 132A; TA 147T) and the maintenance of the V Amphibious Corps roads south and west of MOTOYAMA Field No. ONE were begun. Two Corps distillation units were installed on WEST beach, the last of the sixteen units being brought in by Corps for this organization to operate.

On 6 March, construction of WEST beach road, 5th Division Cemetery, EAST traffic road, 3d Division water point road, water point operation and ship unloading assistance, and maintenance of Corps roads continued. One TD-18 w/angle dozer excavated trenches for burying enemy dead. This machine was blown up by land mine at 1600 in TA 132A. One enlisted man wounded by shrapnel from land mine, treated and returned to duty.

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One enlisted killed and one enlisted wounded by explosion of enemy rocket in TA 132K. One TD-14 w/angle dozer grading and clearing area for Corps Evacuation Hospital Number One in TA 147V.

On 7 March, construction of WEST beach roads, 5th Division Cemetery, water point operation, ship unloading assistance, and Corps roads maintenance continued.

On 8 March, construction of WEST beach road, 5th Division Cemetery, water point operation, ship unloading assistance, and Corps roads maintenance continued.

On 9 March, construction of WEST beach roads, 5th Division Cemetery, water point operation, ship unloading assistance and Corps roads maintenance continued. Commenced operation of quarry at base of Mt. SURIBACHI in TA 132F.

On 10 March, construction of WEST beach roads, 5th Division Cemetery, water point operation, ship unloading assistance, and Corps roads maintenance continued. Started hauling clay&sand from Mt. SURIBACHI pit to BLACK beach for Corps Shore Party. Assistance was furnished 2nd Bomb Disposal Company at EAST Boat Basin.

On 11 March, construction of WEST beach roads, 5th Division Cemetery, water point operation, ship unloading assistance, and Corps roads maintenance continued. The construction of WHITE beach road in TA 181D to TA 180E connecting with loading ramps in TA 180E; and 180 O; and BLACK beach road in TA 1480 to TA 165X was begun. Equipment assistance was furnished to 8th Naval Construction Battalion Shore Party. Enemy artillery fire in bivouac area TA 132A 131E during early morning, mortar and sniper fire caused cessation of operation at WEST beach water point during the night. One enemy killed in TA 132F.

On 12 March, construction of WEST beach roads, 5th Division Cemetery, WHITE beach road and ramp and BLACK beach road, water point operations, ship unloading assistance, and Corps roads maintenance continued. Counter-mining operations begun in TA 132F to intercept possible enemy tunnel.

On 13 March, construction of WEST beach roads, 5th Division Cemetery, WHITE beach road and ramp and BLACK beach road, water point operations, ship unloading assistance, Corps roads

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maintenance, and counter-mining operations continued. Commenced clearing area for Island Command in TA 147V with two TD-18 w/angle dozer.

On 14 March, construction of WEST beach roads, 5th Division Cemetery, WHITE beach road and ramp and BLACK beach road, water point operations, ship unloading assistance, Corps road maintenance, and counter-mining operations continued.

on 15 March, construction of 5th Division Cemetery, ship unloading assistance, water point operations continued. Completed WEST beach roads, WHITE beach roads and ramp, BLACK beach road, and Corps roads maintenance. Eight enemy killed in TA 132A. One enemy captured TA 132F. Carried out demolition work at foot of Mt. SURIBACHI TA 132AF. Received Commanding General, V Amphibious Corps serial 229AA dated 15 March, ordering battalion to embark for base with 25 officers and 547 enlisted USMC and 2 officers and 13 enlisted USN, leaving a special detachment to remain with the battalion equipment of 2 officers and 98 enlisted USMC and 2 enlisted USN awaiting embarkation upon further orders from Commanding General V Amphibious Corps.

On 16 March, work was generally secured and equipment returned to camp. The special detachment continued the operation of WEST beach water point, ship unloading assistance, Corps roads maintenance, and construction of BLACK and WHITE beaches. Orders to embark on XAP SEA RUNNER via LSMs from GREEN beach were received 1900. Embarkation was completed 0400, 17 March, 1945.

On 17 March, embarkation of the battalion, less the special detachment was completed. The special detachment continued distillation, miscellaneous equipment assistance including 5th Division Cemetery and ship handling, and road maintenance. Enemy placed eight hand grenade booby traps under treads of vehicles awaiting embarkation, all were discovered and neutralized. One enemy was killed at 1100 TA 132A, five more were killed at 1300 in cave at foot of Mt. SURIBACHI.

On 18 March, XAP SEA RUNNER sailed from IWO JIMA, arriving at GUAM 21 March, and disembarking personnel on 22 March. The special detachment continued water distillation, road maintenance and miscellaneous equipment assistance including 5th Division Cemetery and ship handling to 21 March. On this date a

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D-7 tractor and Le Tourneau crane was turned over to Island Command, authority Commander Forward Area secret dispatch #1901517 dated 20 March, 1945.

Major work quantities follow:

MOTOYAMA Field No. ONE

N-S Runway, sq. ft.	672,000
N-W S-E Runway, sq. ft.	390,000
Parking area, TA 164NandS, sq. ft.	326,250
Total Sq.Ft.	1,388,250

Roads

Constructed and maintained, miles	4.5
Maintenance only	9.0

Loading Ramps

WHITE Beach, sq.ft.	39,000
WEST Beach, TA 147B, sq.ft.	46,000

Water distilled, 23 February - 14 March, gals 131,000

Approximately 148 U.S. and 307 enemy duds were removed from MOTOYAMA Field No. ONE; 251 U.S. and 171 enemy duds were removed from bivouac areas. About 60 signs were made for V Amphibious Corps, about 175 for Island Command, IWO JIMA.

The equipment brought proved generally adequate. Certain items such as ripper and air compressors were little used, due to finding sand instead of anticipated rock in the area of battalion's activities. The 15 ton trailers again proved inadequate for heavy equipment movement, causing delay in shifting locations. TD-18 dozers were effective in moving boulder filled material which would have been impossible with lighter equipment.

Loading aboard LSTs and LSMs is recommended in view of the nature of the organizations equipment. It is noted neither of the LSTs originally assigned this battalion provided the estimated space; one of them by virtue of being an LST flotilla flagship, and both by reason of using space for ships functions.

SECOND SEPARATE ENGINEER BATTALION, FMF., Special Action
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It is recommended

(a) that 4 - 2½ ton, 6x6 cargo trucks be provided per engineer company, in addition to the six presently authorized H&S Company.

(b) that two 25 ton machinery trailers be substituted for two of the 15 - 20 ton trailers presently authorized H&S Company.

(c) that a heavier wrecking truck than 2½ ton, preferably of 10 ton capacity be authorized.

(d) that the number of graders, road, self-propelled be increased to 4 by the addition of one to H&S Company.

(e) that the number of pumps, centrifugal, 3", gasoline engine powered be increased to five by the addition of one per engineer company.

(f) that the number of rippers, cable operated, 2-wheel be increased to two, and that they be Le Tourneau Model K30 or equal.

(g) that the number of shovels, ¾ cu.yd. capacity, with attachments be increased to two.

It is further recommended, in view of the detachment of the Topographic Company, that a mapping and reproduction section with approximately the personnel and equipment of the former Aviation Engineer Battalion be authorized.

TABLE I

PERSONNEL

		Tot	IST 725(222)					IST 247					ISM 143				
			Tot	H	A	B	Topo	Tot	H	A	B	C	Topo	Tot	H	B	C
USMC	Officers	33	14	8	4	1	1	14	3	1	3	3	4	5	2	1	2
	Enlisted	731	341	157	156	13	15	341	5	10	150	121	55	49		3	46
USN																	
	Officers	2	1	1				1	1								
	Enlisted	16	7	7				8	8					1	1		

SECOND SEPARATE ENGINEER BATTALION, FME., Special Action
Report IWO JIMA Campaign.

TABLE II

Item	Total Pieces	LST 725(222)	LST 247	ISM 143
Truck 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ Ton Dump	30	9 9-H	13 7-B, 6-C	8 1-B, 7-C
2 $\frac{1}{2}$ Ton Cargo	1	1 1-Topo		
2 $\frac{1}{2}$ Ton Wrecking	1	1 1-H		
1 Ton Cargo	7	4 3-H, 1-A	3 1-B, 1-C	
			1-Topo	
$\frac{1}{4}$ Ton Cargo	8	5 4-H, 1-A	3 1-B, 1-C	
			1-Topo	
$\frac{1}{4}$ Ton Ambulance	1		1 1-H	
Trailer 1 Ton Greasing	2	1 1-H	1 1-H	
300 Gal Water	8	4 2-H, 2-A	3 2-B, 1-C	1 1-C
5 Ton Mach Shop	1		1 1-H	
2 Ton Stockroom	1		1 1-H	
10 Ton Machinery	3		3 3-H	
15 Ton Machinery	3	2 1-A, 1-B		1 1-C
3 Ton Copy Camera	1	1 1-Topo		
3 Ton Litho Press	1	1 1-Topo		
3 Ton Darkroom	1	1 1-Topo		
1 Ton Cargo	6	2 2-H	4 4-H	
750 Gal Asph.	1		1 1-Topo	
Spare Parts	1	1 1-H		
Tractor TD-18 w/AD	8	3 2-H, 1-A	3 2-B, 1-C	2 1-A, 1-C
TD-18 w/PTO	8	4 2-H, 2-A	2 2-B	2 1-B, 1-C
TD-14 w/AD	3	1 1-A	1 1-B	1 1-C
D-7 w/crane	1		1 1-H	
TV-9 w/crane	1	1 1-H		
Grader Self-propelled	3	2 1-H, 1-B	1 1-A	
Grader leaning wheel	2	1 1-A	1 1-B	
Scraper 8 cu.yd.	6	3 1-H, 2-A	3 1-B, 2-C	
Ripper cable operated	1		1 1-H	
Shovel 3/4 cu.yd.	1		1 1-H	
Shovel 3/8 cu.yd.	2	1 1-B		1 1-C
Compressor Air 105 cu.yd.	3	1 1-H	2 1-B, 1-C	
Generator 9.4 KVA	2	1 1-H	1 1-H	
Generator 7.2 KVA	2	2 2-H		
Machine Welding 300 Amp	2	2 2-H		
Pump 3" centrifugal	1	1 1-A		
Water Purif Unit Port.	3	2 1-A, 1-C	1 1-B	
Dist. Plant Badger	4	2 1-H, 1-A	2 1-B, 1-C	

Charles O. Clark
CHARLES O. CLARK.

[illegible]

Charles S. May
CHARLES S. MAY,
1401 WOOD,
Transport Quartermaster

PREPARED BY: TRANSPORT QUARTERMASTER SECTION, HQS., EXPEDITIONARY TROOPS, 5TH FLEET.

APPROVED 2/17/64

DUDLEY S. BROWN,
Colonel, USMC,
Chief of Staff.

ENCLOSURE A

BREAKDOWN OF EQUIPMENT & SUPPLIES, 5TH MARINE DIVISION

	TRANSDIV 46					RCT 26					TRANSDIV 47					RCT 27					TRANSDIV 48					RCT 28					12 LSD-5	19 LSTs	TOTAL
	C P A I L S P L	D P A I L S P L	D P A I L S P L	D P A I L S P L	D P A I L S P L	C P A I L S P L	D P A I L S P L	D P A I L S P L	D P A I L S P L	D P A I L S P L	C P A I L S P L	D P A I L S P L	D P A I L S P L	D P A I L S P L	D P A I L S P L	C P A I L S P L	D P A I L S P L	D P A I L S P L	D P A I L S P L	D P A I L S P L	C P A I L S P L	D P A I L S P L	D P A I L S P L	D P A I L S P L	D P A I L S P L								
OFFICERS	85	74	78	80	10	94	86	65	79	8	99	72	64	76	4	5	6	26	296	1307													
ENLISTED	1097	1447	1532	1442	136	1005	1449	1475	1432	212	1290	1473	1527	1420	157	247	90	476	6740	24577													
CARGO LOADED (SHORT TONS)																																	
PACKAGE	6.3	3.0	9.9	2.4	.1	1.2	2.4	.5	2.2	.6	7.4	3.6	2.9	3.6	.2	.4	.4	.5			52.2												
OFFICE EQUIPMENT	6.1	2.5	.4	1.6	.4	1.1	.4	.2	1.0	.5	1.2	.2	.1	.4	.4						18.1												
ORGANIZATIONAL EQUIPMENT	81.3	43.9	28.8	72.7	31.6	71.8	28.1	50.2	84.2	52.8	79.8	27.8	48.4	25.2	50.2	.8			4.1		791.4												
MESS EQUIPMENT	7.7	4.0	2.7	4.8	2.2	7.6	3.7	4.2	9.1	9.1	7.2	4.2	2.4	.4	2.2	1.1					78.7												
CAMP EQUIPMENT	11.3	.5	2.9	12.8	14.9	5.9	.9	2.9	6.9	7.4	5.8	2.8	1.6		52.8	.2					132.6												
SPECIAL EQUIPMENT	6.5	12.8		.5	20.2	15.7	15.2	15.2	2.2		2.8	1.2	2.7		78.2	.2				100.7	291.5												
HEAVY LIFTS (CRATED)	1.2		.5	47.0	60.6	7.2	5.2	.3	5.9	60.6					106.6	.9					296.1												
AMMUNITION (SMALL ARMS)	16.5	27.8	24.4	21.6	4.0	12.9	40.1	27.8	27.8	8.7	27.9	27.0	22.6	16.0	20.7						577.4												
NAVY AMMUNITION (H.E.)																					421.6												
HIGH EXPLOSIVES	16.8	22.2	131.7	22.4	57.1	86.6	37.9	27.8	67.2	538.1	76.2	96.7	108.9	91.9	295.2						3282.1												
PIROTECHNICS AND FUSES	1.7	4.4	5.1	5.1	.2	1.6	4.5	3.7	1.1	16.3	1.2	2.1	6.1	1.0	2.4						62.8												
GASOLINE	73.8	42.6	42.6	40.4	133.5	46.2	46.9	55.4	69.3	160.8	45.1	50.5	51.2	52.4	168.1	63.2			33.0	151.2	1326.5												
OTHER PETROLEUM PRODUCTS	15.9	28.1	28.2	20.1	114.7	15.6	15.7	15.6	15.7	166.1	24.7	18.2	33.7	25.8	162.6	1.5			21.2	319.0	1240.9												
WATER	49.9	9.2	26.4	28.9	109.2	5.3	2.8	8.1	11.1	245.2	20.0	31.8	32.7	206.2							29.9												
OTHER LIQUIDS	1.9	1.3	.3	1.5	4.2	1.2	.5	.9	1.2	.6	3.5	2.5	.2	2.6							237.1												
RATIONS	11.1	90.7	62.2	19.0	347.4	40.8	64.9	79.1	41.2	170.6	43.2	32.1	32.8	24.8	356.3	612.5					346.0												
PK SUPPLIES					164.2																164.2												
SIGNAL										1.3		.5			63.4						66.2												
ENGINEER	36.9		12.8	12.8	81.2	.5			14.2	23.8	2.9	19.3	.5					50.0			275.3												
ORDNANCE	.5				14.1	2.8			.4	.5	2.9	4.1	1.6		7.5						35.0												
MOTOR PARTS	.2								6.1			.2			.6						7.1												
MEDICAL					3.1	.1		7.9	9.2	11.1	1.4				3.8						36.7												
CHEMICAL	1.3	1.1		1.1	23.7	2.4	.9		1.9	.5	1.9	3.9	1.4		1.7			50.4			90.3												
QM SUPPLIES (GENERAL)	9.4	9.0	7.3	6.7	281.7	6.3	25.9	15.4	10.1	16.4	3.4	.1			147.6	71.1					610.4												
TOTAL CARGO	376.3	333.5	418.1	389.8	1475.7	335.8	299.8	345.1	386.1	1491.6	357.4	336.7	375.2	284.5	1738.2	756.6			299.9	2970.9	12931.2												
TOTAL VEHICLES	233.3	129.4	105.7	120.6	379.1	191.9	161.2	169.7	209.2	481.9	144.7	185.0	146.4	203.2	430.2	118.9	588.6	2167.4	4176.1	10342.5													
GRAND TOTAL	609.6	462.9	523.8	510.4	1854.8	527.7	461.0	514.8	595.3	1973.5	502.1	521.7	521.6	487.7	2168.4	875.5	588.6	2427.3	7147.0	23273.7													
VEHICLES LOADED (NUMBER)																																	
AMBULANCE, 1-TON			2	3	7				2	8	3	7	3	4	2						52												
AMBULANCE, 1-TON					2				3					1	1						9												
AIR COMPRESSOR, 105 CU. FT.				1																	1												
CARS	2	35	37	38		7	27	32	33	4	6	35	35	39							330												
CRANE, TRUCK MOUNTED					2																1												
CARRIAGE, MOTOR, 75MM						2															2												
DESTILLATION UNIT	5	6	1	2	5																25												
DESTILLATION UNIT, 1500-GALLON			1	1																	2												
DUNE																					100												
GUN, 37MM					12		4	4	4	4	4				8	4					44												
GUN, 75MM			3																		3												
HALFTRACK	1				2																10												
HOWITZER, 105MM																					48												
LVT-2																					100												
LVT-4																					104												
LVT-4 (Type Not Specified)																					36												
ROLLER, TANDER																					1												
ROLLER, SHEEPSFOOT																					1												
ROVER		1																			41												
SLEDS, LARGE																					12												
SHOVEL, CRANE																					16												
SCRAPER					2																49												
TANK, MEDIUM																					2												
TANK, MEDIUM, W/DOZER																					2												
TANK, RECOVERY																					1												
TRACTOR, TD-14																					17												
TRACTOR, TD-9																					6												
TRACTOR, TD-9, W/DOZER																					13												
TRACTOR, TD-9, W/CRANE																					3												
TRACTOR, TD-10																					11												
TRACTOR, TD-18																					16												
TRACTOR, TD-14, W/DOZER	1	1	1	1	4																1												
TRACTOR, D-4, W/DOZER																					3												
TRACTOR, TD-7, W/DOZER																					6												
TRACTOR, TD-14																					1												
TRAILER, 1-TON, CARGO	16	13	6	7		3	12	9	13	15		13	14	7	12	1					145												
TRAILER, 1-TON, DUMP																					6												
TRAILER, 1-TON, PURIFICATION		1	1	1																	3												
TRAILER, 1-TON, 2-WHEEL, CARGO	1	2	6	2	1	6	1	1	4	19	9	8	5	7	1	1					75												
TRAILER, 1-TON, LUBRICATION	1					1	1	1		1																							

62ND NAVAL CONSTRUCTION BATTALION
C/O FLEET POST OFFICE,
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
16 March 1945.

From: The Officer in Charge.
To : The Engineer Officer, V Amphibious Corps.
Subject: Special Action Report, IWO JIMA Campaign.

PART I

1. The following chronological list is of events as covered by this report:

First orders to Jungle Training	23 October 1944.
Move to Maui	1 November 1944.
Training Period	3 Nov to 9 Dec 1944.
Cargo Preparation	10 to 23 Dec 1944.
Embarkation Headquarters, A&B Co. on APA #195.	25 December 1944.
Loading KA #67	9 to 12 January 1945.
Loading and embarking C&D Co on LST's #766 and #943	18 to 21 January 1945.
Beaching of LST #766	21 January 1945.
LST #884 Loaded	24 January 1945.
LST's Sail in Convoy from Hawaiian Area	24 January 1945.
PA #197 and KA #67 Sail in Convoy from Hawaiian Area	27 January 1945.
PA #197 and KA #67 Arrive Off Iwo Jima.	19 February 1945.
LST's Arrive Off Iwo Jima	20 February 1945.
LST's Beach and Unload.	24 & 25 Feb 1945.
Disbarking PA #195	26 February 1945.
Bivouac Camp Set Up	27 February 1945.
Work on Air Field #1 Begins	26 February 1945.
Airstrip 3,800 ft. long, Ready for Fighters.	1 March 1945.
Water Stills in Operation	1 March 1945.
Detached from 5th Amphibious Corps.	7 March 1945.
Attached to Garrison Force, Iwo Jima, Volcano Islands	7 March 1945.

2. The Battalion received orders from the Hawaiian Area Brigades to have five (5) officers and seventy-five (75) men report to the Army Green Jungle Training Course on Oahu on 14 October 1944. These officers and men, together with a like number from the 133rd Naval Construction Battalion, reconstructed the course and were briefed to instruct the rest of the personnel of the two battalions. The following week all available officers and men from both battalions underwent one week's training at the above mentioned Jungle Training Course.

3. On 1 November 1944 the Battalion embarked on ship for transportation to Maui, T.H. for training under the Fifth

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Amphibious Corps. Three (3) officers and thirty (30) men were left at Iroquois Point to expedite the shipment of Battalion equipment and gear to Maui. The Battalion disembarked after an overnight sail at Kahului, Maui, and was transported by the U.S. Marine Transport Service to the 10th U.S. Marine Tractor Battalion Camp at Maalaea Bay.

4. The Battalion immediately set to work preparing the facilities of the Camp. No time had been allowed for an advance echelon and "K" and "C" rations were used until galleys could be set up. Lt. A.P. Urban, CEC, USNR, was appointed Battalion Military Training Officer and initiated a training program which covered basic military training including physical conditioning and showing of training films. This program continued in effect until the Fifth Amphibious Corps program began on 13 November, 1944, under the supervision of two Marine lieutenants. The two-week program was a brief conditioning and instruction course based on the Marine Corps fuller program for their combat troops. Every phase was attractively presented and interest ran high among the men of the Battalion. Following the Marine program, we resumed control of training and continued along lines followed in our initial program with further emphasis on organization of bivouac in forward area.

5. During the training period, our equipment and gear was shipped from Iroquois Point to Kahului and stored in the 2nd Marine Base Supply Depot there. A large portion of the rolling stock was shipped in four (4) LCT's. The remainder of the component gear was shipped in a cargo ship and a LST. As the gear arrived it was sorted and checked over. In many cases new crates had to be made as the rehandling was extremely hard on crated items. The rolling stock was serviced and put into operation in as many instances as practicable to break it in and to train more operators. Forty (40) men received training in the operation of scoops, dozers, shovels, and cranes. Enough operators were broken in to enable the Battalion Heavy Equipment Section to operate on a 24-hour basis.

6. Also, during this training period, Lt. S.A. Fowler, CEC, USNR, Battalion Transport Quartermaster, worked out shipping plans with the Fifth Amphibious Corps Quartermaster.

7. About 10 December, 1944, all training programs were secured and all hands turned to, preparing for loading according to Transport Quartermaster plans. The entire component was re-sorted and marked in compliance with Marine security requirements. All crates were cubed and weighed and otherwise prepared for loading. Equipment was serviced and waterproofed by applying preservative compounds to all exposed metal surfaces.

Subject; Special Action Report, IWO JIMA Campaign. (Cont'd).

8. On 25 December, 1944, personnel were loaded on APA #195 at 1500. Officers and men of Headquarters, "A" and "B" Companies began embarking. The Battalion Officer in Charge was aboard this ship. Embarkation was completed at 1900 and the ship sailed the following morning.

9. KA #67 docked and began loading on 9 January, 1945. It was ordered by the Commanding General, 4th Marine Division, USMC, that an officer guard be placed on cargo on the dock and in holds of this ship while it was loading. This guard was necessary on account of suspected sabotage of cargo or ship by placement of demolitions in cargo. The watch was a 24 hour watch, and both 62nd Construction Battalion and Fifth Amphibious Corps officers stood watches. After loading, the personnel consisting of five (5) officers and eighteen (18) men were embarked. The ship sailed 12 January, 1945.

10. LST's #766 and #943 arrived and were loaded in that order on 18 January and 20 January, about twelve hours being required to load each one. At 1500, 21 January, 1945, five (5) officers and two hundred twenty-six (226) men, mostly of "D" Company, began embarking on LST #943 while at the dock. At the same time, five (5) officers and one hundred ninety-nine (199) men, mostly of "C" Company, began embarking on LST #766 by means of small boats, as she was riding at anchor outside the harbor at Kahului. All embarkation was completed by 1900 and the LST #943 moved out of the harbor and anchored.

11. Early in the evening the weather began to turn bad and the sea became very heavy. As a result, LST #766 broke her anchorage and drifted onto the reef. By morning she was parallel to the beach and high on the reef. The heavy sea had prevented all attempts to free her. The men and their gear were taken off in amphibious tractors at great risk the following morning. Fortunately, all of the bags and some tools were salvaged. One pack and a few carbines were lost in the handling. None was injured. Two hours were allowed to unload the two hundred twenty (220) men and their gear. All of the rolling stock and equipment and tools remained aboard. The men and their bags were transported by destroyer to Iroquois Point, arriving on the morning of 24 January, 1945. Through the cooperation and prompt action of the 9th Brigade and 41st Regiment, LST #884 in the meantime was being loaded at Iroquois Point with equipment to replace that lost aboard the LST #766.

12. The PA #195 spent about thirty (30) days in maneuvers in the Hawaiian area, and then proceeded in convoy via Eniwetok

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and Saipan to Iwo Jima, arriving at dawn, 19 February 1945, Dog Day. KA #67 sailed from the Hawaiian area on 27 January 1945 and in convoy proceeded to Iwo Jima via Eniwetok and Saipan, arriving at dawn on Dog Day. The two (2) LST's #884 and #943 left Pearl Harbor in convoy on 24 January 1945, and touched at Eniwetok and Guam. At Guam the men were given a day's shore leave in the Fleet Recreation Center there. The LST's arrived off Iwo Jima on the morning of 20 February, 1945, Dog Day plus one (D/1).

13. The LST #884 beached at 2200, 24 February, 1945 at Green Beach. Unloading went on during the night being halted about an hour by enemy mortar fire. Due to the steepness of the slope of the beach and the looseness of the sand, all tired vehicles had to be towed up to the second terrace level where there was barely room to park it, much less to disperse it. The men remained aboard the LST until morning when they moved to Target Area 148-P, with all equipment and dug in. The sandy soil and lack of sandbags made it difficult to construct adequate foxholes. In lieu of sandbags, the men used the abundant supply of 75mm, 105mm Howitzer and 155mm Howitzer shell cases and cartons filled with sand for side support of foxholes. The area was crowded and dispersal was difficult. LST #943 beached at 1500, 25 February, 1945, unloaded equipment and sent it to the bivouac area. The men remained aboard that night, disembarked the following day.

14. The first assault mission was the preparation of Airfield No. 1. The Battalion began the initial work on 26 February by assisting the 2nd Separate Marine Engineers prepare a strip for observation planes. On the following morning one hundred fifty (150) men picked up shrapnel, clearing an area 4000 ft. long and 150 ft. wide. The next four (4) days this crew was diminished to 50, then 15 men. They continued to pick up shrapnel, first clearing the strip 500 ft. towards Suribachi, then 1300 ft. on the North-East end. The strip was then cleared another 35 ft. on each side, making a strip 5800 ft. long by 220 ft. wide. Also during this time and for several days afterwards mortar and other artillery shells fell on and near the strip, making it necessary to pick up resultant shrapnel. In doing this, a magnet trailer was used with success on small pieces, but large pieces had to be removed by hand ahead of the trailer.

15. The Japs placed approximately 12" quarry run clay sand fill on top of the original sand. On top of this they hand layed sand stone blocks approximately 12"x12"x6" thick.

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and surfaced the whole with 2½-3" of quarry clay sand soil. In filling the holes the sand was cleaned out and the borrow soil from surfaced areas outside the strip was placed and tamped. The Japs had further surfaced about 2000 ft. of the Southwest end of the strip with asphalt 1½" thick of 2" and finer crushed stone. This surface was pitted and rough with patches of previous bomb craters. This surface and all the rest of the 2000x150 ft. was scarified, care being taken not to disturb the six inch hand laid courses. The whole was bladed with auto graders and rolled with eight (8) to twelve (12) rollers. Seven (7) to nine (9) blades were in operation at the peak with a like number of rollers. Eight (8) bulldozers and two (2) pans, a shovel and fifteen (15) trucks were in use at the peak of the operation.

16. The field was ready for use on 1 March 1945, but on 28 February a crippled TBF used the field for an emergency landing. This strip is not to be confused with the Northsouth strip and Northwest - Southeast strip put in operation by 2nd Separate Engineer Battalion for use by artillery spotter planes.

17. The next phase was that of readying the surface for use by planes of a strip 35 ft. wide on each side and extending the length from 4000 to 5800 ft. by adding 500 ft. at the Southwest end and 1300 ft. on Northeast end, resulting in an airstrip 5800 x 220 ft. Also, parking areas and Jap revetments were cleared and leveled for parking. This work continued in conjunction with maintaining the surface on the original strip by blading and rolling and wetting by means of 4 water trucks.

18. In early December, 1944, the 3rd Platoon, Second Bomb Disposal Company, including three (3) officers (1stLt. Baker, Ben E., USMC, 1stLt. Karr, Emil, USNCR and 1stLt. Bickerstaff, George A., USMCR) were attached to the Battalion. They aided in our training program with lectures and demonstrations on demolition, bomb disposal and booby traps. They were embarked on LST #884 and upon landing began clearing our bivouac area, then the airstrip ahead of us. They were extremely helpful in training and invaluable on the operation. The unit and its officers have my highest commendation for efficiency, cooperation and courage in clearing areas ahead of our operations. To date the casualties due to duds or mines have been low which is attributed in a large part to their work. Their efforts enabled us to complete our first mission of readying a fighter strip 24 hours ahead of time. This Bomb Disposal Unit was detached from temporary duty with this command on 3 March 1945, by order of Headquarters, Fifth Amphibious Corps.

Subject: Special Action Report, IWO JIMA Campaign. (Cont'd).

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19. Installation of stills on Purple Beach started by first digging well on beach on 1 March 1945. The well was 9x6 ft. and 12 ft. deep. The first four (4) stills were in operation on 3 March. The average output is 3000 gallons per day to date. Water in the well is 130 degrees temperature, but it's use in stills was found to clog evaporation chamber in 75 hours operation. Therefore, a 3" line was run to the sea and sea water has been distilled since 8 March 1945. The first line washed out in the first 7 hours of operation and had to be replaced. The second line is still in operation.

20. On the 28th of February four (4) men and two (2) tractors were assigned to the 5th Marine Division Cemetery. This equipment and these men have worked every day and are still assigned to this project.

21. On the 3rd of March four (4) men and two (2) bulldozers were assigned to leveling off an area near Mt. Suribachi for fuel storage tanks. This work was completed on 6 March.

22. On the 5th of March the Battalion started to operate the quarry. Men and equipment were assigned. The material obtained from the quarry has been used for the airstrip dispersing area for planes and for roads being worked on by the Marines.

RECOMMENDATIONS PART II

1. The transition from a station force unit to a unit of an amphibious force entailed learning procedures and revising concepts of living and working conditions. These recommendations are based on our difficulties in making the changeover in the hope that others may benefit in the future.

2. The main problems in organization and which should have been given more emphasis in officer training were:

- a. Security
- b. Cargo Handling
- c. Supply
- d. Operations
- e. Communications
- f. SOP Amphibious Operations
- g. Medicine

3. It can be said generally that information on all of the above items was tardy and that officers in charge of respective departments were lacking "know how" and information sources.

Staff Officers Field Manual for Amphibious Operations by the Fleet Marine Force, Pacific should be made available to key officers. Officers and men were entirely unfamiliar with such rudimentary information as beach markings.

4. The officers concerned with Battalion security should be given a thorough and concise course on the subject of security of documents and security against enemy action. They should learn the working of the operations security so that they can organize battalion security and later with the Garrison Forces.

5. The Transport Quartermaster of all units to be engaged in the operation would be able to plan and organize the cargo of their respective units if prior to beginning the cargo allocations, they were briefed by the Amphibious Corps, Transport Quartermaster. They should become familiar with procedures, various items of information, which is needed pertaining to cargo, priorities, required tables and other details pertaining to loading and shipping to the target area.

6. Supply officers should also be familiarized with the Amphibious Corps supply procedures and classifications of supplies as it is an Army system and differs in certain respects with the system they are familiar with. This familiarity would enable them to save time and avoid confusion once they begin to assemble the battalion supplies for the operation. Familiarity with the Transport Quartermaster procedure is highly desirable at both ends of the operation. First, it would make it possible to list supplies according to desired procedure when turning them over to Transport Quartermaster; and secondly, when supplies are unloaded and returned to their care, much confusion and searching of beaches could be avoided if the supply officer had adequate knowledge of transport Quartermaster procedure. The supply officer should also be instructed in the Marine classification system of supplies.

7. Operations and engineering officers in the battalion should be briefed in matters pertaining to their sphere of action. This would include topography, soil data, water conditions, weather, sources of material, knowledge of operations of other units--their missions and priority.

8. Communications officers should be given briefing so that they can understand the overall communication setup and be able to keep the battalion in contact with means of communication with all other units necessary.

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Subject: Special Action Report, IWO JIMA Campaign. (Cont'd).

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9. The Operation Plan was not in the hands of the Officer in Charge of the Battalion until over a month after half of the Battalion was embarked. By this time all departments had been worked up without sufficient knowledge and under the difficulties of not knowing what the whole picture was. All cargo had been assigned shipping and loaded without this knowledge. The result was poorly organized departments and confusion on landing.

10. The Medical Department was not provided with information as to sanitary conditions or types of disease to be guarded against until too late to do anything about it. Solutions for impregnating clothing were in our hands after half of the Battalion was embarked.

11. The prime difficulty was tardiness in disposal of information and of briefing of various department heads in the details of the operational procedures. Too many knew too little about what we were trying to accomplish and less about how to go about their respective duties and responsibilities for these reasons.

/s/ F. B. CAMPBELL.

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SECOND BOMB DISPOSAL COMPANY,
FLEET MARINE FORCE, PACIFIC,
In the Field.

17 April, 1945.

From: The Commanding Officer.
To : The Engineer Officer, V Amphibious Corps.
Subject: Special Action Report, IWO JIMA Campaign.

1. PLANNING PHASE:

(a) The Second Bomb Disposal Company, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, was attached to the V Amphibious Corps for planning, training and operations on 5 November, 1944 by FMF dispatch. The Commanding Officer immediately reported to VAC Headquarters and to the Corps Engineer Officer, under whose supervision the organization was to operate. In view of the newness of the organization and the lack of previous training in operating as a company, a brief standing operating procedure was drawn up and incorporated in Corps Training Memorandum #32-44.

(b) It was planned at this time to attach one platoon to each of the 4th and 5th Divisions, for transportation and landing, and one platoon to the 62d Naval Construction Battalion for operational control. This plan did not prove feasible due to the lack of space in divisional transportation, with the result that the company headquarters and two platoons were to be carried in Corps shipping and the one platoon with the 62d Naval Construction Battalion.

(c) At the time of attachment to VAC, the Second Bomb Disposal Company was billeted at the Transient Center, FMF, Pacific, and was still in the process of activation. Shortages in personnel consisted of 2 Bomb Disposal NCOs and 1 barber. Shortages in vital items of equipment consisted of:

- 9 - M3A1 Scout Cars with wrecker conversion.
- 10 - Equipment, Bomb Disposal sets.
- 4 - Trailers, 1/4-ton, 2-wheel.
- 1 - Tools, Bomb Disposal set.
- Communication equipment.

(d) The status of training at this time was somewhat better. All the basic (521) enlisted personnel of the organization had received at least one month's training in explosives, ammunition and bombs. A total of three officers and twenty-seven enlisted men had received two weeks instructions at the CPBC Corps of Engineers Mine School and arrangements were being made for refresher courses for the Bomb Disposal Officers and NCOs.

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Subject: Special Action Report, IWO JIMA Campaign. (Cont'd).

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(e) The lack of communication equipment was corrected immediately upon joining VAC by the drawing of 4 radio jeeps and the temporary attachment of 4 radio operators from the Signal Battalion, VAC.

(f) On 25 November, 1944 the 3rd platoon embarked aboard an LSM for transportation to Maui to join the 62d Naval Construction Battalion. By this time the shortages in equipment of the company had been eliminated and by the end of the year all the Bomb Disposal Officers and NCOs had been given a refresher course at MEIU #4. During the period November-December, 1944, an officer was temporarily attached to each of the 3rd, 4th, and 5th divisions for the purpose of instructing the divisional engineers in the handling of aerial bombs planted in the ground as mines. The 2 1/2-ton trucks acquired during this period upon request to FMF, Pacific, later proved to be invaluable, due to the lack of cargo space in the M3A1 Scout Cars. Early in December the 156th Ordnance Bomb Disposal Squad Separate, USA, consisting of one officer and six enlisted, was placed under the operational control of this unit. This unit later embarked aboard the PA 65 for transportation to the target area.

2. LOADING PHASE:

(a) On 20 January, 1945 the LST 766 on which the 3rd platoon was embarked was grounded off Maui, resulting in the loss of all the vehicles and many of the tools of this platoon. The personnel of this platoon arrived at Pearl Harbor on 24 January 1945, was completely re-equipped with equipment similar to that lost, with one exception, and reembarked the same day. The 3 M3A1 Scout Cars lost were replaced by 3 2-1/2ton, 6x6, trucks, with super-structure and hoists.

(b) On 23 January, 1945 ten enlisted men and all equipment of the company, less the 3rd platoon, were loaded aboard the AKA 90 (Whiteside) for transportation to the target area.

(c) On 25 January, 1945, personnel of the Second Bomb Disposal Company, less 3rd platoon, consisting of 9 officers and 42 enlisted embarked aboard the APA 63 (Bladen) for transportation to target area. At this time the company was nearly up to strength lacking only 1 Bomb Disposal NCO and 1 barber.

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(d) While enroute to the target one Bomb Disposal NCO was declared unfit for duty by the Medical Officer aboard the USS Bladen. This NCO was evacuated at Saipan, and left the company with a shortage of 2 Bomb Disposal NCOs.

3. OPERATIONAL PHASE:

(a) Upon arrival at the target the company prepared to go ashore upon Corps order. At 0930 on Dog Day plus one (D/1) 1 officer and 4 enlisted men were transferred to the AKA 90 to assist in getting vehicles ashore. At 1030 on Dog Day plus one (D/1) orders were received to send one platoon ashore to report to Beachmaster, Green Beach in 5th Marine Division zone of action. This was immediately complied with. At 1430 on Dog Day plus one (D/1) orders were received for the remainder of the company, less 3rd platoon, to go ashore, land on Yellow 1 Beach, contact RCT 23 and later the 4th Division Engineers. Control Yellow informed us it was impossible to land on Yellow 1 due to surf conditions and mortar fire, with the result that we landed on Red 2. Lack of information on the beach made it impossible for us to locate RCT 23 or the 4th Division Engineers until morning of Dog Day plus two (D/2).

(b) The Headquarters CP was initially established about 70 yards inland near the junction of Red 2 Beach and Yellow 1 Beach in Target Area 147-O. On 24 February, 1945, the Headquarters CP was moved to VAC CP area at Target Area 147-N. The Headquarters section was formed into two operating sections comprised of the clerks, mechanics, drivers, and cooks, under the direction of the Commanding Officer and the Executive Officer. These sections cleared the area in and around the VAC Headquarters CP and answered calls when necessary.

(c) The lack of transportation for the company, less 3rd platoon, was relieved on 3 March, 1945, by the landing of all vehicles of the company from the AKA 90.

(d) The 1st platoon, CP was established immediately below Airfield No. 1 in the Northwest corner of Target Area 164-Y and was in contact and working with the 4th Division Engineers.

(e) The 2d platoon CP was established on Red 1 Beach in Target Area 148-R and was in contact and working with the 5th Division Engineers.

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(f) The 3rd platoon attached to the 62d Naval Construction Battalion, landed on 24 February, 1945, with all its vehicles and established CP at Target Area 148-F.

(g) The 156th Bomb Disposal Squad, operating under the control of company headquarters, landed on Dog Day plus two (D/2) and established CP at Target Area 148-K.

(h) The initial task of the 1st and 2d platoons was that of clearing the eastern beaches. The 1st platoon was assigned the Yellow and Blue beaches and the 2d platoon the Green and Red beaches. This proved quite a task because of the lack of vehicles and tools. The intermittent sniper fire on all beaches and the mortar fire on the Blue Beach did not ease the situation. The transportation difficulty was overcome by procuring several LVTs from the Division Beachmasters. When the LVTs were filled with unexploded ordnance they would be taken out to the sea approximately 750 to 1000 yards and the load dumped. Numerous "Dud" projectiles of all sizes were found scattered along the beaches, many of which had been marked by the Division Engineers. A mine field, consisting of 63 Kg and 250 Kg bombs with yardstick mines layed on top, extended the entire length of the eastern beaches. This mine field had a majority of the yardsticks removed by Division Engineers who had left the bombs embedded but marked. A similar mine field was found on the White and Orange beaches on the western coast. The marking of projectiles and bombs by the Engineers was extremely helpful throughout the operation.

(i) The 1st platoon worked with one section on the Yellow Beaches, one section on the Blue Beaches and one section inland on calls from the 4th Division Engineers. The section working on calls cleared numerous storage areas, and command posts, and had cleared the Northwest-Southeast runway on Airfield No. 1 by Dog Day plus three (D/3). As the beaches were cleared, the sections moved inland and north, clearing all areas and roads requested within the 4th Division zone of action. This platoon cleared out three burned over 4th Division ammunition dumps and established a Bomb Disposal Dump at the East Boat Landing in Target Area 167-A. This dump was later used by all platoons. The 2d platoon worked with one section on Green Beach and half of Red 2 Beach and a second section on Red 2 Beach and the remaining half of Red 1 Beach. The third section was used inland on calls from the 5th Division Engineers, clearing command posts and dump areas. Three burned over

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5th Division ammunition dumps were cleared by this unit. This platoon worked westward across the island and then moved north along the western coast, clearing roads, bivouac areas, dump areas, and the western beaches.

(j) The 3rd platoon landing with the 62d Naval Construction Battalion on Dog Day plus five (D+5) immediately began clearing Airfield No. 1 and the construction battalion bivouac areas. When these tasks were completed the platoon was returned to company control. All calls from the 3rd Marine Division were handled by this platoon from this time on. Airfield No. 2 and numerous garrison areas were also cleared by this platoon.

(k) Two main Bomb Disposal cemeteries were set up on the island. The first was set up in Target Area 147-R by the Headquarters section upon their movement to the Corps Headquarters CP on 24 February 1945. All ordnance brought into the dump was later dumped at sea from LVTs. This dump was secured after ten days upon request from the Garrison Force Commander.

(l) The second dump established was that set up by the 1st platoon at the East Boat Landing in Target Area 167-A. This dump was the larger of the two dumps and was better suited for its purpose. This dump was emptied by LVTs and by a barge secured from GroPac Eleven. This dump was turned over to Garrison Force control on 11 March 1945.

(m) The total amount of unexploded bombs, projectiles and mines rendered safe and disposed of is as follows:

<u>AMERICAN</u>	<u>QUANTITY</u>
16" Projectiles	74
14" Projectiles	13
12" Projectiles	9
8" Projectiles	55
6" Projectiles	52
5" Projectiles	2353
155mm Projectiles	40
105mm Projectiles	71
75mm Projectiles	218
81mm Mortar Shells	1502
60mm Mortar Shells	656
40mm Projectiles	29
37mm Projectiles	49
M6A1 Rockets	153

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AMERICAN

QUANTITY

Rifle Grenades	252
4.5 Barrage Rockets	150
500 lb Bombs	14
100 lb Bombs	36
23 lb Frag Bombs	259
5" Aircraft Rockets	19
Pamphlet Bombs	2
4 lb Incendiary Bombs	27
8 lb Oil Bombs	3

JAPANESE

QUANTITY

800 Kg Bombs	1
300 Kg Bombs	52
250 Kg Bombs	408
63 Kg Bombs	504
60 Kg Bombs	251
32 Kg Bombs	24
30 Kg Bombs	10
1/3 Kg APA Bombs	156
50 Kg Rockets	3
60 Kg Rocket Motors	40
12" Rockets	2
8" Rockets	42
Yardstick Mines	518
Tape Measure Mines (Type 93)	392
Wooden Box Mines	209
Terracotta Mines	52
Hemespherical Horn Mines (2 Horn)	166
Conical Horn Mines (1 Horn)	501
Magnetic A.T. Mines	76
150mm Mortar Shells	222
120mm Projectiles	434
4.7 Projectiles	320
81mm Mortar Shells	335
75mm Projectiles	274
70mm Mortar Shells	68
47mm Projectiles	316
50mm Projectiles	2134
37mm Projectiles	345
60 Kg Flares	15
2 Kg Flares	27
21" Torpedoes	1
Float Flares	122

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(n) Note: In addition to the foregoing, there were large quantities of uncounted miscellaneous, unfired, Japanese and United States projectiles, grenades, mines, mortar shells and rockets. These items could only be handled when bomb disposal duties did not require the use of the platoons elsewhere. This was a task that should have been handled by an Ammunition Salvage unit.

(o) On 20 March, 1945 orders for embarking personnel were received. One officer and 10 enlisted were embarked on the KA 19 (Thuban) with all company vehicles and equipment on 21 March, 1945. The remainder of the company, consisting of 9 officers and 55 enlisted were embarked aboard the PA 104 (President Monroe) on 22 March, 1945.

4. RECOMMENDATIONS:

(a) It is recommended that in future operations, one platoon be assigned to each assault division for transportation, landing and initial control. This platoon should work under the cognizance of the Division Engineer.

(b) It cannot be too strongly recommended that the six M3A1 Scout Cars remaining in this organization be exchanged for six, 1 ton, 4x4, trucks. The six M3A1 Scout Cars provide insufficient cargo capacity and are not mechanically or structurally strong enough for their purpose. On this operation, turned and broken springs and brake lines kept at least two of these trucks inactive at all times. These same vehicles could not be used on unimproved roads because of the danger of bogging down.

(c) It is also recommended that the Table of Organization (E-709) of this unit be increased to include two Bomb Disposal NCOs and four more basics (521), enlisted men. These additions would provide sufficient personnel for an operating section and a fuze laboratory in company headquarters.

M. H. Clarke
M. H. CLARKE.

RLS/164

SECOND SEPARATE TOPOGRAPHIC COMPANY
FLEET MARINE FORCE, PACIFIC,
In the Field.

17 April, 1945.

From: The Commanding Officer.
To : The Engineer Officer, V Amphibious Corps.
Subject: Special Action Report, IWO JIL A Campaign.

1. The Second Separate Topographic Company, was activated on 5 February, 1945 by special order from the Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific.

2. This company had previously been "D" Company or Topographic Company of the Second Separate Engineer Battalion, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific. As such had been included in the Operation Plan 3-44 of the V Amphibious Corps.

3. Upon activation as a separate company, the Commanding Officer of this company reported by dispatch to the Commanding General, V Amphibious Corps, for duty, and also, reported to the Commanding Officer, Second Separate Engineer Battalion, for transportation and initial operational control, as directed by higher authority.

4. The mission of the Second Separate Topographic Company, in this operation, was interpreted to be the same as the mission assigned the Second Separate Engineer Battalion, by annex "MIKE" to V Amphibious Corps Operation Plan 3-44, paragraph 2, sub-paragraphs (g) Reproduction and (j) Surveys.

5. With this assignment in view requisitions for the expendable and some minor non-expendable reproduction supplies and reproduction equipment were submitted, via the Second Separate Engineer Battalion, Quartermaster to Fifth Field Depot. Supplies and equipment for the Surveying Platoon and Photo Mapping Platoon, were in accordance with existing Tables of Allowances generally complete. At the time of embarkation, one third of the reproduction supplies necessary and requisitioned for the operation were received by this organization. The main items of equipment scheduled for loading were:

- 1 - Copy Camera, Trailer mounted.
- 1 - Photographic Dark Room, Trailer mounted.
- 1 - Press Multilith, Trailer mounted.
- 1 - Asphalt Emulsion Trailer, 700 gallon capacity, used as water storage trailer.
- 1 - 2-1/2 Ton 6x6, Cargo Truck.
- 1 - 1 Ton 4x4, Truck.
- 1 - 1/4 Ton 4x4, Truck.

Subject: Special Action Report, IWO JIMA Campaign. (Cont'd).

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6. The latter four items were given this organization on temporary loan basis by the Second Separate Engineer Battalion. A Lithographic Dark Room trailer mounted, which is a unit of the Reproduction Mobile Set, was on hand prior to embarkation and was not included as space was not available. It is also to be noted that this organization does not have and was unable to obtain the 30 KVA Generator trailer mounted, listed by current Tables of Allowances as a part of the reproduction equipment. Power for operation of the reproduction trailers was to be supplied by one 9.4 KVA and one 7.2 KVA generator carried by the Second Separate Engineer Battalion.

7. Prior to embarkation and loading the three reproduction trailers, and the 2-1/2 ton 6x6, cargo truck, were loaded with the reproduction supplies and reproduction equipment necessary for the assigned mission, in as far as was possible with available supplies. Survey equipment and photo mapping equipment with expendable supplies were loaded on the 1 ton 4x4, (Recon.) truck. Due to lack of space and vehicles available, only proportionate amounts of surveying equipment and photo mapping equipment and supplies were included. The 700 gallon water trailer was filled prior to loading. Rations, water, galley equipment, clothing replenishments and all necessary supplies not carried by the individual men were included in the supplies of the Second Separate Engineer Battalion.

8. The Second Separate Topographic Company embarked with the Second Separate Engineer Battalion on 9 February, 1945 with a total of 5 officers and 70 enlisted personnel. Equipment and personnel were divided in the following manner aboard two LST's:

1 officer, 15 enlisted personnel embarked on LST #725 with the following equipment:

- 3. - Reproduction Trailers - loaded.
- 1 - 2-1/2 Ton 6x6, Cargo Truck - loaded.
- 1 - 1 Ton 4x4, Recon Truck - loaded.

4 officers, 55 enlisted personnel embarked on LST #247 with the following equipment:

- 1 - 1/4 Ton 4x4, "Jeep" Truck.
- 1 - 700 gallon Water Trailer - filled.

9. Personnel from both ships disembarked and equipment was unloaded on Red Beach No. 1, IWO JIMA, 21 February

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and 22 February, 1945. Bivouac was established in Target Area 148 RQV. All vehicles, trailers and equipment were dispersed in the vicinity of the bivouac area. During the period from 21 February to 25 February, 1945 bivouac was maintained in this area. Some enemy artillery and mortar fire was encountered daily, with two casualties and no damage to reproduction trailers, vehicles or equipment incurred.

10. On order of higher authority bivouac was established in Target Area 147 R, 25 February, 1945. Revetments were dug for the reproduction trailers and reproduction equipment was made ready for operation. One 300 gallon water trailer was obtained from the Second Separate Engineer Battalion in lieu of the 700 gallon water trailer returned. In addition, the 9.4 KVA generator and 7.2 KVA generator were found to be in unserviceable condition and they were also returned to the Second Separate Engineer Battalion. A 15 KW generator was obtained from the 62d Naval Construction Battalion to furnish power for the reproduction trailers. During the night of 26-27 February, 1945, approximately six enemy artillery shells hit in the company bivouac area, causing seven casualties, minor damage to one reproduction trailer, damage beyond immediate repair to one 2-1/2 ton 6x6, cargo truck. A 1 ton 4x4, truck was obtained from the Second Separate Engineer Battalion in lieu of the 2-1/2 ton 6x6, cargo truck.

11. On 28 February, 1945, the Reproduction Platoon, Survey Platoon, and Photo-Mapping Platoon were in readiness for operation. Daily assignments for the Reproduction Platoon were made by the Corps Engineer Section. The Survey Platoon was assigned to make such surveys of airfields, roads and topography as would be of value to the Corps Engineer units in the operation and for future use of those engineer units in the Garrison Forces. The Photo-Mapping Platoon was assigned various drafting jobs, including drafting of an Island Road Map from aerial photographs.

12. During the period 28 February, 1945 to 18 March, 1945, the Reproduction Platoon completed the below listed assignments:

- 505 - Photographs,
- 1,471 - Aerial Photographs.
- 9,485 - Copies, Situation overprints on black 1:20,000 map of Iwo Jima.
- 12,175 - Copies, maps 1:20,000 of Iwo Jima with special grid and situation overprints.
- 304 - "Black and White" prints.

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1,200 - Copies, (miscellaneous) reproduction assignments.

106 - 20" x 24" photographic negatives for lithographic reproductions.

100 - 20" x 24" lithographic plates.

13. The Survey Platoon completed a topographic survey including the area between a line running generally through Target Areas 131-E, 132-A, G, H, as the southern most limit and a line running generally through Target Areas 197-T, 198-P-R-Q-X-Y, 182-A-B-G-H-M-S-T, 183-U, 166-A-G-L, as the northern most limit. Basic control for traverses were landmarks established by Coast and Geodetic Survey. A copy of notes and computations was furnished the Corps Engineer Section, the Photo-Mapping Platoon completed all drafting assignments made by the Corps Engineer and completed one uncontrolled mosaic of Iwo Jima at a scale of approximately 1:5000 for the use of the Corps Engineer Section and for reference data used to complete a more detailed road map of Iwo Jima than was currently available.

14. As directed by higher authority the Second Separate Topographic Company ceased operations and began preparation for embarkation to the rehabilitation area on 18 March, 1945.

15. The total casualties of this organization during the entire operation were as follows:

KIA	1 Officer	0 Enlisted
MIA	0 Officers	0 Enlisted
WIA	0 Officers	8 Enlisted

16. The following recommendations are made to facilitate greater operating efficiency in the future:

(1) That this company be furnished the following equipment above that authorized by Tables of Allowances.

(a) One TD-14 Bulldozer to be used as a prime mover and for construction of revetments for reproduction trailers.

(b) Two water trailers 300 gallon capacity, for water storage.

(c) Three 1 Ton cargo trailers for additional photographic equipment and reproduction supplies.

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(d) One Transit, twenty-second, with solar attachment.

(e) One equipment photographic miniature set.

Robert L. Scott
ROBERT L. SCOTT.

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LVT Report

Appendix 6 to Annex CHARLIE to Special Action Report IWO JIMA Campaign

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

30 April, 1945.

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From: The LVT Officer.
To : The Commanding General.
Subject: Special Action Report, IWO JIMA Campaign.
Enclosures: (A) Recap of LVT losses IWO JIMA Campaign.
(B) LVT Communications IWO JIMA Campaign.

1. a. Detailed planning for the employment of LVT's in the IWO JIMA Campaign was begun early in November, 1944. Three of the five LVT Battalions to be used in this campaign were re-habilitating at GUAM and SAIPAN in the MARIANAS, while the other two LVT battalions were at MAUI and HAWAII in the Hawaiian Area. The battalion commanders of the five LVT battalions to be used at IWO JIMA were ordered to PEARL HARBOR for conference with the Navy. In a series of conferences with the Navy, plans were made for the control set-up for LVT's, plan of guide boats for LVT waves, formations of LVT waves from LST, refueling of LVT's during assault phases, salvage and maintenance of LVT's on LST's etc. In general plans were made and agreements were reached on all phases of LVT operation during the campaign in which the Navy was concerned or would take part. Upon completion of conferences with the Navy, LVT battalion commanders were ordered to the division to which their unit was attached. At this time detailed plans were drawn up by divisions, in conjunction with commanders of attached LVT units, as to composition of landing waves (number and type of LVT's in each wave), number of LVT waves on each beach, number of troops in each LVT, equipment to be transported in assault waves, pre-load to be carried in LVT's, employment of LVT's upon completion of landing assault troops, employment of LVT(A)(4)s, etc.

b. Liaison officers from battalions in the MARIANAS were assigned to divisions during rehearsal at MAUI. This was necessary as only two of the five LVT battalions to be used at IWO JIMA were present at the MAUI rehearsals, and the other LVT battalions did not join the Landing Force until the VACLF reached SAIPAN. Upon completion of the MAUI rehearsals, liaison officers from LVT units in the MARIANAS were sent by air to their units to relay to their battalion commanders all minor changes in plans concerning LVT's. These minor changes in plans were made by commanders of LVT units in the MARIANAS and were in effect at SAIPAN rehearsals. All LVT units employed in the IWO JIMA campaign, took part in rehearsal held at SAIPAN.

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2. a. All cargo type LVTs had pin-on armor as called for in Bu-Ships plan of improvised armor for LVTs. This armor proved highly effective against small arms fire, mortar, and artillery fragments at mid-ranges.

b. Each cargo type LVT was equipped with two machine guns (generally one fifty caliber and one thirty caliber). Machine guns were mounted forward, and each gun was equipped with a circular type splinter shield. A unit of fire was carried in every LVT for each of the two machine guns.

c. All LVT(A)(4)s had pin-on armor on the bow and pontoon, (1/2 inch additional armor on bow and 1/4 inch additional armor on pontoons). This armor proved highly effective at mid ranges against small arms fire, mortar, and artillery fragments. In some instances pin-on armor plate was pierced by shell fragments while the hull of the LVT beneath the plate was only dented. Operation experience shows that this added armor protection on LVT(A)(4)s affected "the sea worthiness" of the vehicle very little. Although some LVT(A)(4)s were lost from sinking, no sinkings can be attributed directly to added weight of armor, (out of fuel, mechanical failure, etc., were cause of sinking).

d. Each LVT(A)(4) carried approximately one hundred twenty-five rounds of 75mm howitzer ammunition of various types. The number of rounds carried by LVT(A)(4)s was adequate and no instances are known where LVT(A)(4)s were out of action due to lack of ammunition before resupply arrived.

3. a. All LVTs (cargo and tank) were transported to the target area on the tank deck of LSTs, no LVTs used in assault waves were loaded on the top deck of these ships. LVTs were loaded on LSTs by being backed in, lines being attached to stern of LVT to square it away with LST ramp until loading was accomplished.

b. Two systems of distribution of LVT(A)(4)s on LSTs were used by divisions for IWO JIMA operation. One division had its 35 LVT(A)(4)s allocated so as to have from three to five LVT(A)(4)s on each LST assigned that division while the other division loaded its allotted 35 LVT(A)(4)s on two LSTs. Each method of distribution has its advantages, but it is believed that loading a few LVT(A)(4)s on each LST assigned is preferable. In event an LST carrying all (A)(4)s is sunk half a division's assigned (A)(4)s are lost, while if the other method of loading (A)(4)s is employed only three to five vehicles would be lost.

c. LSTs transporting LVTs to IWO JIMA carried a side load of cargo on the tank deck. This side load of cargo

caused the LVTs to be so close together when loaded on the tank deck that servicing of the vehicle and the track and suspension system while enroute to the target area was impossible. In LSTs designated as maintenance LSTs, cargo was stowed on top of the winch and side loaded on the tank deck. This loading condition on LSTs designated as maintenance ships limited using the ship as such, and denied completely the use of the ship's winch to tow disabled LVTs aboard for repairs.

4. a. In assault waves LVTs an average of twenty troops were carried in LVT(2)s while thirty troops were carried in LVT(4)s. All troops carried combat equipment, and this number of troops with equipment did not overcrowd LVTs.

b. In addition to troops carried a standard preload of supplies was carried by LVTs in all waves except the first wave of troop carrying LVTs. This preload was composed generally of small arms ammunition, grenades, mortar ammunition, water, and rations. Weight of this preload was approximately seven hundred pounds.

c. All type of equipment was carried in assault wave LVTs, this included flame thrower equipment, demolition equipment, ammunition carts, etc. In later LVT waves radio jeeps and like equipment was landed.

d. A crew of three men was used in LVT(2)s and when additional men were available a crew of four was used in LVT(4)s.

e. Machine gunners for LVT guns were furnished by the infantry troops embarked.

f. A seven man crew was used on the LVT(A)(4)s. A crew of any less number on the LVT(A)(4) is not adequate.

g. Amphibian trailers were used by the VACLF at IWO JIMA for the first time in any of its operations. LVTs were used as a prime mover for the trailer in the water, and as the type of sand on IWO JIMA beaches initially denied the use of wheeled vehicles, the amphibian trailers were also towed inland by LVTs. Much difficulty with the trailer hitch was experienced and when the hitching of an LVT to a trailer was done in the water it took approximately forty-five (45) minutes to make the hitch. The trailer has only one advantage over the LVT, that being the equipment hauled in the trailer is kept dry, but as an expedient for unloading "hot cargo" the trailer failed its purpose on this operation. Except in the unloading of "hot cargo" that has to be kept dry it is believed that LVTs should be used rather than amphibian trailers. The LVT can haul

more "hot cargo" at a load and being self-propelled can take this load anywhere. The Question: "Are Amphibian Trailers wanted or needed in large numbers when LVTs are available", can be answered thusly: Have a small number of trailers loaded with "hot cargo", that must be kept dry, and use LVTs for the hauling of the rest of the "hot cargo".

5. a. The Navy control set-up for LVTs at IWO JIMA was primarily the same as that used at SAIPAN and TINIAN. Each LVT wave had two Navy guide boats assigned, these boats assisted in the forming of the LVT waves and guided LVT waves to the beach. A central control vessel controlled all landing beaches, TransRon control vessels controlled a division's landing beaches, TransDiv control vessels controlled landing beaches of a RCT, Beach Control vessels controlled landing beach of a BLT. All control vessels were in radio communications with each other, and the TransDiv and Beach Control vessels were in radio communications with the guide boats of LVT waves. The Navy had responsibility of control of LVTs until the beach was reached.

b. The VACLIF control set-up for LVTs paralleled the Navy's throughout. The Corps LVT Officer was on a free control vessel and had direct radio communications with the central control vessel. VACLIF had an LVT control frequency which was called "the LVT Common", and on the LVT common frequency were the two division's LVT officers, control officers of the Provisional Groups of the Armored Amphibian Battalion, and the Corps LVT Officer. Division LVT officers were on the TransRon control vessels to assist the naval officer in the control of LVTs. Division LVT officers were in radio communication with the commanders of the two LVT (cargo) battalions assigned to a division. LVT battalion commanders were on the TransDiv control vessels to assist the naval officer in the control of LVTs. Battalion commanders were in radio communication with officers of their battalion aboard Beach Control vessels. Each LVT was radio equipped and it was possible for an LVT battalion commander, by changing frequencies, to get in radio contact with any one of the one hundred LVTs in his battalion. Orders from LVT battalion commanders to individual LVTs or groups of LVTs were passed thru the battalion officers aboard the beach control vessel, and wave commanders of LVT waves. Radio coverage was complete and this was the primary reason for such excellent control of LVTs during the assault phases of the IWO JIMA Campaign.

c. The armored amphibian battalion was provisionally organized into two groups for the landing at IWO JIMA and due to this organization two separate control set-ups were necessary for this battalion. Armored amphibian battalion control officers were on TransRon, TransDiv and Beach Control vessels of each Division. The armored battalion control officers

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were in radio communication with LVT(A)(4)s in their group. The Corps LVT officer was in radio communication with the armored amphibian battalion control officer on each of the TransRon control vessel.

d. Each LVT wave had at least one LVT officer in it, and in most waves there were two LVT officers. These officers were wave commander and assistant wave commanders respectively.

e. The control set-up for LVTs was excellent from the Navy's as well as the Landing Forces' point of view. The only weakness being that liaison is needed with the commander of the LST flotilla. LSTs move out to sea, refuse to open bow doors or lower ramp, don't move in close to the beach when general unloading starts, etc. The difficulties in LVT operations with LSTs arise during the period when LVTs are unloading cargo and supplies, and during the recovery of LVTs after dark. These actions of the LSTs are not believed to be intentional but arise due to lack of liaison between LVT units and LST flotilla commander. If an LVT liaison officer were aboard the same ship with the LST flotilla commander (the LVT liaison officer on the LVT common frequency) and problems arose in LVT operations with LSTs the LVT liaison officer could work with and advise the flotilla commander as to a solution of the problems in which LVT interest were taken into account.

6. a. The formation of all LVT waves from LSTs was accomplished as follows: As LVT debarked from LSTs they formed in column and were led in column formation by Navy wave guide boats on designated flanks of the area between the LD and the LST area as a designated position was reached on flanks of this area, LVT made a right or left turn and proceeded in column parallel to the landing beach, upon signal from wave commander all LVTs made a right or left flank movement and the LVT wave came into position facing the beach on which they were to land.

b. LVT(A)(4)s formed the first wave of LVTs for the landing on IWO JIMA. The amphibian tanks were to land three minutes ahead of the first wave of troop carrying LVTs (the distance in front of troop carrying LVTs being approximately three hundred yards). LVT(A)(4)s were to open fire when within short range of the beach and were to continue firing until the beach was reached. Upon reaching the beach, designated LVT(A)(4)s were to proceed inland a short distance and cover the debarkation of troops from the troop carrying LVTs by firing on enemy targets inland of the landing beaches. Designated LVT(A)(4)s on the flanks of the landing beaches were not to proceed inland but were to remain waterborne and engage enemy targets on the flanks of the landing area.

c. LVTs (cargo) were to debark troops on or immediately inland of the landing beaches. Upon debarkation of troops LVTs (cargo) were to retract from beach and proceeded to designated LSTs where they were to go aboard these ships and load supplies. These supplies were to be landed on order from the divisions.

7. a. Each LVT battalion was organized into two provisional companies during landing of assault troops. Upon completion of landing assault troops the provisional company set-up was in most instances abandoned and battalions functioned normally as three company units.

b. The armored amphibian battalion was provisionally organized into two groups for the landing on IWO JIMA. Each provisional group consisting of two companies and one half of headquarters company. One group (35 LVT(A)(4)s and 4 LVTs 2s or 4s) being attached to each division. Each group operated independently of the other, and this provisional organization of the armored amphibian battalion was continued throughout the IWO JIMA Campaign.

c. There were 482 LVTs employed at IWO JIMA, 70 LVT(A)(4)s, 188 LVT(2)s, 224 LVT(4)s.

d. All LVTs scheduled to be landed in assault waves debarked from the LSTs on D-Day. This 100% debarkation of LVTs reflected excellent maintenance discipline on the part of all LVT battalions.

e. All LVTs were debarked from LSTs in approximately fifteen minutes after unloading began. All waves were formed within the sixty-minutes period allowed from the start of unloading of LVTs until the first wave was scheduled to cross the line of departure. Sixty minutes is considered sufficient time for debarkation of LVTs and forming of LVT waves unless unforeseen difficulties arise such as LST ramp breaking, LVT gets stuck in bow door of LST, etc. When the above mentioned difficulties do arise then a delay in H-Hour is necessary.

8. a. The plan generally for the landing of troops in LVTs at IWO JIMA was for the LSTs with LVTs aboard to be in position fifteen hundred yards behind the line of departure. LVTs would debark, form waves, with LVT(A)(4)s composing the first wave and troop carrying LVTs forming succeeding waves. When LVT waves were formed they were to be dispatched from the line of departure by Navy control vessels. Leading all LVT waves to the beach were LCI(G)s and rocket boats, there being approximately twenty-four (24) of these boats in front of LVT waves.

b. LST's were in position on D-Day at IWO JIMA.

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at approximately 0725. At 0730 LVTs started debarking and by 0745 all LSTs had completed debarking LVTs. LVT waves were formed and in position before 0830 and at 0830 the first wave of LVT(A)(4)s and Navy guide boats led by LCI gunboats and rocket boats crossed the line of departure. All succeeding waves of LVTs were dispatched on time and all waves landed at approximately the scheduled time. (First wave landed at 0900).

c. Surf and wind conditions on the morning of D-Day were very favorable for a landing and no difficulties from these conditions were experienced.

d. On the run to the beach very little enemy gun fire was encountered, and it is estimated that only five (5) LVTs were destroyed in assault waves by enemy shell fire, and on the initial run to the beach very few LVTs (cargo) fired their machine guns. Upon reaching the beach LVTs could not proceed inland due to the nearly perpendicular twelve foot ledge immediately behind the landing beach. Consequently, troops had to be put out on the beach. Upon reaching the beach many of the LVT(A)(4)s that preceded the troops carrying LVTs could not fire because the ledge immediately behind the beach masked their fires. The LVT(A)(4)s that could not fire retracted from the beach and covered the landing and debarkation of troops by firing from the water onto inland targets.

e. The water was very deep right up to the landing beach and the surf broke right at the edge of the beach, the beach was very narrow and immediately behind the landing beach was the nearly perpendicular 12 foot ledge. As LVTs landed some became "bellied up" on the ledge and as the surf broke over the stern of the LVT the cargo compartment of the LVT was filled with water and sand and the LVT was swamped on the beach. When boats began to land they were thrown broadside on the beach and in a very short time they were completely out of the water, having in the meantime been filled with sand and water as the surf broke over them. This beach and surf condition caused the landing beaches to become cluttered with swamped and beached landing craft.

f. The landing beaches at IWO JIMA were not extensively mined but their composition was sand and volcanic ash which would not support wheeled vehicles (wheeled vehicles could not cross the beach nor proceed inland until road matting had been laid). LVTs, caterpillar tractors, and other tracked vehicles were the only vehicles that could traverse the terrain. Until matting was in place for trucks, LVTs furnished approximately 90% of the logistical support for the troops landed. Supplies and equipment were hauled from ships directly to the front lines, and again in this operation had it not been for LVTs the troops ashore would not have been supplied during the early stages of the landing.

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g. The LVTs (cargo) after debarking troops retracted from the beach and proceeded back to designated LSTs where they were loaded with supplies. These supplies were landed by LVTs on order from the divisions. LVT(A)(4)s once having landed, stayed on the beach and when not being employed on firing missions from the water into caves, etc., were employed as beach defense.

h. On the afternoon of D-Day, the wind increased and the surf became very rough, but supplies had to be landed and LVTs were put on a twenty-four hour a day working basis. This working basis for LVTs continued for approximately three days. This working basis for LVTs had to be resorted to, the troops ashore had to be supplied, LVTs were the only vehicles that could take supplies from the ship, cross the beach, and haul directly to front line positions.

i. The large number of LVTs sunk during operations at IWO JIMA was caused primarily by LVTs having to haul at night. Night hauling with LVTs presents many problems; a few being, complete blackout is mandatory, LSTs can not be located, in the dark, some LSTs refuse to lower ramp, the surf is generally very rough, consequently an LVT that gave out of gas, motor failed, etc., sunk in a very short time. Gas barges were available but they could not always be located in the dark.

j. Though many LVTs were sunk during the early stages of the IWO JIMA Campaign the terrain of the island and existing beach and surf conditions dictated "how and when" LVTs had to be employed. The logistical support by LVTs of troops ashore at IWO JIMA during the critical stages of the landing contributed in a large degree to the successful capture of the objective.

k. Most LVT units were shore based on D plus 3 days, and upon being shore based LVTs were employed on supply hauling missions until D plus 22 days. Many special missions were assigned LVTs such as hauling mines and duds out to sea to be dumped, mail runs to ships, evacuating wounded, helping to displace artillery, transporting NGF officers from the beach to fire support ships, etc. LVTs and LVT(A)(4)s were also used in the landing of the VACLIF reconnaissance company on KAMA and KANGOKU ROCKS just off the coast of IWO JIMA.

l. LVT employment during IWO JIMA Campaign was little different on the whole from previous operations in the Central Pacific in which LVTs were used. This campaign was the first in this area in which LVTs were used when the landing beaches were accessible without first crossing a fringing or barrier coral reef. LVTs (cargo) were employed initially to

precede troop carrying LVTs to the beach, firing on enemy targets on run to beach when naval gunfire lifted, and upon landing, the LVT(A)(4)s were to go a short distance inland of landing beaches and cover with fire the unloading of troops from cargo LVTs. The employment of LVTs (cargo) during IWO JIMA Campaign was different only in that all LVTs were placed on a twenty-four hour a day working basis in the early stages of the operation. This operation was the first in which all LVTs (cargo) were ordered to haul around the clock, but as mentioned before it was a necessity. Because of the "around the clock working basis" problems arose that were not present in past operations, but there are answers to these problems. (Covered in RECOMMENDATIONS, this report).

9. a. Nearly all the LVTs used at IWO JIMA were new vehicles, only a few being rebuilt or reconditioned vehicles. During the operation between one hundred and fifty (150) and two hundred (200) operating hours were put on LVTs (cargo). LVT(A)(4)s had an average of approximately eighty (80) operating hours during IWO JIMA Operation. All LVTs employed at IWO JIMA will require a major overhaul before being ready for further combat use.

10. a. During assault phase, maintenance for LVTs was available aboard LST maintenance ships. One LST maintenance ship was assigned to each battalion, with exception of the armored battalion, which was shore based on D-Day. Disabled LVTs were towed to maintenance LSTs by salvage boats and LVTs and then pulled aboard for repairs. Welding equipment, spare parts, sheet metal, etc., were available on maintenance LST to effect repairs. Upon being shore based, battalions set up a maintenance shop and were able to do more extensive repairs and to more profitably employ maintenance equipment carried on the operation.

11. a. Maintenance failures of LVTs at IWO JIMA were mainly clutch, transmission and final drive. Maintenance failures were not much higher than would normally be expected during training or sustained operation. Failures of LVTs mechanically were by no means as high as they were when the operation was against a coral island when majority of LVT running time was over coral reefs. Due to sandy beaches and general soft soil at IWO JIMA only occasional track and suspension system failures were experienced. During the whole operation it is doubtful that six hundred (600) grouseers were lost, and only a few bogie wheels and return idler replacements were necessary.

12. a. LVTs were refueled during assault phases from Bowser boats and LSTs. It was impossible for the refueling of LVTs to be a continuous process, and at times no gas was available in Bowser boats for LVTs, but this condition was alleviated by allocating more boats to be used to refuel LVTs. After being shore based each LVT battalion set up battalion gas dumps on the beach.

13. a. Personnel casualties during the operation were as follows:

	<u>KIA</u>		<u>MIA</u>		<u>WIA</u>		<u>Sick & Evacuated</u>	
	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>
2d ArmAmphBn	1	11	0	1	4	50	0	9
3rd AmphTracBn	0	4	0	0	0	14	1	16
5th AmphTracBn	1	6	0	2	0	30	1	15
10th AmphTracBn	0	8	0	1	0	22	0	5
11th AmphTracBn	0	2	0	0	2	11	0	1
TOTALS	2	31	0	4	6	127	2	46

14. RECOMMENDATIONS.

a. General.

(1) When LVT units assigned to a division for an operation are not in the same area as divisions to which attached that the commander of the assigned LVT units be ordered to temporary duty with that division to assist in the detailed planning for the employment of his unit.

(2) When it is impossible for all LVT battalions being employed in an operation to be present at rehearsals that liaison officers from the battalions not present be sent to the division to which the unit is attached, and that upon completion of the rehearsals the liaison officer assigned be returned immediately to his unit to alert his Commanding Officer to all changes in plans.

(3) That during the period of detailed planning for control of LVTs in an operation that conferences of Navy control planning officers and LVT unit commanders be held so as to formulate jointly specific and detail plans for the Navy control set-up for LVTs, plan of Navy guide boats for LVT waves, formation of LVT waves from LSTs, re-fueling plan for LVTs during the assault phases, salvage and maintenance plan for LVTs on LSTs, etc.

(4) That the communication officer of the Amphibian Tractor Group to be employed work with the Amphibious Group communications officer so as to have radios available on each control vessel for LVT control officers that will be aboard that ship. In general, to insure that there is a "tie in" of LVT control communications and Navy LVT control communications.

(5) That if possible before an operation a meeting be held of LVT unit commanders, LST flotilla commanders, LST group commanders, and LST captains for a general discussion of contemplated LVT-LST operation during the campaign.

(6) That a LVT liaison officer from the Amphibian Tractor Group be assigned to and be on the same ship as the LST flotilla commander. This officer assignment to be made before rehearsals for an operation and terminated only when LVTs are no longer working with LSTs.

(7) That LVT Navy guide boat officers be embarked on the same LST as the LVTs with which they are going to work with in the operation. These officers should be embarked permanently aboard these LSTs at the rehearsal area and remain so embarked until Navy wave guide officers and boats are no longer required in the operation.

(8) That in future operations that LCC boats be assigned as Beach Control Vessels rather than LCP(L)s. LCCs are much more suited for control than are LCP(L)s.

(9) That when LVTs are placed on a 24 hour a day working basis that additional salvage boats be provided and that an LSD (if available) or LSTs in addition to LVT maintenance ships be provided to receive disabled or lost LVTs. This ship or ships to take a stationary position (marked with lights if possible) and this position to be made known to all salvage craft and LVT battalions.

(10) That at the conclusion of each rehearsal period for an operation that a minimum of forty-eight (48) hours be allowed for the rehabilitation of LVTs and the switching of vehicles from one ship to another if necessary.

(11) That provisions be made to allow LVTs to go to the beach for repairs, rehabilitation, etc., after each rehearsal period.

(12) That a minimum of fifty (50) drums of gasoline for LVTs be aboard each LST transporting LVTs to the target area. This gasoline to be used only during the assault phases of an operation except in case of an emergency.

(13) That no LST transporting LVTs to the target area have a side load of cargo on the tank deck, and that cargo stored in the rear of the LST not extend beyond space allotted.

(14) That LSTs designated as maintenance ships for LVTs carry no preload on the tank decks. (This to include the winch in the rear of the tank deck).

(15) That when general unloading begins that LSTs automatically move in as close to the beach as possible (tactical situation ashore permitting). The shorter the run from shore to LSTs the sooner these ships will be unloaded.

(16) That the staff of an amphibian tractor battalion be embarked on the LSTs transporting its LVTs to the target area and not on the transports of the division to which the unit is attached. Attach an officer from the battalion to the division to maintain liaison.

(17) That a LVT liaison officer be assigned to each BLT shore party commander. This LVT officer to have his own radio set so as to have direct communications with his battalion commander. Upon the landing of the RCT shore party commander the two LVT shore party liaison officers will report to this officer and assist in the control and distribution of LVTs over the RCT beaches.

(18) That on each LST assigned to a battalion for an operation the battalion concerned assign an officer with a portable radio set. (This set on the battalion radio command net). This officer will remain on the LST until he is ordered to land by the battalion commander, and while aboard the LST will act in the capacity of tactical, administrative, and logistical officer for his unit on that ship as far as LVTs are concerned.

(19) That studies of theatre of operation, conception of the employment of amphibious vehicles, studies of landing beaches, etc., be made available to amphibian tractor units as soon as practicable during planning phase to facilitate battalion planning for the forthcoming operation.

(20) That provisions be made in embarkation tables of divisions to which LVT units are attached for maintenance personnel on each ship transporting LVTs in addition to LVT crews.

(21) That amphibian trailers be employed in an operation only to land "hot cargo" that has to be kept dry. The number of amphibian trailers to be used in an operation depending on the amount of this type "hot cargo" that has to be landed.

(22) That amphibian trailers should not be considered in the light of "an expedient for the unloading of "hot cargo", but as a means for landing only that "hot cargo" that has to be kept dry.

(23) That in the planning for future operations against hostile shores on which there is doubtful intelligence as to the type of sand, soil, or surf conditions to be encountered at the objective to plan to use no craft other than LVTs to effect the landing of assault troops and to initially supply the troops landed.

(24) That LSTs carrying LVT fuel be equipped with boat booms with several refueling lines running from the boom. In this way several LVTs could be refueled at the same time and LVTs would not be hitting against the side of the ship.

(25) That additional boats be available on call to be designated as Bowser boats if more gas boats are needed.

b. IMPROVEMENTS ON LVTs.

(1) That all LVT(A)(4)s be equipped with an additional plate of 1/2 inch armor on the bow and 1/4 inch armor on the pontoons. (This recommendation was made after the SAIPAN operation, but the LVT development board did not approve it).

(2) That recommended improvements on LVTs, made after other operations and approved by the LVT development board, be incorporated in new LVTs as soon as possible.

15. COMMENTS.

a. It was impossible to observe the effect of the fire of LVT(A)(4) on their initial run to the beach but the small amount of enemy fire received from the beach when naval gunfire lifted indicates that the fire of the LVT(A)(4)s kept the enemy down and in a large degree discouraged his returning fire during initial landing.

b. Although LST maintenance ships assigned are never sufficient in number to do all repairs required by LVTs during an assault, these ships are instrumental in keeping many LVTs in operation that would otherwise be deadlined.

c. Spare parts carried by battalions were in most cases adequate in quantity and type.

d. No Navy E-9-A Repair Units were available to LVT battalions employed at IWO JIMA.

e. Four (4) rebuilt LVTs were drawn from the Navy E-20 unit at SAIPAN to replace LVTs lost in rehearsals. These LVTs were not ready for combat and the type of mechanical failures experienced with these LVTs indicates that E-20 units will have to break down and inspect each part of the LVT being rebuilt. (Broken final drive studs showed evidence of old fractures - counter shaft gear in the transmission stripped, etc.).

f. LVT communications were excellent during IWO JIMA Campaign, sets were well waterproofed, and in no instance was any battalion commander out of communications with any part of his unit due to radio failures.

g. Motor Transport carried on this operation was adequate. On each operation LVT battalions must be allowed to take organic motor transport in accordance with the contemplated supply problems and transportation problems to be encountered at the objective.

h. Modifications previously recommended and on LVTs used at IWO JIMA proved very satisfactory. The improved winch and torsional hinge on the LVT(4) is far superior to the old type winch and hinge. LVT grousers with the non-welded end cut off undoubtedly contributed to so few grousers being lost during the operation.

i. Additional equipment believed necessary in Amphibian Tractor and Armored Amphibian Battalions will be requested in separate letter.

16. Battalion Special Action Reports.

a. Battalion Special Action Reports were submitted directly to the Division to which they were attached for the IWO JIMA Campaign.

(1) LVT Battalions were attached as follows:

(a) 2nd Armored Amphibian Tractor Battalion
Companies "A" and "B" - 4th MarDiv.

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Companies "C" and "D" - 5th MarDiv.

(b) 3rd Amphibian Tractor Battalion:

5th MarDiv.

(c) 5th Amphibian Tractor Battalion:

4th MarDiv.

(d) 10th Amphibian Tractor Battalion:

4th MarDiv.

(e) 11th Amphibian Tractor Battalion:

5th MarDiv.

Henry G. Lawrence, Jr.

HENRY G. LAWRENCE, Jr.,
Major, U. S. M. C.

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V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS LANDING FORCE,
In the Field.

30 April, 1945.

RECAPITULATION OF LVT LOSSES, IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN

1. 2nd Armored Amphibian Battalion.

a. LVTs at start of Operation.

70 LVT(A)(4)s.

5 LVT(2)s.

4 LVT(4)s.

b. LVTs lost during operation.

29 LVT(A)(4)s.

1 LVT(2).

1 LVT(4).

c. How LVTs were lost.

6 LVT(A)(4)s - destroyed by enemy shell fire.

8 LVT(A)(4)s - sunk - mechanical failure.

7 LVT(A)(4)s - sunk - holes in hull caused by enemy shell fire.

8 LVT(A)(4)s - sunk - out of fuel.

1 LVT(2) - sunk - out of fuel.

1 LVT(4) - sunk - out of fuel.

2. 3rd Amphibian Tractor Battalion.

a. LVTs at start of operation.

51 LVT(4)s.

49 LVT(2)s.

b. LVTs lost during operation.

14 LVT(4)s.

13 LVT(2)s.

c. How LVTs were lost.

8 LVT(4)s - 11 LVT(2)s - sunk - out of fuel,
following LSTs trying to
re-embark, lost while
hauling at night, etc.2 LVT(4)s - 1 LVT(2) - destroyed by enemy shell
fire.

Enclosure (A) to Appendix 6 to Annex CHARLIE to VACLIF Special
Action Report IWO JIMA Campaign.

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4 LVT(4)s - 1 LVT(2) - swamped on beach.

3. 5th Amphibian Tractor Battalion.

a. LVTs at start of operation.

64 LVT(4)s.

36 LVT(2)s.

b. LVTs lost during operation.

29 LVT(4)s.

14 LVT(2)s.

c. How LVTs were lost.

21 LVT(4)s - 9 LVT(2)s - sunk - out of fuel, following LSTs trying to re-embark, rammed by ships, while in tow to repair ships, enemy shell fire, etc.

6 LVT(4)s - 3 LVT(2)s - swamped on beach.

2 LVT(4)s - 2 LVT(2)s - burned in ammunition dump explosion, and from enemy shell fire hits on the beach.

4. 10th Amphibian Tractor Battalion.

a. LVTs at start of operation.

53 LVT(4)s.

50 LVT(2)s.

b. LVTs lost in operation.

20 LVT(4)s.

13 LVT(2)s.

c. How LVTs were lost.

12 LVT(4)s - 4 LVT(2)s - sunk - out of fuel, following LSTs trying to re-embark, while in tow to repair ships, etc.

5 LVT(4)s - 7 LVT(2)s - swamped on beach.

Enclosure (A) to Appendix 6 to Annex CHARLIE to VACLF Special
Action Report IWO JIMA Campaign.

HGL/134 RECAPITULATION OF LVT LOSSES, IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN.

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2 LVT(4)s - 2 LVT(2)s - hit mines inland of landing beaches.
1 LVT(4) - destroyed by enemy shell fire.

5. 11th Amphibian Tractor Battalion.

a. LVTs at start of operation.

51 LVT(4)s.
49 LVT(2)s.

b. LVTs lost during operation.

19 LVT(4)s.
13 LVT(2)s.

c. How LVTs were lost.

13 LVT(4)s - 8 LVT(2)s - sunk - out of fuel following LSTs trying to re-embark, mechanical trouble, etc.
3 LVT(4)s - 3 LVT(2)s - sunk by enemy shell fire.
2 LVT(4)s - 2 LVT(2)s - destroyed by enemy shell fire on the beach.
1 LVT(4) - swamped on beach.

6. Consolidated Recapitulation - All Battalions.

a. 482 LVTs (all types) at start of operation.

b. 166 LVTs (all types) total loss during operation.

Enclosure (A) to Appendix 6 to Annex CHARLIE to VACLF Special
Action Report IWO JIMA Campaign.

30 April, 1945.

LVT COMMUNICATIONS - IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN1. Planning:

a. The planning of the communication nets for the LVT battalions used at IWO JIMA was begun about D - 100 days. Other preparation and installations included installing dual-mount TCS radio equipment in some LVTs, waterproofing all radio installations in LVTs, converting the 2nd Armored Amphibian Battalion from Model TCS to Model SCR 500 series radio equipment, and the procurement of all available signal equipment needed by LVT battalions being employed in the campaign.

b. At a joint conference of the communications Officer Provisional LVT Group, the Signal Officer VAC, the Division Signal Officers, the Amphibian Battalion Commanders and representatives from Fifth Phibs Force Communication Office, control boat and LVT communication needs for the coming operation were discussed and a plan agreed upon. The suggested plan provided for each Beach Control Boat (LCP(L)) to have a Model TCS radio for use in the control of LVTs, these radios were secured and installed in all Beach Control Boats. The plan also provided for the following Navy radio equipment to be made available to Amphibian Battalions and the Provisional LVT Group for LVT Control circuits:

(1) Each TransDiv Control Vessel

- 1. TCS radio
- 1. SCR 508 radio

(2) Each TransRon Control Vessel

- 1. SCR 508 radio

(3) VACLF Free Control Vessel

- 1. SCR 508 radio

(4) Each Beach Control Boat (LCP(L)s)

- 1. TCS radio.

c. This radio equipment was to be available for LVTs control until such time as LVT units command posts were

Enclosure (B) to Appendix 6 to Annex CHARLIE to VACLF Special
Action Report IWO JIMA Campaign.

moved ashore. When moving ashore each LVT battalion was provided with a SCR 510 by the Provisional LVT Group for use on the Provisional LVT Group command net.

2. Waterproofing:

a. Each LVT battalion devoted much time and effort to waterproofing radio installations in LVTs. There was no set method used by the individual battalion communication sections in this work. A number of agents were used for waterproofing radio sets such as glyptol, waterproof paper, waterproof tape, water pump grease and other materials. All radios were mounted in the standard waterproof cabinet and the waterproofing agents mentioned above were used to further aid in preventing corrosion.

b. The Armored Amphibian Battalion was equipped with the SCR 500 series equipment mounted in the improved waterproof Fruehauf radio cabinet. This cabinet proved to be a much more satisfactory installation than the type cabinet used in previous operations.

3. Radio Circuits:

a. The radio circuits allocated and provided for LVT battalions were adequate and provided sufficient communications for LVT control functions. Each cargo battalion was assigned two frequencies for company use and a third frequency was assigned each battalion for battalion command frequency. The armored battalion used one frequency for each company and a battalion command frequency for each division. Listed below is each net allocated and the stations on each:

(1) Cargo Company Command Net.
Each LVT
Company Commander

(2) Cargo Battalion Command Net
Company Commanders
Beach Control Boats LCP(L)s
TransDiv Control Vessel

(3) Armored Company Command Net
Each LVT(A)(4)
TransDiv Control Vessel

(4) Division Armored and Cargo LVT Net.
Each TransDiv Control Vessel
TransRon Control Vessels

Enclosure (B) to Appendix 6 to Annex CHARLIE to VACLIF Special
Action Report IWO JIMA Campaign.

- (5) VACLIF LVT Common Net
Each TransRon Control Vessel
V Amphibious Corps Free Control Vessel

b. The radio circuit of the Provisional LVT Group ashore consisted of one control net using the SCR 500 series radio equipment. This net consisted of the Armored and Amphibian Tractor Battalions and the Provisional LVT Group. The battalions maintained their radio circuits when necessary to control the unloading of supplies and the routing of LVTs. The Armored Battalion maintained their radio circuit when the LVT(A)(4)s were on firing missions.

c. All radio circuits were secured to a stand-by status as rapidly as wire installations were established.

4. Equipment.

a. The present Table of Organization and Table of Allowances, including recommended changes to date, provide adequate signal equipment and personnel for the successful operation of the communication section of an Amphibian Battalion. The use of the SCR-500 series radio equipment has proven highly satisfactory to date and the complete conversion to this type equipment will be made as rapidly as it is made available.

5. Comments and Recommendations.

a. The radio circuits allocated for use in control of LVTs during IWO JIMA campaign were sufficient to meet the needs of all Amphibian Battalions and the Provisional LVT Group Headquarters and these circuits were maintained in an excellent manner at all times.

b. It is believed that a communication SOP for Armored and Amphibian Tractor Battalions should be adopted. An LVT communication SOP would eliminate different circuit plans being drawn up by each Amphibian Battalion for each operation and would simplify planning LVT communications for an operation.

c. A SOP for LVT communications is being drawn up and upon completion will be submitted to the Amphibian Tractor Officer, FMF, PAC for approval.

Enclosure (B) to Appendix 6 to Annex CHARLIE to VACLIF Special
Action Report IWO JIMA Campaign.

3. a. The 2nd Armored Amphibian Battalion used the SCR-500 series radio during this operation and the performance of this equipment was very satisfactory. This battalion reports that 100 per cent communications was maintained during all phases of the operation and that LVT crewmen are well satisfied with the radio and the inter-communication system when using this model radio.

Enclosure (B) to Appendix 6 to Annex CHARLIE to VACLF Special
Action Report IWO JIMA Campaign.

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TQM Report

Appendix 7 to Annex CHARLIE to Special Action Report IWO JIMA Campaign

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07/122

V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS LANDING FORCE,
In the Field.

27 March, 1945.

From: The Transport Quartermaster.
To : The Commanding General.
Subject: Special Action Report, Iwo Jima Campaign.
References: (a) Staff Memo 5-45.

Enclosures: (A) Breakdown of Equipment and Supplies, 4th MarDiv.
(B) Breakdown of Equipment and Supplies, 5th MarDiv.
(C) Breakdown of Equipment and Supplies, 3rd MarDiv.
(D) Breakdown of Equipment and Supplies, Corps Ships.

1. This report intends to show the Transport Quartermaster's functions covering the Iwo Jima campaign from the time of planning, the shipping for assault and garrison ships through the discharging of division, corps, and resupply ammunition ships. Difficulties encountered during this time and recommendations for the correction and improvement are submitted.

2. Enclosures (A), (B), and (C) give a clear picture of the equipment and supplies carried by each of the three divisions and the quantities aboard each ship. Enclosure (D) covers the equipment and supplies carried by corps ships.

3. (a) During the planning phase, the greatest single difficulty from a shipping point of view was with drummed fuel. Orders had specified that thirty (30) days fuel supply be carried. Early tentative plans showed that this was difficult to accomplish because of the limited fuel stowage space provided in the VC-2 type ships and the alterations necessary if fuel was to be carried outside fuel space. This problem was eventually solved by a modification in the general logistics plan, changing the fuel required to be lifted by assault units to eighteen (18) days, which had been found to be feasible.

(b) Early in the planning phase, CINCPAC informed COMPHIBSPAC of the garrison units it was desired to carry in the assault. Before it was determined by COMGENVAC that it was possible to lift all of these units, the succeeding echelons had been set up, on the assumption that these units would be carried. When initial assignments were completed, it became apparent that all desired units could not be carried in the assault, and a conference was held between members of the staffs of COMGENPOA and COMGENVAC and a priority of units to be left was drawn up. At a later conference held by CINCPAC, these units were placed in a separate echelon, the so called "assault (garrison-type) ships."

Appendix 7 to Annex CHARLIE to VACLF Special Action Report, IWO JIMA Campaign.

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TQM, Special Action Report, IWO JIMA Campaign.

(c) A great improvement in the manner of handling garrison units was noted in this operation. All units to accompany the assault were released to VAC for planning purposes even prior to the organization of the garrison force headquarters. These units were contacted direct and plans made for embarking them. Excellent cooperation was obtained both before and after the establishment of the headquarters of Iscom, Iwo Jima, and the loading of the garrison units was accomplished to the complete satisfaction of all parties. This is attributed to the early release to and control by CG, VAC, and the cooperation shown by units concerned.

(d) The first use was made in the loading for the operation of the TQM pool being established by FMF, Pac. Five TQM officers were requested and furnished for loading Corps ships. These officers were made available about one month prior to the loading dates and proved invaluable. Their use made possible a complete separation of corps and garrison units from the assault divisions. The units desired by the divisions or assigned for tactical reasons were attached early in the planning phase and no further corps or garrison units were loaded by the assault divisions. This simplified their planning and eliminated the usual practice of assigning units to the divisions for transportation only.

(e) The 4th MarDiv loaded at Maui between December 27 and January 8. Four APA's or AKA's were loaded simultaneously at Kahului, Maui. Two days were allowed for APA's and four days for AKA's, with one day between loadings for assembly of cargo. APA's were loaded one TransDiv (4 ships) at a time, and the 4 AKA's were loaded last. This went on schedule and no serious difficulties were encountered.

(f) The 5th MarDiv loaded at Hawaii between December 25 and January 16. One TransDiv (4 APA's, 1 AKA) was loaded simultaneously, one APA being loaded in the stream. Four days were allowed for each TransDiv, and no difficulty was encountered in meeting the schedule. One small AKA was loaded ahead of the TransDivs. One large AKA, from the last TransDiv to be loaded, could not make the operation, and a substitute was furnished which arrived late and did not complete in time for rehearsal.

(g) The 3d MarDiv loaded at Guam. No details are available beyond that contained in enclosure (C).

(h) Corps and garrison ships loaded at various times between December 23 and January 25. Six (6) APA's and four (4) AKA's were used in this group. Corps troops loaded from Maui and Oahu, and garrison units from Oahu. Dates for individual ships were determined by ship's availability, availability of units for loading, non-interference with 4th MarDiv loading at Kahului, and the desirability of having all ships on rehearsal.

(i) One Corps APA was found to require major overhaul after rehearsal and had to be unloaded and reloaded into a substitute. One corps APA broke down shortly after departure from Pearl and returned for unloading and reloading into a substitute.

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(j) Sixty (60) LST's and thirty-one (31) LSM's were assigned for the operation. Of these, nineteen (19) LST's were assigned each division, fourteen (14) for LVT's and five (5) for DUKW's carrying division artillery. The remainder, twenty-two (22) LST's, were used to carry various corps units. LSM's were assigned sixteen (16) to the 4th MarDiv, twelve (12) to the 5th MarDiv, and three (3) to corps units. The difference between divisions was balanced by an LSD assigned to the 5th Division.

(k) Eleven (11) LST's of each assault division were "preloaded" with cargo, mostly ammunition, which was desired ashore early, to be unloaded by LVT. Four u/f for division artillery and seven u/f for corps artillery were underloaded in sixteen (16) LST's. With the exception of six (6) of the infantry LST's and the five (5) for 5th Division artillery, this was accomplished by corps in the Pearl area because of better loading facilities. Many small difficulties were encountered with labor, LST's breaking down, and not making loading schedules for various reasons, but all were completed in time for rehearsal. See C-4 report for details of preloads. Berth K-12, Pearl Harbor was found unsuitable for loading on a close time schedule. LST's had difficulty getting in and out on time and often had to be moved to allow other ships to enter. Kewalo Basin, Honolulu, was, on the contrary, ideal for this loading due to the excellent cooperation and facilities.

(l) LST's and LSM's assigned to the assault divisions loaded their final loads at Kahului, Hilo, and at Maalaea Bay, Maui and Hapuna Bay, Hawaii between January 5 and January 10. Beaching facilities were available for two (2) LST's or LSM's at Kahului and four (4) LST's or LSM's at Hilo. The only serious difficulty was with the weather at Hapuna Bay, which retarded loading for two (2) days, but subsided in time to complete loading on schedule.

(m) Considerable reshuffling of LVT's, cargo, and personnel was necessary at Saipan, February 11-15. Three battalions of LVT's joined the assault force there and six LST's were first available to assault units upon arrival, to receive assault battalions and LVT's. There were a multitude of final details to be accomplished, and after the rehearsal at Saipan, numerous repairs to be made. A great deal of confusion existed because of the lack of a central control with full knowledge of what was to be done. The Corps LVT officer and Port Director, Saipan worked together most ably, but were assisted only by officers of the LVT battalions.

4. (a) The average tonnage embarked was about 550 tons per APA and 2,000 tons per AKA. LCT's, LSM's, and LST's were used exclusively for unloading, since after D-day, few ships' boats were able to beach due to surf conditions. Unloading was very slow because of this and enemy fire on the beaches. Poor beach conditions slowed unloading of craft which were able to beach, the sand being such that tracked equipment only could move inland. LVT's hauled cargo off the beach and forward to front line units. Tractors towing pallets successfully negotiated the sand hills off the beach. Pallets were extremely successful.

(b) The average time to complete unloading division APA's was 7 to 8 days, AKA's 9 to 10 days. This does not present a true picture of unloading, since the greatest difficulties were lack of craft for unloading and inability to handle cargo on the beach due to congestion.

(c) Corps ships were not begun until D+6 except for a few special called items. Once started, Corps APA's were unloading in an average of 2 to 3 days, Corps AKA's in about 4 days. This again does not present a true picture of unloading, but shows the improvement when more craft were available and beaches were being developed. Unloading of corps ships was further complicated by the landing of supplies and equipment of the reserve division which took place simultaneously.

5. Weather at Iwo Jima is characterized by continuous medium to heavy swells. This caused difficulty in keeping landing craft alongside while receiving their loads, and the usual troubles of loading into a rolling, heaving boat were constantly present. LSM's in particular, while invaluable during unloading, had a sharp roll and were particularly hard to manage alongside a big ship. Great care should be exercised in loading a landing craft to insure that unloading on the beach is not hindered. In many cases, cargo was dumped in landing craft, heavy crates were loaded on top of other cargo or stacked in the bow opening where a crane could not be used, and other means employed to get cargo off the ships with no consideration given to unloading the landing craft. Due to delays involved on the beaches, this actually slowed unloading of ships.

6. Standard rigging and slings were used. Ships were well equipped with all types of cargo handling gear and no shortages developed.

7. Garrison units should not accompany the assault except for liaison groups, and units which have a tactical mission and are requested by the assault commander. Other garrison units, including air forces, should be loaded separately and sailed to a rear area close to the target to be called when the situation warrants. In this operation, garrison elements were landed when they had no immediate need for them ashore. This was because the ships carrying garrison units were in the same Transon as the assault units and had to be unloaded to sail for another operation. Further, ships were kept in the target area which would otherwise have been in a rear area on call. There should be no intermingling of assault and garrison units as their missions are necessarily very different. Some garrison units were afloat at the target for as much as two weeks and at the end of that period were landed although still not wanted ashore.

8. Several types of preload were employed in order to have all types of cargo on call. The LST preloads were satisfactory as to composition, but in some cases not satisfactory in manner of loading. No preload should be side-loaded in LST tank decks as this interferes with LVT upkeep enroute. No preload should be loaded in LVT maintenance LST's as the load interferes with their primary function. Preloads in vehicles should consist almost completely of ammunition. In this operation, amphibian trailers were very

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unsatisfactory. Several were sunk during launching, and those which reached the beach could not be moved beyond the beach by any means whatever.

9. The preloaded supplies in the LST's were very valuable and were unloaded by LVT during the first three days.

10. The first ammunition resupply ship arrived on D/7, the second on D/15, the third on D/22. All three were Victory ships. A special resupply of artillery and mortar ammunition was sent from the Marianas on 3 LST's and arrived on D/22. Only one of the three LST's was used, and only small amounts taken out of the third Victory ship.

11. Loading of ammunition resupply ships was not satisfactory. On the first to arrive, the hatch squares were loaded with ammunition, and delay was encountered in getting to types of ammunition desired immediately. Hatch squares must be left clear, despite the stowage space sacrificed. In all three Victories, sufficient elasticity for discharging had not been provided. Artillery and mortar ammunition were needed urgently. In all three ships these types were almost completely loaded in Nos. 3 and 4 hatches and while troops ashore were short, only part of the ship could discharge what was needed. DUKW's proved the most satisfactory method of discharging ammunition.

12. (a) Reembarkation was effected beginning on 14 March, 1945.

(b) The 4th MarDiv was assigned eight (8) APA's, one (1) AP, three (3) AK's, and one (1) LSD for evacuation. All ships were loaded intermittently as units were released and could be reembarked. All loading was done over one beach about 200 yards wide, using six (6) LST's and ten (10) LSM's. LST's were used primarily for personnel, although vehicles were loaded on the main deck when LSM's were not available. Tank decks of LST's should not be used for cargo to be transferred to a larger ship. The 4th MarDiv completed loading and sailed on the morning of the 19th.

(c) The 5th MarDiv was assigned one (1) APA, eight (8) AP's, three (3) AK's, and one (1) LSD for evacuation. Loading was effected 18 to 27 March. Difficulties with weather slowed the loading, otherwise their loading was similar to that of the 4th MarDiv.

(d) Corps troops returning to the Hawaiian area used one AP and one AK. These were loaded 25-27 March and sailed with the 5th MarDiv.

(e) Corps artillery and the 2d Separate Engineer Battalion were evacuated to Guam using three (3) LST's and part of two (2) AP's. These units were loaded over a period of two weeks as ships became available.

(f) The 3d MarDiv was evacuated in ships moving garrison elements to Iwo, as they became available. This was not completed as of the date of this report.

(g) The 8th Field Depot was assigned one APA and one AK for evacuation. This was not completed as of the date of this report.

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TQM, Special Action Report, IWO JIMA Campaign.

(h) LVT's were evacuated as shipping was available, either to Saipan or Pearl. This covered a long period because of the large number involved. Every ship leaving the target and not otherwise employed was filled to capacity with LVT's.

13. The following recommendations are submitted for the improvement in loading future operations.

(a) That echelon lists be held up until assault planning has reached a point where it can be determined whether or not all desired garrison elements can be lifted with the assault.

(b) That the TQM pool being organized by FMF, Pac be continued and expanded.

(c) That the practice followed in this operation of not assigning corps or garrison units to division shipping for transportation be continued.

(d) That Kewalo Basin, Honolulu, be used for all combat loading of LST's in preference to Berth K-12, Pearl Harbor.

(e) That when transfers of personnel or cargo are necessary at a forward area, all divisions and regiments have representatives at the Port Director's office with the detailed information of transfers so these can be accomplished expeditiously.

14. It is believed that ammunition resupply must be improved and the following recommendations are submitted.

(a) Top load all types of artillery and mortar ammunition and spread through all hatches.

(b) Supplement Victory type ships with LST's.

(c) Emphasize palletization particularly in 105MM and 155MM types.

C. O. BIERMAN
C. O. BIERMAN.

BREAKDOWN OF EQUIPMENT & SUPPLIES. V A C (Corps and Garrison Troops)

[illegible]


NUMBER OF VEHICLES																									
AMMUNITION, 4 TON	3	3	11		1			14	6	12	3		1												54
AIR COMPRESSOR, 105 CU. FT.	1				1		1		3			4					8								22
CRANE, 12 TON													1						1						1
CAR, 5 PASSENGER				1			2		7								22		7						38
CRANE, CRANES																									38
DISTILLATION UNIT	3					1		15					14				6								39
ROCKET LAUNCHER																	4								4
LTV (4)												1													1
DOLLY										2			2				1								5
BULK										2	50	1		2											53
EARTH MOVER					1				1																2
GUN, 90 MM													16												16
GRADER, ROAD							1		2			3		5			3								14
WAGON DRILL					1				1								8								10
GUN, 40 MM																	32								32
ED, 10																	2								2
HOWITZER, 155 MM											24														24
DITCHER, BUCKETS									1			1					1								2
CHURNER, ROPE									1								1								2
MOTORCYCLE							2																		2
MIXER, CONCRETE							2																		2
ROLLER, TANDEN 5 TON						4			2			2													8
ROLLER, TANDEN 12 TON						2			1								1								4
ROOTER						1			1			1		1											4
SHOVEL, GAS												6		3			2		1						12
SCRAPER, 8 YD												4		5											10
SCRAPER, 12 YD												4													4
TANK RECOVERY															3		1								4
TANK, MEDIUM M4A2															46										46
D-7, V/ROCK												4	4	1			4		3						16
TRACTOR, TD-15											1	2	3				1		1						8
TRACTOR, D-8 W/BLADE												4													4
TRACTOR, TD-9				1	4			2	2			1	2												13
TRACTOR, TD-9 W/BLADE																	6		2						9
TRACTOR, TD-9 W/CRANE																	2								3
TRACTOR, TD-15 W/BLADE												4		8			5								21
TRACTOR, TD-15											1	12		8			1								21
TRACTOR, GLETRAC																									1
TRACTOR, ED-14					2			2				2					5								11
TRACTOR, ED-7						5		2									3								10
TRACTOR, M-4										2			6												10
TRAIL, 4 TON, CARGO	8	8	1	3	12	3	21	5	10	3	26	7	5			4	10								126
TRAILER, SC-1																									4
TRAILER, AMPHIBIOUS																	2								2
TRAILER, SEARCHLIGHT, M-51																	32								32
TRAIL, DARKROOM, REC.														1											1
TRAIL, 1 TON, 4 W/ CARGO	2	1	2	10		1	15	3	5	34	13	8	12			6	12								121
TRAIL, 1 TON, LUBRICATION	1		1		1					1	2	1		1			4								12
TRAIL, 1 TON, WATER PUMP.																									--
TRAIL, 1 TON, 2 W/ STEER	1		1							1	2						1								6
TRAIL, 1 TON, FIRE PUMP						8	1			8			1												18
TRAIL, 1 TON, FLOODLIGHT						13	1			4			1												19
TRAIL, 1-TON, LIGHTING	3	2	2			1				2			9	5			4								28
TRAIL, 1 TON, W/RADIO P.H.																									--
TRAIL, 1 TON, W/CR. 300 GAL.	2	3	3		5	5	15	14	10	7	11	4	5	8		1	6								99
TRAIL, 2 TON, 4 W/ CARGO																									--
TRAIL, 2 TON, 4 W/ STEER	1									1				1			2								5
TRAIL, 2 TON, 4 W/ WELDING	1											3		3			4		2						13
TRAIL, 1 TON, WATER PUMP.																									--
TRAIL, ATHEL, 6 TON											6														6
TRAIL, 5 TON, 4 W/ HACH SHIP							1		4					1											6
TRAIL, FORD SERVICE M-5						4			4	4															12
TRAIL, LOVERED										1		1		6			4								12
TRAIL, FUEL, 500 GAL						8																			8
TRAIL, 177													5												5
TRAIL, 564													4												4
TRAIL, STRAM	1		1		1												2								5
TRAIL, M-9							6	2		2				4											4
TRAIL, 2 W/CR. PR-95																									10
TRAIL, 1 TON, 2 W/ STEELIZ.	1	1	2			3	1		2	2															12
TRAIL, FUEL, AAC			10								10														20
TRAIL, RANGER, AACR					1																				1
TRUCK, L-19					3		25	30	10	15	15	20	26	14	10	8		22		2					250
TRUCK, 4 TON, W/RADIO	5	6	23		5		16				2		20												70
TRUCK, 4 TON, W/BLADE																									1
TRUCK, TD-15 (ARMORED)																									7
TRUCK, 4 TON AMBULANCE	1	3	4					7		6	10		1				1								33
TRUCK, TRACTOR																									3
TRUCK, 1 TON BROOM																									1
TRUCK, 1 TON CARGO																									43
TRUCK, FIRE 1 1/2 TON	1		3							2		14			7										1
TRUCK, 4 TON FORD SHIP																									2
TRUCK, 1 1/2 TON, W/RADIO																									2
TRUCK, 2 1/2 TON 6-5 CARGO	12	7	7	12	8	9	52	11	31	23	9	9	16	1		25	66		5						121
TRUCK, 2 1/2 TON 6-5 SHIP	2						1	1			7	23		30			1								65
TRUCK, 2 1/2 TON 6-5 W/CRANE	1													1			2								5
TRUCK, 1 1/2 TON 6-5							3																		3
TRUCK, WATER, 750 GAL.							3			6		1	2												16
TRUCK, 1 TON LUBRICATION																									1
TRUCK, 2 1/2 TON MACHIN SHIP																									3
TRUCK, 3 1/2 TON M72 CARRIER			10		7		7	12	7	6	11	1		8		7	1								77
TRUCK, L-19						1																			1
TRUCK, 2 1/2 TON SIG CORPS							1																		1
TRUCK, 2 1/2 TON SIG REPAIR																									4
ROLLER, TANDEN																									--
ROLLER, BREAKSFOOT							2					2				6									10
STEER, AAC			2																						

PREPARED BY THE TRANSPORT QUARTERMASTER, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS
5 February, 1945

C. O. BIERMAN,
Lt. Col., USMC.

Medical Report

Appendix 8 to Annex CHARLIE to Special Action Report IWO JIMA Campaign.



0122B
06/120

V Amphibious Corps Landing Force
In the Field.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
24 March 1945.

From: The Corps Surgeon.
To: The Commanding General.
Subject: Special Action Report, IWO JIMA Campaign.
Enclosure: (A) Embarkation Chart - Corps Medical Units.
(B) Hospitalization Ashore.
(C) Preliminary Report, Medical Air Evacuation, IWO JIMA Campaign, for period March 3, 1945 to March 20, 1945, inclusive.
(D) Mobile Blood Bank Facility Report, IWO JIMA Campaign.

1. PLANNING PHASE.

a. Medical planning for the IWO JIMA Campaign was begun in October 1944. In preparation for the operation, numerous conferences were held with the medical representatives of the following commands:

- (1) FMF Pacific
- (2) Fifth Amphibious Force
- (3) Attack Force
- (4) CinCPac - CinCPOA
- (5) ComServForPac
- (6) USAFPOA
- (7) Iscom (prospective) IWO JIMA
- (8) 4th and 5th MarDivs
- (9) CVE "MAKIN ISLAND"

b. Conferences were also held with the Commanding Officers of the following units assigned or attached to the V Amphibious Corps for the operation:

- (1) V Amphibious Corps Medical Battalion,
- (2) Corps Evacuation Hospital # 1
- (3) 38th Field Hospital

c. Contact with the 3rd Marine Division was via officer messenger and through FMF Pacific until the 3rd Marine Division was released to the V Amphibious Corps at the Target Area.

d. By means of these conferences many medical problems, both tactical and logistical, were adjusted.

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e. For the computation of casualties, it was assumed that fourteen (14) days would be required to complete the seizure of the objective; that 5% of the entire force would become casualties on each of the first and second days; three per cent of the entire force on the third and fourth days; and $1\frac{1}{2}$ per cent of the entire force on each of the remaining ten days; that twenty per cent of all casualties would be dead or missing. While the duration of the operation was in excess of the assumed duration, the expected casualty rate followed rather closely the actual rate.

2. ORGANIZATION.

a. The organization of each of the three Marine divisions included their normal complement of attached medical troops plus one medical battalion (H&S and five medical companies) per division. In addition the Landing Force was supported by the following Corps medical units:

- (1) VAC Medical Battalion (H&S and three medical companies, plus temporary attachments listed below).. 28 Off 310 Enl

(a) Temporary attachments

1' Mobile Blood Bank Facility 1 Off 2 Enl
 2' Navy Field Medical Photographic
 Unit # 3 1 Off 4 Enl

(2) Corps Evacuation Hospital # 1 27 Off 222 Enl

(3) 38th Field Hospital (Army) 17 Off 190 Enl

(4) "D" Company of the 3rd Division Medical Battalion was temporarily detached from that division and assigned as medical reinforcement to the LSV "OZARK". This ship was reported as having unusually good medical facilities, with possibility for expansion on the tank deck. The contemplated use of the OZARK was a reserve medical facility at night during the retirement of the transports from the target area. Her capacity was estimated at 450 casualties. It is expected that this activity will render a detailed report at an early date.

3. REHEARSAL.

a. The rehearsal for the operation was conducted between the period 11 - 18 January 1945. On 11 January, Corps Headquarters opened aboard the AGC 10. One Corps medical unit, the V Amphibious Corps Medical Battalion, was embarked during the rehearsal, but did not land during that period.

b. Divisional medical units received some training in the handling of simulated casualties during the rehearsal. Each APA landing troops had 40 officers and men designated as simulated casualties. Each LST landing troops had 10 men designated as simulated casualties. Each APA

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was designated to receive 15 litter and 10 ambulatory casualties. Remaining casualties were left ashore to be cared for by the Landing Force.

4. REHABILITATION PERIOD.

a. During this period adjustments were made to correct observed or apparent deficiencies of the rehearsal. A series of exercises for combined and unit staff training were held. Final readiness details were checked over and embarkation was completed.

5. EMBARKATION.

a. Nearly ideal dispersion of Corps medical units and their cargo was obtained by embarkation into six APA's, three AKA's, and one LST as shown in embarkation chart (Enclosure A). For details of embarkation of divisional medical units see the respective division report.

6. ENROUTE TO STAGING AREA.

a. Upon departure on 27 January, individual training of personnel aboard ship was prescribed. The integration of medical and military plans was disseminated and reviewed by medical officers, particularly between opposite numbers of the Landing Force and Attack Force. Organizational training, within the limitations imposed by shipboard facilities was carried out.

7. STAGING AREA.

a. During the period 11 - 13 February, while at the staging area, a simulated landing operation, in which the troops debarked but did not land, was held. Medical units with the assault waves received training in debarkation.

b. Rear Admiral Laning (MC), and the Corps Surgeon inspected the LSV OZARK and were favorably impressed by the arrangements for care of casualties.

8. ENROUTE TO TARGET.

a. As in Paragraph 6 above.

9. LANDING AND ESTABLISHMENT OF MEDICAL UNITS.

a. During the initial stages the medical services were entirely those of the divisions.

b. The Corps Surgeon landed on D plus 2, but was unable to visit any beach other than Red 2. Casualties were found to be receiving

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proper treatment and supply and evacuation proceeding satisfactorily. Beaches were so crowded that no space was available for any Corps medical units. Divisions had not yet landed all their medical companies. All areas were intensely congested. Evacuation was continued directly from the beaches.

c. Collecting Sections of the division medical battalions landed with the assault troops. As a result of heavy enemy artillery and mortar fire on the beaches during the first few days, casualties of medical personnel were heavy. On D plus 5, requisitions for hospital corpsmen as replacements were received from both the 4th and 5th Marine Divisions. Each division was proffered a medical company in support, but requests for individual replacements were refused, since it was desired to maintain the tactical integrity of Corps medical units.

d. 3rd Division Medical Battalion.

(1) Companies A and B were landed on D plus 2 and D plus 7 respectively. D Company remained aboard the LSV "OZARK" as medical reinforcement for that vessel, which was being used as a reserve medical facility. No other medical companies of this division were landed.

e. 4th Division Medical Battalion.

(1) Companies A and C began landing at 1430, D plus 1; Company B on D plus 3; Company D on D plus 8, and Company E on D plus 9. On D plus 8, Company D began to establish a field hospital. On D plus 9, Company E merged with Company D to form a division field hospital at TA 165 K. At noon of D plus 4, the division assumed control of the medical battalion and the division medical supply.

f. 5th Division Medical Battalion.

(1) Companies B, D, and E landed on D plus 4; Company C on D plus 6, and Company A on D plus 7. Companies B, C, D, and E merged to establish a division field hospital at TA 148 B, which opened at 0800 on D plus 9.

g. V Amphibious Corps Medical Battalion.

(1) Due to the marked limitation of area available and the extreme congestion resulting from having made the assault in the narrow southern portion of the island, space for establishing Corps medical units was at a considerable premium throughout the campaign.

(2) On D plus 6, Company A landed and began to set up an operating room and 40 beds, with provision for expansion, just south of Green Beach in TA 132 I.

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(3) The area was allocated by the Shore Party Commander, bulldozers were provided to dig in the operating room and ward tentage, and within eight hours, at 1600, D plus 7, this unit was established with 110 beds and receipt of casualties was begun.

(4) On D plus 9, Companies B and C were landed, and on D plus 11, Company B began to establish a hospital at TA 163 J. At 1500, D plus 11, this unit opened with 100 beds.

(5) On D plus 12, Company C began to establish adjacent to Company B, and merged with Company B to begin receiving casualties on D plus 13.

(6) H&S Company remained with the Company A installation.

h. Corps Evacuation Hospital # 1.

(1) On D plus 7, landing of the Corps Evacuation Hospital # 1 was begun, and by evening of D plus 8, sufficient of its supplies and equipment was ashore to establish a 200 bed hospital. By evening of D plus 12, this hospital had established an evacuation station consisting of surgical facilities and 250 beds in TA 147 Q on the southern portion of Purple Beach, and began receiving casualties.

(2) At 0800 on D plus 15, the remainder of this hospital was established in five revetments just off the north end of the No. 1 airfield in TA 181 O and TA 182 K. This installation consisted of two operating rooms, X-ray facilities, and 300 beds.

i. 38th Field Hospital.

(1) On D plus 8, landing of personnel of the 38th Field Hospital was begun and was completed on D plus 11. Their equipment and transportation was landed between D plus 10 and D plus 12.

(2) On D plus 11, sufficient equipment was ashore to begin establishing the hospital, and on that date, a site at TA 181 HI was approved, and leveling and digging in with a bulldozer was begun. Considerable time had to be spent in clearing this site of mines and duds. At 1200, D plus 12, the hospital opened, and at 1330 began to receive casualties.

10. EVACUATION.

a. Ashore.

(1) It is believed that evacuation of casualties and their ensuing care during the IWO JIMA operation approached nearer to the

ideal than in any previous operation in the Central Pacific Area. Notwithstanding the extreme bitterness of combat over a prolonged period with a heavy casualty rate which maintained a daily average in excess of 1000 per day during the first 21 days, evacuation was carried on in a continuous, smoothly functioning, completely integrated and coordinated operation, in which the wounded received the maximum medical care commensurate with the military situation. The success of a major problem of casualty evacuation was achieved. By D plus 33, a total of 17,677 casualties had been evacuated.

(2) Evacuation within the divisions was carried out along the normal chain of evacuation with division medical battalions supplying second echelon medical service. However, evacuation forward of the battalion aid stations was extremely difficult and hazardous due to the unusually rocky, creviced, desolate, and exposed terrain over which the litter bearers were compelled to operate. Operation of ambulances between the battalion aid stations and division field hospitals was also rendered very difficult by the type of terrain encountered.

(3) The Corps Medical Units furnished third echelon support to the divisions, and, in addition, their ambulances were utilized for evacuation from the divisions to the Corps hospitals, and from the Corps hospitals to the beaches.

(a) The V Amphibious Corps Medical Battalion (less H&S and Company A) was in direct support of the 3rd MarDiv.

(b) The 38th Field Hospital supported the 5th MarDiv.

(c) While it was initially intended to utilize the Corps Evacuation Hospital # 1 (less the unit established on Purple Beach) in support of the 4th MarDiv, that division, with its shorter lines, proximity to the beach and airfield, and its own excellent division hospital, never required the support of a Corps hospital unit other than the specialized neuro-surgical and ophthalmological surgical services. Casualties from the 3rd and 5th MarDivs, Corps Troops, and patients screened out by the Air Evacuation Unit comprised the major portion of the admissions to this hospital.

(d) Company A, V Amphibious Corps Medical Battalion, predominantly supported the Landing Force in providing the specialized services of neuro-surgery, ophthalmological surgery, and neuro-psychiatry. In addition, this unit furnished medical support to Corps units behind divisions as well as those units on the eastern beaches. The fine division hospital established by the 4th MarDiv cared for most of the urgent surgical cases from the northern flank of the eastern beaches after D plus 9.

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(e) The unit of the Corps Evacuation Hospital #1 established on Purple beach furnished medical support to Corps units behind the divisions as well as to the units on the western beaches. It also furnished an additional excellent orthopedic service for all troops.

(4) Corps medical units not only evacuated the division medical facilities, but also provided their own evacuation to the beach evacuation stations. In addition to the normal landing craft available for evacuation to ships, as many DUKW's as could be provided were also excellently utilized for this purpose. At times DUKW's were the only small craft that could make the trip through the heavy surf. In some instances, DUKW's were used direct from the Corps hospitals to the ships for serious cases whose condition might otherwise have been jeopardized by transfer at the beach. DUKW's have repeatedly proven their unquestioned value in the evacuation of the wounded in this theater, and more and more use of them should be made for this purpose whenever possible.

(5) The Weasel was of some value during the early phases for lateral evacuation over the heavy, loose, volcanic sand on the eastern beaches, and in forward areas where wheeled vehicles could not be used. However, its value is not to be compared with that of DUKW's or LVT's for the same use when these latter vehicles are available.

(6) An outstanding service was rendered by the evacuation station operating on the eastern beaches under the direction of the 4th MarDiv evacuation officer, and on the western beaches by the Corps Evacuation Hospital #1 evacuation officer.

(7) Corps medical units insured completion of urgent surgery for all cases prior to evacuation to ships.

(8) For details of activities of medical units within the divisions, see the report of the division concerned.

b. Water.

(1) Continual close liaison was maintained between the Attack Force Surgeon afloat and the Landing Force Surgeon ashore, resulting in a well coordinated, smooth transition in the chain of evacuation from shore to ship. The personal contact was augmented by the use of the SCR 608 voice radio.

(2) The first hospital ship arrived on D plus 1, and the last one departed on D plus 23. During this period a total of eight hospital ships, two of which made three complete roundtrips, and the reserve hospital ship (LSV "OZARK"), were filled to capacity. These vessels were in addition to the capacity loads taken out by the transports and LST(H)'s.

(3) as of D plus 33, 17,677 casualties were evacuated to ships.

(4) For details of surface evacuation, reference should be made to Attack Force (CTF 53) Report.

c. Air.

(1) On D plus 12, the advance echelon of Air Evacuation Squadron # 2 (VE-2), based at Agaña Field GUAM, reported. However, enemy fire on the No. 1 airfield precluded active operations beginning on that date, although one plane did evacuate twelve casualties upon departure. Sporadic artillery and mortar fire continued to be received on the field daily thereafter but did not seriously interfere with the evacuation scheduled.

(2) The Corps H&S Battalion Medical Officer furnished tentage for temporary cover of casualties awaiting loading. He also provided medical supplies and hot drinks for the casualties, and during the early phases he, himself, and some of his hospital corpsmen reinforced the station. Additional litter bearers were provided from the Corps Evacuation Hospital # 1 as required.

(3) The facilities of Company B, 3rd Medical Battalion, adjacent to the Air Evacuation Station, were also made available for temporary cover of casualties awaiting planes.

(4) Casualties selected for air evacuation were given a preliminary initial screening by the medical officers at the medical installation from which they were being sent, and the final screening was made by the medical officers in the Air Evacuation Unit at the airfield. Casualties not believed suitable for air evacuation were sent to the nearby Corps Evacuation Hospital # 1.

(5) On D plus 26, the station was moved to the # 2 airfield since the # 1 airfield was being converted to completely tactical use.

(6) In spite of two casualty loaded planes being hit by enemy fire on take-offs, necessitating their landing and transfer of casualties to other planes, evacuation proceeded on schedule. None of the casualties were re-wounded by these actions.

(7) As a result of careful screening, no deaths occurred aboard the evacuation planes.

(8) There were times when air evacuation was the only means of evacuation from the island as a result of unfavorable sea conditions or lack of facilities afloat.

(9) A total of 2358 casualties were evacuated by air. This air evacuation unit did an outstanding job and deserves much credit for the great assistance rendered in assuring the success of the evacuation problem during the operation. For details of the operation of this unit, see Enclosure (C).

11. HOSPITALIZATION ASHORE

a. Divisional.

(1) Every effort was made to retain maximum flexibility and mobility of division medical battalions and to rely predominantly upon Corps for hospitalization support ashore and for completion of urgent surgery prior to evacuation.

(2) The 4th MarDiv began to operate an excellent field hospital formed by merging medical Companies D and E on D plus 9 in TA 165 K. It had a capacity of 350 beds with 176 as maximum occupied for any one day. It closed at 1500 D plus 23 for reembarkation.

(3) The 5th MarDiv established a highly efficient field hospital, formed out of remnants of Medical Companies B, C, D, and E, at TA 148 B. It opened at 0800, D plus 9, and reached a maximum bed capacity of 400. The maximum beds occupied on any one day was 308. It closed in preparation for reembarkation at 1200 on D plus 30.

(4) The 3rd MarDiv did not land sufficient equipment to establish a field hospital. The two medical companies that landed set up tentage cover for casualties awaiting evacuation to Corps hospitals, and the facilities of B Medical Company, adjacent to the Air Evacuation Station, were also made available for temporary cover for casualties awaiting loading into planes. On D plus 29, B Medical Company of the 3rd MarDiv took over the operation of the hospital that had been established by B Company of the V Amphibious Corps Medical Battalion in TA 163 J, utilizing some equipment of this Corps unit, which was preparing to reembark.

(5) For detailed accounts of divisional hospitalization, see report of the division concerned.

b. Corps.

(1) Corps Medical Battalion.

(a) The Corps Medical Battalion was an experienced organization which had been on previous combat operations. Company A (TA 132 I) of this battalion was the first Corps unit to receive casualties, which began arriving at 1600 on D plus 7. A neuro-surgeon and an

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ophthalmological surgeon were included in the staff of the Corps Medical Battalion, and the services of these specialists were made available at Company A for all troops. The Corps Medical Battalion also had a neuro-psychiatrist on its staff, and his neuro-psychiatric facilities were augmented by a neuro-psychiatrist from the 4th MarDiv in order that all definite neuro-psychiatric cases from every unit could be pooled at this medical company for further disposition. In addition, this neuro-psychiatric facility acted as a screening center for classification of borderline NP - combat fatigue cases. This centralization of specialty facilities worked out very efficiently and provided the maximum care for these serious cases commensurate with the military situation. Considerable brain and spinal cord surgery was performed at this unit with unexpectedly good results considering the difficult field conditions under which the surgeons had to work.

(b) Companies B and C merged in TA 163 J and began receiving casualties at 1500 D plus 11. This hospital furnished general medical and surgical service in support of the 3rd MarDiv, and efficiently rendered a high standard of medical care to a large volume of casualties.

(c) The combined bed capacity for the V Amphibious Corps Medical Battalion was 310, of which 187 were the combined maximum occupied on any one day.

(d) The Corps Medical Battalion closed for reembarkation on D plus 29.

(2) Corps Evacuation Hospital # 1.

(a) The congestion on this small island combined with the violence of combat to make selection of a site for the Corps Evacuation Hospital extremely difficult. However, a portion of the hospital was established in TA 147 Q on south Purple Beach, with basic facilities of an operating room and wards being erected first. This unit had 250 beds available and began receiving casualties on D plus 12. It was organized and operated by a highly qualified orthopedic surgeon whose services were made available to all troops. Urgent surgery for all cases was completed before evacuation, and in addition, this unit furnished medical services for the western beaches, Corps Troops behind the Divisions, and operated an evacuation station. The unit did an outstanding job.

(b) The Corps Evacuation Hospital # 1 (less the unit on Purple Beach) established two operating rooms, X-ray facilities, and 300 beds in airplane revetments just north of # 1 airfield in TA 181 O and TA 182 K and furnished general medical and surgical support to the 3rd and 5th MarDivs. In addition, it furnished medical service to Corps Troops and casualties screened out of the Air Evacuation Unit. Its highly qualified surgeons contributed much to the standard of medical care

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accorded the casualties.

(c) The Corps Evacuation Hospital # 1 reached a combined bed capacity of 550, of which 201 were occupied on any one day.

(d) This hospital closed for reembarkation on D plus 29.

(3) 38th Field Hospital.

(a) This combat experienced field hospital, being in direct support of the 5th MarDiv in that division's zone of action, carried the brunt of the load of casualties received from that division, whose casualties were very heavy.

(b) The site available for its establishment was the farthest advanced of all Corps Medical units, and considerable efforts were required in clearing it of mines, duds, and establishing adequate security about it.

(c) At 1200, D plus 12, it opened in TA 181 HI and receipt of casualties began at 1330 on that date for general medical and surgical care.

(d) The two surgical teams, each consisting of two surgeons and three enlisted men, temporarily attached from the 41st Station Hospital of Garrison Force, landed with the 38th Field Hospital, and were of great value in operating a separate surgery containing two operating tables.

(e) This hospital was also designated to receive POW casualties and civilians. However, as a result of evacuation of civilians from IWO JIMA prior to the assault, only Prisoner of War casualties were hospitalized by this unit.

(f) By D plus 29, the load of serious casualties fell entirely onto the 38th Field Hospital, pending establishment of the 41st Station Hospital, a 250 bed Garrison Force unit. At that time, B Company of the 3rd Medical Battalion was able to handle cases not requiring urgent surgery.

(g) Much credit is due the personnel of the 38th Field Hospital for their tireless efforts in caring for the wounded. Frequently their load of fresh casualties was so heavy that their surgeons were compelled to operate throughout the night.

(h) The 41st Station Hospital was expected to be ready to begin receiving patients by 23 March (D plus 32).

(4) All of the foregoing hospitals gave each other mutual

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support in that when one installation had more operative cases than it could promptly care for, the excess cases were directed to another hospital. These diversions were usually coordinated through the Corps Surgeon, but in some cases were made directly from the hospitals themselves.

(5) For details of daily hospitalization ashore, see Enclosure (B).

CORPS HOSPITAL ADMISSIONS & DISPOSITIONS

Unit	:Period :Covered	:admis- :sions	Dispositions					:Remain- :ing
			Evacuated		:Duty	:Died	:Other	
			:Water	:Air				
VAC Med En	:D plus 7:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:
	: to	: 1022	: 344	: 382	: 160	: 90	: 15	: 31
	:D plus 28:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:
	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:
Corps Evac Hosp # 1	:D plus 12:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:
	: to	: 1639	: 1078	: 277	: 216	: 36	: 24	: 0
	:D plus 28:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:
	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:
38th Field Hospital	:D plus 12:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:
	: to	: 1237	: 194	: 276	: 305	: 43	: 171	: 248
	:D plus 33:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:
	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:

12. CASUALTIES.

a. The ruggedness of the volcanic terrain, the intricate, well-prepared and organized defense system, and the tenacity with which the enemy defended this key island combined to produce the heaviest casualties in the assault of any island fortress in the Pacific Ocean Areas to date.

b. The daily average combined casualties exceeded 1000 per day during the first twenty one days of the assault.

c. The prolonged and effective use of enemy artillery and mortars, as well as their rockets, inflicted especially severe wounds on our troops. High explosive fragment wounds exceeded those due to rifle and machine gun fire. Consequently, the fatality rate was relatively high.

d. Due to the difficult and exposed terrain over which evacuation had to be effected, medical personnel suffered very high casualty rates.

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e. When the casualties among the replacement drafts sent forward are considered, some combat units suffered casualties in excess of 100 per cent of their initial T/O strength.

f. By D plus 18, the non-effectives, consisting of sick and injuries received not as a result of enemy action, gradually built up to approximately 3000, or 4 per cent of the total strength of the Landing Force, after which they leveled off and remained relatively constant at about this figure.

g. The battle casualties suffered by the Landing Force as a whole, and among medical personnel alone are shown in the tables below. None of these figures include any non-battle casualties.

BATTLE CASUALTIES - IWO JIMA - AS OF 1800K D PLUS 33

Organi- zation	Strength	Battle Casualties				Per cent of Strength
		Killed	Wounded	Missing	Total	
3rd Mar						
Div (loss	15,681	869	3222	34	4125	
3rd Mar)		*21.1%	78.1%	0.8%	100%	26.3
4th Mar	21,737	1731	6058	74	7863	
Div		22.1%	77.0%	0.9%	100%	36.1
5th Mar	23,218	1974	6454	140	8568	
Div		23.0%	75.4%	1.6%	100%	36.9
VAC Lan-						
for(loss	9,491	63	324	7	394	
3rd,4th,		15.9%	82.4%	1.7%	100%	4.1
5thMarDiv)						
TOTALS	70,127	4637**	16,058	255	20,950	
		22.1%	76.7%	1.2%	100%	29.8

NOTES: * Percentages listed below casualty figures indicate per cent of total casualties that are killed, wounded or missing.

** As of this date burials ashore totaled 4893.

BATTLE CASUALTIES OF DIVISION MEDICAL PERSONNEL

Division	Initial Med Strength		Battle Casualties								% of Total Med Strength	
			Killed		Wounded		Missing		Total			
	Off	Enl	Off	Enl	Off	Enl	Off	Enl	Off	Enl	Off	Enl
3rd MarDiv	39	640	0	25	1	129	0	7	1	161	2.5	25.1
Totals	679		25		130		7		162		23.8	
4th MarDiv	89	1002	1	69	5	204	0	1	6	274	6.7	27.3
Totals	1091		70		209		1		280		25.6	
5th MarDiv	36	1011	1	47	3	234	0	6	4	237	4.6	28.5
Totals	1097		48		237		6		291		26.5	
Totals for all 3 Divs	214	2653	2	141	9	567	0	14	11	722	5.1	27.2
GRAND TOTALS	2867		143		576		14		733		25.5	
			19.5%		73.6%		1.9%		100%			

13. MEDICAL SUPPLIES & EQUIPMENT.

a. Medical Supplies.

(1) Landing Force medical units carried 30 days' medical supplies. There was the usual loss of medical department whiskey and brandy through pilferage. By now, the containers for whiskey and brandy are generally recognized, and it is believed that an additional non-distinctive container for these items might decrease the loss of them in future operations.

(2) The type and quantity of medical supplies were generally adequate.

(3) The 3th Field Depot Medical Supply Section brought in 1200 units of serum albumin, all of which were issued within three days. Block Shipment 13.5 had 425 units on three ships, but this was not taken off since general unloading of these ships was not done, and the need for spot unloading of medical supplies was not such as to warrant complete unloading. Serum albumin has definite value in use by front line medical units due to the ease of administration, smaller bulk, and the marked systemic response to it by casualties requiring additional blood volume. The serum albumin bottle is only 100 cc as opposed to the 500 cc bottle for plasma, and only one tube is required for administration, or, if required, the serum albumin may be rapidly administered with a syringe. Although its effect is more immediate but not as prolonged as that of plasma, most casualties receiving either probably have a real need for whole blood as soon as same can be administered. With our current adequate supply of whole blood from the blood banks, it appears that serum albumin, judiciously used, can sustain the casualty as well as plasma until facilities for the administration of whole blood are available.

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If serum albumin comes into more general field use, larger quantities should be landed with the assault troops and the amount carried in block shipments should probably be increased to 5000 units.

(4) The supply of plasma carried was probably excessive. The 8th Field Depot Medical Supply Section landed 100 bottles which were never drawn upon, and, in addition, this section salvaged 900 bottles scattered about the beaches. This situation undoubtedly obtained as the result of the widespread, perhaps even excessive, use of the whole blood which was made available in large quantities for this operation.

(5) There was considerable demand for sterile distilled water in 50 cc ampules for intravenous use. The majority of this was for use in the administration of pentothal sodium or penicillin, and it is felt that more of this item should be carried.

b. Medical Equipment.

(1) Medical equipment was generally very satisfactory as to type and amount.

(2) Some heavy items, such as electric refrigerators, never reached the unit for which intended. There were three 32 CuFt electric refrigerators loaded onto an LST from the WHITESIDE (AKA 90) for landing on an eastern beach for use by the 8th Field Depot Medical Supply Section in refrigerating plasma, penicillin, and biologicals, but only one of them ever reached this unit.

(3) It is believed that one 150 CuFt reefer would have been more desirable for the 8th Field Depot Medical Supply Section than the three 32 CuFt electric refrigerators because of the greater control over temperature that is possible with the reefer.

(4) Rough handling resulted in the damaging of some sections of the portable plywood operating rooms belonging to Corps medical units. Consequently, in certain instances, sections from two plywood operating rooms had to be pooled in order to set up one.

(5) Due to the heavy load of serious abdominal cases handled by the 38th Field Hospital, this hospital temporarily ran short of Levine tubes. This was in a great measure due to the failure to receive this item in automatic exchange for those evacuated with the casualties to ships. Their shortage was alleviated by obtaining some tubes from the Corps Medical Battalion and a few from a hospital ship. All other medical units appeared to have an adequate supply of this item. Although the 8th Field Depot Medical Supply Section had 204 Levine tubes in its shipping, it was not until D plus 13 that any medical supplies were unloaded from

8th Field Depot shipping, and even then, location aboard ship of any single item of medical equipment was obviously extremely difficult.

(6) Although occasional temporary shortages of litters and blankets occurred in some units, automatic exchange of these items functioned quite well. It is believed that a considerable factor in the temporary shortage of blankets was the fact that although the prevailing temperatures on IWO necessitated many casualties being evacuated with two or three blankets, only one was received in automatic exchange. Another factor was that not all cargo planes evacuating casualties on the return trip carried sufficient blankets for exchange as did the planes designated as evacuation planes. This situation could be helped by having a sufficient supply of blankets at the Air Evacuation Station on the airfield for continuous automatic exchange rather than depend upon each plane to make its own exchange.

(7) The desirability of the portable plywood operating room for field surgery has been proven again and should always be included in the equipment taken by each medical company.

(8) Vehicles were generally adequate as to type and number, although several were destroyed by enemy fire. The Army 3/4 ton ambulance used by the 38th Field Hospital demonstrated its desirability over the Navy 1/2 ton ambulance for casualty evacuation. It is fully as durable, can travel any where the 1/2 ton ambulance can, and transports casualties in much more comfort than does the 1/2 ton ambulance.

(9) The 38th Field Hospital felt that the Marine combination sterilizer and shower unit mounted on a two-wheeled trailer is more desirable than the bathing unit now in use by that organization.

c. While there were temporary shortages of distilled water, Levine tubes, and blankets, medical supplies and equipment were very satisfactory as to type and quantity, and at no time were there any critical shortages.


14. MOBILE BLOOD BANK FACILITY.

a. Personnel.

(1) The personnel of the Mobile Blood Bank Facility consisted of one officer (Hospital Corps, USN) and two pharmacist's mates second class. On 4 January 1945, the facility was temporarily attached to the V Amphibious Corps Medical Battalion.

b. Equipment.

(1) The equipment of this unit was furnished by ComSerForPac.



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The main items consisted of two 150 CuFt reefer boxes, one Yorke flake ice machine, three electric generators, one $2\frac{1}{2}$ ton 6 x 6 truck, and one $\frac{1}{4}$ ton 4 x 4 truck.

(2) The flake ice machine was not used due to lack of water under pressure necessary for its proper operation. A tentative plan for remedying this problem was formulated by the Officer in Charge of the blood bank and is to be submitted by him for consideration at the earliest opportunity. Ice was furnished by the V Amphibious Corps Medical Battalion and, on request, by ships.

c. Operation.

(1) On 20 January 1945, the complete unit embarked on LST 929.

(2) The initial supply of whole blood was received aboard this LST on 14 February at the Saipan staging area. The Advanced Blood Bank Facility at Guam supplied 1456 units and ships departing from the area furnished an additional 406 units to the blood bank while aboard the LST 929. A preliminary issue of one case (16 units) of whole blood was made to certain ships at the staging area in accordance with the Medical Plan. Beginning on D day, the Facility furnished whole blood on request to all units ashore and to ships.

(3) On D plus 8, the blood bank was landed and was established at TA 181 X, a central location accessible to all units and in the immediate vicinity of B Company, 3rd MarDiv, to which it was temporarily attached for convenience of location and operation.

(4) While operating ashore, additional blood was obtained from hospital ships present and via air from the Advance Blood Bank Facility at Guam.

d. Quantity Received and Dispensed.

(1) As of 1600, 19 March (D plus 28) the following quantities of whole blood were handled by the blood bank on IWO:

Received	3994 Units
Issued	3569 Units
Used by LST 929	325 Units
Surveyed (Hemolyzed)*	<u>18</u> Units
Remaining in blood bank	82 Units.

* This hemolysis was the result of failure to ice properly by the unit receiving it from blood bank.

(2) The average daily issue during the period 19 February - 13 March (D Day - D plus 22) was 134 units.

(3) Occasionally, issue was made from the blood bank ashore direct to ships upon their request.

(4) Upon reembarkation of the blood bank on D plus 29, the remaining whole blood was turned over to the 33th Field Hospital.

(5) At all times throughout the operation, the supply of whole blood was ample, and much credit is due the Officer in Charge for very efficiently operating a facility which was a material factor in saving many lives. This high refinement of modern warfare should, by all means, be continued.

(6) For details of activities of the Mobile Blood Bank Facility, see Enclosure (D).

15. HEALTH & SANITATION.

a. General.

(1) Sanitation was generally very satisfactory, and the health of troops was excellent. The non-effectives increased gradually to approximately four per cent by D plus 18 and remained generally at that level.

(2) No outbreaks of intestinal diseases of any importance occurred, and there were no epidemics.

(3) There was no evidence of the existence on the island of malaria, dengue, filariasis, typhus fever (including Tsutsugamushi fever) cholera, plague, yellow fever, small pox, diphtheria, or venereal diseases.

(4) The early problems of sanitation were, in the order of their importance, disposal of the dead; disposal of human excreta; and disposal of ration tins and food remnants.

(5) Galleys were not permitted to operate until screening was completed.

(6) Only water from previously filled cans, drums, or distillators was authorized for drinking purposes.

b. Disposal of Dead.

(1) Own dead.

(a) Our dead were sprayed with sodium arsenite at the earliest possible time and were buried in one of three division cemeteries as expeditiously as possible. However, spraying and collection of some of our dead from pockets which were isolated by intense enemy fire was delayed for several days.

(2) Enemy dead.

(a) A large problem was imposed by having to dispose of such large numbers of enemy dead. However, it was met by spraying with DDT or sodium arsenite and burying as expeditiously as possible. It was not militarily feasible or practicable to centralize the collection and burial of enemy dead.

c. DDT (DIPHENYL-DICHLOR-TRICHLORETHANE).

(1) In addition to the widespread use of DDT solution for hand spraying, its employment from aircraft was begun by means of two carrier-based TBM's at 1715 D plus 9.

(2) On D plus 3, a request for air spraying of the area between gridline 72.5 and the base of Suribachi Volcano was refused on the basis that it was militarily unfeasible at the time.

(3) From D plus 9 on, DDT air spraying was continued at such times as the military situation permitted, and with consideration for the maximum security to the pilot and plane commensurate with the low altitude necessary to attain effective results. Notwithstanding, on one occasion, one of the C-47 planes was slightly damaged by enemy fire during one of its spraying runs over the northern part of the island. It is believed that this fire came from by-passed enemy troops.

(4) When indicated, respraying of certain areas was accomplished and special attention was given to particularly heavy fly breeding areas.

(5) On D plus 22, land based air spraying began, using one of the two C-47 type planes made available for that purpose and based at Saipan.

(6) On 20 March (D plus 29) responsibility for DDT air spraying was passed to IsCom IWO, although Lanfor retained necessary control to insure coordination with the continuing tactical situation.

(7) The visible effect of DDT air spraying in killing the adult fly was immediate and striking in the areas covered. This refinement of modern military sanitation is of definite value in insect control, but must not be relied upon entirely. It should be thought of

only as an adjunct to the indispensable and recognized hand labor procedures of field sanitation.

d. For detailed report of sanitation on IWO see report of Malaria and Epidemiologic Control Team # 40, attached to 4th MarDiv.

17. TETANUS & GAS BACILLUS INFECTIONS.

a. During the Saipan-Tinian operation, the incidence of tetanus among POW's and civilian internees was high, although prophylactic immunization against tetanus on all enemy wounded was carried out upon arrival under medical care. The majority of these tetanus infections were civilians, and although clinically not necessarily manifest at the time of prophylaxis, it may have been too far advanced to be affected by the prophylactic dose. Routine prophylactic tetanus immunization against tetanus on all enemy wounded at IWO JIMA was also carried out, and although there were no civilians on the island, no cases of tetanus appeared in the enemy wounded.

b. A high incidence of gas bacillus infections in friendly wounded was encountered in the Saipan-Tinian operation. Following debridement, penicillin and sulfadiazine were used, but were apparently ineffective in many cases. In the IWO JIMA operation, prophylactic injections of gas gangrene anti-sera in all wounded were prescribed, and large quantities of therapeutic anti-sera were available. The incidence of gas gangrene in the IWO JIMA wounded appears to be very low at the time this report is being submitted, but can only be definitely computed when reports from the ships and hospitals receiving these casualties become available. Two cases of gas gangrene, both post-operative and apparently moribund, made rapid recoveries after receiving 120,000 units of gas gangrene anti-sera within the first 24 hours.

c. Although the intensely cultivated soil of Saipan-Tinian would naturally be richer in anaerobes than the barren wastes of IWO JIMA, it appears quite probable that prophylactic inoculation was a definite factor in the lower incidence at IWO.

18. NAVY FIELD MEDICAL PHOTOGRAPHIC UNIT # 3.

a. This photographic unit from the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery was attached for temporary duty to the V Amphibious Corps Medical Battalion on 3 January 1945 for the purpose of making a photographic record of the activities of the medical department during the operation.

b. One of the main objectives of this undertaking was to obtain material which might be used in preparing a training film of the amphibious medical service during an actual operation.

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c. The unit was composed of one medical officer, two pharmacist's mates, one photographer's mate, and one corporal, USMC.

d. Mutually pleasant associations and the utmost cooperation were enjoyed between this unit and all organizations with which it came in contact, and it is believed that a photographic record of much medical material of great value has been obtained.

19. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS.

a. This report covers predominantly the activities of V Amphibious Corps medical organizations and does not include reports of the medical units of the 3rd, 4th, and 5th Marine Divisions, or Task Force 53. For detailed information concerning these latter groups, reference should be made to the report of the activity concerned.

b. The initial medical service for the Landing Force was that of the division medical units, with the first echelon of support afloat being furnished by a line of four LST(H)'s, staffed and equipped to act as close-in emergency hospital ships, just seaward of the line of departure.

c. Excellent division field hospitals were established and operated by the 4th and 5th Marine Divisions. The 3rd Marine Division landed only two medical companies, and due to the consequent lack of sufficient facilities, was not able to operate a division field hospital. However, the direct support furnished by Corps hospitals obviated the necessity for establishing a field hospital for that division.

d. Corps medical units were in direct support of the three divisions. They completed urgent surgery for all cases prior to evacuation, as well as supplied ambulance service for evacuation between the divisions and the beaches. In addition, they mutually supported each other.

e. Very effective results were obtained by pooling the specialty services of neuro-surgery, ophthalmological surgery, and neuro-psychiatry at Company A, V Amphibious Corps Medical Battalion in support of all troops.

f. The DUKW again proved of much value as a vehicle for comfortable and safe transportation of casualties from shore to ship. At times, its value was especially great in obviating retransfer of serious cases at the beach for final evacuation to ships, and at other times, it was the only small craft that could safely negotiate the seaward trip through the heavy surf. Its definite value in evacuation is recognized. The weasel was, at times, used for evacuation in the forward as well as the beach areas. It was very useful in lateral evacuation in the heavy, loose sand of the beaches and in the rough terrain of the forward areas where wheeled vehicles could not travel, but in no respect can it be compared

to the DUKW in value as an evacuation vehicle.

g. A total of 2358 casualties were very efficiently evacuated from IWO by air without a single fatality. This service was of great value to the evacuation effort, and at times, when ship facilities were not available, it was the only means of relieving the pressure of the heavy load of casualties from the hospitals ashore.

h. As of 1800, 24 March (D plus 33), total casualties were 24,244, of which 20,950 were battle casualties. As of that same time, burials ashore of our own dead totaled 4893. During the first 21 days of the assault, combined casualties exceeded 1000 per day. The non-effectives of the Landing Force became stabilized at approximately four per cent.

i. Casualties among medical personnel were very heavy. In one division alone, casualties of hospital corpsmen exceeded 50% in each of six battalions, four of which exceeded 60%, and one was in excess of 68%. Combined battle casualties for all division medical personnel exceeded 25%.

j. As of 1800, 24 March (D plus 33), a total of 17,677 casualties were evacuated from IWO.

k. Medical supplies and equipment were generally very adequate as to type and amount. Temporary non-critical shortages occurred of sterile distilled water in ampules, and of Levine tubes. Automatic exchange of blankets was, at times, interrupted, but was never critical. Serum albumin appears to have definite value in the field, but must await the results of further trial before accepting it as any more than an adjunct to the use of plasma.

l. Much credit must be given to the life-saving contribution made by the Mobile Blood Bank Facility, which supplied 3976 units of whole blood for the attack forces. Between D Day and D plus 22, a daily average of 134 units was issued. Maximum utilization should be made of this type of facility. It was not possible to use the Yorke flake ice machine due to lack of sufficient water under pressure required for proper operation. A minimum of 1200 gallons of water under 20 pounds pressure is required for this purpose.

m. As opposed to the high incidence of tetanus in enemy wounded during the Saipan-Tinian Operations, no cases of tetanus were manifest in enemy wounded on IWO JIMA. Likewise, the high incidence of gas gangrene among troops of opposing forces at Saipan-Tinian did not obtain at IWO JIMA. The intensely cultivated soil of Saipan-Tinian would naturally be richer in pathogenic anaerobes than the barren wastes of IWO JIMA, but it appears quite probable that the prophylactic inoculations against tetanus and gas gangrene were the deciding factors, and it is to be

emphasized that both of these types of prophylaxis should be continued in future operations.

n. Sanitation was, generally, very satisfactory. DDT sprayed from the air was extremely effective in controlling flies and fly breeding. The smaller number of mosquitoes present on the island presented no problem, and no serious types of insect-borne diseases were present. Sodium arsenite spraying of the dead aided materially in fly control, and burial of our own and enemy dead was carried out as expeditiously as the military situation would permit.

o. An unusually heavy load of casualties was expeditiously and efficiently evacuated, and a high standard of military medical care was maintained along the entire chain of evacuation. The medical service for the IWO JIMA Operation approached nearer the ideal than during any previous operation in the Central Pacific Area, and it is firmly believed that the casualties received the maximum medical care possible commensurate with the military situation.

20. RECOMMENDATIONS.

a. Centralization of neuro-surgery, ophthalmological surgery and NP specialty services under Corps control in order to more efficiently make available to all units these indispensable services.

b. A pool of litters and blankets large enough to adequately operate an automatic exchange of these items with units evacuating casualties by air should be established at the evacuation station on the airfield rather than place the responsibility of this exchange with the individual planes.

c. Medical units anticipating the probable use of sterile distilled water in ampules, and Levine tubes should insure that adequate quantities of these two items are carried for future operations.

d. Additional, non-distinctive containers for medical department brandy and whiskey should be provided in order to minimize pilferage.

e. The prophylactic use of tetanus antitoxin in enemy wounded and of gas gangrene serum in friendly wounded should be continued.

f. In the treatment of gas gangrene, too much reliance should not be placed upon penicillin and sulfonamides; however, their use together with gas gangrene antisera post-operatively, should be continued.

g. The tried and proven value of the authorized portable plywood operating rooms for field surgery is definitely recognized, and this item should, if obtainable, always be included in the equipment carried by

each medical company. A surgical trailer is not to be considered as an adequate substitute for this item, although there are many situations in which both would be of definite value.

h. Correction of field operating deficiencies of the Yorke flake ice machine should be made, and maximum utilization of Mobile Blood Bank Facility should be continued in future operations.

i. The $\frac{1}{2}$ ton Navy field ambulance should be replaced by the superior $\frac{3}{4}$ ton Army ambulance.

j. Maximum use should be made of available DUKW's in evacuation of serious cases direct from shore hospitals to ships.

k. Continued use of DDT sprayed from aircraft is recommended.

Certified to be a true copy:

L. K. Mantell
L. K. MANTELL, Lt. Col., MC, USA.

/s/ J. B. O'Neill
J. B. O'NEILL

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ENCLOSURE (A)

EMBARKATION CHART - CORPS MEDICAL UNITS

Unit	USS BAR- ROW APA 61	USS BLA- DEN APA 63	USS THUR- STON APA 77	USS LENA- WEBB APA 195	USS WHITE- SIDE AKA 90	USS YAN- CEY AKA 93	USS BER- RIEN APA 62	USS CAR- TARET * APA 70	USS HUI- PHAM AKA 61	IST 929
VAC Medical Battalion	Co. A 7 Off 94 Enl 5000CuFt of cargo	H&S, Co. B and C 19 Off 210 Enl Photo Unit #3 1 Off 4 Enl 36952 Cu Ft Cargo								Blood Bank 1 Off 2 Enl with equip- ment
Corps Evac- uation Hos- pital # 1			8 Off 64 Enl	17 Off 126 Enl	1 Off 12 Enl 18,000CuFt of Cargo	1 Off 20 Enl 39,060Cu Ft cargo				
58th Field Hospital							Hq. and B hospit- al Unit 10 Off 72 Enl 11,400Cu Ft cargo	A and C* Hospital Units 16 Off 110 Enl	1 Off 8 Enl 17,888Cu Ft cargo for Units A and C	

* Personnel of A and C Hospitalization Units originally embarked on USS Brule (APA 66) which developed engine failure two days out of port necessitating her return whereupon this personnel was transferred to the USS Cartaret (APA 70).

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ENCLOSURE (A)

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HOSPITALIZATION ASHORE

ENCLOSURE (B)

	3rd		4th		5th		VAC		Corps Evac		38th Field		TOTALS	
	Mar Div	Cap	Mar Div	Cap	Mar Div	Cap	Med Bn	Cap	Hosp # 1	Cap	Hospital	Cap	Cap	Cap
Feb 28 - D/9	0	0	0	0	139	27	50	2	0	0	0	0	189	29
Mar 1 - D/10	0	0	150	10	250	83	82	34	0	0	0	0	482	127
2 - D/11	0	0	120	22	350	139	89	89	0	0	0	0	559	250
3 - D/12	0	0	150	80	350	308	175	99	20	12	0	0	695	499
4 - D/13	0	0	150	84	350	122	195	120	100	15	119	7	914	348
5 - D/14	0	0	250	25	350	124	240	91	100	26	160	10	1100	276
6 - D/15	0	0	250	165	350	88	310	121	500	32	240	16	1650	422
7 - D/16	0	0	250	84	350	114	310	93	500	135	264	18	1674	444
8 - D/17	0	0	250	176	350	154	310	139	550	201	296	41	1756	711
9 - D/18	0	0	250	79	350	200	310	139	550	171	296	46	1756	635
10 - D/19	0	0	300	121	350	160	310	177	550	138	360	163	1870	759
11 - D/20	0	0	300	153	350	209	310	187	550	146	360	213	1870	908
12 - D/21	0	0	300	47	350	175	310	118	550	139	392	243	1902	722
13 - D/22	0	0	350	54	350	185	310	95	550	100	400	295	1960	729
14 - D/23	0	0	300	0	350	234	310	141	490	168	400	287	1850	830
15 - D/24	0	0	Closed		350	217	310	152	490	175	400	321	1550	865
16 - D/25	0	0	for re-		350	206	300	152	490	123	400	276	1540	757
17 - D/26	0	0	embark-		350	163	300	132	490	54	400	54	1540	403
18 - D/27	0	0	ation		350	88	233	46	250	42	400	65	1233	242
19 - D/28	0	0			400	54	157	31	250	15	400	82	1207	182
20 - D/29	90	25			400	36	Closed		Closed		400	116	890	177
21 - D/30	90	5									400	160	490	165
22 - D/31	90	36									400	177	490	213
23 - D/32	90	21									400	179	490	200
24 - D/33	90	15									400	248	490	263

NOTE: Figures for 25 March not available as this headquarters was in process of embarking that date. Control was passed to ISCom on 26 March (D plus 35).

ENCLOSURE (B)

Ser. 0122B

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Med. Air Evac. Hdqrs.
Air Evac. Sq. 2 (VE-2)
% FPO San Francisco.

ENCLOSURE (C)

20 March 1945

Subject: Medical Air Evacuation Preliminary Report IWO JIMA Campaign,
for period March 3, 1945 to March 20, 1945, inclusive.

1. STATISTICS:

a. Total patients evacuated by air	2237
b. Total litter cases	1290
c. Total ambulatory cases	947
d. Percentage litter cases	57%
e. Percentage Ambulatory cases	43%
f. Number planes loaded	125
g. Average number patients per plane	17.9
h. Number deaths enroute	0
i. Average number evacuated per day	124

2. EVACUATION BY DAYS:

	<u>Date</u>	<u>#Patients</u>	<u>Total to Date</u>
March	3	12	12
	4	36	48
	5	75	123
	6	171	294
	7	161	455
	8	225	680
	9	93	773
	10	49	822
	11	248	1070
	12	212	1282
	13	56	1338
	14	59	1397
	15	165	1562
	16	217	1779
	17	130	1909
	18	138	2047
	19	97	2144
	20	93	2237

3. TYPE PLANE EMPLOYED:

- a. R4D (Sky Train)
- b. R5C (Commando)

4. SCREENING PERSONNEL:

- a. Lt. Comdr. J. B. MAC GREGOR (MC) USN

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Subj: Medical Air Evac. Preliminary Report IWO JIMA Campaign. ENCL (C)

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- b. Captain B. S. BAKER, USA, Medical Corps
- c. Lt. G. C. WILLIAMSON, (MC) USNR
- d. Captain J. J. BAIRD, USA, Medical Corps
- e. Lt. (jg) C. GALLION, (MC) USNR.

5. MEDICAL ASSISTANTS ON GROUND:

- a. PhM/c R. W. SCANLON --- Loading Supervisor
- b. PhM/c L. N. MARTIN ---- Loading Supervisor
- c. PhM/c H. L. BARCLAY --- Office and Records.

6. GROUND PLANE MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL:

- a. Machinist S. F. MAREK, USN.

7. COMMENT:

a. The cooperation and assistance of Marine Corps personnel is acknowledged and duly appreciated. Tentage, medical supplies, extra hospital corpsmen and hot drinks for patients as provided by Dr. Jordan were invaluable.

Certified to be a true copy:

L. K. Mantell
L. K. MANTELL, Lt. Col., MC, USA.

/s/J. B. Mac Gregor
J. B. MAC GREGOR
Lt. Comdr. (MC) USN.

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ENCLOSURE (C)

ENCLOSURE (D)
Ser. 0122B

MOBILE BLOOD BANK FACILITY
V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS

13 March 1945.

Subject: Mobile Blood Bank Facility Report IWO JIMA Campaign.

1. Submitted herewith is a report of the functions of the Blood Bank Facility during the subject operation.

a. Equipment.

(1) The equipment was furnished by the Commander Service Force, Pacific Fleet. It consisted of the following items:

Two (2) one hundred and fifty (150) cu.ft. reefer boxes, gasoline driven.

Three (3) electric generators 127-220 volt, gasoline driven.

One (1) Yorke Ice Flake Machine

One (1) truck 6 x 6.

One (1) jeep 4 x 4.

Five (5) boxes spare parts

One (1) pyramidal tent.

(2) All equipment was placed aboard the LST 929 (H) at the Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor.

(3) The equipment was found adequate and functioned well with the exception that automatic choke on reefers did not function, and the motors had to be started manually. Late in the operation, D plus 15, the starter on one reefer broke down. This was remedied by borrowing a mechanic from the Medical Battalion, VAC.

(4) The ice flake machine was not used, due to lack of water under pressure necessary for proper operation. This problem, it is believed, can be remedied by the addition of a water tank trailer, a centrifugal pump, and an auto radiator connected up to form a cooling and supply system for the machine, to the Blood Bank equipment. A tentative plan has been formulated and will be submitted to a mechanical engineer for advice and approval at the first opportunity. Ice was obtained from ships present during this operation. This method of procurement did not prove satisfactory, due to the uncertainty of delivery.

b. Personnel.

(1) The personnel consisted of one (1) Hospital Corps Officer and two (2) Pharmacist's Mates Second Class.

(2) The enlisted men performed their duties well and were well fitted for the assignment. However, it is recommended that either a

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marine or navy enlisted man, trained in maintenance of gasoline engines be added to the crew. This is believed necessary for the proper care and repair of the various gasoline engines and other mechanical devices that compose the equipment.

(3) The personnel reported aboard the LST 929 (H) at Oahu on 20 January 1945.

c. Staging Area.

(1) All reefers were started and the thermostatic controls were set to hold the temperature at 40 to 44 degrees F, 13 January 1945.

(2) 14 February 1945, fourteen hundred and fifty six (1456) units of whole human blood were received from the advanced Blood Bank Facility at Guam.

(3) 15 February 1945, at 0800 signal was received from CTF 51 to issue blood in accordance with the Medical plan (one case of sixteen (16) units to each ship authorized). By 1200 all ships had drawn their quota of blood except the USS Hansford and USS Sandoval. CTF 51 and subject ships were notified by dispatch. At 1600 the LST 929 (H) got under way to the target.

d. Target Area.

(1) The LST 929 (H) took station as planned on D day and ships present began to send boats for additional blood. The Blood Bank functioned on this ship until D plus eight (8) when orders were received from CTF 53 to land the Blood Bank on Black Beach and report to Headquarters 3rd Marine Division. Two hundred and sixty two (262) units of blood were taken ashore as an initial supply

(2) Blood bank was established in Target Area 181 X-ray and all medical units present soon located the bank and began to draw blood.

(3) Additional blood was obtained from hospital ships present and via air from the advance Blood Bank Facility at Guam. The supply was ample throughout the entire operation.

e. Summary.

Receipts and issues aboard LST 929 (H) 2-15-45 to 2-26-45 incl.

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~~XXXXXXXXXX~~

Received	1862 units
Issued	1257 units
Surveyed (hemolyzed)	18 units
Remaining	587 units

Receipts and issues from target area 181 X-RAY 2-27-45 to 3-13-45.

Initial supply	262 units
Received	1988 units
Issued	1834 units
Remaining	416 units.

Grand recapitulation (entire operation).

Received	3850 units
Issued	3091 units
Surveyed (hemolyzed)	18 units
In bank on LST 929 (2-26-45)	325 units
Remaining Bank VAC	416 units.

Average daily issues during operation (2-19-45 to 3-13-45) were one hundred and thirty-four (134) units.

f. Recommendations.

(1) It is recommended that a suitable water supply and cooling system be added to the equipment as noted in paragraph 1 a (4) and a mechanic added to crew as noted in paragraph 1 b (2).

Certified to be a true copy:

L. K. Mantell

L. K. MANTELL, Lt. Col., MC, USA.

/s/Robert M. Roberts
ROBERT M. ROBERTS
Ensign (HC), USN.

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Liaison Officers' Report

Appendix 9 to Annex CHARLIE to Special Action Report IWO JIMA Campaign

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V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS LANDING FORCE,
IN THE FIELD.

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24 March 1945.

From: Officer-In-Charge, Corps Liaison Team No. 1.
To : The Commanding General.

Subject: Special Action Report, IWO JIMA Campaign.

1. V Amphibious Corps Liaison Team No. 1, consisting of two officers and six enlisted, joined the 3d Marine Division on 1 December, 1944, trained with that division until embarkation on 15 February, 1945, landed on IWO JIMA with division forward elements on 24 February (D plus 5) and operated with the 3d Marine Division in accordance with S.O.P. until rejoining V Amphibious Corps Headquarters on 15 March, 1945.

2. No serious difficulties were encountered either during training or during the operation. Prior to the operation, organizational equipment was augmented by one jeep trailer for the TCS jeep, which trailer was of considerable value in loading team equipment for embarkation, debarkation and displacements during the operation. Equipment was further augmented on D plus 7 by one telephone from the 3d Division switchboard and over which reports to Corps Headquarters were thereafter almost exclusively rendered. During the initial part of the operation, some difficulty was encountered at night and during inclement weather due to the fact that the team was furnished with no protective equipment such as tent or black-out tent. Later upon displacement forward an abandoned emplacement was secured in which telephone, radio, maps and other operational equipment was placed and work could proceed unhampered during darkness or inclement weather. Light was furnished by an extra jeep headlight led in from jeep battery. Lanterns were scarce within the Division and could not be obtained. In view of the above remarks, it is recommended that the organizational equipment of a Liaison Team include the following:

- 1 black-out tent.
- 1 phone, field.
- 2 Coleman lanterns.
- 1 jeep trailer.

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Corps Liaison Team No. 1 Special Action Report, IWO JIMA Campaign.

3. Information of front line units was difficult to obtain. It was usually impossible for the Liaison Officer to personally cover all front line units and still render timely information to Corps. The success of this was, however, dependent upon physical factors such as distance involved, terrain and road nets and also upon communication facilities and efficiency of such at the time. During the several fairly successful attempts by the Liaison Officer to do this, the TCS jeep was taken as far forward as prudent, messenger service established to TCS and messages relayed from TCS to TBX at Division CP. The TBX was not taken forward for this purpose, it being much too slow and cumbersome. Telephone facilities of front line units were used when available but it can be appreciated that organizational telephone nets are considerably crowded when important information is timely and also that it is very difficult to get through so many switchboards. Of course, throughout the period during which the Liaison Officer is personally covering front line units, he must accept the fact that he is out of contact with the larger picture. When the success of personally covering front line units was doubtful, the Liaison Team was dependent for information upon reports of battalions to regiments and regiments to Division. It is believed that from the viewpoint of the higher unit such reports are usually too few and far between. One of the purposes of liaison is to expedite important information, but regardless of the organizational efficiency of a Liaison Team, it obviously cannot expedite information which it cannot obtain due to factors beyond its own control.

4. In view of the above remarks, it is recommended that a system of liaison be organized by a Landing Force prior to an operation, such system to encompass all infantry units from the BLT to the Landing Force inclusive and that this system be effected by groupment of specific personnel and equipment assigned, organized and trained with the character of the operation in view. The mission of the system would be to create rapid, accurate, efficient and intelligent liaison within the Landing Force. The establishment of such a system would in effect create within each such unit an "information booth" containing timely and intelligent information concerning higher, lower and adjacent units.

5. Factors essential to the system in order that the mission may be accomplished are as follows:

(a) Personnel and equipment must be assigned with the character of the operation in view.

Corps Liaison Team No. 1 Special Action Report, IWO JIMA Campaign.

(b) Personnel must be instructed and trained prior to the operation.

(c) The groupment must be independent of other organizations for operational facilities.

(d) Status and purpose must be recognized and understood by all units.

(e) System must be simple and flexible.

It is not considered important whether personnel assigned come from Landing Force or subordinate units but once assigned personnel should come under the direct supervision of Landing Force until completion of the operation in order that the demands of efficiency and economy may best be served. For the same reason, if liaison teams are attached to subordinate units of the Landing Force, they should not be attached except operationally to a unit lower than an RCT and preferably to no unit lower than a Division. After once being instructed and trained, personnel should be attached to Divisions with which they are to serve for purposes of familiarization. If deemed desirable for their own benefit, subordinate units may augment the liaison system within their organization by addition of personnel and equipment. In any event, a working organization is present and a system has been established.

6. An example of a liaison organization which would have accomplished the aforementioned mission within the 3d Marine Division on IWO JIMA is set forth below:

From Corps to Division

1 Liaison Officer	1 jeep TCS
1 Communication Officer	1 jeep cargo
2 CP radio (1 jeep driver)	2 phones
1 CP wire and jeep driver	wire

With each RCT (2)

1 Liaison Officer	1 jeep cargo
2 CP radio	1 TBX
1 CP wire and jeep driver	2 phones
	wire

Corps Liaison Team No. 1 Special Action Report, IWO JIMA Campaign.

With each BLT (6)

1 Liaison Officer
1 CP wire

1 phone
wire

TOTAL

10 Officers

1 jeep TCS

3 jeeps cargo

15 Enlisted

2 TBX

12 phones
wire.

If at first glance it appears that personnel as above are excessive, it is pointed out that such an organization well trained would have obviated the necessity for the following personnel actually involved in liaison work:

From Corps to Division

1 Liaison Officer
1 Communication Officer
6 Enlisted.

From Division to Corps

1 Liaison Officer

From Division to Adjacent
Division

2 Liaison Officers.

From Adjacent Division to
Division

2 Liaison Officers.

From RCT's to Division

2 Liaison Officers.

Between RCT's

2 Liaison Officers.

From BLT's to RCT's

6 Liaison Officers.

TOTAL

17 Officers.
6 Enlisted (minimum)

With very few exceptions the above liaison officers had no independent communication facilities, no place to establish a headquarters where they could be contacted or from where they could operate (organizational operations sections were already too crowded), little or no means for gaining and transmitting information and no

Corps Liaison Team No. 1 Special Action Report, IWO JIMA Campaign.

organization in general. As a consequence most liaison officers became glorified messengers bearing late tidings. Even though a skeleton liaison system only were established, it would obviate such a condition.

7. It is felt that a liaison system such as recommended would be relatively simple to organize, would economize on personnel, particularly officers now ordinarily engaged in liaison work, and would establish efficient liaison within a Landing Force by creating within each BLT and higher unit "information booths" containing timely, accurate, and intelligent information concerning higher, lower, and adjacent units, manned by trained personnel whose only duty is to collect and disseminate such information and served by operational facilities independent of combat units.

8. The above remarks in no way intend to imply lack of cooperation by the Third Marine Division. On the contrary, divisional facilities for receiving and transmitting information were at all times available to the liaison team and the Liaison Officer was able to obtain any or all information received by the various divisional staff sections. The majority of information was gained from the operations section and the Liaison Officer was in fact attached to this section. It is here noted that the operations section was usually considerably crowded and that such condition was in no small part due to the presence of various liaison officers seeking information. Organic personnel were undoubtedly handicapped thereby in the performance of their primary duties. This situation tends to further affirm the need for some system of liaison as recommended. It is pointed out that the system recommended is intended to be for the benefit of all units with a liaison team attached and not for Landing Force Headquarters alone. Subordinate units are to use the teams to the fullest, consider them as an organic section for the duration of the operation and in fact, if possible, have a unit officer in charge of the team as liaison officer for that unit.

B. G. Powers
B. G. POWERS.

V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS LANDING FORCE,
IN THE FIELD.

24 March 1945.

From: The Liaison Officer in Charge, V Amphibious Corps
Liaison Team Number 2.
To : The Commanding General.
Subject: Special Action Report, IWO JIMA Campaign.
Enclosure: (A) Liaison Officer's Notes, IWO JIMA Campaign.

1. A thorough briefing on the preliminary orders and Corps operation plan for the IWO JIMA campaign preceded the assignment of the Liaison Officer in Charge of Corps Liaison Team Number 2 to the 4th Marine Division. In accordance with orders dated 22 November, 1944, the Liaison Officer joined the 4th Marine Division at MAUI, T. H., on 26 November, 1944. The Liaison Communication Team, consisting of one warrant officer and six enlisted men, had been attached to the Division at an earlier date. Immediate steps were taken to establish relations with the 4th Marine Division Staff.

2. The planning stage of the IWO JIMA campaign was well advanced and the 4th Marine Division Operation Plan was made available to the Liaison Officer, along with a Division CPX order. The Division CPX was held under field conditions beginning 29 November, 1944, and lasted two days. No V Amphibious Corps echelon took part, and no messages from the Liaison Officer were transmitted. The Liaison Officer, however, for training secured information, prepared dispatches, submitted them to the 4th Marine Division Chief of Staff for approval and delivered them to the Liaison Team Communication Officer in accordance with Corps General Order Number 68-44, (SOP for Corps Liaison).

3. A check list for organization and staff procedure within the D-1 Section was supplied by the G-1 Section to be filled out and turned in weekly. The preparation of this list provided the Liaison Officer and Corps with pertinent and helpful information.

4. Weekly trips made by the Corps Liaison Officer between the 4th Marine Division Headquarters and the V Amphibious Corps Headquarters afforded a ready means of conveying requests and orders between the two headquarters. The Liaison Officer was kept well informed on the problems of the 4th Marine Division, and the latest

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information available from the V Amphibious Corps. During the weekly trips to Headquarters, V Amphibious Corps, the Liaison Officer was afforded the opportunity to attend conferences being conducted between the V Amphibious Corps and higher echelons concerning the IWO JIMA Campaign.

5. In December, certain members of the V Amphibious Corps Staff participated in a CPX with the 4th Marine Division at MAUI in preparation for the Expeditionary Force rehearsal scheduled for January. The Liaison Officer and the communication team participated in this CPX. Much valuable information on operating procedure between the Division and the V Amphibious Corps was gained by the Liaison Officer.

6. Corps Liaison Team Number 2 was embarked as follows: The Liaison Officer, Communication Officer, and four enlisted (three radio operators and one message center man) aboard the command ship. A TBX radio was retained on the command ship. Two enlisted men (one radio operator and one message center man) with the TCS radio jeep aboard LSM 260. The LSM carried division signal equipment having a high landing priority. One shipboard radio was assigned the liaison team aboard the command ship by the 4th Marine Division Signal Officer and an operating space was assigned for the TBX radio if need for its operation arose. The TCS radio jeep operated only after landing.

7. The first rehearsal for the IWO JIMA landing was held at MAUI, T. H., 9 January to 15 January, 1945. It provided the liaison team with an opportunity to work with the V Amphibious Corps and Liaison Team Number 3 (5th Marine Division). During this rehearsal inter-division liaison officers were assigned the facilities of the V Amphibious Corps liaison radio net. Following the rehearsal a critique on the operation of the liaison radio net was held at the V Amphibious Corps Headquarters, Honolulu, T. H. The following officers were present: V Amphibious Corps Liaison and Communication Officers of liaison teams two and three, and inter-division liaison officers of the 4th and 5th Marine Divisions. Procedure and net operation were clarified. A meeting of the liaison officers in charge of teams two and three with the G-3 Chief of Section and Assistant Chief of Section was held. Messages sent by the liaison officers during the rehearsal were discussed and information desired by the V Amphibious Corps during the forthcoming operation was further outlined.

8. Liaison between the 4th Marine Division and the V Amphibious Corps during the trip from Honolulu to the forward staging area was accomplished by visits of the liaison officer to the V Amphibious Corps command ship at Eniwetok and Saipan.

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9. The Communication team was briefed on the operation by the liaison officer, during the voyage and attended briefing lectures conducted by the 4th Marine Division. Radio equipment was tested and final instruction of the communication team was given during the landing rehearsal held at Tinian.

10. Upon approaching the transport area at IWO JIMA a radio listening watch was established and transmission was begun when radio silence was lifted. The 5th Marine Division and the 3d Marine Division were made "action" or "information" addressees on all appropriate radio messages. The Corps Liaison Officer and the liaison officer assigned to the 4th Marine Division from the 5th Marine Division worked together to prevent the duplication of messages on the liaison radio net.

11. For tactical reasons the 4th Marine Division Headquarters was located on board the command ship until D/4. Liaison communication was broken for several hours during the move from ship to shore. It was re-established ashore using the TCS radio jeep. Telephone communication between liaison team number two and Corps was begun late in the afternoon of D/4. By D/17 telephone communication with the other liaison teams and Corps had obviated the necessity for radio communication. The liaison communication team was secured and ordered to return to the V Amphibious Corps on D/18.

12. After D/4 liaison duty with the three section of the 4th Marine Division was hampered and restricted by the fact that the section worked in very close quarters for security and safety. The command post area was under sporadic enemy fire until near the end of the operation.

13. From D/5 through the remainder of the operation the liaison officer delivered an advance copy of the daily dispatch summary to the V Amphibious Corps command post. He attended conferences when possible, acted as escort for general and flag officers between division and Corps, and delivered advance copies of operation orders and other classified matter from Corps to division.

14. The liaison officer attempted to obtain advance reports on casualties, the status of supply, and the number of operational vehicles during the day. This information is not available or is too inaccurate to be of value until an overall accounting can be made by the units after they secure for the night.

COMMENTS:

1. The several weeks of briefing given the liaison

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officer before leaving Corps Headquarters proved invaluable upon reaching the Division.

2. The CPX's proved very helpful in working into the staff operating procedure of the Division and in training the liaison team.

3. The periodic completion of a form of check list on each section of the Division Staff using, as a guide, the check list as outlined in FM 101-5 or Section 6, Staff Manual, Marine Corps Schools, provided a running account of happenings during the planning and rehearsal phases of the operation.

4. The frequent trips from Division to Corps Headquarters kept the liaison officer fully informed on the latest information. Advance information and help given the Division Staff during the planning phase was repaid by that staff during the rehearsal and execution phase.

5. The embarkation assignment of the liaison team on the 4th Marine Division ships proved to be thoroughly satisfactory. One communication officer and four men were sufficient to maintain communication while using the shipboard radio. The two sections of the team and the TCS radio jeep arrived at the Division Headquarters ashore simultaneously. The communication team of one officer and six men was sufficient to maintain communication ashore.

6. The use of the Corps liaison radio net by the inter-Division liaison officers did not overload the net. The respective liaison officers with the 4th Marine Division were of considerable help to each other in obtaining information.

7. The rehearsals tested the ability of the liaison officer and the communication team to perform their duties. The final rehearsal permitted the communication team to test the radio equipment shortly before its use under battle conditions.

8. The allotment of a shipboard radio to the liaison team greatly aided in the transmitting and receiving of messages.

9. The attempts of the liaison officer to obtain advance information on casualties, status of supply and operational vehicles were met with courtesy by the Division Staff and honest attempts were made to secure the information requested. Little or no success, however, can be met in the confusion of a landing or in battle until the lines are secured and an accurate count made.

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RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. Liaison officers should have the greatest possible amount of information and briefing before reporting to a lower echelon.
2. Liaison officers and communication teams should participate in the greatest possible number of CPX's during their tour of duty.
3. Corps Liaison Officers should make extensive use of check lists on staff functioning, submitting completed lists to Corps Headquarters during the planning and rehearsal stages.
4. The liaison officer should, when possible, make frequent trips between the Division and Corps Headquarters during the planning phase.
5. Corps orders and plans should be transmitted to the Division by the liaison officer where practicable.
6. The use of the Corps liaison radio net by inter-Division liaison officers should be continued to the capacity of the net.
7. A shipboard radio should be allotted the liaison team aboard the Division command ship.
8. Reports of casualties, status of supply, and operational vehicles giving definite figures should not be requested from the Division by the liaison officer except at such times as the Corps orders call for the submission of this information. The liaison officer should, however, supply information on disproportionate losses.
9. The addition of the following equipment will increase the efficiency of the communication personnel: 1 trailer, 1/4 ton; 1 blackout tent; 1 EE8 field telephone.
10. The liaison officer should be furnished a field desk capable of being locked and small enough to be carried by one man.

F. C. Clagett
F. C. CLAGETT,
Major, USMC.

LIAISON OFFICER'S NOTES, IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN

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The battle of IWO JIMA cost the 4th Marine Division heavily in junior officers and experienced noncommissioned officers and men. The loss of experienced men helped reduce the relative fighting efficiency of the Division to a low point on IWO JIMA and their loss will be equally felt in the reorganization and training period to follow.

It is recommended that a high priority be given the 4th Marine Division for replacements with emphasis on experienced enlisted men below the rank of Platoon Sergeant, whose classification is for line duty.

All possible time is needed by the units for rehabilitation, rest, and reorganization with an extensive training period.

The 4th Marine Division zone of action north of airfield number one contained defenses designed by a master of the art of fortification and constructed to enhance an area provided by nature with natural barriers to penetration. The ground is made up of very soft rock which can be cut and shaped with a knife, axe, or pick. Deep ravines with high steep sides cut the whole area running generally from the plateau, on which airfields two and three are located, to the ocean. Caves and tunnels with entrances usually located in the cliffs and ravine sides, housed the defenders. Each large cave had numerous entrances well concealed and defended by camouflaged weapons in emplacements. Many caves were apparently connected by tunnels one of which was reported to be 800 yards long.

The bulk of heavy weapons opposing the 4th Marine Division when it reached this area consisted of mortars and rockets, the coast defense and heavy AA guns having been destroyed by Naval gunfire and air bombardment. AA fire from a few weapons continued to harass observation planes throughout the operation. Tanks were dug in with only the turrets above ground. High velocity guns were emplaced in caves.

The towns in the area were destroyed, except for foundations, by the preliminary air and Naval bombardment. Roads were few and narrow, most of them being blocked by land slides or destroyed by bombardment. The use of tanks were accomplished only by preceding their advance with a tank dozer. Land and anti-tank mines were found in some areas.

North of the East Boat Basin vegetation was very heavy and from early photographs the roughness of the terrain could not be appreciated. During the advance of the 4th Marine Division the enemy used concealment offered by the debris of the tangled mass of vegetation caused by our bombardment.

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Liaison Officer's Notes, IWO JIMA Campaign. (Continued).

Tanks of the 4th Tank Battalion were notably successful in withstanding damage from enemy action and the number irreparable after being damaged was very low. In one instance a tank received a hit by a napalm bomb dropped in error. The resulting fire was extinguished by the crew and the tank continued in the attack. The tanks were given additional armor protection by concrete and wood formed to the sides, tank tracks welded around the turret, heavy wire mesh welded over turret openings, and sandbags placed on the tank top.

The Division Ordnance Company worked as a single unit during the operation except for a special group with the tank battalion. A collecting detail of 25 to 30 men did all the collecting of weapons. The Company did not get ashore until D/4 because of the tactical situation and a number of weapons lost or abandoned on the beach were beyond salvage when picked up. Working as a single unit is recommended for the most efficient utilization of this Company. It is recommended that the allowance of BAR parts be increased.

The loss of the CVE Bismarck Sea on D/2 deprived the 4th Marine Division of its air observers until VMO-4 began operations ashore on D/9. Reports by other air observers often proved inadequate or misleading in the 4th Division zone of action. The Division was seriously handicapped from D/2 to D/9 by the lack of information usually supplied by its observers.

It has been suggested that the SB2C be used by observers working from CVE's and that the SBD or SNJ be used by shore-based observers.

It is recommended that a V Amphibious Corps program be established for the training of aerial observers. Emphasis must be placed on their close cooperation and training with ground troops. Aerial photographs taken by the observer are needed to substantiate, and accurately pin point disappearing targets. During the IWO JIMA Campaign targets were located and their position lost or in doubt by the time the plane could make a second run or adjust artillery fire on them.

The establishment of a "bomb line" or a deep area beyond which aircraft entering the field of operations from other areas could drop unexpended bomb loads would eliminate the disheartening spectacle of seeing bombs dropped at sea at a time when they are badly needed on the enemy.

Offshore beach pictures were taken by the 4th Marine Division of their beaches on the evening of D/1. These photographs were very useful to indicate the condition of the beaches to all parties concerned. It is recommended that the photographing of beaches be carried out at regular intervals during a landing and the pictures distributed to interested parties accompanied by such recommendations as are warranted.

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Liaison Officer's Notes, IWO JIMA Campaign. (Continued).

A system of using panoramic photographs for locating and reporting positions and installations rapidly has been devised by the 4th Marine Division Photographic Officer. It is recommended that an investigation be made into the feasibility of using this system. It appears to be well adapted to terrain where accurate maps or aerial mosaics are not readily available.

It is recommended that all reports requiring an actual count and exact figures from units operating under fire be made a given number of hours after consolidating for the night. In lieu of reports giving figures, it is suggested that early reports state the expected ability of the unit to continue operations on the following day and give general, estimated, or comparative losses.

LVT's were lost on D and D+1 day because they ran out of fuel. Large numbers of these craft were launched simultaneously and exhausted their fuel at approximately the same time. The bowser boats and LST's were unable to refuel the craft fast enough to meet the demand. It is recommended that an increased amount of fuel be carried on LST's and additional fueling stations be provided. Closer coordinated planning for the use of pontoon fueling barges and bowser boats is suggested.

It is recommended the bomb disposal personnel be attached to the Division Engineer units in advance of an operation. In one instance during the IWO JIMA Operation a bomb disposal unit was landed on Division request, but, without their equipment. A special message was required to have the equipment landed.

The following comments were suggested by Battalion Commanders, and staff officers of various echelons:

"Weasels are very satisfactory, we need more of them."

"Larger mortars are needed." "We want 4.2 inch and 155mm mortars."

"Increase the allowance of 60mm illuminating."

"Increase the allowance of illuminating hand grenades."

"Increase the allowance of 81mm light weight shells and decrease the number of 81mm heavy shells."

"The four man group or team within the squad did not work out well in this operation." "The squad complement should remain the same but operate as a squad with no further breakdown."

"More infantrymen should be trained in assault engineer tactics to assist in the destruction of pillboxes and caves using demolitions."

Liaison Officer's Notes, IWO JIMA Campaign. (Continued).

"Replacements were not given sufficient training with our regiments." "They did not know how we operate and fight."

"We would like to have communication with close support aircraft to guide them in after they have been assigned a close support mission to the battalion front."

"Aerial bombardment prior to D-day was too general and targets were not destroyed."

"The experienced pilots who came in close to our front lines on support missions were a big help, those who did not get in close gave the battalion little help."

"Strafing with 50 caliber guns was very ineffective." "We recommend that strafing be discontinued except against troops and vehicles caught assembled in an open area."

"Aerial bombs of less than 500 pounds did very little good." "The light bombs did not destroy caves and tunnels." "Bombs having a 4 to 5 second delay fuze were very effective and those having an instantaneous fuze were relatively ineffective."

"Naval gunfire was insufficient for the destruction of caves, tunnels, and mortar emplacements." "The destruction of coast defense guns and their concrete emplacements was very effective." "Naval gunfire was accurate and all guns capable of firing at our shipping were destroyed."

"The defenses prepared by the enemy were excellent." "The man who planned them was a past master of defense."

"The accuracy of the individual enemy with his weapon from rifles up to 57mm AT guns was surprisingly good."

"In one instance a large mortar fired at my advancing front line until the men were within 50 yards of its position." "The mortar was fired into the air and hit that far in front of its position."

"Large rockets were fired at us from improvised mounts until we were 75 yards from them."

"Our supply was good." "There was plenty of everything we needed and it kept coming." - All echelons commented throughout the operation on the adequacy of supply and the delivery of supplies where they were needed. The work of the 4 section and the quartermasters was outstanding.

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Liaison Officer's Notes, IWO JIMA Campaign. (Continued).

"The maps of IWO JIMA were very inaccurate as to detail in the area north of airfield number one." "More aerial photographs and an aerial mosaic were needed." "Good aerial photo coverage of this area would have helped us." "The terrain is better suited for defense than any I have ever seen."

V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS LANDING FORCE
IN THE FIELD.

 24 March 1945.

From: VACLF Liaison Officer, Team No. 3.
To : The Commanding General.
Subject: Special Action Report, IWO JIMA Campaign.

1. PREPARATION AND REHEARSAL:

(a) In accordance with orders dated 22 November, 1944, from the Commanding General, Fifth Amphibious Corps, I reported to the Commanding General, Fifth Marine Division on 26 November, 1944, at Camp Tarawa, Hawaii, T. H., as Corps Liaison Officer and Officer in Charge of Corps Liaison Team No. 3. The Liaison Officer met all members of the general and special staff, their assistants and enlisted personnel, and studied the method of procedure within each staff section. Knowledge of the source and disposition of information and a personal and friendly acquaintance with those who handle it was found to greatly facilitate obtaining it during the actual operation. Corps, division and regimental plans were studied and all staff conferences were attended. A pass to the conference room was received for the Communication Officer of the Liaison Team in order that he might be informed of the operation plans and assist the Liaison Officer in covering all sections. Regiments, battalions and attached units were visited in order to know their command personnel. Since later, during the operation, units were referred to by their commanders name more often than by their organizational name and also as it was often necessary to visit subordinate commands in order to ascertain the situation, this time was well spent.

(b) During this period several CPX's were held by the division which afforded an opportunity to work out plans for the actual obtaining of combat information. It was the practice in the 5th Division for information of tactical nature to be sent directly to D-3; also the air, artillery and naval gun fire officers operated in this section. Since this was the fountainhead of tactical information, it was necessary for the liaison officer to remain here most of the time. The Communication Officer of the team, who, as previously mentioned had been kept informed of the operation plans and type of information required, covered the D-2 section which operated separately from the D-3 section tent, bringing to the Liaison Officer information obtained there. During lulls in the operation the D-1 and D-4 sections were contacted.

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This system, seemed to work out best for complete coverage of all sections with the means at our disposal, at the same time allowing coverage of that tactical information which must reach Corps as promptly as possible, when the Division CP was established ashore. During these CPX's the communication team, which consisted of six men besides the communication officer, was broken into two sections - one section with the TCS Radio Jeep set up in the Division CP near the D-3 Section, the other with the portable TBX set up a mile or so away simulating Corps. At the end of the exercise messages were compared to check for accuracy of transmission and reception. During this preparation period the communication team followed a daily training schedule under the supervision of the communication officer, the TCS Jeep was waterproofed, and all equipment made ready for embarkation.

2. ENROUTE TO IWO JIMA:

(a) On 2 January, 1945, the liaison teams embarked with the Division staff. Prior to striking the target several rehearsals were scheduled in the Hawaiian Area and the Staging Area. Previous arrangements had been made to secure a high priority for the TCS Jeep and to have the Corps Liaison Team boated in the Commanding General's Group. In all of these rehearsals the entire team participated, using the portable TBX radio set up on deck. Arrangements were made whereby the Liaison Officer remained in the Operation Room, where the Commanding General, Chief of Staff, D-2, D-3, and D-5 were. Here all incoming dispatches were read aloud, thus all tactical information was readily available and was promptly relayed to Corps. A member of the communication team was used as a runner between the Operation Room and the radio on deck. During these rehearsals actual transmission to Corps was effected and was of benefit in preparing the Liaison Officer and the team in the technique of preparing, writing and encoding messages and later by checking with Corps, in finding out time of receipt, whether the messages were accurately received and whether Corps received the desired information. The team also participated in embarking and debarking, boating and landing, including the Jeep and equipment, in order to iron out all boating difficulties prior to landing.

(b) The interdivision liaison officers (4th and 5th) also embarked aboard, did not have their own communication facilities and it was arranged for them to use the Corps liaison net. This did not prove too great a burden for the radio operators or for the net and was beneficial in that it enabled the Corps Liaison Officer to furnish the 5th Division with information of adjacent units. Also a

VACLF Liaison Officer Special Action Report IWO JIMA Campaign.

system was worked out with the interdivision liaison officer from the 4th Division, since both required the same information, whereby both worked together and assured covering all sections at all times. This proved to be an excellent arrangement especially during the first several days of the actual operation, when it was necessary to cover all sections 24 hours a day. At the conclusion of the Hawaiian Area rehearsals, a meeting was called of all corps and division liaison officers in order to iron out information and transmission difficulties and a system was agreed upon to include each other as information addressees when sending information to the unit each represented.

3. ACTIVITIES ON IWO JIMA:

(a) Upon arrival at IWO JIMA communication was established with Corps several hours prior to H-hour. Initially no difficulty was encountered with transmission, and information was relayed to Corps as promptly and continuously as received in the manner worked out at the rehearsals as described above. The Division headquarters was originally scheduled to land early in the afternoon of D-Day, but due to conditions on the beach this was postponed until D plus 2. However, the radio jeep and driver were unloaded early D-day and were dispatched ashore along with other high priority vehicles, before the change in Division Headquarters was announced; this was not as planned but worked out all right as it was in position and ready to operate when the CP displaced ashore. D night and the night of D plus 1 some difficulty in transmission was encountered as the Corps and 5th Division Command ships became separated beyond the range of the TBX radio. However, previous arrangements had been made with the Division Communication Officer to use one of the division nets in case of failure of the Liaison communications.

(b) On D plus 2 the Division CP displaced ashore, the liaison team along with it. Upon reaching the shore communications were promptly reestablished with Corps using the TCS radio jeep. This was used until Corps CP was established ashore. During the landing phase the six men of the communication team were none too many, as it took three to operate the set and one to act as a runner between the set and the operations room (or D-3 tent ashore) and they were operating on a 24-hour basis. When the Corps CP was established ashore, telephone became the primary means of communication with the radio being used as a secondary means when the lines went out. During the early phase, when activity was constant and it was necessary for the Liaison Officer to remain in the D-3 tent constantly, it proved very practical to have the communication officer of the liaison team and the interdivision liaison officer from the 4th Division, both of whom knew what information was desired, to help

VACLF Liaison Officer Special Action Report IWO JIMA Campaign.

cover the other sections, and also have the interdivision liaison officer cover the D-3 section when the Corps Liaison Officer had to leave the CP. It was frequently necessary to leave the CP and to proceed to regiments, battalions and companies in order to ascertain exactly what the situation was, to cover the beaches in order to determine their status and defenses and to make daily trips to Corps. An additional jeep other than the radio jeep would have been of great value.

(c) During this phase other liaison officers from the regiments and supporting arms joined the division CP. It is obvious that the division staff officers, particularly the D-3 cannot be constantly interrupted by all of these officers. The Corps Liaison officer undertook to serve as a clearing house for information disseminating this information to other interested parties, allowing them to use his situation map, telephone and other facilities. Also it enabled him to get information from them and from the liaison officers stationed with adjacent units. This renders a service to the division staff and all others concerned and keeps access to the staff open for himself to get first hand information. Frequently information was delayed in reaching Corps because all messages had to be released by division according to Corps orders. When information is constantly coming in, it is impractical to constantly interrupt the Chief of Staff or D-3 to read and sign dispatches.

During the entire operation, the Commanding General and the staff of the 5th Marine Division extended the Liaison Officer every consideration, and their cooperation greatly assisted him in the performance of his duties.

4: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS:

The main function of a liaison officer is to furnish his parent organization with timely, accurate and complete information of what is happening in the unit to which he is sent. In order to effectively accomplish this it is necessary to establish a personal and friendly acquaintanceship with everybody who can be of assistance to him in carrying out his mission, which includes all members of the staff and commanders of subordinate units to include the battalions. In return he must take every opportunity to be of assistance to the staff in any way possible. He must also study the operating procedure of the various staff sections and adopt himself and the means at his disposal to their method of functioning.

VACLF Liaison Officer Special Action Report IWO JIMA Campaign.

5. RECOMMENDATIONS:

It is respectfully recommended that:

(a) That Corps call a meeting of all corps and division liaison officers in an operation immediately after the rehearsal if possible, in order to coordinate their efforts, iron out communication and information problems, to compare transmissions received with originals sent, to avoid any mistakes or confusion in use of code names, and to assure itself that it is getting desired information.

(b) That a $\frac{1}{4}$ ton 4 x 4 Jeep be furnished the liaison team in addition to the TCS radio jeep, as it is not practical to use the radio jeep over rough terrain or in the forward area, also that a blackout tent and telephone be furnished the team.

(c) It is recommended that the Corps Liaison Officer:

(1) Personally acquaint himself with all unit commanders to include the battalion, attached units, and task group commanders, as well as the division staff.

(2) Train his communication officer and make arrangements with the division liaison officer to assist him in obtaining information, or covering the situation when he must be absent from the command post.

(3) Obtain a high priority for his team and equipment so that he may land not later than the Commanding General's group.

(4) Make previous arrangements with division signal officer to use division communications in case of failure of his own.

(5) Take charge of furnishing division, regimental, battalion and supporting arm liaison officers with information, so as to relieve the 3 section of this task and thus keep the staff open to himself at all times.

R. S. Howell
R. S. HOWELL.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Shore Party Report

Appendix 10 to Annex CHARLIE to Special Action Report IVO JIMA Campaign

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V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS LANDING FORCE,
In the Field.

30 April, 1945.

From: Shore Party Commander.
To : The Commanding General.
Subject: Special Action Report, IWO JIMA Campaign.
Reference: (a) VACLIF Staff Memorandum No. 5-45.
Enclosure: (A) CO, 8th Field Depot, Special Action Report IWO JIMA Campaign.

1. Following is a brief log of activities of shore party, V Amphibious Corps, covering the IWO JIMA Operation.

20 October, 1944

8th Field Depot placed under operational control of Commanding General, V Amphibious Corps and designated as shore party. Commanding Officer, Eighth Field Depot designated Shore Party Commander.

Military training began.

5 November, 1944

33rd and 34th Depot Companies joined.

26 November, 1944

36th Depot Company joined.

6 January, 1945.

1 Officer and 104 enlisted joined from 9th Construction Brigade.

13 January, 1945

Rehearsal off Maui began.

18 January, 1945

Rehearsal off Maui completed.

27 January, 1945

The Corps Shore Party embarked at Pearl Harbor, Oahu, as a portion of the V Amphibious Corps Troops and departed that port.

13 February, 1945

Rehearsal off Saipan.

Appendix 10 to Annex CHARLIE to VACLIF Special Action Report IWO JIMA Campaign.

D-Day 19 February, 1945

Corps Shore Party Commander boarded PCS 1421 to observe landing operations from off shore until such time as it appeared advisable to land the shore party.

D / 1

Beach conditions so congested that there appeared to be no advantage to an early landing of the Shore Party. During this period the off-shore operation of boats and amphibious vehicles was observed.

D / 2

70% of floating signal dump landed by small craft to fill immediate needs of combat units.

Communications officer landed.

D / 3

Corps Shore Party Commander landed at daybreak with small reconnaissance party and established a command post at TA 148-0 on the boundary between Red-2 and Yellow-1 Beaches. Dispatches were sent before noon requesting that the various elements of the Corps Shore Party be landed immediately.

5th Marine Division Shore Party was operating Green-1, Red-1, and Red-2 Beaches with traffic more or less evenly distributed, although Red-1 was partially blocked with artillery positions dug in almost to the shore line.

4th Marine Division Shore Party was operating principally along the south end of Yellow-1. The area in the vicinity of the boundary between Yellow-1 and Yellow-2 was badly blocked by wreckage and by our own artillery positions. Blue-1 was in partial use but was frequently under severe enemy artillery and mortar fire. Blue-2 was wholly denied to use for the same reason.

Surf conditions were bad and LCVP's beached almost as soon as they beached. Many LCM's were also in difficulty.

Conferences were held with the Division Shore Party Commanders and it was decided that it was not practicable to establish a Corps Beach as such and that better results would be obtained by utilizing Corps Shore Party personnel to reinforce the Division Shore Parties. As Beach Teams of the Corps Shore Party came ashore they were turned over to Division Shore Parties and operated as parts thereof.

During the day the following personnel landed ashore: Headquarters Signal Company, two beach teams, one dump team, Tank Retriever section, two platoons of the 8th Ammunition Company, and technical officers from Headquarters Company,

One ammunition platoon was assigned to the 4th Division.

D + 4

The following personnel landed: Shore Party and Battalion Headquarters, Headquarters Motor Transport, General Supply Section, Ordnance Section, Headquarters Military Police Company, Headquarters Engineer Company, two beach teams, and one road repair team. Approximately only one third of the Corps Shore Party had been landed although 36 hours had elapsed since they were requested.

The 3rd Marine Division Shore Party landed and was assigned parts of Red-2 and Yellow-1 Beaches, redesignated as Black Beach. This beach was operated by them and was later expanded to include all of Red-2 and a portion of Yellow-2, the latter being logically in their area.

D + 5

Beach and surf conditions along eastern beaches grew worse. 2nd Separate Engineer Battalion began developing a road to the western beaches.

By Corps Order, Corps Shore Party assumed control of all shore party activities at 1700.

The following personnel were landed: 33rd, 34th and 36th Depot Companies, two dump teams, two beach teams, majority of Motor Transport Section, Communication Section, one road repair team, one military police platoon, Reclamation and Salvage Section.

33rd Depot Company was assigned to the Fifth Division.

D + 6

Corps Cargo with high priority began to come ashore and was handled over any beach on which it could be landed. Cargo in the assault echelon belonging to the Island Command was mixed indiscriminately with Corps cargo.

The remainder of the Corps Shore Party was landed; one beach team, one dump team, ammunition company headquarters and two platoons, distillation section, balance of Motor Transport Section, and Medical Supply Section.

One ammunition platoon was assigned to the Fifth Division.

D + 7

Majority of Corps Shore Party general cargo, less medical supplies had been landed by morning of D + 7.

D + 8

Road to western beaches usable, but attempt to use these beaches to land ammunition was frustrated by enemy gunfire from the northern end of the island.

D + 11

Enemy guns which had denied use of Western Beaches knocked out and Purple-2 beach was put in operation. Shoals limited its operation to LCT's and smaller craft. Thereafter a beach team was maintained on Purple and that beach was used alternately or in conjunction with eastern beaches as weather permitted.

Red Beach-1 closed and not again used during the operation.

D + 13

Remainder of Corps Shore Party Cargo, consisting of urgently needed medical supplies, arrived ashore.

D + 14

Hydrographic surveys of western beaches indicated LSM's and LST's could be landed on White-2. One LST was landed but was forced to retract because of bad weather. This beach was not again used during discharge of assault and sub-assault shipping.

D + 18

The Corps Shore Party turned over beaches Yellow-2, Blue-1, Blue-2, and White to the Island Command at 0800. At the same time 4th and 5th Division Shore Parties reverted to control of their divisions. The Third Division Shore Party remained under control of the Corps Shore Party Commander and operated the northern half of Black Beach. Corps Shore Party retained the southern half of Black Beach and operated it as a unit. Green and Purple-2 beaches remained under Corps control to be used for landing resupply ammunition and for re-embarkation of Corps units.

D + 19

50 men of 33rd Depot Company returned from Fifth Division. The remainder of the Company, 97 men, retained by the Division.

D + 20

73 men from 34th Depot Company assigned duties with 5th Division. This made a total of 170 Depot Company personnel with that Division.

D + 21-33

Routine Shore Party Operations continued.

D + 34

Operational control of Corps Shore Party passed to Commanding General, Third Marine Division on departure of Headquarters VAC. Personnel from 33rd and 34th Depot Companies reverted from 5th Marine Division to Shore Party Control.

D + 36

Ammunition platoon assigned to the Fifth Division reverted to Corps Shore Party.

D + 39

Re-embarkation on USS QUEENS began at 0900.

D + 40

"Banzai" charge by approximately 250 Japanese in TA 198. Two (2) platoons of Eighth Ammunition Company and one (1) platoon of 36th Depot Company participated in action.

D + 41

Re-embarkation on SS Leeds began at 1230.

D + 52

Re-embarkation completed. Departed Iwo enroute Hawaiian area.

2. ORGANIZATION.

A. The Corps Shore Party consisted of the 8th Field Depot, less Rear Echelon, plus other troops attached as follows:

	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>
8th Field Depot	90	1494
442nd Port Company, USA		1
Supply Service, FMF, Pac.	1	1
V Amphibious Corps	2	1
8th Naval Construction Battalion		26
90th Naval Construction Battalion	1	26
95th Naval Construction Battalion		26
23rd Special Naval Construction Battalion		26
TOTAL	94	1601

These figures do not include ship's platoons which consisted of personnel of 23rd Special NCB not formally attached to the Corps Shore Party.

B. Personnel from Island Command units which were attached to the Corps Shore Party were used as operators of mechanical equipment. This was a highly satisfactory arrangement because the 8th Field Depot did not have enough operators for all its own equipment, or for any of the equipment loaned the Shore Party by Island Command units. Army Port Companies, not attached to the Corps Shore Party, were transported in the assault shipping but were not landed until D + 10. They might have been used to good advantage had they been attached earlier as components of the Corps Shore Party.

Recommendation: - That maximum use be made of permanent garrison troops for Shore Party duty. They should be placed under his direction. They should be used to provide ships' platoons, operators for mechanical equipment, and longshore labor.

C. The Field Depot organization was retained as an administrative basis for the Shore Party, but the personnel was organized operationally as follows:

	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>
HEADQUARTERS COMPANY		
Command Section - - - - -	4	
Personnel Section - - - - -	5	10
Supply Section - - - - -	1	5
Cargo Control Section - - - - -	4	5
Ammunition & Ordnance Control Section -	8	8
Medical Section - - - - -	3	8
Communication Section - - - - -	1	18
Signal Supply Control - - - - -	1	3
Military Police Section - - - - -	4	75
MOTOR TRANSPORT COMPANY		
Headquarters Section - - - - -	2	5
Base Section - - - - -	2	30
Mobile Section - - - - -	1	10
Transport Section - - - - -	2	274
ENGINEER COMPANY		
Headquarters Section - - - - -	4	4
Mobile Section - - - - -	3	56
Distillation Section - - - - -	1	12
*BEACH TEAMS #1 to #7 (Inclusive) - - - - -	14	208
**DUMP TEAMS #1 to #4 (Inclusive) - - - - -	9	136
CHEMICAL WARFARE SECTION - - - - -	1	11
TANK MAINTENANCE SECTION - - - - -	2	9
DUMP CONTROL (GENERAL) SECTION - - - - -	6	9
SALVAGE SECTION - - - - -	2	52

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	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>
8th Ammunition Company- - - - -	8	214
33rd Depot Company- - - - -	2	147
34th Depot Company- - - - -	2	143
36th Depot Company- - - - -	2	149
	<u>94</u>	<u>1601</u>

* Each Beach team is composed of approximately two (2) officers and thirty (30) men divided into two reliefs, each relief being constituted as follows:

- 1 - Officer-in-Charge...
- 1 - Team NCO
- 1 - Recorder
- 8 - Checker-Dispatchers (one or more from each of the Signal, Ordnance, Ammunition, General Supply, Headquarters Engineer Section of Depot)
- 4 - Runners.
- 1 - Medical Corpsman.

** Each Dump Team is composed of approximately two (2) officers and thirty-four (34) men divided into two reliefs, each relief being constituted as follows:

- 1 - Officer-in-Charge.
- 1 - Team NCO.
- 1 - Recorder.
- 13 - Receipt & Issue Specialists (One or more men handling each of following classes of supplies: Fuel, Chemical, Clothing, Water, Subsistence, Signal, Engineer, Ordnance, Medical, and General Supply).
- 2 - Runners.

*** Liaison Personnel consisting of one (1) officer (Relief Officer in Charge) and three (3) enlisted men (1 Team NCO and 2 Recorders) from each Beach Team furnished as follows:

- To 5th Division - - - From Beach Teams #1, #2 and #3.
- To 4th Division - - - From Beach Teams #4, #5, #6 and #7.

In addition, one (1) officer assigned to 4th Division and one (1) to 5th Division for liaison officers at Division Shore Party Command Posts.

- D. (1) The decision to utilize Corps personnel to re-inforce the Division Shore Parties instead of setting up separate Corps Beaches prevented the employment of the Beach Teams as organized in the early phases of the landing. This decision was predicated on conditions as they existed and is believed to have been sound. However, it does not follow that this would invariably be the best course of action and the fact that it worked in this instance should not preclude flexibility in future plans. It is believed that operating

separate Corps beaches with teams as originally organized would usually be the best procedure.

- (2) It was possible to use a Beach Team as planned when Beach Purple-2 was established. The team was composed of supervisory and other specialists as described above, labor being furnished from a pool as needed. As worked out on this beach, the most efficient disposition was as follows:

(a) Officer-in-charge with his runners remained at the Beachmaster's Command Post where he could use the speaker to reach all personnel.

(b) Engineer Officer handled lights, fire pumpers, constructed roadways and ramps.

(c) Motor Transport Officer supervised all heavy equipment on beach.

(d) Truckmaster dispatched trucks and assisted Motor Transport Officer.

(e) Personnel Officer supervised working parties and dispatched men to each landing craft when it hit the beach.

(f) Chief checker - assigned checkers to landing craft and supervised work of recorder.

(g) Checkers- Two to a landing craft or ship. Returned extra personnel to labor pool or called for additional men as needed. If they could not determine for whom the cargo was intended, one would so report to the Officer-in-Charge of beach at the same time requesting guides for cargo to Dumps. Checkers were from all Sections, including the technical supply sections, in order that such items as communications equipment, ordnance material, etc., could be quickly identified and properly cared for. This is considered as being one of the most important requirements in organizing beach teams.

(h) M. P. Officer - supervised traffic control.

E. The strength of the Corps Shore Party was satisfactory in general, and was adequate for most requirements. No element was overstrength. A few would have benefited by an increase.

- (1) Engineers: - More men were needed for road teams and beach work, pumpers and lighting units.

Recommendation: That the T/O be amended to include:

- (a) 10 additional men for road teams and beachwork.
- (b) 2 men for each pumper.
- (c) 1 man for each lighting unit.

- (2) Motor Transport: - Shortage of drivers and operators was relieved by attached troops. A small increase in organic strength is advisable, particularly in event of an easy landing when operators from attached units would be detached soon after landing.

Recommendation: That the T/O be amended to include:

- (a) 20 additional truck drivers.
- (b) 10 additional crane operators.

- (3) Communications: - Message center men were furnished by Corps Signal Battalion. This function must continue after they are detached, and should be covered by organic increase.

Recommendations: That the T/O be amended to include:

- (a) 2 additional message center men.

- AF 1115T*
40 WINCHMEN
10 55 PM 39
- (4) Winchmen: - Recommendations previously made are reiterated, that winchmen be included in Shore Party personnel to operate ships' winches. Winchmen are not included in civilian crews of Maritime Commission Ships. This caused some inconvenience during re-embarkation. The Island Command furnished winchmen during this period from Port Companies and the 23rd Special Construction Battalion, but because they had barely enough for their own proper functioning it would have been a definite advantage to have had trained men in the Shore Party itself. Men trained in both crane and winch operation would be the best solution.

Recommendation: That 16 trained winchmen be included in Shore Party personnel.

F. The amount of available labor fluctuated through a wide range from day to day. Ship's platoons were transferred ashore as they completed their duties afloat and augmented the Shore Parties. This increase was offset because much of the labor for the Division Shore Parties was provided from combat replacements which were released to replace casualties as necessary. This was done gradually and there was enough labor at all times to handle the cargo as it came ashore. However, it should be noted that due to difficult beach conditions cargo was not delivered to the beach as rapidly as can normally be expected.

Recommendation: The strength of the labor units should not be a fixed number. It should be based on a study of the contemplated operation.

G. It is believed that the idea of using the Field Depot organization as the nucleus of the Corps Shore Party is sound. The Depot is the best available source of personnel, both officers and men trained in handling cargo of all types. Unless used for this duty the depot has no active function for the period during which the Corps Shore Party is operative, thereby losing valuable productive manpower during the most critical period of the assault. Probably the greatest advantage, however, is that the work done by them during this period simplifies later activities. If the Depot is activated as

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such after the landing has been accomplished, its Shore Party work gradually is converted into Depot functions with no change of authority. On the other hand, if the troops are withdrawn after the assault, as happened at Iwo Jima, it provides a trained agency to act as a rear echelon which is always necessary to adjust supply matters with the Iscom. It is not enough that the Depot merely furnish the personnel, it is more important that the officers and organizational framework be utilized as a basis of the Shore Party.

Recommendation: - That a Field Depot, or equivalent organization, be used as the nucleus for future Corps Shore Parties.

3. LIAISON AND STAFF RELATIONSHIPS.

* A. Liaison groups were assigned by the Corps Shore Party to the 4th and 5th Division Shore Parties. They performed regular duties with these organizations as well as providing liaison with the Corps Shore Party. It was a satisfactory arrangement and was valuable to both parties.

Recommendation: - That liaison parties be habitually sent from Corps Shore Party to Division Shore Parties operating thereunder. That this be effected in time so that a part of their training will be with the Division. 7

B. A liaison officer as a representative of the C-4 section was assigned to the Corps Shore Party. This was highly satisfactory.

Recommendation: - A liaison officer representing the C-4 section be detailed to the Corps Shore Party in future operations.

C. The Corps LVT Officer acted as liaison officer between the Corps Shore Party and both C-4 Section and the LVT commands. This was highly satisfactory.

Recommendation: - That the Corps LVT Officer act as liaison officer as described above in future operations. It is further recommended that he be given cognizance of DUKW's or that an additional liaison officer be designated for that duty.

D. A liaison officer was detailed from Corps as OIC, Corps Shore Party Command unit and his services were very valuable.

E. Transport Quartermaster

(1) The Corps Transport Quartermaster was placed under operational control of the Corps Shore Party Commander during the landing operations but there remains a definite need to tie in his functions and activities much more closely with the Shore Party, from the planning stage onward. This warrants the most careful and complete study as it appears to be incompletely covered in the present doctrine, leaving a critical movement of personnel and supplies more or less to chance. Further comment is made in Paragraphs 13, 14, 15 and 16.

- (2) A liaison officer from the C-4 section (TQM) was assigned during the first days. His efforts were helpful, but the period so assigned should have begun with the planning phase.

Recommendation: - That a thorough study be made at once to improve the teamwork of the TQM and Shore Party. It is suggested that some of the difficulties might be met by making all TQM activities a part of the Shore Party's organization.

4. RECORDS AND PAPER WORK.

A. It was planned that only simple records be kept to aid in control of unloading and to furnish information on which to base future operations.

B. Two forms of cargo tickets were employed. They were based on wholly different conception of use, and it was hoped that experience gained on this operation would establish preference for one or the other.

- (1) One was large form printed on waterproof paper, having all major items printed thereon so that it was only necessary to enter amounts. This was used by the 4th Marine Division and Corps Shore Party.

- (2) The other was a vinylite disc on which entries could be made with a soft pencil. This was used by the 5th Marine Division.

C. Neither was used successfully, and any attempt to do so was abandoned when unloading by large craft was begun. The value of cargo tickets is considerable as a record of movement of boats and vehicles. They have little value as a record of amount of cargo moved. Tentative instructions had been issued to the Corps Shore Party to use the Cargo Ticket as a record of arrival of boat on the beach, time of beginning and time of finishing unloading. Had this procedure been followed it would have provided a much needed control, but the idea came too late for proper promulgation.

D. The information of most value is "how much?" and "where is it?" Dump records are therefore essential. The cargo ticket form was used as a dump report of supplies on hand, and as such it was excellent.

E. TQM records of cargo unloaded give the best information of tonnage discharged.

Recommendations: -

- (1) That a study be made as to what information is required for control of operations and for record. That this study should cover requirements of TQM, Boat Control, Beachmaster and Shore Party.
- (2) That the TQM be given as one of his duties the responsibility of providing adequate records to be dispatched from the ship with each boat load of cargo.

- (3) The series of records set up should be simple but should provide means for the Shore Party Commander to follow unloading operations both at shipside and on the beach as a means of control.
- (4) Accounting records should assemble information as to location and quantity of supplies in the dumps.

5. TRAINING.

A. A comprehensive program of military training was completed by all of the initial 8th Field Depot personnel. Other units were attached too late to receive training. Instruction was stressed in bivouacs, musketry, range firing, combat, booby traps and related subjects, guard duty, and sanitation. Its value was amply demonstrated throughout the operation. The officers conducting this training exercised resourcefulness and had to depend largely on their own initiative and ingenuity in the face of meager facilities available. Field exercises were held at Makaha beach, 38 miles from the depot billeting area.

B. Training in shore party activities was conducted also. It was necessary to travel 20 miles across the island to reach the nearest beach suitable for effective training because local facilities were lacking and complete equipment was not available until immediately prior to departure, so this training was not as complete as desired.

Recommendation: - That the shore party be billeted for training in the vicinity of a suitable landing beach.

C. Training in the technical specialties of all sections was carried out satisfactorily.

D. Completion of satisfactory organization and training was seriously hampered by local conditions which were not corrected although numerous requests and recommendations were made.

- (1) Part of the men were billeted in Camp Catlin and part of them in the Transient Center.
- (2) The men were subsisted in established messes of other organizations in these two locations. It was, therefore, impossible properly to train a mess force.
- (3) The officers were billeted in numerous quarters and billets scattered throughout the Pearl Harbor area.

Recommendation: - That the Shore Party be billeted in one area and be made self sustaining during the training period.

E. Rehearsals.

- (1) No Corps Shore Party equipment was landed during the rehearsal on Maui. Dispatches ordering Beach and Communication Teams to land

were initiated in mid-afternoon. They were not landed before dark and request was made to delay the landing order. However, some Teams were landed during the night. The communications and control channels were completely unprepared to cover this phase of landing. A change in utilization of communications channels was instituted for the assault landing.

6. SECURITY.

A. The Corps Shore Party had no organic security personnel other than the M.P. Company. All organizations were trained to provide their own local security, but there were no weapons heavier than the M-1 rifle in the organization. Due to the conditions anticipated it was considered sufficient to depend upon the Divisions Shore Parties^{ies} for the heavier protection provided in the Pioneer Battalions.

B. The entire beach was subjected to intermittent artillery, mortar and rocket fire for a few days after the shore party landed. Thereafter, a few enemy infiltrated at night into dump, bivouac and operating areas.

C. The only actual combat in which a unit of a Corps Shore Party participated was in repelling a "banzai" charge in the vicinity of White Beach in TA 198. Enemy attacked at 0200, 26 March, with a force of something over 250 men, almost all of whom were killed. The attack penetrated Army, Naval Construction Battalion and Marine bivouac areas. Personnel participating from this command included portions of the 8th Ammunition Company and the 36th Depot Company. The Corps Shore Party Commander is highly gratified with the performance of these colored troops, whose normal function is that of labor troops, while in direct action against the enemy for the first time. Proper security prevented their being taken unawares, and they conducted themselves with marked coolness and courage. Careful investigation shows that they displayed modesty in reporting their own part in the action.

(1) Reports on file indicate the following totals of enemy killed and captured by this organization:

KIA	-	107
POW	-	1

7. CASUALTIES.

Casualties from enemy action sustained within this organization during the operation were as follows:

KIA	- - - - -	5
MIA	- - - - -	1
WIA (Evacuated)	- - - - -	23
WIA (Non-evacuated)	- - - - -	11

Total Casualties	<u>40</u>
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8. The remainder of this report deals with details of the operation which were noteworthy or were in some degree unsatisfactory and which it is believed can be improved. None of the recommendations made involve any radical departure from the procedure used during the operation, as it is thought to be basically sound.

9. WEATHER.

Weather during the period D to D + 18 was normal and did not at any time approximate storm conditions. Wind frequently reached 18-20 knots but did not exceed 25 knots during the early assault phase. Temperature was mild. Sky generally partially overcast but there were heavy rains on only two days. Operations began during the first quarter moon, and night operations were easily possible without lights.

10. BEACHES.

A. Both eastern and western beaches consist entirely of sand composed of black volcanic ash. In fact, the narrow part of the island appears to consist principally of this ash which is so deep that even the digging of water pumps did not strike hard rock. This sand is very fluid and does not become firm when wet. The particles of gravel size in the top layers are so porous that approximately half of them will float. There is a very small proportion of fines, which also partially accounts for its fluidity. The individual grains are comparatively soft and it was observed that in roadways, particularly those used by LVT's, enough fines were ground up within a few days so that the road packed and became firm enough for truck traffic.

B. The terraces which caused so many conjectures when studying photographs of the beach, are definitely caused by wave action. The lower terrace is formed by waves in normal weather. The higher ones are the result of storm action. The most surprising portion was between Beach Green 1 and Mt. Suribachi where the terrace due to storm indicated tremendous wave action at a very recent date. The shore line and its terraces change constantly and sometimes the change is large. It is thought that the terraces are formed because of the peculiarly noted under "surf" i.e.: That the breaker line remains in a relatively fixed position regardless of tide or wave height. Only in severe storms with onshore winds does the breaker line move up to a higher terrace. Sand fills in behind wreckage along the shore, and in the case of the beached Japanese ships this formed a much better working area than was found along the open beach.

C. The terraces were too steep for even tracked vehicles to climb until bulldozed down. Some of them (notably on Beach Red 1) were as much as 12' high at the water's edge. Amphibious vehicles stalled by these terraces were quickly drowned out and obstructed the beach.

D. The average slope from shore line to top of ridge was about 1 in 10, being somewhat steeper in the central and southern section than at the northern end. First roads followed LVT tracks which went directly up the hill.

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These were too steep for trucks and later were replaced by roads laid out diagonally to reduce the grade.

E. The underwater slope of the eastern beach appears to be a continuation of that above the shore line, and is, therefore, very steep. A submerged sand bar extends intermittently parallel to the shore at a distance of about 500 yards, beyond which the bottom drops rapidly so that at 1500 yards the depth is 60 fathoms. The effects of this sand bar are not noticeable except when the surf is heavy.

F. While there were difficulties caused by the deep sand, it had some very definite advantages.

- (1) It was easy to bulldoze, and ramps and roadways were easily constructed although considerable reworking was necessary.
- (2) There was no mud, even when there was heavy rainfall.
- (3) Enemy shellfire and bombs were cushioned by the deep sand, and fragments suppressed. Casualties undoubtedly would have been much heavier in hard or rocky soil.
- (4) Sanitary measures were very easy to provide.
- (5) Steel splinters sank into the sand instead of damaging tires as they have done on the coral formations of other island.

11. SURF.

A. Surf conditions at Iwo Jima in normal weather are difficult for all classes of landing craft. The steep beach causes the waves to come well in shore before breaking. Their force is not dissipated by drag on the bottom, but most of it is expended in a downward blow which acts on the bows of beached boats. Their effect is severe even in comparatively calm weather. An onshore wind greatly increases the severity of the surf so that it was found to be a practical necessity to shift operations from one side of the island to the other. The lee shore was calm enough for unloading even when the windward shore was rough. At no time during the assault was there heavy surf on both eastern and western beaches. It is of interest that even when high waves were caused by storms in the vicinity of the island the breaker line remained at approximately the same point.

B. On the eastern beaches there was a definite set toward the southern end of the island except when there was a strong southeast wind.

12. SHIPPING.

The easiest unloading of original shipping was from LSM's and LST's direct to the beach. Had there been an offshore reef or shoal water to prevent beaching, the story might have been different. However, it appears that more/extensive use of these ships to replace APA's and AKA's.

rapid and effective landing operations would result from more

Recommendation: - That LSM's and LST's be used to the maximum extent possible to replace AKA's and APA's for transit from last staging area to target. Decision should be based on beach conditions anticipated for each specific target.

13. CARGO.

A. All units actually constituting the assault force cut down their impedimenta to bare necessities and they were loaded in a good approximation to their order of necessity. This cannot be said of attached garrison units loaded in assault and sub-assault shipping. As a result, the beaches were clogged and unloading of high priority supplies was delayed by heavy cargo of low priority nature. The principal offenders, although not the only ones, were the Construction Battalion units, and it appears that it is through no fault of their own. Their equipment consists of certain units of supply which they were instructed to bring. There is no question raised as to the necessity for all these items, but there is doubt as to their priority. Lumber, cement, re-inforcing rods, ice cream machines and heavy refrigerating machinery cannot be used ashore immediately and should be carried in a shipping echelon commensurate with their necessity.

B. Particular difficulty was experienced in the case of some items of heavy equipment in the sub-assault and zero-echelon shipping of Island Command Units due to faulty planning in loading.

- (1) Heavy sem-trailers were loaded on LST's without bogies.
- (2) Heavy shovels were received at the beach with no batteries or batteries in uncharged condition. These were special heavy duty jobs and no suitable batteries were available.
- (3) A heavy tractor was sent ashore in the crate in which it left the factory.

C. The floating signal dump, stowed in amphibious trailers, was loaded in an LST in the rear of cargo which could only be unloaded by beaching the LST. The purpose of the trailers was positively defeated, their cargo was unloaded and sent ashore in boats.

Recommendation: -

- (1) That more careful planning be insisted upon in the case of permanent garrison units to insure that items of obviously low priority be excluded from assault shipping, and that heavy equipment be all combat loaded.
- (2) That more care be exercised in loading special equipment so that it can be used in the manner ^{and} for the purpose for which designed.

14. SHIP LOADING.

A. The personnel of the Corps Shore Party was badly scattered among 13

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ships, i.e., 1 GC, 3 APA's, 2 AK's, 2 LSM's and 5 LST's. Three days elapsed after it was requested that they be sent ashore before the last unit landed.

B. Shore Party supplies which were badly needed ashore for operations and to supply combat units were not received until after other cargo of lesser importance had been landed. Loading of shipping of assault units was satisfactory because the using units were permitted to supervise it closely. Loading of equipment and supply for the Corps Shore Party was much less satisfactory as it was dispersed among several ships. In many cases the using and operating personnel were not on the same ship as the equipment although every effort was made to load them together. The same difficulty was experienced with motorized equipment belonging to Island Command Units. In most cases operating personnel did not come ashore with their equipment.

C. Priorities set up prior to embarkation established an inflexible unloading procedure with no means to make rapid change due to unforeseen circumstances. The last Shore Party cargo to be received ashore was medical supplies which were beached on D + 13. They had been urgently needed since early in the operation.

D. There is a definite need for more effective teamwork in this phase of the operation.

Recommendation: -

- (1) That operating and using personnel be carried on the same ship with the equipment pertaining to them.
- (2) That when this is impossible, personnel be transferred to the ship carrying their equipment prior to landing.
- (3) That if neither of these be possible, representatives of the interested personnel remain with the cargo at all times.
- (4) That TQM's of Corps and of the ships concerned make sure that this phase of the unloading be adequately provided for in plans.
- (5) That a more flexible system of priorities be worked out and that Transron Commanders, Ship Commanders, TQM's and Shore Party Commander have a definite understanding of the methods to be employed.

15. SHIP TO BOAT LOADING.

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[The loading from transports into landing craft was in general unsatisfactory. There is a tendency for ships' platoons to dump cargo into landing boats with no consideration for the difficulties of unloading scrambled cargo on the beach. The extra effort required for careful stowage will be saved many times over through easier and quicker unloading on the beach. This is particularly true in the case of craft larger than LCM's. The supervision of this vital function has never been sufficiently stressed and responsibility therefor is carefully avoided by all hands.] Being a borderline case of Naval

and Marine Corps authority has undoubtedly been a contributing factor.

Recommendations: -

- (1) That the supervision of stowage in landing boats be definitely placed on the TQM's concerned.
- (2) That loading and unloading be done by cargo teams remaining aboard the landing craft in the following numbers:

LCVP	2 men	(each shift)
LCM	2 men	(each shift)
LCT	20 men 1 officer or senior NCO	(2 shifts, live aboard)
LSM	20 men 1 officer and 1 senior NCO	(2 shifts, live aboard)
LST	40 men 1 officer and 1 senior NCO	(2 shifts, live aboard)

This system was tried with good success and was only discontinued when Division Shore Parties reverted to Division control.

- (3) That the Shore Party have a TQM in its organization to co-ordinate this function and that a free boat be assigned to facilitate his operations.

16. CONTROL

A. The control of ship to shore movement was the weakest link in the chain of unloading operations. This has been considered a purely Naval matter, but it is vital to successful Shore Party operations that it work effectively. It did not do so in this case, and it is therefore stressed herein. The control of assault waves was beautifully worked out, but the subsequent control of craft landing personnel and cargo left much to be desired.

B. Some beaches were badly congested while at the same time others did not have enough craft on the beach to keep the shore party busy.

C. Loaded craft were held off the beach for long periods when they might have been unloaded. No information was available on the beach to prevent this condition and the control officer had little knowledge of requirements on the beach.

D. TQM's did not comply with the order to inform the shore party hourly of cargo to be unloaded. The first knowledge of the nature of loads was received when the boats landed and were boarded.

E. There are several factors which may have contributed to this confusion.

- (1) Preliminary plans probably should have been more definite, but if they had been made too inflexible and too much in detail it might have been worse rather than better.

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- (2) There was a definite lack of direct communication channels between the shore and ships discharging.
- (3) Some of the delay in landing personnel was due to non-availability of boats. This was of sufficient importance that there should have been a means of providing boats promptly and it should have been within the capabilities of the control officer to provide them.
- (4) Beachmasters worked directly with their Squadron Commanders. This is an excellent principle as far as it goes, but in an operation of the magnitude of this one there should be a closer tie-in with the Corps Shore Party so that Squadron Commanders will recognize authority from that source.

Recommendations: -

- (1) That Control be placed under the Senior Beachmaster, as soon as the assault waves have landed, and that active communication both by radio and by boat be maintained at all times.
- (2) That a representative of the Corps TQM be assigned to the Shore Party with complete information and sufficient clerical assistance so that the Shore Party Commander can intelligently plan and can meet emergencies.
- (3) That direct communications channels be provided between shore and ships discharging and to be discharged. That LCT's, LSM's and LST's ferrying cargo be included in this net. Assault troops will have landed and traffic incident to combat should be greatly reduced by the time these channels are required. This is of the utmost importance.
- (4) That the details of a plan, based on the above, be worked out by the interested parties and included in instruction promulgated prior to the next combat operation.

17. ORGANIZATION OF BEACHES.

A. The Shore Party and Beachmaster Command Posts in general were not tied in together closely enough. It usually was difficult to locate subordinate Shore Party Command Posts or to find the supervisory personnel in charge of unloading individual boats.

Recommendations: -

- (1) That all subordinate Shore Party Command Posts be marked so that they can be located easily.
- (2) That Shore Party and Beachmasters' Command Posts be located in close proximity to each other.

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- (3) That telephone connection be established between Beach Party and Shore Party Command Posts if they are not together.
- (4) That Officers or NCO's in charge of unloading parties have some identifying CP marker, and that there be a definite location designated as a Command Post on board each of the larger types of landing craft.

B. Beach Markers.

- (1) Markers for beach limits were set up and were valuable in controlling the landing of boats. The yellow markers blended too closely with the background and would have been improved by the addition of a black border to provide contrast.
- (2) Cargo classification markers were used in a few instances but appeared to have little or no value. They are solely for the benefit of boat control and their use should be predicated on the need for them expressed by control personnel. The use of standard letter and numeral flags for this phase of control might be studied with profit.

Recommendation: -

- (1) That a study be made of the use of beach markers other than those for beach limits and the doctrine be brought in line with actual operating needs.

18. LANDING CRAFT.

A. The Landing Craft used in the Iwo operation were subjected to severe usage due to beach formation and surf action. It is evident that there is room for improvement in design and handling from the fact that more than 200 craft of various types were lost, few due to enemy action, and this under beach conditions which may be considered normal for this island. The smooth handling of landing craft is of such importance to the Shore Party that the subject is considered here and recommendations are made although it is primarily a Naval subject.

B. Plans contemplated using LCVP's, LCM's and LCT's for unloading the majority of cargo from assault shipping. This was started, but adverse beach conditions precluded the use of all LCVP's and necessitated only limited use of LCM's. The majority of the cargo eventually came ashore in LSM's and LST's, requiring an entirely different unloading technique than that in which the men of the Shore Party had received the most of their training.

C. LCVP's: D-day was exceptionally calm, but even so, LCVP's which beached and let down their ramps, shipped large quantities of water before they could retract. This is usual on steep beaches where the surf breaks so far inshore that the breakers are on a line with or ahead of the bow of the boat. Enemy gunfire was intense, and boats could not be unloaded immediately. If not retracted promptly they floundered and obstructed the

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beach, interfering with boats landing later. Use of LCVP's for landing cargo was discontinued.

D. LCM's: LCM's were slightly more successful, but as the surf continued to become higher, more difficulties were encountered. A large number were lost, principally due to broaching, which soon drowned out their engines and they remained on the beach as obstacles to hinder unloading of craft arriving later. There was so much difficulty in handling them on the beach, and so many broached that their use was limited to lee beaches which were selected from time to time as conditions changed.

Recommendations: -

- (1) Neither LCVP nor LCM has a stern anchor, and anchors would be of doubtful value. However, the great majority of those which were lost could have been saved if there had been a few LCP(R)'s available to secure stern lines to hold the boats perpendicular to the surf and to help them retract.

E. LCT's, LSM's and LST's:

- (1) The larger craft and ships were used almost exclusively to land cargo after D + 10, but even with these, numerous difficulties were encountered for which no satisfactory answer was found by Naval personnel, and makeshift measures had to be taken by the Shore Party in order to speed up unloading. Even then it proceeded at a slower rate than desired.
- (2) The most serious difficulty was the inability of the landing craft to maintain a stable position after it had beached. Side-ways movement of the bow and ramp was almost constant when any appreciable surf was running. Under such conditions cranes could not be run aboard to handle the cargo. When tried, the equipment was damaged. Trucks could not be run aboard. As a result, LVT's were used to handle cargo from landing craft to supply dumps. This is a slow method at best, but in this case it was the only workable method. It was not even possible to fall back on the usual feeble expedient of manhandling the cargo.
- (3) Heavy tractors were utilized as anchors to hold the bows steady - two per landing craft - taking them away from their normal use and further slowing down unloading operations.
- (4) An abortive attempt was made to use "dead men" buried deep in the sand in place of tractors to hold the bow of an LST steady on the beach. This effort failed and no further attempt was made to develop the idea. The reason for its failure appeared to be that no means was provided to let out and take up slack in the mooring lines due to wave and tide action.
- (5) The stern anchors which are normally used to hold the craft per-

pendicular to the surf will not hold in soft sand bottom such as that at Iwo. Ship's officers said that it was "like dropping the anchor in a bowl of mush".

- (6) On steep beaches there is a strong tendency for the craft to slip back off the beach. The method used at Iwo was to keep the engines full ahead to hold the craft on the beach. Even with engines going full ahead, they could not maintain stable positions. When the waves receded, sand got into the bearings with consequent damage.
- (7) No attempts were made to utilize lines from the anchor winches to hold LST's on the beach.
- (8) LST commanders were not awake to the necessity of rigging their landing mats before loading their ships. Although the Shore Party Commander frequently brought this to the attention of loading Officers, there was so much apathy or opposition that mats were rigged in only a few instances.
- (9) Ship's Officers on LST's appeared to be untrained as to how their ship's gear could be used to aid in discharging cargo. The heavy winch aft on the tank deck should be a very valuable asset if Shore Party and Ship's Officers are instructed in its use.
- (10) It is understood that the cranes now carried by each LST are to be discontinued. They can be very valuable if put to use, but unless properly maintained and in the hands of good operators they merely occupy space. The only attempt to use one known to have been made, failed because the crane was mechanically defective and would not hoist pallets of cargo.
- (11) Fork Trucks were used to good advantage on LCT's and larger craft and should always be available.

Recommendations: -

- (1) That a joint study of the whole landing craft situation be made and changes in design made to correct the obvious faults now existing.
 - (a) The hull at the bow should be studied with a view to re-design so that it will be easier to hold in place. The Japanese landing craft appear to be better than ours in this respect.
 - (b) Mooring gear should be provided to hold the craft into the beach without running the engines at full speed. The LST already has sufficient gear to accomplish this, having a

capstan and two independently revolving drums on the forward and two independently revolving drums on the after anchor engines. Additional gear should be provided for the other types of craft.

- (c) Anti-fouling propellers and guards should be tried out as many failures were due to fouling of propellers by lines, cable and nets.
- (2) That training in handling landing craft include beaching on steep beaches, or more properly, beaching on the type of beach on which the assault landing is to be made. In this instance, coxswains of small craft were trained at Waimanole where the surf conditions are mild, although the surf at Waianae resembles that at Iwo Jima much more closely. Training should include methods of holding craft on the beach without the use of engines through the proper arrangement of mooring lines operated by the anchor engines.
- (3) That Officers and crews of LCT's, LSM's and LST's be trained in methods of aiding discharge of cargo across beaches. This should include universal use of landing mats, care and operation of crane carried on LST equipment, and use of fairlead cable gear as an aid to loading of cargo.
- (4) That a study be made of unloading problems to determine if the unloading gear now carried can be improved or should be augmented.

19. PONTON BARGES CAUSEWAYS.

A. Unsuccessful attempts were made to use pontoon barges to land cargo. They were unmanageable in the heavy surf, the cargo was washed overboard, and the barges breached, obstructing the beach.

B. Attempts to install pontoon causeways were likewise unsuccessful for the same reasons.

Recommendation: -

- (1) That the use of pontoon barges and causeways be limited to locations where favorable beach and surf conditions are known to exist.

20. SALVAGE OF BEACHED EQUIPMENT.

The beach was badly obstructed by wrecked boats and amphibious vehicles by the evening of D-day. More boats as well as pontoon barges and causeways breached and remained on the beach as time went on. Efforts to clear the beaches by use of floating equipment produced meagre results, and demolition charges and shore gear were tried out. The most effective equipment

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used were a 20-ton Le Tourneau Crane mounted on Euclid tracks and operated by a D-8 Caterpillar Tractor, and an M(3) Tank Retriever. If more effective types of floating gear cannot be carried, the Shore Party must, of necessity be equipped to clear the beach.

Recommendation: -

- (1) That a joint study be made to determine the types and amount of equipment to be carried for salvage operations.
- (2) That the salvage unit include sufficient trained Naval personnel to insure that boats and landing craft are not unnecessarily damaged in handling.

21. SUPPLY DUMPS.

A. There are two systems of handling cargo from beach to dump.

- (1) Establish Shore Party dumps on the beach, to which all cargo is directed for sorting and further delivery to forward dumps. This is the system normally used in stabilized areas. It prevents cargo from going astray and aids in the preparation of accurate information and records. It requires more personnel. Since it goes into detail it is relatively slow.
- (2) Deliver cargo directly from the beach to forward dumps, where it will be sorted and that which has been mis-sent held for its proper owner or sent to him. A percentage of cargo will go astray. It is relatively difficult to maintain records and accumulate information. It is rapid and therefore uses fewer men.

A choice must be made when planning operations as to which will best suit the needs of the occasion - rapid action with some loss or slow action and greater accuracy. In this operation the former system was followed.

B. Due to congestion on and near the beach, all supply dumps were well inshore, forward of most of the artillery positions. The deep sand made it easy to bulldoze trenches for storage of fuel, ammunition and other critical supplies. A few fires were started due to enemy action, but the damage was not extensive in spite of the close stowage necessitated by existing conditions.

C. Corps Shore Party dump teams were used to establish their own dumps. Division Shore Parties were not organized to operate supply dumps, but cargo was delivered by them directly to the Division Quartermasters who operated the dumps. The 3rd and 4th Divisions worked this system without calling on the Shore Party for continuing help. The 5th Division, on the other hand, drew heavily on their Shore Party for labor, and the Shore Party performed many functions more properly in the province of the Division Quartermaster.

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D. There was at all times sufficient transportation to carry the supplies from beach to dumps, but it was barely sufficient. It was imperative that the vehicles be unloaded promptly day or night in order that unloading of boats might proceed without delay. Considerable difficulty was experienced in the case of Army Units of the Island Command who apparently were not prepared to handle their own cargo. This is not to be construed as a criticism of Army methods, but they are different from Marine Corps methods and the two are incompatible. When Army Units act as subordinate elements in a Marine Corps Operation it is imperative that they follow Marine Corps practice and that they be thoroughly indoctrinated therein before embarkation.

Recommendations: -

- (1) That Division Shore Party and Quartermaster functions be effectively co-ordinated to provide smooth functioning with minimum personnel.
- (2) That delivery of supplies be made as far forward as practicable at time of unloading.
- (3) That attached units from the other services be indoctrinated with the necessity for handling their own supplies promptly at any time of the day or night.
- (4) That the Corps Shore Party maintain a liaison man at the dumps of all attached units receiving cargo across the beach.
- (5) That all Units furnish guides to direct trucks from beach to Supply dumps as requested by Shore Party.

22.

EQUIPMENT.

A. Several pieces of machinery - cranes, dozers, etc., - belonging to Units of the Island Command were carried by the Shore Parties and used by them until unloading was turned over to the Island Command. This is a sound practice because it cuts down duplicate shipments of like items. Operators from the owning organizations should accompany the equipment in all cases.

Recommendation: -

- (1) That cargo handling equipment, with operators, belonging to permanent garrison Units be attached to the Shore Party for use during the landing phase of future operations.

B. In the following paragraphs specific recommendations are made concerning certain makes and models of equipment. It is urged that this subject be given careful consideration as the success of future combat operations may depend to an appreciable extent on the stamina and effectiveness of the mechanical equipment provided. The success of future combat operations in the Pacific theatre will depend to an increasing extent on machines and

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only the best is good enough for this purpose. It is urged that no effort be spared to procure the type and the amounts recommended. These recommendations are based on observation and experience and are very reasonable in quantity.

C. Cranes.

- (1) So far as is known the Iwo Jima Operation was the first Marine Corps landing in which the Shore Party carried with it all the machinery and equipment which the planning Officers knew to be desirable for rapid handling of cargo. It is felt that the results obtained fully justified the use of assault shipping for the types and quantity carried.

- (2) All cranes should have fair-lead cables rigged in order that cargo can be dragged from boats to position under boom.

- (3) The following types of cranes were used in the Iwo Operation:

- (a) 2-T Austin-Western Bagley. A makeshift job. Very slow. Awkward to handle. Mechanical failures frequent.

Recommendation: - No procurement.

- (b) 3-5 T Insley. Furnished by Navy. Excellent. Will handle majority of cargo.

Recommendation: - 2 per beach.
1 per dump.

- (c) 5-10 T Osgood, Link-Belt, Bay City. All excellent types. This size is needed for fair proportion of cargo.

Recommendation: - 2 per beach.
1 per dump.

- (d) 10-20 T Lorrains. Excellent. Long boom and heavy lift necessary for some work.

Recommendation: - 1 per Corps Shore Party.
1 per Division Shore Party.

- (e) Trackson Swing Crane on T9 IHC Tractor. Capacity 3500 lbs. Excellent light swing-boom job for work in close quarters and around supply dumps. Extension boom much preferable. Fixed length boom should not be procured.

Recommendation: - Should not be procured if the crane mounted on TD14 is available.

- (f) Trackson Swing Crane on TD14 IHC Tractor. Capacity 3500 lbs. Superior to the job mounted on T9. Same remarks otherwise apply.

Recommendations: - 2 per beach.
3 per dump.

- (g) "A" frame boom mounted on T9 Tractor. Has very limited use, and then only when nothing else is available.

Recommendation: - No further procurement.

- (h) Le Tourneau 20T Crane w/Euclid Tracks, operated by Cat. D8 Tractor. A limited purpose job, but a positive necessity for clearing beaches. Requires 2 to move a broached LCM.

Recommendation: - 1 per Division Shore Party.
2 per Corps Shore Party.

- (i) Tank Retriever M-3. One was used by Corps Shore Party and proved invaluable in moving heavy equipment which had broken down.

Recommendation: - 1 per Division Shore Party.
2 per Corps Shore Party.

D. Tractors.

- (1) Utility Tractors have but one use and therefore are not as well suited for Shore Party work as tractors with winches and blades.

Recommendation: - No further procurement.

- (2) Tractors w/winches. Rear mounted, single drum winches are essential for many purposes and were in constant use along the beaches. The winch more than doubles the usefulness of the tractor. The double drum take-off is not adapted to beach work as the high-speed drums were not used except with Le Tourneau Crane where both topping lift and hoist line are necessary.

Recommendation: - All tractors to be procured with rear mounted winch.

- (3) Angle Dozers. Angle dozers are less desirable for beach work than bulldozers. There is seldom any angle work to be done. They are heavier, the blades are longer, the rooters are a detriment for this kind of work, and the graders add weight to no purpose. It requires more skill to handle an angle job than it does a bulldozer. The difference is particularly evident when

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armor is installed, as vision is obstructed and the machine can be operated only with great difficulty.

- (4) Bulldozers. As noted under "Angle Dozers", the bulldozer is much preferable for beach work.

- (a) Practically all beach work is best performed by a bulldozer. When an angle job is used, the blade is almost invariably in the bulldozer position.
- (b) The attachment is lighter in weight, so more work can be done with the same power.
- (c) The blade is shorter, making it easier to handle through the doors of landing craft.
- (d) The end of the blade is in line with the side of the tractor, making it easier to judge its position, which facilitates handling.
- (e) No rooters on the blade makes for better beach operation.

Recommendation: - All future procurement be bulldozers.

- (5) Hydraulic vs Cable Operated Dozers. Both types were in use and personal preference varies. However, there is a preponderance in favor of cable operated jobs. The majority of dozer casualties were hydraulic lines cut by shell fragments which were replaced as soon as spare parts came ashore. Cable jobs could have been repaired on the spot. On the other hand, the double drum power take off used with this model cuts down the usefulness of the tractor as a winch.

- (6) Bucyrus-Erie Angle Dozers. This make of dozer has come in for much criticism.

- (a) The harness is too heavy, particularly the model used on TD-18 IHC. The added weight greatly cuts down its effectiveness. Several operators claim they can move as much dirt with the TD-14 IHC model as with the larger one.
- (b) The harness cross member is too far forward, making an unbalanced load difficult to operate.
- (c) The rear pivot of the harness is at the rear sprocket, which is too far back, causing the tractor to nose down when the blade is pushing a heavy load. The LaPlant-Choate model has the pivot amidships, giving much more effective balance.

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Recommendation: - No additional Bucyrus-Erie dozers be procured for TD-18 IHC Tractors.

- (7) Caterpillar vs International Harvester Tractors. Models by both these manufacturers were used by Shore Party Units during this operation. There is unanimity of opinion among operators and observers that the Caterpillar is much superior. More work can be done quicker by the Caterpillar, which is the factor which should govern procurement for combat use.

Recommendation: - All procurement of tractors to be Caterpillars.

- (8) T-9 IHC. Too light for beach work. No gasoline engines should be used for beach work as they drown out too easily. Diesel should be provided in all cases.
- (a) With Angle dozer. Were used for quick, light work along the beaches. The TD-14 was far more useful.
- (b) With dozer-shovel. Those received were not equipped with grouser tracks, apparently having been designed for loading trucks from a hard surface, and are not adapted for beach use. Shovels are not needed for beach operations.
- (c) With dozer-shovel gear and lifting forks. Has numerous inherent faults, and was of little value in unloading operations.
- (d) With dozer-shovel gear and hoisting boom made by the Eighth Field Depot. Much preferable to the fork arrangement. Was little used because of availability of better equipment, but would be valuable in the absence of other hoisting equipment.
- (e) With Trackson Swing Crane. Discussed under "Cranes".
- (f) With "A" frame boom. Discussed under "Cranes".
- (9) TD-14 IHC.
- (a) With Angle dozer. Performance satisfactory, but not equal to D-6 Caterpillar.
- (b) With Trackson Swing Crane. Discussed under "Cranes".

- (10) TD-18 IHC.

With Angle dozer. Performance passable.

Recommendation: - No further procurement.

- (11) D-6 Caterpillar.

Considered best medium weight tractor.

Recommendation: - All future procurement of medium tractors to be this model. Three (3) per beach.

(12) D-7 Caterpillar.

Considered best tractor in its weight range.

Recommendation: - Future procurement of heavy tractors to be this model unless heavier job is particularly specified.
Two (2) per beach.

(13) D-8 Caterpillar.

There is no IHC model in this weight class, and a few should be included in Shore Party equipment. One (1) per beach.

E. Armored Dozers. Seven TD-18's with Bucyrus-Erie hydraulic angledozer attachment were provided by the Navy, and armor designed and fabricated at the Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor. These were brought ashore and were used with considerable success by both the Shore Party and by combat Units. They appear to have a very definite value for landing operations. They were even used to make roads for and in advance of assault tanks in forward areas.

COMMENTS:

- (1) Present armor type and thickness appears adequate for protection against small arms and fragments.
- (2) With the added weight of armor and the heavy blade, TD-18's are woefully underpowered.
- (3) It was found necessary to relieve operators at half hour intervals because of excessive heat.
- (4) Excessive dust rising under the armor skirt adds to the discomfort caused by the heat.
- (5) Visibility for operator inadequate in front and absent to the rear and sides.
- (6) The armor should be easily removed and reinstalled so that it can be removed when necessity therefor ceases to exist. This is true of model used at Iwo.

Recommendations: -

- (1) That the armored dozer be actively developed.
- (2) That the Caterpillar D-8 Tractor only be used.

- (3) That a system of ventilation and dust repression be incorporated. Suggest reversal of fan blades and use of insulation.
- (4) That bullet-proof glass ports or periscopes be used front and rear to provide adequate vision.
- (5) That the standard bulldozer blade be used instead of angle dozer.
- (6) That the weight be kept to a minimum. Protection of non-vital parts of machine should be avoided.

F. Amphibious Vehicles.

- (1) Neither DUKW nor LVT organizations were at any time placed under the command of the Shore Party Commander but both were used extensively in unloading supplies. The Corps LVT Officer remained at the Shore Party Command Post for liaison with LVT organizations and as such greatly facilitated operations. Without his aid much difficulty undoubtedly would have been experienced.
- (2) Both DUKW's and LVT's operated through surf that would have broached LCM's. Their ability to do so lies in the fact that they come on through the surf and up the beaches without stopping. When they had to stop at the shore line they also broached.
- (3) In the late afternoon of D-day while the Corps Shore Party Commander was aboard a PC(S) boat, he observed some of the difficulties experienced by amphibious vehicles, and while not a phase of Shore Party activity, it is nevertheless related thereto, and is of such a serious nature that it is included in this report. It was noted that as the day advanced the sea was becoming rougher, and both DUKW's and LVT's were in increasing danger of foundering if they ran out of fuel or their engines failed. This condition was called to the attention of control by dispatch but no action appears to have been taken. It was later learned that LST Commanders had received orders to close their bow doors and that they therefore refused to take aboard any LVT's or DUKW's. The latter cruised around in the dark until they ran out of fuel. When their pumps stopped, some foundered and sank. Definite figures are not available, but at least fifty (50) LVT's and several DUKW's were so lost.

Recommendation: - That authority be vested in an appropriate officer to direct measures to prevent similar losses in future operations.

- (4) LVT's. The LVT was the outstanding vehicle of the Iwo Jima landing. A large proportion of the cargo unloaded across the beaches was hauled to the dumps in LVT's. Neither trucks nor DUKW's could negotiate the sand beaches without tractors to tow

them, and neither could be run aboard LCT's and larger craft when the sea was at all rough. LVT's could run almost anywhere. Sometimes they could get aboard landing craft only with great difficulty, but they were the only vehicle able to negotiate them at all. Their use was continued after other means might better have been used, but a routine once established should be changed slowly.]

- (5) DUKW's. DUKW's were used extensively for unloading ammunition from resupply ships. Lee shore was always available on one side of the island or the other, and the haul was made directly from ship to dump. This is an ideal situation when the dumps are within a short distance from the shore as in this case. A few DUKW's were lost, but not more than is considered normal for the hours operated.
- (6) Weasels. Corps Shore Party had no Weasels, but Division Shore Parties were so equipped on landing. They proved so valuable for getting medical supplies and other critical items forward and for the return of casualties that the Shore Parties relinquished them to be used for that purpose. They are valuable along sand beaches where the sand is too soft for jeeps. Without some such vehicles the Shore Party Commander gets around very slowly and his value is correspondingly reduced.

Recommendations: -

- (1) That both LVT's and DUKW's be included as cargo carrying vehicles in future operations. Their capabilities complement each other.
- (2) That three (3) Weasels be included in Corps Shore Party equipment.
- (3) It is considered preferable that the command of LVT and DUKW Units remain with the Divisions and be co-ordinated by liaison officers with the Shore Party.

G. Amphibious Trailers. Amphibious Trailers had definite value in this operation, although most of them were landed under the worst possible conditions. The sea and surf were heavy and they were set adrift from the carrying ship late in the afternoon. Curious crew members apparently had opened some of them, had not dogged the hatches tight, and they were not thoroughly inspected before launching. As a result, a few foundered. The remainder were towed ashore or drifted in along the full length of the beach where they were dragged in. They are particularly valuable for critical items. On this beach a toboggan bottom would have been as good as, or better than the wheel job.

Recommendation: -

- (1) That they be used to the fullest extent in future operations.

(2) That experiments with toboggan bottom be conducted.

(3) That specific instructions be promulgated as to inspection prior to launching.

H. Winches. The light Winches were not used as there was enough equipment of a more suitable type available. ~~However, they constituted a very desirable~~ However, they constituted a very desirable reserve in compact form.

Recommendations: - That a few winches be included in Shore Party equipment.

I. Slings and Cables. The types of special slings carried were satisfactory and no additional types are recommended.

Chime hook slings to handle 4 drums.
Slings with 4 pennant hooks to shorten hoist on Cargo nets.
Box hooks for individual boxes.
Bar slings for hoisting pallets.
Choker slings in assorted lengths.
Special slings for each type of vehicle.
Cargo tub slings.
Bomb slings for 500 lb. bombs.
Heavy tow cables for tractors.

A good supply of cable and clamps should be carried. Breakage was high on this operation and not enough cable was on hand although all was brought that could be obtained. Heavy cable should be used for tow lines.

J. Beach Mat.

(1) Approximately 6 miles of Marston pierced planking was hinged together in 50' lengths by the Navy Yard, P.H. for Shore Party use in this operation. It was highly successful, and contributed tremendously to the movement of vehicles and supplies. It was used not only on the beaches, but provided as well the only passable roads in the early stages of the landing.

(2) Surf conditions necessitated the use of LVT's and tractors so that boat landings of matting could not be maintained. Under surf conditions permitting use of trucks into boats, landings made of matting would have been invaluable, and were in fact, used in the later stages of the Iwo Operation.

(3) A desirable improvement in design of the matting would be to provide a quick, positive means of coupling 50' lengths together. In the absence of any other method, welding is advisable. An unexpected factor was the slipperiness of the sand. Truck traffic kicks the lengths of matting sideways and tracked

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vehicles fold and damage it extensively, so that a road crew must work continuously. Much of this work would be obviated by a good coupling.

- (4) Unhinged matting was carried in small quantities. It came apart in a short time. A firm base is necessary even for light traffic.

- * (5) An interesting observation was made on a few occasions when enemy mortar and artillery fire hit lengths of matting and penetrated it before exploding. The matting then acting as a blasting mat and the effects of the exploding shells were almost entirely prevented. This fact may have some value in preparing defenses.

- (6) The wide, corrugated metal sled made up to handle this matting was satisfactory. It is the best method developed to under-stow on LSM's and LST's.

Recommendation: -

- (a) That hinged pierced planking be made standard equipment for landing operations and that as much as possible be carried.
- (b) That experiments be conducted to develop a satisfactory coupling between lengths.
- (7) A small amount of hinged wire matting, light weight, was brought in by Division Shore Parties. It was too fragile and was torn up rapidly by normal traffic.
- (8) LST matting is of great value. (See 18. - E. - (8).)

K. Sled Pallets.

- (1) More cargo was palletized on sled pallets for this operation than on any previous occasion. The value of palletization from the Shore Party standpoint is great, but there is not sufficient indoctrination of TQM's and ships' personnel in their use to get the maximum results. Many were broken open on the ships and the cargo sent ashore loose or in cargo nets.
- (2) Runner sleds are hard to pull through the sand, and pulling by tractors was not used to a very large extent. Most of the handling was by crane as an ordinary pallet would be handled. A toboggan type cargo pallet is easier to tow, but would have to be provided with means for handling by fork truck and crane.
- (3) Individual slings secured to the pallets are favored by many, but in view of the shortage of cable this is deemed unnecessary. Crane slings and tractor tow gear use up only a fraction of the cable and do as good a job. It is better that none have integral cables than that part of them be one type and part the other.

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Recommendations: -

- (a) That pallets be used to the maximum extent practicable.
- (b) That further experimentation be conducted to develop a satisfactory toboggan type pallet.
- (c) That TQM's and ships' platoons be trained in handling palletized cargo.

L. Cargo sleds.

Three types of cargo sleds were used:

- (1) Navy toboggan type steel sled, weight 1500 lbs. These sleds proved to have value and were used to a limited extent. They are too heavy to be hoisted as a pallet.
- (2) Navy "LST" type, made with 3 steel channel runners and wood deck, were also used to a limited extent. They are small enough so that by slight modification they might be used as pallets.
- (3) Sleds made of corrugated metal. These are 10' wide to carry hinged matting and were used to a limited extent after the matting was unloaded. They are too large to be used as pallets.

Recommendation: -

- (1) That a few steel sleds be carried for general use.
- (2) That experiments be conducted to combine the good features of these various types of toboggan sleds with the sled pallet now used for cargo.

M. Cargo "Tubs".

- (1) Five trucks were fitted with cargo "tubs" as an experiment. These were light weight, metal bound, open top boxes made so that 3 snugly fit the bed of a 6 x 6 truck. They were used for ammunition and critical supplies. The metal reinforcing bands ended in sling eyes so that they could be hoisted out easily. If no crane was available they could be unloaded as rapidly as the cargo could be manhandled from the truck bed itself. The heaviest load, 2380 lbs., was a tub filled with ammunition.
- (2) More than half these tubs were recovered and were extremely valuable for packing loose articles such as salvaged equipment, clothing and small arms, for shipment on re-embarkation.
- (3) These tubs appear to be a very valuable addition to cargo handling equipment for landing operations, and in some respects may

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be superior to pallets.

- (4) An almost identical article but of heavier construction is used by the CB's and is called an "ammunition box". They were used on the beach in this landing to handle bags of cement, most of which had been damaged in handling because of individual loading, although more than enough ammunition boxes were available to have carried all the cement.

Recommendation: - That further experimentation be conducted with this type package in conjunction with the development of pallets for landing operation.

N. Wilson Drums. Wilson Drums should be considered as a valuable method of packaging certain items rather than as a universal means of landing cargo. Many of those used had been stored for long periods with gaskets compressed and the gaskets had lost their life, causing the drums to leak. Towing bridles were not used as it was much easier and faster to handle them with cranes fitted with chime hook slings. They also were very useful for repacking stores on re-embarkation.

Recommendation: - That Wilson Drums be used for packaging stores that might otherwise be damaged by weather or breaking of packages.

O. Roller Conveyor.

- (1) Roller Conveyor was used to good advantage in the supply dumps. It is particularly valuable in handling ammunition. The heavy surf prevented its use in unloading boats on the beach, but in spite of the surf it was used to good advantage on one occasion in loading out ammunition on to a beached LST, performing this job faster than could have been done by any other method.
- (2) Ammunition re-supply ships should invariably carry 1000' of conveyor to be left ashore with combat units. Loss through damage is high, and additional quantities are required as storage areas expand. This was requested for this operation but none was received.

P. Public Address Systems. Loud speakers were not provided for the Corps Shore Party although an attempt was made to obtain them. They have great usefulness for all shore party activities. Beachmasters are provided with speakers which cover the immediate beach area, but they should be supplemented by others to facilitate shore party work. The 4th Division found them indispensable in the supply dumps. One also should be provided for Motor Transport Dispatchers.

Recommendations: -

- 1 per beach.
- 1 per dump.
- 1 MT Dispatcher.
- 1 Shore Party Headquarters.

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Q. Radio Jeeps and Walkie Talkies.

- (1) Radio jeeps were provided for dispatcher and truckmasters. They were invaluable and provided communications for a purpose which cannot be provided by any other means.
- (2) The officer in charge of a beach must have a rapid means of communicating with his subordinates who normally are scattered along 500 yards of beach - and approximately half the work is carried on during hours of darkness. Radio communication would not only provide control but would serve to keep all hands on the alert. The job at Iwo could have been done with less pain had the Shore Party been equipped with adequate means of shore range communication.

Recommendation: -

- (a) That radio jeeps be provided as standard Shore Party equipment for Motor Transport dispatchers and truckmasters.
- (b) That walkie talkies be provided to facilitate the supervision of unloading.

R. Beach Lights.

- (1) Early operations were during moonlight and beach lights were not required until the combat situation had become sufficiently safe for their use. They are a necessity and should always be included in Shore Party equipment. Two types of units, both satisfactory, were carried.
 - (a) Floodlight, trailer mounted 5KW, Gas engine driven "Schramm".
 - (b) Generator, 3KW to 6.5K, skid mounted, pedestal flood lights were improvised.
- (2) An operator with no other primary duty must be in charge of each, not only properly to care for it, but as well, to be on the job to turn off the lights immediately in case of a Condition Red alert.

Recommendation: -

4 per beach.
2 per dump.

- (3) Boom lights should be rigged on the crown block of all cranes.

S. Fire Pumps. Seven Pumps, fire trailer, 500 CPM, Chrysler model 101, were included in Shore Party equipment. They were used on several occasion when fires were caused by enemy action. They were also useful for other purposes and their necessity cannot be questioned. An operator with no other

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primary duty must be in charge of each pumper.

Recommendation: -

1 per beach
1 per dump.

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* I T. Smoke Generators. Beachmasters' Parties were to have been provided with Bessler smoke generators, but so far as is known, none was landed. During Condition Red, smoke was made by ships and boats. Use of smoke on beach areas was a matter of considerable concern to Shore Party Commanders. The smoke covered the offshore area roughly to the beach line, and afforded an excellent opportunity for the enemy to attempt a landing undetected. During these periods all unloading activities were knocked off and all hands alerted in beach defense positions.]

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L. S. Swindler
L. S. SWINDLER

ENCLOSURE "A"

TO APPENDIX 10 TO ANNEX CHARLIE

TO VACIF SPECIAL ACTION REPORT


IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN

EIGHTH FIELD DEPOT

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V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS LANDING FORCE,
In the Field.

30 April, 1945.


From: The Commanding Officer, Eighth Field Depot.
To: The Commanding General.
Subject: Special Action Report IWO JIMA Campaign.

1. The 8th Field Depot was designated as nucleus of Corps Shore Party by V Amphibious Corps order on 20 October, 1944, and this constituted its principal function during the Iwo Jima operation. Supplies were carried for its own operations in accordance with orders covering all elements of the Corps. The Depot was not set up as such ashore, and supply activities were limited to furnishing such spare parts and services as were available, operating motor transportation, unloading and distributing a small amount of re-supply of required items, and operation of Corps fuel and ammunition dumps.

2. ENGINEER COMPANY.

A. Engineer Company was engaged almost wholly in shore party functions. Water distillation units were operated, using Cleaver-Brooks and Badger stills. The Cleaver-Brooks was mounted on a trailer for easier handling and was found more satisfactory than when skid mounted.

B. Hinged Marston matting was extensively used for beach and lateral roads and was found to be very valuable for use in sandy areas.

Recommendation: - That this type of matting be designated as an engineering item to be carried in stock for issue to shore parties and combat engineers.

3. GENERAL SUPPLY.

A. General.

- (1) Supplies for the Corps Shore Party were unloaded from D13 to D113, Chiefly during the last few days of the period, which was much later than desirable.
- (2) Quantities of all supplies carried were in accordance with Corps Order and were adequate in most cases. Chief shortages was sandbags which were in abnormal demand by all units because of the nature of the soil. Approximately 95% of Corps Shore Party bags never reached the dump, being absorbed by personnel in beach areas.

B. Medical Supply Section.

- (1) Fifteen hundred (1500) units consisting of cots, blankets, mess

Enclosure "A" to Appendix 10 to Annex CHARLIE to VACLF Special Action Report
IWO JIMA Campaign.

gear and some tentage were loaded on transports to provide for emergency use by the Corps Evacuation Hospital. It was necessary to utilize only a small portion thereof.

- (2) The loading plans did not provide for easy access to and early unloading of the medical supplies carried by this section. There was an acute need for battle dressings and certain other items that could not be filled although they were actually on hand but were still aboard ship. Duplicate shipments were flown in by plane.
- (3) Field Depots mounting out are always confronted with the problem of providing refrigeration for biologicals. Approximately eighty (80) cubic feet of cold space was required for this operation.

Recommended: - That a reserve of 16 and 32 cubic foot electric refrigerators with separate electric generating units be maintained in order to provide adequate refrigeration for biologicals of supply agencies mounting out.

- (4) Insect pests were not a serious problem on this operation; other than flies, few were encountered. DDT sprayed by airplane was effective. Due to the small quantity available only a very small amount could be used for hand sprayers.

Recommended: - That a quantity of DDT in solution and the necessary hand sprayers be supplied Battalions and larger units for fly control.

C. RESUPPLY: Only one re-supply ship was called up. It arrived as scheduled and at an appropriate time. It was partially unloaded to fill the limited requirements consisting principally of clothing, sandbags, medical supplies, ordnance items and signal supplies.

4. MOTOR TRANSPORT.

A. For operational purposes Motor Transport Officer was placed in control of all mechanical equipment used in handling and transporting cargo. Engineer equipment in this category, including operators, was attached to motor transport at inception of training. In order to provide for 24 hour operation, additional drivers and operators were procured from other sources, principally Construction Battalions due to land in later echelon.

B. Motor Transport was divided in four operating sections:

- (1) Headquarters section to perform administrative functions.
- (2) Base section - for higher echelon repair.
- (3) Mobile section - for field repair, maintenance, and servicing.
This section included:

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(a) Mobile repair squads for servicing equipment and making minor repairs on the job.

(b) Servicing squads for refueling and lubricating of equipment on the job.

(4) Transport section. This was the equipment operating section.

C. This disposition of personnel and equipment was extremely efficient in providing transport and handling facilities for the Corps Shore Party and in maintaining that equipment to provide for maximum hours on the job. As a further result, all equipment is serviceable and all but a few units of it ready now for another operation.

D. Tests of the various types of equipment were conducted on the beaches in the vicinity of Makaha during the training period to better acquaint operating personnel with the characteristics of the equipment when operating under both favorable and unfavorable conditions. Personnel of the Transport Section also completed the course of instruction given at the Army Combat Driving Range.

E. No equipment was rendered ineffective through lack of spare parts; 92% of requirements were available in MT stock and the remaining items procured through exchange with other agencies. These were chiefly items not available to the depot on departure for target area.

F. There was little demand for tires - about 2% of supply used. Only six tires have been discarded as being beyond repair. This was due to soil conditions.

G. Rust preventive compound #1 demonstrated its value in a noteworthy manner. Prior to embarkation all equipment on which it might be used was treated. As a result, rust and corrosion was a minor problem. Even after immersion in salt water, nuts and bolts were removed easily. Cables were all treated with special lubricant. All equipment was treated prior to re-embarkation.

Recommendation: - That use of rust preventive compound be included in SOP for all combat units.

H. Preventive maintenance. (PM) Preventive maintenance schedules were maintained principally by the mobile section, even during the most active phases of the operation. As a result, there were almost no deadlined vehicles, and, on completion of the operation, no junk to be disposed of and replaced because of neglect.

I. Salvage - Equipment abandoned ^{by other} agencies because of combat damage and placed in operation include:

2 trucks, 1/4 ton, 4x4.

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1 ambulance, 1/4 ton, 4x4.

1 truck, 1 ton, 4x4.

1 tractor, TD-18 w/dozer.

In addition, one tractor, Jap, Diesel, similar to the TD-18 was placed in operating condition and will be used for training purposes. It has an unusual two cycle engine in which two opposing pistons operate in each of the four cylinders.

J. Performance of various types of equipment are discussed in Corps Shore Party report.

K. Fuels and lubricants are used almost exclusively by Motor Transport, so responsibility therefor was placed with the Motor Transport Officer. Fuel dumps were operated during the period 27 February - 20 March. Approximately 18,000 drums were received and 12,000 issued during the period. This included a large quantity of Avgas and other fuel for the Iscom. For purposes of future planning, the following lists the fuels consumed by the Eighth Field Depot.

Mogas, 80 octane - - - - - 29000 gals.

Gasoline, white - - - - - 1200 "

Diesel - - - - - 9500 "

Kerosene - - - - - 1000 "

Luboc 1 (all types) - - - - 1200 "

5. ORDNANCE COMPANY

A. Ordnance Company did little work in connection with materiel but operated extensively in ammunition handling, stowage and re-supply.

B. Comments on Ordnance items.

(1) Carbines do not have sufficient stopping power and are decreasing in popularity. An officer of this depot hit a Jap seven times before he dropped, during which time he advanced over 25 yards, finally being stopped with a bullet through the head.

(2) Plastic covers for small arms perform their function in an excellent manner and should be universally furnished.

(3) There is a general tendency to use thin lubricants on small arms. Lubriplate has demonstrated its value as a rust preventive, and while issued in sufficient quantities, its use has not been sufficiently encouraged.

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- (4) Tank Retriever M3: The Tank Retriever was an exceptionally useful piece of equipment. It was used principally for clearing and salvaging wrecked equipment on the beach and for salvaging damaged heavy equipment inland.

Recommendation: - That Tables of Allowance provide tank retrievers as follows:

Per Corps Shore Party - - - - - 2

Per Division Shore Party- - - - - 2

C. Ammunition.

- (1) The Corps ammunition dump was operated under supervision of the Ordnance Officer, work being performed by the 8th Ammunition Company. Ammunition was effectively segregated in stows bulldozed in sand above Green Beach. Issues were made as directed by C-4 Ordnance Officer. Part of ammunition was ferried ashore in LCM's, but a large proportion of the re-supply shipments were taken from the ship directly to battery positions in DUKW's. That not desired at the guns immediately was stowed in the Corps dump.
- (2) It was evident that a need exists for regular training of certain Ammunition Company personnel in ammunition depots. Marking and packaging of various types of ammunition changes frequently, and considerable time is lost needlessly in identifying types and quantities by personnel not familiar with latest practice.
- (3) Tonnage of ammunition coming across the beaches from the SS Columbia Victory, the SS Joliet Victory, and 3rd Marine Division ships during the period 24 February - 8 March was as follows: (All figures are weight tons.)

24 Feb - - - - - 568

25 Feb - - - - - 698

26 Feb - - - - - 818

27 Feb - - - - - 836

28 Feb - - - - - 657

1 Mar - - - - - 744

2 Mar - - - - - 748

3 Mar - - - - - 435

4 Mar - - - - - 453
5 Mar - - - - - 740
6 Mar - - - - - 628
7 Mar - - - - - 400
8 Mar - - - - - 458

TOTAL 8183

- (4) Palletizing of ammunition greatly facilitates handling, unloading and storage. Approximately 95% of pallets unloaded by DUKW and 75% unloaded by small craft arrived at the dump in good condition.

D. Ammunition salvage.

- (1) Ordnance Company was made responsible for collecting and disposing of abandoned ammunition south of the O-2 line after the island was declared secure. Serviceable ammunition was stored in the dump for further shipment to rear areas. Much unserviceable friendly and unwanted Japanese ammunition was disposed of by dumping at sea. Remaining ammunition in this category, which could not be disposed of prior to departure, was turned over to the Iscom in accordance with mutual satisfactory oral agreement.
- (2) A quantity of serviceable ammunition was turned over to Island Command on Corps order. A list of this ammunition has been separately submitted to the Supply Service.
- (3) A considerable quantity of small arms was collected by Salvage section. Those which could be repaired were reissued; the remainder were stripped for usable parts or packed for shipment.

E. Ammunition Re-Supply. The purpose for which selective loading was instituted was defeated to some extent in the ammunition re-supply ships when deviations from the loading plan were made and no "as loaded" plan was available. Further, cargo on hatch covers had to be moved and in some cases brought ashore in order to gain access to the holds. Overstowing in the hold also made it necessary to move considerable cargo in order to unload that desired.

Recommended: -

- (1) That a competent supercargo or TQM accompany all major shipments.
- (2) That an "as loaded" plan be on board ship in possession of

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the rider, and one mailed directly to the receiving agency.

- (3) That cargo be not loaded on hatch covers of re-supply ships.
- (4) That overstorage be eliminated to the maximum possible extent.

F. The Ordnance Officer in the C-4 Section and a representative of the Supply Service, FMF, Pacific, assumed some of the operating functions of the 8th Field Depot during discharge of the ammunition re-supply ships. This led to some confusion inasmuch as supervising the handling and physical distribution of all cargo is a supply rather than a staff function.

Recommendation: -

- (1) If it is desired that additional supervision of the landing and distribution of ammunition be provided, it is recommended that the officers to perform this duty be attached to the Field Depot rather than to the staff.
- (2) In any case it is recommended that the Corps Ordnance Officer be assigned to the Field Depot as liaison officer during combat operations, as it is believed he can keep in touch with the situation much easier in that capacity.

6. SALVAGE COLLECTION.

A. The Salvage Section was the principal collection agency of the depot, performing also the salvage functions for general supply items. This section cooperated fully with depot sections and with Division salvage units. Their combined work was uniformly excellent as was evident from the noteworthy lack of salvageable gear throughout the island area.

B. A considerable quantity of clothing was ruined or destroyed because there were no means at hand for renovation. Where incoming garrison units are equipped with mobile laundry units, plans should provide for bringing in their facilities for use by the combat supply force at a time agreed on. This normally should not be prior to D + 10. As a matter of interest, salvaged clothing was washed on board ship and issued 8th Field Depot personnel who, on departing Iwo, were badly in need of clothes.

Recommendation: - That a laundry unit be included in the equipment of the supply depot accompanying landing operations, to be landed about D + 10.

7. SIGNAL SUPPLY.

A. V Amphibious Corps Op Order #3-44 annex Item provided that: "Det Sig Co., 8th Field Depot, under operational control Corps Signal Officer land on order, establish mobile field depot repair facilities, and prepare to handle re-supply of signal equipment, pass to control of Commanding Officer, 8th Field Depot on order."

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

B. This places an administrative staff officer in command of an operating unit, which is directly opposed to principles of staff procedure. It is not a satisfactory arrangement from the standpoint of the Field Depot. The functions performed in combat are the same as at all other times so that there is no apparent reason for such a shift of authority. It is contended that the CO of the Field Depot is fully competent to command all units of his depot in combat.

Recommendation: - That in future operations the Signal Company remain under the CO of the Field Depot or other Service Organization of which it is a part.


L. S. SWINDLER

Anti-Aircraft Artillery Report

(See Annex GEORGE)

Appendix 11 to Annex CHARLIE to Special Action Report IWO JIMA Campaign

Ordnance Officer Report

Appendix 12 to Annex CHARLIE to Special Action Report IWO JIMA Campaign

074/169

V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS LANDING FORCE.
In the Field.

1 May, 1945.

From: The Ordnance Officer.
To : The Commanding General.

Subject: Special Action Report, IWO JIMA Campaign.

Reference: (a) VACLF Staff Memorandum No. 5-45, Conf. Serial 060B,
dated 10Mar45.

Enclosures: (A) Report in compliance with paragraph 1, 2, 4, and 5,
of FMF General Order 66-44, Confidential Serial 01489,
dated 27Dec44.
(B) Report in compliance with paragraph 3, of FMF General
Order No. 66-44, Confidential Serial 01489, dated
27Dec44, (Table No. 1).
(C) Report in compliance with paragraph 3, of FMF General
Order No. 66-44, Confidential Serial 01489, dated
27Dec44, (Table No. 2).
(D) Ordnance Data Report - Iwo Jima Campaign.

1. In compliance with reference (a), enclosures (A), (B), (C),
and (D) are submitted herewith.

B. G. Jones
B. G. JONES.

Appendix 12 to Annex CHARLIE to VACLF Special Action Report IWO JIMA Campaign.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
ORDNANCE SECTION,
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
C/O FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO.

APPENDIX 12 TO ANNEX CHARLIE: SPECIAL STAFF SECTION REPORTS (ORDNANCE).

I. WEAPONS

(A) Number, type and caliber of weapons used.

<u>ITEMS</u>	<u>(3rd, 4th, 5th Divs) less (1 Regt)</u>			<u>TOTAL</u>
(1) Carbine, cal .30 M1	35,014	-	2,737	32,277
(2) Rifle, cal .30, M1903	127	-	18	109
(3) Rifle, cal .30, M1	23,638	-	2,829	20,809
(4) Rifle, BAR, cal .30, M1918A2	2,918	-	288	2,630
(5) MG, cal .30, M1917 & M1919	2,213	-	158	2,055
(6) MG, cal .30, M1919A6	5	-		5
(7) Shotgun, 12 gauge	626	-	2	624
(8) Pistol, cal .45, M1911	2,661	-	109	2,552
(9) SMG, cal .45	320	-	17	303
(10) MG, cal .50 M2HB	995	-	54	941
(11) Gun, 37mm AT M3A1	108	-	12	96
(12) Mortar, 60mm	351	-	39	312
(13) Mortar, 81mm	114	-	12	102
(14) Gun, 75mm SP, AT or Tk.	178	-	20	158
(15) Howitzer, 75mm Pack or AmTrack	123	-		123
(16) Howitzer, 105mm	96	-		96
(17) Launcher, 4.5" BR, M47	61	-		61
(18) Launcher, rocket, AT 2.36"	562	-	58	504
(19) Howitzer, 155mm, M1	24	-		24

(B) Number of days battle employment.

Artillery (4th & 5th Divs)	25 days
Artillery (3rd Div)	21 days
Artillery (Corps)	24 days
Infantry weapons (4th Div)	26 days
Infantry weapons (5th Div)	35 days
Infantry weapons (3rd Div)	31 days

(C) Number, type and caliber of weapons lost.

<u>Major Items</u>	<u>3rd Div</u>	<u>4th Div</u>	<u>5th Div</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Gun, 37mm AT		8	7	15
Mortar, 60mm	12	27	12	51
Mortar, 81mm		5	2	7
Howitzer, 75mm Pack		1		1
Howitzer, 105mm		8	3	11

(D) Malfunctions.

No report received from divisions.

(E) Adequacy of spare parts and accessories.

No report received from divisions except that there was a great shortage of launchers, rifle, grenade, M7 and launchers, carbine, grenade, M8, due to battle losses.

(F) No recommendation as to modifications of existing types or for new types yet received.

II. COMBAT VEHICLES.

(A) Number and type used.

Tanks, medium M4A3 (regular)	138
Gun, motor carriage, 75mm M3	36

(B) Number of days battle employment.

3rd Division	21 days
4th Division	25 days
5th Division	35 days

(C) Number and type lost or damaged beyond repair.

<u>Major Items</u>	<u>3rd Div</u>	<u>4th Div</u>	<u>5th Div</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Tanks, medium	15	11	18	44
Half tracks		2	2	4

(D) Malfunctions.

No report yet received.

(E) Principal items of maintenance difficulty.

No report yet received.

(F) Adequacy of spare parts and accessories.

No report yet received.

(G) Recommendations as to modification of existing types and for new types.

All divisions have verbally shown a preference for the diesel engine in medium tanks.

IV. MISCELLANEOUS ORDNANCE EQUIPMENT.

(A) Number and type used.

<u>Items</u>	<u>3rd Div</u>	<u>4th Div</u>	<u>5th Div</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Tank dozers	3	3	3	9
Tanks, medium M4A3, (w/CB M1 flame thrower)	0	4	4	8
7.2" rocket launchers	(Used alternately by divisions)			4

(B) Number of days battle employment.

Tank dozers	35 days
Tanks, medium M4A3 (w/CB Mk 1 flame thrower)	35 days
7.2" rocket launchers	10 days

(C) Malfunctions.

Tank dozers	No reports yet received.
Tanks, flame throwing	In general, very satisfactory.
7.2" rocket launchers	Satisfactory.

(D) Adequacy of spare parts and accessories.

No report yet received.

(E) Recommendations as to modifications on existing items and for new types of equipment.

Tank dozers	None yet received.
Tanks, flame throwing	Request for 10/division in addition to regular fighting tanks.
7.2" rocket launchers	Numerous verbal requests made for longer range, (800-1000 yards) and launchers with fewer rails, lighter weight and greater mobility, many of which will be embodied in divisional reports.

V. ENEMY MATERIAL SALVAGED.

(A) Weapons.

(1) Guns and Howitzers.

- 4 - 37mm AT guns and parts
 - (1) Model 94
 - (3) Model not given
- 2 - 47mm AT guns.
 - (1) Model I
 - (1) 200-m, damaged w/cover.
- 3 - 47mm gun sights
- 2 - 70mm B.N., Howitzer, damaged
- 2 - 75mm guns, type 90 (Note: New in POA).
- 1 - 75mm Gun, type 38.
- 2 - 75mm gun sights.
- 2 - 120mm Howitzers.
 - (1) Model 138.
 - (1) Model not given.

(2) Weapons (MORTARS)

1 - 30cm. spigot type.

(2) Weapons (MORTARS), (Cont'd).

- 4 - Mortars, type 89.
- 2 - 70mm Barrage.
- 2 - Knee type.
- 2 - 81mm
- 2 - 30cm
- 2 - 81mm, type 3.
- 1 - 15cm.

(3) Weapons, spare parts for mortars.

- 2 - Tail assembly 31cm.
- 2 - Base plates, 81mm.
- 2 - Bipods, 81mm.
- 1 - Tube and tail assembly, 30cm.
- 16 - Poles for base plate, 30cm.
- 4 - Pieces for base plate unspecified type.
- 3 - Tubes for base plate unspecified type.
- 3 - Tail fins for base plate, unspecified type.
- 4 - Tubes, 81mm.
- 1 - Bipod, 15cm.
- 1 - Tripod, 81mm.
- 1 - Tripod, 15cm.

(4) Weapons (SMALL ARMS).

- 56 - Machine guns.
 - (16) Lewis, type 92.
 - (4) Lewis, type 97, cal., 7.7mm.
 - (1) Cal., 13.2mm.
 - (30) LMG, Type 99.
 - (3) AC, 12.7mm.
 - (1) Cal., 13mm w/pedestal mount.
 - (1) AA, cal not specified.
- 4 - 13mm guns.
- 1 - 20mm gun.
- 3 - 20mm AA guns.
- 2 - 25mm AA & AT guns.
- 20 - rifles.
 - (18) Cal. 7.7, model 99.
 - (2) Type 97.

(5) Weapons, spare parts for Machine Guns.

- 2 - barrels, LMG type 99.
- 1 - AA sight for Lewis gun.
- 1 - Sight 13.2mm.
- 1 - Barrel, HMG, type 92.
- 3 - Sights, HMG, type 92.
- 2 - Sights, LMG, type 99.

Appendix 12 to Annex CHARLIE: Special Staff Section Reports (Ordnance, Cont'd)).

(5) Weapons, spare parts for Machine guns, (Cont'd).

- 7 - Tripods, HMG.
- 3 - Sights, HMG, type 92, telescopic.
- 3 - Sights, AA, HMG, type 92.

(B) Combat vehicles: 2 tanks, Model 97, 14 ton.

(C) Ammunition: No list now available. (4th and 5th divisions are known to have salvaged a considerable amount, and ISCOM is salvaging what it can after D + 35.)

(D) Miscellaneous equipment.

(1) Rockets.

- 4 - 20cm rocket launchers.
- 1 - 750 lb. rocket
- 1 - rocket motor, model 10 improvised.
- 2 - rocket motors, model 10.
- 2 - rocket projectors 8"
- 1 - rocket launcher, size unknown.
- 16 - rocket motors.

(2) Miscellaneous equipment.

- 3 - BC spotting scopes.
- 1 - Periscope, hand.
- 2 - Mounts, 70mm Howitzer.
- 3 - Launchers, grenade, type 100.
- 8 - Launchers, grenade, type 89.
- 2 - Range finders, calibrator.
- 4 - pairs, 20 power spotting scopes.
- 2 - Flame throwers.
- 1 - Pair, 20 power binoculars.
- 2 - Gyroscopes, small.
- 2 - Power telescopes.
- 1 - 20 power, spotting scope.
- 1 - Sight, 105mm Howitzer.
- 1 - Sight, artillery, caliber unknown.
- 1 - Director, Coast Defense, damaged.

NOTE: All the above listed captured equipment was salvaged by JICPOA Team.

Appendix 12 to Annex CHARLIE: Special Staff Section Reports (Ordnance, Cont'd))

The following list compiled by the Intelligence Section, V Amphibious Corps, gives the amount of enemy weapons captured by all divisions. Such material was not necessarily salvaged.

INFANTRY WEAPONS:

	<u>NUMBER</u>
1. Rifle, cal. .303	291
2. LMG, cal. .25	17
3. LMG, cal. .303	115
4. HMG, cal. .303	49
5. HMG, AA/AT, cal. .51	17
6. AT gun, cal. .37	10
7. AT gun, cal. .47	26
8. Grenade discharger	22
9. Mortar, 81mm	8
10. Mortar, 15cm	6
11. Flame thrower	1
12. Lewis gun	14

ARTILLERY:

1. Gun, 70mm	9
2. Gun, 75mm	19
3. Gun, 105	2
4. Howitzer, 105mm	3
5. Howitzer, 150mm	1
6. 320mm Mortar (spigot)	6
7. Howitzer, 120mm	2

AA AND DUAL PURPOSE:

1. DP Gun, 8cm	5
2. DP Gun, 120mm	25
3. CD Gun, 120mm	12
4. AA/AT Auto cannon, single Mt, 25mm	104
5. AA/AT Auto cannon, twin Mt, 25mm	39
6. AA/AT Auto cannon, triple Mt, 25mm	1
7. AA/AT Auto cannon, twin mount, 40mm	4
8. AA Gun 75mm	17
9. AA Gun, 105mm	9
10. 140mm CD	4
11. 20mm AA	7

TANKS OR ARMORED VEHICLES:

1. Lt Tanks	3
2. Med Tanks	18

ROCKET LAUNCHING SITES:

1. 8" Rocket Launcher	21
2. 63KG Rocket Launcher	8
3. (?) Rocket Launcher	3

ORDNANCE SECTION,
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
C/O FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO.

TABLE #1.

AMMUNITION REPORT - IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN

UNIT OF FIRE EXPENDITURE RATE BASED ON TOTAL ARMAMENT
OF THREE MARINE DIVISIONS AND CORPS ARTILLERY.

CINCPAC U/F of MAR., 1944	ROUNDS EXPENDED D + 25	AVERAGE U/F EXP/WEAPON/ DAY-25 DAYS	ROUNDS EXPENDED D + 34	AV. U/F EXP/WEAPON/ DAY-34 DAYS
---------------------------------	------------------------------	---	------------------------------	---------------------------------------

Cart., Carbine, Cal .30 M1
Cart., Gren., Carbine, M6
Cart., Gren., Rifle, M3

45

3,905,847
1,465
45,840

.1

2,641,622
31,615
11,040

.07

.30 Caliber
AP - bulk

AP - 5 rd clips
AP - 8 rd clips

Tracer - bulk

Tracer - 5 rd clips
Tracer - 8 rd clips
Belted (all ratios)

(Rifle) 80 AP
(Rifle) 20 Tr
(BAR) 400 AP
(BAR) 100 Tr
(MG) 1200 AP
(MG) 300 Tr
See MG

2,227,174
9,030,910
1,551,900
216,000
16,839,538

.17

2,503,866
9,045,676
1,391,000
211,968
15,826,888

.17

Shell, Shotgun #00 Buckshot

25

116,425

.3

70,850

.19

Cart., .45 Cal. Ball

14

435,900

.17

457,820

.18

.50 Caliber
Incendiary

API

Belted (all ratios)

(MG) 240 AP
(MG) 240 Inc
(MG) 120 Tr

18,300
)
642,066

.04

948,780

.06

60mm Mortar

HE W49A2 w/f M52

Illum., M83 w/f Time M65

Smoke, WP T6

Smoke, HC BE T8

90
10

320,074
58,388
6,391
1,936

.43
.75

318,585
60,399
6,003
2,358

.29
.51

ENCLOSURE (B)

CO

Ammunition Report - TWO JIMA Campaign (Cont'd)

Table #1

		CINCPAC U/F of MAR., 1944	ROUNDS EXPENDED D + 25	AVERAGE U/F EXP/WEAPON/ DAY-25 DAYS	ROUNDS EXPENDED D + 34	AV. U/F EXP/WEAPON/ DAY-34 DAYS
<u>81mm Mortar</u>						
HE M41 w/f M52 (Light)	50		78,957	.55	74,160	.38
HE M56 w/f M53 (Heavy)	40		41,684	.37	43,430	.27
Smoke, WP M57 w/f M52	10		9,906	.35	8,361	.21
<u>37mm Gun</u>						
Canister, M2	20		12,772	.24	10,895	.15
HE, M63 w/f BD M58	40		23,831	.22	24,230	.16
APC, M51 w/tracer	40		18,460	.17	11,895	.08
<u>75mm Gun</u>						
HE M48 (SC) w/f M48			(31,108)		(34,362)	
HE M48 (NC) w/f M54			(15,643)		(15,872)	
TOTAL HE	40 HE		46,751	.26	50,234	.21
Smoke, M64 w/f M57	10 WP		6,493	.14	7,933	.13
APC, M61 w/f BD M66AI	50 AP		28,964	.13	23,971	.08
<u>75mm Pack Howitzer</u>						
HE M48-M41AI w/f M48 (SF)	150		90,395	.50	88,254	.43
HE M48-M41AI w/f M54 (SF)	105		85,971	.68	84,935	.67
Smoke, WP M64 w/f M57 (SF)	30		16,941	.47	14,513	.40
HE-AT M66 w/f BD M62 (SF)	15		7,886	.44	6,410	.36
Canister, T-30			1,994		1,432	
<u>105mm Howitzer</u>						
HE M1 w/f M48	100		137,108	.57	139,288	.58
HE-AT M67 w/f BD M62	10		4,174	.17	8,887	.37
HE M1 w/f M54	70		86,200	.51	89,622	.54
Smoke, WP M60 w/f M57	20		11,704	.24	18,944	.39
Smoke, HC BE M84 w/f M54	Sub WP		2,459		506	

(25 day exp rate as
of D + 34 inventory)

Ammunition Report - IWO JIMA Campaign (Cont'd)

Table #1

UNIT OF FIRE EXPENDITURE RATE BASED ON TOTAL ARMAMENT OF THREE MARINE DIVISIONS AND CORPS ARTILLERY			
CINCPAC	U/F of	EXPENDED	AV. U/F
U/F of	EXPENDED	EXPENDED	EXP/WEAPON/ DAY-34 DAYS
MAR., 1944	D + 25	D + 34	

ITEMS

155mm Howitzer M1

Shell, HE M107 135
 Shell, smoke WP M10 15
 Charge Prop, W3 (GB)
 Charge Prop, W4A1 (WB)
 Primer, percussion
 Fuze, PD M51A3 w/b M21A2
 Fuze, TSQ, M55A3 w/b M21A4
 Fuze, PD, M46
 Fuze, CP, M105

41,195	.50	41,951	*.52
2,385	.26	2,486	*.27
19,920		22,199	
25,309		25,929	
36,002		56,190	
4,031		35,485	
4,127		6,505	
5,643		3,470	
848		4,110	

*25 day exp rate as of
 D + 34 inventories.

Grenades

Hand, Frag, M61A1 w/f M10A3
 Hand, Smoke HC M8'
 Hand, Smoke WP M15
 Hand, Smoke Colored Asst'd
 Hand, Incend., Thermite M14
 Hand, Incend., Frangible
 Adapter, proj, M1
 Illuminating M1 I.
 AT M9A1

176,130	187,123
2,516	1,144
38,109	32,892
6,937	5,262
1,440	1,306
1,180	955
59,299	41,375
21,425	31,425
37,054	27,438

Rockets

AT 2.36" M6
 Smoke, WP 2.36"
 4.5" BR w/f M1 137-1
 7.2"

11,956	13,628
3,165	3,592
30,189	30,034
	650

Pyrotechnics

Signal, Ground M17-M22
 Flares, Trip (M48 and M49)

6,750	5,211
18,878	24,173

Ammunition Report - IWO JIMA Campaign (Cont'd).

Table #1

ITEMS	UNIT OF FIRE EXPENDITURE RATE BASED ON TOTAL ARMAMENT OF THREE MARINE DIVISIONS AND CORPS ARTILLERY			
	CINCPOA U/F of MAR., 1944		AVERAGE U/F EXP/WEAPON/ DAY-25 DAYS	
	ROUNDS EXPENDED D + 25	ROUNDS EXPENDED D + 34	AV U/F EXP/WEAPON/ DAY-34 DAYS	
Mines	396	520		
AT IN	1,922	2,634		
Anti-Personnel M2, M2A1 M3.				
Torpedo Bangalore	2,657	3,264		

NOTES: In general the expenditures reported as of D + 34 are smaller than reported as of D + 25. This is due to the fact that on D + 25 considerable amounts of ammunition were scattered at various combat positions and unaccounted for in Divisional Periodic reports. Later after the major fighting was over, this ammunition was recovered.

- (a) The foregoing report is in compliance with paragraph 3(a), FMF GO 66-44 Confidential Serial 01489, dated 27Dec44.
- (b) The problem of supply from ship to shore was extremely difficult due to bad weather and was not abated until unloading beaches were opened on both sides of the island, when advantage of a lee shore could be taken in any type of weather.
- (c) After D + 11 satisfactory Divisional and Corps ammunition dumps were established by "Bulldozing" stowage slots in the sand and clay.
- (d) Ammunition supply was adequate except during a short period when weather conditions hindered the unloading of the first resupply ship "COLOMBIA VICTORY".
- (e) The newly adopted CINCPOA Unit of Fire is satisfactory as it should remedy the great demand for illuminating projectiles when such become available. A reduction of HE-AT and WP projectiles appears to be indicated.
- (f) No new types other than illuminating projectiles are required.

Table #2

ORDNANCE SECTION,
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
C/O FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO.

AMMUNITION REPORT - IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN

UNIT OF FIRE EXPENDITURE RATE BASED ON TOTAL ARMAMENT OF THREE MARINE
DIVISIONS LESS ONE INFANTRY REGIMENT PLUS CORPS ARTILLERY

ROUNDS EXPENDED	AV. U/F EXP/WEAP/ DAY-25 DAYS	ROUNDS EXPENDED	AV. U/F EXP/ WEAP/DAY-34 DAYS
D + 25		D + 34	

ITEMS
Cart, Carbine, Cal .30 M1
Cart, Gren., Carbine, M6
Cart, Gren., Rifle, M3.

.30 Caliber
AP - bulk
AP - 5 rd clips
AP - 8 rd clips
Tracer - bulk
Tracer - 5 rd clips
Tracer - 8 rd clips
Belted (all ratios)

No analysis of Small Arms ammunition is developed under these headings as it would not be materially different from the analysis in Enclosure (B), Table #1, which was purely arbitrary in view of the fact that there is no way to determine the number of rounds which were fired by any particular type of Small Arms Weapons.

Shell, Shotgun #00 Buckshot

Cart., .45 Cal. Ball.

.50 Caliber
Incendiary
API
Belted (all ratios)

60mm Mortar
HE M49A2 w/f M52
Illum., M83 w/f Time M65
Smoke, WP T6
Smoke, HC BE T8

320,074	.49	318,585	.37
58,388	.81	60,399	.62
6,391		6,391	
1,936		2,358	

Ammunition Report - IWO JIMA Campaign (Cont'd)

Table #2

ITEMS	UNIT OF FIRE EXPENDITURE RATE BASED ON TOTAL AMOUNT OF THREE MARINE DIVISIONS LESS ONE INFANTRY REGIMENT PLUS CORPS ARTILLERY			
	ROUNDS EXPENDED	AV. U/F EXP/WEAP/	ROUNDS EXPENDED	AV. U/F EXP/WEAP/DAY-34 DAYS
	D + 25	DAY-25 DAYS	D + 34	
<u>81mm Mortar</u>				
HE M43A1 w/f M52 (Light)	78,957	.62	74,160	.43
HE M56 w/f M53 (Heavy)	41,684	.41	43,430	.31
Smoke WP M57 w/f M52	9,906	.39	8,361	.24

<u>37mm Gun</u>				
Canister, M2	12,772	.27	10,895	.17
HE M63 w/f BD M58	23,831	.25	24,230	.18
APC M51 w/tracer	18,460	.19	11,895	.09

<u>75mm Gun</u>				
HE M48 (SC) w/f M48	(31,108)		(34,362)	
HE M48 (MC) w/f M54	(15,643)		(15,872)	
TOTAL HE	46,751	.29	50,234	.23
Smoke, M64 w/f M57	6,493	.16	7,933	.14
APC, M61 w/f BD M66A1	28,964	.14	23,271	.08

<u>75mm Pack Howitzer</u>				
HE M48-M41A1 w/f M48 (SF)	98,198	88,254		
HE M48-M41A1 w/f M54 (SF)	61,656	84,935		
Smoke, WP M64 w/f M57 (SF)	15,202	14,513		
HE-AT M66 w/f BD M62 (SF)	3,734	16,410		
TOTAL	178,990	194,112		35,122

<u>105mm Howitzer</u>				
HE M1 w/f M48	124,878	139,288		
HE-AT M67 w/f BD M62	602	8,887		
HE M1 w/f M54	91,500	89,622		
Smoke, WP M60 w/f M57	10,745	18,944		
Smoke, HC HE M84 w/f M54	149	506		
TOTAL	227,874	257,247		29,373

<u>155mm Howitzer M1</u>				
Shell, HE M107	42,000	44,437		
* 1130 rounds of this amount was turned over to 4th & 5th MarDivs.				*2,437

ORDNANCE SECTION,
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
C/O FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO.

ORDNANCE DATA REPORT - TWO JIMA CAMPAIGN

Page 1
Page 2-3
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Page 16-17

Actual armament for operation.
Detailed list of ammunition in resupply shipments 13.5, 14A and 14B.
Analysis of Unit of Fire carried by Divisions and Corps Artillery.
Details of 4th Division Ammunition loading by ships.
Details of 5th Division Ammunition loading by ships.
Details of 3rd Division Ammunition loading by TransDive.

ENCLOSURE (D).

[illegible]

Corps Artillery

[illegible]

• 5274 extra 60mm Smoke
• 1170 extra 75PM. Conister

F

100

#-LVT Maintenance.	X-Propad 1	O-Propad 3 Maintenance	C-KCT
*-PULVIN Maintenance.	X-Propad 2A	A-Fonton Carriage	E-7-16-10-1
90-Medical Supplies.	Z-Propad 2B	E-3-10-10-1	

Set 1 17991.

Kind

Set 2 Page 1

Baron[illegible]

#-117 Maintenance	X-Reload 1	O-Reload 3 (Naval Armory)	C-1 CT
*-DUKW Maintenance	Y-Reload 24	A-Benton Causeways	D-Flak
90-Medical Supplies	Z-Reload 28	B-3x12 Barges	.

Set 2 page 2

KSM details

Set 3 page 1 (1 page only)

Trans Div - 46										Trans Div - 47										Trans Div - 48									
ITEMS (Cont'd)	APA 159	APA 121	APA 96	APA 160	AMA 64	Total	APA 119	APA 194	APA 106	APA 192	AMA 91	Total	APA 161	APA 211	APA 197	APA 208	AMA 68	REMARKS	TOTAL										
Grenade, Hand, Smoke, HC, M8 w/ M200A1	212	262	250	262	362	1,348	375	375	375	375	375	1,500	300	275	275	300	325	1,475	4,323										
Smoke, M7, M15	475	475	475	475	500	2,410	600	600	600	600	600	2,400	475	475	475	500	450	2,375	7,125										
Frangible (M) M1 w/ Ventilation	144	144	24	144	144	624	96	96	96	96	72	456	96	96	96	96	96	480	1,536										
111, M7	500	500	500	500	475	2,475	500	500	500	500	475	2,475	500	500	500	500	475	2,475	6,425										
Grenade, Rifle, AT, M9A1	2,000	1,960	370	2,000		6,330	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000	2,530	6,530	1,250	1,050	1,250	1,450	1,350	6,340	17,180										
Smoke, M7, M19																													
Smoke, colored, T88, Violet																													
Yellow																													
Orange																													
Green																													
White Star																													
Red Star																													
Signal, Signal, Very, M7, Green Star	500	500			30	530				500		530																	
White Star	1,000	500			30	1,530				1,000		1,530																	
Signal, Ground, White Star, M7A1B2	96	96			48	240				96		240																	
White Star Cluster M18A1B2	96	96			48	240				96		240																	
Green Star, M7A1B2	96	96			48	240				96		240																	
Green Star Cluster M20A1B2	96	96			48	240				96		240																	
Amber Star, M7A1B2	96	96			48	240				96		240																	
Amber Star Cluster M22A1B2	96	96			48	240				96		240																	
Red Star, M7A1B2	96	96			48	240				96		240																	
Red Star Cluster M24A1B2	96	96			48	240				96		240																	
Signal, Ground, Smoke, Colored, Red	144	96				240				96		240																	
Orange																													
Green																													
Violet																													
Yellow																													
Flares, Trip, M48	125	225	200	225	335	1,110	370	380	370	370	370	1,120	380	380	380	380	380	1,440	3,270										
M49	500	500	500	500	125	2,125	775	825	775	775	775	2,125	825	825	825	825	825	3,300	6,425										
Flares, Trip, Pot, Smoke Floating, HC, M41	60	60	60	60	60	300	100	100	100	100	100	600	100	100	100	100	100	2,400	2,820										
Demolitions, Cans, Blasting, Electric	500	500	500	500	500	2,500	500	500	500	500	500	2,500	500	500	500	500	500	2,500	7,000										
Demolitions, Cans, Blasting, Non-Electric	5,000	5,000	5,000	5,000	5,000	25,000	5,000	5,000	5,000	5,000	5,000	25,000	5,000	5,000	5,000	5,000	5,000	25,000	70,000										
Demolitions, Charges, shaped, M21	42	18	50	10	10	130	54	54	54	54	15	204	54	40	40	40	40	284	584										
Demolitions, Charges, shaped, T-3	26	12	5	12	12	67	20	20	20	20	15	90	20	15	15	15	15	120	270										
Demolitions, Cord, detom., 100-ft spools	150	150	50	150	100	550	100	100	100	100	100	500	100	100	100	100	100	1,000	1,650										
Demolitions, Detonator, 15-sec, Delay, M1	600	600	600	600	1,000	3,800	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000	400	3,400	600	400	400	400	400	2,800	12,200										
Demolitions, Explosive, C-2, lbs	3,726	3,726	3,098	3,726	125	14,371	3,600	3,600	3,600	1,800	1,800	14,400	2,800	612	2,800	3,412	3,000	11,612	31,202										
Demolitions, Explosive, dem., chain of 8 lb	98	114	50	118	62	442	100	100	100	40	104	444	72	72	72	72	72	560	1,276										
Demolitions, Firing device, M1 Pul type	816	1,068	750	1,068	60	3,684	750	750	750	750	750	4,500	750	250	750	750	750	5,000	12,684										
Demolitions, Firing device, M1 Fuel type	475	475	475	475	540	2,445	450	450	450	450	225	1,545	450	225	450	450	450	1,575	3,720										
Demolitions, Firing device, M1 Release type	135	135	135	135	135	540	135	135	135	135	135	540	135	135	135	135	135	540	1,260										
Demolitions, Fuse, Blasting, Time, Feet	12,000	12,000	6,000	12,000	250	32,250	2,000	2,000	2,000	1,000	1,500	15,750	2,000	1,000	1,500	1,500	1,500	10,000	44,400										
Demolitions, Fuse, Blasting, Time, Feet	12,000	12,000	6,000	12,000	250	32,250	2,000	2,000	2,000	1,000	1,500	15,750	2,000	1,000	1,500	1,500	1,500	10,000	23,500										
Demolitions, Fuse, Blasting, Time, Feet	12,000	12,000	6,000	12,000	250	32,250	2,000	2,000	2,000	1,000	1,500	15,750	2,000	1,000	1,500	1,500	1,500	10,000	23,500										
Demolitions, Fuse, Blasting, Time, Feet	12,000	12,000	6,000	12,000	250	32,250	2,000	2,000	2,000	1,000	1,500	15,750	2,000	1,000	1,500	1,500	1,500	10,000	23,500										
Demolitions, Fuse, Blasting, Time, Feet	12,000	12,000	6,000	12,000	250	32,250	2,000	2,000	2,000	1,000	1,500	15,750	2,000	1,000	1,500	1,500	1,500	10,000	23,500										
Demolitions, Fuse, Blasting, Time, Feet	12,000	12,000	6,000	12,000	250	32,250	2,000	2,000	2,000	1,000	1,500	15,750	2,000	1,000	1,500	1,500	1,500	10,000	23,500										
Demolitions, Fuse, Blasting, Time, Feet	12,000	12,000	6,000	12,000	250	32,250	2,000	2,000	2,000	1,000	1,500	15,750	2,000	1,000	1,500	1,500	1,500	10,000	23,500										
Demolitions, Fuse, Blasting, Time, Feet	12,000	12,000	6,000	12,000	250	32,250	2,000	2,000	2,000	1,000	1,500	15,750	2,000	1,000	1,500	1,500	1,500	10,000	23,500										
Demolitions, Fuse, Blasting, Time, Feet	12,000	12,000	6,000	12,000	250	32,250	2,000	2,000	2,000	1,000	1,500	15,750	2,000	1,000	1,500	1,500	1,500	10,000	23,500										
Demolitions, Fuse, Blasting, Time, Feet	12,000	12,000	6,000	12,000	250	32,250	2,000	2,000	2,000	1,000	1,500	15,750	2,000	1,000	1,500	1,500	1,500	10,000	23,500										
Demolitions, Fuse, Blasting, Time, Feet	12,000	12,000	6,000	12,000	250	32,250	2,000	2,000	2,000	1,000	1,500	15,750	2,000	1,000	1,500	1,500	1,500	10,000	23,500										
Demolitions, Fuse, Blasting, Time, Feet	12,000	12,000	6,000	12,000	250	32,250	2,000	2,000	2,000	1,000	1,500	15,750	2,000	1,000	1,500	1,500	1,500	10,000	23,500										
Demolitions, Fuse, Blasting, Time, Feet	12,000	12,000	6,000	12,000	250	32,250	2,000	2,000	2,000	1,000	1,500	15,750	2,000	1,000	1,500	1,500	1,500	10,000	23,500										
Demolitions, Fuse, Blasting, Time, Feet	12,000	12,000	6,000	12,000	250	32,250	2,000	2,000	2,000	1,000	1,500	15,750	2,000	1,000	1,500	1,500	1,500	10,000	23,500										
Demolitions, Fuse, Blasting, Time, Feet	12,000	12,000	6,000	12,000	250	32,250	2,000	2,000	2,000	1,000	1,500	15,750	2,000	1,000	1,500	1,500	1,500	10,000	23,500										
Demolitions, Fuse, Blasting, Time, Feet	12,000	12,000	6,000	12,000	250	32,250	2,000	2,000	2,000	1,000	1,500	15,750	2,000	1,000	1,500	1,500	1,500	10,000	23,500										
Demolitions, Fuse, Blasting, Time, Feet	12,000	12,000	6,000	12,000	250	32,250	2,000	2,000	2,000	1,000	1,500	15,750	2,000	1,000	1,500	1,500	1,500	10,000	23,500										
Demolitions, Fuse, Blasting, Time, Feet	12,000	12,000	6,000	12,000	250	32,250	2,000	2,000	2,000	1,000	1,500	15,750	2,000	1,000	1,500	1,500	1,500	10,000	23,500										
Demolitions, Fuse, Blasting, Time, Feet	12,000	12,000	6,000	12,000	250	32,250	2,000	2,000	2,000	1,000	1,500	15,750	2,000	1,000	1,500	1,500	1,500	10,000	23,500										
Demolitions, Fuse, Blasting, Time, Feet	12,000	12,000	6,000	12,000	250	32,250	2,000	2,000	2,000	1,000	1,500	15,750	2,000	1,000	1,500	1,500	1,500	10,000	23,500										
Demolitions, Fuse, Blasting, Time, Feet	12,000	12,000	6,000	12,000	250	32,250	2,000	2,000	2,000	1,000	1,																		

Fifth Division

Ammunition & loads

ITEMS	ISD 5	IST 1033	IST 70	IST 643	IST 643	IST 715	IST 634	IST 588	IST 754	IST 928	IST 756	IST 390	IST 241	IST 344	IST 481	IST 785	IST 807	IST 782	To 701
30 Cal., Carbine, M1		79,340	90,000	90,000	90,000	132,250	124,200	170,200	190,900	55,200		120,750	90,000	90,000	20,700	20,700	20,700	20,700	117,825
30 Cal., AP (5-rd) r170		61,500	61,500	61,500	61,500							61,500	61,500	61,500	61,500	61,500	61,500	61,500	362,000
30 Cal., AP (8-rd) r170		168,356	72,296	72,296	72,296	263,152	190,344	465,672	310,692	188,596	28,845	259,344	72,296	72,296	72,296	43,008	43,008	16,128	37,764
30 Cal., Tracer (5-rd) r170		9,750	36,000	36,000	36,000	47,900	42,750	75,250	64,750	20,250		42,750	36,000	36,000	36,000	12,000	12,000	4,500	33,500
30 Cal., Tracer (8-rd) r170			192,000	192,000	192,000	95,000	71,000	25,000	204,000	239,000	17,000	71,000	192,000	192,000	192,000	11,000	11,000	6,000	16,500
30 Cal., AP (ballist 2-2-1) M1			4,000	4,000	4,000	6,000	6,000	11,000	6,000	5,000		6,000	4,000	4,000	4,000				4,400
30 Cal., AP						4,200	4,550	4,550	4,550	4,550		4,550	4,550	4,550	4,550				26,850
30 Cal., Tracer						1,900	2,450	2,450	2,450	2,450		2,450							14,150
30 Cal., AP, (ballist 2-2-1)		61,800	11,340	11,340	11,340	4,200	4,200	4,200	4,200	61,800		4,200	11,340	11,340	11,340	9,800	9,800	9,800	24,800
12 Gauge #00 Buckshot			1,500	1,500	1,500	1,500	1,500	1,500	1,500	1,500		1,500	1,500	1,500	1,500				16,500
20mm GUN, M3 HE			140	140	140	140	140	140	140			140	140	140	140				1,540
20mm GUN, M3 M556, Camifactor M2			260	260	260	260	260	260	260			260	260	260	260				2,860
M3, w/c BD M58 HE			260	260	260	260	260	260	260			260	260	260	260				2,860
AP, M74 w/tracer																			2,860
AP, M51 w/tracer			306	306	306	306	306	306	306			306	306	306	306				3,366
2" MORTAR, M3 - bomb smoke M1/L			368	2,872	2,872	3,490	3,124	5,182	5,242	328		3,124	2,872	2,872	2,872	1,260	1,260		4,020
60mm MORTAR, M492, w/c PD, M52 HE			320	320	320	320	320	472	448	24		320	320	320	320	80	80		4,020
M83, w/c T (r170) M65 111,			144	144	144	144						144	144	144	144				816
WP, T6, smoke			136	136	136							136	136	136	136				816
HC, T8, smoke						475	475	475	475			475							2,375
75mm HORTICHER, M48 w/c PD M54 HE						324	324	324	324			324							1,620
M48 w/c PD M54 HE						36	36	36	36			36							1,800
WP M64 w/c PD M57 Smoke						80	80	80	80			80							4,000
M66 w/c BD M62 HE - AT						72	72	72	72	180		72							5,400
T-30 Camifactor																			
75mm GUN, M48 (SC) w/c PD M48 HE			147	147	147	294	294	294	294			294	147	147	147				2,352
M48 (SC) w/c PD M54 HE			147	147	147							147	147	147	147				832
WP M4 II (SC) w/c PD M54 HE			74	74	74	74	74	74	74			74	74	74	74				814
M61 (SC) w/c PD M64 & Tr. APC			369	369	369	369	369	369	369	64		369	369	369	369	300	300		4,059
81mm MORTAR, M43A1, w/c PD M52 HE			174	490	490	533	533	1,016	1,127	64		532	490	490	300	300			74,555
M56 w/c PD M53 HE			44	392	392	404	431	632	656	18		431	392	392	150	150			5,270
WP M57 w/c PD M52 smoke			60	99	99	103	99	130	184	6		99	99	99	15	15			1,305
105mm M107 M28, M1, w/c PD M48 HE																4,816	4,258	4,170	1,264
M1, w/c PD M54, HE																2,516	3,010	3,320	8876
HC, BK, M83, w/c PD M54																598	778	594	1,670
M67, w/c BD, M62, HE-AT																586	478	506	1,570
PIZES, PD, M46			100	100	100	100	100	100	100			100	100	100	100				1,100
ROCKETS, 2, 36, M61 AT			60	200	200	200	280	690	600	115		280	200	200	200	240	240	40	3,945
WP, 2, 36, T-26 Smoke			96	96	96								96	96	96				576
4.5" M3, TMT, Loaded																			
Puze, M17-1																			
PIZES, AT, HE, M11, comp/w/Tube																			
Anti-Operational, M61,																			
GRANDS, Bomb, Trac, M1 w/c M10A3			700	1,625	1,625	2,217	2,275	4,078	3,897	963		2,275	1,625	1,625	1,625	1,500	1,500	750	29,825
Adapter Pro M1			96	1,008	1,008	1,008	1,008	1,128	1,088	216		1,008	1,008	1,008	1,008	192	192	192	192
Adapter Pro M2			48	48	48	48	48	48	48			48	48	48	48				428
Insured Thawite, M14			87			100			87			100				25	25	25	362

Ammonition roads

SET 2

Fifth Division

Ammonia, 2013

8.6.0

5.5
this classification will change
to RESTRICTED in the combat area

Fifth Division

Ammunition Receipts

ITEMS (CONT'D)	1ST 795	1ST 399	1SM 140	1SM 203	1SM 204	1SM 215	1SM 236	1SM 266	1SM 43	1SM 44	1SM 46	1SM 47	1SM 141	1SM 142	1ST 991/7115 P4	Total	Grand
GRANDES, Band, smoke, colored, M8, Red	10	10														20	230
Orange	10	10														20	230
Violet	10	10														20	230
Yellow	10	10														20	230
Green	10	10														20	230
smoke, M8, M8 w/ M200A1	100															100	7764
smoke, M7, M75																	14724
frangible, (M) M1, w/ M20																	1624
M1, M1																	52350
GRANDES, M170, M170A1																	240
Smoke, M7, M10																	448
colored, 783, violet																	48
red																	48
yellow																	48
orange																	48
green																	48
LIGHTS, signal, vest, M11, green star	250								9	9	9	9	9	9	25	329	2319
red star	250								9	9	9	9	9	9	25	329	4789
white star	250								9	9	9	9	9	9	25	329	2359
SIGNAL, ground, white, star, M17A1B2	12															12	924
olive, M18A1B2	12															12	1068
green, star, M19A1B2	12															12	972
olive, M20A1B2	12															12	1020
amber, star, M21A1B2	12															12	1116
olive, M22A1B2	12															12	924
red, star, M23A1B2	12															12	1212
olive, M24A1B2	12															12	1212
SIGNAL, ground, smoke, colored, red																	120
orange																	120
yellow																	120
green																	120
violet																	120
FLARES, trip, M48																	4041
M48	25	25														50	7874
FLARES, trip, pot, smoke, floating, M41																	4020
DEMOLITION, emp, blasting, electric																	9100
non-electric	100	100														200	87100
charge, shaped, M2A1																	680
T-3																	283
cord, detaching, 100ft spools	5	5														10	1933
detector, 15 sec, delay, M1																	12000
explosive, C-2, 1lb																	47704
demo, chain of 8 b's																	1544
TRE, 1 lb - 1lb	1450	200														1650	30785
firing device, M1, pull type																	12102
Push type																	7485
release																	2460
fuse, blasting, time, foot	50	50														100	18220
fuse, lighting																	2460
FLARE, TRIGGER, M20A1, 1lb									108	108	108	108	108	108	2125	2773	5094
POT, CP P-105									100	100	100	100	100	100	500	500	7485

ITEM	Tread/W 31	Tread/D 32	Tread/L 33	LST's	TOTAL
.20 Calib. Cartridge, M1	827,305	539,043	729,123	8,505	2,113,976
Ball (bulk & 5-rod cased)	840,500	548,000	335,000		1,724,000
(Brd. rd.)	184,956	948,160	575,504	11,360	2,934,380
Trocar (bulk & 5-rod cased)	387,916	378,044	90,700	2,840	859,500
AP & Trocar (boxed L-1)	1595,000	1243,500	912,600	228,500	3,979,600
A/S-MAL, Ball	22,860	12,374	26,360	13,986	75,580
.50-calib. AP, Inv. & Trocar(boxed 2-2-1)	229,360	135,000	106,640		471,000
12-Gauge, #00 Buckshot	13,250	12,875	12,875		39,000
37MM GRN, M3, M3A1, M5, & M6; Canister, M2	1,680	1,680	1,680		5,040
HR, M63, w/f BD, W58	3,360	3,360	3,360		10,080
AP, W7, w/Trocar	3,360	3,360	3,360		10,080
2 nd NOCTURN, M3: Bomb, smoke, Mk I/L	4,032	2,268	4,032	1,764	12,096
60MM NOCTURN, M1 & M2; HR, M49M2, w/f PD, M52	24,570	29,826	19,314		73,710
Illuminating, M83, w/f T (fixed), M65	2,720	2,720	2,720		8,160
Smoke, WP, T-6	975	975	975		2,925
72MM ROCKETER, M1, M1A1, M2 & M3:					
HR, M48, w/f PD, M54	8,820	8,820			17,640
HR, M48, w/f PD, M54, -A1	12,600	12,600			25,200
Smoke, WP, M64, w/f M57	2,520	2,520			5,040
HR-AF, M66, w/f BD, M62	1,260	1,260			2,520
Canister, T-30					
72MM GRN, HR, M48 (SC), w/f PD, M48	5,320	5,280	3,520	1,840	15,960
HR, M48, (SC) w/f PD, M54					
Smoke, WP, M6, II (SC), unfused	1,320	870	1,320	460	3,990
Fuse, PD, M46, E77SMI GRN	1,320	870	1,320	460	3,990
APC, M61, w/f BD, M64A1 & Trocar	6,650	7,350	3,650	2,300	19,950
81MM NOCTURN, HR, M43A1, w/f PD, M52	4,200	4,200	4,200		12,600
HR, M56, w/f PD, M53	3,360	3,360	3,360		10,080
Smoke, WP, M57, w/f PD, M52	840	840	840		2,520
102MM ROCKETER, M2 & M2A1: HR, M1, w/f PD, M48					
HR, M1, w/f PD, M54					
Smoke, WP, M60, w/f PD, M57	1,800	9,960			11,760
HR-AF, M67, w/f PD, M62	675	2,685			3,360
ROCKETS: AT, 2.36", M6, -A1	1,680	1,680			3,360
Smoke, WP, 2.36", T-26	1,690	1,690	1,930		5,310
Smoke, WP, 2.36", T-27	180	180	180		540
Smoke, HR, 2.36", T-27					
Body, HR, 4.5" MG3					
Fuse, MK 137-1					
Mortar, 2.25", Mk 9					
MUSKAT, AF, HR, M4A1, complete w/f	1,000	500	500		2,000
HR-AF, M5	150	138	75		363
AT-M2	1,000	1,000	1,000		3,000
Anti-personnel, M2, -A1, M3	1,506	750	750		3,006
HAND GRENADES:					
Frag, Mk II, w/f M4A3	28,667	21,210	27,552	585	78,014
Adaptor, grenade-protection, M1	12,254	11,577	13,535	293	37,659
Incendiary, Fragible, sect'd.					
Incendiary, Thermitic, M14	752	623	752	129	2,256
Illuminating, Mk I.	1,861	1,725	1,725		5,311
Smoke, HQ, M8, w/f M200A1	1,985	1,215	1,694	280	5,174

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Headquarters Commandant Report

Appendix 13 to Annex CHARLIE to Special Action Report IWO JIMA Campaign

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V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS LANDING FORCE,
IN THE FIELD.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

30 March, 1945.

From: The Headquarters Commandant.
To : The Commanding General.

Subject: Special Action Report, Iwo Jima Campaign.

Reference: (a) VAC LanFor Staff Memo #5-45, dated 10Mar45.

Enclosure: (A) Co "B" Amphibious Reconnaissance Battalion, FMF, Pacific, Action Report, Iwo Jima Operation, December 23, 1944, to March 14, 1945.

1. In compliance with the instructions contained in reference (a), the following report is submitted:

(a) The Headquarters Commandant section, from its inception, on or about 10Dec44, started planning for movement of the Corps Headquarters. Close contact was maintained with the Corps Transport Quartermaster, the Commanding Officer of Corps Troops and the Corps Troops Quartermaster.

(b) All general and Special Staff Sections and the Commanding Officer of Corps Troops were kept informed of the plans for the movement of the Headquarters. Keeping all informed was complicated due to the fact that Corps Headquarters and initial supply were located in Pearl while the Administrative Headquarters, general duty details and most of Headquarters troops were located at Maui. This necessitated a duplication of loading and supply plans for the operation.

(c) Steps were taken by this section, from inception, to train and control personnel of the General and Special Staff sections to pack, secure and move all equipment of their respective sections, in order to make all sections operationally self sufficient. This plan worked well in so far as it is possible to execute a movement of a large headquarters. Improvement can be made.

(d) This section sailed from Fray on 27Jan45. Routine duties were carried out aboard ship.

Appendix 13 to Annex CHARLIE to VACLIF Special Action Report,
Iwo Jima Campaign.

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Subject: Headquarters Commandant Special Action Report,
Iwo Jima Campaign.

2. (a) The Headquarters Commandant landed with the advance echelon on D/4 day to locate and establish a Command Post ashore. A location was selected and work started to prepare the site for occupancy by the command echelon. The Military Police Company was used to establish a security line, duds were marked for removal, the dead were located and removed. Holes were dug by bulldozers for the different sections, a water and ration dump was established. The command echelon came ashore on D/5 and by afternoon the command post began to function ashore. Company "B" Amphibious Reconnaissance Battalion landed on D/6 and were used to strengthen the security of the command post until used on 13Mar45 for a landing on Kama and Kengoku Rocks.

(b) Due to the lack of space and the close proximity of other units, the command post was not properly disposed. Elements of the command post were too close together and adjoining units were too close for proper security.

(c) Considerable improvement was noted in the control of Staff personnel. Continued improvement is expected.

3. The following recommendations are submitted by this section:

(a) A trained bomb disposal officer or NCO should be assigned to duty with the Headquarters Commandant prior to an operation to direct the removal of duds from the command post area.

(b) A trained gas NCO should be assigned this section for permanent duty.

(c) Each Staff Section should reduce the amount of gear taken on an operation. Improvement was noted over previous operations but further improvement can be made.

(d) Bulldozers of the Signal Battalion and the Headquarters and Service Battalion should move ashore with the advance echelon.

Subject: Headquarters Commandant Special Action Report,
 Iwo Jima Campaign.

(e) The general cargo of the Headquarters and Service Battalion and the Corps Troops Quartermaster should be given a higher priority for unloading and should start moving ashore when the command echelon moves.

T. R. WERT.

COMPANY "B"
AMPHIBIOUS RECONNAISSANCE BATTALION,
FLEET MARINE FORCE, PACIFIC
C/O FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA.

29 March, 1945.

From: The Commanding Officer.
To : The Commandant, U. S. Marine Corps.
Via : (1) C-1, Chief of Staff, VAC
(2) CG, FMF, Pacific.
(3) Commander in Chief, Pacific.

Subject: Action Report, IWO JIMA Operation, December 23,
1944 to March 14, 1945.

Reference: (a) PacFlt Conf ltr CL-45, dtd 1Jan45.
(b) FMF Pac GO 66-44 dtd 27Dec44.
(c) VACLIF Special Order Number 2-45.
(d) Corps Troops Administrative Order Number 1-45.

Enclosures: A. Visual Reconnaissance Report of Observer with
UDT #12.
B. Visual Reconnaissance Report of Observer with
UDT #14.
C. Position of Company from 24 February to 5 March
1945 inclusive.
D. Position of Company from 6 March to 13 March,
1945 inclusive.
E. Overlay of landing on KAMA ROCK.
R. Overlay of Landing on KANGOKU ROCK.

PART I Brief Summary.

1. The period covered by this report is from December 23, 1944 to March 14, 1945 inclusive. This period includes training, preparation for and participation in the IWO JIMA Operation.

2. Three (3) enlisted men were attached to Underwater Demolition Teams as observers for Headquarters, Fifth Amphibious Corps. These men, on D minus 2 and D minus 1, closed to within 200 yards of the island while on LCI(S) and observed the beaches and terrain inland.

This Company in addition to other units in the CP Area, was used to provide an outer perimeter of defense for the Fifth Amphibious Corps Command Post.

PART II Preliminaries.

1. This unit, Company "B" Amphibious Reconnaissance Battalion, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, (Russell E. Corey, 1stLt.,

ENCLOSURE A

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USMC), is composed of seven (7) officers, U. S. Marine Corps 112 enlisted, U. S. Marine Corps and 5 enlisted, U. S. Navy (Corpsmen). This organization embarked with four (4) enlisted, U. S. Marine Corps overstrength making a total of 116 enlisted, U. S. Marine Corps. Total personnel embarked, one hundred twenty-eight (128). This organization was attached to Headquarters, Fifth Amphibious Corps, for temporary duty beginning on December 23, 1945.

2. When not actually participating in an operation, extensive training schedules are carried out to train replacements and to maintain the high efficiency of this organization. Prior to this operation most of the training was conducted along the lines of Amphibious reconnaissance, i.e., rubber boat training during daylight and darkness, swimming during daylight and darkness, night and day scouting and patrolling, map reading, use of compass, and aerial photo interpretation. Schooling on and firing of weapons, demolitions, gas warfare (defensive), infantry company in attack and defense, and the subjects contained in MGO-146 made up the remainder of the training schedule. The three men designated to work with UDT Group had ten days schooling at Naval Combat Demolition and Experimental Training Base, T.H., from December 26, 1944 to January 6, 1945.

Embarked upon APA #63 (USS BLADEN) January 16, 1945 for rehearsal exercises. Made two (2) landings on Maui, T. H. Returned to Honolulu January 19, 1945. Left Honolulu January 26, 1945 for the target.

Arrived at Saipan February 11, 1945. Transferred three (3) enlisted men, PlSgt. Willis Hable, Sgt. Frank E. Schnell, and Corp. Melvin C. Holland to Commander Underwater Demolition Group for further transfer to Underwater Demolition Teams #12, #14, #15 respectively. Their mission was to act as observers for Headquarters, Fifth Amphibious Corps, and work with the UDT off the shore of IWO JIMA on D-minus 2 and D-minus 1. Their reports are attached to this report as enclosures (A) and (B). Corp. Holland is reported missing, hence no report. Had one (1) disembarkation exercise at Saipan. Left Saipan February 16, 1945 for the target. Arrived at IWO JIMA February 19, 1945.

3. The primary mission of this organization was to act as advance echelon of Fifth Amphibious Corps CP, and mop up area selected for CP site and then furnish perimeter of defense protection for CP. Secondary mission to be prepared to land on and seize KAMA and KANGOKU ROCKS off the west coast of IWO JIMA.

4. During the entire operation this unit encountered no live enemy personnel.

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PART III

1. At approximately 1730 February 23, 1945 this organization received a message ordering it to land immediately. No details as to where to land or what unit to report to were contained in the message. A message was sent requesting more details, and an answering dispatch ordered us to report to Control Vessel, Yellow Beach for further orders.

While preparing to disembark, enemy planes began bombing the ships and all troops were ordered below. Air raid was over at 2130 at which time this unit disembarked. The sea was very rough and one (1) man, Pfc. John R. O'Day, Jr. broke his ankle while disembarking and was left aboard ship.

Reported to Control Yellow who had no orders for us and could not seem to find any information concerning this unit.

Finally landed on Blue Beach #1, 0130 February 24, 1945. Dug in on beach and waited until daybreak.

At 0930 located Fifth Amphibious Corps C.P. area and reported in to Major Wert, Corps Headquarters Troops Cmdt. PlSgt. Willis Hable and Sgt. Frank E. Schnell, who had been temporarily attached to Underwater Demolition Group joined the Company. Received dispatch telling of bombing of APD(E) (USS BLESSMAN) and of the casualties and missing.

This unit was assigned an area in the perimeter of defense as shown on enclosure (D) and occupied this area from 24 February 1945 to 6 March 1945. Received occasional night shellings by enemy during this time and during shelling on the night of 28 February 1945, Pvt. Troy D. Worley, (492788), received shrapnel wounds in the left shoulder and left leg. He was evacuated to a ship and later evacuated to Base 18 hospital, Saipan.

Received dispatch concerning bombing of APD(E) (USS BLESSMAN), and high percent of casualties and missing reported as result of bombing. No specific information of Corp. Melvin C. Holland who was attached to Underwater Demolition Team #15 embarked aboard. USS BLESSMAN reported Holland as missing in action.

On 6 March 1945 received orders to take over area in Fifth Amphibious Corps C.P. perimeter of defense managed by 1st. Battalion, 28th Marines, as shown in Enclosure (D). Occupied this area until 14 March 1945 when detached from Headquarters, Fifth Amphibious Corps, and ordered to report to Rear Echelon, 8th Field Depot.

At 2300, 8 March 1945, Pfc. Russell Rendall Allen was killed in action.

On 12 March 1945 this organization was ordered to furnish observing detachments to go aboard 12 LVT(A)'s and one (1) LCI and make a visual reconnaissance of KAMA and KANGOKU ROCKS. The observers in the LVT(A)'s were platoon leaders or senior NCO's. The Commanding Officer and Executive Officer made up this observing party for the LCI. No enemy activity was noted and the LVT(A)'s received no fire. At 1600, this organization received orders to land on and seize KAMA ROCK and KANGOKU ROCK on 13 March 1945. KAMA ROCK was to be first objective, Nan hour 0900. The landing on KANGOKU ROCK to be made upon completion of capture of KAMA ROCK. Landings to be made in LCR's from LVT's. Support was to be furnished by one (1) LCI and 10 LVT(A)'s. Executive officer of this unit to act as Naval Gunfire officer aboard LCI. Total landing force consisted of 10 LCR teams or 94 men and 6 officers plus two (2) flame thrower teams which were to remain in reserve until called for. C.O., this organization was to be in command of landing force, and supporting units to furnish fire support as requested by landing force Commander.

At 0830, 13 March 1945 the supporting LVT(A)'s and LCI began preparation fire on KAMA ROCK.

At 0850, the 1st. Platoon consisting of two (2) LCR teams disembarked from 2 LVT's and at 0855 landed on northeastern tip of KAMA ROCK. The 2nd. Platoon acted as reserve in case 1st. Platoon needed support. No enemy were encountered and no signs of enemy activity noted. The 1st. Platoon reembarked aboard LVT's and the task force proceeded to the second objective.

The LCI and LVT(A)'s fired preparation fire on KANGOKU ROCK prior to landing. At 1000, 10 LCR teams landed on KANGOKU ROCK at T.A. NAN. Three (3) platoons abreast moved up the northern portion of the island, one (1) platoon reconnoitered the southern portion, and one (1) platoon was held in reserve on the beach. No enemy encountered and evidences that enemy personnel had been on Rock several weeks prior to time of landing. A few barricaded caves and rock emplacements were noted, but no equipment nor enemy personnel were located. Island was secured at 1024 and Company reembarked aboard LVT's and returned to Company Area on IWO JIMA.

On 14 March 1945 this unit was detached from Headquarters, Fifth Amphibious Corps and ordered to report to Rear Echelon, 8th Field Depot at HODE to await further orders from Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific. Embarked aboard LST #784 at 1130, 14 March 1945.

RUSSELL E. COREY

Copy to: CO, CorHqTrs, VAC; CO, AmphRecnBn, FMF, Pac.

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COMPANY "B"
AMPHIBIOUS RECONNAISSANCE BATTALION
FLEET MARINE FORCE, PACIFIC
C/O FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA.

29 March, 1945.

VISUAL RECONNAISSANCE REPORT OF OBSERVER WITH UDT #12.

I left the APA #63 (USS BLADEN) while at SAIPAN and went aboard the APD #11 (USS GILMER) to report to the Commander of the UDT group. Then I was sent aboard the APD(E) #47 (USS BATES) to join the UDT #12. We then left SAIPAN for IWO JIMA and arrived there on 16 February 1945, (D-minus 3). On our first run we received fire at approximately 1000 yards off shore. This run was made in the morning, and for the rest of the day we circled the island. On 17 February 1945, (D-minus 2) at 1000 (ROGER HOUR), the operation was to begin. I was assigned to Platoon One, which was occupying boat one (1), and which was to dispatch swimmers. The plan was to have the swimmers remain in the water for 45 minutes, at the most, while I was to observe Red Beach #2. However, as our boat approached the beach to dispatch the swimmers, we received medium artillery fire, which was supposedly aimed at the LCI(G). We dropped the swimmers off at approximately 500 yards from shore, and returned to the LCI(G) #474 to take up my position as an observer. Previous to my arriving at the LCI(G), many direct hits had been made on her, by medium and heavy artillery, which later caused her to sink. As I prepared to embark I was instructed that she was preparing to pull out of position, therefore, I embarked aboard the next LCI(G) #466 which pulled into her position. Upon the LCI(G) I took up my position as an observer on the Starboard 20mm Bucket. While I was observing, the LCI(G) received three (3) direct hits, which caused it to lose control and head directly for the beach. At approximately 100 yards off shore they gained control of the ship through the use of an emergency rudder. After the first direct hit on the LCI(G), all available hands were used for administering First Aid. After gaining control of the LCI(G) and leaving the beach, we pulled alongside the USS TENNESSEE to evacuate our casualties and observers. Immediately upon embarking on the USS TENNESSEE, I contacted the Captain and asked to be dispatched to the APD(E) #47 (USS BATES), but there were no small boats available, so I remained aboard until 21 February 1945, (D-plus 2). During those four (4) days, I received two (2) radio messages which stated that I was to be embarked aboard the APD(E) #47 (USS BATES), but which never occurred. On 21 February 1945, an LCI (Press Boat) pulled alongside and I went aboard for transportation to the AGC #11 (USS ELDORADO). Aboard the ELDORADO I reported to G-3 Section which made arrangements for my transportation to the AGC #10 (USS AUBURN) the following day. On the AUBURN I also reported to G-3 Section to be accounted for. Later that same day, I was questioned by Major Wert about my activities from the time

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I left my organization. Major Wert then made arrangements for my transportation to the BATES to recover my gear which I left behind. Upon acquiring my gear, I returned to the AUBURN and stayed with Major Wert until the 23rd, when we went ashore. I then rejoined my Company the next day (24 February, 1945).

WILLIS HABLE
PlSgt., USMCR.

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ENCLOSURE A

COMPANY "B"
AMPHIBIOUS RECONNAISSANCE BATTALION,
FLEET MARINE FORCE, PACIFIC
C/O FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA.

29 March, 1945.

VISUAL RECONNAISSANCE REPORT OF OBSERVER WITH UDT #14

I left the APA #63 (USS BLADEN) while at SAIPAN to board the APD(E) (USS GILMER). From the GILMER I was transferred to the APD(E) #78, (USS BULL), and worked with UDT #14. We left SAIPAN and arrived AT IWO JIMA on the morning of February 16, 1945, (D-minus 3). We made one (1) run with the APD(E), and about 1200 yards off shore drew supposed 20mm and 40mm fire. On 17 February 1945, at approximately 1000, we started to lower the small boats and drew enemy fire immediately. I was attached to platoon one (1) to dispatch swimmers to cover Yellow Beaches #1 and #2. At approximately 800 yards off shore we began to draw Mortar Fire. The intended plan was, that I was to board an LCI(G) and observe from there, but said LCI(G) was hit with artillery and large mortar fire. Therefore, I continued with platoon one (1) while they dispatched their swimmers. Our boats circled around in the water awaiting the swimmers return, and it was during this time that the third (3rd) LCI(G) was hit. The fourth (4th) LCI(C) pulled into firing position and I went aboard. As I went to the conning tower, we received a direct hit on the forward gun tub. About 15 seconds later we received another direct hit, just aft of where first shell hit. The LCI(G) then began to withdraw, and I served as a stretcher bearer and fire fighter. When the small boat containing platoon one (1) pulled alongside, I disembarked, and we returned to the rendezvous area where the swimmers were to return to. After picking up the swimmers, we returned to the APD(E) #78 (USS BULL) and circled the island to reconnoiter the western beaches. During this reconnoitering, we received scattered enemy fire. In the evening at 1800 I disembarked from the APD(E) #78 (USS BULL), and embarked aboard the APD(E) (USS GILMER). From there I was dispatched aboard the APD (USS WATERS). We then headed back toward SAIPAN to meet the landing force. On the morning of 18 February 1945, I left the APD (USS WATERS), and went aboard the AGC #10 (USS AUBURN) to report to Admiral Hill. The following questions were ask by him: If the condition of the beaches would permit an LVT to climb over the terraces and I answered, "in most places they would". If rubber tired vehicles could climb them, and I said, "that I didn't think they could make it", Whether or not the beach was hard surfaced? I said no, they were soft sandy beaches. Then he ask me if I knew what the poles were used for, that were driven in the beaches? This, I did not know. He also asked me what the sunken gas drums on the beaches were for? I told him I thought they were used as sunken foxholes. This was done to keep the soft sand from caving in. He asked the size of the guns and mortars that were firing at us? I believed them to be from three (3) to six (6) inch. What was the general locations of the guns firing at us. I said they were from the base

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of Mount Surabachi and from the right flank of the beaches. Captain Clarke, USN, also questioned me on the same subjects along with the following Marines officers: Colonel Rogers, Major Wert, and the officers of the G-3 section. Colonel Rogers asked if I thought the southwestern beaches would be better to land on? From reconnoitering both beaches, I believed the southwestern beaches to be better for landings. I remained aboard with Major Wert until we went ashore on 23 February 1945, (D-plus 4). The next day I rejoined the Company.

FRANK E. SCHNELL,
Sgt., USMCR.

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ENCLOSURE 2

Public Relations Report

Appendix 14 to Annex CHARLIE to Special Action Report IWO JIMA Campaign



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V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS LANDING FORCE,
In the Field.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4 May 1945.

From: The Public Relations Officer.

To : The Commanding General.

Subject: Special Action Report, IWO JIMA Campaign.

1. The Public Relations Section Special Action Report, IWO JIMA Campaign, is submitted herewith.

A. GENERAL PLAN

1. Generally, it was the responsibility of the Corps Public Relations Officer to coordinate, facilitate and expedite news material gathered by civilian and service personnel assigned to coverage of Marine landing forces engaged in this amphibious operation. To this end, the Marine Corps Public Relations Officers present were to render all possible aid and assistance within the bounds of security and in keeping with the tactical situation.

2. Corps Public Relations Officers were to move ashore as soon as the tactical situation permitted. They were to set up a press headquarters on the beach which would serve as a collecting point for news copy, pictures and radio material submitted by civilian and service personnel. They were responsible for expediting this material to CinCPoa representatives for censorship and disposition.

3. They were to keep abreast of the tactical situation ashore and provide for a daily briefing of civilian correspondents. They were also to arrange shore transportation as an aid to full coverage by civilian correspondents and supervise civilian billeting, messing and safety measures.

4. They were to advise the Corps Commander on Public Relations matters and arrange for necessary or desirable interviews or statements. They were to maintain liaison with the Public Relations Officers of subordinate echelons to insure a constant flow of Marine Combat Correspondent copy, pictures and radio material, supply replacements and coordinate their efforts to increase efficiency of coverage and prevent duplication of effort.

B. SPECIFIC PLAN

1. Specifically, it was the plan of this section to send the assistant public relations officer and one enlisted man ashore on D-Day to establish a press headquarters on Yellow Beach One. This location was selected by the ComPhibsPac Public Relations Officer as being the most approachable for press boats from the ELDORADO where all civilian and service copy and film was to be expedited to Pearl Harbor and Guam.

2. Once civilian press copy left the beach it became the responsibility of the Navy to transmit it by radio to Guam and thence to Pearl Harbor for

Appendix 14 to Annex CHARLIE to VACLF Special Action Report IWO JIMA Campaign.

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cabbling to San Francisco. Civilian mail and service copy was to be picked up by plane from the ELDORADO and flown to Guam. Civilian photographic film was to be sent to Guam for transmission by telephoto. All service film was to be flown to Pearl Harbor for development, editing and distribution.

3. The Corps Assistant Public Relations Officer and one enlisted man were to set up a collection agency on the beach to which Marine Division Public Relations officers were to send copy to be placed aboard press boats. Division Public Relations officers were to collect copy from civilians and service personnel attached to their units. CinCPoa was to send one Public Relations Officer ashore to expedite press material to the ELDORADO.

4. In the event the Assistant Corps Public Relations Officer and one enlisted man did not get ashore on D-Day or they became casualties, it was to become the responsibility of the Division Public Relations Officers to expedite their copy from the beach aboard the press boat or other craft to the ELDORADO.

5. Aboard the ELDORADO, the Public Relations Officer, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, was to assort and log all Marine copy and film before forwarding it to Guam and Pearl Harbor. Once Press Headquarters were established at the Corps CP, Corps Public Relations was to assume this responsibility.

6. The balance of Corps Public Relations personnel was to come ashore with the advance echelon of Corps and establish a press headquarters at the Corps CP where civilian correspondents would be quartered and messed. Division PRO's were also to care for civilian correspondents.

7. Once the Corps CP had been established, press headquarters on Yellow Beach One were to be abandoned and all copy and film were to be funneled through Corps press headquarters at the Corps CP.

8. The Corps Public Relations Section was to have its personnel available for transfer to the Division Public Relations Sections to replace casualties. The Corps Public Relations Section was also to carry additional writing, recording and photographic supplies for the Divisions, should they need them.

9. In addition, the Corps Public Relations Section was to be responsible for coverage of activity within its own headquarters.

C. OPERATIONAL PROCEDURE

1. The Corps Public Relations Officer was aboard the U.S.S. AUBURN with one photographer and one clerk. The photographer made documentary photographs of Corps aboard ship while enroute to the scene of action and before going ashore.

2. Civilian correspondents assigned to the USS AUBURN boarded the ship at Saipan. Interviews with the Corps Commanding General and staff members were arranged by the Public Relations Officer for these correspondents.

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3. The Assistant Corps Public Relations Officer, the non-commissioned-officer in charge of the section, two photographers, one combat correspondent and one general duty man were aboard the APA-61.

4. Second Lieutenant C. P. Zurlinden, Jr., Assistant Corps Public Relations Officer, and Sergeant Roy E. Heinecke went ashore on D-Day with a unit of the Fourth Marine Division, according to schedule. Due to heavy enemy fire, it was impossible to establish a press headquarters on Yellow Beach One. Because of enemy action, the press boat from the ELDORADO did not arrive on D-Day. During D-Day night both Lieutenant Zurlinden and Sergeant Heinecke became casualties, victims of enemy mortar fire, and were evacuated the following day to APA-208 and AGC-11 respectively. They were later sent to Pearl Harbor for treatment.

5. Upon receipt of word that Lieutenant Zurlinden and Sergeant Heinecke were casualties, the Corps Public Relations Officer instructed the Fourth and Fifth Marine Division Public Relations Officers to expedite their copy and film direct to the ELDORADO.

6. Captain William Cessna, USA, CinCPac Public Relations Officer, came ashore on D plus one, but did not remain ashore. He came ashore again on D plus three. No press boat from the ELDORADO arrived on the beach before D plus four due to enemy action and heavy weather.

7. Captain Robert Letts Jones, Public Relations Officer for the Fifth Marine Division, became a casualty on D plus one with a hand injury and was evacuated to the USS LOGAN. First Lieutenant Burns Lee, Assistant Public Relations Officer of the Fifth Division, assumed charge of the Fifth Division Public Relations Section at 1600 21 February, 1945.

8. War Correspondent Keith Wheeler of the Chicago Times was wounded on D plus one at RCT 25 CP and was evacuated to the USS SAMARITAN. He received a gunshot wound in the left jaw. He was removed to Pearl Harbor for treatment.

9. John Lardner of Newsweek was struck in the mid-section following an explosion. He was not evacuated.

10. Arrangements were made on D plus four so that copy from both Marine Divisions was sent to the ELDORADO by a representative from one of the division public relations sections. This was necessary because of the failure of the press boat to reach the beach.

11. The Corps Public Relations Officer, one photographer and one clerk came ashore on D plus four with the advance echelon of Corps Headquarters.

12. On D plus six Second Lieutenant Richard H. Venn and Master Technical Sergeant John W. Black were transferred from Headquarters, Expeditionary Troops, Fifth Fleet, to Headquarters, V Amphibious Corps, for temporary duty with the Public Relations Section as replacements for Lieutenant Zurlinden and Sergeant Heinecke. A Corps press headquarters was set up on this day.

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Public Relations Special Action Report TWO JIMA Campaign.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

13. On D plus six the balance of Corps Public Relations Section personnel, with the exception of the general duty man who came ashore the following day with public relations gear, reported to the Corps CP.

14. On D plus seven Technical Sergeant Nolle Roberts, Combat Correspondent of this Headquarters, reported to the Public Relations Officer of the Third Division for duty with that unit, and Private First Class Charles O. Jones, photographer, reported to the Public Relations Officer of the Fifth Division.

15. Corps Public Relations supplied the Fourth Marine Division Public Relations Section with one wire recorder during the operation and the Third, Fourth and Fifth Divisions with additional wire and film. Other supplies were made available to them as they were needed.

16. On D-Day plus seven the Corps Public Relations Section arranged to collect all copy and film and expedite it to the USS ELDORADO. The Public Relations Officer, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, continued to log and forward this material as long as seaplanes were used to transport press copy. On D plus 13 Corps took over responsibility for logging copy and film and forwarding it by land plane to Guam and Pearl Harbor.

17. On D plus 12 the Corps and the three Marine Division Public Relations Sections had sent to the ELDORADO for forwarding to Guam and Pearl Harbor the following service press material:

- 220 film packs (2748 pictures)
- 1015 stories
- 77 stories with pictures (film packs)
- 25 stories with negatives
- 5 boxes of Kodachrome 4x5 (60 pictures)
- 20 rolls #620 film (160 pictures)
- 13 reels film recordings
- 21 reels wire recordings
- 77 sketches and paintings
- 268 negatives with contacts
- 317 50-foot Kodachrome magazines (15,850 feet 16mm. motion picture film)
- 151 100-foot Kodachrome magazines (15,100 feet 16mm. motion picture film)
- 35 100-foot 35mm. rolls (3,500 feet 35mm. motion picture film)

2244 Total items

18. On D plus 25, the day organized resistance ceased, this section ceased forwarding copy and film for the public relations sections of the Marine divisions because production became practically nil. Corps and Divisions then became responsible for forwarding their own material. On that date total Marine Corps copy and film handled by the V Amphibious Corps was as follows:

174 film packs (2088 pictures)
830 stories
118 stories with pictures
3 boxes Kodachrome 4x5 (36 pictures)
5 reels film recordings
14 reels wire recordings
67 sketches and paintings
54 negatives with contact prints
223 50-foot Kodachrome magazines (11,150 feet 16mm. motion picture film)
154 100-foot Kodachrome rolls (15,400 feet 16mm. motion picture film)
8 100-foot 35mm. rolls (800 feet 35mm. motion picture film)

1650 Total items

19. Total Marine Corps copy produced and handled by Marine Corps Public Relations Sections on this operation, exclusive of material handled for the Army, Seabees, Leatherneck, Mid-Pacifican and Yank, was as follows:

394 film packs (4728 pictures)
1857 stories
320 stories with pictures
8 boxes Kodachrome 4x5 (96 pictures)
20 rolls #620 film (160 pictures)
18 reels film recordings
35 reels wire recordings
144 sketches and paintings
322 negatives with contact prints
540 50-foot Kodachrome magazines (27,000 feet 16mm. motion picture film)
305 100-foot Kodachrome rolls (30,500 feet 16mm. motion picture film)
43 100-foot 35mm. rolls (4,300 feet 35mm. motion picture film)

4006 Total items

20. During the operation the Public Relations Section, V Amphibious Corps, arranged for interviews, provided transportation, furnished supplies, or quartered and messed more than 30 civilian war correspondents, not including those accommodated by the three Marine Division public relations sections. Those availing themselves to facilities of the V Amphibious Corps included:

Malcolm Johnson, United Press
Morrie Landsberg, Associated Press
Don Pryor, Columbia Broadcasting System
Leslie Nichols, Mutual Broadcasting System
William Worden, Saturday Evening Post
William McGaffin, Chicago Daily News
Lt.(jg) Gene Zenier, USNR
James Lindsley, Associated Press
John Henry, International News Service
Robert Trumbull, New York Times

Robert Sherrod, Time Magazine
 John Lardner, Newsweek
 Alwyn Lee, Sydney Sun
 Tom Morrow, Chicago Tribune
 Alphonsus Olsen, Melbourne Argus
 William Marien, Sydney Herald
 Gilbert Bundy, King Features
 Ed Thomas, United Press
 Hamilton Faron, Associated Press
 Emmet Crozier, New York Herald Tribune
 Fred Painton, Readers' Digest
 Ray Coll, Jr., Honolulu Advertiser
 Harold P. Smith, Chicago Tribune
 Homer Bigart, New York Herald Tribune
 W. Eugene Smith, Life Magazine
 Lisle F. Schoemaker, United Press
 A. J. Crocker, St. Paul Pioneer Press and Dispatch
 William Corsine, Department of the Interior
 Lt. Vaughn Paul, CinCPac Newsreel, and four Navy enlisted personnel.
 Percy Finch, Reuters

21. During the operation Sergeant Robert S. Gamble, Corps Public Relations Combat Photographer, was attached to the Corps Shore Party to make a training motion picture and still photographs; Sergeant Claude R. Powe, Combat Photographer, was attached to the Corps Signal Battalion to make a training film and still photographs; and Corporal Claude L. Warnecke, Combat Photographer, was attached to the Corps Evacuation Hospital to make a training film and still photographs.

22. The following Public Relations and Engineering Personnel were casualties:

Killed in Action

TSgt. Donovan R. Raddatz - 3rdMarDiv.
 StfSgt. William Vessey - 5thMarDiv.
 Sgt. John Barberio - 4thMarDiv.
 Sgt. William H. Genaust - 5thMarDiv.
 Corp. William Middlebrooks - 3rdMarDiv.
 PFC. Don Fox - 5thMarDiv.

Missing in Action

Sgt. James McElroy - 4thMarAirWing

Wounded in Action

Capt. Robert L. Jones - 5thMarDiv.
 2dLt. Cyril P. Zurlinden - VAC.
 TSgt. Richard A. Tenelly - 4thMarDiv.

Wounded in Action (Cont'd)

TSgt. H. Neil Gillespie - 4thMarDiv.
TSgt. George B. Kress - 4thMarDiv.
StfSgt. Franklin O. Cooke - 4thMarDiv.
StfSgt. Joseph P. Franklin - 3rdMarDiv.
StfSgt. James F. Galloway - 3rdMarDiv.
StfSgt. Lou Lowry - Leatherneck.
Sgt. Roy E. Heinecke - VAC.
Sgt. David G. Christian - 5thMarDiv.
Sgt. Louis R. Burmeister - 5thMarDiv.
Sgt. James O. Burns - 5thMarDiv.
Corp. George Gauthier, Jr. - 5thMarDiv.
Corp. Walter G. Page - 3rdMarDiv.
Corp. Merle L. Horton - 5thMarDiv.
PFC. Allen L. Farnum - 5thMarDiv.
Keith Wheeler - Chicago Times.

23. Upon orders from The Commandant, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, Captain Raymond Henri, Public Relations Officer for the Third Marine Division, and Second Lieutenant James Lucas, Assistant Public Relations Officer for the Fourth Marine Division, were ordered to Washington, D.C., for duty with the Division of Public Relations, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps. They left Iwo Jima by plane on 17 and 16 March respectively.

24. Staff Sergeant Alvin M. Josephy, Jr., Combat Correspondent with the 21st Marines, Third Marine Division, was ordered to Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, for duty on orders from Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, dated 14 March.

25. Technical Sergeant William K. Beech of the Fifth Marine Division Public Relations Section was ordered to Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps for duty on 19 March.

C. CONCLUSIONS

1. Considering the nature of the battle during its initial stages, which hindered not only the collection of press material ashore but the transmission of it to the ELDORADO and to Guam and Pearl Harbor, the Public Relations Sections of Corps and the Fourth, Fifth and Third Divisions accomplished the tasks set forth in the general plan exceptionally well.

2. Although Corps was not in a position to quarter and mess civilian correspondents during the first week of the operation, the public relations sections handled the civilian press with no complaint.

3. Transportation of civilian correspondents, usually a problem, was easily taken care of on this operation due to the size of the island and by availability of transportation by the Corps Motor Transport Section.

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4. Although enemy fire was not expected to continue on the landing beaches for three days, it is the opinion of the undersigned that it was a waste of effort and personnel to send the Assistant Corps PRO and one enlisted man ashore on D-Day, as Division PRO's and combat correspondents are in a better position to make their arrangements for transmission of copy during the initial stages of the battle.


D. RECOMMENDATIONS

1. It is recommended that the Division public relations officers be responsible for collection and transmission of press material from the shore until Corps is prepared to assume this responsibility.

2. It is evident that, should Corps be expected to continue to set up an advance press headquarters ashore, Corps should be permitted to select its own location. On this operation, the ComPhibsPac PRO selected Yellow Beach One as the location, and this beach turned out to be under heaviest enemy fire.

D. W. POLIVKA

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HEADQUARTERS
V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS LANDING FORCE

- IWO JIMA -

Report
By
Commanding Officer Corps Troops

2nd copy
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DECLASSIFICATION OF WWII RECORDS. NOV 9 '78 *cn*

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Annex DOG

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HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS, C/O FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO

4 May 1945.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1st Endorsement
CO Corps Troops VACLF
ltr 2295-80-10 over
AAG/sdr dtd 7Apr45,
Special Action Report
IWO JIMA Campaign.

From: The Commanding General.
To : The Commandant, U. S. Marine Corps.
Via : Operational Chain of Command.
Subject: Special Action Report, IWO JIMA Campaign.

1. This Headquarters is aware of the anomolous position of the CO, Corps Troops. His position is similar to that of a Camp Commander. That is, he is responsible for housekeeping, general supply, and for local security in action. The recommendation that operational control of such diverse units as signal, medical, tractor, engineer, shore party, and the many other specialist elements attached to a Corps in action be placed under a Corps Troops Commander is definitely disapproved. Much of the confusion covered so fully in this report was due to the enforced separation of the CO, Corps Troops from the Command Post during the planning stage and during the voyage to the objective.

2. Steps will be taken prior to the next operation to make provision in advance for the personnel requirements of the Corps Troops Quartermaster.

W. W. ROGERS,
By direction.

Copies to: Distribution List.

2295-80-10
AAG/jgb

CORPS TROOPS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS LANDING FORCE,
IN THE FIELD.

CO [REDACTED] [REDACTED]:

12 April, 1945.

From: The Commanding Officer.
To : The Commanding General, V Amphibious Corps
Landing Force.

Subject: Action Report, IWO JIMA Campaign.

References: (a) FMF Pac GO 66-44 dtd 27Dec44.
(b) Pac Flt Conf ltr CL-45 dtd 1Jan45.
(c) VACLF SO 2-45 dtd 26Jan45.
(d) VACLF Staff Memo 5-45 dtd 10Mar45.
(e) Corps Memorandum No. 1-45 dtd 1Jan45.

Enclosures: (A) Action Report, H&SBn, CorHqTrps, VAC, IWO JIMA Campaign.
(B) Action Report, Corps Troops QM, IWO JIMA Campaign.

PART I

1. In accordance with verbal instructions from the Chief of Staff, V Amphibious Corps Landing Force, amplifying reference (d), the activities of all elements of Corps Troops that were placed under operational control of the Commanding General, V Amphibious Corps Landing Force, are omitted from this report. In view of this there remains only the activities of Headquarters and Service Battalion, V Amphibious Corps (less detachments), and the Corps Troops Quartermaster, V Amphibious Corps Landing Force, to be covered. The reports of these two elements are herewith forwarded as enclosures (A) and (B).

2. This Report of the participation of Corps Troops in the IWO JIMA operation covers the period 26 November, 1944 to 0800, 26 March, 1945. The earlier date is taken as the beginning of the period in view of the fact that it is the date on which Operation Plan Number 3-44 (Tentative) was received by the Commanding Officer, Corps Troops, and was the first official information received by him of a contemplated operation and that he would command a task unit in that operation.

PART II

1. Operation Plan Number 3-44 (Preferred Plan), dated 23 December, 1944, did not assign a task, as such, to Corps Troops. Paragraph three (3) of that Plan did not mention Corps Troops - however, ANNEX ITEM to that Plan did place certain elements of Corps Troops under the operational control of the Commanding General, V Amphibious Corps Landing Force, through various general and special staff sections of that headquarters, and assigned certain operational tasks to some of those elements.

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Subject: Action Report IWO JIMA Campaign (Continued)

2. Corps Troops, as a Task Unit, consisted of the following elements and the next higher operational command was Commanding General, V Amphibious Corps Landing Force:

Corps Troops

- H&SBn, VAC (less dets)
- * MedBn, VAC.
- * MT Co, VAC.
- *Prov Sig Group.
 - Land For Hq Sig O Sec.
 - SigBn, VAC (less dets).
 - Shore Party Com Unit.
 - Det Sig Co, 8th Field Depot.
 - Det 1st Sep R.I. Plat.
 - Det Sig Hq Co., AWS, VII Fighter Command.
 - Det 568th SAW Bn.
 - Det 726th SAW Co.
 - Det 49th SigConstBn.
 - Det 44 - 70th AACs (less dets).
 - Det Com Unit 434 (Gro Pac 11).
- * Lan For Air Spt Contl Unit.
- * Hq Prov LVT Gp.
- * 2d Sep Engr. Bn (less dets).
- * 62nd NC Bn (3d Plat, 2d Bomb Disposal Co. attached).
- * Co's, A & B, 23rd NC Bn Spl.
- * 8th Field Depot (less dets, plus Hq Shore Party).
- * Corps Evac. Hosp # 1.
- * 2d Bomb Disposal Co (less 3d Plat) (156th Bomb Disposal Squad Attached).
- * Co B, Amph Recon Bn.
- * 38th Field Hosp. (Reinf).
- * Med Sec Civil Affairs.
- * JICPOA Int Team.
- * JICPOA Enemy Materiel and Salvage Plat.

Note: * Indicates elements under operational control of Commanding General, V Amphibious Corps Landing Force, through various general and special staff sections.

3. In view of the fact that Corps Troops as a Task Unit had no special missions assigned and was composed entirely of specialist elements, it was assumed that the various elements would support the operation by carrying out functions in their specialty fields.

4. The troops of this Task Unit were embarked aboard various APA's, AKA's, and LST's - and orders specified that they would be landed on order from Commanding General, V Amphibious Corps Landing Force.

Subject: Action Report IWO JIMA Campaign (Continued).

PART III

1. Headquarters of Corps Troops along with other personnel of Headquarters and Service Battalion, V Amphibious Corps, Company "A", V Amphibious Corps Medical Battalion, and a portion of Corps Motor Transport Company were loaded aboard the USS BARROW (APA 61), and were present for the rehearsal in the Hawaiian Area. The personnel of the Headquarters and Service Battalion, V Amphibious Corps, included in part much of the personnel of the general and special staff sections of V Amphibious Corps Landing Force Headquarters. None of the personnel in the BARROW took part in this rehearsal. A signal was received to land the Advance Echelon of Landing Force Headquarters during the rehearsal. The Commanding Officer, Corps Troops, not having been on the distribution list for reference (e), and having heard nothing of its contents, was not able to comply with the signal.

2. After the rehearsal in the Hawaiian Area and while in Pearl Harbor for a short period before sailing for the combat area, a Detachment from the 362nd Ordnance Maintenance Company (Anti-Aircraft) Ordnance, was loaded aboard the BARROW. Also while in Pearl Harbor men engaged in organized athletics and recreation at the various fields in the vicinity. Athletics and recreation were handled in an excellent manner.

3. The Tinian rehearsal, for the troops embarked in the BARROW, consisted in debarking into boats and reembarking. Although the sea was very rough this was accomplished most satisfactorily, due, to a great extent, to excellent ship-handling on the part of the Captain of the BARROW.

4. Upon arrival at Target the BARROW moved to her assigned position in the Transport Area. Previously designated personnel of the Corps staff sections were transferred immediately to the Command ship. Vehicle drivers were transferred to ships upon which Motor Transport Company and Medical Battalion vehicles had been loaded. The ship then lay-to awaiting instructions relative to debarking troops and unloading cargo in accordance with reference (e) and previous instructions relative to transfer of personnel to the Corps Command Ship.

5. On D-plus-2, having received no information in reference to debarking any of Corps Troops, the Commanding Officer, Corps Troops, sent a dispatch to the Commanding General, V Amphibious Corps Landing Force, requesting that he be made an information addressee on all communications ordering Corps Troops to debark. However, he received no information in this manner, or in fact any other manner, relative to Corps Troops being ordered to debark.

6. The first instructions, relative to debarking and unloading was dispatch 221757 of February directing that the Advanced Echelon, Corps Command Post, be boated beginning 0800 February 23 (D-plus-4) and directed to report to a certain Control Vessel for further orders in reference to landing.

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Subject: Action Report IWO JIMA Campaign (Continued).

Debarkation of these troops was not effected until 1200 February 23 owing to the BARROW having withdrawn from the transport area for the night and not returning in time to debark the troops earlier. Personnel of the C-2 Section aboard the BARROW were also debarked at this time in accordance with orders. Following this, observation personnel of the Intelligence Section, V Amphibious Corps Landing Force Headquarters, were debarked at 1300, same date, in accordance with a dispatch.

7. It was expected that the next troops to be debarked would be the Command Echelon of V Amphibious Corps Landing Force Command Post, as outlined in reference (c). However, the next orders in reference to debarking were received in a dispatch from CTF 53 at 1600 February 25 (D-plus-6) directing the BARROW "Unload your ship completely." Accordingly, the Commanding Officer, Corps Troops, with all troops remaining aboard the BARROW except his Command Post personnel, Headquarters and Service Battalion Command Post personnel, Corps Motor Transport Company, and the Ship's Platoon debarked, clearing the ship at 1700. Upon arrival on the beach and reporting to the Chief of Staff, V Amphibious Corps Landing Force, by phone at 1830, the Chief of Staff asked the Commanding Officer, Corps Troops, who had ordered him to land, and was informed of the orders from CTF 53. Unloading of the BARROW continued throughout the night, and was completed without any incident of importance. Corps Troops Command Post and Headquarters and Service Battalion Command Post were established ashore and continued to function there throughout the operation.

8. After arriving ashore an investigation of the status of unloading for the various Corps Troops units disclosed that a big majority of most of the elements were already ashore. This was naturally quite a surprise to the Commanding Officer, Corps Troops.

9. It was immediately learned that there was some confusion in connection with units of Corps Troops who were ashore not submitting daily periodic and unit reports in accordance with V Amphibious Corps Landing Force General Order Number 1-44, dated 8 November, 1944. The Chief of Staff had directed the Commanding Officer, Corps Troops, to have these reports submitted by the various elements of Corps Troops through the respective staff sections under whose operational control they had been placed and not through Headquarters Corps Troops, and the Commanding Officer, Corps Troops, had given explicit instructions in writing to that effect. However, Units of Corps Troops which had landed ahead of Corps Troops Headquarters had apparently neglected to submit the required reports and the various staff sections had not checked up on these units. This matter was however, soon straightened out, and it is believed that reports were thereafter promptly rendered.

10. During the earlier days of the campaign the areas occupied by the Landing Force Command Post, Corps Troops Command Post, Headquarters and Service Battalion, V Amphibious Corps, Signal Battalion, V Amphibious Corps,

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Subject: Action Report IWO JIMA Campaign (Continued).

and Corps Motor Transport Company were subjected to considerable shelling by the enemy. Details of this shelling and casualties resulting therefrom are covered in the various unit action reports.

11. On 17 March, 1945, when the last of the 5th Division was withdrawn from the Mt. SURIBACHI area, the Second Platoon, Company "B" of Battalion Landing Team 1/9 was placed under the control of the Commanding Officer, Corps Troops, for the purpose of patrolling, mopping up, and outposting the Mt. SURIBACHI area south of the area occupied by the Island Command and the Corps Prisoner of War Stockade. This platoon, under the command of Lieutenant MERTINS, did an excellent job. It was reverted to control of the Division on 23 March, 1945, when that organization was assigned control of the area preparatory to Corps Troops reembarking for the rehabilitation area.

PART IV

Nothing to report.

PART V

Nothing to report.

PARTS VI & VII

1. Action Reports of units making up Corps Troops will cover troops, cargo, landing craft, landing of troops and cargo, casualties, and personnel performance.

PART VIII

1. The Commanding Officer, Corps Troops, V Amphibious Corps Landing Force, was located on MAUI as Commanding Officer, Corps Headquarters Troops, V Amphibious Corps, from the time of his return from GUAM until embarkation for the IWO JIMA operation. Corps Headquarters Troops that were located on MAUI and which became part of Corps Troops, V Amphibious Corps Landing Force, consisted of Headquarters and Service Battalion, V Amphibious Corps (less detachments), Signal Battalion, V Amphibious Corps (less detachments), Corps Motor Transport Company, V Amphibious Corps, and Company "A", Medical Battalion, V Amphibious Corps. The 62nd Naval Construction Battalion was transferred to MAUI from PEARL HARBOR and reported to the Commanding Officer, Corps Headquarters Troops, V Amphibious Corps. The Commanding Officer stated that he understood his battalion was being attached to the V Amphibious Corps for a coming operation. Following this, dispatch 052248 of November, 1944, from Commanding General, V Amphibious Corps, to Commanding General, 4th Marine Division, with Commanding Officer, Corps Headquarters Troops, as an information addressee, designated Colonel A. A. Gladden, Commanding Officer of all Corps Troops then or subsequently located on MAUI. Later the Third Platoon, Second Bomb Disposal Company, reported for duty with the 62nd Naval Construction Battalion.

Subject: Action Report IWO JIMA Campaign (Continued).

2. Not until about November 25, 1944, did the assigned Commanding Officer, Corps Troops, V Amphibious Corps Landing Force, know that it was even contemplated that he would have that assignment, what troops might constitute Corps Troops, V Amphibious Corps Landing Force, or what the proposed target was. At this time the so designated Commanding Officer, Corps Troops, V Amphibious Corps Landing Force, was advised that all elements constituting Corps Troops, V Amphibious Corps Landing Force, except Headquarters and Service Battalion, V Amphibious Corps, would be under the operational control of the various general and special staff sections of Headquarters, V Amphibious Corps Landing Force.

3. From the time that the Commanding Officer, Corps Troops, V Amphibious Corps Landing Force, received information of his assignment as such until the conclusion of the IWO JIMA operation, none of the Commanding Officers of the units constituting Corps Troops, V Amphibious Corps Landing Force, had reported to the Commanding Officer, Corps Troops, for duty or for any other purpose, except those units mentioned in paragraph one (1) above, which units were located on MAUI.

4. This condition made control of most of the units, constituting Corps Troops, V Amphibious Corps Landing Force, by their Task Unit Commander, practically out of the question. The situation was brought to the attention of the Chief of Staff. The Task Unit Commander endeavored to maintain contact with those units, for the purpose of administration and dissemination of information, through the various staff sections under whose operational control they were functioning.

5. The Chief of Staff apparently realizing the difficulty of maintaining administrative control over those units of Corps Troops under the existing set-up, directed that all units constituting Corps Troops would render Periodic Reports direct to the staff sections and not through Corps Troops Headquarters. This was apparently not clear in the minds of the staff sections and resulted in some confusion during the early days of the operation, but the situation was soon cleared up.

6. As for the tasks of the various elements constituting Corps Troops, the Commanding Officer of Corps Troops knew of them only in general terms. Of course with those elements not under the operational control of their Task Unit Commander, he had no responsibility in connection with insuring that those tasks were accomplished - however, it is felt that a Task Unit Commander should be responsible for the accomplishment of his subordinate element's tasks, and should have the necessary control over them to insure the accomplishment of their tasks.

7. Although the Tables of Organization for an Amphibious Corps provide for an organization "Corps Troops", and communications have been addressed to Commanding Officer, Corps Troops, V Amphibious Corps, there has been no officer designated to command that organization. However, a Commanding Officer, Corps Headquarters Troops, V Amphibious Corps, has been designated, although the organization "Corps Headquarters Troops" is not provided for in

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Subject:

Action Report IWO JIMA Campaign (Continued).

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the Tables of Organization of an Amphibious Corps. Instances have arisen where action was necessary on instructions addressed to Commanding Officer, Corps Troops, V Amphibious Corps, and delivered to the Commanding Officer, Corps Headquarters Troops, V Amphibious Corps. In such cases the Commanding Officer, Corps Headquarters Troops, V Amphibious Corps, has taken the necessary action, in order that the instructions would be complied with, although fully realizing that he definitely had no authority to do so.

8. In view of the above, and in order to eliminate the evident confusion in regard to chain of command which now exists among the staff personnel and Commanding Officers of the various units which comprise "Corps Troops" or "Corps Headquarters Troops" and with the end in view of a more efficient functioning of troops which are attached to an Amphibious Corps or Amphibious Corps Landing Force as in the IWO JIMA operation as "Corps Troops" or "Corps Headquarters Troops", the following recommendations are submitted:

- (a) A Commanding Officer, Corps Troops, be designated and be given full administrative and operational control over all troops comprising his organization.
- (b) An adequate staff be provided to maintain full control of units attached.
- (c) Instructions be issued which would clarify the relation of members of the staff sections to units of Corps Troops - setting forth the fact that the relation is identical to the relation between staff section personnel and units of a division.
- (d) The Commanding Officer, Corps Troops, be present at meetings in connection with planning an operation.

Advantages of the above changes, as seen, are:

- (a) Administrative and operational control would be centralized in one office.
- (b) Responsibility for dissemination of all information in reference to training, planning, missions, supply, and evacuation would rest in one office, and unit commanders would know on whom to call for answers to the many questions that arise.
- (c) The Task Unit Commander would have a clear picture of the tasks of his various units, and it would be his responsibility that those tasks were accomplished instead of the responsibility of the various staff sections.
- (d) Members of the various staff sections would be relieved of many duties that of necessity take them from headquarters much of the time.
- (e) Reports of the various elements comprising Corps Troops would be collected, consolidated, and summarized by one office.

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A. A. GLADDEN

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HEADQUARTERS & SERVICE BATTALION
CORPS HEADQUARTERS TROOPS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
IN THE FIELD.

2 April, 1945.

From: The Commanding Officer,
To : The Commanding Officer, Corps Headquarters Troops,
V Amphibious Corps.

Subject: Special Action Report, IWO JIMA Campaign.

1. DESIGNATION AND COMPOSITION OF THE UNIT:

(a) This report covers the action of the Headquarters and Service Battalion, Corps Headquarters Troops, V Amphibious Corps, on the IWO JIMA Campaign.

(b) The unit composition was as follows:

	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>
Headquarters Company.....	139	353
Service Company.....	4	115
Military Police Company.....	6	147
Total:	149	615
Aggregate:.....	764	

2. PLANS AND PREPARATION PRIOR TO OPERATION:

(a) Preparation for the operation of this command consisted of furnishing personnel for the Special and General Staff Sections of the V Amphibious Corps Headquarters, and taking sufficient service and military police personnel to adequately service and protect the Corps Command Post ashore, together with the amount and types of supplies needed to care for this battalion and attached Corps units.

(b) Troop units of this command participated in the rear and forward area rehearsal for the IWO JIMA Operation.

(c) In planning supplies to be carried, a report on the SAIPAN - TINIAN Operation was taken into consideration. Allowances were made for supplying additional units in all class one (1) supplies. Additional "C" and "K" rations were carried for POW and civilians under care of the Civil Affairs Section.

(d) All troops were given additional training on weapons, camouflage, chemical warfare, security at night, first aid, and field sanitation, as well as training for their specific duties assigned.

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Subject: Special Action Report, IWO JIMA Campaign (Continued).

3. ACTIVITIES DURING OPERATION:

(a) The commanding officer landed on Green Beach One, on Dog plus six day, to establish a command post ashore. This echelon included personnel of the medical section, quartermaster section, mess section, Corps Headquarters Troops, and battalion office personnel. The Military Police Company landed on the afternoon of Dog plus four day, and assisted materially in helping to clean up the Corps Command Post area and establishing security. The Headquarters and Service Battalion began to function at 0900 on Dog plus seven day.

(b) All elements of this command were ashore on Dog plus ten day. Members of this command erected and put into operation a screened galley on Dog plus twelve day. Sanitary heads and showers were installed for all personnel. The battalion sick bay and chapel were set up near the battalion command post.

(c) The Military Police Company carried out its mission as assigned in establishing security for the Corps Command Post, and in addition manned the prisoner of war stockade, controlled traffic on number one air strip, manned a defense area on the southwest beach as assigned by the Headquarters Commandant, investigated promiscuous firing of weapons, and mopped up enemy that had infiltrated into and near the Corps Headquarters and attached units area.

(d) One enlisted man, temporarily attached from the Corps Signal Battalion was KIA. Eight officers and nine enlisted were WIA. Of these, one officer and four enlisted were evacuated, the others returned to duty.

(e) Six prisoners of war were captured by personnel of this organization, and ten enemy killed.

4. RECOMMENDATIONS:

(a) In order that the control of equipment and supplies may be under the responsible officer, it is recommended that the battalion quartermaster be included on future operations.

(b) Again on this operation, the galley was equipped with 1937 model field ranges with a No. 84 burner converted for oil. Although white unleaded gasoline was used, the burners did not function satisfactorily. One unit blew up and three burners out of ten were nonserviceable at the end of twenty days of operation. It is therefore recommended that a never improved model range now available be supplied.

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"A-2"

Subject: Special Action Report, IWO JIMA Campaign (Continued).

(c) Personnel of the Military Police Company at the beginning of the operation was sufficient. As men were required for various duties which called for a platoon or squad, the personnel proved insufficient. It is therefore recommended that the Military Police Company be increased by sixteen (16) Privates or Privates First Class to handle equipment recommended in subparagraph (d) and (e).

(d) Due to the effective infiltration by the enemy, it is recommended that four light machine guns and illumination trip flares be provided the Military Police Company for protection of the Corps Command Post. Light machine guns would also be most valuable for the security of the POW stockade.

(e) The necessity of radio communication on this operation was more apparent than on the SAIPAN -- TINIAN operation. Outposts were established and patrols sent out with only messenger communications. This does not permit adequate control over personnel nor does it allow the Military Police Company to function at its maximum. It is therefore recommended that the Military Police Company be furnished one (1) SCR 608, truck, 1/4 ton, 4x4, mount, and six (6) SCR 610.

/s/ Cyril M. Milbrath
CYRIL M. MILBRATH



OFFICE OF THE QUARTERMASTER
CORPS TROOPS LANDING FORCE, VAC.

11 April, 1945.

From: Quartermaster.
To : Commanding Officer, Corps Troops Landing Force, VAC.
Subject: Special Action Report, IWO JIMA Campaign.
Enclosure: (A) Statement of Water and Rations issued during IWO JIMA Campaign.

PERIOD OF PREPARATION

1. In the months of preparation prior to this operation, the supply officer or commanding officer, (or both) of all units known to be attached to Corps Troops Landing Force, VAC, or that would later be attached to Corps Troops Landing Force, VAC, were contacted by this office. They were checked to make sure they were taking the supplies required by the Administrative Order and in the proper amounts, and that they understood their source of supply and supply procedure while on the target. Since units of the Marine Corps, Navy, Army and Air Force were involved, this was essential, and did much to reduce the confusion of previous operations in this respect. In addition, all assistance possible was given them by this office in securing the supplies and equipment required.

2. Since the personnel allowed this office by the present Table of Organization (three enlisted men) was manifestly inadequate to perform the functions assigned it, arrangements were made to borrow necessary personnel from the quartermaster and maintenance sections of the H&S Bn, VAC, and these were trained to carry out the duties of this office.

3. The Supply Service, FMF, directed the Sixth Base Depot to turn over to this office sixteen distillators (1500 gals. capacity) to be delivered to the Second Separate Engineer Battalion on the target. This was done.

4. Supplies and equipment called for in directives, or indicated by previous experience, were secured and crated, boxed, palletized, and otherwise made ready for shipment. This work also required the assistance of personnel borrowed from the H&S Bn, VAC.

PERIOD OF OPERATION ON TARGET

1. The Quartermaster Corps Troops Landing Force, VAC, went ashore on D-plus-4 with two assistants, the remainder of the quartermaster and maintenance sections landing on D-plus-6.

"B-1"

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Subject: Special Action Report, IWO JIMA Campaign (Continued).

2. Water, Fuel, Ration, Salvage and General Supply Dumps were set up immediately upon arrival ashore. A report on rations and water issued is shown in Enclosure (A). In addition to this, a total of 697 separate issues were made by the Quartermaster Corps Troops Landing Force, including clothing, 782 equipment, tentage and various other property items of general supply.

3. In addition to issues made to units of Corps Troops Landing Force, VAC, the Quartermaster Corps Troops Landing Force issued supplies such as blankets, clothing, cleaning gear, 782 equipment, galley gear and accessories, disinfectants, tentage, etc., where the need was obvious and no other source available, to the following listed units of the Army and Navy:

U. S. ARMY

1st Field Service Command
1st Prov. Field Arty. Group
726th Signal Air Warning Bn.
386th Service Group.
604th Graves Registration.
Island Command Headquarters.
41st Station Hospital.
442nd Port Company.
726th Signal Air Warning Co.
473rd Air Transport Command.

U. S. NAVY

USS BARROW (APA-61)
CASU "F" 52
USS L.S.M. - (60)
Joint Army and Navy
Communications Center.
133rd Naval Construction
Battalion.
8th Naval Construction
Battalion.
301st Naval Construction
Battalion.

Various Organizations of the Third, Fourth and Fifth Marine Divisions were also issued whatever supplies were available whenever a request was made by them.

4. The Quartermaster Corps Troops Landing Force, compiled all C-4 Periodic Reports received from the various units attached to the Corps Troops Landing Force, and submitted these daily to the C-4 Section.

5. A daily report of the total amount of water on hand, the total received from the different water points, the total issued to the Corps Troops and Garrison Forces, the total issued to the Hospitals, was submitted daily to the Corps Engineer Section.

6. A large and varied amount of construction and maintenance work was performed for Corps Headquarters and various units, such as building heads, showers, shelters, galleys and various installations, and ranging from bulldozer work to typewriter repair. Staff Sections, Galleys, Dispensaries and other offices were electrified.

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"B-2"

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Subject: Special Action Report, IWO JIMA Campaign (Continued).

7. Five trained and qualified water distillation and purification operators were furnished to the Second Separate Engineer Battalion from the day the distillation units were set up until the island was secured.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The Quartermaster Corps Troops is of little value unless he is an operating quartermaster. During an operation his responsibility embraces in some degree a total of fifteen to twenty thousand officers and men. His task is further complicated by the fact that the organizations are from all branches of the service, many of them attached for the operation only, and unacquainted with Marine Corps supply procedure. Although each organization is in theory self-sufficient, experience has shown that this is far from true in actual practice.

2. The Quartermaster Corps Troops Landing Force is charged with the responsibility of establishing ration, water, fuel and salvage dumps for Corps Troops and attached units, in addition to his other duties. Since the present T/O provides a total of but three enlisted men, the Quartermaster Corps Troops Landing Force is of necessity dependent on borrowing personnel from some organization over which he has no control, in the instance of the Iwo Jima operation, the H&S Bn, VAC. This personnel did not come under his control until they went ashore on Iwo Jima.

3. It is therefore recommended that the Quartermaster Corps Troops be assigned additional duty as Commanding Officer Service Company, VAC, or Commanding Officer Service Battalion, VAC, whichever seems advisable, responsible directly to Commanding Officer, Corps Troops. This would do away with any division of authority, would permit him to train his organization to function properly on an operation, and give him control of his supplies and equipment from the time they are assembled at the base until they are issued or used on the Target.

4. If this recommendation is favorably considered a suggested T/O will be submitted whenever requested.

* * * * *

5. It is suggested that although the distillators delivered to 2nd Separate Engineer Battalion by the Quartermaster Corps Troops on the Target have a rated capacity of 1500 gallons per 24 hours, a capacity figure of 1000 gallons should be used to provide a margin of safety. It is further recommended that minimum storage facilities of 15,000 gallons of water be provided to allow for unavoidable shut-downs.

* * * * *

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"B-3"

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Subject: Special Action Report, IWO JIMA Campaign (Continued).

6. It is essential that the Quartermaster Corps Troops be kept advised of organizations added to Corps Troops for an operation. He should be on the distribution lists that will give him this information. He should also be advised when organizations are attached to Corps Troops during an operation.

7. It appears equally essential that the Quartermaster Corps Troops Landing Force be advised of the plans of the Island Commander as regards supplies, and that he be in contact with the Quartermaster of Garrison Forces in advance of the operation.

* * * * *

8. The greater part of the dunnage used on the Barrow was carried away by that ship because the Captain refused to take the time to discharge it, possibly because of orders from higher authority. This not only caused a hardship on the Target where lumber was at a premium, but also created a dunnage problem when the time of withdrawal of equipment and vehicles arrived.

9. Since lumber is sometimes as important as equipment, it is recommended that greater consideration be given to the matter of discharging dunnage on the Target.

/s/ Max D. Gilfillan,
MAX D. GILFILLAN.

ENCLOSURE: (A) Statement of Water and Rations issued on the IWO JIMA Campaign.

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<u>TYPE OF RATION</u> <u>ISSUED</u>	<u>ISSUED TO</u> <u>U.S. ARMY</u>	<u>ISSUED TO</u> <u>CORPS TROOPS</u>
"B" Rations (semi-complete)	26,042	45,901
"C" Rations	60,056	38,576
"K" Rations	81,240	20,460
"10 in 1" Rations	5,820	11,750
TOTAL	173,158	116,687
GRAND TOTAL		289,845
"PX" Rations	17,600	30,600
GRAND TOTAL		48,200

Largest issue in one day: 17 March, 1945 -- 22,563 Rations.

The above does not include the following rations turned over to the Army Garrison Force upon our departure:

<u>TYPE OF RATION</u>	<u>AMOUNT</u>
"C" Rations	4,952
"D" Rations	5,042
"K" Rations	28,008
"B" Rations (semi-complete)	
Flour, 50 lb., bags.	43
Soup, yellow pea, case.	32
Apples, case.	66
Mustard, ground, case.	7
Cereal, wheat, case.	5
Hash, meat & veg., case.	5
Soup, pea, mix., case.	38


Water received from:

Gallons

2nd Separate Engineer Battalion.	177,587
62nd Naval Construction Battalion.	4,080
133rd Naval Construction Battalion.	12,860
Third Marine Division.	1,925
Water from Ships.	23,311
TOTAL	219,763

Water issued to Army Garrison Force.	50,017
Water issued to Corps Troops.	169,746
TOTAL	219,763

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HEADQUARTERS A.G. No. 01863
V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS LANDING FORCE

-IWO JIMA-

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Division Reports

- Appendix 1 - CG 3d Mar Div Report
- Appendix 2 - CG 4th Mar Div Report
- Appendix 3 - CG 5th Mar Div Report

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Division Reports

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Annex EASY to Special Action Report IWO JIMA Campaign.

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HEADQUARTERS
V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS LANDING FORCE

- IWO JIMA -

Landing Force Air Support Control
Unit Report

Annex FOX

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A4:VEM-ert

HEADQUARTERS,
LANDING FORCE AIR SUPPORT CONTROL UNIT ONE,
PROVISIONAL AIR SUPPORT COMMAND FMF
IN THE FIELD.

17 March, 1945.

SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN

HEADQUARTERS,
LANDING FORCE AIR SUPPORT CONTROL UNIT ONE,
PROVISIONAL AIR SUPPORT COMMAND, FMF,
IN THE FIELD.

17 March, 1945.

~~SECRET~~

From: Commander, Landing Force Air Support Control Unit One.
To : The Commanding General, Fifth Amphibious Corps.
Subj: Special Action Report, IWO JIMA Campaign.
Ref : (a) VAC Staff Memo 5-45, dtd 10Mar45.
Encl: (A) Summary of Air Operations with carrier aircraft,
1 March to 9 March, 1945.
(B) Summary of Air Operations with Army aircraft,
8 March to 14 March inclusive.

1. NARRATIVE SUMMARY:

- (A) Landing Force Air Support Control Unit One, consisting of 17 officers and 56 enlisted men, reported to Commanding General, Landing Force, Fifth Amphibious Corps, on 4 January 1945, and to Commander Air Support Control Units, Amphibious Forces, Pacific Fleet, on 10 January 1945, for employment in the IWO JIMA operation. Three officers of this command were then temporarily assigned to the U.S.S. ESTES for duty with Advance Commander, Air Support Control Unit; two were temporarily assigned to the U.S.S. AUBURN for duty with Relief Commander, Air Support Control Unit; four officers and forty-eight men were assigned with the principal equipment to the U.S.S. THURSTON, and seven men and the secondary equipment to the U.S.S. CARTERET, for transportation to the objective. The Unit Commander, nine officers and one enlisted man flew to SAIPAN and rejoined the organization there for transportation to the objective. The Unit Commander was then embarked on the U.S.S. AUBURN with Commanding General, Landing Force, and his staff.
- (B) Commander, Landing Force Air Support Control Unit One, and a nucleus of his staff, landed on IWO JIMA with Commanding General, Landing Force, on 24 February (D/5). Due to unavoidable delays in unloading, fostered by the critical tactical situation ashore, the unit equipment did not reach the beach until 27 February (D/8). Emplacement of equipment and testing of circuits was completed within 24 hours, and Landing Force Air Support Control Unit One then monitored the circuits during 28 February while air support operations were being controlled from the U.S.S. ELDORADO, and later from the U.S.S. AUBURN. Commanding General, Landing Force, submitted an official

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request that date for the control of air support missions to be shifted ashore at 0700, 1 March, which request was approved by Commander Joint Expeditionary Force. Due, however, to a temporary power failure, Landing Force Air Support Control Unit One was unable to assume full control until approximately 1000, 1 March.

- (C) This Unit exercised operational control of all close air support missions until 11 March 1945, when carrier support was withdrawn, and at which time the equipment and personnel, less the commanding officer and a small detachment, were secured for reshipment to SAIPAN for further scheduled operations. The remaining detachment, with radio jeeps borrowed from other Corps units, continued to exercise control of air strikes flown by Army VF Squadrons until all air support was secured at 1200, 15 March. Detailed operational summaries are given in the enclosures.
- (D) In addition to normal duties of air support control, Commander, Landing Force Air Support Control Unit One served as Deputy Commander, Landing Force Aircraft, and Deputy Air Defense Commander. As such, he exercised operational control of all shore-based air units, transient aircraft, and IWO FIELD Number One, until the arrival of the designated Air Defense Commander, Brigadier General E. Moore, U.S.A., who assumed his functions at noon, 7 March. These additional duties required much personal attention, the diversion of three operational officers, a communications detail, and the secondary control equipment from the Landing Force Air Support Control Unit for a period of ten days. To this extent the normal operation of Landing Force Air Support Control Unit One was somewhat hampered. It is recommended that future planning provide for an Air Base Commander with sufficient personnel and equipment to handle air traffic as soon as the first field becomes available, and that the Landing Force Aircraft Commander arrive with Commanding General, Landing Force, to assume full responsibility for his shore-based air units.

2. PERSONNEL:

- (A) The morale and efficiency of the officers and men remained high throughout the operation, despite adverse living conditions and frequent night shelling by enemy artillery. No casualties were incurred, no cases of sickness reported, and no punishments recorded. Four officers and one enlisted man have been recommended for award of the Bronze Star for "Meritorious Achievement in Combat". Eight enlisted men have been recommended for immediate advancement to higher grades as a reward for outstanding performance of duty under combat conditions.

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- (B) The number of officers and enlisted men (17 and 57 respectively), tentatively assigned to a landing force air support control unit has proven insufficient for sustained operation in the field. Steps are being taken to increase this number to approximately 22 officers and 80 enlisted men. More adequate messing facilities can then be provided, provision made for better internal security, and for the immediate replacement of casualties. The five additional officers requested are necessary to provide reliefs for SAR, SAD, and SAO net controllers, who during this operation were required to operate an average of 12 hours daily for twelve consecutive days.

3. EQUIPMENT:

- (A) The principal equipment of this unit consists of modified Mark IV, U.S. Navy Communication Vans, with control remoted to a special operations room (tent). The arrangement of the control tables and the relative positions of the net controllers follows generally the layout in the Joint Operations Room of the AGC's, except that it is more commodious. All air support control nets, as listed in the communication annex of the Operations Plan, were manned continuously by officers during daylight; the ASC, LAW, and SAR nets were manned at night also, as required.
- (B) Except for the initial power failure, and minor interruptions on one net or another due largely to volcanic dust sifting into the receivers, the equipment functioned in a highly satisfactory manner. Occasional difficulty in communicating with ALO's on the SAR net was experienced, but was usually traceable to imperfections in the ALO's field equipment or to the location of their sets in rugged, defiladed terrain. In such instances communication was effected by relay from other stations on the net with but slight delay. The basic equipment as designed and assembled is considered to have passed its service test under most difficult conditions. No change is recommended at present.
- (C) The secondary equipment, mounted in three radio jeeps, proved very useful in controlling special strikes from advanced observation posts, and for directing air traffic at the airdrome. Its retention for this purpose is recommended. However, it would not be possible to control full scale air operations with such equipment, and it should not be depended upon for this purpose. A complete duplicate set of Mark IV Vans, modified, is recommended for each landing force air support control unit, as being absolutely essential for sustained operations in the field. Such a duplicate set has already been provided for Landing Force Air Support Control Unit One, and steps are being taken to so equip all other units for future operations.

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- (D) A medium cargo truck, a personnel carrier, and an additional passenger jeep are also considered essential additional equipment. Appropriate changes in the tentative TBA will be arranged.

4. OPERATIONAL PROCEDURE:

- (A) Landing Force Air Support Control Unit One operated in accordance with Amphibious Forces, Pacific Fleet, Standard Operating Procedure for air support control, thereby insuring smooth transmission of air support control from ship to shore. No change is recommended in this procedure at present.
- (B) Due to the location of Landing Force Air Support Control Unit One ashore, adjacent to Landing Force Headquarters, and connected directly by land wire to all major units, the control of close air support missions in coordination with troop movements, and with other supporting arms, was greatly facilitated. It is submitted that air strikes in close direct support of our troops, and in accordance with their current requests, can be handled more expeditiously and with greater safety when controlled from ashore. It is recommended, therefore, that in future operations the Landing Force Air Support Control Unit be established ashore at the earliest practicable date. To accomplish this, it is necessary that the unit be loaded in assault shipping, preferably in LST's.
- (C) It is further recommended that ~~as many~~ officers of the landing force air support control unit as possible be embarked on AGC's, for movement to the objective, and that they actively participate in the control of air support until the landing force air support control unit is established ashore. It is particularly recommended that Commander, Landing Force Air Support Control Unit, be embarked on the same AGC as Commander, Air Support Control Unit Afloat.
- (D) The principal operational difficulty experienced in running air strikes close to our troops was the variable efficiency and reliability of the battalion ALP's. Some of the ALO's were very alert and reliable; others were sometimes vague and uncertain in reporting observations. Some of this difficulty is attributable to an overloaded SAR net, and to insufficient personnel in the ALP's to maintain constant communications. It is evident however that a better system of selection and standardized training of ALO's is long overdue. Specifically, it is recommended that air-ground liaison officers should generally be chosen from combat experienced line officers and given special training in aviation tactics, sufficient to acquaint them with the capabilities and limitations of aviation as a supporting arm, and then be thoroughly grounded in the technique of air support control.

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- (E) Commander, Landing Force Air Support Control Unit One, and his principal assistant conducted numerous strikes from forward positions, utilizing the secondary equipment on the SAD, SAR and SAO nets, and directing the strikes by observation of target areas and fall of bombs. While this system offers some advantages for conducting a very close strike, the limitations of portable communication equipment make it of doubtful expediency. Certainly, it indicates the undesirability of turning over control of strikes to ALO's, whose VHF equipment was invariably inferior to the secondary equipment of Landing Force Air Support Control Unit. Usually, when at a forward observation post, Commander, Landing Force Air Support Control Unit One, limited himself to passing on observations over the SAR net to the SAD controller at the station, who relayed the information direct to the air coordinator without appreciable loss of time. Only occasionally was it considered desirable to talk directly with the aircraft while a strike was in progress.
- (F) Coordination between air and artillery was provided by having an artillery officer located in the air support control room, provided with radio and telephone connections direct to all artillery units. This officer was advised in advance of all air strikes, and was thus enabled to take necessary action regarding artillery fires. Plan "Negat" was used only in very special cases to permit low altitude photo and DDT spray planes to accomplish their missions. Plan "Mike" was involved only when Corps artillery was engaged in high angle firing; otherwise the air strikes were so conducted as not to interfere with artillery supporting fires.
- (G) Coordination between Naval gunfire and air was generally handled by the Naval ground liaison officers in forward positions, but inasmuch as only sporadic call fires were in progress during the period of control by Landing Force Air Support Control Unit One, it was possible to run air strikes without formal coordination simply by warning the air coordinators of any danger areas.

5. SUPPORTING AIRCRAFT:

- (A) Defensive air cover, as provided by Carrier Support Groups between 1 March and 9 March inclusive, and as provided by Army Garrison Air Forces after the latter date, was adequate and effective. No enemy aircraft closed the objective area during the period, although several attempts were made by single aircraft and small formations.

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Subj: Special Action Report, IWO JIMA Campaign.

17Mar45.

- (B) (1) The preliminary heavy strikes, made prior to D-3 day by Army heavy bombardment units, did not accomplish the desired result of neutralization. This is considered attributable to the inherent inaccuracy of high altitude bombing against precision targets. Practically all the heavy antiaircraft installations remained intact until taken out by Naval gunfire and dive bombers.
- (2) The preliminary carrier based strikes (D-3 to D-1 inclusive) also failed to accomplish the desired degree of neutralization against enemy batteries and defensive installations. This was due in part to limited time and unfavorable weather, but principally to the disposition, number, and effective camouflage of enemy positions.
- (C) The D-Day carrier based attacks were well planned, well executed, and in maximum strength between H-60 and H-Hour. It is believed that air support during this period was highly effective. Post D-Day air support was adequate in strength, and is considered to have been generally employed to good advantage.
- (D) The air liaison parties performed their functions satisfactorily, considering their previous inexperience in some instances, and their inadequate personnel and equipment. (See paragraph 4(D) for additional comment).
- (E) Based on this and previous experience, it is considered that the ALP's did not have entirely satisfactory communications with the landing force air support control unit. Only one SAR net was available to three divisions, with a consequent overload. This resulted in the inability of some units to get their requests through while a strike was being run in another area. Due to the very limited enemy zone of activity, and the close proximity of our lines, Commander, Landing Force Air Support Control Unit One, chose not to invoke "procedure (1)", but continued to deal directly with battalion ALP's in the interest of greater speed in fulfilling requests, and in accomplishing the accurate direction of strikes. This procedure will undoubtedly be largely used in the future. Consequently it is recommended that a second SAR(MHF) net be provided the battalion ALP's in lieu of the useless VHF they now have, and that it be used only for the special purpose of requesting strikes while the primary SAR frequency is in use for reporting observations of air attacks in progress. This would entail the substitution of a second MHF radio set for the VHF set, as it is considered necessary that all ALP's monitor the primary SAR net at all times. The retention of VHF, (SAD frequency), by

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Subj: Special Action Report, IWO JIMA Campaign.

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regimental and division ALP's, in addition to the two SAR frequencies, is considered desirable, to enable them to know exactly how air strikes in their zones are progressing. It is not considered necessary or desirable that battalion ALP's be equipped to communicate directly with aircraft in the air.

6. CONCLUSIONS:

- (A) The control of air support missions from a shore-based unit located adjacent to Landing Force Headquarters is practicable and highly desirable.
- (B) In order to exercise such control a well trained team of operational and technical personnel is required, and a complex set of communication equipment similar to that installed in an AGC is necessary.
- (C) That the present organization and equipment of landing force air support control units, (with the exceptions noted above), is considered adequate for the operational control of aircraft in support of troops.

7. RECOMMENDATIONS:

- (A) It is recommended that the selection, training, and administration of landing force air support control units remain a function of Aircraft, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, exercised through Commander, Air Support Command, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific; and that, where possible, landing force air support control units be attached to the Third and Fifth Amphibious Corps, Fleet Marine Force, for operational control on a semi-permanent basis. It is considered highly desirable that a landing force air support control unit be available to each Corps and its divisions for conducting training in air support missions, utilizing whatever air units may be available in the area.

V. E. MEGEE.

Copy to: ComASCU's, PhibsPac (2).
CG, AirFMEFPac. (1).
CG, III PhibCorps (3).
CO, ProvAirSupCom (5).
FILE (10).

HEADQUARTERS,
LANDING FORCE AIR SUPPORT CONTROL UNIT ONE,
PROVISIONAL AIR SUPPORT COMMAND, FWE,
IN THE FIELD.

17 March, 1945.

ENCLOSURE (A) TO: SPECIAL ACTION REPORT, IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN.

Subj: Summary of Air Operations with carrier aircraft, 1 March to 9 March inclusive.

	Mar 1	Mar 2	Mar 3	Mar 4	Mar 5	Mar 6	Mar 7	*Mar 8	*Mar 9	*Mar 10	Total
(A) SORTIES:											
VF	152	104	91	-	114	126	92	91	110	46	928
VF	59	59	53	2	59	65	54	57	30	1	439
TOTAL	211	163	144	2	173	191	146	148	140	49	1367
(B) MISSIONS:											
Direct Support	21	17	24	-	18	11	9	9	15	6	130
Observation	8	11	7	-	9	3	4	3	6	2	53
Photographic	1	1	2	-	1	2	-	-	-	-	7
Miscellaneous	-	2	-	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	4
TOTAL	30	31	33	1	28	17	13	12	21	8	194
(C) MISSIONS											
BY											
Air Observer	14	11	18	-	9	7	6	8	14	3	90
X-CAP or X-VOF	8	11	7	-	9	3	4	3	6	2	53
Other	-	4	2	1	1	3	1	1	-	-	13
500# Bombs	96	62	66	-	66	64	82	61	80	46	623
250# Bombs	38	24	-	-	-	-	-	-	20	-	82
100# Bombs	150	190	160	-	220	200	110	340	146	-	1516
Tonnage	36.25	28	24.5	-	27.5	26	26	32.25	29.8	11.5	241.8
Rockets	242	290	480	-	630	376	451	403	244	6	3122
Nepalm	31	16	-	-	8	-	33	30	-	8	126
(E) MISSION											
LEASCU #1	15	8	15	-	10	5	3	2	6	-	64
ALP: Division	1	2	-	-	2	3	4	3	3	-	18
ALP: Regiment	5	7	4	-	4	-	3	3	2	1	29
ALP: Battalion	8	10	11	-	8	6	2	4	9	7	65
Corps	1	4	3	1	4	3	1	-	1	-	18

S. E. T.

Subj: Summary of Air Operations with carrier aircraft, 1 March to 9 March inclusive. 17Mar45.

(F) AIR SUP-

PORT
REQUESTS: Denied:

Total
Fulfilled
Prox to F/L
Lack of observ.
Lack of time
Lack of a/c
By adjacent or
superior unit
Weather
Other
Less than 400Yds
400-600 Yds
600-800 Yds
More than 800Yds

(G) DISTANCE
OF
STRIKES:

	Mar 1	Mar 2	Mar 3	Mar 4	Mar 5	Mar 6	Mar 7	*Mar 8	*Mar 9	*Mar 10	Total
	30	34	26	3	21	16	15	17	21	10	193
	14	19	15	-	15	12	10	10	15	8	118
	5	1	1	-	-	2	-	1	3	2	15
	-	3	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4
	1	1	1	-	5	-	-	-	-	-	8
	3	2	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	7
	3	5	3	-	1	2	4	4	3	-	25
	-	-	-	3	-	-	1	-	-	-	4
	4	3	5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	12
	2	1	3	-	3	1	-	6	5	-	21
	8	10	7	-	2	4	4	1	4	6	46
	3	1	3	-	9	6	2	1	4	-	29
	8	5	8	-	1	-	2	1	-	-	25

Note (1): March 4 air support operations cancelled because of weather.

Note (2): March 10 direct support operations by P-51 aircraft and X-VOF only.

Note (3): Under section (G), data not available for 3 strikes on March 3, 3 on March 5, 1 on March 7 and 2 on March 9.

*Information under these columns include strikes by Army P-51 aircraft for corresponding dates, as shown on enclosure (B).

V. E. MEGEE,
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps,
Commanding.

HEADQUARTERS,
LANDING FORCE AIR SUPPORT CONTROL UNIT ONE,
PROVISIONAL AIR SUPPORT COMMAND, FMF,
IN THE FIELD.

17 March, 1945.

ENCLOSURE (B) TO: SPECIAL ACTION REPORT, IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN.

Subj: Air Support provided by 15th Fighter Group, Army Air Forces,
Garrison Air Force, during occupation of IWO JIMA.

1. The 47th Fighter Squadron, 15th Group, arrived at IWO JIMA at noon 6 March, and flew their first close air support mission on the afternoon of 8 March. The 45th and 78th Fighter Squadrons of the 15th Group arrived 8 March and began flying close air support missions on the following day. The following summary of close support missions flown by the 15th Group between 7 March and 14 March inclusive is herewith submitted:

<u>DATE</u>	<u>TARGET AREA</u>	<u>NO-TYPE PLANES</u>	<u>NO 100# BOMBS EXPENDED</u>	<u>NO 500# BOMBS EXPENDED</u>	<u>NO FIRE BOMBS EXP.</u>	<u>NO RDS. .50 CAL. EXP.</u>
8 March	185-202	8 P-51s	-	-	-	16,640
9 March	230-246	8 P-51s	16	-	-	8,770
9 March	196	7 P-51s	14	-	-	9,185
9 March	196-I	8 P-51s	16	-	-	12,265
9 March	-	8 P-51s	-	16	-	-
9 March	-	8 P-51s	-	16	-	-
9 March	185-D,Q,M.	8 P-51s	-	16	-	-
10 March	250-T 251-P	8 P-51s	-	16	-	2,844
10 March	250-T 251-K L,M,N,P.	7 P-51s	-	14	-	6,949
10 March	250-N,Q,S.	6 P-51s	-	12	-	47
10 March	250-251	8 P-51s	-	-	-	-
11 March	250-N,O. 251-K,L,M,N.	8 P-51s	-	14	-	11,272
11 March	250-T,P. 251-V,Q.	8 P-51s	-	16	-	4,875
11 March	250-T	4 P-51s	-	8	-	4,692
12 March	250	8 P-51s	-	16	-	2,980
12 March	251	8 P-51s	-	16	-	3,089
14 March	-	5 P-51s	-	-	10	9,000
17 Strikes 125 Sorties			46	160	10	92,608.

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Subj: Air Support provided by 15th Fighter Group, Army Air Forces,
Garrison Air Force, during occupation of IWO JIMA. 17Mar45.

2. Considering that these squadrons had not previously been employed in close support missions, and that they had no previous knowledge of the control technique employed, their performance has been highly satisfactory. The flight leaders were intelligent, cooperative, and efficient in controlling their units in flight. The pilots were daring and skillful, pressing their strikes home to minimum altitudes with a consequent high degree of accuracy in their strafing and glide bombing. It is considered that the 15th Fighter Group provided material and timely assistance to our troops.

V. E. MEGEE,
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps,
Commanding.

IsCom IWO JIMA Preliminary Report

(To be Distributed Separately)

Annex GEORGE to Special Action Report IWO JIMA Campaign.
