A Multi-Attribute Extension of the Secretary Problem: Theory and Experiments (Preprint)

Abstract

We present a generalization of a class of sequential search problems with ordinal ranks ("secretary" problems) in which applicants are characterized by multiple attributes that are evaluated independently. We then present a procedure for numerically computing the optimal search policy and test it in two experiments with incentive-compatible payoffs. With payoffs dependent on the absolute ranks of the attributes, we test the optimal search model with both symmetric (Experiment 1) and asymmetric (Experiment 2) search problems. In both experiments we find that, relative to the optimal search policy, subjects stop the search too early. Our results show that this bias is largely driven by a propensity to stop prematurely on applicants of intermediate (relative) quality.

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Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
Dec 28, 2004
Accession Number
ADA638196

Entities

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  • Amnon Rapoport
  • J. N. Bearden
  • Ryan O. Murphy

Organizations

  • University of Arizona

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  • Human Systems

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  • Economics

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