



# ROLES AND FUNCTIONS OF U.S. COMBAT FORCES

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## SUMMARY

*Title 10, United States Code* specifies broad, enduring roles for each U.S. military Service and Special Operations Command. The Secretary of Defense, in *DoD Directive 5100.1*, assigns primary and collateral functions that amplify those statutory responsibilities. This report, prepared to help Congress review the JCS Chairman's 1993 review of roles and functions, concentrates on combat forces.

The purpose of the current review, which *Title 10* requires, is to determine whether replications are beneficial or wasteful; to ensure that responsibilities are properly distributed; and to identify gaps that encourage interservice competition for scarce resources. Congress and the Secretary of Defense could usefully resolve the following list of cogent issues;

### Strategic Nuclear Responsibilities

- Strategic Nuclear Retaliation (Air Force, Navy, or both?)
- Homeland Air and Missile Defense (All Air Force or share duties with Army?)

### Conventional Combat Responsibilities

- Theater Air and Missile Defense (All Air Force or multiservice duties?)
- Battlefield Air Interdiction (All Air Force or multiservice duties?)
- Close Air Support (Air Force and Marine Corps or multiservice duties?)
- Rapid Response to Crises (Army and Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps, or multiservice duties?)
- Peacekeeping (All Army or share duties mainly with Marine Corps?)
- Combat Search and Rescue (Multiservice duties or U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM)?)

### Special Operations Responsibilities

- SOF Organization, Equipage, and Training (USSOCOM or share duties with Army, Navy, and Air Force?)
- Paramilitary Operations (USSOCOM or interdepartmental and interagency duties?)
- Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs (USSOCOM or Army duties?)

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## ROLES AND FUNCTIONS OF U.S. COMBAT FORCES

### Past, Present, and Prospects

Form ever follows function.

Louis Henri Sullivan  
"The Tall Office Building  
Artistically Considered"  
*Lippincott's Magazine*, March 1896

Congress specifies broad, enduring roles for each U.S. military Service, bearing respective operational mediums in mind: land for the Army; sea for the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard; air for the Air Force. Congress also issues instructions to U.S. Special Operations Command. The Secretary of Defense, with presidential approval, assigns primary and collateral functions that amplify those statutory responsibilities. The President and Secretary of Defense prescribe operational missions for each U.S. unified and specified command<sup>1</sup> (operations by U.S. Central Command to oust Iraqi invaders from Kuwait in 1990-91 and provide humanitarian assistance to Kurds immediately thereafter illustrate how rapidly missions may change compared with durable roles and functions).

Some assignments are clean cut. Others unavoidably interlock and overlap, especially where land, sea, and aerospace merge or converge. The original prescriptions, developed in the aftermath of World War II, served acceptably throughout the U.S.-Soviet confrontation. Congress has altered statutory roles just three times since 1947: it specified the composition of the Marine Corps in 1952; transferred operational missions from the Services to combatant commands in the *Defense Reorganization Act of 1958*; and defined roles for a newly-created Special Operations Command in 1986. The Secretary of Defense clarified functions ten times during that 45-year period, but made no major amendments.<sup>2</sup> Threats, strategies, and technologies, however, are undergoing great transformations. Space, a nascent military medium quite unlike land, sea, and air, imposes unique new requirements.

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<sup>1</sup>Official U.S. documents tend to use "roles," "functions," and "missions" as interchangeable terms. This report adopts definitions found in Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr.'s *Roles and Functions of the Armed Forces*, A Report to the Secretary of Defense, Washington, Office of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, September 28, 1989, Appendix C and in General Colin L. Powell's report on *Roles, Missions, and Functions of the Armed Forces of the United States*, December 1992, p. I 1-3 (draft).

<sup>2</sup>Crowe, William J., Jr., *Roles and Functions of the Armed Forces*, p. 4, 10.

*Title 10, United States Code*, as amended by Congress in 1986, directs the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to review roles and functions not less than once every three years, then recommend to the Secretary of Defense changes in policies, directives, regulations, and legislation that he "considers necessary to achieve maximum effectiveness of the armed forces."<sup>3</sup> That exercise is far from academic, because derivative decisions in large measure determine who gets the most money from a budgetary pot that is bound to shrink. Congressional calls for the Department of Defense (DoD) to reduce redundancies that consume costly manpower and materiel further encourage each military Service to reconfirm its current roles/functions and stake out new claims as they compete for scarce funds.<sup>4</sup> Defense oversight committees in Congress express keen interest in the results,<sup>5</sup> with good reasons: U.S. military Services are organized, equipped, and trained to perform particular roles and functions. Resultant responsibilities and relationships deeply affect respective force levels, configurations, and hardware requirements. The assets each service develops and deploys are "building blocks" for all ten U.S. unified and specified commands. Form indeed should follow function.

This report, prepared to help Congress review the JCS Chairman's 1993 review of roles and functions,<sup>6</sup> concentrates on combat forces, which form the centerpiece of U.S. military power. It slights noncombatant space forces, mobility forces, intelligence, administration, logistics, and other support functions. Assessments first establish the rationale for existing arrangements to show why things are as they are. Surveys thereafter identify and discuss contentious issues, with special concern for overlaps and gaps. Alternative courses of corrective action exclude extreme positions of doubtful political feasibility that, for example, would merge the Army and Marine Corps or consolidate all U.S. military air power in one or two Services. Coverage instead accentuates options that Congress and DoD might realistically expect to implement in a reasonable period of time without potentially dangerous disruption. Readers must decide for themselves which points seem most convincing before they opt for change or the *status quo*.

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<sup>3</sup>U.S. Congress, House, *Title 10, United States Code* as amended through April 6, 1991, prepared for the use of the Committee on Armed Services, 102d Congress, 1st Session, Washington, U.S. GPO, Section 153(b), p. 54-55. Admiral Crowe's 27-page report (Note 1) was the first formal review in response.

<sup>4</sup>Senator Sam Nunn, "The Defense Department Must Thoroughly Overhaul the Service's Roles and Missions," *Congressional Record*, July 2, 1992, p. S 9559 - S 9564.

<sup>5</sup>See, for example, U.S. Congress, House, *National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993*, Report 102-507 of the Committee on Armed Services on H.R. 5006, 102d Congress, 2d Session, Washington, U.S. GPO, May 19, 1992, p. 284.

<sup>6</sup>*Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Report on Roles, Missions, and Functions of the Armed Forces of the United States*, December 1992, 85 p., (draft).

## HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES

The United States Army operates primarily on land. The U.S. Navy and Marine Corps specialize in maritime operations. Respective responsibilities unavoidably overlap along seacoasts, but few jurisdictional disputes developed until the Twentieth Century.

### PAST ROLES AND FUNCTIONS

Air power began to complicate those relationships before World War I and subsequently gained great importance. The Joint Army-Navy Board responded in 1927 with *Joint Action of the Army and the Navy*, an official publication that contained the first detailed delineation of U.S. military functions and operational missions (Annex A). That document, revised in 1935, sufficed until nuclear weapons and missile delivery systems created novel issues shortly after World War II, but by no means eliminated interservice tensions.<sup>1</sup>

The *National Security Act of 1947* (Annex B) created a National Military Establishment under a Secretary of Defense. It addressed a separate new Air Force as well as an Army, a Navy, and a Marine Corps, and prescribed broad, enduring roles that *Title 10, United States Code* currently reproduces with minor modifications. That legislation and Executive Order 9877, which President Truman signed on the same day, settled some jurisdictional disputes but accentuated others (Annex C). Arguments over strategic air power and land-based air defense were especially acrimonious. Technological developments repeatedly generated interservice disagreements<sup>2</sup>

Defense Secretary James Forrestal convened a conference at Key West, Florida in April 1948 in an effort to reconcile differences. The results, entitled *Functions of the Armed Forces and the Joint Chiefs of Staff*, differentiated primary Service responsibilities more explicitly than ever before (Annex D). Common and collateral functions permitted each Service to support and supplement others in various capacities wherever and whenever advisable, although collateral functions did not then and do not now justify demands for more forces. The Army, for example, may not buy aircraft solely to interdict enemy sea power through operations on or from land. The Navy and Marine Corps may not buy aircraft solely to provide close air support for Army

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<sup>1</sup>Davis, Vernon E., *The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in World War II*, Vol. I, Origin of the Joint and Combined Chiefs of Staff, Washington, Historical Division of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1972, p. 1-26.

<sup>2</sup>Rearden, Steven L., *History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense*, Vol. I, The Formative Years: 1947-1950, Washington, Historical Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1984, p. 11-27, 385-393.

operations. President Truman, who approved, thereupon revoked Executive Order 9877.<sup>3</sup>

The Key West conference nevertheless failed to resolve contentious issues that centered on control over nuclear weapons. Defense Secretary Forrestal accordingly invited the Joint Chiefs to talks at Newport, Rhode Island in August 1948. The ensuing Memorandum for Record clarified the term "primary mission" loosely enough to satisfy all Services (Annex E). Specifically, it asserted that "exclusive responsibility and authority do not imply preclusive participation." On the contrary, "to avoid duplication and the wastage of resources" the Service assigned the primary function was directed to "take into account the contributions which may be made by forces from other Services."<sup>4</sup>

The superficial harmony achieved at Newport soon succumbed to renewed internecine strife. Relations between the Air Force and Navy became worse. Competition over a drastically shrinking defense budget continued unabated until the Korean War began. The relative merits of carrier air power compared with strategic bombers became the biggest bone of contention, but the future of the Marine Corps and control over combat aviation, airlift, guided missiles, and air defense weapons also inspired fierce controversies. Some such issues have never been satisfactorily settled.<sup>5</sup>

The Key West and Newport Agreements nevertheless have proved to be remarkably hardy. *Department of Defense Directive 5100.1*, a direct descendant, was first disseminated in 1954. It has been reissued or revised seven times since then, most notably after the Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958 (P.L. 85-599). U.S. military Services previously had performed operational missions. Ever since, in conformance with statutory roles, their main functions have been to recruit, organize, supply, equip, train, mobilize, administer, otherwise maintain, and provide armed forces for employment by unified and specified commands which employ them to accomplish missions within respective spheres of responsibility.<sup>6</sup> Other amendments were relatively minor.

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<sup>3</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 393-397.

<sup>4</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 397-402.

<sup>5</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 402-422. See, in addition, four articles on "The Defense Unification Battle, 1947-50": Philip A. Crowl, "What Price Unity;" Paolo E. Coletta, "The Navy;" Herman S. Wolk, "The Air Force;" and Richard F. Haynes, "The Army," *Prologue*, Spring 1975, p. 5-31. Also Allard, Dean C., "Interservice Differences in the United States, 1945-1950: A Naval Perspective," *Airpower Journal*, Winter 1989, p. 71-85.

<sup>6</sup>*The Department of Defense: Documents on Establishment and Reorganization, 1944-1978*, Ed. by Alice C. Cole et al., Washington, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Historical Office, 1978, p. 161-231.

## PRESENT ROLES AND FUNCTIONS

Current roles of the U.S. Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps appear in *Title 10, United States Code*. *Title 10* also addresses U.S. Special Operations Command which, like DoD's military Services, prepares forces for use by U.S. unified and specified commands. *Title 14, USC* stipulates that the Coast Guard, a component of the Transportation Department, "shall maintain a state of readiness to function as a specialized service in the Navy...upon the declaration of war or when the President directs, and shall so continue until the President, by Executive Order, transfers [it] back...." The most recent edition of *DoD Directive 5100.1* contains contemporary functions.<sup>7</sup> (See Figures 1-2 at the end of this section for tabular summaries. Annex F reproduces pertinent parts of *Title 10, Title 14, and 5100.1*). The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff elaborates a bit on a few functions in *Joint Pub 0-2*, which "sets forth principles and doctrines to govern the joint activities and performance of the armed forces of the United States."<sup>8</sup>

Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr., when he was JCS Chairman, prepared the first formal review of U.S. military roles and functions after *Title 10, USC*, as amended by the Goldwater-Nichols DoD Reorganization Act of 1986, established a statutory requirement to do so. That report, delivered to Defense Secretary Dick Cheney two days before Crowe's second term expired, concluded that "the 'roles' of the Armed Forces crafted in law are fundamentally sound. The 'functions'... should be revised and updated to more clearly reflect current U.S. military strategy, our efforts to harness technology, and our responses to new threats to the national security." Admiral Crowe recommended four amendments to *DoD Directive 5100.1*. None of them have been implemented (Annex G).<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>7</sup>U.S. Congress, House, *Title 10, United States Code* as amended through April 6, 1991, prepared for the use of the Committee on Armed Services, 102d Congress, 1st Session, Washington, U.S. GPO, Sections 167, 3062, 5062, 5063, 8062; *Department of Defense Directive 5100.1: Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components*, Washington, September 25, 1987, p. 10-21.

<sup>8</sup>*Joint Pub 0-2; Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)*, Washington, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, April 21, 1989, with Change 1, Chapter 4, Sections I, III-VIII. The quotation above is from p. 1.

<sup>9</sup>Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr., *Roles and Functions of the Armed Forces*, A Report to the Secretary of Defense, Washington, Office of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, September 28, 1989, 27 p. Quotations above are found in Crowe's one page covering memorandum for the Secretary of Defense. See page 15 for recommendations.

## ROLES AND FUNCTIONS RECONSIDERED

Cases can be made to reconsider current roles as well as functions, despite Admiral Crowe's contrary contention.<sup>10</sup> Figures 1 and 2 reveal overlaps, gaps, and other peculiarities in *Title 10* and *DoD Directive 5100.1*. Compromises originally crafted to placate individual Services barely submerge controversial issues. U.S. national military strategy concentrates on regional contingencies to a greater degree than during the Cold War and downplays global requirements.<sup>11</sup> Rapid technological innovation is revolutionizing warfare.<sup>12</sup> Some Service responsibilities accordingly deserve increased attention, others are less relevant, and significant voids are evident.

*Title 10, USC*, for example, tells the Army, Navy, and Air Force (but not the Marine Corps) to prepare for prompt and sustained combat. It does not mention deterrence, although war prevention is a crucial U.S. objective. It directs the U.S. Army and Air Force (but not the Navy and Marine Corps) to preserve peace and security, yet treats those roles precisely the same in "any areas occupied by the United States" as in the United States proper, its territories, commonwealths, and possessions, despite significant differences. *Title 10* instructions to each military Service are quite general except for the Marine Corps, to which it assigns specific roles and for which it describes force composition in detail.<sup>13</sup>

*DoD Directive 5100.1* prescribes functions for special operations, space support, and military activities short of war so imprecisely that respective Service responsibilities are obscure. Some functions identified as Navy and/or Marine Corps are ambiguous. General air and naval supremacy functions seem overly ambitious. A category called "military operations short of war" implicitly includes, but does not separately consider, such dissimilar activities as peacetime contingency operations, anti/counterterrorism, covert operations, narco conflict, humanitarian assistance, and peacekeeping. Coastal defense, port security, search and rescue appear only as Coast Guard prerogatives, although other Services participate. More than half of the functions listed on Figure 2 (18 out of 33) belong to a single Service. All five Services conduct military operations short of war. The Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps share five

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<sup>10</sup>*Ibid.*, covering memorandum.

<sup>11</sup>*National Military Strategy of the United States*, Washington, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, January 1992, 27 p. See especially p. 11-12, 16, 26.

<sup>12</sup>Seven technologies that have military applications are discussed in *Defense Science and Technology Strategy*, Washington, Director of Defense Research and Engineering, DoD, July 1992, 103 p.

<sup>13</sup>U.S. Congress, House, *Title 10, United States Code*, Sections 3062, 5062-63, 8062.

functions. Three Services share four more. Five other functions are duplicative.<sup>14</sup>

The following reviews recognize that detailed roles and functions are not necessarily advantageous, because excessive specificity may restrict flexibility undesirably. Redundancy, a popular target for budget cutters, is not always disadvantageous. It can cost-effectively foster multifaceted capabilities and complicate enemy responses, in much the same way that running backs, tight ends, and wide receivers (all of whom can legally catch passes) benefit football teams.<sup>15</sup> Reforms, nevertheless seem advisable whenever complementary deployments fail to pass those tests.<sup>16</sup>

Assessments herein concentrate to the maximum extent possible on ways to apportion responsibilities among U.S. military Services, rather than on what type armed forces each Service should acquire to perform assigned roles and functions. *Title 10, Title 14, and DoD Directive 5100.1*, if written precisely, should make it clear whether the Army, for example, should procure aircraft for a particular purpose or the Navy should deploy long-range land-attack missiles.

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<sup>14</sup>*Department of Defense Directive 5100.1: Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components*, Washington, September 25, 1987, p. 10-21; Joint Staff comments on a draft of this report, November 25 1992.

<sup>15</sup>Lieutenant Colonel R.V. Dutil, "Thought Piece." *Complementary/Enabling Capabilities*, Washington, HQ. U.S. Marine Corps (Plans), March 18, 1992, p. 2; Admiral William J. Crowe, *Roles and Functions of the Armed Forces*, p. 7, 10.

<sup>16</sup>See, for example, *Shaping Military Roles and Missions to Secure the Newly Won Peace*, a critical analysis prepared by Business Executives for National Security (BENS), Washington, October 1992, 15 p.

Figure 1

## SELECTED STATUTORY ROLES

January 1993

	Army	Navy	Marine Corps	Air Force	Special Operations Command
Preserve Peace and Security					
USA and Possessions	x			x	
Occupied Territories	x			x	
Prepare to Conduct Prompt, Sustained Combat					
On Land	x				
At Sea		x			
In the Air				x	
Support Naval Campaigns <sup>1</sup>					
Seize/Defend Naval Bases			x		
Conduct Land Operations			x		
Develop for Army/Marine Amphibious Forces:					
Tactics, Techniques, Equipment			x		
Equipment			x		
Undertake Special Operations Activities <sup>2</sup>					
Direct Action					x
Strategic Reconnaissance					x
Unconventional Warfare					x
Foreign Internal Defense					x
Civil Affairs					x
Psychological Operations					x
Counterterrorism					x
Theater Search & Rescue					x

<sup>1</sup>Congress authorizes the U.S. Marine Corps to "conduct...such land operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign." The Coast Guard passes to Navy control when so directed.

<sup>2</sup>U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) is the only U.S. unified command that prepares armed forces for use by other organizations. *Title 10* identifies all USSOCOM statutory roles as "activities."

Figure 1 (continued)

	Army	Navy	Marine Corps	Air Force	Special Operations Command
Enforce Federal Laws, Promote Safety High Seas U.S. Waters				x x	
Support Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies Intelligence Equipment, Facilities Training	x x x	x x x	x x x	x x x	
Provide Humanitarian, <sup>2</sup> Civic Assistance Services Transportation	x x	x x	x x	x x	x
Expand to Meet Wartime Demands	x	x	x	x	

SOURCE: *Title 10, United States Code*, Chapters 6 (Section 167), 18, 20, 507, 807 and *Title 14*. See Annex E for verbatim extracts.

Figure 2

**SELECTED PRIMARY FUNCTIONS**  
January 1993

	Army	Navy	Marine Corps	Coast Guard	Air Force
<b>Combat Functions</b>					
Nuclear Deterrence/Warfare		x	x		x
Air & Missile Defense					
USA	x	x	x		x
Elsewhere	x	x	x		x
General Air Supremacy					x
General Naval Supremacy		x			
Joint Operations					
Airborne	x		x		x
Amphibious <sup>1</sup>	x	x	x		x
Special Operations <sup>2</sup>	x	x			x
Close Air Support <sup>3</sup>		x	x		x
Air Interdiction <sup>3</sup>					x
Antisubmarine Warfare <sup>3</sup>		x			
Electronic Warfare	x	x	x		x
Coastal Defense				x	
Port Security				x	
Psychological Operations	x	x	x		x
Search and Rescue				x	
<b>Military Operations</b>					
Short of War	x	x	x	x	x
<b>Support Functions</b>					
Intelligence <sup>4</sup>	x	x	x		x
Aerial Reconnaissance					x
Aerial Imagery <sup>3</sup>		x	x		x
Joint Space Operations <sup>3</sup>					
Launch and/or Support	x	x	x		x
Control		x	x		x
Strategic Mobility	x	x	x		x
Sealift		x			
Airlift					x
Inflight Refueling		x			x
LOC Operations					
Land	x				
Sea		x			
Air					x

Figure 2 (continued)

	Army	Navy	Marine Corps	Coast Guard	Air Force
Logistic Support <sup>4</sup>		x			x
Occupy Territories	x				
Military Government <sup>3</sup>	x				
Nonmilitary Functions					
Civil Works	x				
Operate Panama Canal	x				

<sup>1</sup> Amphibious operations constitute a statutory role as well as a function for the Marine Corps.

<sup>2</sup> *Title 10, United States Code* assigns statutory roles to U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) as shown in Figure 1. *DoD Directive 5100.1* prescribes no USSOCOM functions.

<sup>3</sup> Selected collateral functions related closely to entries above include:

- a. Army: interdict enemy sea/air power through operations on or from land.
- b. Navy: close air support.
- c. Navy and Marine Corps: participate in overall air efforts; interdict enemy land/air power through operations at sea; aerial imagery; military government.
- d. Air Force: anti-submarine and anti-surface ship warfare; aerial minelaying; air-to-air refueling in support of naval campaigns.

<sup>4</sup> The Navy furnishes the Coast Guard with intelligence and logistic support when the Coast Guard is under Navy control.

**GENERAL NOTE:** The Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps organize, equip, and train forces that perform functions listed above. U.S. combatant commands employ those forces (and Coast Guard forces under Navy control) to accomplish assigned missions.

**SOURCE:** *Department of Defense Directive 5100.1: Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components*, Washington, September 25, 1987, p. 10-21. See Annex E for verbatim extracts.

## STRATEGIC NUCLEAR ISSUES

Strategic nuclear roles and functions concern offensive and defensive forces that DoD develops and deploys to deter nuclear attacks on the United States, deter regional aggression by nations with weapons of mass destruction, and respond appropriately if preventive measures fail. U.S. armed Services organize, equip, and train such forces. Combatant commands employ them.

### STRATEGIC NUCLEAR RETALIATION

Strategic nuclear retaliation took precedence over all other roles and functions when U.S.-Soviet relations were adversarial and Soviet nuclear forces were targeted on the United States and its allies. The Air Force and Navy informally shared responsibilities for most of that 40-year period. Nuclear requirements will remain important, even if presently planned force reductions take place in former Soviet Republics and the Chinese nuclear arsenal remains small, but reappraisals now seem advisable.

Strategic bombardment has been an official Air Force function since World War II. Strategic Air Command (SAC) became a major command of the Army Air Forces in March 1946. It retained strategic nuclear deterrent and retaliatory responsibilities as a specified command under the control of National Command Authorities (the President and Secretary of Defense) from the following December until June 1, 1992, when U.S. Strategic Command with Air Force and Navy components took its place.<sup>1</sup>

The U.S. Navy's acquisition of strategic nuclear responsibilities was circuitous in contrast. Interest became evident in 1946, when the Navy announced intentions to build an aircraft carrier that, among its other capabilities, could conduct strikes deep into enemy territory. Air Force resistance was instantaneous and strong. Neither the Key West nor the Newport conferences of 1948 prevented bitter and protracted squabbles about the relative value of bombers and carrier air power. Guided missiles then became potential delivery vehicles. Secretary of Defense Louis A. Johnson in March 1950 gave the Navy responsibility for ship-launched "missiles which supplement, extend the capabilities of, or replace naval aircraft...as required by

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<sup>1</sup>Wolf, Richard I., *Basic Documents on Roles and Missions*, Washington, Office of Air Force History, 1987, p. 2-4, 15-20, 21, 29, 46; General Colin L. Powell, Memorandum for the Secretary Defense, Subject: *U.S. Strategic Command Implementation Plan*, Washington, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, April 6, 1992, 2 p. (with enclosures 24 p.); consultation with staff officers in OJCS, June 1, 1992.

its functions."<sup>2</sup> Charles E. Wilson, his successor twice removed, six years later asserted that "operational employment of the ship-based Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile system will be the sole responsibility of the U.S. Navy."<sup>3</sup> The first Polaris submarine began patrols in 1960.<sup>4</sup> No critic has seriously questioned the Navy's strategic nuclear contributions since then.

Formal assignment clearly did not follow function in this case. *Title 10, USC* has never assigned any strategic nuclear role to the U.S. Navy. *DoD Directive 5100.1* first identified strategic nuclear warfare as a primary Navy and/or Marine Corps function in April 1987. Congress nevertheless authorized ballistic missile submarines and appropriated funds for more than 30 years. Whether resultant redundancies were cost-effective now seems moot, but the time to reconsider seems to have come, given dramatic diminution of perceived threats after the Soviet Union collapsed. Future roles and functions depend on the number of weapon systems needed in the new environment:

- The Air Force and Navy deployed three distinctively different nuclear delivery systems to ensure second-strike capabilities when the United States and the Soviet Union both possessed more than enough weapons to target every ICBM silo, bomber base, and submarine in port several times over. Planned reductions, if implemented, will progressively diminish such dangers, but arguments in favor of the existing triad emphasize that forces now in place are paid for and operating expenses are modest compared with dismantlement expenses.
- Those who prefer a monad claim that silo-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) or submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) alone might suffice, since no potential opponent currently possesses credible ballistic missile defenses or antisubmarine warfare capabilities, and none are predicted at any early date. Either the Air Force or the Navy thus could assume full responsibility, if U.S. strategists considered that tack safe. Strategic nuclear bombers and the extraneous ballistic missile system then could be retired through a process of attrition. One assessment explained that procedure in these words: "While it may not be time to slay these sacred cows...it is probably time to prevent them from breeding".<sup>5</sup>
- Those who would feel insufficiently secure with a strategic nuclear monad despite the recent diminution of nuclear threats to the United

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<sup>2</sup>Wolf, Richard I., *Basic Documents on Roles and Missions*, p. 4, 207-208, 211, 218.

<sup>3</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 292, 300.

<sup>4</sup>Sapolsky, Harvey M., *The Polaris System Development*, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1972, p. 7-9.

<sup>5</sup>*Project 2025*, Washington, National Defense University, November 6, 1991, p. 77.

States and its allies could choose a dyad that contains at least one ballistic missile system. Roles and functions would belong exclusively to the Air Force if decisionmakers picked ICBMs and bombers. The Air Force and Navy would have to share primary functions if ICBMs and SLBMs or SLBMs and bombers were selected.

- Those who prefer a dyad, but want to retain a transitional triad until future U.S. force requirements become clearer, could assign collateral functions to the Air Force or the Navy. Associated restrictions on modernization and replacement would cause collateral weapon systems to wither away, because only primary responsibilities establish a basis for force acquisition.<sup>6</sup>

## HOMELAND AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE

U.S. air defense (AD) and ballistic missile defense (BMD) both require a reliable warning apparatus, tracking sensors, area defense interceptors designed to defeat intruders before they endanger intended targets, and point defense interceptors to protect high value assets against enemy bombers, cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles that "leak" through. U.S. AD forces contain all of those components. U.S. BMD capabilities presently include warning systems without interceptors.

*Title 10, USC* does not explicitly address homeland defense. The Key West agreement of 1948 and every edition of *DoD Directive 5100.1* identify air defense of the United States as a function of the Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps, but do not specify what duties each should perform. No official document instructed any U.S. military Service to safeguard the United States against missiles until April 1987, when *DoD Directive 5100.1* ordered all but the Coast Guard to organize, train, equip, and provide forces for that purpose.

### Air Defense

U.S. air defenses were the world's most imposing until the early 1960s. They began to languish thereafter, even before planned deployments were complete, partly because projected Soviet bomber threats proved inflated and partly because Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara adopted mutual assured destruction (MAD) policies that downplayed homeland defense.<sup>7</sup> Cutbacks accelerated after President Nixon signed a Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems in 1972. Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger subsequently explained the rationale in these words: "Since we cannot defend

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<sup>6</sup>*Department of Defense 5100.1*, p. 13.

<sup>7</sup>McNamara, Robert S., *The Fiscal Year 1969-73 Defense Program and the 1969 Defense Budget*, Statement Before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Washington, Department of Defense, February 1, 1968, p. 41-54, 61-70.

our cities against strategic missiles, there is nothing to be gained by trying to defend them against a relatively small force of Soviet bombers."<sup>8</sup>

Congress and DoD have generally neglected homeland AD roles and functions ever since. The new *National Military Strategy of the United States* and associated Base Force proposals disregard AD entirely. The *Joint Military Net Assessment* for 1992 barely mentions that subject.<sup>9</sup> Residual U.S. area defense capabilities are vested in a diminishing fleet of Air National Guard interceptors. DoD directs selected active Air Force, Navy, and Marine fighter aircraft to reinforce them if unforeseen requirements should arise.<sup>10</sup> The last Army surface-to-air missile (SAM) batteries dedicated to point defense in the United States retired during FY 1974. General purpose Nike-Hercules and Hawk batteries in Alaska and Florida followed suit in April 1979.<sup>11</sup>

Neither Russia nor any other nation now able to mount sizable air assaults against the United States seems inclined to do so. Nations such as Cuba, which might have the inclination, lack much capability. The current absence of *bona fide* threats, however, does not nullify needs to assign air defense roles and functions, because conditions could change on short notice.

- The United States Air Force (USAF), which presently deploys the only dedicated U.S. homeland air defense systems, could shoulder all primary responsibilities. So doing would ensure unity of effort. One Service would monitor AD requirements, update doctrine, and conduct operations. The Navy and Marine Corps could continue to furnish fighter squadrons for area defense as a collateral function, but only USAF would devote funds for research, development, and procurement.
- The Air Force, however, has acquired no experience at point defense. Its early proposal to convert the Navy's fleet air defense Talos missiles for that purpose was stillborn in 1953. BOMARC A (1954-64) and B

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<sup>8</sup>Schlesinger, James R., *Annual Defense Department Report, FY 1975*, March 4, 1974, p. 66-69, Quotation is on p. 67.

<sup>9</sup>*National Military Strategy of the United States*, p. 19-20; *1992 Joint Military Net Assessment*, Washington, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, August 21, 1992, p. 7-6 and 7-7.

<sup>10</sup>Cheney, Dick, *Annual Report to the President and the Congress*, February 1992, p. 66-67; Brown, Harold, *Department of Defense Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1981*, January 29, 1980, p. 137-138; telephonic conversation with North American Aerospace Defense Command liaison office in Washington, D.C., October 7, 1992.

<sup>11</sup>Schlesinger, James R., *Annual Defense Department Report, FY 1976 and FY 1977*, February 1975, p. II-42, II-44; Collins, John M. and Elizabeth Ann Severns, *U.S.-Soviet Military Balance: Statistical Trends, 1970-1980*, Rpt. Nr. 81-233S, Washington, Congressional Research Service, October 1981, p. 30.

(1964-72), the only USAF SAMS, were area defense weapons.<sup>12</sup> The Army does not have, nor is it likely to acquire, area defense capabilities comparable to those the Air Force deploys. *DoD Directive 5100.1* therefore might logically perpetuate present divisions of responsibility between the Air Force and Army, in accord with standard practice the world over,<sup>13</sup> even though so doing would violate unity of command.

- DoD, under a third option that combines the best of both courses above, could form and assign all CONUS defense functions to a separate new Service much like PVO Strany, which handled homeland defense for the Soviet Union.<sup>14</sup> The advisability of such action would depend to a great degree on increased severity of perceived threats, because financial costs would be high and institutional turbulence prolonged during the conversion period.

### Ballistic Missile Defense

Trends that affect future BMD roles and functions are quite different than those associated with homeland air defense. Technological infeasibility coupled with high costs, rather than implausible threats, are the basic inhibitions.

USAF in the late 1950s began to build a land-and space-based warning system that eventually could detect enemy ballistic missiles in flight, compute trajectories, and predict general impact areas. Army-sponsored weapons unfortunately were less successful. BMD missile programs, starting in 1955 with Nike-Zeus, were designed for point *and* area defense, but solved neither problem satisfactorily. Soviet strategic nuclear forces could easily have saturated the most elaborate and expensive U.S. BMD system possible during the next two decades, albeit at severe risk of retaliation. Soviet multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) later magnified defensive difficulties.<sup>16</sup> A 1974 Protocol to the ABM Treaty, which allowed the United

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<sup>12</sup>Schaffel, Kenneth, *The Emerging Shield: The Air Force and the Evolution of Continental Air Defense, 1945-1960*, Washington, Office of Air Force History, 1991, p. 188-189, 235-238.

<sup>13</sup>See, for example, France, Germany, Italy, Turkey, the United Kingdom, China, India, North Korea, and Pakistan in *The Military Balance, 1991-1992*, London, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1991, p. 56-57, 59-61, 64-65, 74-78, 153, 162-163, 168, 175-176.

<sup>14</sup>Scott, Harriet Fast and William F.. *The Armed Forces of the USSR*, Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1979, p. 147-153.

<sup>16</sup>Pratt, Erik K., *Selling Strategic Defense: Interests, Ideologies, and the Arms Race*, Boulder, CO, Lynne Rienner, 1990, p. 9-10, 16-36; Schwartz, David N., "Past and Present: The Historical Legacy," *Ballistic Missile Defense*, Ed. by Ashton B. Carter and Schwartz, Washington, Brookings Institution, 1984, p. 330-349.

States a single BMD site, further restricted U.S. capabilities.<sup>16</sup> One small installation, which opened operations near Grand Forks, North Dakota during October 1975, shut down the next month. The United States consequently has been naked to nuclear missile attacks since the early 1960s.

U.S. policies thereafter discouraged Service competition over homeland BMD roles and functions until 1983, when President Reagan rekindled interest with his so-called "Star Wars" address, which called for long-term R&D efforts to render strategic nuclear missiles "impotent and obsolete."<sup>17</sup> The Army and Air Force advanced a wide variety of land- and space-based programs in response: surveillance and tracking; battle management/command, control, and communications (BM/C<sup>3</sup>); and weapon systems.<sup>18</sup> Rivalry remained strong (perhaps intensified) after President Bush scaled back the original Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) aims in his State of the Union Address in January 1991.<sup>19</sup>

The Missile Defense Act of 1991 (MDA), as amended on October 1, 1992, subsequently directed the Secretary of Defense to "develop for deployment a cost-effective, operationally effective, and ABM Treaty-compliant antiballistic missile system...designed to protect the United States against limited ballistic missile threats, including accidental or unauthorized launches or Third World attacks." Those stipulations drastically restrict the assignment of BMD roles and functions because, in accord with Article V of the ABM Treaty, they implicitly prohibit "ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based" (emphasis added). There is just one exception: a congressional interpretation of that Treaty does permit space-based sensors that can cue ground-based antiballistic missile interceptors.<sup>20</sup>

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<sup>16</sup>U.S. Congress, *Legislation on Foreign Relations Through 1988*, Vol. V, Treaties and Related Material, Joint Committee Print, Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and House Committee on Foreign Relations, Washington, U.S. GPO, December 1989, p. 198-204.

<sup>17</sup>"President's Speech on Military Spending and a New Defense," *New York Times*, March 24, 1983, p. 20.

<sup>18</sup>Moteff, John D., *The Strategic Defense Initiative: Program Description and Major Issues*, Rpt. No. 88-721 SPR, Washington, Congressional Research Service, October 25, 1988, 48 p. and *Brilliant Pebbles: Implications for the Strategic Defense Initiative*, Rpt. No. 90-291 SPR, June 12, 1990, 17 p.

<sup>19</sup>Hildreth, Steven A. and Amy F. Woolf, *Ballistic Missile Defense Development Options*, Rpt. No. 91-560F, Washington, Congressional Research Service, July 19, 1991, 29 p.

<sup>20</sup>*Report to Congress: Plan for Deployment of Theater and National Ballistic Missile Defenses*, Washington, Department of Defense, June 1992, p. 1-4, 5, 7, 21-41, 47, A1-A4; U.S. Congress, House, *National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993: Conference Report to Accompany H.R. 5006*, House Report 102-966, 102d Congress, 2d Session, Washington, U.S. GPO, October 1, 1992, p. 44-

- *DoD Directive 5100.1*, in conformance with current practice, could assign USAF responsibilities for fixed-site land-based BMD warning systems under those conditions. The Army could receive primary responsibilities for land-based BMD interceptors, since it is the only U.S. Service that ever has deployed such weapons. Other selections that might prove attractive sometime in the future would make it impossible for DoD to install defenses early and combat effectiveness probably would lag until the alternative Service became proficient.
- Any U.S. decision to abrogate the ABM Treaty or mutually renegotiate its terms would widen the latitude for BMD roles and functions. *DoD Directive 5100.1*, for example, might order the Air Force to position BMD weapons in space. The Navy could, if directed, perfect and deploy the Sea-Launched Ballistic Missile Intercept System (SABMIS) that it touted twenty-some years ago.<sup>21</sup> The Army and Air Force might appropriately share primary functions in such event. Perceived threats would determine whether the Navy also should participate.

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*Fiscal Year 1993: Conference Report to Accompany H.R. 5006*, House Report 102-966, 102d Congress, 2d Session, Washington, U.S. GPO, October 1, 1992, p. 44-45. For Article V of the SALT ABM Treaty, see U.S. Congress, *Legislation on Foreign Relations Through 1988*, Vol. V, p. 199.

<sup>21</sup>Anderson, William R., "Let's Send SABMIS to Sea Now," *Reader's Digest*, February 1970, p. 103-106.

## CONVENTIONAL COMBAT ISSUES

Conventional forces that perform diversified roles and functions comprise most of the U.S. military establishment. They include dual-purpose strategic nuclear forces, such as manned bombers, when employed in conventional modes. They exclude special operations forces, space forces, and support forces that concentrate on unipurpose activities such as airlift, sealift, intelligence, psychological operations, civil affairs, administration, and logistics.

### THEATER AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE

Theater air and ballistic missile defenses (TAD, TBMD) designed to safeguard U.S. armed forces and friends overseas are similar in some respects to those just described for homeland defense. Both, for example, couple warning systems with point and area weapons. Operations in both cases often occur over friendly territory. Significant differences nevertheless are evident. Response times within theaters typically are much shorter, especially at sites nearest enemy air and missile bases. Mobile weapon systems are important, whereas fixed installations suit U.S. homeland defense.

*Title 10, United States Code* does not mention theater air or ballistic missile defense. *DoD Directive 5100.1* tells the U.S. Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps to "organize, train, equip, and provide forces" for such purposes. USAF additionally develops doctrine in concert with sister Services. Respective responsibilities otherwise are identical.<sup>1</sup>

Two closely related issues currently cause sharp controversies: the allocation of point and area defense responsibilities; questions concerning command and control.

### Point and Area Defense Ashore

Theater AD emerged as a distinctive function during World War II. Early warning and area defenses have been Air Force responsibilities ever since. Point defenses ashore depended entirely on Army air defense artillery (AAA) until the 1950s, when surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) began to enter the U.S. inventory. Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson resolved resultant jurisdictional disputes when he designated the Army to develop, procure, and man land-based SAM systems for point defense "out to a horizontal range of the order of 100 nautical miles." He gave SAMs of greater range to the Air Force and authorized the

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<sup>1</sup>*Department of Defense Directive 5100.1: Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components*, Washington, September 25, 1987, p. 13, 17, 19.

Marine Corps "to adapt to its organic use, surface-to-air weapons by the other services as may be required for the accomplishment of its assigned functions."<sup>2</sup>

Those instructions sufficed for 35 years. The Army's Patriot TAD missiles, which replaced Nike-Hercules in the mid-1980s, have half the allowable range. No other Army SAM, including Hawks that the Marine Corps adapted, reach farther than 25 horizontal miles. The Air Force has never fielded theater AD missiles for area defense. BOMARC squadrons that once served North American Air Defense Command (NORAD) were homeland defense weapons. No U.S. Service has yet developed surface-to-air missiles expressly for ballistic missile defense outside the United States (Patriot is merely a modified air defense system).

Distinctions between point and area defenses, however, have begun to blur. USAF would share point defense responsibilities with the Army if DoD approves a proposal to deploy short-range Air Force SAMs for air base security.<sup>3</sup> The Strategic Defense Initiative Office (SDIO), with DoD and congressional approval, is developing for Army use Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missiles that technically exceed Secretary Wilson's stipulated 100 NM range, even though their maximum effective range is somewhat less in some situations.<sup>4</sup> Technological innovations moreover make it increasingly difficult to differentiate point from area defenses. Ballistic missiles much more capable than the Iraqi SCUDs that caused consternation during Desert Storm are proliferating. Most could be armed with nuclear, chemical, or biological warheads as well as conventional munitions.<sup>5</sup>

Early resolution of resultant jurisdictional and doctrinal disputes therefore seems advisable. DoD and Congress both visualize Army, Navy, and Air Force

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<sup>2</sup>Wilson, Charles E., "Clarification of Roles and Missions to Improve the Effectiveness of Operation of the Department of Defense," a memorandum for the Armed Forces Policy Council, November 26, 1956, in Epley, William W., *Roles and Missions of the United States Army: Basic Documents With Annotations and Bibliography*, Washington, Center of Military History, U.S. Army, 1991, p. 258-259, 263-264. See also Wolf, Richard I., *The United States Air Force: Basic Documents on Roles and Missions*, Washington, Office of Air Force History, 1987, p. 6-8, 292, 297-298.

<sup>3</sup>Footnote, Sheila, "Air Force Eyes Taking Over Air Defense, Theater Missile Defense, and Deep Attack," *Inside the Air Force*, September 4, 1992, p. 7 and "USAF to Set Up Program Office to Purchase Avengers From Army," p. 7-8.

<sup>4</sup>Report to Congress: *Plan for Deployment of Theater and National Ballistic Missile Defenses*, Washington, Department of Defense, June 1992, p. 15-16; Goodman, Glenn W., Jr., "Lockheed Wins \$689-million THAAD Contract," *Armed Forces Journal*, October 1992, p. 12.

<sup>5</sup>Joint Military Net Assessment, Washington, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, August 21, 1992 p. 1-2 and 1-3.

participation, but decisions still are pending.<sup>6</sup> TBMD responsibilities are wide open, because ABM Treaty restrictions on air-, sea-, and space-based weapon systems apply only to U.S. homeland defense against ICBMs and SLBMs (see pages 17-19).

#### Air Defense Options

- *DoD Directive 5100.1* might designate point defense as a primary Army TAD function and reserve area defense for the Air Force, in accord with Secretary Wilson's 1956 memorandum. So doing would preserve longstanding theater AD relationships and take maximum advantage of specialized expertise in each Service. Army SAMs and air defense guns would handle enemy fixed-wing aircraft and cruise missiles that escape USAF interceptors (the number was zero during Desert Storm), plus most hostile helicopters and short-range remotely piloted vehicles.<sup>7</sup> The Army and Air Force perhaps should share selected primary TAD responsibilities with the Navy and Marine Corps, which conceivably could be the main or only U.S. armed forces employed during some crises and the first to arrive during others. Those Services possess fleet air defense aircraft and SAMs that seem especially well suited to protect amphibious objective areas, ports, airfields, and other critical targets along the littoral.<sup>8</sup>
- *DoD Directive 5100.1* might tell the Air Force to protect all air space above 10,000 feet. Air Force Chief of Staff General Merrill McPeak recommended this course of action in a meeting with Army Chief of Staff General Gordon Sullivan on August 20, 1991, according to an Army spokesman.<sup>9</sup> The tightest possible connections between the warning apparatus and weapons for point *and* area defense would prevail if one Service developed all TAD hardware with ranges greater than present day Stingers, formed all units, and trained all personnel in accord with its own doctrine. Possibilities that SAMs might

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<sup>6</sup>*Report to Congress: Plan for Deployment of Theater and National Ballistic Missile Defenses*, p. 13-20; U.S. Congress, House, *National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993: Conference Report to Accompany H.R. 5006*, House Report 102-996, 102d Congress, 2d Session, Washington, U.S. GPO, October 1, 1992, p. 42-43.

<sup>7</sup>Goodman, Glenn W., Jr., "Army's Air Defense Artillery Expands Its Battlespace," *Armed Forces Journal*, October 1992, p.11; untitled *Working Paper* prepared by RAND's Project Air Force and provided to Office of Combat Forces (AF/XOFC), DCS Plans and Operations, HQ USAF, Santa Monica, CA, undated, (October 1992), p. 6-7, 9.

<sup>8</sup>Jordan, Phyllis W., "Navy Decides to Test SDI Waters," *Norfolk Virginian Pilot*, June 8, 1991, p. 1.

<sup>9</sup>"Air Force Asks Army to Hand Over Air Defense Assets," *Defense Daily*, August 28, 1992, p. 323-324.

interfere with interceptor aircraft would be minimized. Cohesion would be only slightly impaired if, as some reports suggest, the Army retained surface-to-air missiles with ranges between 25 and 50 NM.<sup>10</sup> USAF, however, presently develops, procures, operates, and maintains no SAM systems. New personnel specialties and logistical structures would be needed unless the Army transferred a total package to the Air Force, together with commensurate funds. U.S. decisionmakers thus would have to weigh potential long-term benefits against temporary (but nonetheless protracted and steep) costs in dollars, time, and turbulence.<sup>11</sup> Army and Marine Corps maneuver units, which presently possess mobile air defense "umbrellas" for use during fast-paced operations, moreover would have to compete with other USAF priorities for support where and when needed. Serious problems could develop if transfers disrupted the critical link between ground commanders and supporting air defense units (see subsequent section on close air support for analogous problems).

### Missile Defense Options

Theater BMD problems are so different from TAD that point and area defenses become almost indistinguishable. Most ballistic missiles fly much faster than aircraft, and thus are hard extremely to hit after launch. Typical distances between launch sites and targets are 50 to 500 miles. Transit times average five minutes or less, which allows defenders scant opportunity to detect, track, and destroy intruders. The slightest weakness between warning posts and TBMD weapon systems could invite catastrophic failure if enemy missiles carried nuclear, chemical, or biological warheads.

- The physical location of theater missile defense systems, rather than dubious distinctions between points and areas, therefore might form the best foundation for TBMD roles and functions. *DoD Directive 5100.1* might assign land-based warning to USAF and SAMs to the Army, with stipulations that the Marine Corps make use of systems those two Services develop.
- Alternatively, to ensure unity of command under conditions that demand split second response, DoD could allocate theater missile defense entirely to one Service, since neither has much practical experience (brief deployment of Army missiles expressly designed for BMD terminated 20 years ago; USAF has never deployed any BMD

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<sup>10</sup> Foote, Sheila, "Air Force Eyes Taking Over Air Defense, Theater Missile Defense, and Deep Attack," p. 1, 6, 7 and Haseley, Donna, "Sullivan Fights Bold Air Force Bid to Take Over Air Defense, Deep Strike, NMD," *Inside the Army*, September 7, 1992, p. 1, 8.

<sup>11</sup> *RAND Working Paper*, p. 12; Wormser, Owen, "Role of Air Defense," *Defense News*, October 19-25, 1992, p. 26; Opall, Barbara, "AF Stakes Air Defense Claim," *Defense News*, 5-11 October 1992, p. 4, 42; "Air Force Asks Army to Hand Over Air Defense Assets, p. 324.

weapons). The Air Force might be solely responsible for future TBMD systems positioned in space. The Navy logically might develop and deploy TBMD forces afloat.

### Command and Control Responsibilities

Uniservice participation in any activity facilitates unity of command, a time-honored Principle of War that U.S. military doctrines universally respect.<sup>12</sup> Unity also is achievable when one commander exercises centralized control over assets that two or more Services provide and operate. Authorities who frame roles and functions should bear those facts in mind as they search for the best solutions.

Former Army Chief of Staff General George H. Decker and Air Force Chief of Staff General Curtis E. LeMay set a precedent when they agreed that "the Unified Commander should normally appoint the Air Component Commander as the Area Air Defense Commander [AADC]...." A senior Army officer should serve as deputy when "a significant portion of the Regional Air Defense are Army air defense means...."<sup>13</sup> Current TAD/TBMD doctrine, in conformance, declares that overall responsibility will rest with a single commander. "Normally this will be the Air Force component commander," but could be a Navy officer if that Service furnished most of the forces.<sup>14</sup>

### OFFENSIVE THEATER AIR POWER

No one questions Air Force and Navy requirements for trucks or an Army inventory of 550 boats, which exceeds the number in the Navy. Demands for aircraft in all five U.S. military Services (including the Coast Guard) have been equally well demonstrated over the last five decades. Respective roles and functions of those distinctive "air forces," however, seem to merit review.

Participants and observers alike recognize USAF primacy for strategic (non-nuclear) air and missile warfare, which strikes directly against enemy will and war-making capacities. Military industries, electrical power plants, fuel supplies,

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<sup>12</sup>*FM 100-5: Operations*, Washington, Dept. of the Army, May 1986, p. 175-176; *AF Manual 1-1: Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force*, Vol. II, Dept. of the Air Force, May 1992, p. 12. Navy and Marine Corps acceptance of the Principles of War is tacit rather than explicit in their respective doctrines.

<sup>13</sup>Wolf, Richard I., *The United States Air Force: Basic Documents on Roles and Missions*, p. 365-369.

<sup>14</sup>*JCS Pub 3-01.2: Joint Doctrine for Theater Counterair Operations*, Washington, Joint Chiefs of Staff, April 1, 1986, p. III-4 through III-7 and B-4; Opall, Barbara, "Air Force Stakes Claim on Air Defense Duties," *Army Times*, October 19, 1992, p. 38; *RAND Working Paper*, p. 11-12.

and telecommunication nodes are typical targets.<sup>16</sup> DoD Directive 5100.1 perhaps should assign collateral functions to the U.S. Navy, since some of its dual-purpose (nuclear and conventional) weapon systems can supplement or supplant USAF implements under certain conditions. Tomahawk sea-launched cruise missiles, for example, played significant roles during Desert Storm. Offensive counterair, interdiction, and close air support (CAS) issues, in contrast, cause Army-Air Force and Navy-Marine Corps acrimony.

### Offensive Counterair/Interdiction

Offensive counterair and air interdiction, as differentiated from strategic air warfare, concentrate on hostile armed forces and military installations. Counterair strikes focus on enemy aircraft, airfields, and air defense infrastructure. Interdiction emphasizes such diversified targets as command centers, troop formations, transportation bottlenecks, and logistic facilities. Detailed coordination to prevent casualties among friendly land forces in static positions normally is unnecessary, because none are deployed nearby.<sup>16</sup> Air interdiction undertaken to facilitate ground force maneuvers, however, requires careful synchronization to maximize desired results while reducing risks of "fratricide." Bombers, attack aircraft, remotely piloted vehicles, and guided/unguided missiles are applicable instruments.

Title 10, United States Code assigns no related roles to any Service. The Key West Agreement of 1948 enjoined USAF to defeat enemy air forces and interdict hostile land power.<sup>17</sup> That functional monopoly, however, was short lived. Secretary of Defense Louis A. Johnson, in a 1950 memorandum, gave the Army full responsibility for surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs) that supplement, extend the capabilities of, or replace artillery. Simultaneously, he authorized the Navy to acquire ship-launched SSMs that likewise complement naval aircraft. Defense Secretary Charles Wilson later disallowed Army "missiles with ranges beyond 200 miles" and twice forbade Army aircraft to perform interdiction functions (1956, 1957).<sup>18</sup> SSMs in the Army inventory nevertheless remain well suited for offensive counterair and air interdiction missions against stationary targets. The Navy, with fixed-wing attack aircraft as well as SSMs, is even better endowed. Marine Corps air wings possess similar capabilities.

Control, rather than ownership, of air interdiction weapon systems is the central issue, since no U.S. military Service seeks to absorb inventories that

<sup>16</sup>AF Manual 1-1, Vol. II describes strategic attack, p. 147-160.

<sup>16</sup>Ibid. describes interdiction p. 104, 105, 163-165, 169-171.

<sup>17</sup>Wolf, Richard I., *The United States Air Force: Basic Documents on Roles and Missions*, p. 163 or William W. Epley, *Roles and Missions of the United States Army*, p. 223-224.

<sup>18</sup>Ibid, Wolf, p. 6, 207, 210-211, 213, 218-219, 292, 299-300, 323 or Epley, p. 15, 231, 234, 262, 264, 270.

belong to others. The adjudication of alternatives displayed below is doubly difficult in the absence of *joint* doctrine that suits collective needs, because weapons associated with the first option may be liabilities of the second, and vice versa:

- Unified efforts would best be assured if one Service controlled all air and missile strikes beyond the range of tube artillery (18-20 miles). That solution, which *USAF doctrine* prescribes,<sup>19</sup> would satisfy the Air Force, since regional commanders in chief (CINCs) normally designate a USAF officer as Joint Air Component Commander. Synchronized interdiction attacks would be assured and risks of "fratricide" (U.S. and/or allied aircraft hit by "friendly fire") would be reduced.
- Option Two would permit the Army and Marine Corps to control all air and missile attacks in a battlefield air interdiction (BAI) zone that extends as far as surface-to-surface missiles can reach beyond forward positions of troops on the ground. Ground commanders, whose targeting priorities often differ from those of the Air Force, then could best integrate BAI strikes with planned maneuvers and otherwise conduct three-dimensional operations in conformance with *their doctrines*.<sup>20</sup> USAF would retain full responsibility for deeper interdiction.

### Close Air Support

Close air support, conducted by manned aircraft, delivers ordnance on targets so near friendly land forces that detailed air-ground coordination before and during each mission is required to reduce casualties from "friendly fire." Offensive CAS operations help U.S. and allied ground forces crack enemy defenses and facilitate fast advance after breakthroughs. Defensive CAS operations delivered at close quarters help delay, disrupt, demoralize, and destroy enemy assault troops.<sup>21</sup>

Key West agreements of April 1948, refined the following August at Newport, directed the newly-independent Air Force to "furnish close combat... air support to the Army" and told the Navy to provide similar forces "for the

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<sup>19</sup>*AF Manual 1-1*, Vol. I, p. 8, Vol. II, p. 113-115, 121; Donnelly, Tom, "Homing In: Air Force Looking At Gaining Control of Missile System," *Army Times*, November 9, 1992, p. 30.

<sup>20</sup>*FM 100-5: Operations*, Washington, Dept. of the Army, May 1986, p. 20 (undergoing revision); *FMFM 5-42: Deep Air Support*, Washington, HQ U.S. Marine Corps, in preparation; Larder, Richard, "Artillery Center Argues Draft FM 100-5 Is Too Soft on Army Role in Deep Ops," *Inside the Army*, November 2, 1991, p. 1, 10-12.

<sup>21</sup>*AF Manual 1-1*, Vol. II, describes close air support, p. 105-106, 165-168, 172.

conduct of joint amphibious operations." The Navy and Marine Corps additionally were instructed "to conduct close air support for land operations" as a collateral function.<sup>22</sup> Navy-Marine Corps relationships have been relatively smooth until recently, because Marine air wings that train especially for close air support bear most of the burden while Navy aviation concentrates on other functions.<sup>23</sup> Army-Air Force CAS relationships conversely have been in eternal dispute.<sup>24</sup>

### Army-Air Force Options

Army perceptions that USAF neglects CAS is the root of all related problems. Preference for strategic air warfare, offensive counterair, and interdiction has always been evident in Air Force doctrine and aircraft procurement practices. Performance in those regards was exemplary during conflict in Korea (1950-53), Southeast Asia (1964-72), and Kuwait/Iraq (1991), but CAS was less satisfactory. Army commanders thus were often envious of Marine Corps counterparts who could count on close air support when they called, weather permitting.<sup>25</sup>

The Army, in response, explored ways to acquire its own CAS capabilities.<sup>26</sup> A series of official restrictions followed. Memorandums of understanding signed by Secretaries of the Army and Air Force twice forbade

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<sup>22</sup>Wolf, Richard I., *The United States Air Force: Basic Documents on Roles and Missions*, p. 161, 162, 163 or William W. Epley, *Roles and Missions of the United States Army*, p. 222, 223.

<sup>23</sup>FMFM 5-1: *Organization and Functions of Marine Aviation* (Advance Copy), Washington, HQ. U.S. Marine Corps, October 16, 1991, 55 p., *Marine Corps Capabilities Plan*, Vol. One, Washington, HQ, U.S. Marine Corps, undated (1992), p. 14-17. U.S. naval aviation doctrine is distributed among several specialized documents in the NWP 55 Series Aircraft Tactical Manuals, which address such diversified topics as fleet air defense, antisubmarine warfare, and land attack.

<sup>24</sup>See, for example, Holley, I.B., Jr., "A Retrospect on Close Air Support," in *Case Studies in the Development of Close Air Support*, Ed. by Benjamin Franklin Cooling, Washington, Office of Air Force History 1990, p. 535-555; Garrett, Thomas, "Close Air Support: Which Way Do We Go?," *Parameters*, December 1990, p. 29-43; Stubbing, Richard A. with Richard A. Mendel, *The Defense Game*, New York, Harper & Row, 1986, p. 138-143.

<sup>25</sup>Holley, I.B., Jr., "A Retrospect on Close Air Support," p. 542-544; Cooper, Bert H., *Close Air Support: Issues and Perspectives*, Washington, Congressional Research Service, November 13, 1987, p. 2-5; Garrett, Thomas, "Close Air Support: Which Way Do We Go?," p. 30-33, 36-38.

<sup>26</sup>Weinart, Richard P., Jr., *A History of Army Aviation -- 1950-1962*, Ft. Monroe, VA., Office of the Command Historian, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1991, p. 159-180.

Army aircraft to conduct interdiction or CAS operations (1951, 1952). Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson twice reinforced those injunctions (1956, 1957), but the Army's inventory of armed helicopters continued to grow until Air Force Chief of Staff General John P. McConnell finally agreed "to relinquish all claims" on Army rotary wing aircraft "designed and operated for...fire support..." (1966). Army and Air Force Chiefs of Staff institutionally finessed residual issues in 1975 and 1989 when they declared that Army attack helicopters do not perform close air support but complement Air Force CAS capabilities.<sup>27</sup>

Four functional options appear to be open. Each has distinctive advantages and disadvantages in terms of practicality and costs:

- Option 1 would eliminate USAF close air support functions. Sophisticated enemy air defenses, including man-portable missiles and multibarrel, computer-assisted guns, might make this course of action attractive to the Air Force. High performance aircraft that attack at great speed from considerable distance using standoff weapons are most survivable, but find it difficult to identify small and/or mobile targets (especially at night), even using state-of-the-art technological aids. Low- and slow-flying "armored" aircraft produced expressly for CAS find it easier to hit intended targets, but are exposed to hostile anti-aircraft fire for prolonged periods.<sup>28</sup> The absence of USAF close air support aircraft, however, would leave an undesirable firepower gap. Relatively low cost Army attack helicopters collocated with troops they support are potent weapon systems able to "sneak and peep," pop up at treetop level, take full advantage of terrain masks, and deliver devastating strikes from close range. Helos also possess superior abilities to operate from austere bases during darkness and adverse weather, but cannot carry large, versatile weapon loads (no gravity bombs, for example), are more vulnerable than fixed-wing aircraft to rolling artillery barrages as well as small arms fire, and lack the speed/range needed to shift assets expeditiously from one sector to another.<sup>29</sup> Additional field artillery well supplied with terminally-guided munitions would be beneficial, but light spotter planes that loiter over target areas are more vulnerable than USAF fixed-wing aircraft, artillery batteries take more time to relocate than helicopters, and acquisition costs could prove to be prohibitive during this period of budgetary restraint.

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<sup>27</sup>Epley, William W., *Roles and Missions of the United States Army*, p. 237, 239, 262, 270, 286, 291-293 or Wolf, Richard I., *The United States Air Force: Basic Documents on Roles and Missions*, p. 239, 243, 296-297, 323, 382, 403-405, *Memorandum for the Chairmen, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Subject: Close Air Support*, Washington, HQ, U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force (signed by respective Chiefs of Staff), October 11, 1989, 2 p.

<sup>28</sup>Bingham, Price T., "Dedicated Fixed-Wing Air Support -- A Bad Idea," *Armed Forces Journal*, September 1987, p 60, 62.

<sup>29</sup>Garrett, Thomas, "Close Air Support: Which Way Do We Go?," p. 39-40.

- Option 2, which would pass USAF close air support responsibilities to the Army, reportedly is the first choice of Air Force spokesmen, since their Service then could devote full attention to other functions.<sup>30</sup> So doing would vest the Army with complete control. Its aviators, like Marine Corps counterparts, could organize, optimally equip, and train CAS squadrons as part of tightly integrated air-ground teams that fight where, when, and in ways that Army commanders direct. The U.S. Army, however, currently lacks the aircraft, personnel, and infrastructure needed to operate, maintain, and modernize fixed-wing close air support squadrons (pilots, instructors, ranges, logistic facilities, and research-development-test-engineering specialists). USAF might transfer units and funds, but not bases and backup which normally serve many non-CAS purposes. Unipurpose Army units dedicated solely to close air support moreover would be wasteful, since they often would have to perform missions better suited for artillery or remain idle for long periods.<sup>31</sup>
- Option 3, which Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr. advanced during his last days as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, would formally distribute CAS responsibilities among all U.S. military Services except the Coast Guard, converting present practice into a binding obligation. Crowe's proposal was stillborn, because the Army Chief of Staff and his USAF peer both believed that CAS must remain a primary Air Force function.<sup>32</sup> They might have added that such action would officially encourage duplication of effort and dissipate scarce funds.
- Option 4 is the *status quo* with one prominent exception: the Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff would direct the Air Force to provide forces that they agree are appropriate in numbers and types for CAS purposes. *DoD Directive 5100.1* instructions to USAF would remain unchanged with regard to close air support, but Air Force personnel and equipment costs would increase.

#### Navy-Marine Corps Options

Close air support, from USAF perspectives, constitutes "any air operation that theoretically could and would be done by ground forces on their own, if

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<sup>30</sup>Haseley, Donna, "Army Rallies Against Proposal That It Take On CAS...", *Inside the Army*, August 31, 1992, p. 10-11, 12.

<sup>31</sup>Garrett, Thomas, "Close Air Support: Which Way Do We Go?," p. 37-39; Westenhoff, Charles M., *Thoughts on Close Air Support*, p. 3,4.

<sup>32</sup>Crowe, William J., Jr., *Roles and Functions of the Armed Forces*, A Report to the Secretary of Defense, Washington, Office of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, September 28, 1989, p. 10-11, 15, 17, 18, 21.

sufficient troops or artillery were available.<sup>33</sup> The U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) employs CAS to augment available armor, artillery, and naval gunfire support which it finds in short supply, especially during early stages of major expeditionary campaigns.<sup>34</sup>

USMC close air support procedures have been proven repeatedly since World War II. Marine pilots, intimately familiar with CAS tactics and techniques, understand that support for Marine ground forces is their primary purpose. Command arrangements, education, doctrine, and training emphasize that fact. Seamless integration results. Basing flexibility optimizes access to CAS target areas, because Marine air squadrons aboard aircraft carriers can redeploy rapidly to austere sites ashore before suitable airfields become available. Prefabricated construction materials (runway matting, approach apparatus, runway lighting, arresting gear), together with prepackaged control, supply, and maintenance facilities in each Marine Expeditionary Force, make that possible. No other U.S. military Service is as well prepared to operate from bases ashore and afloat.<sup>35</sup>

The key question is: could the Air Force and/or the Navy routinely perform CAS functions for the Marine Corps acceptably well at less cost under most conditions, as the Deputy Assistant Chief of Naval Operations for Air Warfare reportedly recommends?<sup>36</sup> If so, sizable savings might accrue.

- Limited Air Force ability to build expeditionary airfields would not necessarily be a serious liability, because some USAF tactical aircraft can operate off hard surface roads or compressed earth strips. More importantly, friendly countries might offer suitable bases at reasonable distances from scenes of action or U.S. armed forces might seize same from unfriendly occupants. Marine Corps construction capabilities conversely might be less advantageous than advertized, since no kits currently are prepositioned at sea near potential contingency sites. It might take as much as a month to move them in some

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<sup>33</sup>Warden, John A., III, *The Air Campaign: Planning for Combat*, Washington, National Defense University Press, 1988, p. 102, 104-105.

<sup>34</sup>Linn, Thomas C., "Who Really Needs Marine TacAir?," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, October 1992, p. 42; *Why Two Air Forces?*, Information Paper, Washington, HQ, U.S. Marine Corps, undated, (November 1992), 1 p.

<sup>35</sup>*FMFM 5-1: Organization and Function of Marine Aviation*, p. 2-9 and 2-10; Shutler, Philip D., letter to the Honorable Les Aspin, July 10, 1992, p. 1, 2; *Projection of Air Power*, a working paper, Washington, HQ, U.S. Marine Corps, undated (November 1992), p. 2, 3.

<sup>36</sup>Rosenberg, Eric, "Navy Plan Could Spell Demise of Marine Aviation," *Defense Week*, November 16, 1992, p. 1, 11.

circumstances.<sup>37</sup> Many disinterested observers nevertheless believe it would be unwise to break up Marine air-ground teams and substitute USAF support that could create CAS problems comparable to those that cause Army complaints.

- Connections between Marine and Navy aviation are much tighter, but several significant factors limit the CAS capabilities of carrier-based aircraft. The U.S. Navy has never emphasized close air support. Few of its aviators accordingly are as well versed in that specialty as their Marine compatriots, even though *DoD Directive 5100.1* assigns CAS as one of the Navy's primary functions. Continuous close air support by Navy fliers moreover is contingent on the number of carriers on station, their missions, and distances from battlefields ashore. Transit times increase whenever shallow water mines, antiship missiles, or enemy submarines (perhaps in combinations) discourage coastal operations. Sortie rates, which are low compared with flights from forward bases, then tumble.<sup>38</sup>
- *Title 10, United States Code* stipulates that the Marine Corps "shall be so organized as to include not less than three combat divisions and three air wings..." It does not specify that any part be devoted to close air support, but a statutory amendment probably would have to precede any decision to transfer USMC CAS functions to the Navy or Air Force, because only a small fraction of present Marine air power would remain. *Title 10* would not inhibit compromise plans to integrate some mutually agreeable number of USMC squadrons into carrier air wings. That action would allow the Navy to deactivate an equal number of squadrons and thereby conserve resources,<sup>39</sup> but could also degrade CAS capabilities to some uncertain degree for reasons already expressed. The Marine Corps perhaps should retain responsibilities for close air support if and when consolidation is complete. The Navy might fulfill collateral functions, which would allow its air wings to focus their attention elsewhere.

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<sup>37</sup>Ott, Michael, "Aviation: It's About Support," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, November 1992, p. 112; telephone conversation with a USMC spokesman, November 19, 1992; Opall, Barbara, "U.S. Air Force Plan Exhorts Shared Role for CAS in Services," *Defense News*, July 27 - August 3, 1991, p. 18.

<sup>38</sup>Linn, Thomas C., "TACAIR: Marines Shouldn't Leave Home Without It," *Armed Forces Journal*, August, 1992, p. 37; *Combat Sustainability/Readiness*, a briefing slide, Washington, HQ, U.S. Marine Corps, undated (October 1992), 1 p.

<sup>39</sup>*USN/USMC Integration*, a Memorandum for Record signed by the Marine Corps Director of Air Warfare and the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Resources, Warfare Requirements and Assessments), October 10, 1992, 1 p.

## EXPEDITIONARY FORCES

Forward Presence and Crisis Response are pillars of the *National Military Strategy of the United States*, which asserts that successful performance of U.S. expeditionary forces in peacetime and in war depends in large part on adherence to eight related principles: readiness, collective security, arms control, maritime/aerospace superiority, strategic agility, power projection, technological superiority, and decisive force.<sup>40</sup> Discussions that follow could help decisionmakers determine whether *Title 10, United States Code* and *DoD Directive 5100.1* should address related roles and functions more directly.

### Peacetime Forward Presence

The "day-to-day presence of U.S. forces in regions vital to U.S. national interests has been the key to averting crises" for the last 45 years, according to the *National Military Strategy*. American military deployments, large and small, confirm U.S. security commitments, lend credibility to U.S. alliances, help prevent wars, and reduce reaction times if deterrence fails. Associated collective security arrangements concomitantly promote U.S. influence and access, reduce defense spending, and constrain arms competition.<sup>41</sup>

U.S. military forward presence is declining rapidly, but forces that remain will routinely continue to cement personal and professional military relations with friendly nations and promote U.S. aims by means short of armed conflict. Joint/combined exercises, port calls, access, storage arrangements, military-to-military contacts, and civil-military relationships all contribute. There arguably is no need to amplify roles and functions in such regards, because each Service has routinely performed presence missions as a matter of national policy since World War II.

Some peacetime contingencies in the category called "military operations short of war," however, require esoteric task organizations, tactics, techniques, education, and training. Peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, and narco conflict may warrant distinctive recognition by *Title 10* and/or *DoD Directive 5100.1*.

### Peacekeeping

Peacekeeping involves nonviolent buffer activities by neutral armed forces that, following mutual consent of all concerned, are interposed between belligerents to discourage hostilities while rival leaders seek a lasting solution. Typical tasks are to supervise international territory (such as straits), truces or cease-fires, withdrawals, disengagements, demilitarization, demobilization, prisoner of war exchanges, and orderly transfers of power. Skilled diplomats and talented negotiators/mediators/arbitrators are more important than military

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<sup>40</sup>*National Military Strategy of the United States*, Washington, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, January 1992, p. 6-10.

<sup>41</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 7. See also p. 11, 14-15, 20-21, 22.

capabilities, because enforcement plays little or no part (*peacekeeping* becomes *peace enforcement* when compulsion is employed).

American military Services thus far have participated actively in just three major peacekeeping endeavors, each time as part of a multilateral force. The first, in Beirut, Lebanon (1982-84), eventually failed, partly because the mission was never explicit.<sup>42</sup> A U.S. Army battalion task force with the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) in the Sinai since 1982 has fared better under less volatile conditions.<sup>43</sup> A Mobile Army Surgical Hospital (MASH) recently joined the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in former Yugoslavia.<sup>44</sup> A total of 121 U.S. military observers with six U.N. contingents complete the list of DoD peacekeepers: Cambodia (51), Western Sahara (30), Middle East (19), Iraq-Kuwait (13), Mozambique (6), and Angola (6).<sup>45</sup> Most knowledgeable spectators, however, believe that regional conflicts such as those ongoing in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Liberia, and Sudan will cause U.S. peacekeeping activities to increase.<sup>46</sup> U.S. forces may be part of U.N. peacekeeping efforts in Somalia after humanitarian operations cease.

Future requirements likely will be greatest for ground combat troops, engineers, intelligence specialists, and logistical support. The Army and Marine Corps both are convenient repositories. *DoD Directive 5100.1* therefore could assign primary peacekeeping functions to either or both, with instructions to include pertinent courses in their colleges/schools and to indoctrinate prospective peacekeeping units.<sup>47</sup>

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<sup>42</sup>*Report of the DoD Commission on Beirut International Airport Terrorist Act*, October 23, 1983, 141 p.

<sup>43</sup>*United States Sinai Support Mission*, Report to the Congress, Washington, The White House, May 26, 1982, 67 p.; *United Nations: U.S. Participation in Peacekeeping Operations*, Washington, General Accounting Office, September 1992, p. 41-42.

<sup>44</sup>"U.S. Army Opening Tent Hospital in Croatia," *Washington Post*, November 14, 1992, p. A19.

<sup>45</sup>Telephonic communications with a U.S. Army spokesman, November 23, 1992.

<sup>46</sup>See especially U.N. Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping*, A Report...Pursuant to the Statement Adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992, p. 6-10, 29-36.

<sup>47</sup>President Bush recently issued similar instructions to the Secretary of Defense. See "The United Nations: Forging a Genuine Global Community," *U.S. Department of State Dispatch*, September 1992, p. 722-723.

## Humanitarian Assistance

Humanitarian assistance includes routine U.S. civic action programs to improve the quality of life in impoverished foreign countries. It also involves prompt steps to alleviate human suffering caused anywhere by natural and manmade disasters, such as earthquakes, storms, floods, famine, epidemics, and population displacements, of which at least 60 occurred in Fiscal Year 1991. A tidal wave in Bangladesh, starvation in Africa's northeast horn, the plight of Kurdish refugees, and the eruption of Mount Pinatubo in the Philippines are representative. The Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) sees increasing needs for U.S. involvement, given recent political, economic, and social upheavals that continue to spawn regional instability and cause widespread wretchedness around the world.<sup>48</sup>

Not everyone agrees that U.S. armed forces should routinely conduct mercy missions, because such operations could detract from combat capabilities. Deep involvement in civilian affairs moreover might have adverse political side effects.<sup>49</sup> The vast majority, however, believe that military participation is desirable as well as unavoidable. Few organizations besides DoD possess long-haul cargo aircraft or worldwide communications. Fewer still deploy helicopters, landing craft, all-terrain vehicles, and skilled personnel ashore and afloat on a global basis. Probably none can orchestrate interdepartmental/interagency/international activities as well on short notice, deliver bulk goods as fast (food, clothing, fuel, tents, sleeping bags, blankets, pharmaceuticals, bulldozers, dump trucks, and materials), or provide such diversified services (health, sanitation, public works, supply distribution, maintenance, construction, and instruction).<sup>50</sup>

Formal roles and functions, however, are rudimentary. Chapter 20, *Title 10, United States Code* concentrates almost entirely on preplanned assistance. *DoD Directive 5100.1* disregards humanitarian activities entirely. Most U.S. emergency relief operations have been *ad hoc* since the Berlin Airlift (Operation Vittles) delivered 2.3 million tons of coal, food, and miscellaneous supplies to

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<sup>48</sup>OFDA Annual Report, FY 1991, Washington, Agency for International Development/Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance, 1992, 157 p.

<sup>49</sup>Dunlap, Charles J., Jr., "The Origins of the American Military Coup of 2012," *Parameters*, Winter 1992-93, p. 2-20; Gellman, Barton, "Military's Relief Role Questioned," *Washington Post*, December 8, 1992; Summers, Harry, "Waging Peace, Avoiding Pitfalls," *Washington Times*, December 16, 1992, p. 63.

<sup>50</sup>U.S. Congress, House, *Aspects of Anti-Chaos Aid to the Soviet Union*, Hearings Before the Defense Policy Panel of the Committee on Armed Services, (HASC No. 102-22), 102d Congress, 2d Session, Washington, U.S. GPO, 1992, p. 28-29, 33; Curtis, Patrice K., *Providing Humanitarian Assistance: Using the U.S. Military Overseas*, Rpt. No. 92-619F, Washington, Congressional Research Service, July 31, 1992, 22 p.; Kuntz, Carol R. and Robert D. Shuey, *Department of Defense Humanitarian Aid*, Rpt. No. 87-808, Washington, Congressional Research Service, October 6, 1987, p. 1-22.

that beleaguered city between June 1948 and September 1949. Participants nevertheless performed admirably without recourse to special equipment or training. Successors, however, might do even better if *DoD Directive 5100.1* told each U.S. military Service to prepare for humanitarian assistance as a *collateral* function. None then could use such assignment as the sole basis for additional force requests, but accompanying prescripts could require them to study the subject in military colleges and schools, so military leaders at all levels would be well informed about procedures, relationships with civilian coworkers, problems that predecessors experienced under assorted circumstances, the countermeasures they applied, and reasons for ultimate success or failure. Additional duties might require each Service to feed a stockpile of obsolescent but serviceable property that donees would find useful in emergency, and do likewise with nonperishable goods that otherwise would be wasted. U.S. force reductions in progress will leave surpluses that could be used to start that process.

### International Drug Interdiction

The *Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986* found that "the Department of Defense and the use of its resources should be an integral part of a comprehensive, national drug interdiction program." The *National Defense Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1989* more specifically decreed that "The Department of Defense shall serve as the single lead agency for the detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs into the United States." Additionally, it directed the Secretary of Defense to integrate all U.S. command, control, communications, and technical intelligence assets dedicated to drug interdiction. Amendments to *Title 10* contained therein authorized the Secretary of Defense to furnish federal, state, and local law enforcement (LE) officials with drug-related intelligence; to provide them with equipment, supplies, bases, and research facilities; to train LE personnel; and to transport them outside the land area of the United States. Two explicit reservations limit DoD collaboration. None of its members may participate in search, seizure, arrest, or similar operations. DoD support must not "adversely affect the military preparedness of the United States."<sup>61</sup>

President Bush and Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney almost immediately designated narco conflict as "a high priority national security mission."<sup>62</sup> Subsequent policies, plans, programs, and operations greatly expanded DoD involvement. Tasks include, but are not limited to: reconnaissance and surveillance (aircraft, ships, patrol boats, space satellites, remotely piloted vehicles, remotely monitored sensors, manned observation posts replete with

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<sup>61</sup>*Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 (P.L. 99-570)*, Sections 3002 and 3057, October 27, 1986; *National Defense Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1989 (P.L. 100-456)*, "Title XI -- Drug Interdiction and Law Enforcement Support," Sections 1101-1104, September 29, 1988; *Title 10, United States Code*, Chapter 18, "Military Support for Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies."

<sup>62</sup>Duncan, Stephen M., "DoD's Counterdrug Efforts," *Defense Issues*, Vol. 7, No. 29, 1992, 8 p.

night vision devices, blimps ashore and afloat, over-the-horizon radar, drug detection dogs); transportation (fixed-wing aircraft, helicopters, ships); engineering assistance (route renovation, barrier construction, brush clearance, and floodlight installation along the Mexican border); mobile training teams (instruct LE personnel in the operation and maintenance of military equipment, scouting, patrolling, camouflage, map reading, land navigation); selected specialists (linguists, intelligence analysts, photo interpreters).<sup>63</sup> Active and reserve components all participate. National Guard units, acting as state militia, also eradicate marijuana crops in the United States and help Customs examine containers at ports of entry.<sup>64</sup>

*Title 18, United States Code* forbids the Army and Air Force (but not the Navy or Marine Corps) to act as a *posse comitatus* for law enforcement purposes. Section 375 of *Title 10*, however, prohibits direct participation by any DoD personnel in "search, seizure, arrest or other similar activity...unless otherwise authorized by law." The Department of Justice concludes that the so-called *Posse Comitatus* Act applies only within the United States, but the Secretary of Defense as a matter of policy has relaxed restrictions only once under "compelling and extraordinary circumstances" (the 1990 apprehension of General Noriega during Operation Just Cause in Panama). Members of the U.S. Coast Guard, who possess "police" powers, therefore are "assigned on board every appropriate surface naval vessel at sea in a drug-interdiction area, in accordance with Section 379, *Title 10*."<sup>65</sup>

Military flying hours and ship days devoted to drug control soared. DoD's drug budget more than sextupled between FY 1986 and FY 1993, from \$189 million to \$1.2 billion. The grand total, counting Coast Guard expenses,

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<sup>63</sup>*Ibid*; Brown, Dale E., "Drugs On the Border: The Role of the Military," *Parameters*, Winter 1991-92, p. 52-56; Tudor, Thomas S.M. and Mark E. Garrard, "The Military and the War on Drugs: An Air Component's Perspective," *Disarm Journal*, Summer 1992, p. 90-95; Isenberg, David, "Militarizing the Drug War," *Covert Action*, p. 46-47.

<sup>64</sup>Duncan, Stephen M., "DoD's Counterdrug Efforts," p. 5-7; Temple, Herbert R., Jr. and Walter L. Stewart, "The National Guard in the War On Drugs," *Military Review*, March 1990, p. 41-48; Brown, Dale E., "Drugs On the Border...," p. 53.

<sup>65</sup>*Title 18, United States Code*, Section 1385, Use of Army and Air Force as *Posse Comitatus*; *Title 10*, Sections 375 and 379; Cheney, Dick, Memorandum entitled *Modification of DoD Directive 5525.5*, "DoD Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement Officials," December 20, 1989, 1 p.; *Legal Memorandum: The Extraterritorial Application of the Posse Comitatus Act and Chapter 18 of Title 10, U.S. Code*, Washington, Office of the Chief Counsel, Maritime and International Law Division, U.S. Coast Guard, December 22, 1989, 12 p., Doyle, Charles, *Use of the Military to Enforce Civilian Law: Posse Comitatus Act and Other Considerations*, Washington, Congressional Research Service, July 20, 1988, 30 p.

approximates \$2.0 billion.<sup>66</sup> Those figures and levels of effort, coupled with the protracted nature of narco conflict, suggest that official roles and functions now are needed to avert undesirable redundancies.

Objective standards with which to evaluate overall DoD drug interdiction efforts are few and disputatious.<sup>67</sup> Captured contraband annually measures many tons, but influential critics question whether interdiction ultimately produces a proper return on investment. Seizures clearly raise costs and risks for narcotics cartels. The amount and price of illicit products delivered, however, just as clearly remain relatively constant. The General Accounting Office accordingly concludes that "DoD's contribution to supply reduction goals has been negligible." That opinion seems to be widely shared.<sup>68</sup>

Congress and the Secretary of Defense might consider the pros and cons of various amendments to *Title 10* and *DoD Directive 5100.1*, if they deem international drug interdiction an enduring role and function. Three options follow:

- Further emphasize the National Guard, which under state control possesses law enforcement powers that statutes and DoD policies normally deny to federal forces.
- Further emphasize the Coast Guard for similar reasons (Congress, for example, could fund new cutters. DoD could retire Navy frigates devoted to drug interdiction and direct the Navy to support the Coast Guard, rather than the other way around).<sup>69</sup>
- Concentrate activities of active federal forces on detection, tracking, training, and logistic support for law enforcement agencies.

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<sup>66</sup>*National Drug Control Strategy: Budget Summary*, Washington, The White House, January 1992, p. 22-29, 212-214.

<sup>67</sup>*Drug Interdiction: Funding Continues to Increase But Program Effectiveness Is Unknown*, Washington, General Accounting office, December 1990, 23 p.

<sup>68</sup>*Drug Control: Impact of DoD's Detection and Monitoring On Cocaine Flow*, Washington, General Accounting Office, September 1991, 32 p.; U.S. Congress, House, *Narcotics Interdiction and the Use of the Military: Issues for Congress*, Report of the Defense Policy Panel and Investigations Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, 100th Congress, 2d Session, Washington, U.S. GPO, August 24, 1988, 27-31, 39-49.

<sup>69</sup>See stipulations under *Title 10, United States Code*, Chapter 18, Section 379 and U.S. Congress, House, *Narcotics Interdiction and the Use of the Military*, p. 35-38.

## Crisis Response

The *National Military Strategy of the United States* requires abilities to respond rapidly and decisively when U.S. leaders direct this country's armed forces to quell regional crises, whether threats be large or small, expected or unpredicted. Elements ready to project power from the Continental United States on short notice supplement or replace U.S. formations, allies, and other friends overseas.<sup>60</sup>

### Requirements

Fast action by military "9-1-1 forces" during early stages of emergencies often can forestall needs for deeper U.S. involvement later. Designated units must be mobile enough to reach "hot spots" with adequate combat power when needed. Forcible entry capabilities, superior firepower, and sustainability are additional prerequisites. Rapid response capabilities, however, are not enough. U.S. armed forces also must be quantitatively and qualitatively sufficient to deal with prolonged crises.

Posturing to impress opponents is routine, but DoD repeatedly answers calls to enforce embargoes, conduct maritime intercept operations, protect U.S. property in strife torn lands, evacuate endangered U.S. citizens therefrom, perform rescue missions like the one that retrieved *S.S. Mayaguez* in 1975, and mount punitive excursions, such as "surgical" strikes on Tripoli and Benghazi, Libya in 1986. Crises of greater severity since the early 1980s have generated requirements to furnish convoy escort service in the Persian Gulf, support resistance movements or counterinsurgencies around the world, and launch large expeditions against Grenada, Panama, and Iraq.<sup>61</sup> Peacekeeping, typified by Operation Provide Comfort (Kurdistan 1991); humanitarian assistance typified by Restore Hope (Somalia 1992-93); and peacemaking, such as potential operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina, may become commonplace if the international community continues to intervene selectively when sovereign governments or anarchic states deliberately inflict unconscionable suffering on their own people.<sup>62</sup>

### Interservice Competition

Interservice competition over roles and functions related to crisis response intensified severalfold in 1979 after President Carter directed the Secretary of Defense to form rapid deployment forces that could handle Third World

<sup>60</sup>*National Military Strategy of the United States*, p. 7, 9-10, 15, 21, 22, 23-24.

<sup>61</sup>Collins, John M., *America's Small Wars: Lessons for the Future*, Washington, Brassey's (U.S.), 1991, p. 7-8, 9, 29-35, 43-48, 53-57, 58-59, 61-62.

<sup>62</sup>Copson, Raymond W., *The Use of Force in Civil Conflicts for Humanitarian Purposes: Prospects for the Post-Cold War Era*, Washington, Congressional Research Service, Rpt. NR. 92-899 F, December 2, 1992, 27 p.

contingencies.<sup>63</sup> Increased attention to U.S. regional interests, incongruously accompanied by military retrenchment overseas, currently reinvigorates that rivalry. The Army has created five light infantry divisions since 1985 (one in the National Guard), each transportable in existing U.S. cargo aircraft. The U.S. Navy and Marine Corps recently devised a new strategy which requires a "restructured naval force [that] must expand on and capitalize upon its *expeditionary* roles." General Alfred M. Gray, when he was Commandant of the Marine Corps, redesignated Marine Amphibious Forces as Marine Expeditionary Forces to accentuate crisis response capabilities. The U.S. Air Force, not to be outdone, adopted "Global Reach -- Global Power" as its slogan.

The Army and Marine Corps, as a result, are assuming similar characteristics. Both seek greater firepower and sustainability for their crisis response forces. Both emphasize air mobility and prepositioned stocks afloat. Many observers, including Senator Sam Nunn and GAO investigators, accordingly question whether a lighter Army and heavier Marine Corps are undesirably redundant and cost-ineffective.<sup>64</sup>

The Air Force and Navy engage in vitriolic debate about the relative merits of land-based and sea-based aircraft for crisis response purposes. Both claim "victory," but important issues remain unresolved.<sup>65</sup>

#### Corrective Actions

Corrective actions to produce properly balanced "fire brigades might be considered." Illustrative Option A allocates crisis response roles and functions primarily to the Army and Air Force. Option B allocates primary roles and functions to the Navy and Marine Corps. Option C distributes primary responsibilities among all U.S. military Services:

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<sup>63</sup>Jimmy Carter, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States*, 1979, Book II, Washington, U.S. GPO, 1980, p. 1804; *The RDJTF Command Decision*, News Release No. 150-81, Washington, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), April 24, 1981, 1 p.; Kelley, P.X., "Progress in the RDJTF," *Marine Corps Gazette*, June 1981, p. 38-44; Kingston, Robert C., "From RDJTF to CENTCOM: New Challenges?," *RUSI Journal*, March 1984, p. 14-17.

<sup>64</sup>*Light Forces: Need to Assess Whether Planned Force Levels are Excessive*, Washington, General Accounting Office, (in preparation) 39 p.; Hoffman, Frank G., "Sam Nunn: Filling In the Blanks," *Marine Corps Gazette*, August 1990, p. 28.

<sup>65</sup>See, for example, O'Rourke, Ronald, *Naval Forward Deployments and the Size of the Navy*, Washington, Congressional Research Service Rpt. 92-803 F, November 13, 1992, p. 34-36, 45-56 and *Persian Gulf War: Defense Policy Implications for Congress*, Rpt. 91-421 F, May 15, 1991, p. 19-20. Also Perin, David A., *A Comparison of Long-Range Bombers and Naval Forces*, Washington, Center for Naval Analyses, December 1991, 57 p.

- Option A would reconfirm *Title 10* and *DoD Directive 5100.1*, which tell the Army and Air Force to organize, equip, and train forces for prompt and sustained combat operations on land and in the air above. Both documents vest the Navy with identical responsibilities only at sea. Neither identifies prompt or sustained operations as Marine Corps requirements. Both limit Marine operations on land to those "essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign." Army and Air Force formations, which apparently will be based mainly in the United States after force reductions are complete, could respond rapidly to crises in regions that sea services cannot conveniently reach and along littorals near which the Navy and Marine Corps maintain no sizable peacetime presence. Army paratroopers delivered by Air Force transports stand ready to establish initial lodgements on short notice wherever forcible entry is required. Stringent limitations nevertheless are evident. Army light divisions, for example, as yet have no armored vehicles, little air defense, are mainly foot-mobile once they arrive in objective areas, and lack much logistic support. Crises could occur where accommodations for Air Force wings are few or nonexistent and suitable alternatives are far removed.
- Option B would transfer primary rapid reaction roles/functions solely to the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps. Those Services often comprise the initial or sole U.S. response to contingencies in foreign lands.<sup>66</sup> Naval task forces and amphibious ready groups in international waters can redeploy upon receipt of warning orders without waiting for transit or overflight rights; loiter near crisis areas until decisionmakers determine whether, how, and when to react; fight for footholds if required or withdraw directly if diplomacy prevails. Accompanying supplies and equipment, plus stocks prepositioned afloat, enable Marines to operate ashore for 60 days under ideal conditions, pending replenishment. Fixed-wing aircraft that fly from carriers and improvised strips, together with armed helicopters, provide air cover and fire support. The U.S. Marine Corps, however, is neither large enough nor adequately equipped to defeat heavily armed regional aggressors in combat on the scale of Desert Storm. Its activities are confined to coastal areas, because Marines normally could not function well for long separated from support ships. Naval strategists acknowledge that "mastery of the littoral should not be presumed," since some potential adversaries possess ballistic missiles, sea-skimming cruise missiles, shore-based aircraft, shallow water mines, and quiet diesel submarines that could seriously threaten U.S. surface combatants as well as Marines on the beach.<sup>67</sup>

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<sup>66</sup>Siegel, Adam B., *The Use of Naval Forces in the Post-Cold War Era: U.S. Navy and Marine Corps Crisis Response Activity, 1946-1990*, Alexandria, VA, Center for Naval Analyses, 1991, 60 p.

<sup>67</sup>*From the Sea: Preparing the Naval Service for the 21st Century*, a Navy and Marine Corps White Paper, Washington, Dept. of the Navy, September 1992, 12 p. (quotation on page 5); Ramsdell, Douglas, "Keeping the Coast Clear,"

- Option C would aim to maximize crisis response strengths of each U.S. military Service. The Army, Navy, and Air Force would continue to prepare forces for prompt and sustained operations in respective spheres of influence. *Title 10* and *DoD Directive 5100.1* could tell the Marine Corps to organize, equip, and train forces that could promptly project enough power from the sea to handle small contingencies along the littoral and facilitate the early arrival of Army and Air Force units if reinforcements were required.<sup>68</sup> Marines, with congressional approval, have repeatedly performed such functions since 1800.<sup>69</sup> Congress could reconsider *Title 10* requirements for "not less than three [Marine] combat divisions and three air wings," then fix force levels for that Service in accord with its roles and functions. Three divisions and wings might remain the minimum needed for Marines to support naval campaigns as *Title 10* prescribes, satisfy perceived demands for forward presence, and undertake other tasks that the President directs. Alternatively, the Corps perhaps could safely pare some personnel, shed some heavy weapons, and reduce its reserve component.<sup>70</sup> Marine ground combat components then would no longer look so much like the "second Army" that *Title 10* and *DoD Directive 5100.1* both forbid.

### Integrating Capabilities

Joint doctrine authorizes each regional commander-in-chief (CINC) to organize assigned forces as he sees fit to ensure the best performance.<sup>71</sup> Most of them choose Army, Navy/Marine, and Air Force components that perform uniservice functions well, but are not designed to conduct multiservice combat operations. CINCs therefore commonly form joint task forces (JTFs) when crises occur, then dismantle those extemporaneous organizations after they meet short-term needs. A few headquarters maintain small JTF staffs that routinely

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*U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, November, 1992, p. 46-48, 50, 52-53.

<sup>68</sup>Use of the U.S. Marine Corps as an "enabling force" is prescribed in *From the Sea*, p. 4 and *Marine Corps Capabilities Plan*, Vol. One, p. 3.

<sup>69</sup>Roe, Thomas G. et al., *A History of Marine Corps Roles and Missions, 1775-1962*, Washington, Historical Branch, G-3 Division, HQ, U.S. Marine Corps, 1962, p. 11-12, 24-25. For congressional views of USMC as "a versatile expeditionary force in readiness," see U.S. Congress, House, *Fixing the Personnel Strength of the United States Marine Corps, Adding the Commandant of the Marine Corps As a Member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff*, Rpt. NR. 666 to accompany S. 677, 82nd Congress, 1st Session, June 30, 1951, p. 2-6.

<sup>70</sup>Additional discussion is available in Tangredi, Sam J., "Pacific Garrison or Contingency Force?: Implications of the New National Security Strategy for the Marine Corps," *Naval War College Review*, Summer 1992, p. 13-20.

<sup>71</sup>*Joint Publication 0-2: Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)*, Washington, The Joint Chiefs of Staff, April 21, 1989, p. 3-24 through 3-28.

exercise war plans, but all need specialized augmentation in emergency. Those *ad hoc* practices are flawed, because JTF commanders, staffs, and the formations they must employ frequently meet for the first time just before battle begins. The U.S. Army, for example, contributed combat brigades from Fort Bragg, North Carolina and Fort Ord, California during Operation Just Cause in Panama. Neither had ever worked together, much less with other JTF members. U.S. conventional and special operations moreover were poorly integrated during that contingency.

Congress accordingly might consider two *Title 10* amendments that would tell the Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to establish a contingency command and organize standing joint task forces (SJTFs) as its principal components. Regionally-oriented unified commands, on their own initiative, might find standing joint task forces equally beneficial for identical reasons.

A contingency command could perform three useful functions: command all or most of the deployable Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine forces in the Continental United States; transfer reinforcements to regionally - oriented CINCs whenever required; and respond to crises wherever no U.S. combatant command exercises responsibility. The JCS Chairman reportedly is considering this option seriously.<sup>72</sup>

Such a contingency command might conveniently maintain two standing joint task forces. Each would exercise its subordinate elements in accord with joint doctrine, procedures, and plans.<sup>73</sup> An SJTF that featured XVIII Airborne Corps, a Marine Expeditionary Force, Air Force fighter wings, a carrier battle group, and special operations forces would be admirably configured for rapid response. A second SJTF, perhaps centered on the Army's III Corps, could provide backup (Figure 3). Each would organize its forces in peacetime the way they would go to war. Handpicked SJTF commanders would have time to learn the personal quirks of subordinates, capitalize on their strengths, and correct shortcomings. Staff officers could become skilled at joint operations and cross-service support. Team play could supplant service parochialism to much greater degrees, if all increments habitually trained together and developed joint standing operating procedures (SOPs).


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<sup>72</sup>Gordon, Michael R., "Joint Chiefs Head Challenges Calls to Review Military," *New York Times*, December 31, 1992, p. 1, 18.

<sup>73</sup>Helmly, James R., *Future U.S. Military Strategy: The Need for a Standing Joint Task Force*, Carlisle Barracks, PA, Army War College, 1991, p. 14-24, 27, 28-31.

Figure 3

### SAMPLE CONTINGENCY COMMAND



- Legend: BG is Battlegroup  
MEF is Marine Expeditionary Force  
SJTF is Standing Joint Task Force  
SOF are Special Operations Forces

## SPECIAL OPERATIONS ISSUES

Military and paramilitary special operations (SO) are generally unorthodox, comparatively low cost, potentially high payoff endeavors that armed forces with unusual (often unique) skills undertake in pursuit of political, economic, military, or psychological objectives during peacetime or war. SO may complement other military operations during conflicts of any type or intensity. High-level U.S. decisionmakers also may employ SO independently, if alternative methods and implements seem inappropriate or infeasible.<sup>1</sup>

Special operations differ from conventional enterprises in several significant respects. National leaders frequently authorize and oversee SO, especially when successful accomplishment of politically sensitive aims depends on surreptitious tactics and techniques, because failure could seriously embarrass the U.S. government. Special operations routinely require intimate interdepartmental/interagency coordination as well as joint military teamwork. International collaboration is an additional need more often than not. Sophisticated means of infiltration, exfiltration, communications, and support commonly are essential whenever SO occur in hostile territory far removed from established bases. Special operations range from very short to very long duration, with hostage rescues at one extreme and assistance for insurgents or counterinsurgents at the other. Some feature direct and explosive applications of force, while others emphasize finesse.<sup>2</sup> Demands for diversified skills are so great that few special operations forces (SOF) become proficient at more than one or two basic functions, for much the same reasons that Superbowl champions seldom excel at pole vaulting.<sup>3</sup>

Congress in 1986 directed the Secretary of Defense to create U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) to develop strategy, doctrine and tactics; to train all active and reserve SOF in the United States; to validate and prioritize

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<sup>1</sup>Special operations are officially defined by DoD in *Joint Pub 1-02: Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, Washington, Office of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, December 1, 1989, p. 339.

<sup>2</sup>*Joint Pub 3-05: Doctrine for Joint Special Operations*, Washington, Office of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, October 28, 1992, p. I 4-5, IV 7-9; *Long Range Policy for Special Operations Forces*, Washington, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict), June 24, 1992, p. 3-4, 6, 11.

<sup>3</sup>U.S. SOF are identified and described in *Joint Pub 3-05: Doctrine for Joint Special Operations*, p. I 5-6, II 1-2, III 1, 3, and Appendices A-C. See also Collins, John M., *Green Berets, SEALs, and Spetsnaz*, Washington, Pergamon-Brassey's, 1987, p. 21-37.

requirements; and to procure "special operations-peculiar" materiel/supplies/support with funds that U.S. Special Operations Command requests. USSOCOM in many respects thus resembles a military Service as much as a unified command, because it primarily prepares armed forces for employment by other organizations. Its commander-in-chief may conduct special operations only "if directed to do so by the President or the Secretary of Defense."<sup>4</sup>

*Title 10, United States Code*, Section 167, lists ten "activities" that are equivalent to statutory roles and missions insofar as each relates to Special Operations: direct action; strategic reconnaissance; unconventional warfare; foreign internal defense; counterterrorism; theater search and rescue; psychological operations; civil affairs; humanitarian assistance; and "such other activities [often highly classified] as may be specified by the President or the Secretary of Defense."

DoD instructions differ from *Title 10* in important respects. *Directive 5100.1* tells the Army, Navy, and Air Force "to organize, train, equip, and provide forces for the support and conduct of special operations,"<sup>6</sup> but specifies no functions for USSOCOM, which tries to knit Service SOF into a whole greater than the sum of its parts. Special operations doctrine downgrades humanitarian assistance from a statutory obligation to a collateral mission, with the attendant admonition that SOF "commanders should exercise care in allocating forces against non-primary missions to preclude overcommitment...." (Other collateral missions include security assistance, antiterrorism -- the defensive counterpart of counterterrorism --, personnel recovery, counternarcotics, and "special activities," a euphemism for clandestine and covert operations).<sup>6</sup> Several special operations roles and functions, for these and other reasons, might benefit from reviews that could help Congress and the Secretary of Defense determine what additions to, subtractions from, and other adjustments of *Title 10* and *Directive 5100.1* would be appropriate.

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<sup>4</sup>U.S. Congress, House, *Title 10, United States Code* as amended through April 6, 1991, prepared for the use of the Committee on Armed Services, 102nd Congress, 1st Session, Washington, U.S. GPO, Section 167; *Roles and Functions of the Armed Forces*, A Report to the Secretary of Defense, Washington, Office of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, Office of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, September 28, 1989, p. 6, 7, 9. Context is contained in Nichol, Jim, *Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict: U.S. Progress and Problems*, Issue Brief IB90091, Washington, Congressional Research Service, August 30, 1990, 15 p.

<sup>6</sup>*Department of Defense Directive 5100.1: Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components*, Washington, September 25, 1987, p. 14, 17, 20.

<sup>6</sup>*Joint Publication 3-05: Doctrine for Joint Special Operations*, p. II 2, 12-15; *United States Special Operations Forces: Posture Statement*, presented by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict and Commander-in-Chief, USSOCOM, June 1992, p. 4.

## DIRECT ACTION

DoD officially defines direct action (DA) as a "specified act involving operations of an overt, covert, clandestine or low visibility nature conducted primarily by a sponsoring power's special operations forces in hostile or denied areas."<sup>7</sup> That description invites disparate interpretations. SO doctrine, for example, asserts that "units may employ raid, ambush, or direct assault tactics; emplace munitions and other devices; conduct standoff attacks by fire from air, ground, or maritime platforms; provide terminal guidance for precision-guided munitions; and conduct independent sabotage." Direct action also includes efforts to locate and capture or recover personnel and materiel; neutralize, seize, or destroy critical facilities; even help stem the spread of mass destruction weapons.<sup>8</sup>

Some SOF are explicitly organized, equipped, and trained to undertake DA operations like those just described. The Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC), a secret, triservice organization that concentrates on counterterrorism, emphasizes "surgical" strikes against enemy individuals and small groups that conventional forces seldom could engage successfully.<sup>9</sup> The Navy's versatile sea-air-land (SEAL) teams, together with stealthy means of insertion and extraction, undertake arcane DA operations in maritime and riverine environments. Beach defenses, harbor facilities, submerged obstacles, and enemy ships in port typically attract their attention.<sup>10</sup> Specially armed Army helicopters and Air Force fixed-wing gunships able to operate at night in adverse weather also qualify.

Rangers, in contrast, are primarily superb parachute infantry that unified commanders occasionally commit as companies but normally employ in battalion or greater strength to accomplish conventional missions, as they did during Urgent Fury (Grenada, 1983) and Just Cause (Panama, 1989-90). Few Ranger fortes differ much from those of standard airborne infantry except in degrees of

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<sup>7</sup>Joint Pub 1-02: *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, p. 113.

<sup>8</sup>Joint Pub 3-05: *Doctrine for Joint Special Operations*, p. II 5-7; Capaccio, Tony, "DoD Reviews Commando Role in Stopping Mass Destruction Weapons," *Defense Week*, August 17, 1992, p. 1, 13.

<sup>9</sup>Thompson, Leroy, *The Rescuers: The World's Top Anti-Terrorist Units*, Boulder, CO, Paladin Press, 1986, p. 99-109; Collins, John M., *Green Berets, SEALs, and Spetsnaz*, p. 21, 22, 23.

<sup>10</sup>Joint Pub 3-05: *Doctrine for Joint Special Operations*, Annex B; Kelley, Orr, *Brave Men -- Dark Waters: The Untold Story of the Navy Seals*, Novato, CA, Presidio Press, 1992, 288 p.

proficiency. Their combat diving and scout swimming teams possess capabilities comparable to those that SEALs possess.<sup>11</sup>

Marine Expeditionary Units designated "special operations capable" (MEUSOC), like Rangers, are essentially conventional forces. They are task organized, trained, and equipped to conduct various operations that include maritime special purpose missions, but are not SOF and have never come under USSOCOM control (Marines assigned to USSOCOM consist of 17 officers and enlisted men in the headquarters).<sup>12</sup> Congress and the Secretary of Defense might use that precedent to revamp current roles and functions so that USSOCOM would retain primary responsibility only for direct actions that truly require special talent. They should resolve the future purpose and assignment of the Ranger Regiment, however, before they opt for change. At least three options are open:

- The Ranger Regiment could greatly expand its SO-style direct action capabilities at little cost by adapting the best features of *Spetsnaz* brigades that once served the Soviet Union and now belong to various independent republics.<sup>13</sup> Ranger companies, if required, then could quickly form many small, uniquely-tailored teams organized, equipped, and trained to neutralize scattered, high-value, time-sensitive, heavily-guarded targets such as enemy command-control-communications centers and nuclear-chemical-biological delivery systems. Rangers in such event would become SOF in every sense of the word and function much more effectively as members of USSOCOM, provided they could supplement infantry skills with area oriented direct action specialties that require a quite different "bag of tricks."
- The Ranger Regiment might move from U.S. Special Operations Command to Army jurisdiction. Careful consideration should precede any decision to do so, because few Army generals fully appreciate Ranger capabilities and limitations. Their predecessors briefly lionized Rangers for daring deeds early in World War II, later misused and destroyed two battalions at Cisterna, Italy, reduced the remainder to separate companies during the Korean conflict, then erased all Rangers

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<sup>11</sup>*Ibid.*, p. A 4-5; *United States Special Operations Forces, Posture Statement*, p. 10.

<sup>12</sup>General Carl W. Stiner, Commander-in-Chief, USSOCOM, interview in *Armed Forces Journal*, December 1992, p. 26.

<sup>13</sup>Some insights concerning *Spetsnaz* are available in *Inside Spetsnaz: Soviet Special Operations Forces*, Ed. by William H. Burgess III, Novato, CA, 1990, p. 1-16, 221-236; *Soviet Special Purpose Forces*, an unclassified briefing, Washington, Defense Intelligence Agency, 1986, p. 4, 12, 13-14; Suvorov, Viktor, "Spetsnaz: The Soviet Union's Special Forces," *International Defense Review*, September 1983, p. 1210-1211.

from active rolls for 23 years from September 1951 until 1974.<sup>14</sup> Returning Rangers to Army control consequently would be wise only if senior Army leaders welcomed the move.

- The Ranger Regiment might remain under continued USSOCOM control, even though the missions it performs are mainly conventional. Current arrangements clearly are welcome.

## STRATEGIC RECONNAISSANCE

*Title 10* identifies *strategic* reconnaissance (SR) as a special operations "activity." SO doctrine instead addresses *special* reconnaissance, the intended purpose of which is to collect specific, well-defined, and time-sensitive information of national or theater-level significance. SR often depends primarily on human intelligence (HUMINT) agents who put U.S. or U.S.-controlled "eyes" on targets in hostile, denied, or politically touchy territory when technological systems are less satisfactory or infeasible. Typical tasks include contact with insurgent or resistance factions to ascertain whether they deserve U.S. support; topographic, meteorological, hydrographic, and demographic explorations to facilitate military operations on land or at sea; forays to find worrisome enemy weapons, such as mobile SCUD missile launchers in the Iraqi desert; investigations to confirm the strength, location, and movement of major enemy forces; and battle damage assessment probes.<sup>15</sup>

SEALS concentrate their strategic reconnaissance capabilities along continental shelves and coasts.<sup>16</sup> Special operations aircraft perform unique missions aloft. Army Special Forces (SF) conduct strategic recon/surveillance inland. Whether SF should continue to do so is debatable:<sup>17</sup>

- Special Forces teams composed mainly of seasoned, professional noncommissioned officers, are fully qualified to perform strategic reconnaissance missions. Their employment, however, risks hard-to-replace personnel who spend years acquiring language proficiency and cross-cultural understanding applicable to a particular geographic area. One option would be to consider SR a collateral rather than primary function for Army Special Forces.

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<sup>14</sup>Darragh, Shaun M., "Rangers: The Long Road to Recognition," *Special Warfare*, April 1988, p. 19-27.

<sup>15</sup>FM 301-20-5: *Special Reconnaissance*, (working papers), Fort Bragg, NC, U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, February 1, 1991, 494 p.; *Joint Pub 3-05: Doctrine for Joint Special Operations*, p. II 7-8; *United States Special Operations Forces: Posture Statement*, p. 8.

<sup>16</sup>*Joint Pub 3-05: Doctrine for Joint Special Operations*, Appendices A-C.

<sup>17</sup>The versatility of Special Forces is reviewed in Stanton, Shelby L., *Green Berets At War: U.S. Army Special Forces in Southeast Asia, 1956-1975*, Novato, CA, Presidio Press, 1985, 360 p.

- Rangers, in response to any such decision, might fold strategic reconnaissance and surveillance into their repertoire. That embellishment would capitalize on professed abilities of Ranger companies and battalions to infiltrate and exfiltrate hostile territory, survive in all types of weather and terrain under adverse conditions, and perform short-duration tactical reconnaissance.<sup>18</sup> Individual Rangers and small intelligence collection teams thus could excel at SR if given proper training and retention policies that stabilize assignments.
- USSOCOM, at additional cost in terms of personnel, time, and money, could activate the necessary number of specialized SR units. Rangers and Special Forces then could concentrate on other important responsibilities.

### UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE

Unconventional warfare (UW), which may replace, complement, or supplement conventional military operations, involves strategically offensive covert, clandestine, or low-profile assistance for insurgents, secessionists, or resistance movements in foreign countries. U.S. SOF (primarily Army Special Forces) help organize, equip, train, and advise indigenous undergrounds and guerrillas; furnish intelligence, communications, psychological operations, and medical support; and establish evasion/escape networks that not only facilitate safe movement by individuals and small groups to and from enemy-held areas but seek to set captives free. Raids, ambushes, sabotage, deception, paramilitary operations, guerrilla logistics, and survival techniques are UW stocks in trade. Success depends in large part on professional SOF steeped in local cultures and proficient in local languages. UW professionals further require the acumen, maturity, and temperament needed to influence local leaders, whom they normally must persuade instead of command.<sup>19</sup>

The U.S. military establishment conducted three notable UW operations during World War II, in the Philippine Islands, Burma, and France.<sup>20</sup> The succeeding half century has seen none on a comparable scale (Central Intelligence Agency was in charge of the ill-fated paramilitary assault in 1961

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<sup>18</sup>*Joint Pub 3-05: Doctrine for Joint Special Operations*, p. A 4-5.

<sup>19</sup>*Ibid*, p. II 2-5; *Joint Pub 3-07: Doctrine for Joint Operations in Low Intensity Conflict*, Washington, Office of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, October 1990, p. I 5-6 and II 3-4, 6-7, 8-9; comments on a draft of this report by J. H. (Scot) Crerar, BETAC Corp., January 6, 1993.

<sup>20</sup>*Challenge and Response in Internal Conflict*, Ed. by Doris M. Condit and Bert H. Cooper, Jr., Washington, Center for Research in Social Science Systems, Vol. I, February 1968: Johnstone, William C., "Burma (1942-1945)," p. 117-135 and Falk, Stanley L., "The Philippines (1942-1945)," p. 211-236; Vol. II, March 1967,: McDonald, Charles B., "France (1940-1944)," p. 111-150.

at the Bay of Pigs in Fidel Castro's Cuba).<sup>21</sup> U.S. armed forces and CIA both provided low-key training programs in the early 1980s for Contra "freedom fighters" who opposed the Sandinista Government in Nicaragua.

Anticommunism and containment policies, which inspired most if not all U.S. unconventional warfare during Cold War with the Soviet Union, no longer seem in prospect. A counterrevolution in Russia that adversely affected U.S. security conceivably could revive interest, but not necessarily -- decisionmakers in Washington were reluctant to launch large UW operations against the Soviet Union or Red China when both were *bona fide* threats.

- Congress therefore might weigh the advisability of discarding unconventional warfare as a statutory role. *DoD Directive 5100.1*, in response, could designate UW a collateral function. USSOCOM then could devote full attention to foreign internal defense, which requires Army Special Forces to emphasize quite different skills.
- Alternatively, it might be wise to retain unconventional warfare as a statutory role, even in the absence of foreseeable missions. UW was the original function of Army Special Forces. Future uses may materialize quickly. It still contributes to their mystic, and pride in related capabilities remains an immeasurable morale builder. Financial costs would be minuscule.

## FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE

Foreign internal defense (FID), a unique form of collective security, is the strategically defensive counterpart of unconventional warfare. It involves protracted interdepartmental/interagency/multidisciplinary efforts by U.S. civilian specialists and armed forces to forestall or defeat selected insurgencies, resistance movements, and/or lawlessness wherever so doing seems to serve important U.S. interests (U.S. programs in Vietnam spanned more than 15 years). Steps to strengthen political, economic, social, legal, and military institutions in afflicted countries are most important. Military formations and police furnish a shield behind which nation-building may proceed.<sup>22</sup>

The primary purpose of U.S. SOF is to train, advise, and otherwise help host nations develop military and paramilitary forces fully able to maintain internal security, in conformance with long-standing U.S. policies that seek to minimize any need for U.S. conventional combat operations.<sup>23</sup> Some UW and

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<sup>21</sup>Kirkpatrick, Lyman B., Jr., "Paramilitary Case Study--The Bay of Pigs," *Naval War College Review*, November-December 1972, p. 32-42; Wyden, Peter, *The Bay of Pigs*, NY, Simon and Schuster 1979, 352 p.

<sup>22</sup>*Joint Pub 3-05: Doctrine for Joint Special Operations*, p. II 8-11; *Joint Pub 3-07: Doctrine for Joint Operations in Low-Intensity Conflict*, p. II 4-6, 7-14.

<sup>23</sup>*Joint Pub 3-05: Doctrine for Joint Special Operations*, p. II 8; Title 10, *United States Code*, Section 167, p. 67N.

FID skills, such as firm appreciation for local culture and language proficiency, are interchangeable, but different organizations and equipment are required. FID specialists, for example, find infiltration/exfiltration, subversion, and sabotage capabilities less useful than countermeasures and civic action. As a result, Army Special Forces and Navy SEALs are not equally adept at foreign internal defense and unconventional warfare, although U.S. policymakers presently expect equal competence at both.

The need to assign priorities that explicitly fix the relative importance of UW and FID seems pressing, because foreign internal defense is becoming ever more complex in the post-Cold War world. Multinational operations may become the norm.<sup>24</sup> Successful FID moreover might promote U.S. interests in global stability at less cost and risk than most known means.<sup>25</sup> Alternatives listed below therefore might prove advantageous:

- *Title 10* designates foreign internal defense and humanitarian assistance as special operations "activities" (statutory roles). Humanitarian assistance, however, is a subset of civil-military operations (CMO) which, in turn, contribute to FID.<sup>26</sup> No harm therefore would be done if *Title 10* discarded humanitarian assistance as a discrete role for special operations forces. USSOCOM then could legally consider foreign internal defense as an entity and freely determine which aspects to emphasize.
- *DoD Directive 5100.1* does not presently tell USSOCOM whether unconventional warfare or foreign internal defense should take precedence. That document might helpfully assign the primary function.

## PARAMILITARY OPERATIONS

Guerrillas and other armed irregular forces that employ quasimilitary tactics and techniques are offensive paramilitary forces. Defensive paramilitary forces, such as Civilian Irregular Defense Groups (CIDG) in Vietnam, help regular armed forces and law enforcement agencies retain or regain internal security.

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<sup>24</sup>Doherty, Terry, "FID in the 90s," *Special Warfare*, March 1992, p. 39-41.

<sup>25</sup>U.S. interests in stability are expressed more than 20 times in *National Military Strategy of the United States*, Washington, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, January 1992, 27 p. *passim*.

<sup>26</sup>*Joint Pub 3-07: Doctrine for Joint Operations in Low-Intensity Conflict*, p. II 11-13.

The Office of Strategic Services (OSS) conducted U.S. paramilitary operations during World War II.<sup>27</sup> Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), its successor, thereafter assumed paramilitary responsibilities. Diversified endeavors during the 1950s occurred in China, Korea, the Philippines, Guatemala, Indonesia, and Tibet.<sup>28</sup> The Bay of Pigs fiasco soon followed.<sup>29</sup> CIA divided defensive paramilitary responsibilities with U.S. military special operations forces in Southeast Asia for 15 years. It ran the so-called "secret war" in Laos after a small U.S. military mission ceased training Hmong and Lao Theung tribesmen and withdrew by international agreement in 1962. Army Special Forces performed analogous missions in the Republic of Vietnam.<sup>30</sup>

CIA retains primary responsibility for paramilitary operations, but the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) now conducts or controls small-scale actions in Andean states.<sup>31</sup> The State Department's Bureau of International Narcotics Matters (INM) has received legal permission to arm its own Air Wing of 60 fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters for such purposes.<sup>32</sup> Consolidation rather than proliferation of paramilitary responsibilities, however, seems worth consideration. Accordingly:

- Congress might amend *Title 10* to identify USSOCOM as the lead agency for all U.S. paramilitary operations. It might simultaneously

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<sup>27</sup>See Note 20. Also Ford, Corey, *Donovan of OSS*, Boston, Little, Brown and Co., 1970, p. 119-305. For a thorough case study by a participant read Peers, William R. and Dean Breilis, *Behind the Burma Road: The Story of America's Most Successful Guerilla Force*, Boston, Little, Brown and Co., 246 p.

<sup>28</sup>Grimmett, Richard F., *Reported Foreign and Domestic Covert Activities of the United States Central Intelligence Agency: 1950-1974*, Washington, Congressional Research Service Rpt. No. 75-50 F, February 18, 1975, p. 1-5. For details on Korea see Paddock, Alfred H., Jr., *U.S. Army Special Warfare: Its Origins*, Washington, National Defense University Press, 1982, p. 100-109.

<sup>29</sup>See note 21.

<sup>30</sup>Robbins, Christopher, *The Ravens: The Men Who Flew in America's Secret War in Laos*, NY, Crown Publishers, 1987, 420 p. (especially p. 86-135); Stanton, Shelby, *Green Berets At War: U.S. Army Special Forces in Southeast Asia, 1958-1975*, NY, Dell Books, 1985, 396 p.

<sup>31</sup>Mendel, William W., "Illusive [sic] Victory: From Blast Furnace to Green Sweep," *Military Review*, December 1992, p. 74-87. One endeavor is described in U.S. Congress, House, *Stopping The Flood of Cocaine With Operation Snowcap: Is It Working?*, Committee on Government Operations, House Rpt. 101-673, Washington, U.S. GPO, August 14, 1990, 22 p.

<sup>32</sup>*International Narcotics Control Strategy Report*, Executive Summary, Washington, Dept. of State, Bureau of International Narcotics Matters, March 1992, p. 25; *Public Law 102-583*, Section 4 (c) of HR 6187 amending Section 482 (b) (2) (A) of FAA of 1961.

amend *Title 50*, Section 403 (d) (5) to exclude participation by Central Intelligence Agency, which the present text implicitly permits with these words: "perform such other [unspecified] functions...as the National Security Council may from time to time direct." *DoD Directive 5100.1* and joint special operations doctrine thereafter could contain specific instructions related to paramilitary functions, missions, and interdepartmental/interagency relationships.

- CIA might retain primary responsibilities if, after careful review, policymakers decided that it is best qualified to plan and conduct paramilitary operations.

## ANTI/COUNTERTERRORISM

Terrorism, for purposes of this report, is public, repetitive violence or threats of violence intended to achieve sociopolitical objectives by intimidating innocent people and disrupting community routines severely. Afflicted parties eventually capitulate to avoid continued torment if terrorists are successful. Domestic terrorism, which originates within and is directed against one country or factions therein, is a favorite tool of some insurgents. Transnational terrorism, instigated by groups that renegade governments may sponsor and support, emanates from foreign bases.

U.S. interdepartmental/interagency programs to combat terrorism comprise two basic roles. Antiterrorism, the first line of deterrence and defense, emphasizes passive protection for personnel and installations. Counterterrorism may attack terrorists before they strike or be reactive. Timely, accurate intelligence is essential. Antiterrorists cannot accurately anticipate terrorist incursions without it; counterterrorists can neither find terrorists nor rescue hostages. Sensitive operations are apt to backfire with great embarrassment to the sponsor.

*Title 10* designates counterterrorism, but not antiterrorism, as a special operations "activity." *DoD Directive 5100.1* assigns neither function to USSOCOM or any U.S. military Service. Joint special operations doctrine, in the absence of contrary instructions, considers counterterrorism a primary activity and calls antiterrorism collateral.<sup>33</sup>

Distinctions between antiterrorism and counterterrorism are sharp. The two demand different skills.<sup>34</sup> Steps to discourage terrorists before they strike and mitigate damage if they do embrace individual protection programs to reduce risks (bodyguards, bullet-proof glass, combat driver training); public education to increase awareness; installation protection programs (sophisticated alarm systems, security guards, traffic barriers, airline inspection stations, and

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<sup>33</sup>*Joint Pub 3-05: Doctrine for Joint Special Operations*, p. II 11-12.

<sup>34</sup>*Joint Pub 3-07: Doctrine for Joint Operations in Low-Intensity Conflict*, Chapter III.

so on).<sup>35</sup> Each Service and combatant command indoctrinates its personnel as a matter of course. Active countermeasures, in contrast, require unique reconnaissance and surveillance techniques. With rare exceptions (such as the 1986 air attack against Libya<sup>36</sup>), they require intricately choreographed SOF actions as well. Flexibility and a flair for improvisation often are imperative. Hostage rescue units that expect the unexpected, for example, must maintain a mind-boggling array of special skills on standby, because they cannot predict the nature of any future emergency. Samples include electronic eavesdropping, secure communications, and negotiating techniques, along with abilities to break into buildings or board public conveyances of all kinds--cellars, skyscrapers, aircraft, trains, buses, cars, subways, and boats are among them. Procedures to scale walls, rappel, pick locks, handle delicate demolitions, and bypass booby traps are essential. Rescuers also must excel at sharpshooting in crowds and hand-to-hand combat, be proficient at first aid, handle hysterical hostages, jump start and drive strange vehicles, refuel aircraft, and work well at night.

Antiterrorism and counterterrorism nevertheless are closely linked, because they are flip sides of the same coin. Roles and functions that disregard antiterrorism therefore are apt to be flawed. Amendments to *Title 10* and *DoD Directive 5100.1* accordingly may prove appropriate:

- Members of the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC), all intimately familiar with terrorist tactics, are eminently qualified to help the State Department and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) educate and train antiterrorists. *Title 10* could encourage them to do so by adding antiterrorism to other special operations "activities" (roles).
- *DoD Directive 5100.1*, in response, could assign antiterrorism to USSOCOM as a primary responsibility without degrading JSOC's counterterrorism capabilities in the slightest.

## THEATER SEARCH AND RESCUE

Search and rescue (SAR) forces must be properly organized, equipped, trained, and controlled to recover personnel in distress on land or at sea under trying conditions. They remain on constant call, ready to pick up downed aircrews and passengers in peacetime. The U.S. Air Force, for example, literally hunted high and low for Congressman Mickey Leland in 1989, using a U-2 "spy

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<sup>35</sup>Jenkins, Brian M., *Terrorism and Personal Protection*, Boston, Butterworth Publishers, 1985, 451 p.; Livingstone, Neil C., *The Complete Security Guide for Executives*, Lexington, MA, Lexington Books, 1989, 214 p.; *FM 100-37: Terrorism Counteraction*, Washington, Dept. of the Army, July 24, 1987; "Coping with Terrorism: DoD Safe Travel Guidelines," *Army Times*, June 2, 1986, p. 73, 80-81.

<sup>36</sup>Weinraub, Bernard, "American Bombers Strike Bases in Libya; President Asserts Raid Is in Retaliation for 'Reign of Terror' Linked to Qaddafi," *New York Times*, April 15, 1986, p. 1.

plane," C-130 transports, and helicopters.<sup>37</sup> Combat search and rescue (CSAR) operations under fire during minor contingencies and major wars are even more demanding.

Section 167, *Title 10, United States Code* designates theater SAR as a special operations responsibility. *DoD Directive 5100.1* tells the Coast Guard to provide maritime search and rescue forces in wartime, but otherwise snubs SAR. Joint doctrines differentiate SAR from CSAR. Every sovereign country conducts SAR within its own boundaries. U.S. military Services and SOF assist in accord with existing agreements. Each U.S. unified commander, however, regularly conducts CSAR operations in support of U.S. forces within his area of responsibility.<sup>38</sup>

Combat search and rescue forces received due attention throughout the Vietnam war, but units dedicated to that purpose inexplicably disappeared thereafter. Only the Air Force presently maintains full-time CSAR assets. Other Service contributions are *ad hoc*. Only USSOCOM possesses fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft able to penetrate deeply into enemy airspace, pick up evaders and/or recover high-priority cargo, and return surreptitiously.<sup>39</sup> U.S. Central Command consequently was forced to piece together a CSAR capability to meet battlefield requirements during the 1990-1991 war with Iraq.

U.S. Special Operations Command as a direct result "has become the *de facto* force of choice for providing theater-wide CSAR." Continued reliance at current intensities (SOF aircraft on alert, for example, in Italy, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia) reportedly would "catastrophically" degrade abilities to satisfy a host of other SO requirements unless USSOCOM received extra aircraft, personnel, and funds.<sup>40</sup>

Some redistribution of search and rescue roles and functions thus might be appropriate. Various proponents propose several options:

- Congress might begin by revising *Title 10* requirements for theater search and rescue to read *combat* search and rescue, since theater-wide SAR operations in peacetime are basically a host country responsibility.

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<sup>37</sup>"U.S. Rep. Leland Dies in Ethiopian Crash," *Facts on File Yearbook*, 1989, p. 599-600.

<sup>38</sup>*Joint Pub 0-2: Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)*, Washington, The Joint Chiefs of Staff, April 21, 1989, p. 4-10 through 4-14; *Joint Pub 3-50.2: Doctrine for Joint CSAR*, (test), Washington, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, December 20, 1991, 114 p.

<sup>39</sup>*Joint Pub 3-05: Doctrine for Joint Special Operations*, p. C 3-4.

<sup>40</sup>*Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) Paper*, MacDill AFB, FL, USSOCOM, December 11, 1992, p. 2, 3.

- *DoD Directive 5100.1* might subdivide CSAR functions among the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, USSOCOM, and the Air Force. Such action would require all but USAF to designate full-time CSAR assets, since no other Service currently does so.<sup>41</sup> A Joint Rescue Center could coordinate all combat search and rescue forces in wartime. Decisionmakers might consider theater-wide peacetime SAR a collateral function if they take this tack.
- Option three, the consolidation of all CSAR units under USSOCOM would be consistent with current emphases on streamlined functions. Centralized control could foster efficiency and effectiveness in peacetime as well as war. U.S. Special Operations Command, however, would need substantial augmentation, as noted above.<sup>42</sup>
- A compromise that assigned primary covert/ clandestine CSAR functions to USSOCOM and all other combat search and rescue to military Services under joint control might register useful improvements with minimum disruption. U.S. Special Operations Command then could concentrate on SO-related CSAR, even if it received conventional CSAR as a collateral function.

## PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

Psychological operations (psyop), as practiced by the U.S. military establishment, constitute the purposeful use of information and actions to influence the emotions, attitudes, and behavior of target audiences in ways that expedite the achievement of security objectives in peacetime and war. Masters wield words as nonviolent offensive and defensive weapon systems that publicize, conceal, or misrepresent the true source with one of the following purposes in mind: influence friends, enemies, and neutrals before particular operations begin; consolidate and exploit successes; minimize failures; make the most of mixed results.<sup>43</sup>

Positive results sometimes can be decisive. Psyop, for example, won one little war in the Western Hemisphere (Guatemala, 1954) when President Arbenz Guzmán and his followers fell victim to skillful deception that made U.S.-sponsored armed forces seem far more capable than they were in reality. Ends

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<sup>41</sup>*Air Combat Command Concept of Operations for Rescue Forces*, Langley AFB, VA, Hq. Air Combat Command, December 10, 1992, 25 p. (draft).

<sup>42</sup>*Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) Paper*, p. 3-4.

<sup>43</sup>*Joint Pub 3-53: Joint Psychological Operations*, (test), Washington, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, September 1987, 82 p.; Linebarger, Paul M.A., *Psychological Warfare*, 2d Ed; NY, Duell, Sloan, and Pierce, 1954, p. 40-41, 43; Reppert, John C., "Psychological Operations: The Oldest Weapon of Mass Destruction," *Special Warfare*, July 1988, p. 23-33.

and means matched cost-effectively, armed conflict was brief, and casualties were few on both sides.<sup>44</sup>

Psyop targets are idiosyncratic. Subtle themes that work well against timid souls seldom faze tough adversaries such as Saddam Hussein or Serbia's President Slobodan Milosevic. Leaflets are useless if printed in improper dialects or in colors that recipients consider unlucky. Psyop specialists who hope to manipulate key individuals or groups consistently therefore must be conversant with local idioms, customs, and predispositions.<sup>45</sup>

Psychological operations often involve interdepartmental/interagency coordination.<sup>46</sup> Most U.S. military capabilities reside in the Army, which maintains a four-battalion psyop group in its active inventory. Three more groups are reserve components. Air Force aircraft deliver leaflets and provide platforms for loudspeakers. A "shotgun marriage" between psyop and special operations took place at Fort Bragg, N.C. in 1952 when the first Special Forces group joined a newly-formed Psychological Warfare Center to soften resistance by Army, Air Force, and CIA officials who then opposed all efforts to create military SOF formations.<sup>47</sup>

Those largely artificial relationships have long since ceased to exist. The former *Psychological Warfare Center* currently is called the John F. Kennedy *Special Warfare Center*. Perhaps 90 percent of all psyop output supports conventional operations. Critics accordingly question whether psychological roles and functions are properly assigned:

- *Title 10, United States Code* specifies that only so much of psyop as relates to special operations is legitimately a SO "activity" (role). General Richard G. Stillwell (Ret.), bearing that fact in mind, stated to the Secretary of the Army that "the only thing 'special' about psychological operations is their extraordinary importance...." Arguments that psyop – a DoD, indeed national asset – should remain under the full command and direction of the SOCOM strikes at the heart of the Secretary of Defense's efforts to focus attention

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<sup>44</sup>Schlesinger, Stephen and Steven Kinzer, *Bitter Fruit*, Garden City, NY, Doubleday Anchor Books, 1983, 320 p.; *Facts on File*, June 15-24, 1954, p. 206 and June 25 - July 1, 1954, p. 213.

<sup>45</sup>*Human Factors Considerations of Undergrounds in Insurgencies*, Dept. of the Army Pamphlet No. 550-104, Washington, HQ., Dept. of the Army, September 1966, p. 137-144, 148; *Undergrounds in Insurgent, Revolutionary, and Resistance Warfare*, Washington, Special Operations Research Office, American University, November 1963, p. 92-99.

<sup>46</sup>DoD responsibilities are delineated in *Joint Pub 0-2: Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)*, p. 4-31 through 4-35.

<sup>47</sup>Paddock, Alfred H., Jr., *U.S. Army Special Warfare: Its Origins*, 221 p. (see summaries on p. 1-3, 155-159).

throughout the Armed Forces on a proven force multiplier...."<sup>48</sup> Congress consequently could consider shifting psyop to Army control, especially since it normally supports conventional operations. *DoD Directive 5100.1* would pass primary psyop functions to the Army vice USSOCOM in such event.

- Others prefer present arrangements, partly because psychological operations forces, like Rangers, might atrophy if returned to Army jurisdiction. They nevertheless recommend that *DoD Directive 5100.1* formally designate psyop assets as SOF. As it stands, fuzzy relationships reportedly frustrate USSOCOM efforts to command, control, administer, and budgetarily support psyop forces as congressional legislation intends.<sup>49</sup>

## CIVIL AFFAIRS

Civil affairs (CA) specialists facilitate civil-military cooperation between U.S. armed forces and allied governments at national and local levels, before, during, and after hostilities or other emergencies, in accord with international law and bilateral or multilateral agreements. They may also exercise executive, legislative, and judicial authority in occupied territory. Fundamental functions in any event are to identify and coordinate the acquisition of indigenous resources and facilities, such as labor, transportation, communications, supplies, and miscellaneous services; minimize civilian interference with U.S. military activities (refugee movement and crowd control are important concerns); assist military commanders in meeting legal/moral responsibilities to the populace; advise U.S. and host country authorities on civic action; and train allied counterparts.<sup>50</sup>

*Title 10* identifies CA as a special operations "activity" insofar as it relates to SO. A vast majority of assigned missions (perhaps 90 percent), however, assist conventional commanders. Most U.S. civil affairs forces reside in the U.S. Army, which maintains one active battalion (total authorized strength 210) under USSOCOM control. Ninety-seven percent are reserve components subject

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<sup>48</sup>Correspondence from General Richard G. Stillwell (Ret.) to John O. Marsh, Secretary of the Army (information to Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger), April 28, 1987, 2 p.

<sup>49</sup>General Carl W. Stiner, Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Special Operations Command, memorandum through Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the Secretary of Defense (Dick Cheney) April 30, 1992, 1 p.

<sup>50</sup>*Joint Pub 3-57: Joint Civil Affairs Doctrine*, (test) Washington, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, September 1991, 158 p.; Barnes, Rudolph, Jr., "Civil Affairs: Diplomat Warriors in Contemporary Conflict" and "Seal the Victory: A History of U.S. Army Civil Affairs," both in *Special Warfare*, Winter 1991, p. 4-11, 38-41.

to call as required.<sup>61</sup> Two Marine Corps Reserve CA groups support Marine air-ground task forces. Neither is assigned to USSOCOM.<sup>62</sup>

Civil affairs operations, like psyop, frequently require interdepartmental and interagency as well as multiservice coordination.<sup>63</sup> Like psyop, they support assorted U.S. military programs in peacetime (humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, peacekeeping) and at every conflict level. Even more than psyop, the merger of civil affairs with special operations was a marriage of administrative convenience. Critics consequently seldom question the value of civil affairs, but they do debate whether CA roles and functions are properly assigned. Arguments for and against change are virtually identical with those previously described for psychological operations:

- Congress might amend *Title 10* to relieve USSOCOM of civil affairs roles, since only a small fraction of all CA efforts support special operations. *DoD Directive 5100.1* then could order the Army to organize, equip, and train CA forces as a primary function.
- Civil affairs might suffer as a "stepchild" under Army control if *Title 10* remains unchanged. *DoD Directive 5100.1*, however, reportedly would have to formally designate civil affairs forces as SOF before USSOCOM could command, control, administer, and budgetarily support CA as congressional legislation intends.<sup>64</sup>

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<sup>61</sup>James R. Locher, III, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, interview in *Armed Forces Journal*, December 1992, p. 33.

<sup>62</sup>Correspondence from HQ., U.S. Marine Corps (Plans) to author, subject: *Marine Corps Civil Affairs*, December 23, 1992, 1 p.

<sup>63</sup>DoD responsibilities are delineated in *Joint Pub 0-2: Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)*, p. 4-14 through 4-21.

<sup>64</sup>See note 49.

## RECAPITULATION AND CULMINATING COMMENTS

Military roles and functions reflect evolving requirements. U.S. armed forces have passed through three distinctive stages since the American Revolution and recently entered a fourth.

The United States Army, Navy, and Marines successfully fought five major wars and many lesser campaigns between 1783 and 1927 before the Executive Branch formally began to assign Service functions. None were needed during that 144-year period, because overlapping responsibilities caused no serious interservice disputes.

Military aircraft so altered those simple relationships that the Secretary of War and Secretary of the Navy felt constrained to clarify certain responsibilities. *Joint Action of the Army and the Navy*, dated April 23, 1927, was the first U.S. document of its kind (Annex A). It lasted for 20 years, despite imperfections.

U.S. global security responsibilities after World War II, attendant costs of containing an expansionist Soviet Union, and interservice competition for control of expensive weapon systems (especially aircraft and guided missiles) prompted Congress to define the first statutory roles for each military Service in the *National Security Act of 1947* (Annex B). President Truman issued detailed Service functions on the same day in *Executive Order 9877* (Annex C). Refinements at Key West and Newport followed (Annexes D-E). Those formulas, with a few notable amendments, sufficed throughout the Cold War, which lasted almost 45 years.

Political, economic, social, and military upheavals since 1990 have encouraged demands for a fundamental review of Service roles and functions. A new set of multifaceted problems appeared when the Soviet military superpower and its Warsaw Pact partners collapsed. Perceived threats to U.S. national security now are regional and amorphous compared with the previous bipolar world. Nuclear weapons are much less important. Efforts to balance the federal budget and reduce immense deficits guarantee that fewer conventional forces will remain on DoD rolls. High price tags attached to high-technology hardware restrict steps to strengthen residual capabilities. Wasteful redundancies accordingly have become less conscionable than ever, although flexibilities may be no less valuable than in the past.

## SELECTED ISSUES

Reevaluation of U.S. military roles and functions is required to determine whether redundancies foster essential flexibility or raise costs without commensurately increasing capabilities; to ensure that responsibilities are properly distributed among U.S. military Services and Special Operations

Command; and to fill gaps that encourage interservice competition for scarce resources.

This report ventilates several issues that Congress and the Secretary of Defense could usefully resolve before they decide to consolidate, redistribute, augment, discard, or redefine statutory roles and primary functions expressed in *Title 10, United States Code* and in *DoD Directive 5100.1*. The list below highlights important decisions to be made:

### **Strategic Nuclear Responsibilities**

- Strategic Nuclear Retaliation (Air Force, Navy, or both?)
- Homeland Air and Missile Defense (All Air Force or share with Army?)

### **Conventional Combat Responsibilities**

- Theater Air and Missile Defense (All Air Force or multiservice responsibilities?)
- Battlefield Air Interdiction (All Air Force or multiservice responsibilities?)
- Close Air Support (Air Force and Marine Corps or multiservice responsibilities?)
- Rapid Response to Crises (Army and Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps, or multiservice responsibilities?)
- Peacekeeping (All Army or share mainly with Marine Corps?)
- Combat Search and Rescue (Multiservice responsibilities or U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM)?)

### **Special Operations Responsibilities**

- SOF Organization, Equipage, and Training (USSOCOM responsibility or share with Army, Navy, and Air Force?)
- Paramilitary Operations (USSOCOM or interdepartmental/interagency responsibility?)
- Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs (USSOCOM or Army responsibility?)

### **Culminating Comments**

*Title 10* and *DoD Directive 5100.1* tell U.S. military Services and Special operations Command what roles and functions each must perform to ensure

well-balanced armed forces with capabilities that U.S. combatant commands need to accomplish their assigned missions. Every change creates a ripple effect (imagine the transformation of football if revised rules forbade fullbacks to tackle or allowed linemen to forward pass). Decisionmakers consequently should strive to determine beforehand whether any given amendment would increase cost-effectiveness or deprive U.S. combat forces of desirable flexibility.

Paper reforms, however, produce best results only if common practices conform. As it stands, U.S. armed Services, past and present, have always felt free to acquire personnel, weapons, equipment, and supplies regardless of roles and functions. *Title 10* and *DoD Directive 5100.1* accordingly will remain less useful than architects intend until congressional committees and the Secretary of Defense use both documents more consistently than their predecessors did to help shape the U.S. military establishment.

## Annex A

## JOINT ACTION OF THE ARMY AND THE NAVY

## FOREWORD

1. It is vital to success in war that the Army and the Navy so coordinate their actions as to produce the most effective mutual support. To accomplish this it is essential that both services have a common, definite understanding of their respective functions in national defense and of the approved methods for attaining coordination in operations.

2. The aim of this publication is to assemble in one volume all joint policies, agreements, or instructions which have been approved by the War and Navy Departments, with a view to securing effective coordination. It is divided into two parts:

PART I.—Policies to govern joint Army and Navy action.

PART II.—Minor policies, agreements, and joint instructions which by providing effective organization and agencies for coordination, and by enunciating standard practice, promote harmonious joint action.

3. It is the intention to issue additional chapters to this publication covering the contents of Part II as soon as they can be prepared. The loose leaf form is adopted to permit this expansion and to facilitate revision of sections as may be found advisable.

DWIGHT F. DAVIS,  
*Secretary of War.*

CURTIS D. WILBUR,  
*Secretary of the Navy.*

APRIL 23, 1927.

## CHAPTER I

## POLICY AS TO RESPECTIVE FUNCTIONS OF THE ARMY AND NAVY

1. The following policy has been approved by The Joint Board, the Secretary of War, and the Secretary of the Navy, and is published for information and guidance.

**I. Purpose.**

2. The purpose of this statement of policy is to distinguish between the functions of the Army and the Navy in such a manner as to establish an authoritative and adequate basis for development, planning, procurement, and training of each service; and for their guidance in joint operations.

**II. Constitutional Basis.**

3. The Army and Navy are maintained to secure the objectives stated in the Preamble to the Constitution:

• • • to insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare • • •

They are required by the national need for political and territorial security; for the support of our national policies; and for the assurance of the supply of materials vital to the existence of the Nation.

4. The Army and the Navy together constitute the military power of the Nation of which, under the Constitution, the President is the Commander in Chief: therefore their acts derive authority from the direction of the President, either expressed or implied, and are directed to a common end.

**III. Common Mission of Army and Navy.**

5. Conjointly and in cooperation, to defend the territory of the United States against all enemies foreign or domestic; to protect and promote the interests and policies of the United States at home and abroad, in peace and in war.

**IV. Demarcation Between Army and Navy.**

6. To accomplish the above mission, the Army performs functions that normally pertain to land operations; the Navy performs functions that normally pertain to sea operations. Land and sea operations each include air operations over those elements. The President has the power to make exceptions to any general allocation of functions; and in some cases due to the nature of the forces available, the functions of one service may be temporarily performed by the other. The functions of the Army and Navy overlap in coastal operations and in joint overseas operations. The principle that should guide operations is:

Sea operations by the Army or land operations by the Navy are proper only when immediately auxiliary to the normal functions.

#### V. General Functions of the Army.

7. The general functions of the Army in time of peace are:

(a) To provide for the land defense of continental United States and its overseas possessions.

(b) To protect the United States from internal disorder or insurrection.

(c) To make provision for the expansion of the land forces to meet the needs of a major war.

(d) In exceptional cases, to furnish land forces for occupation of foreign territory in protection of the interests of the United States.

(e) To defend permanent naval bases required to insure to the Navy freedom of strategic action.

8. The general functions of the Army in time of war are:

(a) To conduct land operations in defense of United States territory.

(b) To conduct land operations in hostile territory. When this involves an advance of Army forces overseas such advance is dependent upon the Navy.

(c) To conduct land operations in support of the Navy for the establishment and defense of naval bases.

#### VI. General Functions of the Navy.

9. The general functions of the Navy in time of peace are:

(a) To safeguard the interests of the United States on the seas and in the territory of nations having irresponsible governments.

(b) To support the diplomatic policy of the United States.

(c) To make provision for the expansion of the sea forces to meet the needs of a major war.

10. The general functions of the Navy in time of war are:

(a) To conduct sea operations in defense of United States territory and United States interests on the sea.

(b) To conduct sea operations directed toward the defeat of the enemy.

These functions include:

(c) To defeat or contain the enemy fleet.

(d) To control vital sea communications by assuring safe passage to vessels supporting our effort and denying such passage to vessels supporting the enemy.

(e) To control coastal zones and sea lanes.

(f) To escort and support Army forces engaged in overseas operations.

(g) To establish and defend advanced naval bases.

**VII. General Functions of the Marine Corps.**

11. The general functions of the Marine Corps are, as an adjunct of the Navy, to provide and maintain forces:

(a) For land operations in support of the fleet for the initial seizure and defense of advanced bases and for such limited auxiliary land operations as are essential to the prosecution of the naval campaign.

(b) For emergency service in time of peace for protection of the interests of the United States in foreign countries.

(c) For Marine detachments on vessels of the fleet and for interior protection of naval shore stations.

12. As an adjunct of the Army, its general functions require the Marine Corps:

(a) To perform such duties on land as the President may direct.

## CHAPTER III

## FUNCTIONS OF ARMY AND NAVY AIR COMPONENTS

## I. Purpose.

1. The purpose of this statement of the functions of the air components of the Army and the Navy is to establish an authoritative and adequate policy for the development, planning, procurement, and training of the air components of each service and for the guidance of Army and Navy commanders in operations involving air components.

## II. General Functions.

2. It is the general function of Army and Navy air components, respectively, to conduct the air operations derived from the approved respective functions of the Army and Navy stated in "Policy as to Functions of the Army and Navy." Under this policy:

(a) The air component of the Army conducts air operations over the land and such air operations over the sea as are incident to the accomplishment of Army functions.

(b) The air component of the Navy conducts air operations over the sea and such air operations over the land as are incident to the accomplishment of Navy functions.

3. Aircraft by their nature are capable to a degree, dependent upon their design and upon the skill and training of their personnel, of performing either Army or Navy air functions, and available air strength should be used to the best advantage by either service in support of the other.

4. Army aircraft may temporarily execute Navy functions in support of or in lieu of Navy forces. Conversely, Navy aircraft may temporarily execute Army functions under like conditions.

## III. Primary Functions.

5. The air component of each service has a *primary function* to which its principal efforts are to be directed, both in peace and in war.

6. These primary functions are:

(a) Army air component to operate as an arm of the mobile Army.

(b) Navy air component to operate as an arm of the fleet.

## IV. Secondary Functions.

7. Secondary functions of the air component of the Army are:

(a) Air operations in connection with the local defense of cities, important harbors, munition plants, or other fixed installations, in United States territory.

(b) Air operations in support of or in lieu of naval forces.

8. Secondary functions of the air component of the Navy are:

(a) Air operations in support of local naval defense forces operating for the protection of lines of sea communications and coastal zones against attacks by hostile submarines and surface raiders.

(b) Air operations in support of or in lieu of Army forces.

#### V. Marine Corps Air Component.

9. The Marine Corps air component is a part of the Navy air component and its function is to operate as a part of the naval air component, particularly in operations incident to Marine Corps functions, for which operations the Navy may provide land-based aircraft.

#### VI. Provisions to Minimize Duplication.

10. The functions assigned in Sections III and IV to the Army air component require the Army to provide and maintain all types of aircraft primarily designed and used for operations of the Army in the interior or in repelling developed attacks on our coast, or in defense against air raids directed at shore objectives or at shipping within our harbors.

11. The functions assigned in Sections III and IV to the Navy air component require the Navy to provide and maintain all types of aircraft primarily designed and ordinarily used in operations from aircraft carriers or other vessels, or based on aircraft tenders, or for operations from shore bases for oversea scouting, and for the observation and patrol of sea communications and their defense against raids.

12. To avoid duplication in peace-time procurement, the Navy's land-based aircraft procured for the conduct of the secondary functions of naval air component will be limited to those primarily designed and ordinarily used for scouting and patrolling over the sea. The Army will not provide such aircraft at points within the normal operating radius of a place where the Navy has provided them in numbers sufficient to meet Army peace-time requirements, or where the Navy will so provide them at the request of the Secretary of War. These restrictions on peace-time procurement are not to be construed to debar aircraft of either service from using any weapon that they can carry or to preclude the use in war of any aircraft that can be made available.

13. Projects of the Army and Navy relating to their respective air components, including estimates for appropriations, shall, in peace time, with a view to insuring the minimum of overlap and duplication, be considered by the Aeronautical Board prior to being used as a basis for action.

#### VII. Coordination of Air Operations.

14. When a situation develops in which a force of one service can support by aircraft only, a force of the service having paramount interest in the particular operation, unity of command for the conduct of the participating air forces shall be immediately vested in the commander of the force to be supported.

15. When air units of the Army and the Navy are combined into one task force for the accomplishment of a common mission, the commander assigning the mission shall designate an officer to exercise unity of command over such task force during the conduct of the operation.

**Annex B**

**NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947  
(Excerpts)**

PUBLIC LAW 253--July 26, 1947

Public Law 253

Chapter 343

AN ACT

To promote the national security by providing for a Secretary of Defense; for a National Military Establishment; for a Department of the Army, a Department of the Navy, and a Department of the Air Force; and for the coordination of the activities of the National Military Establishment with other departments and agencies of the Government concerned with the national security.

BE IT ENACTED BY THE SENATE AND HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA IN CONGRESS ASSEMBLED,

Short Title

That this Act may be cited as the "National Security Act of 1947".

## Department of the Army

Sec. 205. (a) The Department of War shall hereafter be designated the Department of the Army, and the title of the Secretary of War shall be changed to Secretary of the Army. Changes shall be made in the titles of other officers and activities of the Department of the Army as the Secretary of the Army may determine.

(b) All laws, orders, regulations, and other actions relating to the Department of War or to any officer or activity whose title is changed under this section shall, insofar as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, be deemed to relate to the Department of the Army within the National Military Establishment or to such officer or activity designated by his or its new title.

(c) The term "Department of the Army" as used in this Act shall be construed to mean the Department of the Army at the seat of government and all field headquarters, forces, reserve components, installations, activities, and functions under the control or supervision of the Department of the Army.

(d) The Secretary of the Army shall cause a seal of office to be made for the Department of the Army, of such design as the President may approve, and judicial notice shall be taken thereof.

(e) In general the United States Army, within the Department of the Army, shall include land combat and service forces and such aviation and water transport as may be organic therein. It shall be organized, trained, and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained combat incident to operations on land. It shall be responsible for the preparation of land forces necessary for the effective prosecution of war except as otherwise assigned and, in accordance with integrated joint mobilization plans, for the expansion of peacetime components of the Army to meet the needs of war.

## Department of the Navy

Sec. 206. (a) The term "Department of the Navy" as used in this Act shall be construed to mean the Department of the Navy at the seat of government; the headquarters, United States Marine Corps; the entire operating force of the United States Navy, including naval aviation, and of the United States Marine Corps, including the reserve components of such forces; all field activities, headquarters, forces, bases, installations, activities, and functions under the control or supervision of the Department of the Navy; and the United States Coast Guard when operating as a part of the Navy pursuant to law.

(b) In general the United States Navy, within the Department of the Navy, shall include naval combat and services forces and such aviation as may be organic therein. It shall be organized, trained, and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained combat incident to operations at sea. It shall be

responsible for the preparation of naval forces necessary for the effective prosecution of war except as otherwise assigned, and, in accordance with integrated joint mobilization plans, for the expansion of the peacetime components of the Navy to meet the needs of war.

All naval aviation shall be integrated with the naval service as part thereof within the Department of the Navy. Naval aviation shall consist of combat and service and training forces, and shall include land-based naval aviation, air transport essential for naval operations, all air weapons and air techniques involved in the operations and activities of the United States Navy, and the entire remainder of the aeronautical organization of the United States Navy, together with the personnel necessary therefor.

The Navy shall be generally responsible for naval reconnaissance, antisubmarine warfare, and protection of shipping.

The Navy shall develop aircraft, weapons, tactics, technique, organization and equipment of naval combat and service elements; matters of joint concern as to these functions shall be coordinated between the Army, the Air Force, and the Navy.

(c) The United States Marine Corps, within the Department of the Navy, shall include land combat and service forces and such aviation as may be organic therein. The Marine Corps shall be organized, trained, and equipped to provide fleet marine forces of combined arms, together with supporting air components, for service with the fleet in the seizure or defense of advanced naval bases and for the conduct of such land operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign. It shall be the duty of the Marine Corps to develop, in coordination with the Army and the Air Force, those phases of amphibious operations which pertain to the tactics, technique, and equipment employed by landing forces. In addition, the Marine Corps shall provide detachments and organizations for service on armed vessels of the Navy, shall provide security detachments for the protection of naval property at naval stations and bases, and shall perform such other duties as the President may direct: PROVIDED, That such additional duties shall not detract from or interfere with the operations for which the Marine Corps is primarily organized. The Marine Corps shall be responsible, in accordance with integrated joint mobilization plans, for the expansion of peacetime components of the Marine Corps to meet the needs of war.

#### Department of the Air Force

Sec. 207. (a) Within the National Military Establishment there is hereby established an executive department to be known as the Department of the Air Force, and a Secretary of the Air Force, who shall be the head thereof. The Secretary of the Air Force shall be appointed from civilian life by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.

(b) Section 158 of the Revised Statutes is amended to include the Department of the Air Force and the provisions of so much of Title IV of the Revised Statutes as now or hereafter amended as is not inconsistent with the Act shall be applicable to the Department of the Air Force.

(c) The term "Department of the Air Force" as used in this Act shall be construed to mean the Department of the Air Force at the seat of government and all field headquarters, forces, reserve components, installations, activities, and functions under the control or supervision of the Department of the Air Force.

(d) There shall be in the Department of the Air Force an Under Secretary of the Air Force and two Assistant Secretaries of the Air Force, who shall be appointed from civilian life by the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.

(e) The several officers of the Department of the Air Force shall perform such functions as the Secretary of the Air Force may prescribe.

(f) So much of the functions of the Secretary of the Army and of the Department of the Army, including those of any officer of such Department, as are assigned to or under the control of the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, or as are deemed by the Secretary of Defense to be necessary or desirable for the operations of the Department of the Air Force or the United States Air Force, shall be transferred to and vested in the Secretary of the Air Force and the Department of the Air Force: PROVIDED, That the National Guard Bureau shall, in addition to the functions and duties performed by it for the Department of the Army, be charged with similar functions and duties for the Department of the Air Force, and shall be the channel of communication between the Department of the Air Force and the several States on all matters pertaining to the Air National Guard: AND PROVIDED FURTHER, That in order to permit an orderly transfer, the Secretary of Defense may, during the transfer period hereinafter prescribed, direct that the Department of the Army shall continue for appropriate periods to exercise any of such functions, insofar as they relate to the Department of the Air Force, or the United States Air Force or their property and personnel. Such of the property, personnel, and records of the Department of the Army used in the exercise of functions transferred under this subsection as the Secretary of Defense shall determine shall be transferred or assigned to the Department of the Air Force.

(g) The Secretary of the Air Force shall cause a seal of office to be made for the Department of the Air Force, of such device as the President shall approve, and judicial notice shall be taken thereof.

#### United States Air Force

Sec. 208. (a) The United States Air Force is hereby established under the Department of the Air Force. The Army Air Forces, the Air Corps, United States Army, and the General Headquarters Air Force (Air Force Combat Command), shall be transferred to the United States Air Force.

(b) There shall be a Chief of Staff, United States Air Force, who shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, for a term of four years from among the officers of general rank who are assigned to or commissioned in the United States Air Force. Under the direction of the Secretary of the Air Force, the Chief of Staff, United States Air Force, shall exercise command over the United States Air Force and shall be charged with the duty of carrying into execution all lawful orders and directions which may be transmitted to him. The functions of the Commanding General, General Headquarters Air Force (Air Force Combat Command), and of the Chief of the Air Corps and of the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, shall be transferred to the Chief of Staff, United States Air Force. When such transfer becomes effective, the offices of the Chief of the Air Corps, United States Army, and Assistants to the Chief of the Air Corps, United States Army, provided for by the Act of June 4, 1920, as amended (41 Stat. 768), and Commanding General, General Headquarters Air Force, provided for by section 5 of the Act of June 16, 1936 (49 Stat. 1525), shall cease to exist. While holding office as Chief of Staff, United States Air Force, the incumbent shall hold a grade and receive allowances equivalent to those prescribed by law for the Chief of Staff, United States Army. The Chief of Staff, United States Army, the Chief of Naval Operations, and the Chief of Staff, United States Air Force, shall take rank among themselves according to their relative dates of appointment as such, and shall each take rank above all other officers on the active list of the Army, Navy, and Air Force: PROVIDED, That nothing in this Act shall have the effect of changing the relative rank of the present Chief of Staff, United States Army, and the present Chief of Naval Operations.

(c) All commissioned officers, warrant officers, and enlisted men, commissioned, holding warrants, or enlisted, in the Air Corps, United States Army, or the Army Air Forces, shall be transferred in branch to the United States Air Force. All other commissioned officers, warrant officers, and enlisted men, who are commissioned, hold warrants, or are enlisted, in any component of the Army of the United States and who are under the authority or command of the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, shall be continued under the authority or command of the Chief of Staff, United States Air Force, and under the jurisdiction of the Department of the Air Force. Personnel whose status is affected by this subsection shall retain their existing commissions, warrants, or enlisted status in existing components of the armed forces unless otherwise altered or terminated in accordance with existing law; and they shall not be deemed to have been appointed to a new or different office or grade, or to have vacated their permanent or temporary appointments in an existing component of the armed forces, solely by virtue of any change in status under this subsection. No such change in status shall alter or prejudice the status of any individual so assigned, so as to deprive him of any right, benefit, or privilege to which he may be entitled under existing law.

(d) Except as otherwise directed by the Secretary of the Air Force, all property, records, installations, agencies, activities, projects, and civilian personnel under the jurisdiction, control, authority, or command of the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, shall be continued to the same extent under the jurisdiction, control, authority, or command, respectively, of the Chief of Staff, United States Air Force, in the Department of the Air Force.

(e) For a period of two years from the date of enactment of this Act, personnel (both military and civilian), property, records, installations, agencies, activities, and projects may be transferred between the Department of the Army and the Department of the Air Force by direction of the Secretary of Defense.

(f) In general the United States Air Force shall include aviation forces both combat and service not otherwise assigned. It shall be organized, trained, and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained offensive and defensive air operations. The Air Force shall be responsible for the preparation of the air forces necessary for the effective prosecution of war except as otherwise assigned and, in accordance with integrated joint mobilization plans, for the expansion of the peacetime components of the Air Force to meet the needs of war.

**Annex C****EXECUTIVE ORDER 9877  
Functions of the Armed Forces**

By virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and as President of the United States and Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States, I hereby prescribe the following assignment of primary functions and responsibilities to the three armed services.

Section I - The Common Missions of the Armed Forces of the United States are:

1. To support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign or domestic.
2. To maintain, by timely and effective military action, the security of the United States, its possessions and areas vital to its interest.
3. To uphold and advance the national policies and interests of the United States.
4. To safeguard the internal security of the United States as directed by higher authority.
5. To conduct integrated operations on the land, on the sea, and in the air necessary for these purposes.

In order to facilitate the accomplishment of the foregoing missions the armed forces shall formulate integrated plans and make coordinated preparations. Each service shall observe the general principles and fulfill the specific functions outlined below, and shall make use of the personnel, equipment and facilities of the other services in all cases where economy and effectiveness will thereby be increased.

Section II - Functions of the United States Army

General

The United States Army includes land combat and service forces and such aviation and water transport as may be organic therein. It is organized, trained and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained combat incident to operations on land. The Army is responsible for the preparation of land forces necessary for the effective prosecution of war, and, in accordance with integrated joint mobilization plans, for the expansion of peacetime components of the Army to meet the needs of war.

The specific functions of the United States Army are:

1. To organize, train and equip land forces for:

- a. Operations on land, including joint operations.
  - b. The seizure or defense of land areas, including airborne and joint amphibious operations.
  - c. The occupation of land areas.
2. To develop weapons, tactics, technique, organization and equipment of Army combat and service elements, coordinating with the Navy and the Air Force in all aspects of joint concern, including those which pertain to amphibious and airborne operations.
  3. To provide, as directed by proper authority, such missions and detachments for service in foreign countries as may be required to support the national policies and interests of the United States.
  4. To assist the Navy and Air Forces in the accomplishment of their missions, including the provision of common services and supplies as determined by proper authority.

### Section III-Functions of the United States Navy

#### General

The United States Navy includes naval combat and service forces, naval aviation, and the United States Marine Corps. It is organized, trained and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained combat at sea. The Navy is responsible for the preparation of naval forces necessary for the effective prosecution of war, and in accordance with integrated joint mobilization plans, for the expansion of the peacetime components of the Navy to meet the needs of war.

The specific functions of the United States Navy are:

1. To organize, train and equip naval forces for:
  - a. Operations at sea, including joint operations.
  - b. The control of vital sea areas, the protection of vital sea lanes, and the suppression of enemy sea commerce.
  - c. The support of occupation forces as required.
  - d. The seizure of minor enemy shore positions capable of reduction by such landing forces as may be comprised within the fleet organization.
  - e. Naval reconnaissance, antisubmarine warfare, and protection of shipping. The air aspects of those functions shall be coordinated with the Air Force, including the development and procurement of aircraft, and air installations located on shore, and use shall be made of Air Force personnel, equipment and facilities in all cases where economy and effectiveness will thereby be increased. Subject to the above provision, the Navy will not be restricted as to types of aircraft maintained and operated for these purposes.

- f. The air transport necessary for essential internal administration and for air transport over routes of sole interest to naval forces where the requirements cannot be met by normal air transport facilities.
2. To develop weapons, tactics, technique, organization and equipment of naval combat and service elements, coordinating with the Army and the Air Force in all aspects of joint concern, including those which pertain to amphibious operations.
3. To provide, as directed by proper authority, such missions and detachments for service in foreign countries as may be required to support the national policies and interests of the United States.
4. To maintain the U.S. Marine Corps whose specific functions are:
  - a. To provide Marine Forces together with supporting air components, for service with the Fleet in the seizure or defense of advanced naval bases and for the conduct of limited land operations in connection therewith.
  - b. To develop, in coordination with the Army and the Air Force those phases of amphibious operations which pertain to the tactics, technique and equipment employed by landing forces.
  - c. To provide detachments and organizations for service on armed vessels of the Navy.
  - d. To provide security detachments for protection of naval property at naval stations and bases.
  - e. To provide, as directed by proper authority, such missions and detachments for service in foreign countries as may be required to support the national policies and interests of the United States.
5. To assist the Army and the Air Force in the accomplishment of their missions, including the provision of common services and supplies as determined by proper authority.

#### Section IV-Functions of the United States Air Force

##### General

The United States Air Force includes all military aviation forces, both combat and service, not otherwise specifically assigned. It is organized, trained, and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained air offensive and defensive operations. The Air Force is responsible for the preparation of the air forces necessary for the effective prosecution of war except as otherwise assigned and, in accordance with integrated joint mobilization plans, for the expansion of the peacetime components of the Air Force to meet the needs of war.

The specific functions of the United States Air Force are:

1. To organize, train and equip air forces for:
  - a. Air operations including joint operations.
  - b. Gaining and maintaining general air supremacy.
  - c. Establishing local air superiority where and as required.
  - d. The strategic air force of the United States and strategic air reconnaissance.
  - e. Air lift and support for airborne operations.
  - f. Air support to land forces and naval forces, including support of occupation forces.
  - g. Air transport for the armed forces, except as provided by the Navy in accordance with paragraph 1f of Section III.
2. To develop weapons, tactics, technique, organization and equipment of Air Force combat and service elements, coordinating with the Army and Navy on all aspects of joint concern, including those which pertain to amphibious and airborne operations.
3. To provide, as directed by proper authority, such missions and detachments for service in foreign countries as may be required to support the national policies and interests of the United States.
4. To provide the means for coordination of air defense among all services.
5. To assist the Army and Navy in accomplishment of their missions, including the provision of common services and supplies as determined by proper authority.

HARRY S. TRUMAN

THE WHITE HOUSE  
July 26, 1947

## Annex D

**KEY WEST AGREEMENT  
AND  
EXECUTIVE ORDER 9950**

THE WHITE HOUSE

April 21, 1948

Honorable James Forrestal  
Secretary of Defense  
Washington, D.C.  
My dear Mr. Secretary:

In reply to your letter of March 27, 1948, I have today issued an Executive Order revoking Executive Order 9877, of July 26, 1947. In its stead, I wish you to issue the statement of functions of the Armed Forces and the Joint Chiefs of Staff which has been drawn up by you and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Very sincerely yours,  
/s/ Harry S. Truman

21 April 1948

Functions of the Armed Forces  
and the Joint Chiefs of Staff

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Introduction

- Section I--Principles
- Section II--Common Functions of the Armed Forces
- Section III--Functions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
- Section IV--Functions of the United States Army
- Section V--Functions of the United States Navy and Marine Corps
- Section VI--Functions of the United States Air Force
- Section VII--Glossary of Terms and Definitions

Introduction

Congress, in the National Security Act of 1947, has described the basic policy embodied in the Act in the following terms:

"In enacting this legislation, it is the intent of Congress to provide a comprehensive program for the future security of the United States; to provide for the establishment of integrated policies and procedures for the departments, agencies, and functions of the government relating to the national security; to pro-

vide three military departments for the operation and administration of the Army, the Navy (including naval aviation and the United States Marine Corps), and the Air Force, with their assigned combat and service components; to provide for their authoritative coordination and unified direction under civilian control but not to merge them; to provide for the effective strategic direction of the armed forces and for their operation under unified control and for their integration into an efficient team of land, naval and air forces."

In accordance with the policy declared by Congress, and in accordance with the provisions of the National Security Act of 1947, and to provide guidance for the departments and the joint agencies of the National Military Establishment, the Secretary of Defense, by direction of the President, hereby promulgates the following statement of the functions of the Armed Forces and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

### Section I--Principles

1. There shall be the maximum practicable integration of the policies and procedures of the departments and agencies of the National Military Establishment. This does not imply a merging of Armed Forces, but does demand a consonance and correlation of policies and procedures throughout the National Military Establishment in order to produce an effective, economical, harmonious and businesslike organization which will insure the military security of the United States.

2. The functions stated herein shall be carried out in such a manner as to achieve the following:

- a. Effective strategic direction of the Armed Forces.
- b. Operation of Armed Forces under unified command, wherever such unified command is in the best interest of national security.
- c. Integration of the Armed Forces into an efficient team of land, naval, and air forces.
- d. Prevention of unnecessary duplication or overlapping among the Services, by utilization of the personnel, intelligence, facilities, equipment, supplies and services of any or all Services in all cases where military effectiveness and economy of resources will thereby be increased.
- e. Coordination of Armed Forces operations to promote efficiency and economy and to prevent gaps in responsibility.

3. It is essential that there be full utilization and exploitation of the weapons, techniques, and intrinsic capabilities of each of the Services in any military situation where this will contribute effectively to the attainment of over-all military objectives. In effecting this, collateral as well as primary functions will be assigned. It is recognized that assignment of collateral functions may establish further justification for stated force requirements, but such assignment shall not be used as the basis for establishing additional force requirements.

4. Doctrines, procedures, and plans covering joint operations and joint exercises shall be jointly prepared. Primary responsibility for development of certain doctrines and procedures is hereinafter assigned.

5. Technological developments, variations in the availability of manpower and natural resources, changing economic conditions, and changes in the world politico-military situation may dictate the desirability of changes in the present assignment of specific functions and responsibilities to the individual Services. This determination and the initiation of implementing action are the responsibility of the Secretary of Defense.

#### Section IV--Functions of the United States Army

The United States Army includes land combat and service forces and such aviation and water transport as may be organic therein. It is organized, trained, and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained combat operations on land. Of the three major Services, the Army has primary interest in all operations on land, except in those operations otherwise assigned herein.

##### A. Primary Functions

1. To organize, train, and equip Army forces for the conduct of prompt and sustained combat operations on land. Specifically:
  - a. To defeat enemy land forces.
  - b. To seize, occupy, and defend land areas.
2. To organize, train, and equip Army antiaircraft artillery units.
3. To organize and equip, in coordination with the other Services, and to provide Army forces for joint amphibious and airborne operations, and to provide for the training of such forces in accordance with policies and doctrines of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
4. To develop, in coordination with the other Services, tactics, technique, and equipment of interest to the Army for amphibious operations and not provided for in Section V, paragraph A 4 and paragraph A 11 c.
5. To provide an organization capable of furnishing adequate, timely, and reliable intelligence for the Army.
6. To provide Army forces as required for the defense of the United States against air attack, in accordance with joint doctrines and procedures approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
7. To provide forces, as directed by proper authority, for occupation of territories abroad, to include initial establishment of military government pending transfer of this responsibility to other authority.
8. To develop, in coordination with the Navy, the Air Force, and the Marine Corps, the doctrines, procedures, and equipment employed by Army and Marine forces in airborne operations. The Army shall have primary interest in the development of these airborne doctrines, procedures and equipment which are of common interest to the Army and the Marine Corps.

9. To formulate doctrines and procedures for the organization, equipping, training, and employment of forces operating on land, at division level and above, including division corps, army, and general reserve troops, except that the formulation of doctrines and procedures for the organization, equipping, training, and employment of Marine Corps units for amphibious operations shall be a function of the Department of the Navy, coordinating as required by paragraph A 11 c, Section V.

10. To provide support, as directed by higher authority, for the following activities.

a. The administration and operation of the Panama Canal.

b. River and harbor projects in the United States, its territories, and possessions.

c. Certain other civil activities prescribed by law.

B. Collateral Functions. The forces developed and trained to perform the primary functions set forth above shall be employed to support and supplement the other Services in carrying out their primary functions, where and whenever such participation will result in increased effectiveness and will contribute to the accomplishment of the over-all military objectives. The Joint Chiefs of Staff member of the Service having primary responsibility for a function shall be the agent of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to present to that body the requirements for and plans for the employment of all forces to carry out the function. He shall also be responsible for presenting to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for final decision any disagreement within the field of his primary responsibility which has not been resolved. This shall not be construed to prevent any member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from presenting unilaterally any issue of disagreement with another Service. Certain specific collateral functions of the Army are listed below:

1. To interdict enemy sea and air power and communications through operations on or from land.

2. To provide forces and equipment for and to conduct controlled mine field operations.<sup>1</sup>

#### Section V--Functions of the United States Navy and Marine Corps

Within the Department of the Navy, assigned forces include the entire operating forces of the United States Navy, including naval aviation, and the United States Marine Corps. These forces are organized, trained, and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained combat operations at sea, and for air and land operations incident thereto. Of the three major Services, the Navy has primary interest in all operations at sea, except in those operations otherwise assigned herein.

##### A. Primary Functions

1. To organize, train, and equip Navy and Marine Forces for the conduct of prompt and sustained combat operations at sea, including operations of sea-based aircraft and their land-based

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<sup>1</sup>This collateral function was transferred from the Army to the Navy by the direction of the Secretary of Defense on 24 May 1949.

naval air components. Specifically:

- a. To seek out and destroy enemy naval forces and to suppress enemy sea commerce.
  - b. To gain and maintain general sea supremacy.
  - c. To control vital sea areas and to protect vital sea lines of communication.
  - d. To establish and maintain local superiority (including air) in an area of naval operations.
  - e. To seize and defend advanced naval bases and to conduct such land operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign.
2. To conduct air operations as necessary for the accomplishment of objectives in a naval campaign.
  3. To organize and equip, in coordination with the other Services, and to provide Naval forces, including Naval close air support forces, for the conduct of joint amphibious operations, and to be responsible for the amphibious training of all forces as assigned for joint amphibious operations in accordance with the policies and doctrines of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
  4. To develop, in coordination with the other Services, the doctrines, procedures, and equipment of naval forces for amphibious operations, and the doctrines and procedures for joint amphibious operations.
  5. To furnish adequate, timely, and reliable intelligence for the Navy and Marine Corps.
  6. To be responsible for naval reconnaissance, antisubmarine warfare, the protection of shipping, and for mine laying, including the air aspects thereof.<sup>2</sup>
  7. To provide air transport essential for naval operations.
  8. To provide sea-based air defense and the sea-based means for coordinating control for defense against air attack, coordinating with the other Services in matters of joint concern.
  9. To provide naval (including naval air) forces as required for the defense of the United States against air attack, in accordance with joint doctrines and procedures approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
  10. To furnish aerial photography as necessary for naval and Marine Corps operations.
  11. To maintain the United States Marine Corps, which shall include land combat and service forces and such aviation as may be organic therein. Its specific functions are:
    - a. To provide Fleet Marine Forces of combined arms, together with supporting air components, for service with the Fleet in the seizure or defense of advanced naval bases and for the conduct of such land operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign. These functions do not contemplate the creation of a second land army.

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<sup>2</sup>The words "and controlled mine field operations" were added to this paragraph by direction of the Secretary of Defense on 24 May 1949.

b. To provide detachments and organizations for service on armed vessels of the Navy, and security detachments for the protection of naval property at naval stations and bases.

c. To develop, in coordination with the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force, the tactics, technique, and equipment employed by landing forces in amphibious operations. The Marine Corps shall have primary interest in the development of those landing force tactics, technique, and equipment which are of common interest to the Army and the Marine Corps.

d. To train and equip, as required, Marine Forces for airborne operations, in coordination with the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force in accordance with policies and doctrines of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

e. To develop, in coordination with the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force, doctrines, procedures, and equipment of interest to the Marine Corps for airborne operations and not provided for in Section IV, paragraph A 8.

12. To provide forces, as directed by proper authority for the establishment of military government, pending transfer of this responsibility to other authority.

B. Collateral Functions. The forces developed and trained to perform the primary functions set forth above shall be employed to support and supplement the other Services in carrying out their primary functions, where and whenever such participation will result in increased effectiveness and will contribute to the accomplishment of the over-all military objectives. The Joint Chiefs of Staff member of the service having primary responsibility for a function shall be the agent of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to present to that body the requirements for and plans for the employment of all forces to carry out the function. He shall also be responsible for presenting to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for final decision any disagreement within the field of his primary responsibility which has not been resolved. This shall not be construed to prevent any member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from presenting unilaterally any issue of disagreement with another Service. Certain specific collateral functions of the Navy and Marine Corps are listed below:

1. To interdict enemy land and air power and communications through operation at sea.
2. To conduct close air support for land operations.
3. To furnish aerial photography for cartographic purposes.
4. To be prepared to participate in the over-all air effort as directed by the Joint Chiefs of staff.

#### Section VI--Functions of the United States Air Force

The United States Air Force includes air combat and service forces. It is organized, trained, and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained combat operations in the air. Of the three major Services, the Air Force has primary interest in all operations in the air, except in those operations otherwise assigned herein.

### A. Primary Functions

1. To organize, train and equip Air Force forces for the conduct of prompt and sustained combat operations in the air. Specifically:

a. To be responsible for defense of the United States against air attack in accordance with the policies and procedures of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

b. To gain and maintain general air supremacy.

c. To defeat enemy air forces.

d. To control vital air areas.

e. To establish local air superiority except as otherwise assigned herein.

2. To formulate joint doctrines and procedures, in coordination with the other Services, for the defense of the United States against air attack, and to provide the Air Force units, facilities, and equipment required therefor.

3. To be responsible for strategic air warfare.

4. To organize and equip Air Force forces for joint amphibious and airborne operations, in coordination with the other Services, and to provide for their training in accordance with policies and doctrines of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

5. To furnish close combat and logistical air support to the Army, to include air lift, support, and resupply of airborne operations, aerial photography, tactical reconnaissance, and interdiction of enemy land power and communications.

6. To provide air transport for the Armed Forces except as otherwise assigned.

7. To provide Air Force forces for land-based air defense, coordinating with the other Services in matters of joint concern.

8. To develop, in coordination with the other Services, doctrines, procedures, and equipment for air defense from land areas, including the continental United States.

9. To provide an organization capable of furnishing adequate, timely, and reliable intelligence for the Air Force.

10. To furnish aerial photography for cartographic purposes.

11. To develop, in coordination with the other Services, tactics, technique, and equipment of interest to the Air Force for amphibious operations and not provided for in Section V, paragraph A 4 and paragraph A 11 c.

12. To develop, in coordination with the other Services, doctrines, procedures, and equipment employed by Air Force forces in airborne operations.

B. Collateral Functions. The forces developed and trained to perform the primary functions set forth above shall be employed to support and supplement the other Services in carrying out their primary functions, where and whenever such participation will result in increased effectiveness and will contribute to the accomplishment of the over-all military objectives. The Joint Chiefs of Staff member of the Service having primary responsibility for a function shall be the agent of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to present to that body the requirements for and plans for the employment of all forces to carry out the function. He shall also be responsible for presenting to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for final decision any disagreement within the field of his pri-

mary responsibility which has not been resolved. This shall not be construed to prevent any member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from presenting unilaterally any issue of disagreement with another Service. Certain specific collateral functions of the Air Force are listed below:

1. To interdict enemy sea power through air operations.
2. To conduct antisubmarine warfare and to protect shipping.
3. To conduct aerial minelaying operations.

#### THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

21 April 1948

#### MEMORANDUM FOR:

The Secretary of The Army  
 The Secretary of the Navy  
 The Secretary of The Air Force  
 Joint Chiefs of Staff

Attached is a signed copy of the paper defining the functions of the Armed Forces and the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Attached also is a photostatic copy of President Truman's letter, approving this paper.

The only change in the paper, as executed, occurs in the third line from the bottom of page 1 where the words "by direction of the President" have been added.

/s/ James Forrestal

#### EXECUTIVE ORDER 9950

Revoking Executive Order No. 9877 of July 26, 1947,  
 Prescribing the Functions of the Armed Forces

By virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and as President of the United States and Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States, it is ordered that Executive Order No. 9877 of July 26, 1947, prescribing the assignment of primary functions and responsibilities to the three armed services, be, and it is hereby, revoked.

Harry S Truman

THE WHITE HOUSE  
 April 21, 1948

**Annex E****NEWPORT AGREEMENT**

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
Washington

23 August 1948

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD**

**SUBJECT:** Newport Conference--Summary of Conclusions Reached and Decisions Made (Decisions with respect to command arrangements are included in a separate Memorandum for the Record, dated 23 August 1948, and entitled "Newport Conference--Decisions with Respect to Command").

At the conferences in Newport from 20 August to 22 August, the following actions were taken:

**1. CONTROL AND DIRECTION OF ATOMIC OPERATIONS.** (Herein of the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project)

a. Planning for the Atomic Aspects of "Halfmoon": It was agreed that, as an interim measure, the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force should, as heretofore proposed by General Bradley, direct the Chief, Armed Forces Special Weapons Project to report to the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force for instructions of the atomic aspects of "Halfmoon". This directive should be identical with the proposed directive attached to the memorandum from General Bradley to the Secretary of Defense of 3 August 1948, except that its title would be modified by inserting the word "interim" at the front of the title.

b. Permanent Organization: It was agreed to postpone any decision concerning the permanent future organization for the control and direction of atomic operations until the current study of the Military Liaison Committee could be completed.

**2. CLARIFICATION OF THE TERM "PRIMARY MISSION" IN THE FUNCTIONS PAPER**

a. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended, and the Secretary of Defense approved the issuance of the following supplement to his paper on "Functions of the Armed forces and the Joint Chiefs of Staff" which was attached to his memorandum to the Joint Chiefs of Staff of 21 April 1948:

"Subject to control by higher authority, each service, in the fields of its primary missions, must have exclusive responsibility for planning and programming and the necessary authority. In the execution of any mission of the armed services, all available

resources must be used to the maximum overall effectiveness. For this reason, the exclusive responsibility and authority in a given field do not imply preclusive participation. In providing for our armed forces, including the preparation of the annual budget and the preparation of mobilization plans, it is essential to avoid duplication and the wastage of resources therefrom. For this reason the service having the primary function must determine the requirements, but in determining those requirements must take into account the contributions which may be made by forces from other services."

b. It was agreed that the effectiveness of the foregoing decision would depend upon (1) the spirit in which it was carried out; (2) general acceptance of the view that the decision was not in any wise a victory or defeat for any service, and (3) mutual acceptance on the part of all concerned of the obligation to work amicably to settle any differences arising under the decision, and to anticipate, and resolve in advance, any prospective differences. To this end, it was agreed that the Secretary of Defense, together with the three service Chiefs of Staff, should assemble the top members of their staffs at a meeting on Tuesday, 24 August for the purpose of describing and explaining the foregoing decision. It was also suggested that an effort should be made to secure newspaper cooperation in making clear the precise consequences of the decision, putting it up to the various journalist protagonists that this program could only work with their cooperation.

### 3. ESTABLISHMENT OF A WEAPONS EVALUATION GROUP

a. It was agreed that the establishment of a weapons evaluation group is desirable and necessary.

b. Although no final decision was reached as to the precise form of organization for a weapons evaluation group, it appeared to be the consensus of opinion that the group should be organized directly under the Joint Chiefs of Staff but that the Joint Chiefs of Staff should call upon Dr. Bush to organize the group and get it operating. It was also suggested that the civilian chief or civilian deputy chief of the group (depending on which of these two jobs was made a civilian job) might well be nominated by the Research and Development Board.

c. It was agreed that Mr. Forrestal and Mr. Carpenter would discuss this organizational problem further with Dr. Bush, as soon as Dr. Bush returned to Washington, specifically suggesting the solution referred to in b. above. Thereafter, and depending upon the outcome of the meeting with Bush, there should be another meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

JOHN H. OHLY  
Special Assistant to the Secretary

Attachment [not printed]

## Annex F

## CURRENT ROLES AND FUNCTIONS

## ARMY

## Title 10, United States Code, Chapter 307

## § 3062. Policy; composition; organized peace establishment

(a) It is the intent of Congress to provide an Army that is capable, in conjunction with the other armed forces, of—

- (1) preserving the peace and security, and providing for the defense, of the United States, the Territories, Commonwealths, and possessions, and any areas occupied by the United States;
- (2) supporting the national policies;
- (3) implementing the national objectives; and

(4) overcoming any nations responsible for aggressive acts that imperil the peace and security of the United States.

(b) In general, the Army, within the Department of the Army, includes land combat and service forces and such aviation and water transport as may be organic therein. It shall be organized, trained, and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained combat incident to operations on land. It is responsible for the preparation of land forces necessary for the effective prosecution of war except as otherwise assigned and, in accordance with integrated joint mobilization plans, for the expansion of the peacetime components of the Army to meet the needs of war.

## DoD Directive 5100.1 (September 25, 1987)

(1) The Army, within the Department of the Army, includes land combat and service forces and any organic aviation and water transport assigned. The Army is responsible for the preparation of land forces necessary for the effective prosecution of war and military operations short of war, except as otherwise assigned and, in accordance with integrated joint mobilization plans, for the expansion of the peacetime components of the Army to meet the needs of war.

(2) The primary functions of the Army are:

(a) To organize, train, and equip forces for the conduct of prompt and sustained combat operations on land--specifically, forces to defeat enemy land forces and to seize, occupy, and defend land areas.

(b) To organize, train, equip, and provide forces for appropriate air and missile defense and space control operations, including the provision of forces as required for the strategic defense of the United States, in accordance with joint doctrines.

(c) To organize, equip, and provide Army forces, in coordination with the other Military Services, for joint amphibious, airborne, and space operations and to provide for the training of such forces, in accordance with joint doctrines. Specifically, the Army shall:

1 Develop, in coordination with the other Military Services, doctrines, tactics, techniques, and equipment of interest to the Army for amphibious operations and not provided for elsewhere.

2 Develop, in coordination with the other Military Services, the doctrines, procedures, and equipment employed by Army and Marine Corps forces in airborne operations. The Army shall have primary responsibility for developing those airborne doctrines, procedures, and equipment that are of common interest to the Army and the Marine Corps.

3 Develop, in coordination with the other Military Services, doctrines, procedures, and equipment employed by Army forces in the conduct of space operations.

(d) To organize, train, equip, and provide forces for the support and conduct of special operations.

(e) To provide equipment, forces, procedures, and doctrine necessary for the effective prosecution of electronic warfare operations and, as directed, support of other forces.

(f) To organize, train, equip, and provide forces for the support and conduct of psychological operations.

(g) To provide forces for the occupation of territories abroad, including initial establishment of military government pending transfer of this responsibility to other authority.

(h) To develop doctrines and procedures, in coordination with the other Military Services, for organizing, equipping, training, and employing forces operating on land, except that the development of doctrines and procedures for organizing, equipping, training, and employing Marine Corps units for amphibious operations shall be a function of the Marine Corps coordinating, as required, with the other Military Services.

(i) To organize, train, equip, and provide forces, as directed, to operate land lines of communication.

(j) To conduct the following activities:

1 Functions relating to the management and operation of the Panama Canal, as assigned by the Secretary or Deputy Secretary of Defense.

2 The authorized civil works program, including projects for improvement of navigation, flood control, beach erosion control, and other water resource developments in the United States, its territories, and its possessions.

3 Certain other civil activities prescribed by law.

(3) A collateral function of the Army is to train forces to interdict enemy sea and air power and communications through operations on or from land.

(4) Army responsibilities in support of space operations include the following:

(a) Organizing, training, equipping, and providing Army forces to support space operations.

(b) Developing, in coordination with the other Military Services, tactics, techniques, and equipment employed by Army forces for use in space operations.

(c) Conducting individual and unit training of Army space operations forces.

(d) Participating with other Services in joint space operations, training, and exercises as mutually agreed to by the Services concerned, or as directed by competent authority.

(e) Providing forces for space support operations for the Department of Defense when directed.

(5) Other responsibilities of the Army. With respect to close air support of ground forces, the Army has specific responsibility for the following:

(a) Providing, in accordance with inter-Service agreements, communications, personnel, and equipment employed by Army forces.

(b) Conducting individual and unit training of Army forces.

(c) Developing equipment, tactics, and techniques employed by Army forces.

## NAVY AND MARINE CORPS

### Title 10, United States Code, Chapter 507

#### § 5062. United States Navy: composition; functions

(a) The Navy, within the Department of the Navy, includes, in general, naval combat and service forces and such aviation as may be organic therein. The Navy shall be organized, trained, and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained combat incident to operations at sea. It is responsible for the preparation of naval forces necessary for the effective prosecution of war except as otherwise assigned and, in accordance with integrated joint mobilization plans, for the expansion of the peacetime components of the Navy to meet the needs of war.

(b) All naval aviation shall be integrated with the naval service as part thereof within the Department of the Navy. Naval aviation consists of combat and service and training forces, and includes land-based naval aviation, air transport essential for naval operations, all air weapons and air techniques involved in the operations and activities of the Navy, and the entire remainder of the aeronautical organization of the Navy, together with the personnel necessary therefor.

(c) The Navy shall develop aircraft, weapons, tactics, technique, organization, and equipment of naval combat and service elements. Matters of joint concern as to these functions shall be coordinated between the Army, the Air Force, and the Navy.

§ 5063. United States Marine Corps: composition; functions

(a) The Marine Corps, within the Department of the Navy, shall be so organized as to include not less than three combat divisions and three air wings, and such other land combat, aviation, and other services as may be organic therein. The Marine Corps shall be organized, trained, and equipped to provide fleet marine forces of combined arms, together with supporting air components, for service with the fleet in the seizure or defense of advanced naval bases and for the conduct of such land operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign. In addition, the Marine Corps shall provide detachments and organizations for service on armed vessels of the Navy, shall provide security detachments for the protection of naval property at naval stations and bases, and shall perform such other duties as the President may direct. However, these additional duties may not detract from or interfere with the operations for which the Marine Corps is primarily organized.

(b) The Marine Corps shall develop, in coordination with the Army and the Air Force, those phases of amphibious operations that pertain to the tactics, technique, and equipment used by landing forces.

(c) The Marine Corps is responsible, in accordance with integrated joint mobilization plans, for the expansion of peacetime components of the Marine Corps to meet the needs of war.

**DoD Directive 5100.1 (September 25, 1987)**

(1) The Navy, within the Department of the Navy, includes, in general, naval combat and service forces and such aviation as may be organic therein. The Marine Corps, within the Department of Navy, includes not less than three combat divisions and three air wings and such other land combat, aviation, and other services as may be organic therein. The Coast Guard, when operating as a Service within the Department of the Navy, includes naval combat and service forces and such aviation as may be organic therein.

(a) The Navy and Marine Corps, under the Secretary of the Navy, are responsible for the preparation of Navy and Marine Corps forces necessary for the effective prosecution of war and military operations short of war, except as otherwise assigned and, in accordance with the integrated joint mobilization plans, for the expansion of the peacetime components of the Navy and Marine Corps to meet the needs of war.

(b) During peacetime, the Department of Transportation is responsible for maintaining the United States Coast Guard in a state of readiness so that it may function as a specialized Service in the Navy in time of war or when the President directs. The Coast Guard may also perform its military functions in times of limited war or defense contingency, in support of Naval Component Commanders, without transfer to the Department of the Navy.

(2) The primary functions of the Navy and/or Marine Corps are:

(a) To organize, train, equip and provide Navy and Marine Corps forces for the conduct of prompt and sustained combat incident to operations at sea, including operations of sea-based aircraft and land-based naval air components--specifically, forces to seek out and destroy enemy naval forces and to suppress enemy sea commerce, to gain and maintain general naval supremacy, to control vital sea areas and to protect vital sea lines of communication, to establish and maintain local superiority (including air) in an area of naval operations, to seize and defend advanced naval bases, and to conduct such land, air, and space operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign.

(b) To maintain the Marine Corps, which shall be organized, trained, and equipped to provide Fleet Marine Forces of combined arms, together with supporting air components, for service with the fleet in the seizure or defense of advanced naval bases and for the conduct of such land operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign. In addition, the Marine Corps shall provide detachments and organizations for service on armed vessels of the Navy, provide security detachments for the protection of naval property at naval stations and bases, and perform such other duties as the President or the Secretary of Defense may direct. However, these additional duties must not detract from, or interfere with, the operations for which the Marine Corps is primarily organized. These functions do not contemplate the creation of a second land army.

(c) Further, the Marine Corps shall:

1 Develop, in coordination with the other Military Services, the doctrines, tactics, techniques, and equipment employed by landing forces in amphibious operations. The Marine Corps shall have primary responsibility for the development of those landing force doctrines, tactics, techniques, and equipment which are of common interest to the Army and the Marine Corps.

2 Train and equip, as required, forces for airborne operations, in coordination with the other Military Services, and in accordance with joint doctrines.

3 Develop, in coordination with the other Military Services, doctrines, procedures, and equipment of interest to the Marine Corps for airborne operations and not provided for by the Army, which has primary responsibility for the development of airborne doctrines, procedures, and techniques, which are of common interest to the Army and Marine Corps.

(d) To organize and equip, in coordination with the other Military Services, and to provide naval forces, including naval close air support and space forces, for the conduct of joint amphibious operations, and to be responsible for the amphibious training of all forces assigned to joint amphibious operations in accordance with joint doctrines.

(e) To develop, in coordination with the other Services, the doctrines, procedures, and equipment of naval forces for amphibious operations and the doctrines and procedures for joint amphibious operations.

(f) To organize, train, equip, and provide forces for strategic nuclear warfare to support strategic deterrence.

- (g) To furnish adequate, timely, reliable intelligence for the Coast Guard.
- (h) To organize, train, equip, and provide forces for reconnaissance, antisubmarine warfare, protection of shipping, aerial refueling and minelaying, including the air and space aspects thereof, and controlled minefield operations.
- (i) To provide the afloat forces for strategic sealift.
- (j) To provide air support essential for naval operations.
- (k) To organize, train, equip, and provide forces for appropriate air and missile defense and space control operations, including the provision of forces as required for the strategic defense of the United States, in accordance with joint doctrines.
- (l) To provide equipment, forces, procedures, and doctrine necessary for the effective prosecution of electronic warfare operations and, as directed, support of other forces.
- (m) To furnish aerial photography, as necessary, for Navy and Marine Corps operations.
- (n) To develop, in coordination with the other Services, doctrines, procedures, and equipment employed by Navy and Marine Corps forces in the conduct of space operations.
- (o) To provide sea-based launch and space support for the Department of Defense when directed.
- (p) To organize, train, equip, and provide forces, as directed, to operate sea lines of communication.
- (q) To organize, train, equip, and provide forces for the support and conduct of special operations.
- (r) To organize, train, equip, and provide Navy and Marine Corps forces for the support and conduct of psychological operations.
- (s) To coordinate with the Department of Transportation for the peacetime maintenance of the Coast Guard. During war, the Coast Guard will function as a Military Service. The specific wartime functions of the Coast Guard are as follows:
- 1 To provide an integrated port security and coastal defense force, in coordination with the other Military Services, for the United States.
  - 2 To provide specialized Coast Guard units, including designated ships and aircraft, for overseas deployment required by naval component commanders.
  - 3 To organize and equip, in coordination with the other Military Services, and provide forces for maritime search and rescue, icebreaking, and servicing of maritime aids to navigation.

(3) The collateral functions of the Navy and Marine Corps include the following:

- (a) To interdict enemy land power, air power, and communications through operations at sea.
- (b) To conduct close air and naval support for land operations.
- (c) To furnish aerial imagery for cartographic purposes.
- (d) To be prepared to participate in the overall air and space effort, as directed.
- (e) To establish military government, as directed, pending transfer of this responsibility to other authority.

(4) Navy and Marine Corps responsibilities in support of space operations include:

- (a) Organizing, training, equipping, and providing Navy and Marine Corps forces to support space operations.
- (b) Developing, in coordination with the other Military Services, tactics, techniques, and equipment employed by Navy and Marine Corps forces for use in space operations.
- (c) Conducting individual and unit training of Navy and Marine Corps space operations forces.
- (d) Participating with the other Services in joint space operations, training, and exercises, as mutually agreed to by the Services concerned or as directed by competent authority.

(5) Other responsibilities of the Navy and Marine Corps include:

- (a) Providing, when directed, logistic support of Coast Guard forces, including procurement, distribution, supply, equipment, and maintenance.
- (b) Providing air and land transport essential for naval operations and not otherwise provided for.
- (c) Providing and operating sea transport for the Armed Forces other than that which is organic to the individual Services.
- (d) Developing, in coordination with the other Services, doctrine and procedures for close air support for naval forces and for joint forces in amphibious operations.

## AIR FORCE

### Title 10, United States Code, Chapter 807

#### § 8062. Policy; composition; aircraft authorization

(a) It is the intent of Congress to provide an Air Force that is capable, in conjunction with the other armed forces, of—

- (1) preserving the peace and security, and providing for the defense, of the United States, the Territories, Commonwealths, and possessions, and any areas occupied by the United States;
- (2) supporting the national policies;
- (3) implementing the national objectives; and
- (4) overcoming any nations responsible for aggressive acts that imperil the peace and security of the United States.

(b) There is a United States Air Force within the Department of the Air Force.

(c) In general, the Air Force includes aviation forces both combat and service not otherwise assigned. It shall be organized, trained, and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained offensive and defensive air operations. It is responsible for the preparation of the air forces necessary for the effective prosecution of war except as otherwise assigned and, in accordance with integrated joint mobilization plans, for the expansion of the peacetime components of the Air Force to meet the needs of war.

(d) The Air Force consists of—

- (1) the Regular Air Force, the Air National Guard of the United States, the Air National Guard while in the service of the United States, and the Air Force Reserve;
- (2) all persons appointed or enlisted in, or conscripted into, the Air Force without component; and....

#### c. Functions of the Department of the Air Force

(1) The Air Force, within the Department of the Air Force, includes aviation forces, both combat and service, not otherwise assigned. The Air Force is responsible for the preparation of the air forces necessary for the effective prosecution of war and military operations short of war, except as otherwise assigned and, in accordance with integrated joint mobilization plans, for the expansion of the peacetime components of the Air Force to meet the needs of war.

(2) The primary functions of the Air Force include:

(a) To organize, train, equip, and provide forces for the conduct of prompt and sustained combat operations in the air--specifically, forces to defend the United States against air attack in accordance with doctrines established by the JCS, gain and maintain general air supremacy, defeat enemy air forces, conduct space operations, control vital air areas, and establish local air superiority except as otherwise assigned herein.

(b) To organize, train, equip, and provide forces for appropriate air and missile defense and space control operations, including the provision of forces as required for the strategic defense of the United States, in accordance with joint doctrines.

(c) To organize, train, equip, and provide forces for strategic air and missile warfare.

(d) To organize, equip, and provide forces for joint amphibious, space, and airborne operations, in coordination with the other Military Services, and to provide for their training in accordance with joint doctrines.

(e) To organize, train, equip, and provide forces for close air support and air logistic support to the Army and other forces, as directed, including airlift, air support, resupply of airborne operations, aerial photography, tactical air reconnaissance, and air interdiction of enemy land forces and communications.

(f) To organize, train, equip and provide forces for air transport for the Armed Forces, except as otherwise assigned.

(g) To develop, in coordination with the other Services, doctrines, procedures, and equipment for air defense from land areas, including the United States.

(h) To organize, train, equip, and provide forces to furnish aerial imagery for use by the Army and other agencies as directed, including aerial imagery for cartographic purposes.

(i) To develop, in coordination with the other Services, tactics, techniques, and equipment of interest to the Air Force for amphibious operations and not provided for elsewhere.

(j) To develop, in coordination with the other Services, doctrines, procedures, and equipment employed by Air Force forces in airborne operations.

(k) To provide launch and space support for the Department of Defense, except as otherwise assigned.

(l) To develop, in coordination with the other Services, doctrines, procedures, and equipment employed by Air Force forces in the conduct of space operations.

(m) To organize, train, equip, and provide land-based tanker forces for the in-flight refueling support of strategic operations and deployments of aircraft of the Armed Forces and Air Force tactical operations, except as otherwise assigned.

(n) To organize, train, equip, and provide forces, as directed to operate air lines of communications.

(o) To organize, train, equip, and provide forces for the support and conduct of special operations.

(p) To organize, train, equip, and provide forces for the support and conduct of psychological operations.

(q) To provide equipment, forces, procedures, and doctrine necessary for the effective prosecution of electronic warfare operations and, as directed, support of other forces.

(3) Collateral functions of the Air Force include the following:

(a) Surface sea surveillance and antisurface ship warfare through air operations.

(b) Antisubmarine warfare and antiair warfare operations to protect sea lines of communications.

(c) Aerial minelaying operations.

(d) Air-to-air refueling in support of naval campaigns.

(4) Air Force responsibilities in support of space operations include:

(a) Organizing, training, equipping, and providing forces to support space operations.

(b) Developing, in coordination with the other Military Services, tactics, techniques, and equipment employed by Air Force forces for use in space operations.

(c) Conducting individual and unit training of Air Force space operations forces.

(d) Participating with the other Services in joint space operations, training, and exercises as mutually agreed to by the Services concerned, or as directed by competent authority.

(5) Other responsibilities of the Air Force include:

(a) With respect to amphibious operations, the Air Force shall develop, in coordination with the other Services, tactics, techniques, and equipment of interest to the Air Force and not provided for by the Navy and Marine Corps.

(b) With respect to airborne operations, the Air Force has specific responsibility to:

1 Provide Air Force forces for the air movement of troops, supplies, and equipment in joint airborne operations, including parachute and aircraft landings.

2 Develop tactics and techniques employed by Air Force forces in the air movement of troops, supplies, and equipment.

(c) With respect to close air support of ground forces, the Air Force has specific responsibility for developing, in coordination with the other Services, doctrines and procedures, except as provided for in Navy responsibilities for amphibious operations and in responsibilities for the Marine Corps.

## COAST GUARD

### Title 14, United States Code, Chapter 1

#### § 1. Establishment of Coast Guard

The Coast Guard as established January 28, 1915, shall be a military service and a branch of the armed forces of the United States at all times. The Coast Guard shall be a service in the Department of Transportation, except when operating as a service in the Navy.

(Aug. 4, 1949, ch. 393, 63 Stat. 496; Oct. 18, 1976, Pub. L. 94-546, § 1(1), 90 Stat. 2519.)

#### HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES

Based on title 14, U.S.C., 1946 ed., § 1 (Jan. 28, 1915, ch. 20, § 1, 38 Stat. 800; July 11, 1941, ch. 290, §§ 5, 6(a), 55 Stat. 585).

Said section has been divided. Provisions relating to operation under the Navy in time of war are placed in sections 3 and 4 of this title, and the remainder is in this section.

This section continues the Coast Guard as a military service and branch of the armed forces of the United States at all times. By the act of July 11, 1941, 55 Stat. 585 (title 14, U.S.C., 1946 ed., § 1), the Coast Guard was constituted a branch of the land and naval forces of the United States at all times. This section therefore merely continues an existing agency and codifies existing law on the military status of the Coast Guard, substituting "armed forces" for "land and naval forces" because of the recent establishment of the Department of the Air Force as an "armed force" rather than as a part of the "land and naval forces". The Coast Guard is designated a service in the Treasury Department except when operating as a service in the Navy. This is a better definition of the status of the Coast Guard than one which defines it as a service under the Treasury Department in time of peace, because the President is authorized to place the Coast Guard under the Navy in time of emergency, which could be in time of peace.

Changes were made in phraseology. 81st Congress, House Report No. 557.

#### AMENDMENTS

1976—Pub. L. 94-546 substituted "Department of Transportation" for "Treasury Department".

#### TRANSFER OF FUNCTIONS

The Coast Guard was transferred to the Department of Transportation and all functions, powers, and duties, relating to the Coast Guard, of the Secretary of the Treasury and of other offices and officers of the Department of the Treasury were transferred to the Secretary of Transportation by Pub. L. 89-670, § 6(b)(1), Oct. 15, 1966, 80 Stat. 931. Section 6(b)(2) of Pub. L. 89-670, however, provided that notwithstanding such transfer of functions, the Coast Guard shall operate as part of the Navy in time of war or when the President directs as provided in section 3 of this title. See section 108 of Title 49, Transportation.

#### § 2. Primary duties

The Coast Guard shall enforce or assist in the enforcement of all applicable Federal laws on, under, and over the high seas and waters subject to the jurisdiction of the United States; shall engage in maritime air surveillance or interdiction to enforce or assist in the enforcement of the laws of the United States; shall administer laws and promulgate and enforce regulations for the promotion of safety of life and property on and under the high seas and waters subject to the jurisdiction of the United States covering all matters not specifically delegated by law to some other executive department; shall develop, establish, maintain, and operate,

with due regard to the requirements of national defense, aids to maritime navigation, ice-breaking facilities, and rescue facilities for the promotion of safety on, under, and over the high seas and waters subject to the jurisdiction of the United States; shall, pursuant to international agreements, develop, establish, maintain, and operate icebreaking facilities on, under, and over waters other than the high seas and waters subject to the jurisdiction of the United States; shall engage in oceanographic research of the high seas and in waters subject to the jurisdiction of the United States; and shall maintain a state of readiness to function as a specialized service in the Navy in time of war, including the fulfillment of Maritime Defense Zone command responsibilities..<sup>1</sup>

#### § 3. Relationship to Navy Department

Upon the declaration of war or when the President directs, the Coast Guard shall operate as a service in the Navy, and shall so continue until the President, by Executive order, transfers the Coast Guard back to the Department of Transportation. While operating as a service in the Navy, the Coast Guard shall be subject to the orders of the Secretary of the Navy who may order changes in Coast Guard operations to render them uniform, to the extent he deems advisable, with Navy operations.

**DoD Directive 5100.1 (September 25, 1987)**

See Page 96.

## U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND

### Title 10, United States Code, Section 167

#### § 167. Unified combatant command for special operations forces

(a) **ESTABLISHMENT.**—With the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the President, through the Secretary of Defense, shall establish under section 161 of this title a unified combatant command for special operations forces (hereinafter in this section referred to as the "special operations command"). The principal function of the command is to prepare special operations forces to carry out assigned missions.

(b) **ASSIGNMENT OF FORCES.**—Unless otherwise directed by the Secretary of Defense, all active and reserve special operations forces of the armed forces stationed in the United States shall be assigned to the special operations command.

(d) **COMMAND OF ACTIVITY OR MISSION.**—(1) Unless otherwise directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense, a special operations activity or mission shall be conducted under the command of the commander of the unified combatant command in whose geographic area the activity or mission is to be conducted.

(2) The commander of the special operations command shall exercise command of a selected special operations mission if directed to do so by the President or the Secretary of Defense.

(e) **AUTHORITY OF COMBATANT COMMANDER.**—(1) In addition to the authority prescribed in section 164(c) of this title, the commander of the special operations command shall be responsible for, and shall have the authority to conduct, all affairs of such command relating to special operations activities.

(f) **BUDGET.**—In addition to the activities of a combatant command for which funding may be requested under section 166(b) of this title, the budget proposal of the special operations command shall include requests for funding for—

(1) development and acquisition of special operations-peculiar equipment; and

(2) acquisition of other material, supplies, or services that are peculiar to special operations activities.

(j) **SPECIAL OPERATIONS ACTIVITIES.**—For purposes of this section, special operations activities include each of the following insofar as it relates to special operations:

(1) Direct action.

(2) Strategic reconnaissance.

(3) Unconventional warfare.

(4) Foreign internal defense.

(5) Civil affairs.

(6) Psychological operations.

(7) Counterterrorism.

(8) Humanitarian assistance.

(9) Theater search and rescue.

(10) Such other activities as may be specified by the President or the Secretary of Defense.

**DoD Directive 5100.1 (September 25, 1987)**

No USSOCOM functions.

## Annex G

## ADMIRAL CROWE'S REVIEW

## Executive Summary



OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN  
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-0001

CM-2243-89  
28 September 1989

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Report on Roles and Functions of the Armed Forces

1. After consulting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I am forwarding this report on the roles and functions of the Armed Forces required by title 10 USC as amended by the Goldwater/Nichols DOD Reorganization Act of 1986. The report contains my recommendations for changes in the assignment of Service functions that will achieve a greater degree of effectiveness and enhance the capabilities of the combatant commanders to carry out their missions .
2. The report concludes that the "roles" of the Armed Forces as crafted in law are fundamentally sound. The "functions" of the Armed Forces contained in DoD Directive 5100.1 should be revised and updated to more clearly reflect current US military strategy, our efforts to harness technology, and our responses to new threats to the national security. I have included in the report a draft change to the Directive that reflects these recommendations.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "William J. Crowe, Jr." with a stylized flourish at the end.

WILLIAM J. CROWE, JR.  
Chairman  
Joint Chiefs of Staff

## *EXECUTIVE SUMMARY*

1. This report on roles and missions of the Armed Forces is required by title 10, United States Code, section 153 (b) (10 USC 153(b)), as amended by the Goldwater/Nichols DOD Reorganization Act of 1986. The law directs the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, to submit periodically a report to the Secretary of Defense that contains recommendations for change in the assignment of functions (roles and missions) to the Armed Forces that will achieve maximum effectiveness. Further, the law requires subsequent reports not less than every three years or upon request from the President or the Secretary of Defense.
  
2. The report addresses the framework in which to consider the assignment of Service "roles and functions," the impact of technology and threats upon them, and the gaps and overlaps in them which need resolution. Appendix A is a recommended revision of DOD Directive (DODD) 5100.1. Appendix B is an analysis of the impact of changes in technology and threat on functions of the Armed Forces. Appendix C contains definitions of terms important to this report.
  
3. The report concludes that:
  - a. The "roles" of the Armed Forces as crafted in law are fundamentally sound.
  - b. The "functions" of the Armed Forces as written in DODD 5100.1 are also basically sound, but need to be revised and updated to more clearly reflect current national military strategy, our efforts to harness technology, and our responses to evolving threats to the national security.
  
4. The report recommends that:
  - a. DODD 5100.1 be amended as outlined in Appendix A:
    - (1) To require the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, to report on roles and functions of the Armed Forces once during each 2-year appointment.
    - (2) To provide more clarity and precision in the allocation of Service functions.
    - (3) To clarify assignment of Service functions for close air support: Specifically that all four Services are tasked to provide close air support.
    - (4) To reflect proposed changes in the assignment of Service functions for space combat, combat support, and combat service support: Specifically, that the Air Force shall have primary responsibility for space functions; the Army shall have responsibility for space functions which directly contribute to land operations; and the Navy shall have responsibility for space functions which directly contribute to maritime operations.
  - b. During the PPBS cycle, the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, recommend to the Secretary of Defense resource priorities for Service functions based upon the national military strategy to bridge the gap between the assignment of Service functions and the allocation of resources for those functions (e.g. what priority for defense of advanced naval bases, and forward land and air bases).
  - c. The Secretary of Defense and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, should continue to work with USCINCSOC to develop and refine the functions of USSOCOM.

d. An OSD-Joint Staff study group be formed to review defense intelligence production. That review should include an analysis of the needs of the combatant commanders; and the production process of the community to satisfy those needs, apportion resources to meet those needs, and distribute intelligence output to the commanders. The review should also examine the needs of the Service Departments and determine whether or not there is excessive duplication of effort among the DOD intelligence activities.

## Annex H

## GLOSSARY

**AIR INTERDICTION** Aircraft and missile attacks to divert, disrupt, delay, or destroy enemy forces or facilities before they can be used effectively against friendly forces. *See also* Battlefield Air Interdiction; Close Air Support; Strategic Air Warfare.

**ANTITERRORISM** Defensive measures that reduce the vulnerability of people and property to terrorism. *See also* Combating Terrorism; Counterterrorism; Terrorism.

**BATTLEFIELD AIR INTERDICTION** Aircraft and missile attacks to safeguard, and to facilitate maneuvers by, friendly land forces not in contact with enemy formations. The range of Army and Marine surface-to-surface missiles determines the depth of the zone. Careful coordination is required to prevent casualties among participating air and ground forces. *See also* Close Air Support; Air Interdiction.

**CIVIL AFFAIRS** 1. Nonmilitary functions that foreign armed forces perform for, and by agreement with, indigenous governments in peacetime or war. 2. Executive, legislative, and judicial authority that foreign armed forces exercise in occupied countries or territories.

**CLOSE AIR SUPPORT** Air strikes against targets so close to friendly ground forces that careful coordination is required to prevent casualties among requesting units and/or attacking aircraft. *See also* Battlefield Air Interdiction.

**COMBATING TERRORISM** Deterrent, offensive, and defensive measures, both active and passive, taken to diminish threats from domestic and transnational terrorists. *See also* Antiterrorism; Counterterrorism; Terrorism.

**CONVENTIONAL FORCES, OPERATIONS** Regular military organizations, hostilities, and hardware that exclude nuclear, chemical, and biological capabilities. *See also* Special Operations.

**COUNTERAIR OPERATIONS** Offensive and defensive actions to destroy enemy aircraft and surface-to-surface missiles at bases, launch sites, or in flight.

**COUNTERINSURGENCY** 1. Political, economic, social, military, and paramilitary measures that indigenous governments and associates use to forestall or defeat insurgencies. 2. Similar measures occupying powers use to forestall or defeat resistance movements. *See also* Insurgency.

**COUNTERTERRORISM** Offensive measures designed to deter, and if necessary defeat, terrorism. *See also* Antiterrorism; Combating Terrorism; Terrorism.

**CRISIS** An international emergency with adverse implications for observers as well as afflicted parties. Some crises are short, others are long. *See also* Crisis Response.

**DIRECT ACTION** 1. Any use of military force to supplement or replace other actions. 2. Short-duration strikes and other small-scale offensive activities conducted primarily by special operations forces.

**DISASTER RELIEF** Humanitarian assistance in the United States or abroad to alleviate suffering caused by natural and manmade catastrophes such as fires, floods, earthquakes, and riots. *See also* Humanitarian Assistance.

**EXPEDITIONARY FORCES** Any military formation designed to operate in foreign countries during peacetime or war.

**FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE** Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in programs another government undertakes to forestall or defeat insurgency, transnational terrorism, lawlessness, or subversion.

**FUNCTION** A specific responsibility that the President of the United States or the Secretary of Defense assign to U.S. military Services and Special Operations Command in amplification of or in addition to statutory roles. *DoD Directive 5100.1* is the usual conveyance. *See also* Mission; Role.

a. **Primary functions.** Principal responsibilities assigned to a Service for which it may allocate funds and generate force structure. More than one Service can be assigned identical primary functions.

b. **Collateral functions.** Secondary responsibilities assigned to a Service which supplement or complement another Service's primary functions. A Service may not allocate funds or generate force structure based solely upon a collateral function.

**HUMANITARIAN AND CIVIC ASSISTANCE** Aid designed to improve the quality of life in a foreign country. Chapter 20, *Title 10* limits DoD contributions to medical, dental, and veterinary care provided in rural areas of a country; construction of rudimentary surface transportation systems; well drilling and construction of basic sanitation facilities; rudimentary construction and repair of public facilities; and transportation of relief supplies. *See also* Disaster Relief.

**INSURGENCY** Extended, organized efforts by domestic groups to overthrow the established order (not necessarily a government), seize political power by subversive and coercive means, and sometimes (not always) alter social systems. *See also* Counterinsurgency.

**JOINT TASK FORCE** A military formation composed of assigned or attached elements from two or more Services. It performs transitory missions, then disbands. The Secretary of Defense and commanders of U.S. unified commands, specified commands, and existing joint task forces may act as constituting authorities. *See also* Standing Joint Task Force.

**MISSION** A task that the President of the United States or Secretary of Defense assigns to a unified or specified command. *See also* Function; Role.

**PARAMILITARY FORCES, OPERATIONS** 1. Land, sea, and air forces of a nation which have a distinctive chain of command, primarily perform internal security functions beyond the ability of law enforcement units, and supplement the regular military establishment as required; 2. Guerrillas and other armed irregulars that use quasimilitary tactics and techniques.

**PEACEKEEPING** Nonviolent efforts of a military force, interposed between belligerents by mutual consent, to maintain a truce or otherwise discourage hostilities. *See also* Peacemaking.

**PEACEMAKING** Efforts by a military force to prevent armed conflict in a specified locale or terminate hostilities by force, if necessary. *See also* Peacekeeping.

**PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS** The planned use of propaganda and actions to influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes, and behavior of friends, neutrals, and enemies in ways that assist accomplishment of security objectives.

**ROLE** A broad, enduring duty that Congress assigns to the U.S. Army, Navy, Air, Force, Marine Corps, and Special Operations Command in *Title 10, United States Code*. *Title 14, United States Code* contains analogous instructions for the Coast Guard. *See also* Function; Mission.

**SEARCH AND RESCUE** The use of aircraft, surface craft, submarines, specialized teams and equipment to find and recover personnel in distress on land or at sea. Combat search and rescue operations occur during armed conflicts.

**SPECIAL OPERATIONS** Unorthodox, comparatively low-cost, potentially high-payoff, often covert or clandestine methods that national, subnational, and theater leaders employ independently in "peacetime" or to support nuclear/biological/chemical and/or conventional warfare. *See also* Conventional Forces, Operations.

**STANDING JOINT TASK FORCE** A permanent joint task force that is organized, equipped, and trained to undertake various missions whenever and wherever directed. *See also* Joint Task Force.

**STRATEGIC AIR WARFARE** Aircraft and missile attacks to destroy an enemy's war-making capacity and undermine will to resist. *See also* Air Interdiction.

**STRATEGIC RECONNAISSANCE** Operations to collect or verify information of national or theater-level significance concerning the capabilities, intentions, and activities of actual or potential enemies; geographic, demographic, and other characteristics of a particular area; post-strike battle damage data.

**TERRORISM** Public, repetitive violence or threats of violence to achieve sociopolitical objectives by inspiring widespread fear among people not personally involved and disrupting community routines so severely that compliance with terrorist demands eventually may seem preferable to further disorder. *See also* Antiterrorism; Counterterrorism.

**UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE** Activities by a foreign government or group that assists insurgents or resistance movements in another country.

## Annex I

## ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ABM	Ballistic Missile Defense
AD	Air Defense
BAI	Battlefield Air Interdiction
BMD	Ballistic Missile Defense
CA	Civil Affairs
CAS	Close Air Support
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CINC	Commander-in-Chief
CONUS	Continental United States
CSAR	Combat Search and Rescue
DA	Direct Action
DoD	Department of Defense
FID	Foreign Internal Defense
ICBM	Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JSOC	Joint Special Operations Command
JTF	Joint Task Force
LE	Law Enforcement
LOC	Lines of Communication
NM	Nautical Mile
Psyop	Psychological Operations
PL	Public Law
SALT	Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
SAM	Surface-to-Air Missile
SAR	Search and Rescue
SEAL	Sea-Air-Land
SJTF	Standing Joint Task Force
SLBM	Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile
SO	Special Operations
SOF	Special Operations Forces
SR	Strategic Reconnaissance
SSM	Surface-to-Surface Missile
TBMD	Theater Ballistic Missile Defense

TAD	Theater Air Defense
USC	United States Code
USAF	United States Air Force
USMC	United States Marine Corps
USSOCOM	United States Special Operations Command
UW	Unconventional Warfare