

PHOTOGRAPH THIS SHEET

INVENTORY

LEVEL

AD-A953 605

DTIC ACCESSION NUMBER

Naval Forces, Vietnam Monthly Historical
Summary for August 1970

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A

Approved for public release
Distribution Unlimited

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT

ACCESSION FOR

NFS GRA&I

DTIC TAB

UNANNOUNCED

JUSTIFICATION

BY *Per Ltr. on File*

DISTRIBUTION /

AVAILABILITY CODES

DIST

AVAIL AND/OR SPECIAL

A/1

DISTRIBUTION STAMP

UNANNOUNCED

84 11 26 527

DATE RECEIVED IN DTIC

DTIC
ELECTE
DEC 14 1984
D

DATE ACCESSIONED

DATE RETURNED


REGISTERED OR CERTIFIED NO.

PHOTOGRAPH THIS SHEET AND RETURN TO DTIC-DDAC

**Monthly
Historical
Summary**



AD-A953 605



AUGUST 1970

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A

Approved for public release;
Distribution Unlimited

1-12

039589

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
U.S. NAVAL FORCES, VIETNAM
FPO, SAN FRANCISCO 96626

FFS-16/023:dcg
5750
Ser:0853
6 October 1970

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~


From: Commander U. S. Naval Forces, Vietnam
To: Distribution List

Subj: U. S. Naval Forces, Vietnam Monthly Historical Summary for August 1970.

1. The U. S. Naval Forces, Vietnam Monthly Historical Summary is forwarded for information and retention.

W. O. McDaniel
W. O. McDANIEL
Chief of Staff

Distribution:
CINCPACFLT (4)
COMUSMACV (Hist. Branch, SJS)
COMUSMACV (Doctrine Branch J - 343)
COMUSMACV (COC, JOD)
COMUSMACV (J3 - 12)
CNO (OP - 09B9) (3)
CNO (OP - 09B91E)
CNO (OP - 03, 04, 05, 06) (1ea)
CNO (OP - 34)
CNO (OP - 92)
CNO (Ops Eval. Group)
OPNAV (OP - 601V)
CINCLANTFLT
COMFIRSTFLT
COMSECONDFLT
COMSIXTHFLT
COMSEVENTHFLT
CHNAVMAT (Code 04)
COMSEVENTHFLT (Hist. Team)
PRES NAVWARCOL



Declassified by authority of the
Director of Naval History on 1 Mar 1979
in accordance with OPNAV Instructions
5510.1 and 5513.1.

039589

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FFS-16/023:rsd
5750

COMPHIBLANT
COMCBPAC
COMCBLANT
COMINEPAC
Commandant, Armed Forces Staff College
Commandant, U. S. Army War College, (Attn: Library U-393),
Carlisle Barracks, Pa. 17013
COMNAVFACECOM
SUPT USNA
CHINFO
CO NAVPHIBSCOL LCREEK
CO NAVPHIBSCOL Coronado
PHIBTRADET MARIS
NSRDC PANFLA
NIOTC MARIS
Project Manager, Naval Inshore Warfare Project, Washington, D. C.
20360
CG Aerospace Studies Institute (Code ASAD), Maxwell AFB Ala. 36112
CHNAVSEC C&GS Col., Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas 66027
CHNAVSEC Air University (Attn: AUL (SE) 69-10), Maxwell AFB
Ala. 36112
USA Special Warfare School (Attn: USN/MC Liaison Officer) Ft.
Bragg, N. C. 28307
USMC Rep., U. S. Army Infantry School, Ft. Benning, Ga. 31905
DIA (DIAAP-4A2/Pentagon)
Office of the Senior Marine Advisor, Naval Advisory Group, Box 9
FPO San Francisco 96626
Commander Naval Ship R&D Center, Washington, D. C. 20007
Commander Mine Squadron ELEVEN
Commander Naval Special Warfare Group, Atlantic, NAVPHIBASE,
LCREEK, Norfolk, Va. 23521
Commander Naval Special Warfare Group, Vietnam, Box 25
NAVFORV/NAVADVGRP MACV NOTE 05216 of 1 Apr 1970
List II (A&B)
List III (Less E)
List IV (Less D&E)
List V
List VI (A1&2, D1 E&H14)

UNCLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNCLASSIFIED

COMMANDER

U. S. NAVAL FORCES

VIETNAM

MONTHLY HISTORICAL SUMMARY

August 1970

Force HistorianLCDR Donald G. Roller
Field HistorianLTJG Richard C. Schiller
LTJG Stephen W. Frantz
LTJG George G. Lynn
LTJG Michael W. Taylor
Historical JournalistsJO1 Joe LeClerc
JOSN Robert S. Drew

UNCLASSIFIED

Table of Contents

	<u>Page</u>
<u>FOREWORD</u>	ii
<u>CURRENT OPERATIONS</u>	1
<u>USN OPERATIONS</u>	
Task Organization (TF 115 and 116)	3
Operation Sea Float/Solid Anchor	11
Breezy Cove	16
Search Turn	23
Operation Blue Shark	27
<u>VNN OPERATIONS</u>	
Task Fleet 21	29
Tran Hung Dao I	36
Tran Hung Dao II/CTG 214.1	38
Tran Hung Dao V/Ready Deck	41
Tran Hung Dao VIII	42
Tran Hung Dao IX Barrier Reef	44
Vietnamese Naval Operations in Cambodia	47
Tran Hung Dao XIV	50
Rung Sat Special Zone	52
Coastal Surveillance Forces	53
Stable Door	57
CTF 213 Organizational Chart	58
River Assault Groups	59
River Interdiction Divisions TF 214	61
River Assault and Interdiction Divisions TF 211	61
Rung Sat Special Zone Shipping Incidents	64
Special Incident - USS Jennings County (LST 846) Fire	65
<u>PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS AND CIVIC ACTION</u>	
<u>SUMMARY</u>	67
<u>ACCELERATED TURNOVER PROGRAM AND TRAINING</u>	
<u>SUMMARY</u>	73
<u>NAVAL SUPPORT ACTIVITY, SAIGON</u>	77
<u>THIRD NAVAL CONSTRUCTION BRIGADE</u>	81
<u>APPENDIX I - Glossary of Abbreviations</u>	I-1

UNCLASSIFIED

FOREWORD


Enemy activity within the Republic of Vietnam was characterized during the month of August by being moderate to low level in all Military Regions for most of the month. Only during the last two days of the month did enemy activity sharply increase. This increase was in keeping with reports of enemy plans to attempt to disrupt the Government of Vietnam Senatorial Elections and to commemorate the death of Ho Chi Minh. Even with the increase in activity, the elections were conducted quietly in most areas with a generally good voter participation.

The most significant rise in enemy activity in all Military Regions was in mine warfare. Not all the mining attempts were directed specifically at U.S. Navy or Vietnamese Navy assets, but the increase in mining activity in the Cua Viet River area, under Vietnamese Navy control, and in the Sea Float/Solid Anchor area, under U.S. Navy control, was significant. Five boats were sunk and six boats were damaged as a result of the mining incidents during the month of August.

UNCLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNCLASSIFIED



Members of Tran Hung Dao Association and Saigon
citizens gather before a special alter at the waterfront statue
of Gen. Tran Hung Dao, 13th century hero of Vietnam and
patron saint of the Vietnamese Navy.

CURRENT OPERATIONS
(As of 31 August 1970)

<u>VNN Designation</u>	<u>USN Designation (Nickname)</u>
Tran Hung Dao I (TG 214.2)	No USN nickname; originally part of Border Interdiction
Tran Hung Dao II (TG 214.1)	Giant Slingshot
Tran Hung Dao III	Sea Float (TG 116.1)
Tran Hung Dao IV	Solid Anchor (TG 116.1)
Tran Hung Dao V (TG 216.1)	Ready Deck
Tran Hung Dao VI *	Search Turn (TG 116.3)
Tran Hung Dao VII (TG 221.1)	Sea Tiger
Tran Hung Dao VIII (TG 217.1)	No USN nickname
Tran Hung Dao IX (TG 212.3)	Barrier Reef
Tran Hung Dao X **	Breezy Cove (TG 116.2)
Tran Hung Dao XI (TG 210.1)	No USN nickname (Cambodian Ops) Officially ended on 27 Aug. 1970
Tran Hung Dao XIV (TG 217.2)	No USN nickname

* Tran Hung Dao VI will operate as TG 212.5 when activated.

** Tran Hung Dao X will operate as TG 212.6 when activated.

TASK ORGANIZATION

Task Force 115

CTF 115	Coastal Surveillance Force	CDR T.F. MULLANE CAPT NGUYEN HUU CHI, VNN (DEP)
CTG 115.1	Northern Surveillance Group	CAPT HO VAN KY THOAI, VNN CDR R.C. KUCERA, (DEP)
CTG 115.2	Central Surveillance Group	CDR PHAN MANH KHUE, VNN CDR J.L. MARRIOTT (DEP)
CTU 115.2.1	North Central Surveillance Group	CDR N.N. RAC, VNN LCDR C.E. HOLCOMB, (DEP)
CTU 115.2.2	South Central Surveillance Group	LT T.H. DONG, VNN LT R.P. FERGUSON (DEP)
CTG 115.3	Southern Surveillance Group	CDR BUI CUU VIEN, VNN CDR K.P. HUGHES (DEP)
CTU 115.3.6	Southern WPB Support Unit	As assigned
CTG 115.4	Gulf of Thailand Surveillance Group	CDR DO KIEM, VNN LCDR G.W. MACKAY (DEP)
CTG 115.6	Market Time Offshore Reaction Group	CDR T.F. MULLANE
CTU 115.6.1	Market Time Offshore Reaction Unit ONE	As assigned
CTU 115.6.2	Market Time Offshore Reaction Unit TWO	As assigned
CTU 115.6.3	Market Time Offshore Reaction Unit THREE	As assigned
CTU 115.6.4	Market Time Offshore Reaction Unit FOUR	As assigned

Task Force 115 (cont.)

CTU 115.6.5	Market Time Offshore Reaction Unit FIVE	As assigned
CTU 115.6.6	Market Time Offshore Reaction Unit SIX	As assigned
CTU 115.6.7	Market Time Offshore Reaction Unit SEVEN	As assigned
CTU 115.6.8	Market Time Offshore Reaction Unit EIGHT	As assigned
CTE 115.6.8.1	Sea Float Logistics Support Element	As assigned
CTE 115.6.8.2	Sea Float NGFS Element	As assigned
CTU 115.6.9	Market Time Offshore Reaction Unit NINE	As assigned
CTG 115.7	Unassigned	
CTG 115.8	CDR Coastal Flotilla ONE Cam Ranh Bay	CDR T. F. MULLANE
CTU 115.8.1	CDR Coastal Squadron ONE, Cat Lo	CDR L. R. JEFFERIS
CTU 115.8.2	CDR Coastal Division 11 An Thoi	LCDR W.G. MARTIN
CTU 115.8.3	CDR Coastal Division 13 Sa Dec	LCDR D. J. SULLIVAN
CTG 115.9	Harbor Defense Group Cam Ranh Bay	CDR G. H. OVERSTREET
CTU 115.9.1	Harbor Defense Unit Vung Tau	LCDR H. H. WOODRUFF
CTU 115.9.2	Harbor Defense Unit Cam Ranh Bay	LCDR W. DYER
	Harbor Defense Unit Advisor, Qui Nhon	LTJG D. OGDEN
	Advisor, Nha Trang	LCDR W. MURPHY

Task Force 115 (cont.)

CTU 115.9.5 Harbor Defense Advisory Team / LCDR H. L. BARNES

Task Force 116

CTF 116	River Patrol Force and River Patrol Flotilla FIVE Binh Thuy	CAPT J. R. FAULK
CTG 116.0	CDR U.S. Patrol Group and COMRIVPATFLOT FIVE Binh Thuy	CAPT FAULK
CTU 116.0.1	Force Special Warfare Unit and OIC SEAL Team TWO, Det A Binh Thuy	LT T. R. TRUXELL
CTE 116.0.1.1	Special Warfare Support Element and OIC MST TWO	LT T. MASON
CTU 116.0.2	Ordnance Disposal Unit and OIC EODMUPAC Team 38 Binh Thuy	CWO2 P. C. KINNEY
CTU 116.0.4	Beach Jumper Unit and OIC BJU ONE, Team 13 Binh Thuy	LT K. K. HENKEL
CTG 116.1	Sea Float and Solid Anchor Commander and OIC MATSB Sea Float	CDR T. A. KELLEHER
CTU 116.1.1	RAC Unit ALPHA and CO RID 45 Sea Float	LT NAM, VNN
CTU 116.1.2	RAC Unit BRAVO and OIC RAD 152 Det, Sea Float	LTJG J. D. BEAN
CTU 116.1.3	Special Warfare Unit and OIC SEAL Team 1, Det GOLF Sea Float	LT B. P. DYER

Task Force 116 (cont.)

CTE 116.1.3.1	SEAL Element ONE and OIC SEAL Team ONE, Det GOLF, Sea Float	LT W. H. WARD
CTE 116.1.3.2	SEAL Support Element ONE / and OIC MST TWO, Det BRAVO, Sea Float	LTJG S. G. SMITH
CTE 116.1.3.3	SEAL Element TWO and OIC SEAL Team ONE, Det GOLF, Plt FOXTROT, Sea Float	LT F. G. WINANT
CTE 116.1.3.4	SEAL Support Element TWO / and OIC MST TWO, Det CHARLIE Sea Float	LT G. M. FULKERSON
CTE 116.1.3.5	SEAL Element THREE and OIC SEAL Team ONE, Det GOLF, Plt GOLF, Sea Float	LT R. E. DILL
CTE 116.1.3.6	Ranger Element and OIC VNN Rangers Sea Float	As assigned
CTE 116.1.3.7	PSYOPS and POLWAR Element, OIC BJU ONE. Team 13 Det, Sea Float	LTJG T. BYRNES
CTE 116.1.3.8	Demolition Element and OIC UDT ELEVEN, Det GOLF, Sea Float	LTJG J. E. KLINGER
CTU 116.1.4	PCF Unit - Sea Float	Senior PCF OIC assigned
CTU 116.1.5	Ordnance Disposal Unit and OIC EODMUPAC Team 70 Element 04	CWO2 C. E. MORGAN
CTU 116.1.6	KCS Unit and POIC KCS	TMJ R. E. SEARLES
CTU 116.1.7	NTSDS Unit and POIC NTSDS Number TWO	STG2 D. GOODPASTER

CTU 116.1.8	Water Dog Unit and POIC Water Dog Team	GMG3 VALLANTI
CTG 116.2	Breezy Cove Group CDR COMRIVRON 15 Song Ong Doc	LCDR K. J. RHEA
CTU 116.2.1	CO RPG 62 Senior Advisor RPG 62	LT TRAN NGOC LIEN, VNN LT G. N. EISCHEN
CTU 116.2.2	Support Unit CO USS JENNINGS COUNTY	LCDR G. YARBER
CTU 116.2.3	OIC SEAL Team TWO, Det ALPHA, SIXTH Pltn, Ca Mau	LT H. H. BOINK
CTE 116.2.3.1	OIC MST TWO, Det FOX- TROT, Ca Mau	ENS T. J. Mc CHESNEY
CTU 116.2.4	RAC Unit and COMRIVDIV 152	LT P. F. ROGERS
CTG 116.3	Search Turn Group CDR Deputy COMRIVPATFLOT FIVE, Rach Gia	CDR M. A. BRISBOIS LT LE HUE NHI, VNN (DEP)
CTU 116.3.1	CO RPG 58, Rach Soi Senior Advisor RPG 58	LT LE HUE NHI, VNN LT H. M. HIGHLAND
CTU 116.3.2	OIC SEAL Team ONE, Det GOLF, Plt KILO, Rach Soi	LTJG J. C. MARSH
CTE 116.3.2.1	OIC MST TWO Det ECHO Rach Soi	CWO2 W. A. SCOTT
CTG 116.4	Unassigned	
CTC 116.5	Blue Shark CDR (COMCOSRON ONE) Cat Lo	CDR L. R. JEFFERIS CDR NGUYEN BA TRANG (DEP)
CTU 116.5.1	Upper River Surveillance Unit - YRBM 16	LTJG R. P. HARMON
CTE 116.5.1.1	Upper Mekong Patrol Element	Senior PCF OIC assigned

CONFIDENTIAL

Task Force 116 (cont'd)

CTE 116.5.1.2	Upper Bassac Patrol Element / Senior PCF OIC assigned	
CTE 116.5.1.3	Chau Doc Patrol Element 1	Senior PCF OIC assigned
CTE 116.5.1.4	Unassigned	
CTE 116.5.1.5	SEAL Element	As assigned
CTE 116.5.1.6	SEAL Support Element	As assigned
CTU 116.5.2	Central River Surveillance Unit (COMCOSDIV 13) Sa Dec	LCDR D. J. SULLIVAN
CTE 116.5.2.1	PCF Raider Element, Sa Dec	Senior PCF OIC assigned
CTE 116.5.2.2	Unassigned	
CTE 116.5.2.3	SEAL Element, Sa Dec	As assigned
CTE 116.5.2.4	SEAL Support Element	As assigned
CTU 116.5.3	Lower River Surveillance Unit (COMCOGARDIV 13) Cat Lo	As assigned
CTE 116.5.3.1	Patrol Element Long Phu	Senior PCF OIC assigned
CTE 116.5.3.2	Unassigned	
CTE 116.5.3.3	SEAL Element Long Phu OIC SEAL Team ONE, Det GOLF, plt JULIETT	LTJG J. QUINCANNON
CTE 116.5.3.4	SEAL Support Element Long Phu, OIC MSP TWO Det GOLF	LTJG T.E. HENDRICKSON
CTE 116.5.3.5	SEAL Element My Tho OIC SEAL Team ONE, Det GOLF, plt HOTEL	LT A. M. TODD
CTE 116.5.3.6	SEAL Support Element My Tho, OIC MSP TWO Det ALPHA	LTJG R.T. STEINSON

Task Force 116 (cont.)

CTE 116.5.3.6	SEAL Support Element My Tho, OIC MST TWO Det ALPHA	LTJG F. T. STINSON
CTG 116.6	Crusades Commander, Binh Thuy, COMRIVPATFLOT FIVE	CAPT J. R. FAULK
CTU 116.6.0	Deputy Crusades Commander COMNAVFORV Staff Saigon	LT R. J. DANAHER
CTU 116.6.2	Breezy Cove Crusades CDR, Song Ong Doc	LTJG K. M. MICHLITSCH
CTU 116.6.3	Barrier Reef Central Cru- sades CDR-Kinh Quan Hai	LTJG L. A. DALE
CTU 116.6.4	Barrier Reef West Cru- sades CDR - Thuong Thoi	LTJG D. A. BARRE
CTU 116.6.5	Hoi An Crusades CDR	LTJG D. S. HUGHES
CTU 116.6.6	Vinh Te Crusades CDR Tinh Bien	LTJG M. L. FREY
CTU 116.6.7	Sea Float Crusades CDR Sea Float	LTJG A. D. DENMARK
CTU 116.6.8	Barrier Reef East Cru- sades CDR - Tuyen Nhon	LT R. F. Mc KINNON
CTU 116.6.9	Giant Slingshot Crusades CDR - Tra Cu	LTJG J. H. TESS

(NOTE: Crusades will be disestablished on 15 August 1970. Task Group 116.6 will then be unassigned.)

CTG 116.7	CO HA(L) 3, Binh Thuy	CAPT M. J. TWITE, JR.
CTU 116.7.1	OIC HAL 3, Det 1 Sea Float	CDR A. F. SCHMITT

Task Force 116 (cont.)

CTU 116.7.2	OIC HAL 3, Det 2 Nha Be	CDR M. A. ARTUSO
CTU 116.7.3	OIC HAL 3, Det 3 Ha Tien	LCDR S. A. FIELDS
CTU 116.7.4	OIC HAL 3, Det 4 Ben Luc	CDR K. A. HAMMAN
CTU 116.7.5	OIC HAL 3, Det 5 YRBM 20	CDR T. H. STARBUCK
CTU 116.7.6	OIC HAL 3, Det 6 Song Ong Doc	LCDR J. M. PEEPLES
CTU 116.7.7	OIC HAL 3, Det 7 Ben Luc	LCDR R. L. REDMAN
CTU 116.7.8	OIC HAL 3, Det 8 Rach Gia	LCDR G. M. WEBER
CTU 116.7.9	OIC HAL 3, Det 9 YRBM 21	LCDR H. J. WYNN
CTU 116.8	Black Pony CDR (CO VAL 4) Binh Thuy	CDR. V. W. KLEIN
CTG 116.9	CDR RSSZ River Patrol Group and SA RSSZ, Nha Be	CDR J. G. WILLIAMS, III
CTU 116.9.1	CO RSSZ PBR Unit (RIVDIV 535) / LT W. J. Mc CARTHY	
CTU 116.9.2	CO MINDIV 112	LTJG R. A. RUPPERT
CTU 116.9.3	CO MINDIV 113	LT P. N. JOHNSON
CTU 116.9.4	CO RSSZ RAC Unit (RAC 153) / LT T. J. LOPEZ	
CTU 116.9.6	OIC SEAL Team TWO, Det ALPHA, SEVENTH Plt.	LT T. L. HAWKINS
CTE 116.9.6.1	OIC MST TWO Det ALPHA	LTJG J. D. BARNES

(NOTE: Information presented is as of 1 August 1970 and is taken from
COMNAVFORV/NAVADVGRP MACV NOTICE 05440 of 070842Z AUG 70.)

Operation Sea Float / Solid Anchor

Enemy activity throughout the Sea Float/Solid Anchor area of operations continued to be moderate throughout the month of August. The enemy lost 18 killed (10 B.C., 8 prob.) and nine captured in action during the month. These figures show significant decreases from previous months. Once again, the U.S. Naval forces stationed at Sea Float/Solid Anchor paid a high price for their successes. Sixteen U.S. sailors were wounded in action in August. One PG, USS CANON (PG 90), and one PCF were severely damaged and another PCF lightly damaged by enemy fire.

Numerous problems continued to plague the persistent sailors of Sea Float/Solid Anchor in August. These problems ranged from enemy sapper attacks and the move ashore to the Solid Anchor site to the completely unsatisfactory material condition of the RID 45 units attached to Sea Float (only one boat operational out of 11 there as of 28 August).

The move to Solid Anchor was well underway by month's end and was completed in the early days of September. CTG 116.1 shifted to the Solid Anchor site on 1 September. While doing a great deal to reduce the threat of enemy sapper attacks, this move also brought to light numerous base defense problems which will have to be met

CONFIDENTIAL

if Solid Anchor is to be considered a secure haven. The 102 Seabees at work on the Solid Anchor site continued their professional construction work on the base throughout August.

One distinguished visitor to the Sea Float/Solid Anchor complex during the month was CAPT E. B. Mitchell, USN, Supervisor of Salvage NAVSHIPSYS COM HQ. He visited the site of the LSSL 225, which was sunk by an enemy mine in July, on 10 August. The LSSL 225 remained on the bottom at month's end as salvage possibilities were studied by U.S. and Vietnamese Naval commands.

On the morning of 11 August, USS CANON (PG 90) was ambushed by eight B-40/41 rockets and automatic weapons fire while entering the Song Bo De approximately 25 kilometers east of Sea Float (vicinity WQ 232 687). The CANON received five direct hits in the starboard side and another three in the port side as well as numerous hits by automatic weapons fire. Although 12 of the crew (almost half of the entire ship's complement), including the captain and the weapons and engineering officer were wounded, CANON returned heavy suppression fire as Seawolves were scrambled to provide support and PCFs 35 and 695 rushed to the scene. The PG then cleared the ambush area and proceeded to Sea Float where the wounded were medevaced and treated. Throughout the

engagement the crew of the CANON, led by their captain LCDR David B. Robinson, USN, exhibited bravery and professional skill in saving their ship.

The CANON suffered extensive damage in the attack and was sent to the Naval Support Facility, Cam Ranh Bay, for repairs which would enable her to make the transit to the Ship Repair Facility at Guam. The bloody, but unbowed ship, set sail for Guam on 27 August.

The ever present threat of enemy sapper attacks reasserted itself twice at Sea Float during the month of August. The first of the two encounters took place on the morning of 18 August when the body of a dead swimmer sapper, apparently targeted for Sea Float, washed ashore at the Solid Anchor site. His chest had been crushed and medical examination determined that he had been dead for two to five days. It appears that this sapper was killed by one of the concussion grenades which are randomly thrown from Sea Float as a swimmer deterrent.

A combination chemical and metal fatigue delay fuzed mine was attached to the body. The mine consisted of a wooden box approximately 10"X10"X22". A spool of line was attached to each end of the box with each spool containing approximately 70 meters

CONFIDENTIAL

of line. A flotation device attached to the top of the box consisted of three plastic floats. The mine contained a total of 118 pounds of TNT plus 13 blasting caps.

The second swimmer sapper incident occurred in the early morning hours of 23 August. A skimmer from the USS GALLUP (PG 85) was making a regular patrol around the anchored PG near the Sea Float complex when the skimmer personnel sighted an upright bamboo stick amidst some debris which was floating toward the GALLUP. A grenade was thrown at the debris and the explosion brought two swimmers to the surface. One swimmer attempted to swim down the port side of the skimmer and was shot in the head at close range. The second swimmer was taken under grenade attack and was not seen again. The MATSB went to GQ and scrambled all boats. Helos were also scrambled to assist in providing illumination and searching with night observation devices (NODs). The GALLUP shifted her anchorage and was checked for mines by EOD personnel. GQ was secured an hour later.

On the following day (24 August), two swimmer sapper bodies, evidently killed by concussion grenades, were found floating in the Sea Float area. Neither had been shot and it was assumed

CONFIDENTIAL

that the attempted attack on 23 August was conducted by a three-man team, all of whom were killed. Three hand grenades of U.S. manufacture were found on the second body. Two were lost while recovering the body however.

The SEALs attached to Sea Float/Solid Anchor continued their heavy schedule of patrols during the month. A typical SEAL operation took place on the night of 25-26 August when PO1 Rauch and SN Gerson of SEAL Team ONE accompanied nine Kit Carson Scouts (KCSs) and an interpreter on a mission to capture five VC in an area 18 kilometers northeast of Sea Float (vicinity WQ 123 775). As they entered two hootches in the target area, one male was taken under fire and killed as he attempted to evade. Simultaneously, the KCSs were taken under fire by approximately four VC. Fire was returned and two more VC were killed and another two captured. The KCSs and SEALs then withdrew and returned to the KCS camp.

Breezy Cove

United States Naval forces of Operation Breezy Cove (TG 116.2) scored several important victories during August in the Song Ong Doc area where enemy activity continued at a high pace. The month's highlight came with the liberation of 28 Vietnamese prisoners of war in the first successful Navy-led assault on a communist prison camp. While there were only three enemy-initiated fire-fights during August, intelligence sources indicated extensive enemy operations southward from the U Minh Forest sanctuaries. In addition to fighting guerrillas, TG 116.2 personnel had to contend with threatening rains and seas at mid-month.

The greatest tragedy of the month was the death of LTJG K. W. Tapscott, Operation Breezy Cove's Naval Intelligence Liaison Officer, killed in action seven kilometers east of Song Ong Doc on 6 August as he was on a routine patrol with units of RPG 62. PBRs 20, 31, and 36 came under intense rocket and automatic weapons fire from the north bank at VQ 854 999. After the lead boat on which the NILO was riding sustained a rocket hit on the port bow, the three craft made a second firing run through the contact area, again receiving a heavy barrage. One B-40 rocket struck LTJG Tapscott in the chest and shoulder, mortally wounding him.

CONFIDENTIAL

The second boat received three rocket hits which wounded four Vietnamese sailors. Within 20 minutes of the initial attack, Seawolves arrived overhead to place rocket and minigun strikes along the canal bank. Monitor 1 was summoned from the Song Ong Doc Advanced Tactical Support Base (ATSB) and arrived on station to lob 35 105 mm shells into the enemy's ambush site. The entire exchange lasted over an hour, and the ensuing ground sweep by VNN sailors revealed a hat riddled with bullet holes near a pool of blood. LTJG Tapscott, who had been Song Ong Doc NIO since May 1970, was recommended for the Bronze Star for meritorious service.

PBRs 33 and 38 intercepted three Viet Cong sampans 13 kilometers east of Song Ong Doc (VR 926 009) on the afternoon of 8 August. While transiting from Binh Thuy to Song Ong Doc, the two RPG 62 craft noticed the Vietnamese sampans taking evasive action. When they gave chase, the sampans beached and Viet Cong on both sides of the canal opened fire on the allies with automatic weapons. Two other PBRs of RPG 62 arrived to make firing runs through the contact area and Seawolves 66 and 67 scrambled to place air strikes. After the firing subsided, a VNN boat crew and a Popular Force company from Song Ong Doc made a ground sweep and captured the three sampans, three kilos of rice, and Viet Cong documents, including three personal letters, training documents, and pay records.

CONFIDENTIAL

The ATSB at Song Ong Doc was apparently threatened by sappers during the morning of 12 August. At 0930H a large junk stopped briefly about 500 meters west of the pontoon complex and then proceeded toward the sea. Within fifteen minutes the fantail watch on the ATSB reported bubbles coming from under the western pontoon. An American officer who observed these bubbles believed that they were similar to those coming from the discharge of a scuba regulator at the respiratory rate of a working diver. The base went to General Quarters as boats of RIVDIV 152 came alongside and the sailors began throwing concussion grenades into the water around the ammi complex. The bubbles ceased after the explosion of the first grenade, but within ten minutes a knocking sound was heard under the easternmost pontoon. The sound traveled the length of the pontoon, apparently with the current, but nothing was seen emerging from the opposite end. Divers were flown in from Solid Anchor and searched the ammi hulls and mooring cables with negative results. The base secured from battle stations at 1311H.

Monsoon rains and heavy seas proved to be a greater threat to the Song Ong Doc base during August than the enemy itself. A storm on 16 August with winds of 30 knots gusting to 40 knots created two foot waves around the ATSB ammis. The initial period of adverse weather carried away the bridge between the ammi complex

and the shore, the communication lines to the Seawolves and Duffle Bag installations, and the AN/GRC-10 antenna. The weather slackened during the night but the seas rose again the following day, putting tremendous strain on the cables mooring the ammis. No further damages resulted although the torrential rains threatened the foundations of the Seawolf helicopter pad. Although it took several days to repair the damage, CTG 116.2's support capabilities were not seriously hampered.

ATCs 7 and 50 were on routine patrol on 22 August at the southern end of the "VC Canal" (VQ 890 962) when ATC 7 struck a mine at the mouth of "VC Lake." The explosion did not entirely disable the craft, and the RIVDIV 152 units limped back to Song Ong Doc for assessment of damages. The blast had damaged both screws and the rudder post, but the hull appeared to be in sound condition.

U.S. Naval SEALs accounted for the most daring and prestigious victory of the August Breezy Cove operations when they led the rescue of 28 prisoners of war on 22 August. This feat, the first successful rescue attempt of Operation Brightlight, was dependent upon the combined forces of the Army, Navy, Australian Air Force, and Vietnamese Regional Forces.

Acting on intelligence provided by an escaped POW, Australian B-57's began placing 750 lb. bomb strikes on the morning of 22 August along a canal near the camp, located 39 kilometers southeast of Ca Mau (WQ 440 928) to establish a blocking force on one side. At 0910H, SEALs of Detachment ALPHA, 6th Platoon, led by LT Boink, and the 974th Regional Force Company inserted by air approximately six kilometers north of the camp (WQ 445 931) along a narrow beach line. Upon insertion, the SEALs shot an armed VC who attempted to enter a nearby bunker. Army gunships began placing heavy rocket and minigun fire into the jungle north and west of the POW camp to establish a further blocking force. When the escapee led the SEALs and RFs into the POW camp, the allies noticed many fresh footprints heading south. Army gunships, Seawolves, and the USS SOUTHERLAND (DD 743) were directed to saturate the area 500 meters south of the camp in an effort to cut off escape and hopefully force the communist guards to release their captives. The ground forces continued their southerly pursuit for over two hours, following a trail of abandoned clothing and gear. At 1245H, they linked up with 28 POWs whose guards had just fled the area. An Army Slick recovered the ex-prisoners and took them to Ca Mau. Seven of them, including the former company commander of the 1109th Viet Cong Company, were former VC who had been captured while attempting to Chieu Hoi.

Two separate patrol groups of RPG 62 were attacked with B-40 rockets and small arms fire six kilometers east of Song Ong Doc (VR 865 001) at 0735H on 30 August. The lead boat of one patrol was struck by a rocket which did not detonate, but the cover boat sustained two rocket hits which wounded both the forward and after .50 calibre gunners, the boat captain, the M-60 gunner, and the American advisor. The forward .50 calibre gunner was carried aft for treatment, whereupon he got up and manned the M-60, only to be mortally wounded by an AK-47 round. Monitor 1 and Zippo 3, assisted by Seawolves and a third PBR patrol, entered the contact area and quickly suppressed the enemy fire. The USCGC PONCHARTRAIN (WHEC 70) fired to the north of the area to cut off the enemy's escape route as Seawolves evacuated the wounded personnel. Fireman Nguyen Viet Tam, the gunner killed in action, was recommended for the American Bronze Star for heroic action.

Navy Seawolves accounted for the largest single combat success of the month when they killed 25 of the enemy on 30 August 10 kilometers east of Song Ong Doc (VR 904 040). The helicopters of Detachment SIX placed heavy air strikes against an estimated company-sized Viet Cong force in contact with a unit of the 33rd ARVN Regiment, and when they departed to refuel and rearm, were replaced by Seawolves of Detachment THREE from Ca Mau.

CONFIDENTIAL

These Seawolves received heavy small arms fire and called for additional assistance from the OV-10's. All enemy fire was suppressed by 0015H on 31 August, two hours after the fighting began. An intercepted communist transmission revealed that the aircraft had killed 25 of the enemy.

CONFIDENTIAL

Search Turn

Navy SEALs were the most active members of TG 116.3 during August as they worked throughout the month to halt daytime Viet Cong travel and detain VC suspects in the Kien Luong Province. River units of Operation Search Turn were involved in 12 firefights, more than any other SEA LORDS group with the exception of Operation Sea Float. The boats and crews of River Patrol Group 58 were complimented by Deputy COMNAVFORV, RADM H. S. Matthews for their exceptional condition and high degree of readiness.

Acting on Kit Carson Scout (KCS) and informer intelligence, SEALs of Detachment GOLF, KILO Platoon, and a KCS squad attempted to capture two district level Viet Cong political leaders in the early morning of 12 August. LTJG Stubblefield's SEALs and Vietnamese counterparts left Rach Soi shortly before midnight on 11 August, heading for a hamlet 11 kilometers south of Rach Gia on the Cai Lon River. While approaching the insertion point, the MSSC was ambushed with B-40 rockets and automatic weapons from both sides of the canal while passing through a row of fish stakes at WR 108 955. Though the enemy silhouetted the allies with parachute flares, they were unable to inflict any casualties. Seawolves 85 and 86 scrambled to place air strikes on the enemy positions, and when these were completed, the SEALs made another

CONFIDENTIAL

firing run through the area, suppressing the enemy fire which they received and destroying several sampans along the canal bank. The body-snatching mission was aborted.

A Duffle Bag monitoring team stumbled onto what was apparently a Viet Cong monitoring/communications base on the morning of 16 August. Members of Duffle Bag Team NINE were working three kilometers northeast of Rach Soi at WS 152 065 when they discovered a recently abandoned enemy encampment. The most important equipment found was a commercial transistor short wave radio modified to receive FM transmissions, an unsophisticated but effective example of guerrilla ingenuity. Unfortunately, a Regional Force soldier who was accompanying the sensor team inadvertently changed the monitored frequency before it could be recorded.

No other crypto gear or intercepted messages were discovered.

A meal for approximately 30 men was still on the fire, indicating the enemy had fled as the Duffle Bag team approached. The camp, surrounded by booby traps, consisted of two large hootches and five bunkers, all fully camouflaged to preclude aerial detection.

Seawolves and OV-10's were called in to destroy the complex, but as the monitoring team withdrew toward their PBRs, a small group of the enemy attacked with small arms fire. The aircraft

covered the ground forces' extraction and then destroyed the small base. There were no personnel casualties, but Seawolf 83 incurred minor damage from the ground fire. All of the sensors planted in that area were active that evening, indicating extensive enemy movement in a northerly direction from the camp site.



A Strike Assault Boat (STAB) departs homebase for an operation in the waters of South Vietnam.

Operation Blue Shark

Enemy activity remained moderate in the Blue Shark area of operations during the month of August. Blue Shark units accounted for 39 enemy killed (25 BC, 14 prob) and 26 captured. Nine U.S. sailors were wounded as a result of enemy action.

The majority of these U. S. casualties occurred on the afternoon of 4 August when the USCG WPB POINT MARONE was ambushed with four B-40 rockets and 82 mm mortar shells rigged as command detonated booby traps on the bank. The POINT MARONE, along with the POINT CYPRESS, was exiting from a canal approximately 14 miles east of Tra Vinh (vicinity XR 807 938) when the ambush was sprung. The POINT MARONE received four rocket hits which wounded five men (one seriously) and caused extensive damage to the WPB. Both units returned fire into the ambush site and transited the kill zone without further incident. Ten Kit Carson Scouts aboard POINT MARONE were also wounded in the encounter. Six of the enemy were killed, one wounded, and four others captured on the patrol which ended in the well-planned ambush.

Task Fleet 21

Combat activity in the SEA LORDS area of operations in August followed the same basic pattern set in recent months with hostilities becoming more pronounced the further south one traveled. Tran Hung Dao V/Ready Deck (CTG 216.1) experienced a typically uneventful month on the Upper Saigon River while units in the Ca Mau Peninsula, Operations Sea Float and Breezy Cove, were almost in constant contact with the enemy.

River interdiction operations conducted by Task Fleet 21 units in early August were quite successful in blocking the transit of Viet Cong personnel and supplies along major waterways. On one operation on the Mekong River, PCF crews, operating with ARVN soldiers and VNN Mine interdiction personnel aboard, captured over 20 confirmed Viet Cong and numerous communist documents. The operation revealed that the enemy is using several unusual and clever devices to conceal their documents. Hidden material included:

- a) small paper messages woven into conical straw hats;
- b) messages in plastic bags submerged in baby formula bottles;
- c) documents hidden between planks of the hull;
- d) invisible ink messages written on brown paper wrapped around food;
- e) documents in plastic bags sunken in the mud caulking along sampan's structural members;
- f) messages written on woman's underclothes;
- g) messages written on chewing gum wrappers.

CONFIDENTIAL

As part of the ACTOV Program, CTF 212 has been conducting a PBR school for prospective boat officers. As part of their "on the job" training, a group of VNN officers and warrant officers embarked on a five day familiarization cruise on 10 PBRs of River Patrol Group 65 beginning 5 August.

TASK FLEET TWO ONE ORGANIZATION

<u>Task Designator</u>	<u>Operational Title/Units assigned</u>	<u>Commander</u>
COMTASKFLT 21	First SEA LORDS	RADM MATTHEWS
CTF 210	CDR TRAN HUNG DAO 11	RADM MATTHEWS
CTG 210.1	CATF 211	CAPT THONG, VNN
CTU 210.1.0	THD 11 Senior Advisor	As assigned
CTU 210.1.1	CTG 211.1 (RAIDS 70, 71)	LCDR HOC, VNN
CTU 210.1.2	CTG 211.2 (RAIDS 72, 73)	LCDR TONG, VNN
CTU 210.1.3	CTG 211.3 (RAIDS 74, 75)	LCDR NHUT, VNN
CTG 210.3	THD 11 Support Group (USS SATYR, USS BENEWAH)	LCDR GIGANTI
CTG 210.9	On Scene Test CDR SA CTF 211	CAPT SPENCER
CTU 210.9.1	Boat Support Unit	As assigned
CTU 210.9.2	Helo Support Detachment OIC HAL-3 Det 7	LCDR REDMAN
CTU 210.9.3	UDT Detachment	LCDR SPINX
CTF 211	CDR Amphibious Operations	CAPT THONG, VNN
CTF 212	CDR Interdiction Ops	CAPT PHU, VNN
CTG 212.1	TF 212 Area Coordinator (RPGs 51, 52, 57)	LCDR MAY, VI...
CTG 212.2	TF 212 Area Coordinator (RPGs 53, 54 - 10 boats)	LCDR SINH, VNN
CTG 212.3	CDR TRAN HUNG DAO /	LCDR DA, VNN
CTU 212.3.0	Deputy CDR TRAN HUNG DAO 9 /	LCDR FERGUSON

<u>Task Designator</u>	<u>Operational Title/Units assigned</u>	<u>Commander</u>
CTU 212. 3. 1	CDR THD 9 WESTERN (CO RPG 56)	LCDR NHON, VNN
CTU 212. 3. 2	CDR THD 9 CENTRAL	LT CAHILL
CTE 212. 3. 2. 1	RIVDIV 571	LT DONALDSON
CTE 212. 3. 2. 2	COMRIVDIV 532	LT CAHILL
CTE 212. 3. 2. 3	CDR RAS 15 Element	LT CAHILL
CTE 212. 3. 2. 4	OIC Monitor Team 8	LTJG DALE
CTU 212. 3. 3	CDR THD 9 EASTERN (CO RPG 59)	LT HOC, VNN
CTU 212. 3. 4	EODMUPAC Team 39	LTJG FULLER
CTU 212. 3. 5	OIC YRBM 21	LTJG FRY
CTU 212. 3. 6	OIC Monitor Team 7	LTJG CANADY
CTG 212. 4	CDR TRAN HUNG DAO 1	LCDR GIANG, VNN
CTU 212. 4. 1	CDR WESTERN TRAN HUNG DAO I	LCDR LONG, VNN
CTE 212. 4. 1. 1	CO RPG 61	LCDR LONG, VNN
CTE 212. 4. 1. 2	CO COASTAL GROUP 42	As assigned
CTE 212. 4. 1. 3	Senior OIC assigned PCF	As assigned
CTU 212. 4. 2	CDR CENTRAL TRAN HUNG DAO I (CO RID 41)	LT TRIEU, VNN
CTE 212. 4. 2. 1	CDR PBR Element	As assigned
CTE 212. 4. 2. 2	CDR RAC Element	As assigned
CTU 212. 4. 3	CDR EASTERN TRAN HUNG DAO 1	LCDR TRIEU, VNN
CTE 212. 4. 3. 1	CO RPG 55	LCDR TRIEU, VNN
CTE 212. 4. 3. 2	CO RID 42	LT TOAN, VNN

<u>Task Designator</u>	<u>Operational Title/Units assigned</u>	<u>Commander</u>
CTE 212.4.3.3	CO RPG KSB	LT BAO, VNN
CTU 212.4.4	CDR River Unit	LT BAO, VNN
CTE 212.4.4.1	CDR Takeo Element (Patrol Officer assigned)	As assigned
CTE 212.4.4.2	CDR Chau Doc Element	As assigned
CTE 212.4.4.3	CDR Bassac Element (Patrol Officer assigned)	As assigned
CTU 212.4.5	CDR Special Ops Unit	As assigned
CTU 212.4.6	CO USS GARRETT COUNTY	LCDR BROWN
CTU 212.4.7	Retrans Site	As assigned
CTU 212.4.8	OIC Monitor Team 1	ENS THANH, VNN
CTE 212.4.8.1	Monitor Team 1, Det 1	As assigned
CTE 212.4.8.2	Monitor Team 1, Det 2	As assigned
CTE 212.4.8.3	Monitor Team 1, Det 3	As assigned
CTG 212.5	(To be activated) CDR TRAN HUNG DAO 6 (RPG 58)	
CTG 212.6	(To be activated) CDR TRAN HUNG DAO 10 (RPG 62)	
CTF 213	MARKET TIME Ops under SEA LORDS	CAPT CHI, VNN
CTF 214	CDR General Reserve Force	CDR PHONG, VNN
CTG 214.1	CDR TRAN HUNG DAO 2	LCDR TIEU, VNN
CTU 214.1.1	Ben Luc Interdiction Unit (RPG 53 - 10 boats)	LTJG BA, VNN
CTU 214.1.2	Tra Cu Interdiction Unit/RID 44	LTJG BE, VNN

<u>Task Designator</u>	<u>Operational Title/Units assigned</u>	<u>Commander</u>
CTU 214.1.3	Go Dau Ha Interdiction Unit/RID 40 /	LT THINH, VNN
CTU 214.1.4	Ben Keo Interdiction Unit/RPG 53	LT JUNG, VNN
CTU 214.1.5	Tan An Interdiction Unit RID 43, RPG 54, RIVDIV 594	LT AN, VNN
CTU 214.1.6	Tuyen Nhon Interdiction Unit RIVDIV 594	LT SMELLY
CTU 214.1.7	Moc Hoa Interdiction Unit RIVDIV 535	LT McCARTHY
CTU 214.1.8	Monitor Team 7	LT Mc KINNON
CTE 214.1.8.1	Monitor Team 7, Det 1	As assigned
CTU 214.1.9	OIC Monitor Team 3	ASP PHONG, VNN
CTE 214.1.0.1	SEAL Team	No information
CTE 214.1.0.2	UDT Team	No information
CTE 214.1.0.3	EOD Team 70, Element 3	No information
CTF 215	FLEET COMMAND Ops under SEA LORDS	CAPT CHAU, VNN
CTF 216	CDR SEA LORDS Third Riverine Area Operations	CDR HIEU, VNN
CTG 216.1	CDR TRAN HUNG DAO 5	LCDR GIA, VNN
CTU 216.1.0	Deputy CDR TRAN HUNG DAO 5	LCDR WERNDLI
CTU 216.1.1	CO RAG 24	LCDR GIA, VNN
CTU 216.1.2	CO RPG 52	LT DAO, VNN
CTF 217	CDR SEA LORDS Fourth River Zone Operations	CDR DAO, VNN
CTG 217.1	CDR TRAN HUNG DAO 8	CDR DAO, VNN

<u>Task Designator</u>	<u>Operational Title/Units assigned</u>	<u>Commander</u>
CTU 217.1.1	CO Logistic and Fire Support Elements/RAG 21, RAG 33	No information
CTE 217.1.1.1	RAG 21/33 Elements	As assigned
CTU 217.1.2	CO Patrol Elements	No information
CTE 217.1.2.1	PBR/VN Element	As assigned
CTE 217.1.2.2	PBR/US Element	As assigned
CTE 217.1.2.3	PBR/US Element	As assigned
CTU 217.1.3	CDR SEAWOLF Unit (OIC HAL-3 Det 4)	CDR HAMMON
CTU 217.1.4	PCF/US Element	As assigned
CTU 217.1.5	STABDIV 210	No information
CTG 217.2	CDR TRAN HUNG DAO 14 (CO RAG 23/31)	LCDR LAI, VNN
CTU 217.2.0	Deputy CDR TRAN HUNG DAO 14	Vacant
CTU 217.2.1	RAG 23/31	As assigned
CTU 217.2.2	RAID Support Unit	Vacant
CTU 217.2.3	PBR Support Units	Vacant
CTU 217.2.4	LSIL 329	
CTU 217.2.5	Helo Support Detachment	No information
CTU 217.2.6	LSIL 327	

(NOTE: The above information has been taken from COMTASKFLT
TWO ONE message 031125Z August 1970 and changes.
The information presented is current as of 19 August 1970.)

Tran Hung Dao I

Vietnamese Navy assets of Operation Tran Hung Dao I operating along the Vinh Te Canal and into Cambodia were involved in only seven firefights during August, but two were on a massive scale. Allied units reported killing 14 of the enemy by body count and estimated probably killing another 50.

VNN units of RID 42 suffered very heavy casualties on the morning of 5 August. Four Assault Support Patrol Boats (ASPBs) came under heavy B-40 and recoilless rifle fire from both sides of the Upper Bassac River, eight kilometers south of the Cambodian border (WT 084 235) at 1030H. On initial contact, the personnel on ASPB 61 sustained two killed, 11 wounded, and two missing. The boat apparently received a direct hit with a 105 mm recoilless rifle round on the starboard side and several B-40 rocket hits. The units immediately cleared the contact area and proceeded northward to pick up ARVN troops. When the boats re-entered the ambush site on the return trip at 1445H, they were again attacked. They returned a heavy volume of fire, and the troops disembarked for a ground sweep, but made no further contact. The ASPBs limped back to YRBM 20 for repairs.

CONFIDENTIAL

Units of RID 42 became involved in a large scale firefight on 26 August when VNN crew members in a WBGF on the Vinh Te Canal (VS 661 663) attacked approximately 100 Viet Cong moving in a westerly direction along the south bank. OV-10 aircraft from VAL-4 replied to calls for assistance by providing illumination and making firing runs, triggering one secondary explosion. Seawolves 330 and 319 joined in the destruction by placing additional strikes in the vicinity of the explosion. The only friendly casualty of the engagement was GME3 J. P. Cullena, USN, an advisor on PBR 16, who was injured when a round exploded in the gun he was firing.

LT Deroco, USN, was assigned additional duty as Deputy to LCDR Long, VNN, CTU 212.4.1 (Western Sector Commander) in August. This was in keeping with the Chief of Naval Advisory Group's efforts to assign all American officers serving in combined commands as deputy commanders of those operations where appropriate. When the combined command becomes a unilateral Vietnamese Navy command, the advisor's additional duty will terminate and the former USN deputy commander will revert to senior advisor to the command.

CONFIDENTIAL

Tan Hung Dao II / CTG 214.1

A nocturnal WBGW was not a new experience for SN Sung, VNN, and his USN advisor, POL Gilliss - many times they had eased their Boston Whaler with its small ambush team embarked into the soft brown mud on the banks of the Vam Co Dong River and waited patiently for some hint of movement in the thick foliage beyond. The night of 5 August they decided to try something different. At 2040H they tied up 15 kilometers upriver from Tra Cu (XT 411 132), formed a defensive perimeter, setting out claymore mines on the bank about ten meters from the boat. A transistor radio emitting the melancholy strains of a Vietnamese folksong and a stick of incense were then placed by one of the mines. Soon four persons emerged from the jungle, presumably curious about such festive sounds and smells in such hostile territory, although the author of the subsequent spotrep claimed that the VC were "apparently intent upon attacking the transistor radio." The radio broadcast was suddenly punctuated by a burst of M-14 fire from a friendly sniper, who hit one of the four men in the chest. The claymores were then fired at the remaining three, while AK-47 rounds and grenades began coming in from the left of the friendly position. The defensive party then withdrew to the boat, while the whaler laid down covering fire. As they got underway, a faulty pop flare ignited

in the boat, and soon the gas tanks were ablaze. Four personnel were directed over the side as one VNN and three advisors extinguished the flames, then the whaler returned to the base. One M-14 and one M-16 were lost to the muddy currents of the Vam Co Dong in the melee, and one VC lay dead on her banks. The transistor radio was saved.

All the August encounters in the Tran Hung Dao II AO were not so dramatic however. There were 45 friendly-initiated and 18 enemy-initiated firefights, which produced a total of ten VC killed and no friendly mortalities.

An FOM of RAG 22 sank by the stern early in the morning of 4 August. Apparently the ebb tide left the boat high and dry on the bank where she was tied up, and as the tide began to rise, water entered through the engine exhaust. She was salvaged at the next low tide.

Another VC was killed by a Black Pony and Seawolf (HAL-3/ Det 9) strike at 2205H on 5 August, 14 miles from Tuyen Nhon (XS 187 817), supporting a WBGp operation headed by LTJG Stevens of RIVDIV 571.

RIVDIV 571 departed the THD II AO on 25 August to prepare itself for turnover.

Perhaps the major single action for the month occurred at 0102H on 23 August, when PBR 27 of RIVDIV 535 with QMC Stamps in charge detected movement on the south bank of the Vam Co Tay while in WBGP 10 kilometers from Moc Hoa (WS 948 977). It was a gusty monsoon night and the boat crew was having trouble identifying the source of movement, when suddenly two grenades landed near the boat, both of them exploding on the bank and causing only slight shrapnel damage to the boat. The PBR broke WBGP and opened fire, receiving fire which they suppressed. A ground sweep at first light revealed fresh trails and two bodies, 2-3 months old. The local populace later reported to a MEDCAP team on 26 August that the engagement of 22 August had killed one VC and wounded nine others. The man killed was one Tran Van Minh, the platoon leader of a 17-man sapper group.

RAG 22 almost incurred its second casualty at 1215H on 26 August when an explosion occurred in the water at the end of a pontoon bridge at the Go Dau Ha Base, where boat HQ 5041 was tied up. A small boy of about nine years was captured by the crew of HQ 5041, and the body of a second boy killed in the blast was retrieved from the water. The prisoner claimed that he and four other boys were attempting to place a charge in HQ 5041 when it exploded prematurely. The boy then led personnel of RID 40 to the riverside home of a man said to have given them the explosive. The man was turned over to the district police for interrogation.

CONFIDENTIAL

Tran Hung Dao V / Ready Deck

Units of RPG 52 and RAG 24, the operational units of Operation Tran Hung Dao V (CTG 216.1) experienced a typically uneventful month during August as they were involved in only three firefights. Two of these resulted from light sniper fire which was quickly suppressed.

On 27 August the second boat of a four boat PBR patrol was attacked with four B-40 rockets and approximately 300 rounds of automatic weapons fire. The boats took the area under fire and called in U. S. artillery on the enemy positions. There were no friendly personnel or material casualties.

CONFIDENTIAL

Tran Hung Dao VIII

Tran Hung Dao VIII, a campaign to conduct Riverine and Interdiction operations in the Fourth Military Region in support of the 7th ARVN Division, commenced at 0600H on 3 August 1970.

Even before the campaign officially commenced, allied forces suffered their first casualties of the campaign. At 011645H, on 1 August, PCF 97 was returning from an exploratory transit when it came under B-40 rocket attack at XS 394 440, one and one half kilometers northwest of Dong Tam on the Kinh Xang in Dinh Tuong Province. The PCF was hit by at least three rockets and suffered seven wounded. Six were U.S. Navy personnel; the other, a Vietnamese sailor. None were seriously wounded.

On 16 August, VNN PBRs 78 and 79, with no advisors aboard, were attacked by approximately 30 VC using B-40 rockets at XS 385 485, five kilometers northwest of Dong Tam on the Kinh Xang in San Giang District of Dinh Tuong Province. PBR 78 was sunk and PBR 79 was damaged in the attack. Two VNN were killed and six wounded. PBR 78 was later raised and towed to Dong Tam, but not without further excitement. On 17 August, while PBR 78 was under tow, one B-40 rocket was fired at the escorting PBRs near XS 387 428, three and one half kilometers northwest

of Dong Tam. The PBRs suppressed the fire and proceeded to Dong Tam with no additional casualties.

On 20 August, CTF 217 was able to report that since the start of Tran Hung Dao VIII on 3 August, there has been (1) an increase in traffic on the Kinh Xang Canal and (2) there has been no reported VC attempts to extort taxes from the local populace.

On 27 August, the senior advisor to CTG 217.1 reported that he had been advised by the Sam Giang District Senior Advisor that since 12 August, Seawolf strikes had resulted in the destruction of 45 bunkers, 15 structures, two bridges, and 10 sampans. The Seawolves had also been responsible for the deaths of three high level VC operating in Sam Giang District. One was a platoon leader of a sapper platoon; the second was the company commander of C350 (Company) 309F Artillery Battery; and the third was a VC village chief responsible for VC activities in his area.

Tran Hung Dao VIII assets at the end of August were:

<u>Task Designation</u>	<u>Units</u>	<u>Boats</u>
TU 217.1.1	RAG 21/33	26
TU 217.1.2.1	RPG 54	10
TU 116.7.7 (TU 217.1.3 originally)	HAL 3, Det 7	2 (Helos)
TU 217.1.4	COSDIV 13 (U.S. PCF)	/ 2
TU 217.1.5	STABDIV 201	10

Tran Hung Dao IX / Barrier Reef

Hostile activity during August in the Tran Hung Dao IX/ Barrier Reef AO increased from the previous month with an apparent step-up in guerrilla infiltration efforts from Cambodia. While there were 10 firefights involving TG 212.3 assets, the allies did not suffer any personnel killed or wounded as a result of enemy action.

Misdirected friendly fire killed two and seriously wounded three Americans at the Phuoc Xuyen Advanced Tactical Support Base (ATSB) on the night of 6 August. In response to a Duffle Bag sensor activation at WS 817 792, the Phuoc Xuyen mortar team began firing the 81 mm mortar. The second outgoing round impacted on the north bank of the Grand Canal about 15 meters from the messing ammi pontoon. BMC Andrew C. Grant and ENC Lloyd A. Murphy were killed instantly, while GMGSN David L. Meyer, TMSA Leon E. Zimmerman, and SN Gaylan E. Kocheren were medevaced with serious abdominal wounds. The mortar crew immediately ceased firing and the ATSB went to General Quarters to continue shooting at the enemy who returned fire briefly. The mortar crew stated that the second mortar round had apparently misfired and consequently fallen short. Inspection of the mortar unit indicated a clear bore and no apparent defects, and all other rounds in the lot being used fired without malfunction.

Intelligence sources warned CTG 212.3 of increased enemy infiltration from Cambodia's Crows Nest area near Phuoc Xuyen and of the possibility of attacks on allied river boats on the Grand Canal. A member of the well-armed element of the 88th Regiment of the North Vietnamese Army told a friendly agent that they planned to concentrate their attacks on U.S. advisors in the vicinity of Phuoc Xuyen. The time, date, and method of the impending attacks was not specified. It was further reported that the 502nd NVA Battalion had been reconnoitering outposts at Cai Be (WS 833 590), Kinh Xang Xeo (WS 828 544), Kinh Ngau (WS 888 461), and Kinh Xang Moi (WS 858 506) for sapper attacks so that they could set up communication and logistics routes to the 88th Regiment units operating to the south. These attacks, predicted to occur between 25 August and 5 September, had not materialized by the end of the month.

Seawolves 96 and 92 scrambled from the Seawolf bunker at Moc Hoa on the evening of 26 August to assist three PBRs which were receiving hand grenades and heavy automatic weapons fire from both sides of the canal 16 kilometers northwest of Moc Hoa (WS 840 953). The river boats had been attacked while trying to set an ambush for a 200-man North Vietnamese Army unit which was expected to cross the canal at that point. The Navy gunships, after expending their ordnance on enemy positions, were relieved

by Black Ponies 04 and 06. The Seawolves returned for a second strike and were accompanied by Seawolves 45 and 48 and Black Ponies 12 and 16. After one hour of constant bombardment, the pilots estimated that they had killed 15 of the enemy, and the boat captains reported that they probably killed an additional 10.

During August a plan to relocate half of River Patrol Group 59 to Phuoc Xuyen was aborted as it was decided that the Tuyen Nhon base had sufficient support capabilities for the entire unit. This decision, coupled with the removal of STAB units from Phuoc Xuyen and a consequent paucity of assets in that area, resulted in a shift in RPG 59's area of operations to the west to insure sufficient coverage of central Tran Hung Dao IX.

VIETNAMESE NAVAL OPERATIONS IN CAMBODIA

The month of August saw the Vietnamese Navy's involvement in operations against communist forces in Cambodia increase in scope as one phase, evacuation of refugees, came to an end and another phase, direct support of Cambodian forces, began.

At 0930H on 19 August, LST 504 arrived in Vung Tau from Phnom Penh with 374 refugees thus completing the final lift of Vietnamese refugees from Cambodia. Between 10 May and 19 August the naval vessels participating in this entirely Vietnamese operation transported 81,790 refugees from Cambodia to Vietnam. The largest and perhaps the most unusual lift of all occurred on 31 July when a convoy of 300 junks carrying 8,500 refugees towed by four Vietnamese tugs departed Phnom Penh. They were escorted by LSSL 230, RAID 70, two VNN PCFs and two VNN PBRs. One hundred junks arrived at Long Xuyen on the morning of 1 August and the remaining 200 junks arrived at Can Tho later the same day.

The entire refugee evacuation was conducted entirely without American advisory participation and the general admiration of the men of the U. S. Navy in Vietnam was expressed by VADM J. H. King, Jr., on 22 August in a message to the CNO of the Vietnamese Navy:

"I extend my sincere congratulations to the VNN for the successful repatriation of more than 90,000 (sic) VN refugees from Cambodia to the Republic of Vietnam through hostile waters. The VNN can be justly proud of this accomplishment which was made possible through the detailed planning, outstanding seamanship, and personal dedication that was displayed throughout the operation. The performance of the VNN was in keeping with the highest traditions of the naval service. Well done."

Prior to August Cambodian forces had undoubtedly benefited enormously from Vietnamese naval operations on the Mekong River. In fact, some observers considered the Vietnamese Navy's presence there one of the major factors deterring the enemy from overrunning Cambodia completely. Nevertheless, until August, the prime concern of the Vietnamese Navy in Cambodia had been the evacuation of Vietnamese refugees, the support of Vietnamese Marine Corps operations, and the security of the Mekong between the border and Phnom Penh. No operations had been carried out directly in support of Cambodian forces.

At 1400H on 18 August a convoy carrying more than 600 tons of supplies for the beleaguered city of Kompong Cham sailed up the Mekong out of Phnom Penh escorted by RAIDs 72 and 73 and LSIL 330. The convoy was attacked three times on its way to Kompong Cham. One Cambodian naval vessel was sunk and another was heavily damaged during these attacks. LSIL 330 took a hit in a magazine

about six miles southwest of Kompong Cham at 0730H on 19 August, and two VNN sailors were wounded. Around noon on 19 August the convoy finally arrived in Kompong Cham. The heaviest and most damaging attack occurred between 2340H on 19 August and 0110H on 20 August during the return trip to Phnom Penh. The enemy attacked the convoy with a wide assortment of weapons between WU 480 155 and WU 320 190, an area about 30 miles north of Prey Veng. At WU 320 190, about 11 miles southwest of Kompong Cham, LSIL 330 received a 75 mm recoilless rifle hit which caused a three-foot hole in the bow three feet above the waterline. One Vietnamese Navy sailor was killed and six were wounded. Several boats of RAIDs 72 and 73 received minor damage. The battle-scarred convoy arrived back in Phnom Penh at 0330H on 20 August.

Meanwhile, the enemy continued to make his presence known on the relatively secure stretch of the Mekong River south of Phnom Penh. At 1050H on 27 August, CCB 6106 of RAID 71, engaged in checking traffic about 11 miles south of Neak Luong (WT 270 275), called a sampan alongside. The occupants of the sampan tossed two packages of explosives into the CCB causing it to sink immediately. One VNN sailor was killed and the commanding officer of RAID 71 was wounded in both legs. At month's end, efforts were underway to salvage the sunken craft.

Tran Hung Dao XIV

Tran Hung Dao XIV, an Interdiction and Destruction operation along the Mo Cay River to support rural development and pacification in the Fourth Military Region in Kien Hoa Province, commenced at 1200H on 17 August 1970.

Hardly had the operation started than the LSIL 327 came under 75 mm recoilless rifle, B-40 rocket, and 82 mm mortar fire at 1635H at XS 522 200, ten kilometers south of Ben Tre City in Kien Hoa Province. LSIL 327 returned fire with all weapons and the action terminated at 1755H. LSIL 327 sustained four hits: One B-40 hit in the vicinity of the starboard running light; one 75 mm round hit the starboard bullwark on the main deck; and two 82 mm's landed in the main deck area below the bridge. All damage was superficial, but one VN sailor was slightly wounded. The commanding officer of LSIL 327 reported a direct hit on the 75 mm recoilless rifle position.

On 24 August, VNN ATC 1240 and ASPB 5125 were beached together at XS 466 231 on the east bank of the Mo Cay River about four kilometers north of Mo Cay Town/District. At 0130H, a single large explosion occurred beneath ATC 1240 and turned the boat over. ASPB 5125 apparently received serious hull damage from

the explosion and slid from the river bank towards the center of the river and sank in about four minutes. Four VNN were wounded and five missing.

When salvage divers investigated the boats prior to salvage work, it was apparent that each boat was mined separately and that two explosions had occurred simultaneously. It is believed that swimmers placed the mines which were later command detonated.

Tran Hung Dao XIV assets at the end of the month were:

<u>Task Designation</u>	<u>Units</u>	<u>Boats</u>
TU 217.2.1	RAG 23/31	12
TU 217.2.2	RAID 75	10 (6 ATCs; 2 ASPBs; 1 Zippo)
TU 217.2.3	Not assigned	
TU 217.2.4	LSIL 329	
TU 217.2.4.1	Coastal Group 34/35	- 6 junks
TU 217.2.5	HAL 3, Det 7	- 2 Helos (TU 116.7.7)
TU 217.2.6	LSIL 327	

The flow of waterborne traffic in the Ham Luong River and the Mo Cay Canal areas has increased substantially since the beginning of Tran Hung Dao XIV. Initially, traffic was heavy only from 0700H to 1000H. Now traffic appears to be more evenly distributed throughout the day. VC tax collection points were reported to be located at XS 492247 and XS 467 224, along the Mo Cay Canal. Recent questioning of the people indicates that no taxes have been collected since the movement of Tran Hung Dao XIV units into the area.

Rung Sat Special Zone

Combined operations were continued in the Rung Sat Special Zone (RSSZ) during the month of August. Five such operations were conducted and were named Chuong Duong 32-70 through Chuong Duong 37-70. On only three of these operations were friendly forces able to make contact with enemy forces. The results of Chuong Duong 33-70, if disappointing, was typical for the month of August. The results of Chuong Duong 33-70, conducted 4 through 6 August, were: Assorted documents captured; seven sleeping platforms, three bunkers, two structures, one 250 lb. U.S. dud bomb, one sampan, eight CHICOM grenades, 60 kilos of salt, assorted clothing, assorted cooking utensils, and one 50 gallon container destroyed. One body was discovered which was believed to be the result of a USAF air strike conducted on 1 August. There were no friendly casualties, and, as far as is known, there were no enemy casualties.

RSSZ operations during the month accounted for 13 enemy killed and four probably killed. Friendly casualties for the month were two killed and four wounded. Of these casualties, the U. S. Navy suffered one killed and all of the four wounded.

COASTAL SURVEILLANCE FORCES

It is perhaps a measure of the effectiveness of more than four years of Market Time patrols that during August, the last month during which the Market Time inner barrier was to be under U.S. operational control, there was an almost uniformly low level of enemy activity in the waters of the four coastal zones. It would seem that the ships and men of Operation Market Time had indeed accomplished their mission of denying to the enemy the coastal waters of Vietnam and securing those waters for peaceful use by the merchants and fishermen of South Vietnam. As the day approached when the Vietnamese would assume command of the all-important inner barrier, the American sailors could find additional satisfaction in their knowledge of their Vietnamese counterparts' readiness for such responsibility. During August U.S. forces in Operation Market Time inspected 5,224 craft, boarded 497 craft, and detained 25 junks and 240 people. Vietnamese forces searched 50,463 junks and 150,838 people and detained 91 junks and 443 people.

The only flaw in an otherwise generally peaceful picture was found in the area around the Cua Viet River in the First Coastal Zone. Here, the enemy maintained a continuous campaign to mine the Cua Viet River. An upswing in activity began in July

when the mine interdiction forces responsible for the security of the Cua Viet River were turned over, and the enemy apparently attempted to test the Vietnamese.

At 0130H on 3 August, LCPL 26 of MID 92 was sunk by an underwater explosion, believed to have been caused by a swimmer-placed charge, while tied up alongside the CG 11 pontoon causeway. Fifteen minutes later MSM 15 of MID 92, anchored in the Cua Viet River about one kilometer from the mouth (YD 338 698), was slightly damaged as a result of an underwater explosion, again believed to have been caused by a swimmer-placed charge. Shortly after this second incident, a U.S. Navy LCU was damaged by an underwater explosion about one kilometer southwest of the CG 11 piers (YD 335 689). Fortunately, no one was injured in this concentrated series of incidents.

Two weeks later, an incident occurred which indicated a step-up in the mining campaign. At 1140H on 17 August, a CG 11 junk, while on its way to a rendezvous with PCE 10, struck a mine and was completely destroyed about 1000 yards seaward of the mouth of the Cua Viet River (YD 350 708). The two Vietnamese Navy sailors aboard the junk were killed. The PCE 10 reported that the junk vanished in a 100-foot waterspout. EOD personnel estimated that the mine contained at least 100 pounds

of explosives. This appeared to be the first enemy attempt to lay mines in the open sea. Although the mine could have drifted out to sea from an original position in the Cua Viet River, analysts could not discount the possibility that it was a deliberate attempt to mine naval gunfire support or northern barrier ships. This hypothesis was strengthened when, on the morning of 29 August, USS DYNAMIC (MSO 432) discovered another floating mine seaward of the mouth of the Cua Viet River (YD 347 707) while assisting craft from CG 11 in the search for remains of the junk sunk on 17 August. The mine was magnetic-acoustic, potentially the most destructive of the enemy's watermine stockpile, and represented a degree of sophistication and logistics not evidenced by the enemy in over two years.

At 1530H on 18 August, SS ROBIN TRENT, while mooring at the DeLong Pier in Qui Nhon Harbor, collided with Korean tug no. 277. The tug capsized and sank in four minutes, blocking the channel. There were no injuries. As the tug's position necessitated closing Qui Nhon Harbor, efforts to raise her were expedited. The tug was raised at 1120H and refloated by 1540H on 21 August by floating cranes with the assistance of a VNN EOD team, ROK Navy divers, and NSAD Qui Nhon divers. The port of Qui Nhon reopened at 0700H on 22 August.

CONFIDENTIAL

Vessels of the Vietnamese Navy continued to patrol the coastal waters of Cambodia as far as the vicinity of Kompong Som during the month without incident.

CONFIDENTIAL


Stable DoorUnit ONE - Vung Tau

At 0300H on 12 August, the Harbor Entrance Control Point (HECP) was informed by the military police that there had been an explosion under the civilian tug MICHAEL B. The Stable Door EOD team was dispatched and upon making a check of the MICHAEL B, found no external damage. It was believed that the mine had dropped off the tug's hull and detonated on the harbor bottom. The shock from the explosion caused some internal damage. Four crew members were treated for minor injuries and released from the hospital. The EOD team conducted a hull search of the remainder of the ships in the inner harbor with negative results.

On 1 September, the Stable Door unit at Vung Tau was turned over to the operational control of the Vietnamese Navy.

Unit TWO - Cam Ranh Bay

Normal Stable Door patrols were conducted by the Cam Ranh Bay unit with no significant incidents reported during the month. The Cam Ranh Bay unit is scheduled for turnover to the Vietnamese Navy on 1 November 1970.



River Assault Groups

During August the River Assault Groups continued to conduct normal river denial and troop lift operations. Enemy activity was generally light and scattered with the exception of a few areas in the lower Delta, notably An Xuyen Province.

RAG 25/29 carried out operations in An Xuyen Province during the month and consequently was subject to a good deal of harassing action by the enemy. At 2110H on 26 August, one commandement, one monitor, one LCM-6 and two FOMs were at an RF outpost about 14 miles north of Ca Mau City (WR 199 376) working in support of the 250 RF Company when two 105 mm launch bombs were fired from the opposite bank of the canal at a range of about 75 yards. One bomb landed at the outpost's perimeter and the second hit a 60 mm mortar pit, destroying the mortar. The RAG units returned the fire and suppressed it. The next morning at 0925H, a landing party of RAG personnel swept the area from which the bombs had been fired and captured five 105 mm launch bombs and launchers. The bombs were electrically fired and were fuzed with hand grenade type fuzes.

On 30 August an LCM-6 of RAG 25/29, while making a supply run from Tan Phu to Toi Binh, struck a watermine about

14 miles north of Ca Mau City (WR 153 379). The craft lost one 20 mm mount into the water and the starboard engine was 70% destroyed. Three Vietnamese Navymen were wounded.

At the end of August, the RAGs of the VNN were deployed as follows with assets as listed:

Homeport / Total / LCM-6 / LCVP / FOM / COMM / VED / RPC / ATC / MON

RAGs (3rd Riverine Area):

22 Nha Be	19	5	6	5	1				2
24 Cuu Long	17	5	4	5	1				2
28 Nha Be	14	5	2		1				2
27 Cat Lai	22	6			1		13		1
30 Cuu Long	14	5		2	1				1

RAGs (4th Riverine Area):

21 Dong Tam	18	5	6	5	1				1
23 Vinh Long	20	6	5	6	2				1
25 Can Tho	16	5	3	6	1				1
26 Rach Soi	18	5	4	6	1				2
29 Can Tho	12	5			1	4	3		2
31 Vinh Long	10	5			1				1
33 Dong Tam	8	6			1				1
32 Hue	16	6	4		1	4			1
81 Cat Lai	28		14	10					4

River Interdiction Divisions / TF 214

Captain Vuong Huu Thieu, VNN, assumed command of TF 214 on 4 August, relieving LCDR Nguyen Van Thuyen, Acting Commander.

River Assault and Interdiction Divisions / TF 211

At the beginning of August, all RAID assets were assigned to 210.1 in Cambodia, with the exception of RAID 75, which continued performing troop lifts for the 21st ARVN Division along the Song Trem Trem south of the U Minh Forest. RAID 75 experienced no major engagements with the enemy, although two ATCs and one ASPB in WBGD on the Song Trem Trem 15 kilometers from Toi Binh received automatic weapons fire and one B-40 round at 1830H, 11 August. The ASPB took the lone B-40 round in the port side, but it only caused minor damage; two USN advisors, SF1 Charles McCarthy and QMSN James Blanton, received very minor wounds. The incident was exacerbated by the fact that the advisors could not use the saturated VNN circuits to obtain Seawolves and did not have radios of their own, though they had previously requested their own circuits, to no effect.

On 18 August, RAID 75 began operations with the 7th ARVN Division under the opcon of CTF 217 in the Tran Hung Dao XIV AO.

RAID 74 also moved down from Cambodia on about 18 August to commence lift operations with the 32nd Regiment, 21st ARVN Division in Kien An Province. She completed these operations on 21 August and returned to Rach Soi for repairs. She was still there at the end of the month awaiting reassignment.

Mine Interdiction Divisions

<u>Division</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Assets</u>
MID 91	Cuu Long	10 MLMs 6 LCMMs
MID 92	Cua Viet	5 MSMs 5 LCMMs 4 Skimmers
MID 92 Det	Tan My	5 LCMMs
MID 93	Cat Lai	6 MSR's 3 MSMs

River Assault and Interdiction Divisions

<u>Division</u>	<u>AO</u>	<u>ATC</u>	<u>ASPB</u>	<u>MON</u>	<u>CCB</u>	<u>Zippo</u>
RAID 70 *	An Long	7	9			
RAID 71	An Long	9	3	2	1	
RAID 72	An Long	8	5	2	1	
RAID 73	An Long	8	5	1	1	
RAID 74	Rach Soi	8	4	2	1	
RAID 75	Dong Tam	8	4	1		1

*RAIDs 70 - 73 are currently operating under CTF 210 in Cambodia.

River Interdiction Divisions

<u>Division</u>	<u>AO</u>	<u>ATC</u>	<u>ASPB</u>	<u>MON</u>	<u>CCB</u>	<u>Zippo</u>
RID 40	Go Dau Ha	6	6		1	1
RID 41	Tan Chau	8	6	1		
RID 42	Chau Doc	3	9		1	1
RID 43	Tan An	3	8	1	1	1
RID 44	Tra Cu	4	9	1	1	
RID 45	Sea Float	7	5	1	1	

Rung Sat Special Zone Shipping Incidents

Almost two months had passed without an attack being aimed at merchant ships transiting the Long Tau Shipping Channel, when on 20 August, the USNS HERKIMER, while transiting north, was the recipient of four B-41 rockets fired from the south bank in the vicinity of YS 065 632, approximately 20 kilometers southeast of the Nha Be Navy Base. Only one rocket hit the ship which resulted in negligible damage and no casualties. Friendly forces arrived at the scene at 1355H, within ten minutes of the initial attack, but were unable to locate the enemy forces.

On 25 August, the SS RAPHAEL SEMMES, transiting north, was taken under fire with two B-40 rockets at 0704H from the southwest bank from the vicinity of YS 125 633, 25 kilometers southeast of the Nha Be Navy Base. The RAPHAEL SEMMES suffered two hits and no casualties. The rockets did only superficial damage to the forward deck area near a cargo hatch. Seawolves, on a routine patrol, were on the scene in three minutes and placed strikes on the suspected enemy position. A troop sweep located two B-41 rockets and fresh footprints but no enemy troops. The rockets were destroyed in place.

USS JENNINGS COUNTY (LST 846) Fire

At 2222H on 3 August, a fire was discovered in the AC generator room of the USS JENNINGS COUNTY (LST 846) which was off the western coast of the Republic of Vietnam in the vicinity of Song Ong Doc. Unable to contain the blaze with her own assets, the JENNINGS COUNTY called for assistance to the USCGC YAKUTAT (WHEC 380) which was on patrol in the area. The YAKUTAT rushed to the scene and was moored alongside the JENNINGS COUNTY at 2325H.

Both ships expended all of their available fire fighting foam attempting to subdue the stubborn blaze and then continued to fight the fire with water while awaiting more foam which was being speeded to them from Binh Thuy. By 0100H on 4 August, the conflagration was extinguished.

By the time the fire was put out, diesel generator rooms ONE and TWO and the auxiliary engine room were flooded to eight feet with fire fighting water. Also, all communications and electrical power aboard JENNINGS COUNTY were lost rendering the ship's main engines inoperable. The YAKUTAT remained alongside the stricken LST to assist in dewatering and to provide emergency lighting and power.

Fortunately, only one crew member was injured in fighting the blaze. He was medevaced to Song Ong Doc by boat for treatment of lung burns suffered due to an OBA canister explosion.

The tug PATRICK was dispatched to the scene, took the JENNINGS COUNTY under tow, and proceeded to Vung Tau. From Vung Tau the JENNINGS COUNTY was towed to the Naval Station at Subic Bay by USS BOLSTER (ARS 38), arriving 13 August. After an extensive survey of the fire damage it was decided to strike the JENNINGS COUNTY from the Naval vessel register. The projected date for this action is 25 September 1970.

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS AND CIVIC ACTION SUMMARY

In the Rung Sat Special Zone, eight MEDCAP/DENTCAPs were conducted during the month of August. Vietnamese Navy medical teams accompanied by various U.S. Navy officer and enlisted advisors conducted these operations at widely scattered villages. The teams treated 650 villagers for various medical/dental ailments and distributed 265 Health Kits to the villagers.

Airborne psyops broadcasts and leaflet drops were continued during the month of August in the RSSZ. Over 636,000 leaflets were dropped during the month. A breakdown of these leaflet drops by type follows: Chieu Hoi - 255,000; Safe Conduct Passes - 184,000; Weapons Reward - 50,000; and Support for the Government of Vietnam - 147,000. Loudspeaker broadcasts, using both live and taped broadcasts, were conducted for five hours and 45 minutes during the month. Psyops broadcasts and leaflet drops were also conducted in conjunction with the combined Chuong Duong operations.

In the Sea Float AO, "Sunday Night at the Movies" came to Ham Rong hamlets on 2 August. The VNN POLWAR team showed Vietnamese language movies obtained from the American Cultural Center at Can Tho. The movies dealt with a variety of subjects such as Vietnam travelogues, pre- and post-natal care, and

comedies featuring well-known Vietnamese comedy teams. Between 200 and 300 people attended the movies on each of four nights.

A poster campaign was initiated during the month utilizing boats in Waterborne Guardpost (WBGp) locations. The theme of the posters used was: "Wherever you go patrols are watching you." These posters would be a constant reminder to enemy supporters and enemy troops that virtually no waterway or land area is safe for them. During daylight hours, psyops personnel will staple posters over existing VC psyops signs painted on wooden boards.

On 22 August, LTJG Byrnes, the Sea Float Psyops Advisor, submitted a report on the integration of the numerous recent refugee arrivals at Tran Hung Dao Village. He reported, "The majority of the refugees, approximately 85 per cent, have settled in Ham Rong 2 Hamlet where they have been absorbed so completely that it would be impossible to locate them unless you asked for them by name. The generosity displayed by the people of Ham Rong 2 toward the new arrivals has enabled the refugees to assume a middle class position in the economic structure of the community. Ham Rong 2 residents loaned woodcutting equipment such as axes and saws to woodcutting refugees, and netting, fishing lines and hooks to those who were fishermen. This allowed an immediate

source of income which quickly provided financial stability for the new arrivals. In addition, private homes were opened to the refugees providing food and shelter for the four to six day period required to build their own homes and acquire cash money.

The majority of the refugees have remained in Tran Hung Dao Village and appear to be sincere in their stated desire to work for a better way of life in relative safety under the protective wings of the GVN. Several families have left the area to work in or around Ca Mau, New Nam Can, and Cai Keo, where they have relatives."

On 22 August, 25 people rallied to the GVN from Nhung Mien Village, located between the Rach Nhung Mien and Rach Bien Nhan at VQ 925 556. The group consisted of four men, six women, and 15 children. The people rallied because of face to face psyops conducted by the Kit Carson Scouts (KCS) and the SEALs who had been operating in the area a few days earlier. The people had never seen an American before, and had no knowledge of Tran Hung Dao Village. The KCSs and SEALs were so convincing in their psyops program that the whole hamlet decided to rally. All of the ralliers were taken to Tran Hung Dao Village by Yabuta junks, and were immediately absorbed into the community. All seemed to have close friends who were living in the village.

On 23 August, 24 people rallied to the GVN from essentially the same area, although a different hamlet. Four men, seven women, and 13 children rallied in response to an airborne loudspeaker broadcast from the daily SEAL Slick helicopter. The tape employed was specially prepared on board Sea Float and stressed the dangers inherent in continued residence in the area (not specified). In addition, instructions were given on how to rally to Sea Float or to Sea Float waterborne assets. These new ralliers/refugees brought the total count to 247 people coming to Tran Hung Dao Village since 10 July 1970.

At 250830H, a group of 96 refugees in 19 sampans and seven small house junks rallied to Sea Float PCFs at VQ 93 61. The refugees stated that they had heard the psyops broadcasts and had seen leaflets. The group consisted of 60 children, 17 men, and 19 women.

On 26 August, 16 more refugees arrived at Sea Float.

On 27 August, 20 refugees rallied to the LSSL 228 and on 28 August, 21 refugees and two VC guerillas rallied to PCF 93. All persons who rallied had seen leaflets and had heard the psyops broadcasts loud and clear.

On 29 August, NILO Nam Can submitted the following report regarding the refugee situation at Tran Hung Dao Village.

"Between 23 August and 29 August, 313 refugees fled areas of VC

control to seek GVN protection in the pacification hamlets. This represents an almost total evacuation of two hamlets supporting a VC/NVA mine factory southwest of Sea Float. Most refugees left the VC-controlled areas because of hunger, heavy fighting in the area, and because they had been made aware by psyops helo broadcasts that the pacification hamlet would provide protection and a high standard of living. The Sea Float Psyops Team has done an outstanding job in getting the word to would-be refugees through helo broadcasts, river patrol broadcasts, and saturation pamphlet drops. Practically every refugee and Hoi Chanh could recite parts of these broadcasts and believed that a better life awaited him in his new home. Much of this credence was due to the psyops officer's patient effort to get personal tapes from each refugee group addressed to neighbors not yet ready to flee. These tapes overcame the VC propaganda stories that refugees would be immediately drafted, subjected to forced labor, and paraded through the annex in shame. The Sea Float Psyops Team also completed a population census this week that put the annex population at in excess of 5,200 people. The annex has been growing at the rate of 10-15 per cent per month since July."

The following information was reported in the Sea Float Psyops/Civic Action Summary for 21 through 27 August: "Information received from one refugee indicates one Nhung Mien Hamlet Security

Cadre (VCI) is now resident of Ham Rong 1. . . . There can be little doubt that a substantial number of refugees have recently been VC guerillas. Most adults seem to be aware of the Chieu Hoi Program, and would probably admit to having been VC guerillas except for the fact that Hoi Chanh must spend a month at the Chieu Hoi Center. Many families have only one breadwinner, and he has no desire to leave his family alone in a new place for one month. Assurances that families will be taken care of by friends and local authorities carry no impact. "

On 29 August, 54 refugees and one Viet Cong tax collector rallied to Vietnamese Navy PCFs at VQ 983 674. This brought the refugee total to 451 and the Hoi Chanh total to seven since 10 July 1970.

All Civic Action construction has been in the hands of the Vietnamese Navy POLWAR team since the early part of August. Current projects in progress include a 25-bed hospital and a civilian agricultural project. The hospital project has been slowed down due to lack of materials but is expected to be completed soon.

ACCELERATED TURNOVER PROGRAM AND TRAINING SUMMARY

On 1 August, LCDR Da, VNN, relieved LCDR Ferguson, USN, as Tactical Commander of Operation Barrier Reef, the interdiction operation stretching over a series of canals due west from Tuyen Nhon, on the Vam Co Tay River, to Chau Doc, on the Upper Bassac River. The operation is now designated Tran Hung Dao IX, and will remain a combined command, with the USN providing about half the assets, until December of this year when it will be completely turned over to the VNN. The following is the current organization of THD IX:

Barrier Reef Commander (LCDR Da) COMSTABRON 20	YRBM 21	Chau Doc
Barrier Reef West Commander (LCDR Nhon) RPG 56	YRBM 21	Chau Doc
Barrier Reef Central Commander (LCDR G. J. Ellis, USN) RIVDIV 532 STAB Element	Phuoc Xuyen	
Barrier Reef East Commander (LCDR Hoa) RPG 59 OIC EODMUPAC Team 39	Tuyen Nhon	

Craft turnovers for August were nine boats configured for minesweeping, (six MSRs, three MSMs), two USCG WPBs, and various small support craft. The minesweepers became Minesweeping and Interdiction Division (MID) 93 on 15 August and on 18 August the VNN assumed responsibility for moored and chain-drag sweeping on the Long Tau Shipping Channel, a job formerly accomplished by MINEDIV 112. MID 93 is under the operational control of CTF 228 and the administrative control of CTF 214.

The two WPBs, PT CYPRESS and PT MARONE, were the last of the 26 82' cutters to be turned over to the VNN and with their transfer, at 1100H, 15 August, the history of COMCOGARDSQD ONE and its remaining division, COGARDIV 13, came to an end. Over 3,000 members of the U.S. Coast Guard have served in Vietnam since the Coast Guard's participation in Operation Market Time commenced in May, 1965. To carry out the necessary administrative and liaison functions previously performed by the Coast Guard Activity, Vietnam, (COGARDACTV), a new Office of Senior Coast Guard Officer, Vietnam (SCGOV) has been established as part of the COMCOGARDSEASEC Staff. The following were among the words sent from COMNAVFORV to COMCOGARDACTV upon the latter's disestablishment: "With the turnover of the last two of 26 cutters you have also completed a major milestone in the ACTOV

Program. I am sure the training and preparation that went into the turnover of each cutter will be reflected in the continued success of WPB coastal operations under Vietnamese command."

On 8 August, three picket boats were turned over at the Harbor Defense Unit, Danang.

Base development continued in August. Of 34 bases and nine ATSBs programmed, 11 bases and one ATSB were complete by the end of the month.

The following training objectives were achieved in August:

---On 13 August, all of 20 enrolled VNN officers completed the 12-week Communications Officers' Course at Cam Ranh Bay.

This is the fourth class to have completed that course, making a total of 59 graduates;

---240 VNN petty officer candidates graduated from Class 22, and 89 VNN warrant officer candidates graduated from Class Three at NTC Saigon on 15 August;

---on 21 August 59 of 62 VNN officer candidates in Class One, OCS Newport, were commissioned in Saigon as Aspirants;

---159 Vietnamese sailors graduated from the Saigon Maintenance School on 22 August;

---on 29 August 143 EN "A" School enrollees graduated at NTC, Nha Trang;

---the Class "A" Schools at Cam Ranh Bay also produced 276 graduates on 29 August, 133 of them being divided between the BM and GM rates, and the remainder distributed among the YN, DK, QM, DC, and CS rates;

---82 BMs and 61 GMs also graduated at Cam Ranh Bay on 29 August from the BM/GM Petty Officer School.

In the Dependent Shelter Program, construction continued at 18 of 34 sites with 1,633 family units completed and 1,174 shelters under construction. The Hon Khoi, Cua Viet, and Qui Nhon projects are completed with 34, 83, and 74 units respectively. A 50-unit complex was turned over at Qui Nhon on 18 August, the result of a four-month project completed by NAVCAT 15. Likewise, on 14 August, 80 units were turned over to the VNN base commander at Cam Ranh Bay, marking the completion of 187 of a planned 575 units at that site.

As the housing problem is worked out, the food projects are following suit. Of 78 animal husbandry programs planned, 36 are in the pilot stage and 42 in the expansion stages.

NAVAL SUPPORT ACTIVITY, SAIGON

Two Naval Support Activity, Saigon detachments underwent mortar attacks during the month of August. Dong Tam received seven rounds of 82 mm mortar fire on 4 August and 22 rounds of 122 mm mortar fire on 10 August. Two Vietnamese civilians and two ARVN were killed in the first attack. There were no U. S. personnel or material casualties. On 23 August, the ATSB at Moc Hoa received mortar fire which caused a minor wound to QMC Sherman V. Stamps. QMC Stamps was treated and returned to duty.

In the early morning hours of 21 August, the engineering watch aboard PBR MOBASE TWO at Tan An discovered a concussion grenade lodged in the base's watermaking unit with its pin pulled. The grenade was gingerly dislodged by base personnel and thrown over the side where it detonated. A search of the base revealed no further devices.

In a tragic accident at ATSB Phuoc Xuyen on the evening of 6 August, two U. S. Navymen lost their lives when a mortar round malfunctioned. The two men, BMC Andrew C. Grant and ENCS Lloyd A. Murphy, were standing on the messing ammi with three other sailors watching mortar rounds impact on an

intelligence target approximately 1900 meters away. The rounds were being fired by the mortar emplacement at Phuoc Xuyen. Suddenly, one round malfunctioned and landed in the Grand Canal only 15 meters from where the men were standing. BMC Grant and ENCS Murphv were killed instantly and the other three were seriously wounded.

On a more pleasant note, repairs were completed on the USS KRISHNA (ARL 38) during the month. The KRISHNA had been severely damaged in a mining incident while anchored near Sea Float in July. The KRISHNA also received a Navy Unit Commendation for "exceptionally meritorious service ... from 24 September 1968 to 1 July 1969," in onboard ceremonies on 12 August.

The USS BENEWAH (APB 35) spent the first two weeks of August alongside the USS HECTOR (AR 7) at Vung Tau undergoing a well-deserved tender availability period. The BENEWAH had spent more than a year on station in the interior of the Mekong Delta, providing the support requirements of naval activities in that area.

In administrative highlights, CDR Joseph C. Lewis, Jr., USN, relieved CDR George L. Jackson, USN, as Commanding Officer, U.S. Naval Facility, Danang on 15 August, and LCDR Walter E.

CONFIDENTIAL

Knight, USN, relieved LCDR William J. Bartee, USN, as
Commanding Officer, USS ASKARI (ARL 30) on 13 August.

On 12 August, Master Chief Petty Officer of the Navy, Delbert
D. Black, visited the Naval Support Activity Detachment at Nha Be.
This was the first stop on his annual Vietnam visit.

CONFIDENTIAL

THIRD NAVAL CONSTRUCTION BRIGADE

Mining incidents continued to hamper Seabee construction efforts along Routes LTL-4 and QL-1D in the southern part of the First Military Region throughout the month of August. Fortunately, only one Seabee was wounded as a result of these minings, and his wound was minor.

Construction continued on several ACTOV bases in August. These bases, with their projected completion dates, are: Nam Can - 30 October 1970; Kien An - 15 October 1970; Long Phu - 15 November 1970; Cho Moi - 30 January 1971. Projects completed during the month included the restoration of the Phu Bai airfield and the rehabilitation of the main supply routes in Danang City. The Quang Tri Highway Bridge on Route QL-1 was 89% complete by month's end.

On 11 August, Captain J. E. Washburn, CEC, USN, was relieved by Captain K. P. Sears, CEC, USN, as Commander, Thirty-Second Naval Construction Regiment. Other significant Seabee events for the month included visits to NMCB TEN by GMCM D. D. Black, Master Chief Petty Officer of the Navy, on 16 August and by noted author Richard Tregaskis (Guadalcanal Diary, Vietnam Diary) on 26 August.

The Naval construction forces have a total projected backlog in the First Military Region amounting to 10 weeks of horizontal work and 16 weeks of vertical work. In the Third and Fourth Military Regions, the projected backlog for present Seabee assets is 33 weeks of horizontal work and 57 weeks of vertical work. There were a total of 2,492 Seabees (82 officers, 2,410 enlisted) in the Republic of Vietnam as of 31 August. Seabees received a total of five Bronze Stars, one Legion of Merit, three Navy Commendation Medals, one Purple Heart, two Navy Achievement Medals, and 43 Combat Action Ribbons in August.

APPENDIX I - Glossary of Abbreviations

The following abbreviations and terms are commonly used in the combat zone by all agencies and are listed here in amplification of those used in the text :

ABF	Attack by fire
AMMI PONTOON	A multi-purpose barge, standard size is twenty-eight feet by ninety feet
AO	Area of operations
ARVN	Army of the Republic of Vietnam
ASPB	Assault Support Patrol Boat
ATC	Armored Troop Carrier
ATSB	Advance Tactical Support Base
A/W	Automatic weapons
BLACK PONY/BRONCO	OV-10 Twin Engine Turboprop Counter-insurgency Aircraft
CCB	Command and Communications Boat
CG	Coastal Group
CHICOM	Chinese Communist
CIDG	Civilian Irregular Defense Group - mercenaries of Vietnamese, Laotian, Cambodian descent who fight primarily around their own villages
CMD	Capital Military District

UNCLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONUS	Continental United States
CRIP	Civilian Reconnaissance Intelligence Platoon
CS	Tear gas grenades
CTZ	Corps Tactical Zone
CZ	Coastal Zone
DELTA HAWK	Mohawk OV-10 aircraft
DUSTOFF	Medical evacuation by helicopter
ENIFF	Enemy initiated firefight
FOB	Forward Observation Base
FSB	Fire Support Base
FWMAF	Free World Military Assistance Forces
GDA	Gun Damage Assessment
GVN	Government of Vietnam
HAFT	Helicopter Attack Fire Team
H&I	Harassment and Interdiction Fire Support
JGS	Joint General Staff (Vietnamese)
KIT CARSON SCOUTS	- Former Viet Cong who have come over to the side of the Saigon government and serve with allied military units
LAFT	Light Attack Fire Team (OV-10's)
LAW	Light Anti-tank Weapon
LCPL	Landing Craft, Personnel, Large
LDNN	Vietnamese equivalent of USN Underwater Demolition Team

UNCLASSIFIED

LHFT	Light Helo Fire Team
LOH	OH-6 Light Observation Helicopter
LRRP	Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol
MACV	Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
MATSB	Mobile Advance Tactical Support Base
MEDCAP	Medical Civic Action Program
MONITOR	Heavily armored LCM-6 (40 mm cannon or 105 mm Howitzer)
MRB	Mobile Riverine Base
MRF	Mobile Riverine Force
MSB	Minesweeper, Boat
MSD	Minesweeper, Drone
MSF	Mobile Strike Force - mercenaries who deploy and go anywhere
NGFS	Naval Gunfire Support
NILO	Naval Intelligence Liaison Officer
NIOTC	Naval Inshore Operations Training Center
NOD	Night Observation Device
NVA	North Vietnamese Army
OIC	Officer in Charge
OJT	On the Job Training
PBR	Patrol Boat, River
PCF	Patrol Craft, Fast (Swift Boat)

POW	Prisoner of War
PRU	Provincial Reconnaissance Unit
PSA	Province Sector Advisor
Psyops	Psychological Operations
RAD	River Assault Division
RAG	River Assault Group (VNN)
RAID	River Assault and Interdiction Division (VNN)
RAS	River Assault Squadron
RF/PF	Regional Forces/Popular Forces
RPG	Rocket Propelled Grenade (or) River Patrol Group
RSSZ	Rung Sat Special Zone
RVNAF	Republic of Vietnam Air Force (or Armed Forces)
SAR	Search and Rescue
SEAWOLF	UH-1B Helo, heavily armed, USN operated
SHADOW	C-119 aircraft
SKIMMER	20-foot fiberglass motor boat
SLICK	UH-1B Helo, USA operated
SPOOKY	C-47 aircraft
SSB	Swimmer Support Boat (Skimmer)
STAB	Strike Assault Boat
SCATTOR	Small Craft Asset, Training, and Turnover
SHOTGUN 49	Call sign for Army OLA aircraft
START	Swift Training and Rapid Turnover

TAOR	Tactical Area of Responsibility
USARV	United States Army, Vietnam
VNMC	Vietnamese Marine Corps
VNN	Vietnamese Navy
ZIPPO	Flame thrower equipped ATC or Monitor
RAP	Rocket Assisted Projectile