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20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number)

This Volume III, Command History, 1969, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam contains Letter of Promulgation, Title Page, Table of Contents, and Chapters XI thru XIV as well as Annexes A-N (Less Annex F) as follows:

Chapter XI - MACOI and The Press (Page XI-1 thru XI-64).
Chapter XII - Research and Development (Page XII-1 thru XII-26).
Chapter XIII - Psychological Operations (Page XIII-1 thru XIII-18).
Chapter XIV - Other Significant Activities (Page XIV-1 thru XIV-74).

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Annex A - List of Ground Operations by Corps Tactical Zone (Page A1-A22).
Annex B - Weather in Southeast Asia (Page B1 - B10).
Annex C - Commanders & Principal Staff Offiers (Page C1 - C8).
Annex D - Redeployment of 9th Infantry Division (Page D1 - D32).
Annex E - Communist Strategy as Reflected in Lao Dong Party and COSVN Resolutions (Page E1 - E14).
Annex F - Omitted purposely.
Annex G - The Defense of First Support Base Crook (Page G1 - G8).
Annex H - The ARVN BEN HET-DAK TO Campaign (Page H1 - H12)..
Annex I - The Pentalateral Agreement of 1950 (Page I-1 - I-8).
Annex J - Historical Background on the Advisory Effort in Vietnam (Page J1-J14).
Annex K - Law 019/69 of 30 Dec 69 Estb Press Regulations (Page K1- K14).
Annex L - COMUSMACV 1969 Command Chronology (Page L1 - L40).
Annex M - Glossary (Page M1 - M20).
Annex N - Index (Page N1 - N36).

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UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM
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
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1969

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CHAPTER XI

MACOI AND THE PRESS

OVERVIEW

(U) This chapter describes the methodology employed by the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam in disseminating information to the world public, and friendly forces in-country; the various media by which servicemen in the RVN received the news; relations between the command and the press (to include television and radio); and the overall press coverage of the Vietnamese conflict.

MISSION OF MACOI

General

(U) The mission of the Military Assistance Command Office of Information (MACOI) was "to serve as the principal advisor to COMUSMACV and the staff on information matters, provide for a maximum flow of information on military matters to the free world press, initiate internal information programs designed to increase understanding among men and women in the component commands of the MACV missions, policies, and programs, and to advise the RVNAF on information matters." [1]

Relationships Between MACV and the Embassy, MACOI, and JUSPAO

(U) Since MACV and the US Embassy in Saigon were governed by "The Country Team" concept, the US Ambassador was theoretically in overall charge of US activity in RVN. Thus, the MACV information effort came under the aegis of the Minister-Counselor for Public Affairs of the Embassy. However COMUSMACV, and MACOI for COMUSMACV, controlled release of military information. MACV policy guidance concerning this relationship stated:

> The Minister-Counselor for Public Affairs US Embassy, Saigon, exercises responsibility and authority over the total US public affairs function in RVN. Under guidance of the Minister-Counselor and CINCPAC, COMUSMACV is the sole authority for the clearance and release of information concerning US military operations in Vietnam and adjacent waters. When operations in Vietnam involve US forces other

than those based in RVN, commanders of forces involved will provide COMUSMACV with information for release. COMUSMACV clears all military public information still photographs concerning combat operations in SEA and which is intended for public release through other than Hometown News Centers. ASD/PA (Assistant Secretary of Defense/Public Affairs) retains release authority for military public information motion picture footage.

COMUSMACTHAI is the releasing authority for military public information concerning the operations of US forces in Thailand.

Commanders of US forces in RVN or Thailand are authorized to conduct hometown news programs in accordance with military department and component directives and in consonance with guidance issued by CINCPAC, COMUSMACV, and COMUSMACTHAI, as appropriate.[2]

This relationship was characterized by close coordination, between MACV and the Embassy and between MACOI and the Joint United States Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO), on policy and in areas of overlap of function, and by relative independence in their respective areas.

Organization

(U) MACOI was divided into five subdivisions and the Armed Forces Radio and Television Service in Vietnam (AFVN). The Public Information Division (PID) processed and released some information from the field, released information for the command in general, and answered questions posed by the press. The Plans and Policy Division (PPD) developed contingency plans and was the repository for policy guidance. It also reviewed materials which were published within internal publications and those materials which were produced by members of the command for publication. The Command Information Division (CID) was primarily the voice of the commander and of the command to the troops, and published the MACV Observer. The Information Advisory Division (IAD) advised the RVNAF information program, served as liaison between MACOI and the RVNAF IO, and had a liaison and advisory relationship with US information advisors to RVNAF. Although every division of MACOI participated in the effort to Vietnamize the information aspects of the war, IAD was the division most intimately involved. The Special Projects Division (SPD) accredited members of the press, provided them with transportation, assisted in their everyday needs, and served as their liaison with MACOI. AFVN provided programs of information, education, and entertainment and broadcasted world news to Americans in RVN. The authorized strength of MACOI, excluding AFVN, was 53 officers and enlisted men.

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Policy Making

(U) Information policy guidance came to COMUSMACV from CINCPAC or from the Office of the Secretary of Defense. In some instances MACV developed guidance on information policy matters independently or in coordination with the US Embassy. On the most important matters, MACV and MACOI were the executors of information policy decisions reached at higher levels. MACV Directive 360-1 declared:

> Never in the past has a war been fraught with so much political/diplomatic sensitivity as is the case in the war in Vietnam. Each military action has a potential for affecting national interests. It is difficult to evaluate political/diplomatic sensitivity at the local level where not all the facts are available. In some instances the sensitivity of a military action can be assessed only at the national level where all the attainable facts are available. [3]

Frequently, MACV was asked for and rendered advice on important matters of high level diplomatic and command interest.

(U) Decisions on the timing of information releases were often coordinated in Honolulu, Washington, Paris, and Bangkok. The MACV Chief of Information spoke twice daily with the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (OSD/PA). These discussions were concerned primarily with: impact from developments in the news; what news could be expected to break; and coordination of the release of information and policy. MACOI also served as advisor on information matters to COMUSMACV.

General Philosophy of Information

(C) The theoretical framework for public affairs policy relating to the war had been established at the Honolulu Public Affairs Conference of March 1965, with concurrences from the Department of Defense, the State Department, the US Information Agency, CINCPAC, the American Embassy in Saigon, and COMUSMACV. The basic principle established there was that the maximum amount of information would be made available to the press within the limit of security, and the flow of unclassified information to the US public would not be inhibited.

(U) Guidance from Washington concerning national policy in some cases took the form of what the President and department secretaries said on the public record and therefore determined MACV information policy concerning particular issues.

COMUSMACV Philosophy of Information

(C) The basic guidance from COMUSMACV concerning information policy was to "let our accomplishments speak for themselves". [4] However, COMUSMACV did not mean that accomplishments should go unmentioned; rather, he urged that they be publicized in a low key manner. [5]

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In short, COMUSMACV favored a cautious information policy which employed the following guidelines:

1. The public information program should rest on accomplishments. Do not use the hard sell.

2. Bad news policy: Don't hide mistakes. Determine the facts as quickly as possible, and then get them out.

3. Get to know the press who visit your area.

4. Use "no comment" when necessary.

5. Help the RVNAF to improve itself by obtaining or assisting in getting good coverage for RVNAF accomplishments. [6]

THE DIVISIONS OF MACOI

Public Information Division

(U) The mission of the PID was to maintain complete, accurate, and timely flow of information on US forces' military and related activities to the free world press; to conduct daily briefings on the conduct of military operations; to develop press conferences, press briefings, and interviews with key US civilian and military officials; maintain continuing liaison with key free world news media representatives; maintain the capability to respond around the clock to inqueries and requests for assistance from news media representatives.[7] In essence, PID was the nerve center of MACOI concerning substantive relations with the press. In this role, PID continued to release information on air, land, and sea military operations; and to make material available to newsmen on developments in pacification programs and Vietnamization of the war. To this end, PID daily published two news releases and participated in a daily combined US-GVN briefing at the National Press Center in Saigon.

The Information Officer (IO) in the Field

(U) The IO in the field was under the jurisdiction of his unit commander. Stories of an operational nature developed by the IO about his unit had to be cleared by MACOI. The relation between the IO in the field and the press was determined by the former and his commanding officer, though both operated under general guidance from MACOI. Periodic information conferences, attended by field IOs, were held at MACV when sensitive issues or sufficient turnover among IO personnel made them necessary.

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The Background Briefing

(FOUO) One of the most significant developments of 1969, to improve relations between MACOI and the press, was the re-emergence of background briefings. This step was taken by MACOI in an attempt to ameliorate a growing strain between the command's policies on releasing information and newsmen who asserted they were being denied full information regarding US combat activity, particularly casualties and battle damage. [8]

(U) Prior to the first background briefing, MACOI held a meeting with the press in July 1969 to determine what could be done to improve the situation described above. It was agreed that the Chief, PID, would attend the daily briefing held at the National Press Center to answer questions following the briefing on a background basis for any newsman who desired such assistance. These sessions provided information which could not be released on the record and also permitted a clear cut explanation of why certain information might not be available. Shortly after the meeting, the first formal background briefing was held on 15 Jul. Attendance at these briefings, held at MACV Headquarters, was limited by invitation to major bureaus and reporters. An attempt was made to have a briefing once every two or three weeks, interspersed with field command background briefings. The briefing usually provided J-2 and J-3 updates plus the presentation of a major topic for discussion. Major topics presented in 1969 included three on Vietnamization (RVNAF training, RVNAF logistics, combat support provided RVNAF by US troops), pacification presented by DEPCOMUS/CORDS, sapper tactics, COSVN Resolution 9, and the RVN highway construction program. The briefings were presented by members of the MACV staff, including general officers. All presentations were followed by a frank exchange of questions and answers. [9]

(U) The background briefing had certain advantages for both the command and the press. It allowed the correspondents to receive in-depth background information which aided them in analysing the war in terms of current operations and the friendly and enemy situation, as well as the Vietnamization, pacification, and nation-building programs. On the other hand, it gave key MACV staft members the opportunity to communicate directly with the press through the briefings and question and answer sessions. The reporters could not specifically attribute the information gleaned from the "Backgrounders" to the command or to the individuals conducting the briefings. The stories written from information received in a "Backgrounder" had to appear to be the result of the reporters' investigative efforts. This ground rule allowed the command greater latitude in disclosing information and provided greater opportunity for exchange between correspondents and the representatives of the command. The background briefings were considered to have done much to enhance the rapport between the command and the press corps as well as the credibility of MACV since they afforded free and candid exchanges between knowledgeable officials and media representatives.

(C) One result of MACOI background briefings was that more intelligence information began to appear on the front pages of newspapers. Occasionally, the State Department asked the Saigon Embassy how information about a document had reached print. The embassy described the nature of the background briefing, asked MACOI to let the embassy know when a briefing would occur and what topics would be covered, and forwarded information about briefings to Washington. [10]

(U) COMUSMACV also invited press bureau chiefs to background dinners. Comments at these dinners were not attributable to COMUSMACV. Senior officers also became more available for interviews with reporters on a background basis. DEPCOMUS/CORDS frequently took

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members of the Saigon press corps or visiting reporters on his weekly overnight trips to various provinces. The US Ambassador invited groups of reporters to dinner on numerous occasions and frequently lunched with newsmen. Further, background briefings for the press were usually held by senior US officials during their visits to RVN. MACV's Chief of Information also met on a continuing basis with the bureau chiefs and major visiting newsmen and provided background information.

(FOUO) Background briefings and discussions between newsmen and senior civilian officials were arranged by MACOI's counterpart at the embassy, the Mission Press Center (MPC). MACOI handled press relations for the command and the MPC fulfilled the same function for the embassy. The center was located in the JUSPAO I building, returning to that building in June after an 11 month absence caused by a fire in July 1968. Actually part of the embassy, the MPC came under the administrative control of JUSPAO. [11]

The Ground Rules

(U) Ground rules constituted the compromise reached between field press censorship and complete freedom of the press. Field press censorship had been imposed during World War II and to a lesser extent in Korea. There had never been censorship during the Vietnam War. The ground rules were worked out to protect the security of troops. Reporters agreed to abide by the ground rules when they became accredited. Discussion of the ground rules and of their application in 1968 may be found in the 1968 Command History (pp. 942-946).

(U) The ground rules describing information which could not be released were:

> Excerpts from "Rules Governing Public Release of Military Information" (31 Oct 66 and 29 Mar 67)
>
> The following is not releasable, unless and until released by MACV.
>
> 1. Future plans, operations, or strikes.
>
> 2. Information on or confirmation of Rules of Engagement.
>
> 3. Amounts of ordnance and fuel moved by support units or on hand in combat units (ordnance includes weapons or weapons systems).
>
> 4. During an operation, unit designations and troop movements, tactical deployments, name of operation and size of friendly forces involved.
>
> 5. Intelligence unit activities, methods of operation, or specific locations.
>
> 6. Exact number and type of casualties or damage suffered by friendly units.

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7. Number of sorties and the amount of ordnance expended on strikes outside of RVN.

8. Information on aircraft taking off for strikes, en route to, or returning from target area. Information on strikes while they are in progress.

9. Identity of units and locations of air bases from which aircraft are launched on combat operations.

10. Number of aircraft damaged or any other indicator of effectiveness or ineffectiveness of ground antiaircraft defenses.

11. Tactical specifics, such as altitudes, course, speeds, or angle of attack. (General descriptions such as "low and fast" may be used.)

12. Information on or confirmation of planned strikes which do not take place for any reason, including bad weather.

13. Specific identification of enemy weapons systems utilized to down friendly aircraft.

14. Details concerning downed aircraft while Search and Rescue (SAR) operations are in progress.

15. Aerial photos of fixed installations.

(U) Since it was obvious that no set of ground rules could cover every tactical situation encountered by newsmen in the field, MACV provided 24-hour ground rule interpretation service to any reporter who was concerned about the intelligence value of material he wished to use in a story.

(U) In event MACOI learned that a reporter had violated a ground rule, an investigation ensued. If the newsman was found guilty of the violation after he and his bureau chief had been afforded an opportunity to offer a defense, his accreditation was usually suspended for 30 days and he was denied the use of services provided by the command, such as government transportation and low cost press camp billeting. The right of appeal was also guaranteed. All such actions required the approval of COMUSMACV and were closely coordinated with the Mission Counselor for Public Affairs of the US Embassy. [12]

(C) MACOI held a meeting with the press on 15 Dec in order to discuss the practical situations covered by the ground rules in light of several violations or near violations. It was stressed that the security of the troops was the reason for the existence of the ground rules. The media representatives were told that lives were at stake, that one man killed was important, and that casualties became even more significant because the numbers of casualties were decreasing. It was also emphasized that MACOI had no desire to slow the flow of news.

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(Occasionally, unique circumstances made it necessary for the command to provide representatives of the press with certain background information that would otherwise have been classified CONFIDENTIAL.) Paraphrased comments on some of the ground rules follow:

> Ground Rule One -- was concerned with the publication of actual military plans. Conjecture by the reporter was permitted. If through conjecture a reporter described a plan exactly, the writer might be asked to embargo the article.
>
> Ground Rule Two -- Examples of rules of engagement which weren't to be published were when, specifically, fire would be returned and which areas required clearance before fire could be placed into them. It was stated that if reporters saw a unit go over the border, they could report it, but they could not tell what the rules of engagement for the situation were.
>
> Ground Rule Five -- Intelligence units don't want intelligence cut off. Infiltration was a sensitive area because detailed discussion could reveal sources. Speculation about infiltration was permitted. Some information became available as circumstances changed so reporters were advised to check in this area periodically.
>
> Ground Rule Seven -- was designed primarily to apply when North Vietnam was being bombed. Concerning bombings in Laos, reporters could print articles on their own, but could not ascribe the command or MACOI as sources.
>
> Ground Rule Eight -- Information of air operations was to be published after the operation occurred.
>
> Ground Rule Nine -- The air bases from which aircraft left on combat activity were not releasable.
>
> Ground Rule Ten -- The command did not want to give the North Vietnamese information about the effectiveness of their antiaircraft fire. This ground rule was applied generally to North Vietnam, but could be applied in South Vietnam if the NVA and VC moved in large numbers of antiaircraft weapons. [13]

(U) Although not directly a ground rule, MACOI commented on the request of the command that the press hold up announcement of position held by casualties until the next of kin had been notified. This alleviated the possibility of next of kin learning about a casualty through unofficial news reports which identified the casualty through his unit and position. The press informally and voluntarily agreed to withhold the names of casualties until notification of next of

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kin was accomplished. Though this voluntary agreement was generally respected, there was some difficulty in the case of a general officer casualty because of what some agencies referred to as "high news value."

(U) MACOI added the following points in response to newsmens' questions:

> A reporter asked about the possibility of telephones being tapped by the enemy in relation to telephoning in embargoed stories to the Saigon offices from the field. MACOI said that if a story was embargoed, the bureau could prepare it and have it ready to go as soon as the embargo was lifted. Reporters could not be expected to withhold embargoed stories from their bureaus since this could delay the flow of news.
>
> Information officers in the field were not authorized to waive the ground rules.
>
> Backgrounders allow comment about RVN involvement which can't go on the record. The backgrounder allows people who don't want to speak for attribution to meet with the press. This was often true of intelligence personnel.
>
> In response to a question asking why, after one news source broke an embargo about a brigade movement at Bu Prang, others still were forbidden to publish the information, MACOI said that the information had not been too widely disseminated. If one of the wire services had carried it, then others would have had to be cleared to carry it. [14]

(FOUO) Some actual cases revealed what types of information release the ground rules were designed to avoid. The following comments are paraphrased:

> One news story involved a cavalry unit which took some extensive losses in a night defensive position. The story said that 12 tanks and tracked vehicles had been damaged and gave the exact number of casualties. MACOI would have given the precise information but not that soon. The information had been given out by an IO somewhere along the line between the cavalry unit and MACOI. The IO hadn't realized the extent to which these losses had weakened the unit. The bureau which released the information was held responsible because MACV was authorized to release this information first.

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Another news story reported the manner in which indirect fires at Bu Prang had been walked back from the front to the rear of the base where the artillery was located. The exact time of the attack was given. The story described how an artilleryman was hit, how six of his buddies came to his aid without care for their own lives, and how they in turn were hit. The story included the exact number of casualties. The violations of ground rules came in describing where the artillery pieces were located and in giving the exact number of casualties.

A story was released about the redeployment of an 82d Abn unit before MACOI had released the information.

There was only one serious violation of the background briefing rules. The reporter involved wasn't at fault and wasn't held accountable by MACOI. The newsman wrote a story based on the background briefings and correctly avoided ascribing it directly to MACV sources. However, the story was rewritten at the home office in the US and MACV was given as the source. Another newsman brought this to MACV's attention. The original newsman explained what had happened and his explanation satisfied MACOI. Reporters were asked to caution the rewrite men. [15]

(U) In spite of the small number of ground rule violations which occurred, the press generally understood the need to protect the security of the troops and abided by the ground rules.

News Branch of PID

(U) As in 1968, the News Branch was responsible for much of the information which flowed from MACOI to the press including all of the current operational information or significant US combat actions. (See 1968 Command History, p. 942.) MACOI was able to communicate with major command IOs in RVN by means of the dedicated information teletype net, which included the Danang Press Center, Phu Bai (XXIV Corps), Pleiku (II Corps), Can Tho (DMAC), Nha Trang, USARV (Long Binh), Bien Hoa, 7AF, and JUSPAO. Reporters also used this net to file stories. A morning and an evening communique, based on entries in the log of the official journal in the Command Operations Center, describing significant military actions in RVN, were released each morning and afternoon. The News Branch also released information periodically. A "Weekly Military Strength Summary" was released with the afternoon news release on Mondays. MACJ1 compiled the figures. Information was based on the situation of the preceding Thursday.

(U) The strength summary became particularly important to newsmen during the redeployment phases. Attention was focused on strength figures especially during Phase I. A "Weekly

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Summary" of the US and enemy casualties was released on Thursdays. The information was based on the casualty list of the preceding Saturday and compiled by DOD from statistics provided by the components. These figures were released simultaneously in Saigon and Washington at 1615 hours each Thursday. Attached to the casualty release was a summary of "Enemy Materiel Losses" and a "Review of Operations". Another frequent release to newsmen by MACOI was the "Memorandum for Correspondents". This covered many of the most significant events of the year and was concerned with nonoperational as well as operational matters. Another periodical release was the number of "Aircraft Losses" which was made available each Friday, with information based on figures through the preceding Thursday. A "Climatic Outlook in Vietnam" was released after the 25th of each month, applicable to the following month.

(U) Each week the "Weekly Network News Summary" kinescope showing was held. The Army TV Center in the Pentagon recorded evening news shows on videotape, edited them to include subjects relating to the DOD, and mailed them out weekly. They were shown to newsmen and to the MACV staff. [16]

(U) Two changes occurred in 1969 relating to these periodic and daily releases. The first pertained to criteria which governed the choice of actions to be included in MACOI's daily releases:

> To avoid future erroneous impressions that may be given by reporting the total number of attacks by fire, MACOI began reporting on 21 Apr only the number of significant attacks. The number now reported excludes almost all attacks which result in no casualties or damage. [17]

Later on 5 Jun, the reporting procedure on indirect fire attacks was changed to reflect the total number of significant indirect fire attacks throughout the RVN, the number against US units or installations, and the total number of insignificant indirect fire attacks (those which did not result in casualties or damage). The second change related to casualty and strength figures which were to be released on different days:

> On 26 Aug 69, a memorandum for the press informed recipients of the communiques that in the future the weekly military strength in-country summary for US and Free World Forces would be released each Monday to reflect figures available on the preceding Thursday. This decision gave news media representatives two news leads weekly, as opposed to one when both the high-interest casualty and strength figures were released each Thursday in one memorandum. [18]

(U) A briefing was held for the press every afternoon at 1615 hours in the National Press Center in downtown Saigon. This forum provided daily contact between spokesmen for the command and the press. Reporters sought information about events and information which they could attribute to the command. This combined briefing was conducted by MACOI, the Mission Press Center, RVNAF, and the GVN. The format consisted of a statement by the GVN spokesman, followed by spokesmen from the MPC, RVNAF, and MACOI,followed by questions from

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correspondents and responses by the spokesmen. The briefing was normally attended by about 100 newsmen; approximately 200 would attend when a major story broke.

(U) The News Branch had a chief briefer and four assistant briefers (two ground and two air briefers). The first step in preparing for the afternoon briefing consisted of preparing a statement, which occasionally included answers to anticipated questions. This preparation in some cases involved extensive coordination with the MACV staff. The second step in the process was actually delivering the briefing. One change in the presentation occurred in June:

> On 23 Jun at the request of correspondents, the MACV portion of the Daily Press Briefing was revised to consist of brief comment on more significant developments, late additions, and a question period, thus eliminating the more extensive review of the Press Communique. AFVN assumed responsibility for narrating and adding the evening communique text to the regular taping of press briefing dialogue for transmission to OASD/PA. [19]

(C) Air briefers had the added responsibility for reporting aircraft downed over RVN, and maintaining and reporting Air South sorties. Details were available to the press in the form of the daily communiques cited above, and could be obtained by members of the press immediately prior to the briefing. The briefers returned to MACV Headquarters and MACOI to be debriefed about the questions which had been asked and the answers they had given. [20]

(U) Other activities of the News Branch included producing monthly and yearly historical chronologies, conducting weekly briefings regarding the military situation in RVN for newly arrived newsmen and information officers, and monitoring some of the interviews which PID arranged between newsmen and members of the staff. The PID became a repository for varying operational statistics as well as being the producer of some of those statistics.

(U) One of PID's innovations during the year was the establishment of "the account system". Officers of MACOI were assigned responsibility for liaison with particular sections of the MACV staff. This allowed MACOI to answer queries from newsmen more effectively and in a timely manner. The IO either knew the information through his liaison activity or he knew where to get it. [21]

Visit of the President

(FOUO) MACOI played an important role in the visit of President Nixon to RVN in July. Along with the MACV staff, MACOI representatives participated in the "close hold" planning of the President's movements in the capital and its environs. The Mission Press Center weekly report of 1 Aug commented on the events of the preceding week:

> Overriding emphasis was on visit of President Nixon. Newsmen speculated until arrival that President would come. Some so reported. Afternoon before arrival MAC-OI set up with US bureau chiefs pooled coverage on contingency basis. Three hours before Nixon arrival MAC-OI did make a general

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callout inviting accredited newsmen to ride buses to unspecified news event. General coverage was arranged at most points of visit; poolers handled rest and debriefed in evening at MPC. [22]

MACOI planned the press coverage of the visit. During the President's sojourn in the capital and visit to nearby troop units, MACOI coordinated air and ground transportation for the press corps. For security reasons, the story of the President's visit was embargoed until his departure from RVN. Tension developed within the press corps when the embargo was maintained even though RVN press and radio broke the embargo. The press thought that the rationale for the embargo had been obviated when the RVN media had publicized the visit, thereby probably giving the VC information about the President's location. [23]

(C) MACOI also was involved in aiding press coverage of other visits during the year and in setting up planeside statements or news conferences by visiting officials. CINCPAC guidance stressed the opportunity that visits of senior US officials offered for the dissemination of information:

1. Visits to Vietnam by senior DOD officials provide an excellent opportunity for exposure to the large Saigon press corps and dissemination of information important to our military effort in SVN. Frequently, restrictions placed on COMUSMACV and failure to realize the press corps interest of the visit, turned the visit into a negative public affairs event.

2. The following procedure for visits by senior officials of DOD and the military services to Vietnam is suggested:

a. Saigon press corps informed of impending visit, purpose of visit, and arrival time in sufficient time to cover the event, e.g., after official is airborne en route to Vietnam.

b. Press corps permitted a stated period of time at the airport for free access to official for photography.

c. Official arrives in Vietnam with a brief opening statement for release to press at planeside. Questions at discretion of official. In most situations, press corps content with opening statement which could state nothing more than purpose of visit. [24]

At the close of 1969, MACOI was involved in preparation for the visit of Vice President Agnew.

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Events and Issues

(S) Following is a discussion of the manner in which MACV treated information releases concerning the most significant events and issues that occurred in 1969. The major events and issues covered below are: redeployment, "Green Beret" Case, My Lai, release of US PWs, Ho Chi Minh's death, and terrorism.

1. (S) Redeployment. The redeployment of US troops from RVN as part of Vietnamization was a very important development in 1969. Information release policy on this issue was coordinated closely between MACV, CINCPAC, and Washington. Concern was expressed over the word to be used to describe redeployment. A Saigon Embassy telegram stated that the term "troop withdrawal" was not to be used and that "correct terminology should be troop reduction or replacement". [25]

a. At times, the redeployment issue became sensitive, as evidenced by this message from CINCPAC:

> Until further notice, there will be no further discussion with press--either on or off the record--on the subject of troop replacements or deployments from South Vietnam.
>
> Insure strict compliance with this directive within your command. [26]

b. The first redeployment process, KEYSTONE EAGLE, served as the shakedown period for developing redeployment information release policy. Some of the lessons learned were:

> Because of the political/public information aspects of Vietnamization, an extremely large number of correspondents could be expected to visit major redeploying units. Judicious handling was required to insure good press relations yet preclude delays caused by large numbers of visitors. Press emphasis on spot occurrences must not be allowed to distort perspective.
>
> The initial KEYSTONE EAGLE redeployment announcement was ambiguous because it specified a 25,000 space reduction, but was not specific as to the base figure from which the 25,000 spaces were to be taken. This caused problems in answering press questions. News media questioned whether strength levels were actually being reduced at the same rate that personnel were reported to be leaving the RVN. There were open implications that the military was circumventing the Presidential order. The initial announcement should have been based on concrete figures that would have been more readily explainable to the public; all agencies then could have used this figure as a common denominator to help avoid press skepticism.

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> The overall publicity value which accrued to the ceremonial activities of the 3/60 Infantry, i.e., the departure ceremony in the RVN and the parade in Seattle, is questionable. While the ceremonial unit was a worthwhile symbol upon which the press could concentrate because it focused attention on the fact that the US was attempting to de-escalate, negative publicity asserted the men had to stand and practice in the hot sun for the parade; exploited the fact that many men were assigned to the battalion only for the move and did not relate to its achievements; and gave much coverage to the antiwar demonstrators, comparing their attitude with World War II homecoming receptions. Little positive publicity can be expected from similar ceremonial units in future redeployments.
>
> The effort to demonstrate the redeployment of specific combat units by filling redeploying units with those due to rotate from other units was not successful from an information standpoint. Press speculation could have been reduced and better reporting expected if numbers of redeploying personnel were emphasized, as opposed to numbers and types of units; and if it were explained that, because of attrition, units would not redeploy at full strength. Additionally, stress should have been placed on the attempts being made to redeploy individuals based on their time in-country, not their luck in finding themselves in a redeploying unit. [27]

2. (U) The "Green Beret" Case. Information release on the "Green Beret" Case was coordinated by DA and USARV. MACOI referred questions to USARV, cooperated with USARV in providing a forum for USARV announcements, and assisted in the press callout for a USARV background briefing on the subject. The briefing was held in the auditorium of the JUSPAO building in Saigon.

3. (C) The My Lai Case. Information release on the My Lai incident was basically handled in the same manner as that for the "Green Beret" Case. DA conducted the investigation, and USARV became the primary information release point in-country. Comments on My Lai came from the highest levels of government. Guidance provided from the SECSTATE included:

> The whole matter is under investigation and judicial proceedings: USG is determined, to extent legally possible, to bring to justice persons responsible for any wrong-doing. In meantime matter should not be prejudged. If charges are proved correct, what happened at My Lai is directly contrary to US policies on conduct of war, and is an atrocious aberration which can unfortunately occur in any war and particularly in the Vietnam conflict.

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> We cannot excuse or condone My Lai. The allegations of what happened there are deeply shocking to all Americans. As a people committed to the rule of law we will deal with this event and its implications openly and with regard to the rights, obligations and interest of all of those involved, Vietnamese and American. Although My Lai is a part of the war, it does not characterize it, or our role in it. [28]

Guidance from DA included:

> The Department of the Army is conducting an over-all investigation into the alleged incident in Vietnam. Evidence developed as a result of this investigation is forwarded to the commanding officer of the individual for appropriate disposition. The Army will refrain from commenting on those facts and circumstances of the alleged incident which could become part of the evidence in any trial which might be held. [29]

The US Embassy and MACV HQ stated that investigations concerning events in Quang Ngai during March 1968 have been operative for more than a year. [30]

4. (S) Release of US Prisoners of War. A small number of US prisoners were released in 1969. (See Chapter X.) DA forwarded the following guidance concerning the release of WO Michael Peterson and SGT Vernon C. Shepard:

> a. (FOUO) It is not known whether returnees desire press interviews. In event press is on hand at any point along the return route, subjects may discuss the publicly known aspects of their return to US control. Comments should generally be restricted to feelings about being home and their health. Comments should not jeopardize the welfare and possible escape or release of other PWs.
>
> b. (S) Following are matters which may not be discussed with press:
>
> (1) Details of his return to US control, other than those publicly known.
>
> (2) Information on escape plans or attempts of others to escape.
>
> (3) Methods used by prisoners to communicate with each other.
>
> (4) Assistance given by any persons while in captivity.

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(5) Possible acceptance of VC propaganda by any detainee.

(6) Location of VC camps, routes traveled, other than by province.

(7) Identity of VC unit which guarded prisoners.

(8) Viet Cong sympathizer, defector activity in camp.

(9) Interviews with Communist correspondents.

(10) Knowledge of VC and National Liberation Front (such as particulars of VC units, organization, order of battle information). General comments on the Viet Cong as a soldier are acceptable.

(11) Details of Hanoi's control of nations Liberation Front.

(12) Changes in VC morale, if any, noted during captivity.

(13) Effectiveness of US air strikes in general and relation to morale in particular.

(14) Identities or other details pertaining to US personnel he knew to be or suspected were PWs.

c. (FOUO) If media pressure for details of capture, captivity, and return to US control, IO on scene should inform press that returnees do not desire to discuss such matters, except those publicly known, as it might jeopardize the welfare and possible future escape and/or release of other prisoners.

d. (U) Request local IOs make early contact with returnees and provide guidance.

e. (U) Report telephonically to PID, OCINFO, DA, and press contacts, names of personnel and agencies present, summary of questions and responses, and problems encountered, if any.

f. (U) CONARC and CONUS Army information offices concerned will render all possible assistance.

g. (U) Guidance contained in this message is applicable both during movements to and during stay at hospital facilities, and while on leave. 31

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5. (C) Ho Chi Minh's Death. The reaction of the Government to Ho Chi Minh's death was cautious, and the guidance forwarded reflected that caution. The SECSTATE, prior to assessing the possible import of Ho's death, said:

> Posts will have noted that White House and Executive Agencies will have no official statements or comments. We are, of course, uncertain ourselves of consequences of Ho's death and are anxious meanwhile to avoid any actions or pronouncements which could have adverse effect on Paris meetings. Likewise, we do not wish to encourage exaggerated speculation and comment. [32]

PSYOP guidance on the death of the North Vietnamese leader stated:

> Mission PSYOP Policy Guidance on Ho Chi Minh's death emphasizes passing of tragic historical figure from Vietnamese scene should open new opportunities for reconciliation of Vietnamese people. Urges media recall President Thieu's magnanimous offer of July 11. Communists should realize they cannot win. Vietnamese people and GVN ardently desire peace, which will come if only communists renounce violence.
>
> Guidance cautions against gloating over Ho's death in order to avoid giving communist troops and sympathizers, who now dispirited, any cause to resolve to fight on in Ho's name. Guidance cautions media not to speculate on Hanoi regime developments or possible effect Ho's death on Paris negotiations or troop replacement decisions. [33]

6. (C) Terrorism. As in previous years the command deemed it prudent to release information concerning atrocities committed by the VC and North Vietnamese. A policy synopsis dated 19 Mar, using as reference MACV Directives 59-2 and 535-12 asserted:

> It is a matter of concern that atrocities committed by the enemy have gone unpublicized. This is largely the result of not receiving timely notice of the incident and being unable to move news media representatives to the site of atrocities to provide on-the-spot coverage. The instructions contained in this letter are designed to provide the MACV Office of Information early notice in case of discovery of atrocities in order to ensure rapid and complete news coverage. [34]

This general statement was followed by specific guidance citing steps that should be taken to increase the release of information about atrocities. In 1969, policy guidance directed that greater efforts be made to disseminate information relative to VC/NVA acts of terror. The

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USIA in Washington told the Saigon Embassy that there was "Washington interest in intensifying effort to tell story of VC terrorism worldwide. We are especially interested in stories of atrocities committed against civilians, particularly women and children...". USIA then asked, "Can timely coverage on specific, flagrant acts of terrorism against civilians be increased without serious impairment of coverage of other aspects of Vietnam story?" [35] JUSPAO and the embassy replied:

> In some measure we can increase terrorist coverage without reducing current stress on presenting affirmative actions and aspects of GVN and ARVN (as) well as increased confidence of population in present regime. However, supply of JUSPAO correspondents is limited and we sometimes face difficult priority choices.
>
> Problem of reducing time interval between occurrences in outlying provinces and awareness in Saigon in sufficient detail to permit editorial judgement is a major one.... [36]

Motion Picture News Branch

(U) The Motion Picture News Branch of PID, formerly named the Audio Visual Branch, produced numerous short films of various aspects of the war in RVN, pacification efforts, and the Vietnamization process. (For a discussion of the activities of the Audio Visual Branch in 1968, see the 1968 Command History, pp. 947-948.)

(U) The primary components of the branch were five motion picture news teams (MOPIX teams), consisting of two Army teams, one Navy team, one AF team, and one USMC team. Each team was made up of five men. This branch was partly autonomous of MACOI with "input of ideas" to and "readout of policy" from MACOI. The films were shot and sent back to Washington without MACOI reviewing them until after they were released. These films went to the Audio Visual Branch of the OASD/PA to be processed, cut, and released. They then were released to the Washington News Pool, which consisted of ABC-TV, CBS-TV, NBC-TV, Fox Movietone, and UPITN (UPI Television News) for use on major newscasts and regional newscasts.

(U) Approximately 125 film clips were released to the News Pool during the year. In the earlier part of the year, stress tended to be placed on maintaining a low rate of rejection by the Audio Visual Branch at the Pentagon. In the latter months of 1969, Chief, MOPIX News Branch, pushed the news teams to turn out more stories. Thus, there was a higher rejection rate at OASD/PA, but also a higher utilization rate by the News Pool. The availability of an increased number of projects for selection was designed to increase the quality and timeliness of the films. [37]

(U) Since the networks were their major customers, the MOPIX branch pushed to balance the coverage of the networks. MOPIX tried to avoid covering the same story as the networks, unless it had a different angle or unless a MOPIX team happened to be on the scene of a breaking story. Hence, in the earlier period of the war, coverage of civic action and nation building tended to be stressed by MOPIX. As the networks moved towards the coverage of that aspect of

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the war, approximately 50 percent of the MOPIX coverage was combat and combat support, while the remaining 50 percent of output covered subjects related to pacification and Vietnamization. In effect, MOPIX acted to complete the picture of the One War. From April until the latter part of October, teams covered Thailand, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Korea, as well as RVN. As of 1 Nov, the Public Affairs Office of CINCPAC reinterpreted the charter to the effect that the teams were authorized to operate only in RVN and perhaps Thailand if a story warranted unless clearance for operations in other countries was secured from CINCPAC. [38]

The Plans and Policy Division

(U) The Plans and Policy Division (PPD), which consisted of the Plans Branch and Review and Analysis Branch, continued in its function of: preparing information annexes for all COMUSMACV and SEATO plans; developing and collating information policy; and reviewing and clearing all unit news materials concerning US operations in II CTZ, III CTZ, and DMAC. (III MAF reviewed material in I CTZ.)

(U) In 1969, the Chief, PPD was assigned as the MACOI project officer for the July Presidential visit. A comprehensive information plan was developed and a detailed reconnaissance of all Presidential itinerary areas was made. Travel arrangements and related activities were coordinated for the White House press corps, White House Staff personnel, and the Saigon press corps. [39]

(U) The Review and Analysis Branch reviewed military reporting in II, III, and IV Corps. The civilian press was not included in this process. Copy submitted by information officers prior to publication in unit newspapers or elsewhere was checked. IOs were encouraged to make their own decisions on nonoperational articles. If there were doubts about articles, IOs forwarded them to MACOI. Statistical data was checked with the Command Operations Center log. If technical information was involved, the information was cleared with someone who knew the subject. Private manuscripts, which men in the service wanted to publish, were also submitted to this branch. During 1969, almost 10,000 items were reviewed. [40]

(FOUO) The criteria used to review articles were security, accuracy, policy, and propriety. One aim was to avoid the release of sensitive information. The majority of articles submitted were not altered. Only a small number were stopped outright. Photographs were reviewed in the attempt to avoid "backfires", photographs which would have had a heavy emotional impact at home or would have brought forth a negative reaction. Few photographs were stopped before publication. According to guidance from the OASD/PA, photographs of badly wounded, maimed or dead soldiers normally would not be cleared, unless they were likely to improve military morale. Photographs which showed technical devices, might be stopped to avoid revealing classified information. [41]

Command Information Division

(U) The mission of the Command Information Division (CID) was to support the US effort in Vietnam by providing information materials designed to increase the knowledge and understanding of our internal public concerning RVN, and our role here. CID was concerned with the

internal audience in contrast to PID's concern with external audience. (For further discussion of CID's missions and functions see 1968 MACV Command History, pp. 935-937.)

(FOUO) During 1969 extensive efforts were directed to CI policy concerning redeployment. This policy encompassed each division of MACOI and the command, therefore it was greater in scope than CID's role. Guidance issued concerning Phase I redeployment stated:

> Units scheduled for redeployment should conduct an effective program to keep personnel informed, thus keeping rumors and speculation to a minimum.
>
> Information programs must be consistent with requirements for security and the needs of the personnel involved.
>
> MACOI will, upon release of unit designations, provide appropriate authoritative information to AFVN, Stars and Stripes, and redeploying units through CI fact sheets.
>
> The following are guidelines for emphasis in developing programs:
>
> 1. It was at the request of the government of RVN that US forces came to RVN's assistance; and by President Thieu's request that RVNAF replace 25,000 US forces. We have fought alongside the RVNAF and have assisted them in modernizing their forces. We will continue to assist in RVNAF modernization.
>
> 2. Both increased RVNAF strength and pacification progress have made redeployment possible.
>
> 3. Redeployment will not endanger remaining US forces nor does it indicate any weakening of US resolve to honor our commitment and seek an honorable end to the conflict. The vast hulk of US forces remain to ensure that end.
>
> 4. The units redeploying were selected after lengthy and detailed consideration of the overall tactical situation, the ability of the RVNAF to replace these units, and enemy capabilities, as well as other factors.
>
> 5. The criteria for the selection of personnel accompanying the redeploying units may differ among the services based on the new missions of the redeploying units and the areas to which these units will move. The criteria will be fair and equitable and

will in certain cases involve reassignment of personnel within country. Personnel turbulence will be minimized.

6. All personnel should make every effort to avoid friction between US forces and the Vietnamese people. US forces will attempt to assist VN employees and minimize impact on local citizens.

7. It is the efforts and sacrifices of both US forces and RVNAF which have made replacement possible. [42]

Virtually the same guidance was issued prior to the announcement of the units to be redeployed in Phase II.

(U) Two of the major developments in CID during 1969, were the increased stress of the Commander's Call and the technological changes which allowed the MACV Observer and unit newspapers to be prepared for offset printing at MACV instead of in Tokyo at the Stars and Stripes plant.

Commander's Call/Officer's Call/Noncommissioned Officer's Call

(U) Plans were developed in 1969 to improve the channels of communication between leaders at every level of command and their men. Previously, much of the CI program had been left to the individual services. MACOI and CID had issued quarterly guidance suggesting topics to be covered by commanders. Guidance from CID for October to December stated:

To support the local CI program, commanders may direct the scheduling of MACV CI subjects appropriate to their mission and situation or select other subjects they deem appropriate. Subjects may be presented through unit publications, informal discussions, command announcements, bulletin board displays, daily bulletins, or any other suitable means available.

Subjects suggested in this 4th Quarter guidance were "Mines and Booby-traps", "Malaria", "War Trophies", and "Drug Abuse". [43]

(U) In December, a decision was reached that biweekly Commander's Calls would be required. Flexibility was maintained. These sessions could be formal sessions at the major base camps and major posts or informal bull sessions at the fire support bases. The local small unit commander could stress what he thought needed to be emphasized. The aim was to discuss why the soldier was in RVN and the role that he had. Another aim was to give brigade and battalion commanders greater responsibility in guiding younger officers by means of Officer's Calls. [44]

(U) MACOI forwarded the new program to subordinate commanders with the following guidance:

> Effective 1 Jan 70, the CI program for all component commands and units of MACV will include the following:
>
> 1. Officer's Call will be held monthly for all officers within the unit. The classes will be conducted by the unit commander and will encompass mandatory subjects which have been disseminated through the chain of command.
>
> 2. Commander's Call will be an hourly period of instruction, scheduled and conducted biweekly. Participation by all available noncommissioned officers and enlisted men will be mandatory. Mandatory subjects prescribed by higher headquarters and MACV will be presented by the unit commander.
>
> 3. Noncommissioned Officer's Call will be conducted by the unit sergeant major for all senior NCOs within his unit. Subjects will deal with professional areas that could or do affect the unit.

Mandatory subjects for January were "The Vietnamization and Redeployment Program" and "Dissent". The alternate subject was "Drug Abuse". The general objective of the session, a precis of the guidance, and references were included in the CID fact sheet which was sent to the units. At year's end, the plans had been made and circulated. The effectiveness of the program would be tested in the field during 1970. [45]

The MACV Observer

(U) The MACV Observer was a high quality service newspaper and the only joint newspaper in RVN. As such, it allowed members of the services in RVN to read about activities of the other services. The Observer's articles had command wide interest.

(U) Articles were submitted to the Observer by IOs in the field. Operational articles were cleared through MACOI and III MAF. Articles were rewritten to meet the requirements of the Observer. The Observer also generated some copy by sending its own men into the field. The Observer's weekly press run was 100,000 copies, with about one copy per five servicemen in RVN. A special effort was made to get the paper to men in isolated positions by mailing them out in small bundles.

(U) During 1969, 1 Aug and 14 Nov were important days for CID and the Observer staff. On the former date, the Composing Branch became operational and the IBM Magnetic Tape Selectric (MTS) Composing system arrived. This system included an MTS Model-IV magnetic tape "Selectric" typewriter, three Model-V's and two Magnetic Tape Selectric Composers (MTSC). This was the biggest innovation in printing in RVN and the system was the only one of

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its type west of Hawaii and in SEASIA. The first issue using the new system was published on 14 Nov. The process allowed justified and camera-ready copy to be produced at MACV HQs, and then to be sent to Tokyo for printing. The linotype process step in Tokyo was ended, as was the necessity to have staff members on TDY in Tokyo for long periods of time. Formerly, numerous men from unit newspapers also were on TDY in Tokyo in order to print their newspapers. [46]

(C) The cost in TDY money per year was more than $250,000 and there was the outflow of gold involved. The new system cost $60,000. In addition, the linotype process in Tokyo was no longer necessary, and the Observer was printed less expensively. Previously, it had cost $24.50 a page for the Observer; the new process cost $10.50 per page. [47]

(U) In addition to utilizing the process for the Observer, the following unit newspapers were added to the process in 1969, which created camera ready copy at MACV HQs, prior to being sent to Tokyo for printing:

Go-Devil - 9th Inf Div
Firebase 173 - 173d Abn Bde
Castle Courier - Engineer Troops, Vietnam
Screaming Eagle - 101st Abn Div
Roundup - 18th MP Bde

Unit Newspapers

(U) There were over 140 unit papers in RVN. The number of unit newspapers began to decline in 1969, as units redeployed and their newspapers ceased publication. One decision by USARV, which was expected to limit the number of general publications (not necessarily newspapers) in the future was:

> Pending clarification of an apparent conflict in regulations, the use of appropriated or non-appropriated funds for the publication of unit histories, yearbooks, pictorial reviews and similar chronologies is not authorized. [48]

Other Activities

(U) The CID continued to publish numerous CI pamphlets. One innovation in 1969 was the more extensive use of color. Most of the time, this was achieved not by using more than one color ink, but by using different color paper.

(U) Some of the other activities of CID in 1969 included initiating and updating general officers' biography files, writing unit anniversary messages for COMUSMACV, and answering letters received by him.

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Special Projects Division

(U) The Special Projects Division (SPD) provided the press with the capability to get out and cover the war. Its mission was to provide a service and liaison agency for news media representatives visiting RVN to cover military actions. SPD worked very closely with the press. As one commentator said, "even when MACOI was aggravated about a 'lousy story' and the press was aggravated about an'alleged cover up', SPD continued to function." Its primary functions were to accredit newsmen, help newsmen get accustomed to some of the basic aspects of daily living in RVN, and to provide transportation for the press. (See 1968 MACV Command History, pp. 937-938.)

Accreditation

(U) MACV was the sole agency with authority to accredit correspondents to US forces. One of the 1969 developments was the consolidation of the accrediting process. Starting on 1 Aug, MACV press cards, MACV privilege cards, noncombatant cards, an "orientation press kit" information packet containing information on the ground rules and a guide describing releasable and non releasable information, and other items were given to the press at the SPD offices in the JUSPAO building. (On 27 Jun, SPD moved from the Brinks Hotel Annex to the JUSPAO building.) Also, the newsmen agreed to follow the ground rules at the same time they were accredited. Everything the press needed for accreditation, could be obtained from SPD, except the Vietnamese press card. A year end summary of SPD's functions stated:

> The basic requirement for MACV accreditation is that the applicant must be, in fact, a full-time working journalist (photographer, cameraman, soundman) employed by, on assignment from or under agreement with a recognized news agency or publication. Additionally, any journalist applying for MACV accreditation must first obtain accreditation from the Ministry of Information, Republic of Vietnam. SPD carefuliy screens all applicants for accreditation and, on a number of occasions has exposed fraudulent applications. [49]

For accreditation, full time newsmen required a letter from the agency for which they worked. Free lance newsmen required letters from at least two agencies affirming that the agency intended to purchase their work. [50]

(U) In 1969, SPD continued to help newsmen plan their itineraries, provided situation briefings, arranged for newsmen to interview members of the MACV staff, provided communications for newsmen, and maintained liaison with military and civilian information officers. Newsmen continued to stay at press camps at Danang, Phu Bai, Nha Trang, Pleiku, and Can Tho. Close liaison was maintained with the IAD of MACOI in order to provide newsmen access to RVNAF channels.

(U) The most important service SPD provided reporters was transportation. A Memorandum for Correspondents, describing priorities and the use of transport said:

> MACV-accredited correspondents are granted Priority III, space-required travel on aircraft. MACV Directive 59-3 states:
>
> Priority III. Reserved for administrative troop movement, or other official travel, travel of information media personnel, routing couriers, and PCS movements from RVN to CONUS.
>
> Correspondents have priority over: PCS from CONUS, return from TDY or emergency leave, R&R personnel moving on a space-required basis, permissive TDY, pass, ordinary leave, and dependents.
>
> The SPD of MACOI is the agency charged with the responsibility for arranging flights from the Saigon area. There are presently 10 flights daily to 12 in-country locations on each of which SPD has three seats blocked. A call to SPD before 1800 hours the day prior to your travel will reserve one of these seats.
>
> SPD can arrange special flights to locations not served by regularly scheduled flights.
>
> In the event of a "fast breaking" news situation, SPD will endeavor to get correspondents on available seats to the news location as quickly as possible. [51]

(U) An example of the functioning of SPD appeared in the aid SPD gave to a National Education Television (NET) film crew:

> The NET film team arrived in Saigon on 2 Dec 69. The team was not met at the airport, because their flight number and time of arrival were not known. Contact was made quickly, and all of the members of the team were accredited by both the Vietnamese and MACV on the first day. Assistance was provided to the team in locating their equipment, which had supposedly been shipped ahead, but which was still in Hong Kong. During this delay, SPD arranged an itinerary for the team, modifying it daily as the equipment remained missing. SPD provided briefings and introductions to all of the liaison agencies and offices which would be assisting the team when they began shooting. SPD provided military currency and combat clothing to the team.

7 Dec: SPD provided vehicle and escort to pick up the team's equipment when it arrived. Arranged through HQ Area Command to take film from the top of Rex Hotel (restricted area) and provided escort.

8 Dec: Provided air transportation to Danang. Prior liaison made with III MAF Press Liaison Officer in Saigon, who arranged S-3 (plans and operations) briefing, and coordinated with Danang Press Camp on team requirements. Danang arranged interviews and provided escort.

9 Dec: Danang Press Center arranged visits and interviews at a tactical fighter wing, medical battalion, and a USO show. Danang provided ground transportation and an escort.

10 Dec: Provided helicopter transportation to the 1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech). The brigade IO provided ground transportation, arranged interviews and arranged for the team to accompany an armored patrol.

11 Dec: Provided air transportation to the 101st Abn Div at FSB BASTOGNE. Division IO provided ground transportation and escort.

12 Dec: Provided air transportation to Saigon. Met at airport by SPD vehicle and escort.

13 Dec: Provided air transportation to US Navy installation and return. Ground transportation and escort provided by US Naval Forces, Vietnam.

14 Dec: Air transportation to Navy tactical base on the Saigon River and return. Escort by Navy, transport by patrol boat on river.

15 Dec: Open day in shooting schedule. SPD assisted in preparations to leave country, change money, arrange transportation.

16 Dec: Aerial photography of Saigon area from helicopter provided by SPD. Truck provided for supplementary shots from ground at various locations around Saigon. Escort by SPD.

17 Dec: Team provided transportation by SPD from hotel to airport for departure. [52]

(U) SPD also provided weekly summaries of the number of correspondents accredited to MACV. The SPD yearend summary stated:

> The number of correspondents accredited to MACV in recent months has been averaging about 460. The highest number accredited at one time was 647 in March 1968. Within the monthly average will be found correspondents who have been in Vietnam for more than five years, as well as correspondents who are making a one-time visit of several days. In the past 36 months, approximately 2,800 individual correspondents have been accredited. [53]

About equal numbers of US and non-US citizens (other than Vietnamese citizens) were accredited to MACV. An average of about 100 Vietnamese were accredited to MACV. The highest number of newsmen present in RVN at one time in 1969 occurred during the Tet period.

(U) One of the tasks performed by SPD was keeping track of the newsmen who had been killed and wounded while covering the war in RVN. Over 100 newsmen had been killed and wounded in this endeavor. The newsman's profession in RVN was a dangerous vocation and it required courage to cover the war in the field. The following three newsmen were killed in 1969: Oliver Noonan, a 29 year old AP photographer, was killed 19 Aug, when the helicopter he was riding in crashed in action south of Danang; Alain St Paul, 29, Assistant Bureau Chief for Agence France Presse (AFP) in Saigon, was killed on 6 Dec by a rocket during shelling near Duc Lap, while working with a CBS camera crew; SP4 Paul Savanuch of Stars and Stripes, was killed on 20 Apr while with Troop C, 3d Sqdn/5th Cav during an attack on the unit's night defensive position near the DMZ. Twenty-one newsmen had been killed or had died in RVN, or as a result of being in RVN prior to 1969. Among their number were some of the greatest newsmen and combat reporters. Americans killed were:

1. Capa, Robert, Life Magazine, killed in 1954.

2. Castan, Sam, Look Magazine, killed 21 May 66 by mortar fire in Central Highlands.

3. Chapelle, Dickie, veteran war correspondent and photographer, killed by boobytrap south of Danang.

4. Eggleston, Charles, United Press International, killed 6 May 68 in street fighting within Saigon.

5. Ellison, Robert, photographer, killed 5 Mar 68 in C-123 airplane crash when airplane was hit be enemy fire.

6. Fall, Bernard, author and widely known authority on RVN, killed 21 Feb 67 by boobytrap near Hue.

7. Gallagher, Ronald, photographer, killed 11 Mar 67 by artillery fire in Mekong Delta.

8. Higgins, Marguerite, Newsday, died 3 Jan 66 after returning from Vietnam of suspected hepatitis.

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9. Kolenberg, Bernard, Associated Press photographer, killed 2 Oct 65 in USAF plane crash near An Khe.

10. Rose, Jerry, writer, killed September 1965, in a plane crash near Quang Ngai.

11. Schuyler, Felipa, correspondent and concert pianist, killed 9 May 67 in helicopter crash near Danang.

12. Van Thiel, Peter, died May 1965 in Mekong Delta.

Information Advisory Division

(U) The Information Advisory Division (IAD) participated fully in the Vietnamization process. Clearly etched on the canvas of a number of events and incidents were the successes, failures, and frustrations of Vietnamization in 1969. In Vietnamization, the US and Vietnamese character traits and political and cultural traditions met face to face.

(U) MACOI became deeply involved in publicizing and participating in Vietnamization. The involvement of each division within MACOI revealed the ways in which each interacted with the other. Discussion of the overall MACOI involvement and of the RVNAF information situation will precede a discussion of the functioning of IAD.

(U) Increasing emphasis was placed on Vietnamization by the President, the SECDEF, the command, and MACOI in 1969. Before completion of the Administration's review of the Vietnam policy, prior to the subsequent adoption of the Vietnamization policy, and preceding the enunciation of what came to be called the "Guam doctrine" of US foreign policy in Asia, the command and MACOI were concerned with increasing public awareness of RVNAF and its operations and activities. Improvement of the RVNAF image ranked as a high priority and one of the major information objectives of MACV. However, what was needed was not a high pressure campaign, but rather accurate reporting of the real accomplishments and progress of improving RVNAF. [54]

(C) The revised MACV Directive 550-3, published 4 Mar, established a program to improve the image of RVNAF. It was not intended to establish a hard hitting publicity campaign, but rather to help the RVNAF, in all ways possible, gain due recognition for its loyalty, courage, continuing improvement, and its long fight against insurgency which had been overshadowed by the advent of major US units conducting large operations against major enemy formations. Specific responsibilities outlined in this directive for MACOI were:

> 1. Continue advisory effort with the Information and Public Relations Bloc (Public Information Office) of the General Political Warfare Department.
>
> 2. Improve effectiveness of RVNAF information officers by developing training programs and by supervision of the information advisory effort.
>
> 3. Continue program of producing short radio and television clips for use by the AFVN and for release in the US.

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4. Insure authorized newspapers include sufficient news regarding RVNAF.

5. Encourage and assist newsmen in their efforts to gather information about the RVNAF and its activities.

All US commanders were directed to:

1. Take every opportunity to call the attention of all correspondents to the qualities of RVNAF training and performance, and avoid derogatory comments about RVNAF units or commanders in conversations with news media representatives.

2. Acquaint news media representatives with RVNAF activities by accompanying them, when possible and appropriate, to visit efficient RVNAF units operating in their areas.

3. Advise news media representatives of outstanding successes and reliability of RVNAF units, particularly in recent joint or combined operations.

4. Include background material on the war in Vietnam, on Vietnam itself, on the quality of the Vietnamese people, and the quality of RVNAF in news and feature stories prepared for unit publications.

5. Notify MACOI immediately when significant actions favorable to the RVNAF or unfavorable to the enemy occurred. [55]

(C) After the Midway Conference, much greater emphasis was placed on Vietnamization throughout the chain of command. Top level concern was reflected in the following:

....CJCS, CINCPAC, and COMUSMACV expressed concern over the fact that much recent progress in the RVNAF has not received its due share of news media coverage. [56]

(U) A monthly status report on the effort to publicize RVNAF achievements was prepared monthly. Among the achievements cited in these reports were MOPIX films on RVNAF, MACV releases and special memorandums to the press, RVNAF weekly consolidated press reports, increased press coverage of Vietnamization in the form of specific articles mentioned, a greater number of stories on AFVN, including specials on Vietnamization, greater contact between newsmen and the Information and Public Relations Bloc of the GVN General Political Warfare Department, increased coverage of RVNAF events by US newsmen arranged by MACOI, more articles in the MACV Observer, press conferences and tours arranged by the Information and Public Relations Bloc, General Political Warfare Department, and others. The program was well established in December. [57]

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(FOUO) On 19 Jun, COMUSMACV requested more articles about Vietnamization from subordinate commands in order to have more features about Vietnamization to release in the US. Shortly thereafter, COMUSMACV advised his commanders:

> 1. Reports by US commercial news media contain scant information on the accomplishments of the ARVN, RF, and PF, although there are numerous good combat actions to report. Correspondents here in Vietnam know from long experience that their editors use little on the ARVN, RF, and PF; so consequently they file little.
>
> 2. This headquarters is arranging with OSD for news releases on accomplishments by ARVN/RF/PF to be used by various means in Washington in a manner that will insure that many of our releases will get to the public. The key to this procedure will be a continual flow of stories from your headquarters directly to MACV via information teletype channels. These stories will be in addition to the regular ones on which information advisors assist the RVNAF.
>
> 3. MACOI will communicate directly with your information officer on details. Request you give this program the impetus necessary to insure that adequate material is forthcoming. [58]

The SECDEF commented on MACV efforts, 4 Oct:

> Your strengthened efforts to inform the American public about the military side of Vietnamization, which were reported to me....at the Phase II planning conference at PACOM, are showing positive results here. We have recently seen a number of informative stories and TV news reports on this subject. The NYT of 4 Oct carries comprehensive report beginning three columns, page one by Sterba on Vietnamization. Story shows outstanding efforts your command is making to underscore importance of this program. Results will be a better informed public which is our mutual objective. [59]

(C) The PPD produced a draft plan on the information aspect of Vietnamization in the fall, which was reviewed throughout MACOI and staffed in the headquarters. Although it was not formally promulgated, it expressed the range of MACOI proposals, some of which were implemented; this plan included specific suggestions for the divisions of MACOI. Among the recommendations made by the plan were: US information advisors be used exclusively in that capacity; the status of the US information advisory programs and information advisors and RVNAF information programs and information officers be upgraded; an in-country information school to educate RVNAF information personnel be established; "eventual separation of the RVNAF Information and POLWAR Agencies" be accomplished in order to improve the credibility of RVNAF

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press releases; and liaison and cooperation between, and even combination of, RVNAF and US information staffs and programs be increased in order to publicize Vietnamization developments fully. In addition, specific tasks for MACOI's divisions were suggested. [60]

(U) Basically, MACOI's program entailed three approaches to the task. First, MACOI would do everything possible to publicize RVNAF achievements to the world. Second, MACOI would strive to advise, encourage, and help build the RVNAF information program with the ultimate goal being a self-sufficient RVNAF information program. Third, MACOI would institute a strong internal or command information program. MACOI hoped that US troops in RVN would bring news of Vietnamization home with them when they completed their tours. [61]

(U) Further insight into the nature of the problem came in the response of the PACOM Public Affairs Officer to one of the MACV draft information plans. He stated in a letter to MACV Chief of Information:

> We've gone over rather carefully your draft operation information plan for Vietnamizing the war and I'd like to pass on some of our observations and suggestions.
>
> On the ASSUMPTIONS paragraph, . . . that "RVNAF information activities will remain under the staff supervision of Political Warfare" should be modified. One of the prime objectives of the plan should be the establishment of an information organization along US lines where public information is completely divorced from political warfare. Without that, it will be all but impossible to establish any degree of credibility.
>
> The mission should be broadened to become twofold: one to "Vietnamize the war", the other to establish a viable information setup in the RVNAF. I suggest a mission statement along the following lines:
>
> MISSION. Through individual and joint efforts of the RVNAF, US, and FWMA Forces:
>
> a. Develop within the RVNAF an information philosophy, structure and operation which will provide for the rapid dissemination of information concerning the RVNAF consistent with security to the world public, and
>
> b. Release the maximum amount of information consistent with security through RVNAF, US, and FWMAF information channels to the world press and public regarding the military and pacification actions of the RVNAF.

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I would also recommend that the following be added where pertinent:

OBJECTIVES.

a. Intensive effort by MACV to insure competent, experienced information personnel are assigned to information advisory positions.

b. Intensive effort by MACV to insure full manning of RVNAF information positions by qualified personnel. [62]

RVNAF Information Structure and Concepts

(U) The letter above cited a basic fact that revealed the differences between the US and RVN philosophies of information and the realities of the respective information policies. The RVN information program was not separated from psychological warfare operations. Furthermore, the Information and Public Relations Branch came under the jurisdiction of the General Political Warfare Department. [63]

(U) The General Political Warfare Department's responsibilities were broad. The mission was:

1. To create and maintain the loyalty of the RVNAF to their leaders, nation, and national ideology.

2. To gain and maintain the support of the civilian populace in both friendly and enemy controlled areas.

3. To destroy the loyalty of enemy troops to their leaders, nation, and national ideology. [64]

The Political Warfare Handbook for Advisors asserted:

> The key elements of the political warfare program are troop and dependent welfare, recreation and entertainment, indoctrination and motivation, civil affairs, PSYWAR activities, and security investigations. The integrated program is aimed at influencing the "minds of men" and is designed to create and maintain an allegiance to the RVN or destroy the allegiance to NVN. The three target audiences in order of priority are RVNAF soldiers and dependents, civilians in enemy and friendly areas, and the enemy troops. [65]

The system stemmed from the Russian political commissar system which the Chinese Communists and Chinese Nationalists had adopted and adapted. The Nationalist Chinese altered the

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Soviet relationship between the political officer and the military unit commander, placing the unit commander in charge. RVN officials adopted the present system from the Nationalist Chinese. President Diem visited Taiwan in 1960, and listened to Chiang Kai-Shek discuss the system. After years of coordination with the Nationalist Chinese and planning, the system had been officially established on 24 Oct 64. It was within this General Political Warfare Directorate with its broad functions and variations of the commissar concept that the Information and Public Relations Bloc emerged. [66]

GVN Press Policy

(C) The RVN had a severely restricted, but not altogether "unfree" press in 1969. Debate on a new press statute throughout much of 1969 was climaxed by President Thieu's promulgation of the New Press Statute on 29 Dec. Prior to the promulgation of the statute, the National Assembly had met on 10 and 11 Dec to consider President Thieu's proposed amendments to the press law passed by the Assembly in July. In commenting on the actions of the Assembly in December, the Saigon Embassy wrote:

> 1. National Assembly met in joint plenary session December 10 and 11, and rejected four of President Thieu's proposed amendments to the press law, consciously approved three, and failed to reject one.
>
> 2. The four amendments rejected would have restricted the press freedoms provided in the National Assembly version of the law. The most important of these would have limited the right of the press to report statements of deputies and senators, and thus the legislators access to the public. This amendment was rejected by the overwhelming vote of 127 to 1.
>
> 3. The Assembly narrowly failed to reject Amendment #3. Accordingly, the law will not exempt the press from prosecution when it reports in good faith declarations or political debates held in open sessions of legal political parties. On the other hand, Assembly positively approved (130 to 12) an amendment which stated that of the publisher, editor, or manager of a newspaper, at least one cannot be immune from prosecution.
>
> 4. COMMENT Press law which President Thieu now must promulgate retains most of the freedoms envisaged by the National Assembly version, except the freedom from prosecution for reporting statements made at political party sessions. Given present situation in SVN, it is a reasonably liberal statute, though the proof of the status of press freedom in SVN will come in this law's application. Importance National Assembly gives to the press was clearly indicated in its ability

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> to overcome chronic absenteeism and muster sufficient votes to reject almost all of the restrictive amendments. [67]

(U) The new press law provided for what could best be termed a licensed press. Government influence was also exerted through prepublication censorship of daily media offerings. See Annex K for complete law.

(S) Government policy towards the press fluctuated during the year. Newspapers were suspended or closed throughout the year. A "liberal" period followed the change of ministries during the summer. The Saigon Embassy rated the new Information Minister favorably, asserting that "Information Minister Ngo Khac Tinh is sophisticated and competent, and is bringing a team of Nhan Xa Party members to the Ministry who are eager to improve the GVN's poor performance in press and information matters". On the television program "The People Want to Know", the new Information Minister declared, in the words of the Embassy:

> Some papers which previously had been closed would again be given permits to operate, as would papers of all legally constituted nationalist groups, i.e., political parties qualifying under the political party statute. He affirmed that cooperation with and assistance of the press are primary functions in his Ministry.
>
> (Comment: The new government's press policy thus far has been quite liberal. Several opposition journalists have remarked to us recently that they are under less pressure from the GVN now than at any time in recent memory.) [68]

(C) However, in December the government adopted a harder line and some newspapers were closed either "temporarily" or "indefinitely". The An Quang Buddhist daily, Chanh Dao, was closed "indefinitely", ostensibly for a sarcastic article about Christmas. The government accused a story on 26 Dec of "tending to promote division within the national leadership and cause religious discrimination". [69] Tieng Noi Dan Toc, published by two lower house opposition deputies, was closed temporarily. These two actions seemed to be part of President Thieu's drive against Senator Tran Van Don's and "Big" Minh's efforts to develop a political position between the VC/NVA and the GVN government, which President Thieu called "neutralism". In addition, "six weekly magazines for women chiefly devoted to serial romance and adventure sagas, were closed on grounds of indecency". [70]

RVN Press, Television, and Radio

(U) The overall state of RVN print and broadcast journalism was revealed by the following JUSPAO description:

> Television and radio play the major role in the national communications system. Saigon newspaper circulation is only about 341,000 (which includes sales

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in province cities), and province and district newspapers probably not over 300,000 (of which many are weeklies or monthlies). Vietnam's 13 radio stations and four TV stations (one in each category being airborne at this time) broadcast to an estimated 2.4 million radio sets and close to 300,000 TV receivers representing geographic coverage of 75-80 percent of the population. Distribution is concentrated in the four principal population areas--Can Tho (and surrounding delta provinces), Saigon (and III CTZ provinces), Nha Trang (highlands and central coastal region), and I CTZ (principally Thua Thien, Quang Nam and Quang Ngai Provinces).

Broadcasting both TV and radio is by decree a government monopoly (Decree No. 7 of 1 Dec 55--Establishment of National Broadcasting Authority). Shortage of technical personnel continues to preclude an early shift to some private broadcasting.

Orientation is as prescribed by Ministry of Information which exercises careful policy control over all broadcasting, and hence output can be relied on to reflect GVN policy.

Breakdown of audience by rural vs urban is difficult, but probably runs around 60 percent urban and 40 percent rural. Breakdown difficult to define because even Vietnam's largest cities blend very quickly into rural environment when one gets away from the "center of town". Because of the duplication of communications sources in urban centers, however, one set in the bush is worth a dozen in city hands.

Apportionment of news, commentaries and features for radio: 15 percent news, 10 percent commentary, 25 percent features, 50 percent entertainment. For TV: 20 percent news, 15 percent commentary, 25 percent features and 30 percent entertainment. Under features are included "freight"-bearing entertainment programs including Chieu Hoi drama, ARVN skits, etc. News sources include commercial wire services, Vietnam Press and (in the case of TV) CBS television news service. [71]

(FOUO) As of 8 Dec, the US Embassy gave the following figures concerning newspapers in Saigon:

The number of newspapers in Saigon fluctuates almost daily. By Embassy count, there are at present 35 newspapers printing. Of these, 22 are

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> Vietnamese and 10 Chinese. Two Vietnamese dailies are "temporarily" suspended, one other suspended daily has been given permission to re-open but has not yet done so, and four authorized papers (including one Chinese journal) have not yet appeared. [72]

(C) The GVN also banned several issues of US weekly news magazines. These issues continued to be sold in PXs. The 23 May issue of Time was banned, as were the 10 Nov issue of Life and the 23 Jun issue of Newsweek. The issue of Life was banned because of a story which was entitled in part "A Phase by Phase Guide to Guerrilla Doctrine Invented by Mao and Used in Modern Revolutions from Cuba to Vietnam". The GVN asserted that the article was "helpful to the Communists". [73] The issue of Newsweek was banned because of an article entitled, "Vietnam Exodus: A Favored Few" which asserted that some of the wealthier Vietnamese were preparing to leave RVN or had left. A US Embassy telegram discussed the Newsweek article:

> Newsweek Bureau Chief Maynard Parker was summoned to Ministry of Information today, June 23, to talk to Director of Cabinet Tran Van Phuoc (second-ranking MOI official). Parker gave us following account: Phuoc expressed appreciation for Newsweek reporting in Vietnam but said that recently, a number of articles, especially "Vietnam Exodus" in the June 23 issue were unsuitable and harmful to the country's stability. The content of the "Vietnam Exodus" article, particularly the claim that Mrs. Thieu had bought a house in Switzerland, Phuoc continued, would affect the morale and fighting spirit, not only of ARVN but of US soldiers fighting in SVN. Phuoc noted this story had been denied by the office of Mrs. Thieu, and added that in some cases stories in Newsweek are taken from some irresponsible sources in SVN, and based on speculation and rumor. [74]

(C) Another telegram discussed the same case and forwarded the advice which the US Embassy gave to the RVN government. This advice reflected the philosophy espoused by US embassies in other countries of SEASIA when similar issues arose:

> As in the case of the banning of Time magazine three weeks ago, we immediately communicated with the Foreign Ministry and gave them to consider that by banning Newsweek they were apt to give the objectionable item much greater world-wide circulation than by ignoring it. We felt GVN should weigh adverse domestic effect of letting a few hundred copies circulate in Saigon (largely among foreigners), against the bad impression the ban would create abroad and especially in the US. [75]

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(U) SECSTATE Rogers expressed the USG's views on press freedom in RVN at a departure press conference in Saigon on 19 May. In response to a question about whether the issue of "civil liberties" had arisen during his conversations with GVN officials, Secretary Rogers said:

> No, we discussed in a general way the right of the press, freedom of the press, and we expressed the concern of our Government on that subject. We did not go into any particular cases. We don't think it's appropriate to. Secondly, when there's a war on, situations are somewhat different. I think it would be unwise for us to attempt to spell out in detail our thoughts on that subject. Even in our own case during the war, if you recall, we did some things that were somewhat repressive and I think it's understandable why there is a temptation in that regard. I must say that there's been considerable improvement, I think here in freedom of the press, and I think the government is quite conscious of the problem. But they are fighting a war. They are having their men killed. And the problem of freedom of press at a time when the nation is at war is not an easy one to decide. [76]

(U) North Vietnam and the VC allowed no free internal press. Virtually no non-Communist correspondents and news services were allowed to reside in NVN. One agency that did have a newsman in Hanoi was Agence France Presse. Occasionally, reporters from non-Communist countries were allowed to visit NVN.

(S) One very significant development in 1969 was the increasing use of television and radio by President Thieu and other GVN officials. President Thieu and some cabinet ministers appeared on a new television show named "The People Want to Know" which was modeled openly on Meet the Press/Face the Nation. An example of the use of television by the GVN was a television program about the National Police, which was described this way:

> On December 17, the National Police presented an hour long program on the GVN TV station in Saigon. The program was centered around a drama about the cooperation of neighborhood group with the police to destroy the VC. At intermission points there were spot announcements on police activities such as ID card registration requirements and some patriotic songs. Ministry of Information has approved a twice monthly National Police television hour long program in "prime time" beginning this month. [77]

President Thieu also was interviewed for US television programs, appearing on "Issues and Answers" televised 28 Sep. He was interviewed also by Charles Collingwood on 17 Oct, appearing as part of a one hour program, "CBS Reports: A Timetable for Vietnam", shown in the US on 2 Dec. The Saigon Embassy commented about President Thieu's responses to Collingwood's questions, "Thieu's answers amount to a generally effective restatement of his recent public stands on issues of current interest..." [78]

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(FOUO) The GVN generally placed increased emphasis on its PSYOP and information programs in 1969. One specific example was the significance placed on the use of the media in the future. On 9 Oct, the contract for the Four Station Radio Network project was signed. This program involved upgrading the Saigon radio transmission facilities and constructing radio transmission facilities at Nha Trang, Qui Nhon, and Danang. The plan allowed for the continued functioning of existing stations. The project was to have two channels. Channel A would be aimed at civilians. Channel B would be directed to the military. DOD became involved in the funding because Channel B was to be beamed at the military. The eventual goal was to reach 95 percent of the population of RVN with 12 stations. [79]

(C) Significant events in 1969 concerning GVN-press relations or GVN information developments included:

1. When President Nixon visited Saigon on 31 Jul, RVN radio broadcasted the visit to the Palace live, in spite of a communications blackout. The US Embassy passed back to Washington the RVN briefer's explanation:

> Briefer said GVN authorized broadcast for "technical" and "political" reasons. Political reason, he said was that GVN wished to show that it is independent country with elected constitutional government. Briefer saw no inconsistency between this and GVN desire to cooperate on US Presidential security. Briefer promised to check whether USG was advised of GVN live broadcast plans; and whether USG concurred. [80]

2. At a press reception on 15 Sep, VP Ky told two newsmen, Bollo of AFP and Kirk of the Washington Star, that President Nixon was going to announce the next day a troop redeployment of 40,500 men. This news went around the world and provoked official Washington. [81]

3. Efforts were made to have the captured VC general campaign plan, COSVN Resolution 9, released first by the GVN rather than by the US. After some difficulties in working out the signals, apparently among US agencies, release under GVN auspices was accomplished. [82]

4. In November, police tried to keep reporters from observing the removal without violence of Cambodian-descent Buddhist monks from in front of the Presidential Palace. The monks were demanding restoration of minority privileges for ethnic Cambodian Vietnamese. In December, three newsmen said that they were roughed up when a clash between police and the monks erupted as the latter tried to march to the Presidential Palace. An Embassy telegram reported the GVN briefer's response to reporters about the incident:

> At December 15 combined briefing GVN spokesman Huyen expressed regret when correspondents complained of difficulties encountered with national police while covering two more demonstration attempts by Buddhist-descent monks in Saigon this weekend. Briefer said GVN has instructed police; as well as other officials, "to help correspondents do their job and ease their work here". Suggested newsmen identify themselves by wearing armbands to avoid any future "misunderstandings". [83]

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IAD Mission, Functions, and Activity

(U) The mission of the IAD was to assist the RVNAF in improving its capability to transmit, through public news media, timely, complete and factual information concerning its mission, role, and accomplishments to the Vietnamese and worldwide public audiences, as well as to internal and US/FWMAFs. The functions of the IAD were to:

1. Institute close MACV-RVNAF rapport at the highest level necessary to bring about RVNAF-wide recognition of the importance of its information function.

2. Provide the ingredients necessary for RVNAF development and implementation of sound information programs and objectives, through close, continuous association with RVNAF counterparts.

3. Assist RVNAF information officers in contacts with non-Vietnamese news media representatives, and, conversely, encourage news media contacts with RVNAF.

4. Effect appropriate coordination as required within MACOI, as well as between MACOI and information offices of RVNAF, JUSPAO, US component commands, and FWF in support of information program, projects, and activities of mutual US/FWF interest.

5. Conduct as necessary, liaison between RVNAF and agencies of the US Mission Council in solution of such information problems as on-and-off shore training, procurement of non-military equipment and supplies, and, where appropriate, the identification and recruitment of trained civilian information personnel.

6. Advise other MACOI offices, i.e., Public Information, Command Information, Special Projects, and Armed Forces Radio and Television, in carrying out their responsibilities under MACV Directive 550-3. [84]

(U) The IAD division was very closely linked with its counterpart, the Information and Public Relations Branch of GPWD. With some success, IAD strove to develop in RVNAF an awareness of the significance of a public information program. One sign of this increased awareness was that in March, for the first time the position of Chief of Information and Public Relations Bloc of GPWD was filled by a lieutenant colonel. Until that time, although the slot was authorized a colonel, it had been filled by a major. [85] The information advisors to each RVNAF division, corps, and service were important participants in this effort. However, the information advisor was under the direct control of the senior American advisor at his particular level, and not under the control of IAD or of MACOI. So, IAD advised and made suggestions to

information advisors in the field, but lacked direct control over them. Two information advisors conferences, attended by US advisors and RVNAF information officers, were held in 1969.

(U) An important letter concerning the RVNAF information program from CJGS to COMUSMACV on 28 Dec 67, had included some of the suggestions which came to fruition in 1969. The letter was written with the goal of achieving more favorable, rather than derogatory, reports about RVNAF. In addition to agreeing with the proposal to place US information advisors with each Vietnamese division, he wrote of the importance of setting up information sections in major RVNAF units, of providing more information for newsmen about RVNAF activities and of arranging visits of newsmen to scenes of RVNAF victories. (See 1968 Command History, pp. 938 - 942.) [86]

(U) Among the accomplishments of the RVNAF information program were press trips for which the Information and Public Relations Bloc did the call outs to reporters, arranged for air and ground transportation, and arranged for briefings themselves. Noteworthy among these trips was a visit to a prisoner of war camp and a visit on 12 Dec to the graduation of the first four year class at the Vietnamese National Military Academy at Dalat. On another occasion, representatives of the press were called out for an action at Tuyen Binh, after RF/PF forces had won a victory there. VNAF flew the press group to Can Tho and from there the group was transported by US helicopters. Reporters received a good briefing and also had as much time as they needed, and if "ARVN could run all its press trips that way that would be fine". [87]

(U) IAD also arranged for American reporters to visit RVNAF bases and units. Coverage of base and material turnovers from US to the RVNAF was arranged by MACOI and the Mission Press Center. IAD provided information to reporters concerning RVNAF activities. IAD coordinated with AFVN-TV to place RVNAF news on the air. On AFVN-radio, the weekly "Panorama" program had a section on RVNAF, which was a joint IAD-AFVN produc RVNAF items were also included daily on AFVN-radio.

(U) In a number of areas, 1969 saw a complex interaction between IAD and the Information Bloc. One factor involved was that the Information Bloc was not separated from PSYWAR. The IAD did not expect the Press and Public Relations Bloc of GPWD to function with the same "philosophy" that US information officers had, because the section was under PSYWAR supervision. Further, the Chief, IAD noted that cultural differences had a profound effect. IAD's role was to demonstrate what information activities might succeed. RVN information efforts adopted them if shown that they were successful in their information program. [88]

(U) In addition to the press trips sponsored by the Information Bloc, there were other improvements in the RVNAF information program. In June, it was not possible to get the RVNAF to reveal how many artillery battalions they had. In December, they were breaking them down by type. Whereas at one time it was rare for the Vietnamese to release information about any operation, they began to provide full disclosure to include failures. [89] This candor surprised the press when RVNAF admitted failures. Another improvement was that weekly summaries of "Vietnamese military activities and actions compiled by unit" began to appear under the title of "Weekly Roundup" on 14 Sep. At first, IAD wrote, cut the stencil, handled reproduction and distributed the product. On 12 Oct, the Information and Public Relations Bloc prepared the Vietnamese language edition. Later, the RVNAF produced the entire product. IAD's participation was limited to passing on the information it received through US channels. [90]

(U) The battles of Ben Het in the spring and of Bu Prang-Duc Lap in the autumn marked the primary base points from which to assess where the Vietnamization of the information function started in 1969, and the point that it reached. The following information after action report on Ben Het summarized how information dissemination was handled during the battle and made some suggestions for the future:

> Press operations centered around the Pleiku MACV Press Camp. Billeting and messing facilities were adequate to accommodate media representatives. MAJ Milsak conducted periodic background briefings to keep the press advised of the current situation. While air transportation to and from Ben Het was limited by weather conditions and intensity of enemy fire, two dedicated UH-1Ds would have been ideal and very responsive to press requests. (Helicopters were normally available within two hours after request.) Flight arrangement for persons desiring to go to Ben Het were handled by Co B, 5th SFGA, while flights to Dak To and Kontum were arranged by MAJ Milsak.
>
> Limited personnel were available for escort functions. MAJ Milsak arranged press conferences with senior Vietnamese officers and American advisors as requests developed. At the Dak To TOC, no one appeared to be designated to brief the press. Prior designation of briefers at specific locations could solve this problem should similar situations occur.
>
> Information responsibilities were not well defined.
>
> 1. The II Corps IO advisor willingly covered ARVN and 24th STZ activities; however, he was reluctant to speak about US and/or CIDG functions.
>
> 2. 5th SFGA IO originally stated (this could possibly be attributed to his guidance) that because the CO, 24th STZ was the force commander that his IO should cover the entire effort. Later on, the members of this conference agreed that future situations will require a united or team effort to afford maximum information coverage.
>
> 3. A central point and responsible individual must be established to facilitate coordination, briefing, and handling queries. Possibly, the IO for the commander in charge of the operation could and should be tasked with this responsibility.

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Future Planning

1. Information Officers must be brought into the early stages of such actions and preferably during the planning phase.

2. Information Officers must anticipate possible questions--i.e., boundaries and rules of engagements. Prepared handouts covering commanders and units would be very helpful.

3. Individuals attending this conference concluded that maintaining trained information officers in information advisor slots could have tremendous impact on future situations.

4. Communications seemed to be adequate for this particular situation; however, future efforts may develop commo requirements.

The information lessons learned from Ben Het were that people and facilities had to be ready to handle newsmen and provide them with communications when the next similar battle occurred.[91]

(U) After Ben Het, the Chief of PID coordinated with I FFORCEV. That headquarters created an on-call advance party, and as a battle loomed in the Bu Prang-Duc Lap area in late fall, the advance party went to Ban Me Thuot and set up a press camp. When the anticipated battle occurred, the press camp was ready.[92]

(C) Difficulties developed however, which required visits by MACOI to straighten out. The difficulties included some reporters being forced to leave the 23d ARVN Div headquarters by a US advisor. The difficulties centered around the problems newsmen had for a long time in getting access to ARVN officers who could provide them with information. After Ben Het, half the information lesson of Vietnamization had been learned. The basic problem was that since the action was purely an ARVN action, release authority rested with the ARVN. US officers could not arrogate authority to conduct briefings, or even cover on a background basis until after the ARVN had made an initial release of the information. It took from one to two weeks to establish regular briefings by ARVN officers who were there, had the information, and were capable of giving good briefings. The ARVN officers on the scene waited for orders from higher headquarters to give the briefings. After two weeks of stress, and considerable MACOI urging, daily briefings by members of the Vietnamese staff were established. The action resulted from personal contact of MACV's Chief of Information with the Director, General Political Warfare Department of JGS. The latter secured full command authority and orders were issued to the field commanders.[93]

(U) One lesson learned was that RVNAF had to be ready in the future to do the same thing that I FFORCEV had done prior to the Bu Prang battle. RVNAF information officers would have to move on their own to conduct briefings for newsmen, and if they failed to do so, US advisors would have to be prepared to urge them to do so.[94]

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American Forces Vietnam Network

(U) The seven year old American Forces Vietnam Network (AFVN) continued to provide servicemen in RVN with command information, entertainment, and news during 1969. (See 1968 Command History, pp. 950-953.)

(U) As one of the primary aids to the morale of US servicemen, AFVN strove to improve and refine its service in 1969. The OIC of AFVN stated in June:

> The network, as I see it, has now about completed its stage of expansion. A few embellishments are still however on the horizon. The talent and abilities of personnel within the network are obviously outstanding.
>
> I believe our challenge now to be primarily one of taking our resources and refining them to a degree of absolute professionalism... [95]

Activity

(U) AFVN continued live coverage of virtually every major news and sporting event in the US. Presidential statements and news conferences were broadcast live. Numerous news conferences given by officials who visited RVN were covered by AFVN. Sports events such as the Superbowl and the World Series brought cheers for touchdowns and home runs ringing through the early morning hours. The New York Mets climaxed their "impossible dream" at 0317 hours on AFVN radio, the same moment that New Yorkers began to throw ticker tape out of skyscraper windows. The sounds of modern hard-rock over AM radio were balanced by sounds of "easy-listening" and classical music on FM. FM-stereo was introduced in the fall when AFVN began its multiplex broadcasting.

(U) One of the great accomplishments of AFVN in 1969, was the coverage of the Apollo missions to the moon. Pictures of Apollo 11 were picked up by commercial satellite in the Philippines. AFRTS in the Philippines captured them on videotape. Planes raced from Clark Air Force Base to Tan Son Nhut. The film was shown to audiences in the Saigon area, and as it was shown, copies were filmed for the stations up-country. The aircraft which had carried the original video tapes from Clark, then flew the copies to the up-country stations. Copies were also made in Saigon for stations in Thailand, the 7th Fleet, and for THVN, the RVN television station. As a result of the arrangement, Neil Armstrong's historic first step on the surface of the moon was viewed in RVN three or four hours after the event occurred. For Apollo 12, copies of special feature programs were made in Saigon, flown to detachments and aired on the whole network at the same time. [96]

Mission

(U) The mission of AFVN was to provide the commander with a radio and television capability to broadcast information and entertainment programs for US Armed Forces personnel in

the RVN, and to provide engineering assistance to the JUSPAO for the installation of television facilities for the GVN. The OIC of AFVN stated that "entertainment is the catalyst with which to gain and hold the attention of the audience for news and information". [97]

Chain of Command

(U) AFVN came under the operational control of MACV. The network was under the command and administrative control of and was funded by USARPAC.

(U) AFVN was a true network, on the radio side, since the satellite stations were connected electronically. [98] Each radio station could break from the network up to three hours a day for local news and command information. Television programming was provided from Saigon. AFRTS in Los Angeles provided the film weekly; Saigon AFVN routed blocks of film weekly to the component stations. Beginning 11 Oct, all eight television facilities telecast at least 12 hours a day. [99]

(U) Because of the necessity to rotate the weekly program film packages in sequence from one detachment to the next, a given program was not seen simultaneously throughout the network. However, the master schedule resulted in a high degree of standardization, for instance, while the detachments did not air the same "Bonanza" Sunday at 2100, they all aired a "Bonanza" at that hour. In addition to establishing uniform air times for the three daily newscasts and all major programs, the standardized program schedule greatly assisted AFVN's Saigon headquarters in arranging country-wide simulcasts of information specials. [100]

(U) The network consisted of Class A and Class B detachments. Class A detachments had independent AM and FM radio and television capability. Saigon, Danang, Cam Ranh-Nha Trang, Pleiku, and Qui Nhon had Class A facilities. Qui Nhon began to broadcast FM in December. Class B detachments included independent AM radio and television capability. Quang Tri had these facilities. Class C facilities had only an independent television capacity. Chu Lai and Tuy Hoa fell under this category. The station at Quang Tri was formerly located in Hue. However, the Hue station was overrun during Tet of 1968, at the cost of two men killed and four captured. Plans were laid, and efforts made, to upgrade stations and to further develop transmitters and transmission capacity. FM-stereo capability was added in 1969 to Saigon and Danang, with plans to extend the capability to Pleiku and Cam Ranh-Nha Trang. Additional plans were laid to combine AM, FM, and TV facilities for the Cam Ranh-Nha Trang-Phan Rang area at Cam Ranh Bay. Detachments continued to upgrade their facilities in 1969, but facilities in the provinces remained more makeshift. [101]

(U) The base unit in Saigon was divided into an engineer branch, a supply branch, a news branch, a radio branch, and a television branch. All four services were represented among the men who worked for AFVN.

(U) The network engineering branch conducted repair work and planned for the future. AFVN also provided engineering assistance to the GVN television program by installing equipment. JUSPAO advised the GVN radio and television programs. AFVN also extensively covered Vietnamization and RVNAF modernization and improvement on radio and TV, thus contributing to Vietnamization.

(U) The network news branch put out a newscast every hour on radio, three major television newscasts a day, and provided information and supporting material to the detachments. During the fourth quarter, operationally, AFVN news expanded its services to AFVN detachments. Rather than forcing the detachments to make up their own telecasts from wire-service reports, recorded radio actualities, etc., the news branch began sending a prepared telecast up to the detachment on a voice land line circuit. It would arrive approximately 1-1/2 hours prior to air time. It was recorded by the detachment and aired on tape or retyped and read live. A list of suggested visuals was also sent along with appropriate voice actualities. [102]

(U) Though AFVN produced some documentaries, it basically disseminated news; AFVN did not generate news. AFVN lost three staff members while making one of these documentaries. Photographer's Mate First Class Robert G. Stricklin, Photographer's Mate Second Class Carl W. Hudgins, and Journalist First Class William R. Wilson, were killed on 8 Jun when the vehicle in which they were riding struck a mine, 7 miles south of Danang. The men had been filming the last episode of a six-part series on the activities of the military chaplain in Vietnam, called the "Circuit Riders". A chaplain, chaplain's assistant, and the assistant driver were also killed. [103]

(U) Major sources of news for AFVN were military sources, the Associated Press and United Press International wire services, AP wire-photo, ABC newsfilm, CBS newsfilm, and videotape copies of the Walter Cronkite and Roger Mudd television shows. The use of the Cronkite and Mudd shows commenced in May. A major source of news for AFVN was AFRTS in Washington. Direct teletype contact was maintained between Washington and Saigon. "Voice actuality" was received by direct line from AFRTS in Washington, taken on tape, and then used in newscasts. AFRTS sent down compiled newscasts each hour. [104]

(U) Guidance for substantive programming on AFVN stemmed from CINCPAC in May 1967, passing DOD policy to all CINCPAC forces:

> 1. I want to re-affirm that the public information policy of the DOD demands maximum disclosure of information except for that which would be of material assistance to potential enemies. The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) must take all actions necessary to implement that policy, assuring that nothing inhibits the flow of unclassified information to the American public.
>
> 2. Members of our Armed Forces constitute an important segment of this public. They are entitled to the same unrestricted access to news as are all other citizens. Interference with this access to news will not be permitted. The calculated withholding of unfavorable news stories and wire service reports from troop information publications such as Stars and Stripes, or the censorship of news stories or broadcasts over such outlets as Armed Forces Radio and Television Service (AFRTS) is prohibited.

3. The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower) is directed to take all actions necessary to assure a free flow of information to our troops.

4. News management and meddling with the news will not be tolerated, either in external public information or internal troop information. [105]

(U) The AFVN SOP also provided guidance concerning AFVN news policy:

News Broadcasts: It is the responsibility of the AFVN News Branch to provide timely, accurate, newsworthy, factual, reliable, well-balanced newscasts to US military personnel stationed in the RVN.

Content of news broadcasts will be selected on the basis of objectivity and will be as complete as practicable. Newscasts will be based on a balanced coverage of principal national, international, Vietnam and local news and will not contain editorialization, analysis, commentary or sensationalism. When opinions are expressed, the person or source of such opinion will be clearly identified. Morbid, sensational, or alarming details not essential to factual reporting will be avoided.

Attribution will be given at the beginning and end of each newscast on AFVN radio and television.

Programs of news analysis or commentary will be clearly identified in a manner to distinguish them from newscasts.

All news concerning the war in the RVN will be based on official press releases and/or briefings by MACOI. Under no circumstances will wire service or commercial network information be used unless the story facts are checked with MACOI.

News items concerning RVNAF actions not obtained from official military press releases will be checked through the RVNAF National Press Center.

Any story with political overtones or implications concerning Vietnam will be checked for factual accuracy with JUSPAO.

Although AFVN is not an official voice of the USG, it is frequently interpreted as the in-country voice of the US. For this reason, it is extremely important to

> maintain complete objectivity in the reporting of news and to report all news in a manner commensurate with the ethics of good broadcasting and so as not to be detrimental to the best interest of the US. For these reasons, and to avoid offending our host country, certain subject matter with either political or military ramifications is considered to be sensitive and will be treated with extreme care. Guidance will be promulgated by the Network News Branch to all news departments concerning sensitive areas and the policies concerning the specific handling of such material.
>
> Within the existing framework of factual and objective reporting, the best interests of the USG and support of US national objectives will be the keynote of all news selection. [106]

(U) There was AM broadcasting 24 hours a day; FM radio broadcast from 0600 until 2400 hours. After it became available and where it was available, FM-stereo radio broadcast from 1800 until 2400 hours and FM continued to broadcast from 0600 to 1800. AM and FM radio programming were designed to complement each other. When FM programming ceased for the day, AM and FM broadcast simultaneously. The FM signal did not go off the air. The OIC, AFVN stressed that every effort was made to broadcast to the tastes of the majority of servicemen in RVN. He said that although it was recognized that AFVN radio and television also had US civilian and RVN audiences, the focus of the programming was "the man carrying the M16, the man dropping the round down the mortar tube, the man on the flight line, the man on the ship".[107]

Programming

(U) The general audience of AFVN was overwhelmingly male, with about 75 percent under 25 years of age. Radio was considered to be their best source of general information, news of world events, and entertainment. Regarding the latter, the most popular types of music were "mod", pop-standard, country-western, and soul. AFVN television facilities reached about 80 percent of the men stationed in RVN. Eight types of television programs were ranked according to popularity as follows: comedy, sports, drama, westerns, current events, local shows (USO, special services, etc.), programs on local military, and educational shows. [108]

TYPICAL AFVN-TV BROADCAST DAY [109]

Category	Percent of Total Broadcast Day
News	8.0
Sports	9.6
Command Information	2.4
Information	5.8
Entertainment	74.2

WEEKLY AM RADIO PROGRAMMING

Program	Percentage
Light Rock	24.1
Middle of Road (easy listening)	13.0
Newscasts	11.4
Country-Western	9.7
Top 40 (best sellers)	7.1
Variety (drama, Tonight Show, etc.)	5.8
Command Information Spots (793/Week)	5.1
Sportscasts	4.9
Oldies (Top 40 back to 1954)	4.5
Sports	4.3
Information	3.9
Jazz	2.3
Religious	2.1
Soul	1.8

WEEKLY FM RADIO PROGRAMMING

Program	Percentage
Easy Listening	39.1
Middle of the Road	37.0
Newscasts	12.7
Command Information Spots (559/Week)	5.6
Classical	3.5
Religious	.9
Radio Drama	.7
Sports	.3
Weather	.2

(U) Controversy developed at AFVN over alleged censorship of news broadcasts in 1969. The controversy gained top level executive and legislative interest in Washington and received coverage and comment in the US press. The controversy began to develop in July when nine broadcasters at AFVN expressed the view to the AFVN News Chief that AFVN practice differed from DOD guidance. The controversy developed throughout the fall and winter. An IG investigation was completed after one of the newsmen aired his complaints to the civilian news media in September. As the year closed, the controversy had not been resolved. New allegations were made as the new year opened and a second IG investigation was undertaken in January 1970.

(U) Some of the broadcasters involved had limited backgrounds in civilian broadcasting and had additionally been trained at the DOD Information School. They stressed their desire to "tell it like it is" and expressed the view that DOD policy in the form of SECDEF guidance in 1967 backed them up. The officers at AFVN and at MACOI cited limits to complete freedom of the news in RVN. In addition to limits imposed by security criteria, which all accepted, AFVN and MACOI indicated that sensitive areas had to be handled carefully, and cited guidance which

asserted that stories dealing with the host country particularly had to be handled carefully, since the network broadcast with the permission of the GVN. Most news relating to the GVN and to events in RVN was broadcast. Most of the instances of alleged censorship fell in the sensitive areas and no news was actually censored.

(U) One of the alleged instances cited by the newsmen was the restriction on AFVN's broadcasting of Vice President Ky's announcement of the Phase II troop redeployment figures prior to President Nixon's announcement. The Ky statement was used as soon as a White House statement was received which placed the information in perspective and made clear that it was not fully accurate. Another example of "news management" cited was guidance which had been handed out at an information officer's conference and which AFVN had subsequently adopted concerning the use of certain phrases.

(U) The first IG investigation concluded that there was no management of the news involved. The volume of material coming into AFVN required that editorial judgement be exercised, and the decisions of the supervisory personnel were simple cases of judgement in accordance with the supervisors' understanding of their responsibilities. The two principal complainants were given an opportunity to read the CINCPAC instructions and the MACV directive pertaining to news; they concluded that they had misused the term "news management" and admitted that they were, in fact, questioning the decision of their superiors as to what news items should be used. The youth and inexperience of the complainants and of one of the officers involved also contributed to the incidents. One of the facts cited by the IG was that the newsmen had not been adequately informed of the range of directives which gave guidance on news policy. Efforts were made to obtain and assign mature, competent, and experienced personnel to the staff at AFVN; the OIC, AFVN revised and updated the AFVN SOP to ensure complete understanding of the internal operations; and a training program was initiated to inform and orient the personnel at AFVN as to their responsibilities and obligations. [110]

STARS AND STRIPES

(U) Stars and Stripes was virtually a civilian newspaper, under control of CINCPAC and not MACV, which contained news of RVN and the world. Together with AFVN, it connected Americans in RVN to news of the outside world. Stars and Stripes also served Japan, Thailand, Taiwan, the Philippines, Okinawa, Korea, Guam, Wake, Midway, Hong Kong, and the fleet at sea.

(U) Approximately 135,000 copies of Stars and Stripes were provided servicemen in RVN. Of this number, over 116,000 were free. The remainder was sold. In other countries, all copies were sold.

(U) Stars and Stripes had a bureau in Saigon which was staffed by a small number of full time reporters, and augmented by soldiers assigned to Stars and Stripes TDY. All reporters were in the service. Pages six and seven covered developments in Vietnam. Pages seven and 23 appeared only in the RVN edition.

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(U) In addition to war news, Stars and Stripes provided its readers with news of the full range of world events, articles from columnists with different political viewpoints in place of an editorial page, and a sports section which ranked with any sports section in the US. "Dear Abby" was possibly the most widely read single item in the paper. [111]

(U) Editorial policy guidance for Stars and Stripes was contained in CINCPAC Instruction 5720.15, which stated:

> The calculated withholding of unfavorable news stories and wire service reports from Pacific Stars and Stripes is not authorized. The news content of Pacific Stars and Stripes will be factual, objective, accurate, balanced, and impartial; and conform to the principles of propriety and good taste. When an opinion is expressed the source will be identified. [112]

Stars and Stripes was not censored. Its reporters functioned similarly to civilian reporters. Correspondents were accredited by MACV, and ran the same risks in the field that civilian reporters ran. The paper lost one reporter during the year. SP5 Paul D. Savanuck was killed on 18 Apr near the DMZ when the unit with which he was traveling was attacked in a night defensive location. He had volunteered to cover a pacification story in I CTZ and had joined an armored unit to reach the location of the story. [113]

A REVERSAL OF COMMAND - PRESS ROLE

(C) A significant interchange between the press and the command occurred in November 1968. Intelligence officers interviewed newsmen who had been to Cambodia. Thus the usual relationship between the command and the press was reversed in this instance. [114]

THE PRESS

(U) Every imaginable form of news media covered the war in RVN; each generated special requirements which influenced its particular contact with MACV. The wire services, television networks, radio stations, reporters for newspapers and news weeklies submitted stories from RVN around the world. The US wire services, the Associated Press and United Press International worked under tremendous time pressure and their telex machines fed copy out of RVN 24 hours a day. They competed with each other, with Reuters, and with other newsmen in RVN. The wire services pushed to forward a story from RVN at least one minute sooner than anyone else. For the television networks, the need to be on the scene when a story broke, or shortly thereafter, was imperative. Unshot film was "irretrievable". Usually, 3-man teams were the primary method by which television networks covered the war. Thus, television teams, perhaps more than any other media, wanted instantaneous transportation with their equipment to the scene of a story. They also wanted access to spokesmen whom they could film, so that they could provide film background for a breaking story. Time pressure existed to get the completed

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stories back to the US. For important stories, the television networks had the very expensive capability of rapidly getting them back to the US via satellite from Japan. Otherwise, the films were flown to California and usually on to New York. Decisions on what would be shown on the nation's television screens were made in New York, but the television bureaus in Saigon were remarkably free to develop stories on their own. [115]

(U) Reporters for many major newspapers were not faced with daily deadlines. They covered the war as stories broke and researched particular newsworthy items. If the home papers had no copy from the reporter, copy from the wire services was always available. For these reporters, access to the location of a story when it was breaking, and access to military and civilian officials who knew the information they needed was essential. They had to get out in the field, away from Saigon. Their stories were forwarded from the field to the bureau or office in Saigon, telephoned in from the field to that office, or else written by the reporter after he returned to Saigon. Other reporters with daily deadlines and radio men faced with daily feeds, often were rooted by necessity to Saigon. For them, the daily 1615 briefing was particularly important. They also were more dependent on, and utilized more, sources of information. Newsmen for the news weeklies, such as Time and Newsweek had their own particular weekly Monday or Tuesday to Saturday cycle geared to the functioning of their home offices back in the US. [116]

Digging for the News

(U) Reporters wrote about what they themselves saw, what they learned through talking to people, and what they read in releases or heard in briefings from military and civilian officials. Reporters scrambled once a story broke. They traveled using their intuition to guess where stories would break. Previously, when large unit contacts occurred more frequently, reporters accompanied units as operations began. They still did so, but less frequently in 1969. Their stories were usually embargoed in these instances until the unit commander gave the go-ahead. A number of reporters expressed the opinion that they generally found it easier to obtain information the farther away from Saigon they traveled. To a great extent, the access to someone who would talk openly to reporters depended on the particular unit commander or IO in the field. However, the farther out in the field the newsmen ventured, generally the happier troops were to see and talk to someone who cared enough about their part in the war to come out there. Newsmen strove to talk to the commanding officer or to the officers who knew most about whatever they were researching. They also spoke with men in the ranks. One task of the reporter was to sift information which he received from different individuals and from different perspectives in the chain of command. If he met reluctance to talk, the reporter often tried to move around the obstacle. Another age old reportorial tactic was to play off two or more individuals or groups. One reporter said that sometimes one could do this in RVN by playing the different services off against each other. Also, the reporter commented that so long as there was an opposition in RVN it was possible to learn some of the factors involved in Vietnamese politics, since one side would respond to what the other side would say.

(U) Vietnamization, redeployment, and the decline of large unit actions were major developments in 1969. Press coverage reflected these developments. As one reporter stated, the assignment for a reporter began to resemble in some of its aspects, a typical foreign assignment rather than the coverage of Americans abroad at war. Developments in the RVNAF and in RVN politics became more important. [117] Press coverage concentrated more on pacification,

RVNAF modernization and improvement, and Vietnamization. Combat was reported less, partly because of the decline in large unit actions, and partly because it had been covered extensively over the years, particularly on television. Battles continued to be covered. The Hill 937 ("Hamburger Hill"), Ben Het, Que Son Area, and Bu Prang-Duc Lap battles received extensive coverage and were among the year's most important stories from RVN. They were covered as battles and as reflections of changes in the nature of the war. The death of Ho Chi Minh received extensive coverage. The fate of US PWs in NVN was one of the year's major news stories. The alleged massacre at My Lai received extensive coverage as did the "Green Beret" Case. Particularly, towards the end of the year, some articles appeared, vividly describing the terror tactics of the VC and describing and analyzing in greater detail than previously, the massacre at Hue. Events in the US relating to RVN were also covered. The new Administration's emerging Vietnam policy was described and analyzed. The Vietnam War moratoriums and President Nixon's appeal to the "silent majority" ranked with the year's most important developments and stories. Some of the other issues described and analyzed in 1969 were the lowered level in enemy activity during the early summer, the controversy over the Sheridan tank, and the PHOENIX Program.

(U) Some stories concerning Vietnam or related areas generated controversy. A story by Peter Arnett which began:

> They call themselves "the forgotten men of Ben Het".
>
> They are grimy, unshaven, angry. [118]

drew sharp response from many sides. Other stories also caught Washington's eye with the first cup of morning coffee and brought queries from the nation's capitol. A number of stories from Laos and Thailand generated response. Stories about areas where full disclosure of information did not occur because of policy or other considerations tended to retain news interest for a long time.

Press Comment about Press Relations with MACV

(U) Press comment about relations with MACV was mixed. Newsmen recognized and commented on the fact that they were able to go wherever they pleased to cover the war. They recognized that there was no censorship. Generally, correspondents commented favorably on the transportation provided for them by the command. One US reporter observed that representatives of the foreign press were "amazed" at how the US military helped the press, and that this contrasted with the experience of foreign reporters in covering wars in other parts of the world. [119] Horst Faas from Germany and Peter Arnett from New Zealand commented that "the United States military are the only ones to treat reporters as human beings". [120] Reporters affirmed that the ground rules were reasonable, and affirmed that they recognized and favored actions taken to protect the security of troops. Criticisms of the ground rules were that they were not applied evenly enough, and that some newsmen or agencies got away with things. A number of newsmen believed that at times, stories were not released when security was not the issue, and that MACOI and IOs often became obstacles for the press. One newsman expressed the view that IOs should "fight" the press' "battles" as "advocates" of getting all the information to the press. He added that "a number of brilliant American commanders who had stories to

tell" were telling them, which the press "depended" on, but that others were not. He criticized the view, which he believed some commanders held, that "if the press didn't know about it, it didn't happen". [121] One reporter suggested that the problems which he had faced with MACOI had less to do with MACOI and MACV than with "restricted policy" from above. A number of reporters disliked being followed around by IOs in the field, although one reporter commented that this helped a reporter when he was new in RVN. [122] A number of newsmen said that obstacles to coverage of the news could be skirted but that was not the optimum solution. Incidents were cited where unit commanders tried to limit what was said to the press by subordinates. David Hoffman stated that any attempt to keep a reporter from seeing the man who knew a subject best "deprived the reporter, who sets out to be conscientious, access to people who can best express the military point of view". [123]

(U) One reporter commented that if one visited an advisor in the field for a brief period of time, one was told that "all was great", but that if one stayed for several days and then talked to the advisor, the advisor admitted that there were problems, discussed the problems, and concluded by asking the reporter to "remember the big picture". [124] One newsman commented that the type of IO that he had most confidence in, and found to be best, was the man who had the complete confidence of his commander. [125] Reporters commented that honesty was one of the qualities they most respected in IOs.

(U) A number of reporters worried about difficulties which might be posed for reporters by Vietnamization. Vietnamization was a tougher story to cover than straight combat stories. [126] Another correspondent commented that reporters might not have the "luxurious transportation and cooperative information officers" in the future. The reporter added that RVNAF were not as concerned about time as were the US news media. He also was concerned that the communications system might not be as good. In general, he was concerned that the war might be "harder to cover" and that it might be "harder to find out what was happening when one got there". [127] Newsmen knew that IAD was making an effort to Vietnamize the information releasing process. Most newsmen did not speak Vietnamese. Most major bureaus hired a Vietnamese to cover and keep them informed of developments in Vietnamese politics.

(U) One newsman stated bluntly that he did not expect MACV to be an impartial agent since it was "fighting an enemy" and also was a "major interest group" in the US. He said that he viewed tension between the press and MACV as natural.

Some Criticisms of the Press

(U) A number of criticisms of the press were heard in 1969. One criticism was that the press often failed to provide the full perspective or lacked perspective in coverage of an event. Often, minor events were stressed out of context or the event was not related adequately to a larger context. [128] A frequent criticism was that the press stressed the negative. Another comment was that the newsmen had come to view their role as that of an "adversary". [129] A criticism leveled at Pacific Stars and Stripes was aimed in 1969 at other newsmen too. "All too often Stripes' reporters are inclined to accept the viewpoints of persons clearly not in a position to know what they are talking about, and rarely do they seek the views of someone in a position to give them the straight dope". [130] Another criticism of newsmen was that sometimes they wrote stories after too short a visit to a unit or area to grasp the breaking situation. One critic cited an instance where a reporter went out to cover a story with a strong preconception of what he would find. Critics often referred to newsmen's penchants for the sensational, and the strong

concern of publishers and network executives to sell newspapers or attract a television audience. Critics asked if the media ever criticized their major advertisers. One critic asserted that the press had given too much coverage to the opposition to the war, which he said was a minority view; and not enough coverage to what he felt was the majority view. [131] Another comment was that the press covered negative acts of the US, but did not adequately report terroristic acts of the VC/NVA. Perhaps the harshest criticism was that the press sometimes gave "aid and comfort to the enemy." Some critics of the press felt that the press should have aided the war effort and had not done so.

The Press Responds

(U) The press responded to criticism vigorously. Reporters generally asserted that they covered what happened in RVN and that if the bad news predominated, it was because the bad news was predominant, or else that bad news had a greater impact on people, and they remembered bad news longer. David Hoffman did add that "news is naturally negative." [132] Peter Arnett asserted that what the press wrote had not altered events in RVN, and that even if the press had written what officials would have liked, events would have taken the same course. [133]

(U) Correspondents asserted that they got out in the field because they had to in order to cover the war. One reporter commented that he recognized that the different levels of command had different perspectives on the same event, that he sought the different viewpoints, and that the reporter had the obligation to assess them. [134] One newsman commented that coverage of terrorism on television was difficult, because it was hard to get to the scene of the act. Newsmen were able to cover the US side of the war quite thoroughly, but unable to cover the VC/NVA side. Newsmen recognized this, but said that they could not do anything about it since correspondents were not allowed to cover the war from the enemy side.

Conclusion

(U) One newsman emphasized a view basic to the functioning of the US press that "inquiry is part of a way of life". [135] Peter Arnett asserted that the Military Assistance Command was a "direct servant of the United States" and that the press was an "indirect servant", that both "are serving the same basic purpose" and that "both roles are tied in very closely". [136] Joseph Kraft wrote a realistic assessment of what the "news" was in the US democracy in 1969:

> All the news is what emerges from the vast range of papers, radio stations, TV networks, magazines, and books which are constantly put out in this country. Under this system, the truth is not so much arrived at as surrounded. [137]

(U) How one assessed the relationship between MACOI and the press in 1969, depended on whether one wanted to stress the freedom which the press had to seek out the story and to travel the length and breadth of RVN in search of the story, or whether one wanted to stress those areas in which press access to the full story was limited. James Reston wrote:

> The responsible government official and the responsible reporter in the field of foreign affairs are not really in conflict ninety percent of the time. When they do their best work, they are allies... Clever officials cannot "manipulate" reporters, and clever reporters cannot really "beat" the government. From both sides, they have more to gain by cooperating with one another, and with the rising minority of thoughtful people, than by regarding one another as "the enemy". [138]

(U) The fact remained that never had so much material been released to the press during combat, never had the press been provided such direct access to the battlefield and to complete information at all levels, and never had so much analytical and intelligence material been made available to the press on a continuing basis. Other reporters covering other areas in SEASIA envied the full and complete access the press had to information in RVN. As one newsman stated in Bangkok, "...they can cover just about everything from the press releases." Further it must not be overlooked that this was the first war in modern history without press censorship.

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CHAPTER XII

RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

ORGANIZATION AND POLICY

MACSA History

(S) In February 1964, the JCS directed that all research and test agencies in the RVN be organized into a single command. As a result, the Joint Research and Test Activity (JRATA) replaced the Joint Operations Evaluation Group, Vietnam (JOEG-V), effective 23 Apr 64. BG John K. Boles, Jr. was announced as the Director, JRATA. This agency initially was composed of the Army Concept Team in Vietnam (ACTIV), the Air Force Test Unit - Vietnam (AFTU-V), and the Advanced Research Projects Agency/Research Development Field Unit - Vietnam (ARPA/RDFU-V). Provisions were made for inclusion of a naval test unit when activated. (The Navy Research and Development Unit - Vietnam, NRDU-V, became operational 26 Aug 65.) The commander of JRATA was the principal staff advisor to COMUSMACV on research development, testing, evaluation, combat developments, and he advised and assisted the Vietnamese in their research and development effort through the Combat Development Test Center, Vietnam (CDTC-V). The objectives of JRATA were to:

1. Enhance the counterinsurgency capabilities of both US and GVN forces.

2. Provide research and development, testing and evaluation (RDT&E), and combat development (CD) support to RVNAF.

3. Assist RVNAF to develop their own RDT&E and CD capabilities.

4. Provide access to data, and test environment for the development of new and improved weapons, equipment, concepts, and techniques applicable to countersubversion and counterinsurgency.

5. Provide sound and fully objective military evaluations of improved operational or organizational concepts, doctrine, tactics, techniques, and material in the combat environment of RVN.

(S) Projects to be conducted in the RVN were to be proposed by JCS, the military services, Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)/ARPA, CINCPAC, COMUSMACV, or JRATA. CINPAC was the approving authority for all projects. JRATA monitored projects, reviewed their status periodically, and evaluated selected, completed projects.

(S) The proposal to establish a resident MACV Science Advisor grew out of correspondence between COMUSMACV, CINCPAC, CJCS, and Director, Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E) in early 1966. In an almost coincident action it had been decided to deactivate the JRATA, returning its several service test agencies to their respective service components and placing the ARPA/RDFU-V under the operational control of ACofS, J3. It was the opinion of

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COMUSMACV, with concurrence of CINCPAC and JCS, that with the establishment of component commands, the requirement for a joint research and test activity was obviated. In a 29 Jun 66 message to CINCPAC, COMUSMACV stated his conviction that RDT&E and CD activities essentially were service matters and that component commanders were in a position to absorb the test units and assist them in fulfilling their responsibility. In the same message, COMUSMACV also stated that "nothing proposed herein should alter the assignment of a Scientific Advisor and a DDR&E officer on TDY...These personnel will be assigned to another MACV staff agency. "[1]

(S) COMUSMACV announced the appointment of Dr. McMillan as the first Science Advisor at a staff meeting on 5 Oct 66, and JRATA was disestablished on 15 Nov. The general orders establishing the Office of the Science Advisor, United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACSA), were published 8 Dec 66. During the interim period COMUSMACV had agreed to terms of reference for the Office of the Science Advisor. (See 1968 Command History, page 745.)

(S) Initially, the Office of the Science Advisor consisted of six people: the Science Advisor, a military deputy, a military administrative assistant, a project officer, and two enlisted clerical assistants. It was agreed between COMUSMACV and the Director of ARPA that the ARPA/RDFU-V would be placed under the staff supervision of MACSA, reporting through the Deputy Science Advisor. No specific instructions were provided to establish the working relationships.[2]

(S) MACSA, from the beginning, became engrossed in a variety of activities--most associated with the application of existing technology. His first year in close association with the tactical demands in an active theater of operations and with the mechanics of RDT&E, apparently convinced the Science Advisor that the "system" required major revision. On 5 Dec 67, he submitted a proposal for reorganization and expansion of the RDT&E effort. In essence, he recommended three organizational changes designed to "realize the full potential of scientific and technological applications to this war." First, it was recommended that corps of scientific field advisors be attached to the commanders of field units "down to the level of division and independent brigade..." In MACSA's view, these advisors"...would be on the lookout for new equipment, ideas, modifications, candidates for the in-country fix-it shop, special captured enemy gear, etc." MACSA's second proposal called for an integration of the RDT&E units in RVN. Despite the great dedication and fine motivation of the individuals involved, the memorandum said, "the efforts of the service RDT&E components continue to be largely isolated, fragmented and uncoordinated." MACSA, therefore, proposed an "overall" organization encompassing the various service RDT&E units which would have as its "sole mission" the expeditious "development and application of new technical equipment for prosecution of the Vietnam War." The result would re-establish a JRATA-type organization and provide a central role for MACSA. It followed that with this recommended expanded emphasis on R&D, MACSA saw the need for an enlarged MACV Science Advisor's office to handle the "greatly expanded number of programs and problems generated by field advisors and to provide the necessary integration among the assembled test units." This would require extensive augmentation of the MACSA office. Finally, MACSA believed that increased emphasis on RDT&E in RVN would require a corresponding "increased capability" in CONUS. The proposal did not specify what the "increased capability" should encompass exactly, but "somehow we must establish an organization having the type of capability achieved by OSRD during WWII." In any case, an essential attribute desired was the ability of the CONUS organization to "attract the most capable scientists, and to inspire the spirit, verve, and dedication to get the job done..."[3]

(S) MACSA's plan did not experience smooth sailing. In particular, field commanders did not see the necessity in having scientific advisors assigned below the levels of the main field forces. Thus, when COMUSMACV formally forwarded the proposal to CINCPAC in February

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1968, it recommended that scientific advisors be attached to senior field commanders only with their concurrence (See MACV Command History, 1968, p747). At the same time, COMUSMACV agreed to MACSA serving as a science advisor to the Deputy Commanding General US Army Vietnam (DCG, USARV), with a deputy on station at Long Binh to handle day-to-day business. Reaction at CINCPAC and JCS to the proposal was generally unfavorable. CINCPAC believed that the scientific advisors proposed by MACSA should be primarily responsible to the commanders they support, rather than MACSA. In other words, MACSA's role should be one of coordination rather than direction. "It is important" CINCPAC noted "that the use of scientific advisors and increased emphasis on MACSA's coordination of R&D activities do not erode established service channels for R&D." JCS was even more critical. In particular, it rejected MACSA's proposed buildup until "complete documentation and justification" had been made.[4]

(S) In July 1968 and again in September 1968, MACSA submitted revised proposals more in line with views of the higher command. In both documents--the latter was a minor revision of the earlier one--MACSA adopted the recommendations of higher headquarters. The revised proposals also accepted the premise that the field science advisors should be assigned only to the principal field forces, and that their relationship with MACSA should be a "channel of information and support." These advisors would be assigned to the III MAF, I FFORCEV, II FFORCEV, IV CTZ Senior Advisor, 7th AF, and NAVFORV; however, they would be available for TDY at other requesting agencies. No components or field commander requested the assignment of a Science Advisor.[5]

(S) On 22 Sep 68, the Science Advisor again reviewed the RDT&E "system." In a memorandum to DEPCOMUSMACV, prompted by his desire "to pass on the burning lessons I have learned," he continued to expound "the need for a drastic change...predicated on the thesis that our present RDT&E system for SEASIA is mortally sick." Although his memorandum did "not address in any detail how to fix the system permanently," he called for the establishment of "one or more czars with authority and willingness to make decisions and to take responsibility for them." He did not recommend any particular individual ny name for the position of czar, other than to identify his own experience and qualifications. No specific action resulted from this MACSA memorandum. (DEPCOMUSMACV "noted" its contents which essentially were addressed to RDT&E issues beyond the purview of MACV.) No documentation was available recording the response of DDR&E, or from Mr. Leonard Sullivan, Deputy DDR&E for SEASIA, who had direct responsibility for the RDT&E system for SEASIA. By subsequent separate action however, MACSA initiated, on 17 Dec 68, a staff action to gain MACV approval for the establishment of the field laboratory. The MACV staff unanimously nonconcurred in the establishment of the field laboratory. The nonconcurrences ranged from questioning the efficacy of adding yet another US military laboratory to the more than 150 existing DOD laboratories (especially one in-country, intended apparently to remedy the R&D faults of all the others)--to pointing up the fact that service facilities already existed which comprised not only "technical personnel but also extensive electronic shops, laboratory facilities and machnie shops." J3 wanted explicit information outlining the concept or rationale for MACSA establishing a US technical field laboratory in RVN, when ARPA/RDFU-V had the mission and existing plans to improve, modernize, and expand the RVNAF RDT&E capability, and had an approved program to construct a laboratory. And in view of the references to a ship-borne facility, pointed up in the staff action as a "1965 idea of DDR&E," J5 called attention to the facilities available on the Corpus Christi Bay which were accomplishing the purpose and objectives of the initial idea. The Corpus Christi Bay was in fact, a floating repair facility, comprising shop and laboratory facilities. It was under the Army control, however, and not MACSA.[6]

(S) In early January 1969, Dr. Nels F. Wikner assumed the position of Science Advisor

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vice Dr. William G. McMillan. The Science Advisor withdrew his recommendation for the field laboratory on 9 Jan 69. He concluded "that there is no need for an additional US military field laboratory since it would duplicate many service facilities in-country." COMUSMACV concurred.[7]

(S) Following the review of the staff action on the field laboratory, the Science Advisor, at the request of the CofS, undertook an appraisal of the entire Office of the Science Advisor--its functions, personnel, and activities. In view of changing events and circumstances, it was a propitious time to do so. Since the MACSA JTD was based on a plan for expanding the role of the Science Advisor that received generally poor acceptance and was not approved, a re-orientation of effort and a subsequent reorganization was effected. The operations of the office were recast to reflect assigned functional responsibilities and those activites authorized by COMUSMACV.[8]

(S) A critical appraisal of the activities and projects engaged in by MACSA over a period of two years indicated that, with but few exceptions, MACSA was involved with either service or ARPA-sponsored projects and equipment. As long as MACSA was not a funded or a recognized RDT&E entity, it could be no other way. Operating under these constraints called for a mix of tact, initiative, and an unobtrusive presence. Although the necessity for such interaction was argumentative, MACSA's involvement was constructive in many instances.[9]

(S) The re-examination of functions, responsibilities, and activities resulted in the elimination of the position of Deputy Science Advisor for CORDS (MACV would need only one Science Advisor--one capable of advising all staff sections) and the termination of the dual responsibility of MACSA as the Science Advisor to USARV. The rationale for this action was in a 24 Mar memorandum:

> There is little need for a Science Advisor at USARV. Far better that those technical people presently at USARV be marshalled in a cohesive organization... Should an advisor be chosen I would strongly recommend that he come from the Army R&D system so that he has access to means...a system where he can cause work to be initiated... The reasons for the present arrangement between the Science Advisor at MACV and USARV are not sound. The conditions in the Memorandum of Understanding resulted from an accommodation reached following an unacceptable recommendation to centralize R&D activities in Vietnam under MACSA. Several judgements can be made from this brief look at MACSA history so that mistakes will not be repeated or perpetuated and that remedial measures can be implemented:[10]
>
> 1. To be most effective, the role of the Science Advisor must be disassociated from responsibility for the conduct of operations.
>
> 2. The Science Advisor must maintain an impartial and critical attitude with respect to equipment and projects in order to maintain his credibility. This does not result if he becomes involved in the design, test, or evaluation of projects in which he has a vested or emotional interest.

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3. The Science Advisor must recognize and function within the primacy of the ARPA/Service RDT&E role in SEA--RDT&E matters of a unilateral service nature are the responsibility of each serve component commander reporting through service channels.

4. The point of greatest impact and the place to influence RDT&E is at the DOD level where the interaction is budgetary and where coordination and centralized control is appropriate--not in an operational theater or war--and not after the fact in the R&D cycle. If, for example, the 150 DOD laboratories are not performing up to expectations--you don't build another laboratory to correct the deficiencies in the existing 150--you address the cause, not the effect. And finally, if an item of equipment does not perform to specifications in appropriate CONUS tests, its performance will not be improved by testing in SEA. [11]

ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS

(S) Research, development, testing and evaluation matters of a unilateral service nature were the responsibility of each service component commander reporting through service channels. MACV's RDT&E objectives included the enhancement of combat effectiveness and the counterinsurgency/countersubversion capabilities of US, Vietnamese, and FWMAF, by assisting the US scientific and military R&D community to orient attention and resources toward combat requirements of forces in RVN. ARPA/RDFU-V was an OSD organization attached to MACV for operational control. MACSA had staff supervision over ARPA/RDFU-V. [12]

(S) Because of the staff relationship and a comparability of functions, MACSA and the RDFU-V worked in concert in discharging their related RDT&E functions. The relationship included the provision of ARPA funds to MACSA and personnel augmentation of MACSA's JTD. MACSA was not a funded entity; ARPA was a semi-autonomous, funded RDT&E organization with broad, authorized R&D responsibilities. On 4 Apr, MACSA submitted a recommended change to the MACV JTD which would reduce the authorized strength of the Office of the Science Advisor from 18 military positions to nine. This would eliminate an organizational redundancy (vis-a-vis RDFU-V and MACSA) and more accurately reflect the legitimate roles and missions of MACSA. [13]

(S) During the first quarter of 1969, a number of organizational changes were proposed and reviewed; the following were considered most important:

1. Continue existing organizations, functions, and relationships of MACSA and ARPA/RDFU-V.

2. Establish a "combination" or integrated MACSA/RDFU-V organization wherein the MACSA becomes the Director of the RDFU-V.

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3. Disestablish MACSA.[14]

(S) The existing MACSA and RDFU-V organizations and relationship were appropriate, but less than operationally and economically efficient in terms of functions and overall personnel and resource management. Approval of the 4 Apr MACSA JTD, a modification to MACSA's functional statement, and an amendment to the general orders placing ARPA/RDFU-V under MACSA staff supervision, was expected to correct this latter deficiency. The principal advantage in "combining/integrating" the organizations and functions of MACSA and RDFU-V was expected to make more economical use of personnel rescources. The major disadvantage was seen as a possible conflict of interest and/or a resultant loss of independent judgment on the part of a Science Advisor employed by OSD/DDR&E. The position of a Science Advisor was justified in terms of providing requisite applied technology support for COMUSMACV; an independent operational component thereof, duplicatory of existing organizations and staff divisions, was not appropriate. The Science Advisor recommended that:

1. The Office of the Science Advisor retain its identity and independence as a MACV staff agency, subordinate to and reporting through the CofS. (The Science Advisor would continue to retain his role as principal advisor to COMUSMACV on scientific and technical matters.)

2. The revised MACSA functional statement be approved. This involved transferring the below MACSA responsibilities to ACofS, J3:

a. Monitor and coordinate, as appropriate, the activities of civilian scientific and technical consultants who were participating in the RDT&E and CD program in Vietnam.

b. Review the HQ MACV requirements for scientific and technical advisors and consultants and recommend to COMUSMACV appropriate functions, organizations, and staff relationships.

3. The recommended special instructions for ARPA/RDFU-V be included in an amendment to MACV General Order 1914, which was dated 8 Dec 66. (This included adding, "This ARPA, RDFU-V will establish and conduct projects in the RVN as approved by COMUSMACV", the following: "including those projects to be evaluated by the CDTC-V, under the Cross Fertilization Program. Projects proposed for CDTC-V evaluation by service component commanders and other in-country RDT&E agencies will be submitted to Director, RDFU-V, for review prior to final COMUSMACV approval.")[15]

In July 1969 at which time the above recommendations were being approved, Mr. John E. Kirk was appointed as the Science Advisor vice Dr. Nels F. Wikner. These recommendations were incorporated into a revised MACV Directive 70-1 which identified objectives and specified policies, procedures, and responsibilities for establishing, conducting, and controlling RDT&E and CD activities in the RVN.[16] During the first half of CY 69, the primary task adopted by the Science Advisor, was to re-assess and re-organize his office. This was in keeping with the reactions gained during the previous year with regard to proposals by his predecessor for expanding the organization and influence of the office. As a result of these appraisals, the office was reduced in terms of numbers of people assigned and visibility within the staff. The reductions also included severance of communications with most field activities with whom the office formerly had dealt with directly. During the second half of the year, the Science Advisor firmly established in his office the policies set forth in the previously stated recommendations. However, to ensure that his office might better serve Headquarters, MACV, and the components,

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he instituted a low key program for establishing a dialoque with field elements pertaining to RDT&E problems. This was accomplished primarily by means of personal visits by the Science Advisor and members of his staff.

FINDING THE ENEMY

(C) Detection of the enemy was an ever present problem during 1969, as the enemy continued to improve his deception capability. This was true in both defensive and offensive operations. As a result, a number of complex problems which required research and development was presented to MACV for solutions.[17]

Personnel Detection

(C) During 1969, the enemy continued to make detection of his activities difficult by employing effective cover and concealment techniques. Taking advantage of jungle canopy, tall grass, darkness, and inclement weather, the enemy was able to assemble forces, move cross-country, establish ambushes, and launch attacks on friendly positions and installations without being detected. Therefore, a requirement existed for new or improved methods, capable of searching large areas and providing timely detection and location of personnel and vehicles, with sufficient accuracy to permit effective counteraction.

AN/PPS-10 Radar

(C) The AN/PPS-10 was a one-man, range-gated, tactical ground surveillance radar that weighed 10 pounds. It was developed as an R&D effort to provide detection and location of low velocity targets, such as moving personnel on or near the ground, during periods of darkness or low visibility. The radar set was capable of detecting, locating, and identifying moving targets at velocities of 1/2 - 35 mph. Detections were possible for a man-size target (one-half square meter) up to a maximum range of 1,500 meters; a vehicular-size target (10 square meters) was detectable at a maximum range of 3,000 meters. Personnel operating the AN/PPS-10 were able to identify targets aurally and visually. Additionally, the radar could be remotely operated, thus enabling the operator to be concealed. Testing of the AN/PPS-10 had commenced 28 Oct 68. Interim evaluations on 12 Sep 69 indicated user enthusiasm. The radar sets performed successfully when employed in tactical, perimeter defense, reconnaissance patrols, riverine ambush, and SEAL operations. However, there were reliability problems and the manufacturer took corrective action. Final evaluation reports were scheduled for February 1970.

Foliage Penetration Radar

(C) The Foliage Penetration Radar (FOPEN) was developed to assist combat forces with the detection and location of enemy forces concealed in heavy vegetation. The FOPEN system

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consisted of a 0.2-watt, man-portable, VHF radar capable of detecting and locating moving targets hidden by vegetation. It had a beam width of 45 degrees produced fluctuating audio tones, and triggered a warning light upon detecting an intruder. Once detected, an operator could determine the range and direction of the enemy; detection ranges varied from 0 - 1,000 feet in jungle terrain, and 0 - 1,500 feet in heavily wooded areas or tall grass. Four FOPEN systems were under testing by the 25th Inf Div at the end of 1969. Final evaluation was expected in the first quarter of CY 1970.

Integrated Observation Device

(S) The Integrated Observation Device (IOD) was a supplemental line-of-sight target acquisition device, under joint US Army and USMC development and evaluation. The IOD consisted of three sensors (laser range-finder sensors), selective power binoculars, and a night observation device. They were mounted on a platform capable of attachment to either a portable tripod or fixed pedestal. The IOD provided increased observation and highly accurate range determination for artillery. Ten systems were under evaluation in RVN in 1969. Six were employed by III MAF, two by XXIV Corps, and two by the 23d (Americal) Div. Results achieved were outstanding. The CG, III MAF reported approximately 1,000 enemy kills as of 31 Dec, which he attributed to his six systems that were deployed in October 1969. MACV considered the IOD sufficiently important and operationally valid to warrant its procurement as an interim item of equipment.

Camp Sentinel II

(C) The Camp Sentinel II (CSR-II) was a range-gated, pulsed-doppler radar, designed to detect low velocity targets in dense foliage. The circular array antenna was mounted on an extendible 100-foot tower and had a 360 degree scanning capability. The CSR-II was evaluated by the 3d Bde, 1st Inf Div at Lai Khe and Bandit Hill FSB sites. Initial success led to the CSR-II being modified to increase its range to 3,000 meters. Evaluation of the radar terminated in September and USARV requested that the modified radar be retained in-country for operational use by the 1st Inf Div.

Stabilized Image Binoculars

(C) The Model-1610 MARK was a hand-held, self-contained stabilized image binoculars. This unit had a magnification capability of 10 - 20 power, and was developed to compensate for undesirable motion and image oscillation due to vibration. Evaluation determined it acceptable for operational use and considerable quantities were procured by III MAF, NAVFORV, US Navy, and 7th AF.

(C) The Model S-023 Dynalens was a motion compensating unit which consisted of an optical head fitted to a variable power, electrically-zoomed binocular set with 1.5 - 12 power magnification, and an electronica control unit. Favorable evaluation led to the procurement of 465 units for US Army operational use and 10 units for FAC use by the 7th AF.

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Quiet Aircraft

Quiet Aircraft, YO-3A

(C) The enemy conducted frequent operations at night and during adverse weather to minimize his disadvantages with respect to mobility, firepower, and logistical support. This created the need for new or improved covert devices for discovering enemy activity during these periods. The Quiet Aircraft, YO-3A was developed as a partial solution to this problem. Quiet aircraft were designed to provide pre and post-strike reconnaissance, surveillance of infiltration routes, resupply routes, enemy base areas, rivers, canals, tree lines, and coast lines. The system was also designed to support FACs during night air-strike operations.

(C) The YO-3A was a modified version of the QT-2PC Quiet Airplane, which had been evaluated jointly by ACTIV and NRDU-V during 1968. The YO-3A incorporated quieting features that included a muffled engine and a large, slow-turning, laminated, wooden propellor to reduce propulsion-system noise to a minimum. The basic sensor payload consisted of a night vision aerial periscope designed to incorporate a laser target designator and an infrared illuminator beam for search, observation, and target designation. The first two airplanes were scheduled for shipment to RVN for evaluation in September 1969. The project, however, was cancelled. At the end of the year, attempts were being made to have the YO-3A program reinstated.

Tunnel Detection and Destruction

(C) The enemy made extensive use of underground tunnel systems to conceal and protect personnel, installations, and materiel. The tunnels and underground rooms ranged in size from a small ambush tunnel for three to five men to a complex system with tunnels connecting many rooms on several levels. Since the entrances and ventilation openings of these tunnels were carefully concealed and camouflaged, they could only be detected visually through arduous and time consuming search. This created an urgent requirement for the development of tunnel locating systems and devices.

GEODAR Tunnel Locator

(C) The GEODAR Tunnel Locator was developed in 1968 to "see" underground. Although able to detect tunnels and other underground anomalies, its weight, complexity, and configuration limited its use. The system was not considered satisfactory for US Army or USMC field requirements. GEODAR was further tested from January - April 1969 by ARVN units, under the aegis of CDTC-V It proved successful and plans were made to construct a GEODAR range in January 1970, for the purpose of calibrating equipment and training personnel in the detection of underground targets.

Cesium Vapor Differential Magnetometers

(C) During 1969, research and development efforts were conducted in the area of cesium

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vapor differential magnetometers. These devices were developed to detect local disturbances in the earth's magnetic field, caused by the presence of a tunnel. Evaluation of these magnetometers was scheduled to begin in the RVN in early 1970.

Canine Tunnel Detection

(C) Two squads of dogs from the 60th Scout Dog Platoon arrived in RVN in May 1969. These dogs had been trained at Fort Gordon, Georgia to search for, detect, and respond to camouflaged and uncamouflaged tunnels and cave openings. The dogs were considered effective, as a result of evaluations by the 25th Inf and 23d Inf (Americal) Divs.

(C) In 1969 research was continued in an attempt to develop an airborne detection system which would permit rapid search over large areas of terrain at altitudes and speeds that would provide for reasonable aircraft safety. Research in this area was expected to continue in 1970.

(C) Enemy tunnel complexes that were discovered had to be destroyed or rendered unusable by the enemy. A requirement existed for systems that would rapidly effect destruction or denial of tunnels.

Liquid Destruction System

(C) The Liquid Explosive Tunnel Destruction System (LETUDS) and liquid Explosive Demolition Kit, XM-242, were designed to provide a means of rapidly destroying underground tunnels by explosive means. The LETUDS consisted of a liquid explosive, lay-flat plastic tubing, and an air compressor powered by a gasoline engine. The tubing was deployed into the tunnel by personnel. The tubing was in 500-foot sections and each section would accept the contents of two 55-gallon drums of liquid explosive, pumped into the tubing by means of the air compressor. A single kit would destroy a 500-foot tunnel that had 10 feet of overburden. Three kits operated in parallel were required to destroy a tunnel with 30 feet of overburden. Thirty systems were evaluated in RVN during the period August to October 1968. This evaluation was suspended when the system was temporarily declared unsafe due to the detonation of partially filled drums of nitromethane above ground. The system was returned to CONUS for modification in 1969. The modified units were scheduled to arrive in RVN for evaluation in early 1970.

Project DOUCHE - Fire Fighter

(C) Project DOUCHE, also known as Fire Fighter, was designed to provide a system that could quickly and efficiently neutralize or destroy enemy bunkers or tunnels along the waterways of RVN. The system utilized a high velocity waterjet which would destroy bunkers and tunnels by direct action on the target or by eroding the ground around it, thus causing it to collapse. The system could deliver 2,750 gallons of water per minute at a nozzle pressure of 200 pounds per square inch. Its effective range was 175 - 250 feet. In-country evaluation results in April 1969 of this Naval Applied Science Laboratory development, were satisfactory; recommendations were forwarded stating that the system was acceptable for operational use. (Project DOUCHE also proved effective for mine sweeping, boobytrap detection, and defoliation along canals, and for dislodging grounded boats.)

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Antiswimmer

(C) The enemy was successful in destroying or damaging bridges, moored ships, piers, and other waterfront structures with swimmer attacks and implanted explosives. There was an urgent need for protective systems that could be installed to detect, destroy, and minimize the effects of swimmer assault teams and sappers.

Long Range RUDD

(C) During 1969, the Remote Underwater Detection Device (RUDD) was modified and improved in order to increase its flexibility and ability (range) as a covert listening device used for surveillance and interdiction by PBR crews. RUDD was an acoustic detection device consisting of a small hydrophone, pre-amplifier, reel containing three miles of telephone wire, and a power supply post amplifier assembly. The hydrophone was dropped over the side of a PBR and allowed to settle to the bottom of a river. The PBR was then able to move up to a distance of the limit of the wire and still monitor the drop point. Tests of the expendable RUDD hydrophone unit, connected to 5 1/2 miles of Army telephone wire, were also successfully conducted. Evaluation began in May and was expected to continue through the first quarter of 1970. Though the system was promising, preliminary reports indicated that wire failure was a continuing problem which would have to be corrected.

Acoustic Burglar Alarm

(C) The Swimmer Acoustic Burglar Alarm System (SABAS) was developed as a swimmer detection device that would be effective in salt and fresh water. It was designed to detect the presence of shallow subsurface swimmers passing through a given area. The system included a detection device utilizing a sound projector that transmitted a 125-KC sonic beam through the water area to be defended. The Beam was monitored by two receivers located up to 120 yards from the projector. The area between the projector and receivers, from the surface down to about 5 feet, was covered by the beam. A swimmer passing through the area covered by the beam caused an audible alarm to be generated by the receivers. Testing in RVN began in late January; initial reports were considered promising. The major problem encountered was the system's tendency to produce false alarms; however, by the end of February the system test results were so promising, the device was returned to CONUS for minor modifications. Due to the low cost, simplicity of installation, operation, and maintenance, SABAS was considered one of the most promising swimmer detection systems. The improved version of the SABAS arrived in RVN in July 1969 and was evaluated by NRDU-V and CDTC-V. The system was found to be effective and in-country operational deployment by the Army and Navy was pending at the close of 1969.

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SEARCH AND ATTACK SYSTEMS[18]

(C) Reconnaissance and strike aircraft employed in RVN did not have an acceptable capability for real time detection and attack of enemy targets concealed by darkness, adverse weather, and heavy vegetation. Several systems to meet this requirement were tested and evaluated in 1969.

BLACK SPOT

(C) BLACK SPOT was a search and attack system which consisted of a C-123K aircraft equipped with a self-contained, night attack system. The sensors used were forward-looking radar with moving target indicator, forward-looking infrared detection, low light level television, and laser ranging. All sensors were linked with a weapon release computer to provide automatic dispensing of CBU munitions. Evaluation in RVN was completed on 10 Jan with excellent results. The system was returned to CONUS for inspection and refurbishment and returned to RVN during October where evaluation continued. Initial reports received in December indicated it was successful and evaluation was scheduled to continue throughout the first quarter of CY 1970.

COMBAT KING

(C) COMBAT KING was an airborne, target acquisition and neutralization system which consisted of the C-119K with jet-augmented pods (J-85) and additional sensors and guns over the C-119G aircraft. Sensors included the Night Observation Device, side-looking infrared unit, forward-looking radar, and side-looking or beacon tracking radar; two VULCAN cannons were also included. With this equipment, COMBAT KING was able to provide close air support and armed reconnaissance, during periods of darkness or adverse weather, in support of ground forces. Evaluations conducted in 1969 were expected to continue into 1970. Overall, the system was considered successful.

COMBAT GUARD

(C) To provide improved close air support during periods of darkness, the AC-119G gunship, code name COMBAT GUARD, was developed. The AC-119G was equipped with side-firing guns and a fire control system composed of an analog computer, night observation sight, a safety display panel, an optical gunsight, a sight amplifer, and a sight control panel. Target identification under conditions of low light intensity was accomplished with the four-power night observation sight; this was required since the pilot was unable to see the target at night with his unaided eye. When aimed at a prospective target, the night observation sight activated the computer, which in turn adjusted the four GAU-2B/A 7.62mm automatic guns. When computer signal lights indicated that the process had been completed, the pilot commenced firing. Evaluation of this system began on 6 Jan and was completed on 6 Mar; the system was considered operational.

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Iroquois Night Fighter

(C) The Iroquois Night Fighter and Night Tracker (INFANT) was developed to provide improved night vision capability for the crew of the UH-1C helicopter to perform various functions on a full time basis, including contact flight, aerial surveillance/reconnaissance, target acquisition, and integrated fire control. The INFANT system consisted of remote and direct view image intensifier subsystems. Both subsystems had a zoom capability (magnified about four times) and were used to acquire targets and control fires of the M-21 armament system (7.62 mm MGs and 2.75-inch rocket launchers). The system also included an optional assist through the use of two 500-watt searchlights, boresighted with the M-134 miniguns. CONUS flights of INFANT aircraft during December 1968 had been highly successful. Three systems arrived in RVN for testing and evaluation in October 1969. Reports in December indicated the INFANT highly effective; the only shortcoming being a lack of navigational equipment. Evaluation was continued into 1970.

Forward Looking Helicopter

(C) A Forward-Looking Infrared (FLIR) sensor was developed to provide the UH-1C helicopter with the capability for passive detection of targets by means of thermal radiation. A sensor was mounted in the nose turret of the helicopter to provide a television-type presentation of targets and terrain, both day and night. The turret was movable in azimuth and elevation by means of a pantograph sight, which was part of the M-21 weapons system. A capability was provided for search, target tracking, and identification. Due to delays in delivery of some components, and unexpected difficulties in assembly and check-out, evaluation of this system was not scheduled in RVN until the third quarter of FY 1970.

MOBILITY[19]

(U) Mobility (especially air mobility) was one of the most significant advantages enjoyed by US and FWMAF during the Vietnamese conflict. Accordingly, RDT&E efforts continued in this vital area throughout 1969.

Countering Adverse Visibility Conditions Aloft

(C) From the onset of the war in RVN through 1969, there was no capability to conduct all-weather air operations. An urgent requirement existed to develop equipment that would reduce the number of occasions when aircraft were either endangered or grounded because of low visibility, darkness, or inclement weather. COMUSMACV held that a solution to the problem of countering adverse visibility conditions aloft would contribute significantly to improving the overall battle posture of friendly forces. Although emphasis was placed on this critical problem area, no workable solution appeared in 1969.

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Simplified Tactical Approach and Terminal Equipment

(C) In 1969, the Simplified Tactical Approach and Terminal Equipment (STATE) system was developed. This tactical approach guidance unit was designed on the transponder concept, where by it would remain passive until interrogated by an aircraft through the use of coded pulses. The STATE provided aircraft with glide slope, localizer, range, and rate information. Evaluation began in late 1969 by III MAF and was scheduled for completion in 1970.

(C) Also under development in 1969 was a low frequency, non-directional beacon. It was to be modular in construction and permit a portable mode of operation. It was hoped a man-pack version could be developed which would weigh approximately 35 pounds and have an operating range of 25 miles.

(C) In the last half of 1969, III MAF requested that research and development efforts be aimed at designing a fog dispersal system, capable of clearing fog and low clouds, for helicopters approaching a landing zone.

Helicopter Landing Zone

(C) The enemy continued to rely upon the jungle for sanctuary because such areas were not readily accessible to friendly forces, even those that were air-mobile. Jungle clearing operations for the construction of helicopter landing zones, to include any required expansion into fire support bases, were time consuming, provided considerable advance warning to the enemy, and endangered the small work party and security force on the ground.

Project WOOD CHOPPER

(C) Project WOOD CHOPPER was designed to clear helicopter landing zones by using a 1,000 pound, continuous-rod warhead, engineering tool. The warhead consisted of 600 pounds of ribbon stell rods, 200 pounds of supporting steel structure, and 200 pounds of explosive. The device was designed to be emplaced by hand or from a helicopter. Evaluation by III MAF in February, indicated that helicopter emplacement was unsatisfactory; hand emplacement was only partially successful because it cleared areas consisting of only brush or small trees.

COMMANDO VAULT

(C) COMMANDO VAULT had been developed in 1968 in response to the need for clearing helicopter landing zones in jungle areas. It employed a 10,000-pound bomb and a MSQ/TPQ radar for aircraft release positioning and standard heavy drop procedures for bomb extraction. COMMANDO VAULT was successful and declared an interim operational capability in 1969.

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COMBAT TRAP (CD-1)

(C) This 15,000-pound device, which contained 12,000-pounds of a gelled, slurry explosive, was developed for preparing helicopter landing zones in jungle areas. The CD-1 was tested in RVN during May, using COMMANDO VAULT procedures. COMBAT TRAP cleared an area approximately twice the size of that created by the COMMANDO VAULT; it was recommended as a replacement for COMMANDO VAULT.

Helicopter Landing Zone Marker

(C) The increase in air mobile operations within the theater created the need for a helicopter landing zone locator device, which would permit accurate troop insertion into a selected landing zone. The Helicopter Landing Zone Marker, a radio activated strobe light that could be air dropped from altitudes of 50 - 150 feet at speeds up to 80 knots, was developed to meet this requirement. It was weighted and constructed so as to right itself after impact. The Helicopter Landing Zone Marker could be dropped at a selected landing zone, and then activated by a helicopter-borne transmitter, from a range of 4 miles, when it was desired to relocate the landing zone and insert troops after daylight hours. Evaluation of this unit began in February by SEAL teams at Binh Thuy, in IV CTZ. Although it was determined suitable for operational use, units were hesitant to employ the marker as it pre-identified the landing zone.

Water and Land Vehicles

Air Cushion Vehicle (ACV)

(C) For better and more flexible inland-water mobility, the Bell Aerosystem SK-5 commerical craft was converted to a combat vehicle weighing about 12 tons when combat loaded. (See 1968 Command History.) Six ACVs were approved by DA for operational use in RVN. A USN version was used operationally by III MAF, and the Navy's vehicles in I CTZ were to be replaced by ACVs.

Quiet Fast Boat

(C) The requirement for a silent running boat for covert operations precipitated the development of a Boston Whaler, equipped with one partially silenced, 105-horsepower engine and one 9.9-horsepower, fully silenced engine. Both engines were standard outboard type, modified to reduce noise. The Quiet Fast Boat was evaluated as effective by RIVFLOT FIVE in April, with the recommended procurement of 23 additional boats for in-country use.

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Carrier XM-571

(C) Operations into remote areas that commenced with an air assault were without M-113 (armored personnel carrier)-type support, until the XM-571 was developed. The XM-571 was a special purpose vehicle capable of providing all-season mobility over various types of terrain, which included mud, soft marshes, and jungle swamps, such as found in the Mekong Delta. It was transportable, either internally or externally, by the CH-47A helicopter. It carried a crew of two, plus eight passengers or 1,500 pounds, at a top speed of 32 mph on land or 3.4 mph in water. The 1st, 9th, 25th Inf and 101st Abn Divs, and the 173d Abn Bde evaluated 37 XM-571s in the RVN. The XM-571 was considered unsuitable because of inadequate speed and vulnerability to land mines.

ARTILLERY/MORTAR/ROCKET COUNTERMEASURES[20]

(C) Enemy indirect fire attacks using artillery, rockets, and mortars came from any direction, and produced casualties and damage. A 360-degree capability for detection of incoming artillery, rocket, and mortar rounds was required.

Los Alamos System

(C) The Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory Sound Ranging System (LASL) was an automatic, azimuth-computing, artillery and mortar locator. The basic system consisted of four monitoring stations, operable unattended and remotely, and a base station which could be located at any one of the monitoring stations or at a fifth station. Each station had microphones arrayed on a five foot frame, an automatic azimuth computer, and a telemetry transmitter. During 1968, USARV evaluation determined the system unacceptable, without further research and modification to reduce the false target detection rate. An improved LASL arrived in-country for evaluation in August. It also was unacceptable because of false alarm rates. It was recommended that no more LASL units be produced.

AN/TPQ-31 Radar

(C) The AN/TPQ-31 Radar was a modified AN/UPS-1 Air Defense Radar that was converted to a countermortar radar. The system's function was to detect incoming mortar and artillery rounds out to 20 km. Design use of the radar was the provision of sufficient first round data to point more accurate locating radars, such as AN/MPQ-10A or AN/MPQ-4A, for second round detection and computation of firing position location. Operational evaluation began in February. One radar set was evaluated, and that in a counterrocket role in the Saigon area for 90 days. Results were generally poor because of the radar's location and low operational time created by nonavailability of spare parts and fluctuating power supplies.

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AN/TPQ-28 Radar

(C) The Omnidirectional Mortar Locating Radar Set, AN/TPQ-28, provided a 360-degree countermortar radar capability for use in defense of large, semi-permanent installations. The system consisted of four, dual-plan, array antennas, central computer and control console unit, and power supply. The AN/TPQ-28 was designed to detect and process, simultaneously, up to 10 mortars, 60mm or larger, to a range of 10km; location accuracy was within 50 meters. The equipment was airtransportable by CH-47A helicopters. Preliminary evaluation in November indicated the AN/TPQ-28 Radar promising, and its subsequently underwent testing and modifications to correct false alarm and weather degradation problems.

MUNITIONS AND WEAPONS SYSTEMS[21]

(C) The enemy made extensive use of remote waterways and jungle trails to move his personnel and equipment. Therefore, a requirement existed for new or improved interdiction and tactical blocking devices that would deny or severely impede enemy mounted and dismounted movement through large, remote areas, trails, roads, and waterways. There also was a requirement to deny him the use of areas for base camps, repair sites, or operations.

Pop Up Flame Mine

(C) The Pop Up Flame Mine, XM-54, was developed as an improved interdiction and blocking device. It was an airburst, antipersonnel munition, filled with plasticized, white phosphorous. It weighed 30 pounds and could be command-fired, boobytrapped, or activated by trip wire. When fired, it would bound 10 - 35 feet into the air, discharging phosphorous and metal fragments over a radius of about 25 meters. Evaluation from 1 Oct 68 to 31 Mar 69, determined that the mine was not acceptable for use in ambushes due to its weight; and not acceptable for perimeter defense because of excessive safety radius (100 meters) and smoke.

Chemical Bombs

(C) The BLU-52/B and BLU-52A/B gas-dispersing bombs were designed to be delivered by high performance aircraft. Neither the BLU-52/B (filled with CS1) nor the BLU-52A/B (filled with CS2) contained explosive components. During evaluation, these munitions were used operationally in support of a USAF LOC interdiction program called the Turnpike Interdiction Campaign and in support of US Army units for terrain restriction. Evaluations were completed on 28 Feb, and these munitions were declared suitable for continued use in the RVN.

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Back-Pack Ammunition Feed System for the M-60 Machine Gun

(C) The Back-Pack Ammunition Feed System for the M-60 Machine Gun was developed in 1969 to reduce the reloading time for the M-60 machine gunner and increase his ammunition handling capacity. The back-pack system permitted the machine gunner to carry 400 rounds of ammunition, as compared to 100 rounds without the device. The major components of the system were a standard back-pack, a reel-type ammunition container, and flexible ammunition chuting. Total weight of the system, including 400 rounds of ammunition, was 36 pounds. Seventeen systems arrived in RVN for evaluation in May 1969. Evaluation reports in October determined the back-pack system unsuitable because of excessive weight and difficulties in firing from the prone position.

VULCAN, Self-Propelled, 20mm. Antiaircraft Gun, XM-163

(C) The VULCAN had been developed to provide a highly mobile weapon which could be employed in either an air defense or ground role. The system consisted of a 6-barreled, 20mm gatling gun, mounted on a modified M-113A1 Armored Personnel Carrier. The gun had a high and low cyclic firing rate of 3,000 and 1,000 rounds per minute. Its maximum effective range was 1,600 meters against aircraft flying at speeds up to 600 knots and altitudes up to 2,000 feet. The vehicle could travel 40 mph on land and 3.5 mph on water. (The weapon could not be fired when the vehicle was in water.) Four weapons were evaluated in a ground role from November 1968 to May 1969. The VULCAN was found highly effective, although maintenance problems were encountered. The VULCAN system was scheduled to be made organic to US Army infantry and armored divisions as soon as modifications and recommendations in equipment and unit organizations were completed.

Mines

(C) Throughout 1969, a new family of scatterable, antipersonnel, antivehicular, and antitank mines were under development. These mines were to be designed for delivery by air, artillery, and ground dispersing means. The mines were to contain anti-disturbance, self-destruct, wide range sensoring, and lifetime control features. At the close of 1969, it was expected that several of these mines would be available for in-country testing and evaluation during 1970.

MINE DETECTION AND BOOBYTRAPS[22]

(C) Mines and boobytraps continued to account for a major portion of US and FWMAF casualties in 1969. In addition to creating intolerable constraints for tactical and logistical operations, clearing operations for mines and boobytraps were extremely hazardous and required excessive time and resources.

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Fuel Air Explosive Device

(C) The Fuel Air Explosive Device (FAE) was an 80-pound, hand-emplaced device, designed to clear minefields and defoliate areas concealing boobytraps and caves. The device functioned by generating an aerosol cloud that when detonated produced 250 - 350 pounds per square inch of overpressure. The FAE was under evaluation by elements of III MAF for most of 1968 and 1969. Although considered acceptable, limited FAE devices were scheduled for in-country use. This was primarily due to the failure of the ignition system within the FAE, which resulted in many duds.

Canine Detection of Mines and Boobytraps

(C) Two squads of dogs from the 60th Scout Dog Platoon were specifically trained at Fort Gordon, Georgia to detect mines and boobytraps. Upon arrival in RVN during May 1969, they were sent to the 25th Inf and 23d Inf (Americal) Divs for evaluation. The dogs were found to be the most successful "system" to date, for detecting mines and boobytraps.

Mine Clearing Roller

(C) The Mine Clearing Roller was an expendable system which employed two roller assemblies on extended arms which were pushed ahead of a tank or armored personnel carrier. By this employment of weight transfer mechanisms, pressures equivalent to those of the tank or armored personnel carrier were applied to the ground to activate enemy emplaced mines. Evaluations during 1969 by the 1st, 4th and 25th Inf Divs, and 23d Inf (Americal) Div, and the 11th Armd Cav Regt determined the roller for the armored personnel carrier unsatisfactory, while that for the tank acceptable.

Remote Control Mine Detector

(C) The Remote Control Mine Detector was a M-151 1/4-ton vehicle with a metallic mine detector, consisting of a 6-foot, front search head. The entire unit was remotely controlled at distance up to 300 yards. The vehicle would automatically stop when a mine was detected. After initial, favorable evaluation by the 1st and 25th Inf Divs a 10-foot front, search head was developed. After extensive testing conducted in RVN, the unit was found acceptable; however, it was limited in operational application to nearly level terrain.

VIETNAMIZATION

(S) Research and development efforts in the 1969 Vietnamization program fell into two general groups. One group contained problem areas common to both US and RVNAF for which

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capabilities were limited or non-existent. The other group was made up of problems which resulted from US equipment being too sophisticated for effective Vietnamization. (Most significant problem areas within the confines of the first group have already been discussed in this chapter.)

(S) In 1969, as the GVN was reaching the upper limits of its manpower base to sustain the RVNAF, the US recognized that its R&D efforts should be directed toward providing equipment specifically tailored to meet the RVNAF's needs. Existing and planned R&D programs would have to be reviewed to identify those which had potential application to the Vietnamization process. New programs would have to be oriented toward simplification of existing equipment, development of new equipment, or to the adaptation of equipment available or under development, so that it could be easily incorporated into the RVNAF inventory. These programs would have to recognize the physiological and psychological differences between the Vietnamese and US people. Emphasis would have to be placed upon simplified maintenance and logistical procedures which were compatible with the capabilities and training of RVNAF.

(S) As major reductions were anticipated in US forces, it was recognized that future US funding levels in support of RVNAF would have to be restricted. In this regard, it was considered that eventually the RVN defense budget would have to provide the major proportion of funds to procure, maintain, and operate RVNAF equipment. Consideration would have to be given to selecting for use in Vietnamization, those R&D projects which would produce products that could be compatible with the estimated RVN economy of 1974.

(S) A review was conducted by MACV to determine the capability of the RVNAF to assume the responsibility for critical operational missions, and to determine if the items of equipment and/or weapons systems employed by US elements to accomplish these missions, were essential. Equipment identified as being essential was further reviewed to determine if its operational use by the RVNAF was consistent with their training, skill, and logistic potentials. New, modified, or simplified equipment and weapons systems which appeared to be required, in order that RVNAF could effectively conduct critical operational missions, included the following:

1. Intrusion devices (acoustic, seismic, pressure, infrared, magnetic) extensively used by US Forces needed improvement to reduce the large number of false alarms, which required the operators to be exceptionally skilled, before they could be effectively employed by RVNAF. It was also determined that the indicators on the intrusion devices would have to be redesigned to provide simpler readouts.

2. Airborne Personnel Detector (SNIFFER) and Southeast Asia Mohawk Revision SEAMORE Surveillance systems were necessary and extremely sophisticated detection and surveillance units. These devices were difficult to maintain and required highly skilled operators. Simplification of these units was deemed necessary before they could be turned over to RVNAF units.

3. AC-47, AC-119K, AC-130 Gunships, which contained multiple subsystems providing target acquisition and neutralization capabilities, were considered too sophisticated for VNAF. It was determined if the AC-47 night attack equipment could be palletized, the VNAF tactical airlift fleet of C-7, C-47, and C-119 aircraft could be converted rapidly to gunships, thus the VNAF gunship support capability would be significantly improved.

4. The Rome Plow with D-7E Tractor (land clearing engineer equipment) required

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extensive maintenance and parts replacement. Use of the Rome Plow would overburden the RVNAF's maintenance capability. Improved equipment which could be effectively employed with the D-7E Tractor for land clearing would be required before addition to the RVNAF inventory.

(S) In a 24 Nov message to the CJCofS, regarding research and development in support of Vietnamization, COMUSMACV stated: "It is recommended that service R&D which is oriented toward the RVNAF be drawn from sound analyses of what they need, what they can reasonably operate and maintain, and for which a responsive RVNAF supply and training system will be practicable. It is then envisaged that, as any of the improved equipment becomes available the component commands would introduce it through military assistance program channels."[23]

(S) US research and development agencies placed increasing emphasis, throughout 1969, on the RVNAF's R&D agency, Combat Development and Test Center, Vietnam (CDTC-V). Generous outlays of scientific and technical aid in the form of consultants, materials, and funds were provided this agency and RVNAF R&D efforts throughout RVN. Some "hardware" items were tested and evaluated by CDTC-V concurrently with US R&D agencies; however, the majority of items tested and evaluated by CDTC-V were those which had already been favorably evaluated by US units in the field. In this manner, CDTC-V units were instrumental in determining the Vietnamization potential of many items of equipment.

(C) CDTC-V's most significant R&D achievements were in the area of "softwares". The following included significant programs and contributions whereby CDTC-V demonstrated its capabilities, thus promising a viable, Vietnamese R&D effort for the future.

Living Standards of RVNAF

(C) This program had been initiated by CDTC-V in March 1968 to study the living standards of the RVNAF and recommend methods by which such standards could be improved. A study of actual living standards in the field, as perceived by ARVN soldiers and their dependents, and an evaluation of JGS living standards policy and program effectiveness and responsiveness, was conducted. Throughout 1969, assistance to this program was provided by a Vietnamese civilian and US consultant. In November 1969, a final report of this program was submitted to JGS. The English translation of this report was scheduled to be completed and distributed in January 1970.

Military and Civilian Research Cooperation Program

(C) This CDTC-V program commenced in June 1965 to establish a viable program through which both the military and civilian communities would assist in performing research necessary to national defense. The Faculty of Sciences, University of Saigon, was instrumental in this program and conducted numerous short range research projects. Some of these were co-sponsored by RDFU-V and received RDFU-V aid in the form of equipment and chemical substance. In 1969, as a result of this program, a book entitled Wild Vegetation in Vietnam, to be used in jungle operations by the RVNAF, was produced; relief maps for botanical study were forwarded to the University of Saigon; civilian scientists prepared a textbook on basic social science research methodology in Vietnamese; a Social Research Institute within the GVN, working through the Ministry of Interior was developed, and in November, a charter was granted for the establishment of the Social Research Association.

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Contest for New Ideas

(U) This CDTC-V program was introduced to encourage military and civilian personnel of all ranks to exercise their creative capacity through original proposals in such fields as military equipment, tactics, pacification, and organization. Many proposals were received, and preliminary evaluation of ideas and screening by CDTC-V engineers and specialists followed. A central committee then evaluated the ideas to determine those chosen for future research. On 28 May, this central committee presented two individual, 12 consolation, eight encouragement, and five unit awards as a result of the ideas received. In June, instructions for the 1970 Contest for New Ideas were published and made available to all interested persons and agencies.

SMALL INDEPENDENT ACTION FORCE[24]

(C) The Small Independent Action Force (SIAF) was initiated as a R&D effort on 4 Feb. It was a system engineering approach, designed to improve the capability of small infantry units conducting independent operations in a counterinsurgency environment. The SIAF approach was designed to demonstrate the feasibility and desirability of addressing the problem of small unit effectiveness with systems analysis techniques.

(C) The R&D objectives of the SIAF program were: establish a valid model of a small, independent action force; optimize the model and develop a test and evaluation environment based on this optimization; and evaluate material specifically designed for the model.

(C) The logistical SIAF model was developed by the VERTEX Corporation in Kensington, Maryland. Data on SIAF-type operations in RVN by US Army, USMC, USN, and USAF units was collected by eight VERTEX personnel from 1 Jun - 28 Jul. Two-hundred fourteen detailed briefings of personnel who had led SIAF-type operations were completed, and approximately 2,500 unit after action reports were collected.

(C) On 27 Sep, COMUSMACV approved a package of 18 experimental and 15 standard clothing and equipment items for testing and evaluation in the SIAF program. Testing agencies were to be the 5th SFGA, III MAF, 1st Australian Task Force, and RVNAF. On 19 Nov a guide test plan was received and subsequently disseminated to the testing agencies.

(C) Due to difficulties and resultant shipment delays with certain SIAF test equipment in CONUS during December, the SIAF program which had been previously scheduled to commence in January 1970, was postponed until April 1970. It was believed that the enthusiasm generated among the testing agencies over the SIAF program would let down considerably after the postponement, and cause doubt regarding the efficacy of the overall program. At the end of 1969, it was hoped that a SIAF test, reduced in scope, could still be undertaken in January 1970.

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SHELTER TECHNOLOGY[25]

(U) Initiated in September 1969, the Shelter Technology program was designed to develop to develop a low-cost, lightweight, post and beam shelter technology suitable for the requirements of the RVN. The shelters were to be of simple, concrete construction, easy to fabricate and erect, and suitable for Vietnamese military shelter programs. Building materials would have to be readily available in RVN.

(U) The Shelter Technology program consisted of the following three phases:

1. Phase I: The contractor for this program, Neal Mitchell Associates, Inc. from Cambridge, Massachusetts, was to conduct a field trip to RVN to obtain information on building materials, costs, previous construction problems and solutions, significant design considerations for Vietnamese housing, and selection of a demonstration building site. Additionally, the contractor was to develop a shelter "package" in CONUS.

2. Phase II: Representatives from the GVN and US user agencies were to witness construction and demonstration of shelters in CONUS.

3. Phase III: Vietnamese laborers were to be trained to precast the concrete posts and beams used in the construction and also to erect shelters using a minimum of construction equipment. In addition, prototype shelters were to be erected on a demonstration site in RVN employing Vietnamese labor and local building materials.

(U) The field trip included in Phase I was conducted in the RVN from 17 Sep - 5 Oct. Design work and preliminary training materials selection were completed, and this phase was expected to end on 19 Jan 70. Phase II began in late December at Boston, Massachusetts. The demonstration was scheduled for late January 1970. Phase III was scheduled to begin in mid-February 1970 and was expected to last four to six weeks.

RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT - XII

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2. HQ MACV Dir 70-1 (C), 27 Sep 67, Subj: Research and Development (U), Gp-4.
3. Memo (S), MACSA to COMUSMACV, 5 Dec 67, Subj: Toward Improved RDT&E for Vietnam (U), Gp-4.
4. Ltr (C), CINCPAC to COMUSMACV, 23 May 68, Subj: Improvement of RDT&E in Vietnam (U), Gp-4.
5. Ltr (S), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 27 Jul 68, Subj: Plan for Improved RDT&E (U), Gp-4.
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CHAPTER XIII

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

INTRODUCTION

(U) Psychological operations were used to influence motivation and behavior to achieve a reasonably stable and secure environment necessary for development. The environment was constantly changing and was continually examined for indicators of relative stability and security so that resources could be focused on the most urgent problems. The major psychologically significant events of 1969 which were considered advantageous to either the DRV/NFLSVN or the US/GVN were:

1. Midway Conference (8 Jun). Joint announcement by President Nixon and President Thieu that RVNAF would replace 25,000 US Forces, which were scheduled for redeployment by the end of August.

2. Formation of the Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG) (11 Jun). Communist media announced that a "national congress" was held at an undisclosed location 6-8 Jun. Reportedly organized by the NFLSVN and the Alliance of National, Democratic and Peace Forces, this congress established a "Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam."

3. Demise of Ho Chi Minh (3 Sep). Ho Chi Minh, President of the DRV, died on 3 Sep. The loss of Ho Chi Minh exacerbated tension between pro-USSR and pro-Communist China factions in the NVN leadership hierarchy. Ho's successor was forced to navigate a precipitious course between Communist China and the USSR while maintaining a semblance of neutrality. In addition, he had to maintain a similarly successful relationship with Cambodia and Laos.

4. Subsequent Troop Redeployment. The initial redeployment of US forces was announced at the Midway Conference on 8 Jun. The enemy immediately launched a campaign to depict redeployment as evidence of Allied defeat and withdrawal. In order to offset the enemy psychological exploitation of redeployment, early policy guidance explained the basis for redeployment and Vietnamization. PSYOP programs were initiated to convince the Vietnamese friendly and enemy audiences that RVNAF were growing stronger. The increasing capability of GVN to stand as a proud and independent government was publicized to increase popular loyalty and confidence in GVN. On 16 Sep, President Nixon announced further reduction of US forces to a level of 484,000 to be accomplished by 15 Dec. The second phase of redeployment had considerably less psychological impact than did the initial announcement. The anxiety and apprehension that was prevalent during the initial redeployment period had largely been allayed by the demonstrated ability of RVNAF to provide security in those areas from which US units were redeployed. In general, the Vietnamese were not alarmed by redeployment; many faced the situation with a degree of pride and confidence in the Vietnamese ability to handle their own affairs.

5. Austerity Tax (Nov). The economic impact of inflation was compounded by the promulgation of the Austerity Tax.

ORGANIZATION

(U) The major organizations involved in PSYOP in RVN during 1969 are described in the following sections:

Joint United States Public Affairs Office

(U) The Joint United States Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO) provided policy guidance for the conduct of all US PSYOP in RVN.

MACV Psychological Operations Division

(U) The major PSYOP responsibility in Hq MACV was performed by the PSYOP Division, MACJ3-11, which employed Army, USN, and Air Force personnel and operated under the staff supervision of the ACofS, J3. It was a relatively unique military organization, because it served in both an advisory role to RVNAF and a supervisory role to US Forces.

(U) The primary functions of this office were:

1. Advise COMUSMACV and MACV staff on PSYOP and the psychological implications of military operations.

2. Provide operational control of the Hq, 4th US Army PSYOP Group.

3. Act as senior advisor to the General Political Warfare Department (GPWD) of the RVNAF and provide staff guidance for subordinate US military advisory teams in RVNAF units in matters relating to political warfare.

US Army Units

4th PSYOP Group

(U) The 4th PSYOP Gp had been activated on 1 Dec 67, with headquarters in Saigon. The subordinate units of the group were the 7th PSYOP Bn which was employed in I CTZ; the 8th PSYOP Bn in II CTZ; the 6th PSYOP Bn in III CTZ; and the 10th PSYOP Bn in IV CTZ. The latter was reduced by 78 spaces effective 31 Dec 69.

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7th PSYOP Group

(U) The 7th PSYOP Gp, located in Okinawa, supervised a widely scattered organization. The 244th PSYOP Detachment, located in Saigon, maintained liaison between the 7th PSYOP Gp and the various PSYOP agencies located in the RVN, but the primary effort of this detachment was to expedite the printing of propaganda material developed by US/Allied forces.

US Air Force

(C) As part of Phase II Redeployment, the 5th Special Operations Squadron (SOS) was deployed from RVN in October. With its headquarters located in Bien Hoa and Binh Thuy Air Bases, the 5th SOS was one of the two in-country squadrons whose primary mission was PSYOP support. After departure of the 5th SOS, PSYOP air support in III and IV CTZs was provided by the 9th Special Operations Squadron, "B" Flight, which moved from Pleiku Air Base to Bien Hoa Air Base.

VNN/USN POLWAR/PSYOP

(U) In 1969, the VNN/USN political warfare policy was to effectively employ diplomatically, and militarily, all VNN POLWAR/PSYWAR activities in reaching the common goal of achieving successful results in three main problem areas. Those three problem areas were: the development of a strong VNN civic action program; the expansion of VNN proselyting activities; and the coordination of unit operations with political training to better achieve military successes. This policy was conceived in accordance with the VNN 1969 PSYWAR Guidance Plan and was conducted in conjunction with the GVN Pacification/Rural Development Program.

(U) The POLWAR objective was to influence every VNN sailor to be loyal in helping build his navy in the service of the people. One aspect of this objective was the development of a POLWAR organization within each VNN unit that comprised or trained POLWAR cadre. POLWAR activities included the indoctrination of each unit with information about the policies of the GVN, thus transforming each VNN sailor into a face-to-face communicator. Other POLWAR activities included the construction of several hundred VNN dependent shelters and the development of a swine and poultry raising program at the various VNN bases.

(U) Vietnamese Navy victories were exploited throughout the areas of naval operations. Proselyting activities were carried out through the use of waterborne loudspeaker broadcasts, newspaper exhibitions, radio, television, and photographic exhibitions of civic action promoted by the VNN.

Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces POLWAR

(U) The national level political warfare headquarters element was called the General Political Warfare Department (GPWD). GPWD Headquarters was responsible for staff coordination and direction of political warfare at the national level and for coordinating all political warfare

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activities within RVNAF. It was also responsible for developing long range political warfare programs and providing basic political warfare doctrine and guidance for the RVNAF.

(U) The GPWD which encompassed media in support of the RVNAF, included the functions of PSYWAR, Political Indoctrination, Social Services, Chaplain Services, Military Security Service, Information Service, and the Political Warfare College. The principal targets of the POLWAR effort were, in priority:

1. Friendly troops and their dependents.
2. Civilian population under GVN control.
3. VC/NVA forces and the civilian population of enemy-controlled or contested areas.

The POLWAR system consisted of cadre throughout RVNAF assigned to accomplish the above missions.

1. Headquarters Staff and Schools	2,460
2. Military Units	9,728
3. Civil Admin POLWAR Cadre	2,096
	14,284

Political Warfare Battalions

(U) The 10th, 20th, 30th, and 40th ARVN POLWAR Battalions were located in I, II, III, and IV Corps respectively, and were under the operational control of the respective corps commanders. The 50th ARVN POLWAR Battalion in Saigon was under the operational control of the Chief, GPWD. It was responsible for conducting political warfare operations in the CMD and served as a general reserve. The 10th, 20th, 30th, and 40th ARVN POLWAR Battalions each had one Special Warfare Printing Plant.

The Political Warfare College

(U) The POLWAR College was one of several military academy type commission-granting institutions maintained by the ARVN. It was run on a mobilization basis, graduating approximately 400 officers every two years. The curriculum of the POLWAR College was comparable to that of a junior college, with emphasis being on the social and behavioral sciences. The staff included 24 professors and over 100 staff members. Plans called for developing the college on a graduated basis so that by 1977 the institution could graduate 100 new officers per year (400 cadet student body) as well as provide branch training for 600 officers and NCOs. Accordingly, the facilities continued to be expanded during 1969 to meet this objective.

The POLWAR Training Center

(U) Established in May 1967, the POLWAR Training Center offered two 5-week courses of instruction: The POLWAR Staff Officer Course and the Deputy Company Commander/POLWAR Officer Course. In 1969, 2,843 students underwent POLWAR training at the Center.

The Social Service Training School

(U) The Social Service Training School provided basic and advanced technical social welfare training to officers, noncommissioned officers, and civilian kindergarten teachers. Four courses of instruction were offered in 1969: Officer Social Service Assistant Course - 24 weeks; NCO Social Service Assistant Course - 12 weeks; NCO Social Service Assistant Refresher Course - eight weeks; and Kindergarten Teacher Refresher Course - four weeks. The training included recreation, handicrafts, organization and operation of schools, sociology, psychology, sanitation, economics, pharmacology, law, and finance.

Introduction to the Single Manager Concept

(U) Prior to June 1969, there were two basic PSYOP efforts within MACV. One, managed by a staff of CORDS PSYOP advisors, was responsible for PSYOP in support of pacification efforts. The other was concerned primarily with implementation of national PSYOP policies and with advising RVNAF's GPWD. Chieu Hoi activities came under the tactical PSYOP program, as did those efforts directed at the NVA, such as tactical exploitation tapes and leaflets associated with B-52 strikes. The program to encourage reports of weapons locations and the surrender of weapons for cash rewards also fell under military PSYOP, along with ELEPHANT WALK, a program offering cash rewards for assistance or information leading to the return of captured Allied personnel.

(U) Pacification PSYOP was directed primarily at friendly and neutral target audiences and used themes such as the GVN image, community development, rural development, the US/FWMAF image, public safety, and refugee programs.

(U) Effective with the publication of MACV Directive 10-1, dated 12 Jun 69, COMUSMACV was made "responsible for the execution of all PSYOP programs in both tactical and pacification/development areas at the CTZ/region and lower level."[1] The directive then named the ACofS, J3 (MACJ3) as the "staff PSYOP Single Manager of COMUSMACV." In effect, COMUSMACV through his PSYOP Single Manager, assumed control and direction of all psychological advisory activities conducted by MACV elements. Moreover, through the ACofS, J3, as represented by the Chief, PSYOP Division, COMUSMACV assumed the coordination and integration of all PSYOP activities conducted in RVN.

(U) Since the objective of the PSYOP Single Manager concept was to integrate tactical and pacification PSYOP into a cohesive and unified effort, the PSYOP Single Manager concept did not stop at MACV level. Single Managers were appointed at the CTZ level and, in fact, were extended by the Field Force Commanders to the lowest operational level practicable.[2]

NEW CONCEPTS IN PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

(U) On 28 Oct 69, Prime Minister Arrete (decree 1147) announced the establishment of National and Provincial Political Mobilization Committees. The committees replaced the

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PSYOP Coordinating Committees and Indoctrination Committees. The concept of political mobilization was designed to produce cohesion and national resolution among the civil and military members of the government at all levels by timely dissemination of the government's policies with a thorough explanation of the reasons the government had adopted a particular position. The government's policy and position on various issues were to be communicated by the key officials at each level in regualr informal seminars. The program sought to make motivation and information a command responsibility within the entire GVN structure. US advice and mass media back-up support assisted this new concept consistent with the pacification objective of "People's Information."[3]

Vietnamization

(U) In 1969, the Combined Campaign Plan, AB 145, directed that a combined US-Vietnamese PSYWAR Development and Coordination Center be established in each CTZ. These centers were jointly operated by personnel of the US PSYOP battalions and the collocated Vietnamese POLWAR battalions. A national level PSYWAR Development and Coordination Center, manned by personnel of the 4th PSYOP Gp and the RVNAF GPWD, was to be established as soon as facilities were completed. [4]

(S) In December 1969, "Vietnamization-RVNAF Improvement and Modernization (Phase III)" was developed. [5] The PSYOP annex to this document provided a concept for the Vietnamization of PSYOP, including the gradual phase down of US Army and USAF PSYOP units. The annex also provided a comparison of US, GVN, and enemy motivational capabilities. Items of equipment designated for transfer from US PSYOP units to ARVN POLWAR units included light mobile printing presses and audio-visual units.

PSYOP Research

(U) In late 1969 a Human Science Research, Inc., research team arrived in RVN under contract to Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) to study the criteria for the assessment of effectiveness of PSYOP. The 6-man team responded to research requirements of the MACV PSYOP Division and JUSPAO. Early investigation of enemy vulnerabilities and obstacles to defection indicated that there were two primary obstacles that inhibited enemy soldiers from defecting. These obstacles were fear of harm to self by either side and of punitive action against one's family. [6]

POLWAR Support RF/PF

(S) The lack of POLWAR support for RF/PF forces was recognized in 1969 when JGS recommended the formation of 49 POLWAR companies to provide education, religious advice, indoctrination, and information to the RF/PF forces in the 44 provinces and five selected cities. MACV concurred in this recommendation as part of the Phase III RVNAF Improvement and Modernization package. [7] A total of 3,106 personnel would fill the 49 POLWAR companies; the cost of this package was estimated at US $4.75 million.

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(U) In 1969 the quick reaction PSYOP capability known as EARLYWORD was given widespread use. This concept permitted immediate exploitation of a rallier by the radio transmission of his personal appeal to an aircraft circling over the rallier's unit. The aircraft rebroadcasted the transmission via loudspeakers; simultaneously, the message was taped. The latter was then used in subsequent offerings. This use was called QUICK TAPE.

PSYOP MEDIA

Face-to-Face Propaganda

(U) Effective PSYOP depended on getting a predetermined message across to a target audience in the most effective way. The degree to which a target was influenced was directly proportional to the proximity of the cor municator and the target, both geographically and socially. Major PSYOP face-to-face activities used in 1969 are described below.

Armed Propaganda Team (APT)

(U) APTs were made up of over 5,000 ralliers under the Chieu Hoi program. The teams, under the control of the province chiefs, provided their own protection and proved most effective in ob aining ralliers, frequently by interacting with the families of known VC.

Culture Drama Teams

(U) Organic to the GPWD was a Central Culture Group. This group was composed of all types of entertainers and provided culture drama shows for RVNAF, primarily in the CMD. Organic to each POLWAR battalion in the four CTZs was a Culture Platoon which provided entertainment throughout the CTZ in the form of songs, dramas, dances, and similar activities.

Medical Civic Action Program

(U) The Medical Civic Action Program (MEDCAP) was part of the socio-economic development plan for RVN sponsored by the government and executed with active voluntary participation of the local population. The basic intent of MEDCAP was to establish and maintain a continuing spirit of mutual respect and cooperation between the military and civilian population by providing basic medical care to the people living in the rural and often VC-infested villages and hamlets.

Revolutionary Development Cadre

(U) The aim of the Revolutionary Development Cadre program was to bring social, political, and economic reform to the countryside, and it was the major mechanism utilized to decrease the support of the insurgency and win the people's confidence and loyalty for the GVN. There were over 13,000,000 rural people living in 44 provinces, 243 districts, 2,157 villages, and 10,552 hamlets that were the target of the Revolutionary Development Cadre operation. As of 31 Dec, there were 1,552 Revolutionary Development Cadre groups with a total strength of 41,242.



"A Culture Drama Team enroute to entertain RVNAF personnel"

Vietnamese Information Service - Village and Hamlet Cadre

(U) The Village and Hamlet Cadre were the functioning ends of the Vietnamese Information Service (VIS). They were the tentacles that reached out and actually made contact with the people. The rest of the organization existed merely to support the work of the people at the hamlet and village level. The basic activities of the Village and Hamlet Cadre centered on motivating the people voluntarily to build a democratic way of life in politics, economy, culture, and social welfare within the villages, hamlets, and urban communities. At the village level, the ultimate goal (for 1970) was to have one cadre member in each village and one cadreman and an information installation (office and reading room) in each of the hamlets. At the end of 1969, these village and hamlet goals had been 91 percent achieved. Only 1,000 hamlet and 200 village vacancies remained to be filled.

Loudspeaker Operations in RVN

(U) The use of loudspeakers in the execution of PSYOP in support of military operations offered the opportunity to capitalize on enemy vulnerabilities in many unique ways. Mounted on trucks or aircraft, these loudspeakers presented news, music, and appeals by Hoi Chanh to many people.

(U) During the period May-December 1969, interrogations of 841 PWs and Hoi Chanh were conducted by III MAF, IFFV, and IIFFV concerning PSYOP media penetration and effectiveness under Specific Intelligence Collection Requirement (SICR) U-UPE-1600. The respondents reported hearing aerial broadcasts more frequently (85 percent) than ground-delivered (11 percent) or waterborne (2 percent) loudspeaker broadcasts. Of those who heard broadcasts, 89 percent understood all or part of the broadcasts. Of those who understood all or part of the broadcast messages, 68 percent believed the content and 68 percent reported that the broadcasts elicited thoughts of rallying or surrendering.

Radio and Television

Vietnamese Military (Channel B) Radio

(U) The PSYWAR Department had operational control of the GPWD Radio Branch which in 1969 broadcasted to about 75 percent of the population from a 20-KW transmitter located near Saigon. Regular scheduled programs of news, commentary, documentaries, music, and drama were designed to carry PSYWAR messages to a primary audience of RVNAF and their dependents. Throughout 1969 the Radio Branch broadcasted 18 hours daily, seven days a week. A radio expansion project was underway in which three new up-country stations would be added. The three new stations, which were to be located at Nha Trang, Qui Nhon, and Danang were expected to increase coverage to 95 percent of the RVN population. Construction of these new facilities began in the summer of 1969.

(U) A 50-KW radio station in Pleiku broadcasted PSYOP messages to VC/NVA forces in the Central Highland area, and three hours of daily programming were directed toward RVNAF personnel. The station also included one hour pe day in the Jarai Montagnard dialect.

Programming for the station was conducted by the RVNAF Intelligence Division, PSYWAR Department. Technical operation of the station was conducted by US personnel from the 8th US PSYOP Battalion of the 4th US PSYOP Group.

(U) Of the 841 respondents interrogated under SICR U-UPE-1600, 34 percent were able to listen to radio broadcasts, and 85 percent of those able to listen did so. Eighty-six percent of those who listened reported that they believed non-Communist news broadcasts and 83 percent said the broadcasts induced thoughts of rallying or surrendering.

RVN Television

(U) The PSYWAR Department had operational control of the GPWD TV Section which produced entertainment and information programming carrying PSYWAR messages. Program content included national and international news, sports, music, drama, indoctrination, and special reports on RVNAF unit activities. Two programs of 60-90 minutes in length were produced each week and programmed on the Vietnamese National Television Network (VNTN) which included stations at Saigon, Can Tho, and Hue. The Blue Eagle airborne TV transmitter telecasted the programming in the Qui Nhon area. A television translator was being installed north of Danang to rebroadcast the TV signal from Hue to the Danang area. During second quarter 1969, the PSYWAR Department made plans for expanding the TV programming to three programs per week. The third program, a [illegible] minute show started on 18 Aug, featured news and information from the RVNAF Logistics Branch. The TV Branch and the Motion Picture Branch jointly produced an average of three 10-minute newsreels per week which were also programmed on the VNTN.

Newspapers and Magazines

Mien Nam Tu-Do

(U) Debriefing of Major James N. Rowe, after his escape from the VC in December 1968, confirmed the fact that reliable news had been scarce in the contested areas and many VC and the people under them believed what the Communists told them, because that is all they heard. It was to fill this gap that a bi-weekly newssheet named Mien Nam Tu-Do was printed, with distribution beginning in January 1969. Appearing in three editions -- the main edition, and editions A and B -- the newssheet contained information about the war, pacification, GVN viability, etc. The sheet was specifically designed to be read by unfriendly target audiences. The main edition, consisting of a single 10 1/2" by 16" page of newsprint, was hand-distributed by RD Cadre and other personnel entering the contested areas. Edition A which contained half the news of the main edition, and edition B, which contained the other half, were airdropped. The "paper route" devised by the MACV PSYOP Division covered most of RVN with a distribution of approximately 4.3 million copies every two weeks. [8]

(U) In June, announcement was made of a change in the newspaper. The main edition would go to friendlies at the rate of 600,000 every two weeks. Titled Vietnam Today, it would be the official pacification newspaper for the GVN. Editions A and B continued to use material from the main edition and be airdropped to the enemy. Distribution was at the rate of 2.6 million every two weeks. [9]

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Tien Tuyen

(U) Tien Tuyen (Frontline) was a daily newspaper published by the PSYWAR Department and distributed in Saigon. Normal circulation was 22,000 copies daily; the newspaper was distributed free to RVNAF personnel.

Thong Cam

(U) During 1969, the 4th PSYOP Gp developed the monthly magazine Thong Cam. This magazine, published in 135,000 copies, was disseminated to Vietnamese employees of the US in order to promote better understanding.

Movies

(U) The Motion Picture Branch produced an average of three 10-minute newsreels per week for use on the VNTN. Three special films were produced. "The Communist Massacre at Hue," which documented the exhuming and reburial of hundreds of civilians killed by the VC during the 1968 Tet offensive, was produced with Vietnamese, English, French, and Chinese soundtracks and was distributed internationally. The second special film was produced for US Armed Forces Day (19 Jun), documenting RVNAF activities during the preceding year. The third special project was an entertainment film featuring three RVNAF soldiers who, through the plot of the film, expressed their motivation and reasons for supporting the GVN.

Leaflets

(U) Perhaps the best known PSYOP medium was the leaflet. These were employed in astronomical numbers throughout the RVN and the extended battle area. A total of 9 billion leaflets were dropped in RVN during 1969.

(U) Of the 841 respondents interrogated under SICR U-UPE-1600, 93 percent reported that they had seen Allied leaflets. Of those who saw leaflets, 84 percent read one or more leaflets and 27 percent reported some difficulty in understanding the leaflet content. Of those who read leaflets, 77 percent believed the contents and 65 percent reported that the contents elicited thoughts of rallying or surrendering.

Enemy Propaganda

Changes in Emphasis and Direction

(C) The plans contained in COSVN Resolution 9 revealed a basic shift in enemy emphasis from the general offensive strategy to the classic patterns of guerrilla warfare combined with political tactics. Essentially, this shift was toward the same type of low level activity waged before 1965, and it was to include increased political organization, military operations employing economy of force, and an increase in proselyting, especially among the military.

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(C) Diplomatically, the enemy definitely increased his reliance on internation pressure, and in particular US anti-war factions, to force the US out of RVN.

(C) A shift in emphasis was revealed in the difference between the enemy's 1969 definition of a decisive victory and that of the preceding year. In 1968, the enemy considered a decisive victory to be the clear-cut military success that they had envisioned for Tet. In 1969, they redefined a decisive victory in terms of forcing US withdrawal, acceptance of a coalition government by the GVN, and recognition of the 10- and 12-point solutions of the NFLSVN and PRG.

Specific Changes in Enemy Propaganda

(C) In the beginning of 1969, the enemy exploited the US bombing halt of NVN and the acceptance of the NFLSVN at the Paris Peace Talks as victories for the DRV and the NFLSVN.

(C) As the Paris Peace Talks began to be stalemated, the enemy shifted his emphasis to condemning the US for its stubbornness in refusing to make concessions.

(C) At the end of the summer, a significant increase occurred in the number of reports on enemy attempts to proselyte among RVNAF and their families. Targets for these increases included not only military personnel but civil servants, National Police, and government officials at all echelons.

(C) The enemy also stepped up efforts to infiltrate cadre into government organizations, public organizations such as schools and medical facilities, the military, and the Chieu Hoi apparatus to disrupt and subvert these from within.

(C) Enemy propaganda, especially following the death of Ho Chi Minh, placed renewed emphasis on preparing for a protracted struggle.

PSYOP Programs

(U) Measuring the effectiveness of propaganda on a target audience was somewhat difficult. Changes in behavior of the enemy or specific actions by an enemy force as a result of propaganda were often unobservable. Reports by returnees or PWs were often shaded to provide information they believe the interviewer wishes to hear. Despite these difficulties, efforts continued to be made to elicit meaningful indicators of 1969 PSYOP results. By screening captured documents, analyzing enemy radio output, interviewing PWs and returnees monitoring countermeasures or reactions taken by the enemy toward allied propaganda, and evaluating the attitudes among the civilian populace, indicators of effectiveness were determined.

PSYOP Effects on the Enemy

(C) Chieu Hoi Program. In 1969 the number of recorded Hoi Chanh exceeded 47,000, more than 2 1/2 times as many ralliers as in 1968. Since the beginning of the Chieu Hoi program in 1963, more than 140,000 former Communists had chosen allegiance to GVN. While it was generally agreed that a wide variety of factors induced the enemy to rally, including battle hardships, lack of food and supplies, the desire to be reunited with their families, and others, PSYOP demonstrated the importance of informing the enemy of the existence of the alternative to continued

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fighting. The enemy's reaction provided an insight into the results achieved by friendly PSYOP. This reaction appeared in the targeting of PSYOP personnel and equipment, intimidation and increased proselyting of government troops, written resolutions and documents, and radio broadcasts.

(C) Radio Hanoi frequently attacked Allied propaganda, advising its populace "not to be fooled by open arms and psychological warfare promises."

(C) Articles published in Hoc Tap, an official periodical of the Hanoi regime, attacked in detail Allied messages directed toward the civilian population. For example, one article was entitled "Resolutely Defeat the Psychological Warfare of the American Imperialists."

(C) The Chieu Hoi appeal and promises of good treatment resulted in violent reaction from both the NFLSVN and NVA. Cadres intensified their political indoctrination to stress the harsh treatment and tortures that the US/ARVN supposedly inflicted on returnees as well as PWs after they had been exploited. Specific countermeasures to rally and surrender appeal programs included:

1. During aerial broadcasts VC cadre instructed their troops to distract each other by yelling, beating drums, and making loud noises.

2. VC/NVA units had strict rules against keeping or reading Allied leaflets and listening to Allied broadcasts.

3. The most common punishment for those caught reading leaflets or listening to Allied radio broadcasts was public criticism.

4. Extreme countermeasures included assassination of Hoi Chanh, public execution for those recaptured, and threats to the Hoi Chanh family.

(C) Hoi Chanh, towards the end of the year, single ralliers or ralliers led PSYOP field teams back to their villages in an effort to induce others to rally. EARLYWORD, QUICK TAPE, and leaflet messages from ralliers continued to encourage defection. A substantial number of documented accounts illustrated the effective utilization of these new PSYOP techniques in support of the Chieu Hoi program.

(C) Repeated reports of re-indoctrination periods and programs indicated a concern and lingering doubt on the part of enemy cadre that Allied PSYOP could demoralize his soldiers. This additional expenditure of effort and time in countermeasures justified an aggressive program.

Thinh Thuong Campaign (Affection)

(C) During the period 15 Nov-31 Dec 69, a combined PSYOP campaign was conducted by MACV, JUSPAO, VIS, Ministry of Chieu Hoi, GPWD, and ARVN. The campaign was directed against two target audiences; the civilian population, and NVA soldiers in SR-1. One campaign objective was to educate the civilian populace about the Chieu Hoi Program so they could assist Hoi Chanh in rallying. Another objective of the campaign was to present to the NVA soldiers the better living conditions they would enjoy if they rallied, i.e., medical attention and more and better food. The interesting result of the campaign was a significant increase in VC ralliers

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(243) while the NVA rally rate remained stable with five ralliers at the same time as the national rates were decreasing. The ralliers during this 6-week period accounted for one-third of the yearly total. A significant factor to be noted was that no significant military activity occurred during the campaign period. Due to the success of the campaign and the control exercised by ARVN, the campaign was extended to 31 Mar 70.

(C) Results of the campaign indicated that a high returnee rate could best be attained by:

1. Targeting small defined areas and a specific unit.

2. Directing all possible PSYOP resources to the target.

3. Concentrating APTs in the target area to maintain constant contact with the population over an extended period of time.

4. Obtaining full participation in the campaign by all government services, especially VIS and RD Cadre to assist the APTs in explaining the Chieu Hoi program to the people.

Nguyen Trai II Campaign

(C) During the period 15 Oct 68 to 31 Jan 69, the GPWD conducted the Nguyen Trai - I Campaign, a nationwide campaign to increase the Hoi Chanh rally rate by 50 percent. The results of the campaign showed an increase of 80 percent in the Hoi Chanh during the reporting period and prompted GPWD to initiate the Nguyen Trai - II Campaign for the period 16 Jun-15 Sep 69. The target audiences for Nguyen Trai - II were VC/NVA cadre and troops, and the people living in enemy-controlled areas. With the culmination of the campaign there had been 14,018 ralliers which was 116.2 percent of the final goal.

VCI

(C) The PHOENIX Program attempted to neutralize 1,800 VCI each month. During the first nine months of 1969, 14,161 VCI were neutralized leaving an estimated VCI strength in RVN of 76,745. In speeches, GVN officials stressed the importance of informing the populace of the PHOENIX Program which operated on the theory that systematic forays against Communist cadre went a long way towards weakening the entire VC movement. PSYOP assumed an expanding role in promoting the success of this program. Particularly in the Delta, PSYOP support of the PHOENIX Program met noticeable success with the use of wanted posters and individual targeting.

Dai Doan Ket Program

(U) The Dai Doan Ket Program was an extension of the Chieu Hoi program. It was aimed at the ranks of middle and higher level cadre of the VC and civilian infrastructure of the NFLSVN. Most officers and high ranking party officials of the VC/NFLSVN rose from the peasantry to their present ranks, and they were not inclined to revert to peasant status. In the Dai Doan Ket Program the GVN agreed to accept high ranking returnees and cooperate in placing them in responsible positions. All returnees were accorded the political rights guaranteed by the Constitution.

B-52 Exploitation Program

(S) The terror of a B-52 raid had long been a great potential psychological weapon in RVN, and early in the program COMUSMACV directed that all in-country ARC LIGHT missions be exploited psychologically after each strike. 10

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(S) In December 1968, COMUSMACV proposed to CINCPAC that ARC LIGHT could be better covered and exploited by use of the M-129E1 leaflet bomb which could be dispensed by ARC LIGHT aircraft on every in-country strike. CINCPAC approved the concept on 10 Feb 69, and the first leaflet bomb was dropped on 2 Apr. Feedback obtained from ground sweeps of five separate target areas, after the missions were flown, revealed that leaflet coverage was excellent. Leaflets were concentrated in an area from approximately center point of target train, 1 km down the bomb train and 1 km either side of the bomb train. Additionally, there was some coverage extending 1 km back from center point.

(S) PSYOP exploitation of ARC LIGHT strikes by means of the leaflet bomb was temporarily suspended on 23 Jun to permit evaluation of the program. Exploitation was resumed on 18 Jul, however, with no change in the program. 11

ELEPHANT WALK

(C) ELEPHANT WALK was a program designed to enlist the assistance of the populace in rescuing Allied personnel from enemy detention camps in RVN by offering a reward for their return. The reward offer was disseminated by leaflets. The Joint Personnel Recovery Center (JPRC) coordinated the program. Additionally, aircraft of the USAF 9th SOS dropped approximately 4 million leaflets in support of this program. During 1969, three bodies were recovered in conjunction with this program.

PSYOP Effects and the Civilian Population

(U) GVN and Allied efforts designed to increase popular support to friendly forces and to encourage the withholding of support to the enemy have been effectively supported through a wide range of PSYOP activities. PSYOP concentration on civilian audiences was increased substantially during 1969 through the increased support to the Pacification Plan.

Volunteer Information Program

(U) PSYOP support to this program had been given through printed leaflets informing the civilian population of the rewards for providing information leading to the recovery of enemy weapons and ammunition. Leaflets listing the rewards for recovered weapons were carried by innumerable informants.

Cordon Operations

(U) PSYOP field teams cooperating in cordon and search operations succeeded time and again in securing the confidence and cooperation of civilian populations. This cooperation was extremely important to the success of military operations.

Mine Reports

(U) The 4th Inf Div began a program to reduce the mining incidents on QL-19 from Pleiku to Mon Hang Pass, utilizing a PSYOP field team to broadcast messages along the road asking the people to report locations of mines. The team also passed out leaflets and posters reporting mining incidents. The week before the program began 17 mines were found by the mine sweep team and one week later only two were found.

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Pacification

(U) Many of the programs outlined under the 1969 Pacification Plan were already receiving support from PSYOP field elements at the first of the year. However, during 1969, effective PSYOP action greatly increased in support of refugees, land reform, the image of RVNAF, local elections, and the People's Self-Defense Program.

1. Refugees. By the end of November the total number of refugees was reduced to 416,514, down from an all time peak of 1.45 million in February. PSYOP support of the program took the form primarily of providing entertainment for displaced refugees and encouraging relocation out of the VC-controlled areas.

2. Land Reform. PSYOP leaflets drew attention to the "land freeze" and free distribution of GVN-owned land. Leaflets encouraged farmers to take possession of the land offered. During the year nearly 200,000 acres of GVN-owned land was distributed to tenant farmers. PSYOP support was pledged to the land-to-the-tiller program once legislation is passed by the Legislature.

3. Image of RVNAF. This was a natural area for PSYOP support to the Vietnamization program. Enemy admission of GVN fighting strength may in part be accounted for by effective PSYOP promotion of the fighting image of various RVNAF units. In what was an apparently straight forward analysis of GVN successes, an operation plan for the Fall Campaign, captured in Binh Dinh Province and dated July 1969, admitted that the ARVN had improved in quality and quantity in order to "Vietnamize" the war. Such recognition was essential to building confidence in the ARVN.

Out-of-Country PSYOP Efforts

FRANTIC GOAT

(S) FRANTIC GOAT was an overt aerial leaflet operation against selected targets in NVN. It was designed to reinforce the effects of air strikes and to accomplish psychological objectives not necessarily related to air strikes. This effort stressed the dissemination of news and related facts to the NVN audience. The program attempted both to counter the false or misleading propaganda produced by DRV for its own people and to provide information which was not ordinarily received by the NVN public. This program was temporarily suspended on 1 Nov 68 concurrent with the bombing halt announcement. Since the suspension of the effort against NVN the FRANTIC GOAT assets were used on PSYWAR targets in RVN, Laos (TRAIL Campaign), and in support of the CAMEL PATH Campaign.

TRAIL Campaign

(S) The TRAIL Campaign provided a means of exposing NVA forces to psychological warfare operations while they were in the process of infiltrating into RVN. The program was conducted in the eastern half of the Laotian panhandle. Targets selected for leaflet coverage consisted of infiltration routes and trails, staging areas, way stations, bivouac and storage areas, truck parks, and infiltration check points. Approximately 100 million leaflets were programmed

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monthly for dissemination into the target area. Principal dissemination was by C-130 aircraft (FRANTIC GOAT) staged out of Ubon RTAFB, Thailand. Back up dissemination was provided by C-123 aircraft staged out of Nakhon Phanom RTAFB, Thailand and C-47 aircraft staged out of Danang AB.

CAMEL PATH

(TS) CAMEL PATH was a leaflet campaign conducted against VC/NVA forces garrisoned in or using Cambodian territory as an operational sanctuary or route of infiltration into RVN. Generally, the wind drift method of leaflet dissemination was used. This involved flying along the border (without violating Cambodian airspace) and using easterly winds to drift leaflets into selected target areas. However, during seasons of westerly winds, permission to penetrate to a distance of 20 kms in some border areas was authorized under specified conditions. A faster falling leaflet was then used to limit overflight. To gain the desired penetration, all leaflets were printed in Vietnamese language only. Approximately 50 million leaflets were programmed monthly for dissemination by C-47 cargo aircraft. Air bases of operation were Tuy Hoa and Bien Hoa in RVN and Ubon in Thailand.

BUFFALO TRACK

(TS) BUFFALO TRACK was a rewards program for the return of Allied prisoners being held in Cambodia. During 1969, wind drift leaflets dropped in conjunction with this program assisted in the recovery of four bodies.

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2. Memo (U), MACJ3-11, 24 Jul 69, Subj: June PSYOP Conference.
3. Ltr (U), MACJ01R, 2 Dec 69, Subj: People's Information and Political Mobilization.
4. Plan (S), MACV/JGS, 31 Oct 69, Subj: Combined Campaign Plan, 1970, AB 145 (U), Gp-4.
5. Rpt (TS), MACV, 29 Dec 69, Subj: Vietnamization-RVNAF Improvement and Modernization (Phase III) and Related US Planning (U), Gp-1 (See Vol II).
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9. Nwsltr (U), ACofS, MACJ3, 30 Jun 69, Subj: PSYOP/POLWAR Newsletter, Vol IV, No. 6.
10. Rpt (TS), MACJ3, 15 May 69, Subj: Monthly Historical Summary for April 1969 (U), Gp-4.
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CHAPTER XIV

OTHER SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES

DISCIPLINE, LAW, AND ORDER

General

(U) During 1968 the command had experienced three major problem areas with respect to discipline and maintenance of law and order. These areas had been: establishment of machinery for disciplining of US civilians who committed criminal acts, both against GVN and US laws; the marihuana problem; and the continuing incidents of black market and illicit currency and commodity transactions. (See 1968 MACV Command History, pp. 836-841 for detailed account of disciplinary problems encountered during 1968.)

(U) The previous year's problems continued into 1969 despite intensive corrective efforts by all commanders and a fourth major problem area was added, the latter being more contrived by irresponsible reporting by the mass media than real. This new problem was the unsubstantiated allegation that the components were experiencing rising incidents of AWOL and desertion. There were several spectacular crimes against Vietnamese and third country nationals involving US servicemen during the year. Also the first indications of efforts by subversive elements to spread dissension among US forces were revealed during 1969.

(U) With a view toward reducing the number of disciplinary actions, a MACV regulation definitively establishing prohibited activities was promulgated on 2 Nov. This regulation applied to: US military personnel; US nationals employed by, serving with, or accompanying the Forces; TCNs employed by the US, its invited contractors doing business in RVN, or by nonappropriated fund activities or their concessionaires; and all personnel authorized to use exchanges, clubs, messes, APOs, or other US military facilities. The specific prohibited acts were:

1. Transfer by sale, barter, gift, loan, exchange, or rental, of any merchandise or article purchased in an exchange to an individual not having similar exchange privileges, except as provided in MACV directives.

2. Possession of other than the one ration card issued to the individual or possession of a ration card which had been altered or modified without proper authority.

3. Transfer of a ration card to another by gift, loan, sale, exchange, or by any other means.

4. Purchase of more than the number or amount of rationed items authorized.

5. Purchase, during any one month, of more rationed items than the quantity authorized by the Vietnam Regional Exchange System.

6. Possession of unreasonable or excessive quantities of exchange items (rationed or nonrationed). The possession of more than 12 cartons of cigarettes, 12 bottles of liquor/wine,

or six cases of beer without appropriate authority was considered unreasonable and was prohibited.

7. Transfer of any personal identification/privilege card to any other person or to permit any other person to use another's identification/privilege card. The loss, theft, or disappearance of such a card was to be reported immediately.

8. Possession of more than one identification/privilege card.

9. Possession of an identification/privilege card when the holder's status had changed to one no longer authorized privileges, or was otherwise in violation of MACV directives.

10. Possession of more MPC than was consistent with an individual's legitimate requirements. MPC was not currency in a normal sense; it was an instrument (scrip) denominated in US dollars, or fractions thereof. In no event would MACV personnel have more than $1,000 in MPC at any time unless the total of an individual's last previous pay in MPC actually drawn in-country exceeded $1,000 in which case he could possess no more than the amount drawn.

11. Purchase or acquisition of piasters from any source other than those authorized by MACV directives.

12. Acquisition of MPC from any source or the use of MPC at any place not authorized by MACV directives.

a. MPC was authorized for use in all US Government sales and services facilities, theater and entertainment facilities, postal facilities, military banking facilities, American Red Cross and USO facilities, nonappropriated fund activities, and in other activities as authorized by COMUSMACV.

b. MPC was not authorized for use in dealing with Vietnamese personnel or organizations or any other person or organization not authorized to possess MPC per MACV directives.

13. Purchase of postal money orders, bank money orders, US Treasury checks, or other dollar instrucments for, or on behalf of, any other person except as authorized in MACV directives.

14. Transfer of MPC to a person not authorized to possess same by MACV directive.

15. Giving of MPC as a tip or gratuity to persons not authorized possession.

16. Issue or transfer in RVN of any check, money order, or other dollar instrument without a specified payee on the instrument.

17. Issue or transfer of any check or other dollar instrument to an individual or activity in RVN not authorized to receive dollar instruments.

18. Possession, delivery, or use of US currency in RVN except as provided in MACV directives.

19. Purchase of dollar instruments with cash, MPC, or the depositing of cash, MPC, or a combination thereof, in excess of $200.00 in any one month, except as provided in MACV directives.

20. Sale, barter, or exchange of any item or merchandise imported into RVN free of customs duties, except to another person having the same duty-free import privileges, or in accordance with specific authorization pursuant to MACV directives.

21. Possession of privately-owned firearms.

22. Carrying of a loaded firearm except when required by actual combat or emergency conditions.

(U) In addition to the above prohibited acts, US Armed Forces personnel on active duty in RVN, unless otherwise authorized, were required to:

1. Occupy only their assigned billets.

2. Be in a US Government-controlled area during prescribed curfew hours.

3. Refrain from engaging in business ventures in RVN. This prohibition included participation in the ownership or management of any privately-owned activity conducted in RVN for the purpose of making a profit from the sale of goods or services. (Ownership of stock in a publicly-held US corporation was exempt from this subparagraph.)

4. Present themselves for medical treatment only to US Armed Forces medical facilities except in case of emergency.

5. Wear the prescribed military uniform at all times while outside a US military or RVNAF-controlled facility.

(U) The directive also established the policy that US funding sources would not accept more MPC from any FWMAF than the amount of MPC such force acquired from authorized sources minus confirmed sales in the respective FWMAF post exchange or other sales facilities, as deemed appropriate. [1]

Staff Judge Advocate Activities

(U) Throughout 1969 the SJA provided a wide range of guidance and professional assistance to COMUSMACV and his staff, component commanders, numerous subordinate commands, and other agencies of the US Mission. These services included primarily the following areas:

1. Currency control and black market activity suppression.

2. Jurisdictional problems over civilian employees.

3. The GVN attempts to control, regulate, tax, impose customs and duties on military interest material, cargo and property.

4. Property (land and title) disputes.

5. Rental payments, land use concurrences, and other real estate problems.

6. Establishment of policies to control, regularize, and define the status of US Government contractors.

7. Purchase and procurement (including nonappropriated fund procurement) policies and directives.

8. Vietnam Regional Exchange activities.

9. Commissary, field ration mess, and other logistical legal problems.

(U) In addition the SJA provided advisory assistance to the RVNAF Directorate of Military Justice. This latter function included teaching courses in comparative law and US jurisprudence at the Faculty of Law at the University of Saigon in addition to the generally accepted advisory duties. Also, series of English lessons and legal discussions were held several times each week with senior officers of the Directorate of Military Justice.

Narcotics, Marihuana, and Dangerous Drugs

General

(U) During 1968 the problem of marihuana, and to a much lesser degree opium and hard narcotics, had grown to considerable proportions. The incidence rate had risen from 1.3 per thousand in January to 4.5 per thousand at the end of the year. While this increase appeared somewhat dramatic, it had been suggested that the rise could be attributed, at least in part, to improved detection and increased command emphasis. Significant steps had been taken during the year to include vigorous command action at all echelons, use of a special Criminal Investigation team, and a coordinated effort between US and GVN authorities. (See 1968 MACV Command History, pp. 839-840 for a more detailed account of 1968 experience.)

(U) In 1969, commanders in RVN continued to be confronted by this serious problem, one which can only be understood in terms of the ready availability of marihuana in RVN and the attitudes of the VN society. Marihuana was grown openly in various parts of the country and was readily and easily obtainable from indigenous personnel wherever US Forces were located. The cost was less than in the US and penalties imposed by GVN were normally not as severe as those imposed in the civilian courts in the United States. Servicemen quickly learned that marihuana could be easily obtained. In many cases, they were solicited on the streets and in the less reputable bars or other indigenous facilities catering to US personnel. Marihuana was sold by taxi drivers, prostitutes, street urchins, and other persons of ill repute. The enforcement effort directed toward the elimination of the source of marihuana was hampered by the lack of training and interest by GVN authorities. While the use of marihuana was recognized by commanders as a serious matter with far reaching consequences to the individual, many of the younger personnel (18-26 year age group) shared the view that it was a relatively minor infraction. Further, they did not consider marihuana harmful to their health or well being; apparently this view was carried into the service from their civilian communities and college campuses.

This attitude was of growing concern to commanders and prompted a prominent psychiatrist to observe - "surely this is the first war in which the Army has been more concerned with marihuana than with venereal disease."

(U) In announcing the opening in early 1969 of a campaign aimed at suppressing the practice COMUSMACV stated:[2]

> The ready availability of narcotics, marihuana, and dangerous drugs to our troops in Vietnam has been a continuing source of concern. The known involvement rate has been relatively low; however, even this is too much. The use of narcotics, marihuana, and dangerous drugs is inimical to the proper performance of military duties. In a combat theater the user is a danger to himself and to others who must rely on him. Use of these substances will not be condoned, and greater efforts are needed to eliminate their use. This headquarters, in conjunction with the Government of Vietnam, is instituting a campaign against marihuana, opium, and other dangerous substances (drugs). A preliminary step was taken by the GVN Prime Minister in issuing a circular condemning the traffic in these substances and charging all province chiefs, mayors, and police chiefs with responsibility for eliminating marihuana and opium from Vietnam. The Prime Minister's circular was closely followed by implementing instructions from the Director General of the National Police and the Chairman, JGS. Steps have been taken to expand the Vietnamese Narcotics Bureau to include a capability to receive, process, and act on police intelligence on narcotic users, traffickers, caches, and fields. MACV will cooperate in every possible way with GVN officials and police in this campaign. One of the most significant areas for cooperation is in the exchange of information. Detailed instructions concerning the exchange of information will be published separately. As part of this campaign, commanders and senior advisors are to place increased emphasis on the detection and apprehension of narcotics, marihuana, and dangerous drug users. Additionally, existing educational programs are to be reviewed to insure coverage of the following considerations:
>
> a. Marihuana is sometimes tried out of curiosity as a relief from boredom. It is apparent that those doing so do not understand the serious and lasting consequences of their acts. For example:

(1) In addition to any disciplinary action which might be taken under the UCMJ, a copy of the case file of every military narcotics user is forwarded to the Federal Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs.

(2) The US passport of any narcotics user is to be marked to reflect that he is a narcotic user.

(3) The user may have to register with the local police authorities of the town or city in which he resides.

(4) Social stigma in a society which considers narcotics addiction repugnant.

(5) Marihuana smoking is often a first step toward a deterioration of the individual's character and personality. This could lead to increased reliance on drugs or addiction to a hard narcotic such as heroin.

b. Lack of understanding is difficult to combat. The young serviceman's existence in a combat environment may be marked with an insecurity that sometimes allows him to rationalize away normal caution and good sense for the sake of a quick thrill or for "kicks." It is to this target that the information and education campaign must be tailored for maximum impact. Junior officers and noncommissioned officers are the key educators for this purpose.

Suppression

(U) With a view toward destroying marihuana at its source the Provost Marshal in May requested the use of one LOH and one LFT aircraft for one day each week. These aircraft were to fly missions in the Delta in an attempt to locate fields in which the plant was being grown. This request was approved and these flights commenced in May. The flights proved quite successful as evidenced by the July experience. During that month, the equivalent of 8,990 kilograms of dried marihuana was destroyed as the result of aerial detection and security forces then being sent to cut and burn the plants. [3]

(U) Another technique added to the suppression program during 1969 was the use of marihuana-detecting dogs. These dogs had been used by the US Customs Bureau at US border stations with considerable success and in May COMUSMACV requested DA provide similar dog-handler teams for testing. Two teams arrived in August and, though the dogs were scout and sentry animals retrained in Okinawa, they proved successful. Initial experience disclosed that the mere presence of the dogs at processing points had a deterrent effect as evidenced by repeated findings of discarded marihuana before the baggage was actually inspected. The dogs also were effective in locating the plant in barracks areas and their environs. [4]

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


FIGURE XIV-1

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1969 Experience

(C) Figure XIV-1 depicts the command experience for 1969. By mid year more than 3,900 known users of marihuana had been identified, most of whom had been apprehended. This number exceeded the 1968 total. Significantly, the success of the suppression program was in considerable measure due to the increasing cooperation of GVN authorities who assisted in ferreting out suppliers. Emphasis and support became increasingly effective at all GVN levels. [5]

(C) While incidence statistics (Figure XIV-1) showed a sharp increase in number of violations during June and July, officials believed the rise was indicative of improved suppression activities and probably did not indicate a significant increase in number of users.

(C) In August there was a decline in the number of marihuana offenders though the following month experienced a return to the June-July levels. This tendency was reversed in October and November and by year's end there was evidence the efforts to reduce the incidence of use and trafficking in narcotics/marihuana/dangerous drugs were increasingly effective.

Black Market Currency/Commodity Control

General

(C) During 1968 some progress had been made in suppressing black market and illicit currency/commodity activities. While annual statistics had shown a dramatic increase in violations, this increase had been attributed to more stringent investigative efforts. In October of 1968, the first MPC conversion since establishment of the system in 1965 had been successfully completed and it was estimated that over $6 million had been in the hands of unauthorized possessors at the time. (See 1968 MACV Command History for additional treatment of 1968 activities.)

1969 Activities

(U) Figure XIV-2 depicts the command experience with black market activities during 1969.

(U) A major step to halt the flow of dollar instruments into unauthorized hands was taken in June when a MACV directive was changed so as to prohibit nonappropriated fund (NAF) activities from delivering US currency, MPC, or personal checks payable in either form to individuals, organizations, or firms which were not authorized such currency. This change was aimed primarily at the large number of entertainers and their agents in RVN. The guidance authorized further mailing by the NAF activity of dollar instruments in payment for services to a bank designated by the agent in his verified country of citizenship or permanent residence. No dollar instrument could be delivered to any individual or firm in RVN. Payment to meet normal living expenses was authorized to be paid to entertainment agents in piasters, by piaster check, or in MPC to those entertainment agents legitimately authorized the possession of MPC, to meet legitimate expenses for food, billets, or other purchases from facilities where MPC was required. Vietnamese nationals were authorized payments only by piaster. [6]

(C) In July the concern of both MACV and AMEMB for the continuing problem of currency violations prompted a joint proposal providing for a mandatory dollar remittance program for all TCNs employed by the US Mission in RVN. The proposal stated: [7]

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


FIGURE XIV-2

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This Mission believes that a mandatory dollar remittance program, should be instituted for all Third Country Nationals (TCNs) employed by the US Mission in Vietnam, whereby dollar earnings would be immediately converted into the local currency of the TCN's country of citizenship. This mandatory scheme should reduce the possibility of TCN involvement in black marketeering and increase the foreign exchange of our principal TCN supplying countries, Korea and the Philippines. A study recently completed by the Joint Economic Office, indicated that approximately $60 million -- 45 percent of the total projected TCN dollar earnings exclusive of all payments in kind for CY 69 -- will be deposited outside the TCN's country of citizenship. As reported by MACV, some portion of this $60 million earnings not remitted to the TCN's country of citizenship enters the black market in Vietnam through dollar checks drawn on Stateside and other dollar accounts. The inducement for TCNs to exchange dollar checks for piasters in violation of GVN law and US policy is of course the more favorable exchange rate offered for piasters on the black market.

The following proposal embodies US views:

a. US dollar payments for salaries and allowances, not specified in the contract for payment in piasters (or MPC), will be made outside the Republic of Vietnam to the account of each (non-Philippine citizen) contractor employees in a bank of his choice in his country of citizenship, except to the extent existing employment contracts explicitly provide otherwise. No other provisions on this subject, except as enumerated below in para b and c, shall be contained in any new employment contract nor in any renewed or extended existing employment contract.

b. All US dollar payments to Philippine citizens for salary and allowances, not specified in the employees bank outside the Republic of Vietnam; and all such dollar payments, when Philippine citizens are initially recruited in the Philippines for work in Vietnam, shall be in accordance with the provisions of the Philippine Labor Offshore Agreement.

c. At the contractor's discretion, in no case prior to seven calendar days of contractor employee's departure from Vietnam on TDY, authorized leave, or termination except for cause; the contractor is authorized to provide dollar check, for which negotiability had been limited to a specified branch of a GVN-licensed commercial bank (i.e.,

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pay to Saigon branch of X Bank for Mr. Y) for purchase of travelers checks by the contractor's employee in an amount not to exceed one month's total pay plus all allowances not specified in the contract for payment in piasters.

d. Footnotes:

(1) When the Mission receives adequate assurance that newly-hired Philippine nationals can no longer have unrestricted dollar accounts on deposit in the Philippines, the US Mission would propose to SECDEF/SECSTATE that para (b) above and the words "non-Philippine citizen" be deleted from the proposal.

Before the Washington discussions in April 1969 on the Philippine Labor Offshore Agreement, all components of this Mission concurred in a proposal for mandatory remittance of TCN dollar earnings. This was generally accepted by all parties in attendance at the Washington meetings. However, problems were: (A) Could the remittance scheme be made retroactive, that is, could the US Government legally issue implementing instructions for contracts already in force without running the risk of a suit for damage? (B) Would the Government of the Philippines be willing to accept as a quid pro quo a USG-instituted mandatory dollar remittance scheme for Philippine nationals in exchange for GOP agreement to liquidate or place stricter exchange controls on a limited number of TCN dollar accounts now on deposit at the Philippine National Bank?

First problem was resolved through agreement that the mandatory remittance scheme would only be applied to new contractors and contract renewals. The second problem, the unrestricted TCN dollar accounts on deposit in the Philippines, is still being negotiated with the Philippine Government. On April 30, 1969, the Mission asked Manila about the GOP's reaction to the mandatory dollar proposal scheme ... No action has yet been taken by President Marcos on the proposal although approved by the government.

We do not want to delay action on control of remittance because of negotiations in Manila and consequently we suggest that a mandatory remittance scheme be instituted immediately for all TCNs other than Filipinos. Our proposal would insure Korean and other TCN mandatory remittances and would still permit the option of

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offering mandatory remittance to the GOP as a quid pro quo for tightening exchange controls on dollar bank accounts in the Philippines.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

If SECDEF/SECSTATE approve this Mission's proposal, we request joint dissemination to insure contractor implementation of the mandatory TCN dollar remittance program.

MPC Conversion

(C) The second MPC conversion, 11 Aug, was made as the Series-661 was converted to the Series-681. Significant data relative to the conversion was as follows:

1. Total amount Series-661 placed in country: $288,968,000.00

2. Total amount Series-661 destroyed prior to C-day: $ 6,991,009.60

3. Total amount Series-661 not placed in circulation: $ 88,752,000.00

4. Total amount Series-661 in disbursing officer's account at close of business 10 Aug: $113,128,763.90

5. Total amount Series-661 converted as of C+15 (26 Aug): $ 75,427,831.10

(NOTE 1: Amounts include conversions of Series-661 MPC to Series-681 MPC and to Treasury Checks.)

(NOTE 2: Amounts do not include $1,135,953.24 held on property receipt pending substantiation or outcome of board of officers actions.)

6. Amount of genjune Series-661 MPC confiscated during conversion: $ 25,194.40

7. Amount of counterfeit Series-661 MPC confiscated during conversion: $ 250.00

8. Amount reported to US Army Central Finance and Accounting Office Vietnam as out of country on 26 Aug (C+15): $ 254,998.20

(C) All US military bases reported the C-Day operations were generally smooth and successfully completed. Several minor problem areas were encountered but were resolved locally. The 7AF authorized a system of pre-funding a paying agent, to allow for concurrent conversion. Reports from throughout the command reflected a most effective and efficient conversion.

(C) As a result of experience gained from the conversion of 21 Oct 68 and improved applicable directives, substantial improvement was achieved in the overall conversion. This was particularly true of methods of dissemination of C-Day notification to field units. The initial

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message was transmitted by command wide (VMAC) distribution with certain added addressees to assure rapid dissemination and retransmission. The message also was transmitted with FLASH precedence. This enabled MACV headquarters to withhold release of the message for approximately four hours later than the previous C-Day notification. Finally, component commands telephonically confirmed receipt of the C-Day notification with all disbursing offices.

(U) Substantial problems were encountered in C-Day operations of the ROKFV and RTFV. Several reports were received concerning questionable activities on the part of these forces. Some of the more flagrant areas were as follows:

1. Troops were not restricted to their compounds until individuals had converted their MPC.

2. Both officers and enlisted personnel of the ROKFV were observed buying MPC from local Vietnamese nationals. Although official reports were lacking, similar actions were suspected of RTFV personnel.

3. The majority of ROKFV and RTFV personnel requested conversion of the maximum allowable amount, $150 on supporting documentation.

4. Conversions were not accomplished expeditiously.

5. Conversion documentation was incomplete and inaccurate. Subsequent inquiries revealed that little, if any, effort was made to orient personnel concerning conversion procedures.

6. Unusually large amounts of funds, other than personal, were submitted for conversion. In most cases, records were not available to substantiate these funds. As of C+15, funds in the amount of $1,068,238.54 were being held on property receipt pending verification.

(C) Because of questionable conversion activities by the ROKFV and RTFV, COMUSMACV issued two interim policy changes during the conversion. The first change required that all funds, other than personal, submitted for conversion by FWMAF be accepted by Finance Officers on property receipt only and information forwarded to MACV for approval of each fund prior to conversion. The second action terminated all requests for unit conversions as of 21 Aug for those units in contact with the enemy unless MACV was notified by the above date of the specific units involved. These were to be subsequently verified through MACV, J3 channels as valid requests.

(C) A substantial number of messages was exchanged between MACV and ships at sea including Seventh Fleet and MSTS vessels. This message traffic pointed out the need to develop specific instructions for these units concerning their procedures on C-Day in RVN. These procedures were incorporated into MACV directives.

(C) A specific problem involving ROKFV troops en route to RVN on the USNS Geiger resulted in a MACV policy decision never again to authorize the issuance of US currency (green) for use by ROK troops on MSTS ships en route to Vietnam. Series-681 MPC had not been prepositioned on the ship. Upon receipt of C-Day notification, the old Series-661 MPC on board was mailed to RVN and authority was requested, and subsequently granted, to issue US currency for use during the voyage. At the termination of the voyage, approximately $5,000 was not presented for conversion. This resulted in the movement of the ship back into the harbor until the

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US currency was presented for conversion. Ultimately, most of the dollars were converted to new MPC series.

(C) Overall execution of coordinated actions prior to C-Day was very smooth and effective. Information pertaining to C-Day was restricted to a bare minimum of personnel on a strict need-to-know basis. Coordination with other staff agencies was delayed until the last possible moment to reduce the risk of security violations. Close liaison with Combat Operations Center on a daily basis permitted flexibility in planning C-Day notification procedures and simultaneously permitted cancellation, if necessary, up to the actual release of the C-Day notification message. [8]

Black Market Modus Operandi

(C) The chief sources of dollars for the illegal market were the 5,000 US and TCN civilians in RVN, including the government contractors, construction workers, international traders and others who lived there or commuted into the country regularly. They could easily buy piasters ($VN) at 160 to 220 to the dollar instead of the official rate of 118. Since they paid their local bills in $VN, these civilians cut their living costs almost in half. They could also increase their profits by buying military scrip, which was also discounted by the money sellers, and then convert the MPC into such dollar instruments as travelers checks and postal money orders. The money market was a highly structured network that involved small street vendors dealing with large runners and bankers. At each step in the exchange there was a small markup to give everyone a profit. At the highest levels the money dealers and their customers had developed highly sophisticated forms of exchange. Two distinct trails were revealed.

1. The simplest method was for the customer to give a dealer in Saigon a personal or corporation check to purchase $VN or scrip. The dealer then deposited these in bank accounts maintained under code names in Saigon or Hong Kong. Once deposited in a legitimate channel of any international bank, the money could be transferred around the world.

2. A customer deposited his dollars in one of the blind accounts and presented his bank receipt to the dealer in $VN. In some instances, agents representing the dealers verified the deposits in the hidden accounts by cable.

(U) In August, the AMEMB with COMUSMACV, components, and CINCPAC concurrences recommended that the Armed Services Procurement Regulation Committee modify the currency exchange clause in all contracts for performance in RVN as follows: [9]

> Individuals employed under United States Government-financed contracts in Vietnam who have engaged in Black Market or other illicit activities will, as a matter of U.S. Mission policy, be suspended from all privileges granted by the United States Military, be denied access to all United States Military installations and are to be considered as unacceptable for continued employment under United States Government-financed contracts.

(U) On 16 Nov, Sen. Abraham Ribicoff, D-Conn, alleged that a billion dollar black market in US dollars and $VN "flourished" in RVN. He stated that his Senate Permanent Investigations

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Committee would conduct hearings on the currency black market. The Connecticut senator further said he intended to present evidence of currency transactions through US and Hong Kong banks.

(U) In subsequent testimony before Sen. Ribicoff's Senate investigations subcommittee the magnitude of the money black market in RVN received considerable airing with attendant wide coverage by the US mass media. Evidence was presented that a total of $374,655,987 from black market money operators in RVN had reached 13 different accounts in US and Hong Kong banks. A former FBI agent testified that some of the ill-gotten money ($24 million) had turned up in Dubai, a small seaport on the Persian Gulf where the money was used to speculate in gold. While much of the testimony before the subcommittee was allegation, it was clear that the illicit money operation was pervasive and that it was having a serious effect on the unstable and struggling RVN economy already burdened with critical imbalance of trade.

(C) The actions taken by COMUSMACV have been described above; however, they were applicable only to the military and those civilians accompanying the US Forces. A large number of civilians were outside the jurisdiction of the military and thus were free to continue their unsavory practices with relative impunity. In late November, Sen. Edward J. Gurney, R-Florida, in a message to AMEMBASSY, Saigon urged pressure be applied to GVN to exercise its sovereignty by deporting offenders of currency regulations. In replying to the proposal the Ambassador stated: [11]

> I have expressed concern about the black market problems on number of occasions in my discussions with President Thieu. Other senior officers of Mission have done likewise in their own discussions with other GVN officials. Senator Gurney's suggestion that USG encourage GVN to deport individuals who have engaged in black market operations is most timely. I have asked Ambassador Berger to review current status of USG-GVN efforts in this field with Prime Minister Khiem and make specific recommendation re deportation along lines of Senator Gurney's suggestion. We have long been aware of value of deportation as tool in combatting black-market activities, and have discussed this approach generally at various levels with GVN. However, it would be most useful to bring Senator Gurney's suggestion to personal attention of Prime Minister. Deportation is likely to be among most effective tools available for combatting black market activities.

(U) Meanwhile, the illegal rate of exchange for converting piasters to green dollars soared to 1:280, an all-time high, reacting to this inflation and the growing US urgings for more stringent control of black market activities. Prime Minister Khiem on 20 Nov directed a campaign be launched to eliminate transactions involving illegal US dollar instruments and commodities. The directive, issued through the Mayor of Saigon, tasked the RVN customs officials with the responsibility for the campaign in coordination with the National Police and US Military Police. A planning conference was held on 26 Nov during which 40 combined RVN-US teams were established. On 27 Nov these teams commenced a series of raids of establishments, private houses,

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sidewalk vendors, bars, and hotels. The raids continued for four days and while small amounts of illicit currency and commodities was confiscated, there was no question but that those who trafficked in the items would do so under threat of increased surveillance with attendant increased likelihood of apprehension. The initial raids resulted in confiscation of $VN 3 million worth of duty-free, PX items and $(US) 9,739.20 (green). Over 2,800 illegal items of merchandise were confiscated and $(US) 23,999 worth of illegal Vietnamese gold certificates were also taken.

(U) Follow up raids were conducted after the initial series and by the end of the year the amount of US dollars seized had risen to $20,047 while commodities valued at over $75,000 was confiscated. [12]

(U) At the end of the year the value of negotiable dollar instruments on the illicit money market in Saigon was at an all-time high. The illegal exchange rates were as follows: $VN135-140 for $1.00 MPC; $VN175-180 for $1.00 check; $VN220-230 for a $1.00 US Postal Money Order; and $VN250-275 for a $1.00 Federal Reserve Note (Green). Checks had declined in value somewhat due to the increasing number of counterfeits appearing on the market. By the end of December they were no longer being accepted from other than "known" customers. [13]

(U) Also at the end of the year there were indications that the restrictions imposed on the sale of money orders had caused a change in the modus operandi of AWOLs and deserters. The latter had relied on the profits from purchase of the money orders before the restrictions were imposed. With this means of support denied them, they turned to trafficking in PX items such as cameras, radios, TVs, and other relatively high dollar value items. Intensified MP surveillance of exchanges had begun to result in apprehension of these offenders. [14]

Alleged Incident at My Lai

(U) In late November the allegations that US troops had participated in a "massacre" of Vietnamese civilians at My Lai hamlet in Quang Ngai Province in May of 1968 first appeared in the US press. The allegations attracted world-wide press attention.

(U) Apparently the first suggestion that something extraordinary had occurred at My Lai had reached DA in early April, 1969 when SECDEF and five members of Congress received identical letters from Ronald Ridenhour, a former soldier who alleged "that TF Barker of the 11th Brigade had been assigned the mission of destroying My Lai and all its inhabitants. He went on to describe in detail several instances of murder which he believed to have occured there." [15]

(U) Upon receipt of the allegations, the SECDEF had directed DA to make a complete investigation of the allegations. The investigation was underway at the time the incident surfaced in the press. At the end of the year LTG William Peers and a team of investigators had just arrived in RVN and were conducting the in-country portion of their investigation.

The "Green Beret" Case

(C) The "Green Beret" case, as the incident was luridly dubbed by the mass media, involved allegations against eight personnel serving with the 5th Special Forces Group to include

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the commander, COL Robert F. Rheault. The other accused were: MAJ David E. Crew, MAJ Thomas C. Middleton, Jr., CPT Leland J. Brumley, CPT Robert S. Marasco, CPT Budge E. Williams, CW2 Edward M. Boyle, and SFC Alvin L. Smith, Jr.

(U) The accused were charged with violations of Article 81 (conspiracy) and 118 (premeditated murder) of the Uniformed Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). In substance they were alleged to have conspired to kill and subsequently to have murdered a Vietnamese civilian, Chu Yen Thai Khac, at Nha Trang "on or about 20 June 1969."

(C) An Article 32 investigation was ordered by CG, Support Troops, USARV (also the Chief of Staff/Assistant DCG, USARV, the officer having general courts martial jurisdiction). The charges were referred for trial; however, before the arraignment of any of the accused, the Secretary of the Army assumed jurisdiction, exercising his authority under Article 22 of the UCMJ. On 29 Sep, he directed dismissal of all charges against the accused.

(U) The case quite naturally attracted world-wide publicity and considerable irresponsible reporting by the mass media. While the allegations were serious, the notoriety was exacerbated by public utterance by many persons both within and without the US Government. Several famous lawyers expressed interest and made public observations relative to the substantive matters involved in the incident. Without doubt, the issues were complex and involved to a significant degree the national security interests of the US. The view was held in many quarters that the sensitivity of some of the evidence was, at least in part, a major consideration in the charges being dismissed. Further, it was suggested that the rights of the accused and the US had been significantly prejudiced by the irresponsible and garrulous publicity accorded accounts of the incident by the press.

Courts-Martial of US Civilians

(C) During 1968, the AMEMB Saigon had requested a blanket approval to request waivers of GVN primary right to criminal jurisdiction over US civilian offenders. This request had been denied by SECSTATE on the basis that the sole purpose of limiting waiver requests was to minimize the number of such requests and thereby reduce the visibility and magnitude of USG exercise of jurisdiction over US civilians. There had been several cases in which the effect of State Department policies had denied the military a means of punishing civilians accused of serious crimes. While the military had resorted to administrative resources (denial of privileges, discharge, and bar from further employment), there had remained a distinct requirement to establish more efficacious machinery for punishment of civilian offenders.

(C) In 1969 the State Department continued to resist efforts to establish more effective procedures for punishing civilians accompanying US forces in RVN. Citing the Latney Case (See 1967 MACV Command History) which had been overruled by the US Court of Appeals on the grounds the military did not have jurisdiction over Latney (a merchant seaman convicted of a Danang murder). While there was a divergence of views relative to the Latney case (apparently State and Justice Departments did not agree as to the applicability of the Court of Appeals ruling), the effect was to constrain MACV efforts at maintaining jurisdiction over civilian offenders. State Department reluctantly granted AMEMB permission to request GVN waivers. This tendency resulted in some instances of civilian offenders going unpunished, particularly in those cases such as currency and commodity violations in which GVN was disinterested.

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Acquisition and Use of MPC, US Dollars and Piasters by FWMAF

(U) Since many currency violations were traceable to FWMAF, particularly ROK, ROP, and Thai contingents, COMUSMACV imposed stringent controls in November on all FWMAF with the concurrence of the respective force commanders. The new controls were the responsibility of the FWMAF commanders and provided for the following measures:

1. Each FWMAF commander appointed a command finance representative to conduct all financial transactions for his force. The representative so appointed was the only agent authorized to conduct financial transactions with US military forces in the RVN, except for Australian Army Training Teams. In the case of the latter, US military disbursing officers located outside of Saigon, were authorized to furnish certain finance services to individual members of the teams serving with MACV advisory teams. This service was limited to the encashment of limited depositary MPC account checks for MPC, the sale of piasters in exchange for US dollars or MPC, and the exchange of MPC for US dollars for those individuals departing RVN on R&R from the aerial port of embarkation other than Tan Son Nhut Air Base. In those instances where US dollars were furnished team members going on R&R, the transaction was reported to the Commander, Australian Force, Vietnam.

2. Finance representatives of FWMAF acquired funds for their commands only from the Fianance Officer, Funding Division, Central Finance and Accounting Office, Vietnam (CFAOV), in the following manner:

a. MPC could be acquired only in exchange for US dollars or negotiable instruments drawn in US dollars or limited depositary MPC checks.

b. Piasters for official transactions and for resale to individuals could be acquired only in exchange for US dollars, negotiable instruments drawn in US dollars, MPC, or limited depositary MPC checks.

c. US dollars, US Treasury checks, or limited depositary MPC checks could be acquired only in exchange for MPC. Such transactions were not subject to control by use of MACV Form 385 (Controlled Currency Transactions Form) as this was intended for use by individuals subject to US military or civilian control.

d. US Treasury checks and/or limited depositary checks issued to FWMAF financial representatives for use in the RVN were to be drawn to the order of an appropriate US disbursing officer for payment to a military disbursing officer of a FWMAF. An example of this limited negotiability feature is as follows: "Pay to the order of Finance Officer, 99th Finance Section, for payment to CPT Jose Sampanos." Under no circumstances could a US Treasury check be made payable to an individual representative of a FWMAF in the RVN.

e. US Treasury checks issued to FWMAF financial representatives for transmission to the respective parent country were restricted as to payee authorized. Such checks could be drawn only to the order of the government concerned, or to a designated bank or financial representative of said government located within the geographical boundaries of the FWMAF country.

f. Control of MPC.

(1) The amount of MPC which could be returned by each FWMAF to US military disbursing offices was limited to the amount of MPC acquired from authorized sources minus the amount of confirmed sales in the respective FWMAF post exchange and other authorized activities.

(2) The amount of MPC which could be converted for each FWMAF in conjunction with an MPC series conversion was limited to the outstanding balance of MPC on day of conversion. This balance was equal to the total amount of MPC acquired from authorized sources since the previous MPC series conversion minus all returns of MPC to US funding sources and confirmed sales in the respective FWMAF post exchange and other authorized activities.

(3) When the outstanding MPC balance of a FWMAF was zero or negative, no further funding service would be furnished the FWMAF concerned until a positive MPC balance was re-established.

3. Financial representatives of FWMAF were responsible for ensuring MPC and piasters in the possession of their personnel were exchanged for US dollars, other currencies, or negotiable instruments, as deemed appropriate, prior to departure from the RVN. The provisions of other MACV directives and the appropriate financial working arrangement with the respective FWMAF prescribed the limitations on the amount of funds authorized to be converted on departure from the RVN.

4. US military disbursing officers were prohibited from furnishing US dollars or dollar-negotiable instruments to individual members of the FWMAF except as permitted to Australian Army Training Teams as described in 1, above.

(U) Component and uniservice commanders were authorized to provide certain limited financial services to assist FWMAF in the conduct of their financial affairs. The services provided were to be by mutual agreement entered into between the component or uniservice commanders and the FWMAF commander. Services were limited to the following:

1. Bulk funding of MPC or piasters. This procedure consisted of the cashing of US Treasury checks drawn in the manner outlined in paragraph 2d, above. Encashment of such checks required prior arrangement with the US military disbursing officer concerned to ensure local availability of funds.

2. Acceptance of site exchange MPC receipts in exchange for US Treasury checks payable only to Vietnam Regional Exchange (PACEX). Site exchange MPC receipts were accumulations of sales receipts generated from small local exchanges.

(U) Neither the more stringent controls nor the financial or military working arrangement executed between COMUSMACV and FWMAF commanders was a prohibition on making payments direct to an individual member of a FWMAF. When payment was in settlement of an amount legally due the individual by an official of quasi-official agency of the US Government, such payment was made in MPC or piasters. (US Treasury checks and limited depositary MPC checks were to be utilized.)[16]

(U) At the end year, the more stringent controls were in effect though it was still too early to appraise their efficacy.

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Serious Incidents with Racial Overtones

(C) In September there were 18 serious incidents resulting in confrontations and subsequent assaults between Caucasian and Negro servicemen. Three incidents involved relatively large numbers of personnel. Several of the incidents grew out of altercations in clubs and messes and resistance to MPs attempting to restore order and make arrests. Because of these incidents and the possibility that they reflected the efforts of dissident elements, COMUSMACV directed component commanders to conduct studies within their commands in an attempt to determine the causes of the disturbances. [17]

(U) In November, Mr. L. Howard Bennett, acting ASD (Civil Rights) completed a week long inquiry into racial unrest among servicemen in RVN. Throughout the inquiry, Mr. Bennett interviewd and listened to complaints of Negro servicemen at various locations where there had been indications of racial unrest. In his exit interview with COMUSMACV, Mr. Bennett summarized his findings as follows:

1. There was a communication problem in getting the word down from the top echelons of command, and a similar communication problem in getting problems up the chain of command so that appropriate action could be taken.

2. There was too much concern over the threat of black group violence, a threat that did not exist.

3. There was a need for more sensitivity to the problems of the black servicemen, more understanding of his cultural situation, and more of an appreciation of black pride and what it involved.

4. The "open door" policy of commanders was not sufficient. Negro servicemen believed there was a negative attitude in particular on the part of junior officers and noncommissioned officers.

5. The majority of blacks did not have confidence in the complain. and grievance machinery, and they did not understand all of the appellate channels available to them. They said they complained and nothing happened.

6. Black servicemen complained about inequities in the administration of military discipline, punishment, and the promotion system.

(U) Mr. Bennett, describing all of the above as constituting "a sensitive, explosive area," recommended that all echelons of command look more objectively at the sensitivities, problems, and pride of the black servicemen. He added that commanders must deal with problems quickly rather than allow them to fester through neglect or delay. He made the following specific recommendations:

1. Officers should get out and learn firsthand the problems of black servicemen.

2. Workshops, seminars, and human guidance councils should be set up under command guidance and control to surface problems and identify sensitivities.

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3. A system should be established to expedite the transmission of valid complaints through the chain of command to the echelon which could take affirmative action. [18]

(U) As a result of the increased awareness of the very human sensitivities gained from the information obtained from Mr. Bennett, COMUSMACV prepared a letter to every leader in the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, and Coast Guard units deployed in RVN. He addressed specifically the leader's responsibilities to keep the communications channels open, up and down, bad news as well as good, unresolved problems as well as solutions. He also directed a re-examination of policies and practices to eliminate unnecessary incursions on individual aspirations and identity, and he recognized the value of open forums, responsible discussion groups to permit an interchange of views. He also made clear, the requirement for the military mission accomplishment to remain paramount but he emphasized the leader's next principal concern was for the care and welfare of his subordinates.

(U) It was believed that all concerned gained from Mr. Bennett's findings an increase awareness of the thinking motivating the new breed of serviceman -- black and white -- better categorized by age rather than by race.

AWOL/Desertions

(U) In spite of press efforts to make it so, AWOL and desertions did not constitute a significant problem for MACV components during 1969. The AWOL and desertion rates for US troops in RVN, although a matter of concern, were much less than for the component services worldwide. Generally Army rates were the highest followed by USMC, USN, and USAF in that order.

(U) In 1968 MACV components had experienced the following AWOL and desertion rates per thousand:

AWOL

	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Avg
USA	1.99	2.30	1.79	1.85	2.84	1.90	2.63	1.70	2.15	2.36	2.22	2.22	2.16
USMC	.72	.59	.81	.65	.37	.53	.78	1.25	1.23	1.30	1.61	1.26	.92
USN	.27	.08	.45	.68	.61	.53	.45	.73	.65	.53	45	.49	.49
USAF	.08	.10	.18	.15	.23	.16	.27	.34	.27	.20	.38	.22	.21

DESERTIONS

	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Avg
USA	.32	.35	.26	.24	.41	.33	.38	26	.48	.40	.34	.39	.34
USMC	.15	.20	.14	.21	.05	.31	.35	.27	.46	.34	.33	.35	.26
USN	.03	.00	.08	.14	.00	.11	.02	.02	.10	.16	.15	.08	.07
USAF	.05	.01	.00	.05	.01	.00	.04	.14	.03	.05	.05	.06	.04

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DESERTION, 1969

	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
USMC	24	27	31	24	29	39	1	11	14	13	12	12
USAF	2	1	4	5	2	0	4	1	5	2	3	1
USN	5	11	2	1	0	3	0	2	1	2	0	1
USA	121	99	92	133	60	88	87	154	92	88	83	132
TOTAL	152	138	129	163	91	130	92	168	112	105	98	146




FIGURE XIV-3

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AWOL DATA, 1969

	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
USMC	119	112	83	90	105	74	99	94	78	68	84	113
USAF	22	12	14	16	12	13	13	12	23	10	13	12
USN	36	18	22	8	13	19	15	15	23	9	14	18
USA	800	1024	704	975	559	636	739	764	590	573	546	750
TOTAL	977	1166	823	1089	689	742	866	885	714	660	657	893

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FIGURE XIV-4

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(U) In 1969 there was a slight increase over 1968 rates in all categories except for Army desertions which occurred at a slightly lower rate than in the previous year. Figures XIV-3 and XIV-4 depict 1969 experience. The data took on added significance when viewed in terms of the experience of components worldwide and in previous wars.

(U) Worldwide all-Army AWOL rates in FY 67 and 68 were 78.0 and 89.7 respectively while the desertion rates were 21.4 and 29.1 for the two years of interest. Navy worldwide rates for FYs 67 and 68 were 22.4 and 14.4 respectively and desertions were 9.7 and 8.5 for the the same periods. The AF experience for the same two years was: AWOL 3.6 both years; desertions .42 and .44. The Army's Korean War AWOL rates ranged from 181.0 in FY 52 to 116.7 in FY 54; desertion rates for the same period ranged from 14.8 to 22.5. In sharp contrast was the peak WWII desertion rate of 63.0

(U) Clearly AWOL and desertion was not a significant problem for US commanders in RVN. Offenders were a matter of interest, however, in that there was a positive correlation of AWOL/desertion offenders to currency offenders. The AWOL or deserter serviceman frequently resorted to illicit purchase of money orders and travelers checks as a means of survival. Information received from several AWOLs indicated that Vietnamese Nationals dealing in money orders were supplying US Forces who worked for them with false ID cards, orders, ration cards, and commander's certificates. The servicemen used these documents for a few days and then were supplied with a different set of documents bearing another name. The Vietnamese usually concealed the MPC in the heaters or other sections of their vehicles and only gave the servicemen the exact amount for the money order(s). The MPC was usually counted and placed in an envelope when it was given to the servicemen for the purchase of money orders. The money trader also hired other US personnel to follow and check on the individual buying the money order to make sure that he did not run out with the money. The man checking the purchaser usually received 5 percent of the face value of the money order purchased. Another method the Vietnamese nationals employed to keep US personnel from running out with their money was to require some type of security, usually the individual's wallet or weapon. The US personnel were usually paid in Vietnamese piasters for their services. Based on information received from several US Army deserters apprehended in Saigon in July, false identification documents were being sold for the following prices:[19]

Ration Card:	$100.00
ID Card:	$ 50.00
Driver License:	$ 25.00
Class A Pass:	$ 25.00

Project MOOSE

(C) Project MOOSE (Move Out of Saigon Expeditiously) had begun in 1966 when the Ambassador and COMUSMACV had recognized the need to reduce the presence in the Saigon-Cholon metropolitan area. (See 1968 MACV Command History, pp. 801-5).

(C) By the end of 1968, the working population in Saigon-Cholon had been reduced from 7,800 to 6,400; the billeted population had been reduced from 10,500 to 7,200; and the leases on 21 hotels, 16 villas, nine office buildings, two warehouses, and six miscellaneous facilities in the Saigon-Cholon area were terminated.

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Project MOOSE Statistical Data

September 1966 - 30 June 1969

Saigon/Cholon	Sep 66	*Jun 67	Dec 67	Jun 68	Dec 68	Jun 69	Net Reduction Compared with June 1967
MACV	2,787	2,879	853	915	781	1,249	- 1,630
USARV	7,933	7,910	5,249	4,076	3,912	3,485	- 4,425
NAVFORV	1,200	1,480	1,688	1,302	1,056	1,156	- 324
7th AF	148	212	142	133	103	69	- 143
TOTAL	12,068	12,481	7,712	6,462	5,852	5,959	- 6,522
Tan Son Nhut							
MACV	110	435	2,444	2,397	2,442	2,240	+ 1,805
USARV	9,899	12,465	6,999	6,458	6,042	5,496	- 6,979
NAVFORV	266	210	140	281	164	148	- 62
7th AF	12,680	12,685	11,309	11,404	10,615	11,464	- 1,221
TOTAL	22,945	25,795	20,892	20,540	19,263	19,338	- 6,457
Total							
MACV	2,897	3,314	3,097	3,312	3,223	3,489	+ 175
USARV	17,822	20,375	12,248	10,534	9,954	8,971	- 11,404
NAVFORV	1,466	1,890	1,808	1,583	1,220	1,304	- 386
7th AF	12,826	12,897	11,451	11,537	10,718	11,533	- 1,364
	35,011	38,276	28,451	26,966	25,515	25,297	- 13,154

*Highest reported figures.

TABLE XIV-1

XIV-25

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(C) During the first six months of 1969, the major relocation actions involved movement out of the metropolitan area of various support units of 1st Logistical Command and the increased billeting of enlisted personnel in the expanded MACV Annex area. Remaining military elements in the Saigon-Cholon area consisted generally of RVNAF advisors, MACV Office of Information operations (AFVN and Press Center) required to remain in downtown Saigon, Free World Military Assistance Office support, and US Army Headquarters Area Command activities.

(U) Project MOOSE was officially terminated on 30 Jun 69.

(C) The original goals for Project MOOSE had been to reduce the Saigon-Cholon population to 7,000 personnel and the Tan Son Nhut area population to 21,000. A MACV program review in June 1968 lowered the Saigon-Cholon total to 5,450 and raised the overall Project MOOSE goal to 26,550 personnel remaining.

(C) From September 1966 through 30 Jun 69, actions taken by component commands reduced the military population in the greater Saigon area to 25,297 personnel. The Saigon-Cholon goal (5,450) was not met because of essential unforseen increases in MACV's Training Directorate for additional instructors and administrative personnel for the expanded language schools located in Saigon. Nevertheless, the overall goal was exceeded by a reduction of 1,253 less than the 26,550 figure. (A time-phased chart of personnel strengths, is shown in Table XIV-1.)

(U) In addition, from June 1967 through 30 Jun 69, there were 126 leases terminated in Saigon-Cholon primarily as a result of relocation of activities and personnel under Project MOOSE.

(C) In December, both State Department and AMEMB, Saigon expressed renewed interest in further reducing the US presence in Saigon and this interest along with continuing MACV efforts culminated in the designation of Project MOOSE II. At the end of the year a working group chaired by MACJ4 was preparing a plan for reducing even further the number of US and FWMAF activities in the metropolitan Saigon-Cholon area. [20]

CASUALTY DATA

(U) In 1969 US battle deaths in RVN exceeded 40,000. Table XIV-2 depicts cumulative data relative to US losses since the beginning of the US presence.

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COMPARATIVE CASUALTIES - SOUTHEAST ASIA

	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	Cum 1960 to Date
U.S. Military											
Deaths, hostile											
Vietnam #	-	1	31	77	146	1,365	4,989	9,358	14,561	9,367	39,895
(RVN)	-	(1)	(31)	(77)	(145)	(1,331)	(4,946)	(9,314)	(14,537)		
(NVN)	-	(-)	(-)	(-)	(1)	(34)	(43)	(44)	(24)		
Laos	-	10	-	1	1	4	19	20	31	47	133
Sub-Total	-	11	31	78	147	1,369	5,008	9,378	14,592	9,414	40,038
Thailand	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	
Total SEASIA	-	11	31	78	147	1,369	5,008	9,378	14,593	9,414	40,039
Deaths from other causes:											
Vietnam #	-	2	18	36	48	359	1,043	1,679	1,917	2,110	7,212
(RVN)	-	(2)	(18)	(36)	(48)	(359)	(1,043)	(1,537)	(1,899)		
(NVN)	-	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(142)	(18)		
Laos	-	-	3	-	-	-	2	1	2	3	
Sub-Total	-	2	21	36	48	359	1,045	1,680	1,919	2,113	7,223
Thailand	-	2	8	11	8	24	56	57	102	91	359
Total SEASIA	-	4	29	47	56	383	1,101	1,737	2,021	2,204	7,582
Wounded, nonfatal:											
Hospital care required:											
Vietnam	-	1	39	218	521	3,307	16,520	32,359	46,783	32,898	132,646
Laos	-	1	2	-	1	1	6	12	16	42	81
Sub-Total	-	2	41	218	522	3,308	16,526	32,371	46,799	32,940	132,727
Thailand	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	1	
Total SEASIA	-	2	41	218	522	3,308	16,526	32,371	46,801	32,941	132,730
Hospital care not required:											
Vietnam	-	-	35	193	517	2,803	13,540	29,629	45,991	37,210	129,918
Laos	-	1	2	-	-	3	27	25	30	66	154
Sub-Total	-	1	37	193	517	2,806	13,567	29,654	46,021	37,276	130,072
Thailand	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1
Total SEASIA	-	1	37	193	517	2,806	13,567	29,654	46,022	37,276	130,073

XIV-27 TABLE XII-2A

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COMPARATIVE CASUALTIES - SOUTHEAST ASIA

	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	Cum 1960 to Date
RVN Military											
Deaths from hostile action:											
RVNAF	2,223	4,004	4,457	5,665	7,457	11,243	11,953	12,716	24,323	18,863	102,904
Paramilitary									3,592	2,895	
Total									27,915	21,758	
Wounded, nonfatal:	2,788	5,449	7,195	11,488	17,017	23,118	20,975	29,448	61,084	56,039	234,601
RVNAF									9,612	8,995	
Paramilitary									70,696	65,034	
Total											
Missing:	2,515	3,233	1,270	3,137	6,036	7,848	3,283	2,340	1,996	655	32,313
RVNAF									464	259	
Paramilitary									2,460	914	
Total											
VC/NVA Military											593,491
Deaths from hostile action	5,669	12,133	21,158	20,575	16,785	35,436	55,524	88,104	181,149	156,954	
Prisoners of War (Cumulative)											32,544
Other Nation Military											354
Deaths from hostile action					1	14	60	76	104	59	2,987
Australia - New Zealand	-	-	-	-	-	17	506	1,005	824	635	8
Korea	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	8	-	-	199
Philippines	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	16	51	132	
Thailand	-	-	-	-	-	-	-				
RVN Civilian											
Deaths from hostile action					1,795	1,900	1,723	3,706	5,389	6,202	

SOURCE: Directorate for Information Operations
Office of the Secretary of Defense
11 March 1970

Including the adjacent waters which are within the limits of the designated combat zone.

NOTE: RVN Paramilitary casualty data are not available prior to 1968.

MORALE AND WELFARE

General

(U) During 1969 the morale of the command was maintained at a high state. This was due in part to the aggressive leadership at all levels of command. More significantly, however, high morale esprit seemed, in large measure, due to the individual soldier's awareness of and pride in his own as well as his unit's roles in the task he had undertaken. Soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines daily manifested their pride in their individual and collective missions. The vocal paroxyms of the radical dissenters and demonstrators in the US and elsewhere, frequently irresponsibly reported by the mass media, had little or no effect on the fighting men in RVN. Most men were busy practically around the clock, seven days a week and had little time to reflect on "moratoriums" and the like. Commanders were universal in their views that there was a fundamental understanding by servicemen why they were in RVN. One brigade commander, reflecting the views of his counterparts in other organizations opined, "The American soldier is still an outstanding fighting man when he makes contact with the enemy and closes onto his objectives." A division artillery commander echoed the same view in describing the morale in his organization: "Even the new troops, including those that suffer from idealistic passions, make surprising adjustments to their new environment and the realism of the moment."

(U) There were other factors which undoubtedly contributed to the state of high morale in the command. Foremost among these was the one year tour. Every serviceman arriving in RVN knew that barring misconduct on his part he could return to CONUS or a chosen overseas assignment at the end of his tour. In addition to the salutary effect of the tour length, there was the usual array of morale and welfare services provided all members of the command. The more significant of these are described in this section.

(U) A significant boost to morale, had one been needed, occurred following the President's appeal for support of the US Forces in RVN by the US public in his 3 Nov speech. There was a deluge of mail, gifts, and countless other expressions of support that left little doubt in the serviceman's mind that the great preponderance of his countrymen were solidly behind him.

Awards and Decorations

General

(U) During 1968 significant improvements had been made in what was already an efficacious MACV awards system. These improvements included authorization for division and separate brigade (when commanded by a general officer) commanders to make impact awards for valor to RVNAF personnel, establishment of procedures for meritorious service awards for FWMAF, and a more responsive system for recognizing achievement and valor by civilians. (See 1968 MACV Command History, pp. 800-803.)

(U) Because of the joint nature of the command, there were minor variations in awards and decorations policies and procedures. Table XIV-3 indicates approval authority for military and

AWARDS APPROVAL AUTHORITY

Decoration		Approval Authority										
		Svc Secy (1)	US MACV* (2)	USARV (1)	7th AF (1)	PACAF (1)	NAVFORV (1)	III MAF (1)	(3)	FMFPAC/ PACFLT (1)	(3)
Dist Svc Cross		x		x							
Dist Svc Medal	(9)	x									
Silver Star	(4)	x	x	x (12)	x	x				x	
Legion of Merit	(4) (5) (9)	x	x (14)	x		x				x	
Dist Flying Cross	(4) (5) (10)		x	x (12)		x				x	
Soldiers Medal (A, N, AF, M)	(4)	x	x	x (12)	x	x					
Bronze Star	(4) (5) (10)	x	x (14)	x (12) (13)	x	x	x	x		x	
Merit Svc Medal	(15)	x	x	x		x				x	
Air Medal	(4) (5) (10)	x	x	x (12) (13)		x	x	x		x	
Comm Medal	(10) (4) (5) (6)	x	x (14)	x (12) (13)	x	x	x	x		x	
Purple Heart		x	x	x (12) (13)	x	x	x	x		x	
Pres Unit Cit	(4) (7)										
Val Unit Awd	(4)	x		x							
Merit Unit C	(4)	x		x							
Navy Unit C	(4)	x									
AF Outstanding Unit Award		x									
Pres Medal for Freedom	(7) (9)										
Medal for Merit	(7) (9)										
Pres Awd for Dist Fed Svc	(7) (9)										
DOD Dist Civ Svc Award	(8) (9)										
Dec for Except Civ Service	(10) (11)	x									
Merit Civ Svc Award	(10) (11)	x		x							
Cert of Apprec for Patriotic Civ Svc	(9)	x		x							

LEGEND:

1 - Approved own svc awards
2 - Approved Army awds only
3 - FMFPAC auth same as PACFLT FMFPAC acts on DFC and above
4 - Auth for FWMF with Mission concurrence
5 - Meritorious awards to FWMF approved by Svc Secy of AF and Navy
6 - Only COMUSMACV awarded JSCM. Not auth for award to FWMF personnel
7 - Awarded by the President
8 - Awarded by Secy Defense
9 - For merit only
10 - For merit or bravery
11 - Auth for FW foreign civ
12 - Also awarded by commander in grade of MG or higher
13 - Also awarded by Commander of Sep Bde in grade of BG and CO, 5th Special Forces Group Awarded for valor to RVNAF, RF/PF company grade and below
14 - Approved for meritorious service to members of FWF. COMUSMACV approved ACM for 05 and below
15 - Not auth for award in RVN

*Army awards were given to members of other services with concurrence of service concerned

DECORATIONS AWARDED BY COMUSMACV/CG, USARV

	JSCM	PH	ARCOM	ARCOM "V"	AM	AM "V"	BSM
MACV:	2,945	705	2,868	1,729	2,157	67	7,999
USARV:	0	58,049	200,985	21,821	199,308	5,106	122,098
TOTALS:	2,945	58,754	203,873	23,550	201,465	5,173	130,097

	BSM "V"	SM	DFC	DSC	LM	SS	TOTAL##
MACV:	4,620	102	30	0	430	297	21,969
USARV:	24,137	1,175	4,285	250	1,360	6,193	644,767
TOTALS:	28,757	1,277	4,315	250	1,790	6,490	666,736

RECOMMENDATIONS FORWARDED TO OTHER HQ (All services)

	*COM	NCFV	AM	BSM	**SM	DFC	LM	SS	DCM	MH	DSC#	TOTAL
Army:	30		2	7			3	2	23	49	3	119
Navy:	99	1		148	1		14	15		5		283
Air Force:	79		6	221		6	52		3	3		370
Marine:	34		1	101	1		24	8	2	17	3	191
RVNAF:	36		12	199	5	3	29	14				298
Third Country:			1	87	1		21					110
TOTAL:	278	1	22	763	8	9	143	39	28	74	6	1,371

*Incl Army, Navy and AF Commendation Medals.
**Incl Soldiers, Navy and Marine Corps, and Airman Medals.
#Incl Distinguished Service, Navy and AF Crosses.

##VN: SS: 60
DFC: 3
AM "V": 24
BSM "V": 1,335
ARCOM "V": 1,081
ARCOM: 274

ROK: SSS: 2
AM "V": 2
BSM "V": 58
ARCOM "V": 12
ARCOM: 10

THAI: SS: 18
AM "V": 6
DFC: 1
BSM "V": 65
ARCOM "V": 87
ARCOM: 128

PHILIPPINES: ARCOM: 10

CHINESE: ARCOM: 1

civilian awards. In spite of the minor variations, the system generally worked well and deserving personnel received recognition for their performances.

(U) During 1969 the awards shown in Table XIV-4 were made by MACV and USARV. In addition to the awards approved by COMUSMACV and CG, USARV, awards were forwarded to other headquarters for approval as indicated in Table XIV-4.

(U) There were 447 unit awards processed during the year. Three outstanding civilian awards also were approved.[21]

Vietnam Campaigns

(U) In February COMUSMACV recommended to CINCPAC that the seventh campaign be terminated as of 30 Jun 68 and designated the "Vietnam Counteroffensive, Phase IV," and that the period 1 Jul 68 through 1 Nov 68 be established as the eighth campaign and designated "Vietnam Counteroffensive, Phase V." The latter termination date obviously was based on the bombing halt directed by the President as of that date. These dates were subsequently approved.[22]

(C) In October COMUSMACV, with component concurrences, recommended to CINCPAC that the Vietnam Counteroffensive, Phase VI Campaign be terminated as of 22 Feb 69. In terms of both enemy and friendly activities, the 22 Feb date appeared significant. The same proposal also recommended designation of the period 23 Feb-8 Jun 69 as the Tet 69/Counteroffensive Campaign. This period was justified on the basis of 70 significant named ground operations in which Allied forces incurred 3,289 KIA and 19,596 WIA. The enemy lost 56,021 men killed and captured and over 17,000 weapons during the period. Also of significance was the proposed termination date which coincided with the President's Midway announcement of Phase I redeployments. A decision on the COMUSMACV proposal was expected in January, 1970.[23]

Rest and Recuperation

General

(C) Throughout 1968 the rest and recuperation (R&R) program had undergone considerable reorientation as the result of the expansion of the Hawaii subprogram, the increased half fare options offered by the airlines, and the rapid growth in popularity of the Sydney subprogram. These factors also had contributed to the growing unpopularity of several of the Far Eastern sites, particularly Penang, Kuala Lumpur, Singapore, and Manila. As these sites declined in popularity, it had become necessary to increase daily on-ground capacities at Sydney and Hawaii to 1,500 and 2,000 servicemen respectively. At the end of the year there had been monthly, 30 flights to Sydney and 60 flights to Hawaii. Other sites in use at the end of 1968 were Bangkok, Tokyo, Hong Kong, and Taipei. In addition, CG III MAF had afforded personnel having families in Okinawa the opportunity to spend their R&R periods there with a weekly C-130 flight from Danang. Also, Guamanians or personnel having dependents on Guam could debark from Hawaii-bound flights if they desired. (See 1968 MACV Command History, pp. 810-821, for detail discussion of that year's R&R activities.)

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R&R EXPERIENCE

		JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
MACV	*	971	924	884	1121	1211	1296	1210	1282	1262	1124	1094	3360
	#	1018	1008	1129	1199	1233	1192	1222	1108	1143	1056	991	3044
USARV	*	25,936	23,309	25,707	25,048	25,139	24,635	24,918	25,728	24,833	24,837	24,075	73,711
	#	24,903	23,449	25,654	24,769	24,936	24,390	25,007	25,093	24,307	24,996	24,553	72,418
7AF	*	4035	3922	4214	4213	4150	4096	4256	4321	4112	4103	3881	12,602
	#	3638	3473	4018	3974	4030	3792	3791	3950	3833	3901	3750	11,413
III MAF	*	6449	5589	5736	5701	5984	6058	6446	5868	5636	4323	4956	5289
	#	5772	5152	5282	5255	5411	5362	5634	5297	4919	4210	4064	4311
NAVFORV	*	2234	1990	2145	1904	2002	2055	2255	2238	2199	3045	2193	2262
	#	2113	1985	2094	1870	1993	2013	1919	1897	1815	1921	1831	1974
AMEMB	*	78	76	71	95	75	65	107	109	107	63	69	62
	#	53	44	47	58	55	42	41	51	46	40	41	35
FWMAF	*	2079	1900	2390	1922	1970	1811	1939	1888	2038	1968	1961	1966
	#	2212	1929	2341	1911	2002	1865	1854	1787	1884	1838	1768	1879
7THFLT	*	137	119	165	94	105	84	85	85	85	91	75	80
	#	99	57	81	53	85	82	55	57	72	84	47	56
TOTAL	*	41,927	37,829	41,312**	40,098	40,634	40,098	41,216	41,518	40,272	39,554	38,304	39,618
	#	39,608	37,097	40,626**	39,089	39,745	38,738	39,525	39,240	38,019	38,046	36,985	35,883
PERCENT		94.9	98.1	98.3	97.5	97.8	96.6	95.9	94.5	94.4	96.2	96.6	90.6

* Allocated
\# Used
** Does not include Penang site which closed 1 Mar 69

TABLE XIV-7

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1969 Program

(U) The R&R program continued to be well subscribed in 1969. Table XIV-5 (R&R Experience 1969) depicts the use of the program by components, JWMAF, Seventh Fleet, and the US Embassy. There was as an average monthly utilization of 95 percent for the year. Almost 40,000 servicemen went on R&R each month.

Closure of Malaysian Sites

(C) The Malaysian sites (Kuala Lumpur and Penang) were closed because of decreasing interest and two fortuitous occurrences. On 26 Feb, use of the Penang site was suspended because of runway repairs at the airfield there. Meanwhile the MACV staff had concluded the Kuala Lumpur site should be closed because of lack of interest. On 13 May communal disturbances erupted in that city and all flights were suspended. The sites were never reopened because curfews remained in effect in these cities in spite of the short-lived disturbances.

Philippine Government Promotes Manila Site

(C) In June, the Philippine Government sought to increase the popularity of the Manila site by urging use of commercial aircraft instead of the military airlift currently in use. The proposal was motivated by the belief of GOP officials that Manila business interests stood to gain an additional $9 million annually and that an improved Philippine balance of payments would result. Significantly, the GOP officials offered to waive the usual landing, takeoff, and parking fees in order to attract the commercial airlift. There was serious doubt at MACV as to whether the change to commercial airlift for the Manila would in fact increase popularity; and in July COMUSMACV informed the State Department that the 25,000 personnel departing RVN under the President's 8 Jun announcement would preclude any increase in R&R flights to Manila. [25]

(S) In September the CINCPAC representative in the Philippines advised that he deemed it inadvisable to consider any increase in use of the Manila site. He based his position on the impending national Republic of Philippine elections and the violence generally associated with them. He further advised that MACV should be prepared to suspend the Manila R&R program on short notice should the anticipated disorders threaten the safety of US personnel. [26]

Wearing of Civilian Clothes on R&R Flights

(U) On 27 Jan, CINCPAC approved a COMUSMACV request to permit wearing of civilian clothes on all R&R flights except those to Hong Kong and Taipei. This change became effective on 15 Feb and was based on a desire to reduce the obtrusiveness of the US presence in host countries while affording more relaxed and comfortable travel for participants. The relaxation of the uniform requirements enhanced the appearance of the servicemen, most of whom were from combat units which did not have facilities needed to launder or dry clean uniforms in an acceptable manner. At Bangkok, however, a major problem occurred as the result of the wearing of civilian clothes. When incoming troops were observed debarking at Bangkok, there were complaints of preferential treatment from Thai immigration officials and the general public. This outcry culminated in a request from the Thai Supreme Command's Deputy Chief of Staff for reversion to the former practice of wearing uniforms. The host country's request was honored and R&R servicemen resumed wearing of uniforms to that site. [27]

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(U) In December and in response to continuing efforts by COMUSMACV, to permit the wear of civilian clothes by R&R servicemen, the ROC officials granted permission for personnel visiting Taipei to arrive in mufti provided such apparel was in good taste. At the end of the year only the sites at Hong Kong and Bangkok required R&R visitors to arrive in uniform. [28]

ROKFV Program

(C) In January the Deputy Commander, ROKFV requested establishment of an R&R program for his forces pointing out that all FWMAF except the ROKFV had at least 85 percent of their assigned strengths participating in an out-of-country R&R program and that his forces, because of low pay, could not afford to take R&R to countries other than ROK. He specifically requested 1,897 servicemen monthly be transported to Seoul for six days R&R. The request was forwarded to CINCPAC recommending favorable consideration as a special program exclusively for ROKFV with transport service provided through expanded MAC channel airlift. After coordination with COMUSKOREA, it was determined by CINCPAC that the costs of such a program precluded favorable consideration and the Deputy Commander ROKFV was informed of the decision. While lack of funds was the limiting factor, other considerations were the current special home leave program which was unique for ROKFV and the excessive, and in some instances illicit, amount of baggage being carried homeward by ROK personnel. [29]

(C) When informed on 27 Mar of the unfavorable consideration of his initial request, the Deputy Commander ROKFV asked reconsideration and the proposal was resubmitted to CINCPAC. The latter forwarded the request to JCS urging favorable consideration in the interest of equity for all FWMAF in RVN and enhancement of morale and effectiveness of the major FW FWMAF contributor, ROK. The request also included the same eligibility criteria as that used for US personnel (e.g., one out-of-country R&R per normal tour) and the use of MAC channel airlift funded in the same manner as other R&R airlift. [30]

On-ground Time Standardized

(C) In November the on-ground time was standardized at a minimum of 127 hours for all sites. This policy resulted in visitors to all sites having six nights and five days on the ground where in the past only servicemen to the long haul (Tokyo, Sydney, and Honolulu) sites had enjoyed the longer period. Because of the longer period, in effect an additional day, it was necessary to increase the minimum funds for personnel going on R&R to $250. (This requirement was waived for personnel using the Camp Zama facility on the outskirts of Tokyo.) [31]

Extended in-Flight Service for R&R Aircraft

(U) In attempt to improve in-flight services on aircraft, COMUSMACV in June requested CINCPAC query MAC relative to providing stereo music and movies on all MAC charter aircraft moving troops to and from R&R sites. When queried, the two carriers, Pan-American World Airways and World Overseas Airlines, provided cost estimates to MAC. The latter company's aircraft required extensive and costly modifications which precluded provisions of the service. Pan-American indicated it could provide the services desired at a cost of $95.75 per movie showing plus $40.00 per flight for earphones. The latter service was desired by MACV and contractual arrangements were made for service to begin 1 Jan 70. [32]

(U) In December, CINCPAC advised COMUSMACV that while he supported the position to improve on a continuous basis the in-flight services on R&R flights, the cost of the movies and

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stereo music would add approximately $.25 million to the annual cost of the program. Therefore, the service could not be approved. [33]

Effect of Troop Redeployments

(C) The Presidential announcement to reduce US troop strength in RVN combat units necessitated planning for reducing the R&R program proportionally. The first replacement action of 25,000 equated to a reduction of 11 R&R flights per month and this ratio was initially selected as basis for all replacement actions.

(C) Based on FY 69 R&R participation, FY 69 seat utilization percentage on R&R site preference survey, and the components' quarterly requirements reports, the preferred priority for the retention of R&R sites was as follows: (1) Hawaii, (2) Sydney, (3) Bangkok, (4) Hong Kong, (5) Taipei, (6) Tokyo, (7) Manila and (8) Singapore. To permit a variety in selection of an R&R site, it was recommended that these eight sites be retained as long as it was economically feasible and in-country strength permitted acceptable utilization.

(C) The rationale for reduction or closures of sites as requirements diminished was as follows:

1. Hawaii, Sydney, Bangkok, Hong Kong, and Taipei had a utilization factor above 97 percent and were the sites most requested by the troops for their R&R. Maintaining these sites at a high level commensurate with Vietnamization would best help morale.

2. The R&R Program to Hawaii affected the largest number of Americans, both military and their dependents. A proposal to increase the numbers of flights by 15 a month had been implemented to shorten the waiting time, reduce the gold flow, and permit more personnel to visit the site of their choice.

3. Sydney should be retained at current number of flights. Utilization was near 100 percent and survey indicated it was the most popular site. On-ground strength limitation was near the maximum, restricting an increase in the number of flights.

4. Bangkok was the departure point from Thailand for combat air crews going on R&R. There were over 40 flights per month scheduled to Bangkok and it could be reduced a proportionate share.

5. Hong Kong was the most popular shopping site and R&R personnel expenditure average was approximately double that of other free port sites. Additionally, Hong Kong was the operating/maintenance location for the civilian carrier which performed over 75 percent of all the R&R flights. MACV would attempt to maintain approximately the same number of flights to Hong Kong in order to reduce ferry costs and permit better scheduling.

6. Taipei had high utilization and was increasing in popularity.

7. Tokyo, Manila and Singapore had the lowest utilization percentages ranging from 94.8 percent to 87.5 percent. Many individuals visiting these sites were R&R standbys who could not obtain space-required seats to the sites of their choice for the dates they requested. Despite the above percentages, components' requests for specific locations indicated MACV was over-buying seats for these sites. Initial reduction in the program should be absorbed by these

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locations and any reduction in sites should begin with (1) Singapore, (2) Manila, and (3) Tokyo. Utilization figures and troop preferences should be the guiding factors for reducing and closing sites.

(C) It was anticipated that as troop strength in-country decreased, so too would the level of hostilities. A decrease in the level of combat operations would permit a greater number of personnel to be absent from their units and allow a higher percentage of personnel to take R&R. Therefore, the following forecast of requirements for FY 71 was forwarded to CINCPAC.

(C) The required number of flights to provide support for 85 percent in-country troop strength was as follows:

	TROOP STRENGTH		
Sites	484,000	425,000	375,000
Bangkok	42	42	42
Hawaii	75	75	75
Hong Kong	30	30	30
Manila	10	0	0
Sydney	45	45	45
Taipei	21	21	21
Tokyo	15	15	15

(These requirements reflected the desired number of flights per month.)

Flights reduction would not necessarily occur in the same quarter that troop replacement was effected, since the majority of troops who departed would have taken their R&R.

Conduct of R&R Personnel

(U) In 1968 the indecorous and sometime illicit behavior of a small number of personnel on R&R had caused considerable embarrassment to the Command and the US Government. This embarrassment had resulted from such incidents as illicit possession and introduction into host countries of marihuana, weapons, and munitions; departure of personnel from RVN with infectious venereal diseases; and the failure of individuals to have current innoculations. While COMUSMACV had directed stringent corrective action, the problem continued into 1969 though on a much reduced scale.

(U) In Hong Kong, a case which occurred at the end of 1968 seemed to have had considerable impact on R&R personnel. On 28 Dec, SP4 Charles E. Ramsey upon arrival at Hong Kong airport had been found to be carrying 762 marihuana cigarettes. He was tried, convicted, and sentenced to two years imprisonment for importation and one year for wrongful possession of "Indian Hemp" (marihuana), both sentences to run concurrently. Ramsey appealed his conviction to Hong Kong Supreme Court and the sentence was reduced to one year. In summarizing the court's opinion, Chief Justice Rigby observed that there had been 75 seizures of "Indian Hemp" in Hong Kong since January 1968 and, in each case, importation was attributed to US military personnel. In these seizures, 24 arrests had been made and 15 cases went to trial. In stern language, Justice Rigby warned that if importation of marihuana continued from RVN by US servicemen, the courts in Hong Kong would have to consider more severe punishment. This warning

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was disseminated widely to all R&R personnel and at midyear seemed to have resulted in improved compliance with existing rules. [34]

(U) Another incident occurred in Hong Kong on 6 Oct. Thirty-five marihuana cigarettes wrapped in a handkerchief were found on the floor of the customs hall by preventive service officers. While responsibility could not be fixed, there was little doubt that the marihuana had been deposited by a passenger from an R&R flight out of Cam Ranh Bay. This further misconduct caused COMUSMACV to direct that, effective 10 Oct, all personnel E-5 and below bound for Hong Kong would be physically searched.

(U) In December there were two more incidents at Sydney involving R&R servicemen. One incident concerned an AF sergeant attempting to take in opium; the second involved a soldier also having opium. The two men were promptly tried in Australian courts and given 10- and 5-year sentences respectively. Of greater significance, however, the remainder of the servicemen going on R&R to Sydney were subjected to 100 percent body search upon arrival and their baggage was checked thoroughly, to include the use of marihuana-detecting dogs. [35]

Postal Operations

(U) At the end of 1968 the US Forces Postal Service in RVN was operating at a high state of efficiency providing continually improving services to its customers. Significant improvements during 1968 had been: limitations imposed on other than servicemens' use of SAM and PAL following a visit to RVN by the Deputy Postmaster General and the use of retrograde C-141 aircraft for all personal mail regardless of class as approved by Assistant SECDEF for Logistics.

(U) In 1969 the system continued to handle a large volume of mail and money order service. The data in Figure XIV-5 depict the significant quarterly and annual workload of the system.

(U) As part of the continuing effort to eliminate mailing of contraband items, two significant measures were implemented. The first was fluoroscoping of outgoing parcels, which was instituted at Danang, Cam Ranh Bay, and Saigon aerial mail terminals. This program was performed by the USAF and utilized Bucky X-ray units. In July, the first dogs trained to detect marihuana arrived in RVN and they were used to intensify efforts to detect the illicit material in parcels.

(U) There was a significant change in postal operations on 15 Aug when PAL and SAM parcel privileges were withdrawn from NAF activities. The withdrawal resulted from amendment of Public Law 90-206 which had been proposed by COMUSMACV in December 1968. The proposal was based on reducing the volume of parcel mail, 65 percent of which was for NAF activities, and improving the overall service to servicemen. [36]

(U) Figure XIV-6 depicts the dollar value and number of postal money orders bought by US forces in RVN during 1969. Of significance in these data is the declining tendency reflected in the last quarter, a period which usually was marked by rising sales. The November sales (320,508 money orders valued at $21,560,410) was $1 million below October sales and $3.3 million below sales for September. The decline was attributed to the controls placed on the sale of money orders in order to reduce their illicit use in black market money transactions. (See Black Market Currency/Commodity Control.) Among these controls was the requirement for

POSTAL OPERATIONS




FIGURE XIV-5



MONEY ORDER SALES
NUMBER
600,000
500,000
400,000
300,000
200,000
100,000
MONEY ORDERS BOUGHT (READ RIGHT)
DOLLAR VALUE (READ LEFT)
JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC
MILLION
30
20
10
DOLLAR VALUE

FIGURE XIV-6

the postal clerk selling the money order to seal and mail the envelope for the customer. From all indications this provision was having its intended effect.

(U) The customary peak work load in postal operations occurred in December and the efficacy of the Christmas mail program was reflected in the delivery of nearly 30 million pounds of Yule mail. [37]

Chaplain

(U) During 1968, chaplain activities had been integrated into a truly unified tri-service effort providing area coverage regardless of component. This joint effort had ameliorated the problems attendent to dispersion of units, hazardous surface routes, and frequent lack of priority for helicopter lift; every serviceman in RVN, was afforded an opportunity for worship, sacraments, and spiritual counsel. Chaplain strength had stabilized at just over 550 chaplains (Protestant: 404; Catholic: 142; Jewish: 4.) by the end of the year.

(U) In 1969 chaplain strength continued to increase and by midyear reached 586. These chaplains provided a wide variety of traditional services in response to the religious and spiritual needs of the command.

(U) On 30 Mar, visits of denominational agents to the command were resumed as Bishop Paul V. Galloway of the United Methodist Church arrived for a tour. (The denominational visits had been suspended during Tet, 1968.) Other religious leaders visiting RVN and MACV during the first part of the year were: Army Chief of Chaplains, Chaplain (MG) Frank L. Sampson; PACFLT Chaplain, RADM H. J. Ratrige; Brigadier G. J. Crossman, Principal Chaplain for the Royal Australian Air Force; Right Reverend Arnold M. Lewis, Bishop of the Armed Forces for the Protestant Episcopal Church; Most Reverend Philip Nigel Warrington Strong CMG, Archbishop of Brisbane and Metropolitan of Queensland and Primate of Australia (Church of England); the Reverend William E. Flood, Secretary, Department of Chaplain Services, American Baptist Home Mission Societies; the Reverend Elwood Matthews, endorsing agent for "The Church of God of Prophecy"; Reverend Jim Davis, "Assemblies of God" endorsing agent; and DepCh of AF Chaplains, Chaplain (COL) Roy M. Terry.

(U) On 7 Jan it was learned that the Congressional Medal of Honor had been awarded posthumously to Navy Chaplain Vincent R. Capodanno who had been killed in action in September 1967. He was the second Navy chaplain and the third chaplain in history to earn the nation's highest military award.

(U) The advisory functions of the chaplain were accentuated in March when the command chaplain accompanied Chaplain (LTC) Nguyen Van Long, RVNAF Chief of Catholic Chaplains, and his official party on a tour of IV CTZ to visit the RVNAF chaplains in the field. The itinerary included visits to Can Tho, Sa Dec, Phu Binh Air Base, Moc Hoa, Cao Lanh, Chau Doc, and Vi Thanh Air Base. At the several sector headquarters the official party visited schools, chapels, and religious facilities used by RVNAF dependents. The visitation had significance as the initial visit by any Vietnamese Chief of Chaplains to the RVNAF chaplains in the field with the troops, and contributed greatly to the development and growth of the RVNAF chaplaincy.

(U) One of the highlights of religious activities during the year was an address by COMUSMACV at memorial services held at MACV headquarters on 1 Jun. This address which received considerable attention in the press and acclaim, both within and ourside the command, ended with the following prayer:

"O Lord, lest I go my complacent way,
Help em to remember
That somewhere out there a man
Died for me today.
So long as there be war
I must ask and answer
Am I worth dying for."

(U) During the third quarter, servicemen in RVN were visited by the following civilian clergymen: Rev Dr Norman Vincent Peale, pastor of Marble Collegiate Church in New York City; Rev H. C. Wood, endorsing agent of the United Presbyterian Church; and Rev Leon A. Dickerson, endorsing agent of the United Church of Christ.

(U) A MACV Command Chaplin's Conference marked the beginning of the fourth quarter as component and field force chaplains assembled in Saigon for a one day session. Plans for the coming holidays were reviewed as well as other subjects concerning the spiritual welfare of the command.

(U) Distinguished visitors during the last quarter included: Dr. G. Carlos Smith, LDS Bishop; Rabbi Aryah Lev, Executive Director of the Jewish Welfare Board; Chaplain (MG) Edwin R. Chess, Chief of Chaplains, USAF, and Chaplain (Rear Admiral) James Kelly, Chief of Navy Chaplains. During the Christmas season, His Eminence Terence Cardinal Cooke, Military Ordinariate and Dr. C. J. Hoffmann of the Lutheran Hour visited troops and conducted services throughout RVN.

American Red Cross

General

(U) In 1968 the American Red Cross (ARC) organization in RVN had continued to expand and by the end of that year there was an elaborate and responsive nexus of field offices, suboffices, hospital staffs, recreation centers, and clubmobile units providing services to US Forces. The ARC in-country strength had risen with the build-up of US Forces until it totaled over 400 men and women at the end of the year. During this period the organization had provided its traditional services to individuals to include assisting over 287,000 servicemen, handling 372,000 cables, confirming 46,000 emergency leaves and extensions, and granting of over 4,000 interest-free loans or grants. There also had been direct assistance provided nearly 19,000 hospitalized servicemen; volunteers had assisted in this effort with over 5,000 hours of service. The organization's Supplemental Recreational Activities Office (SRAO) also had expanded its activities with 17 units staffed with 125 young women whose popularity was clearly manifested by the continual demand from organizations for their support. Another measure of the improving services provided by ARC was the increase in messages handled from 24,000 per month in February 1968 to 34,000 monthly in February 1969. 38

1969 Activities

(U) During 1969 the tempo of ARC operations continued at a high level as evidenced by the following statistical summary of activities:

Servicemen Assisted	312,862
Emergency Leaves/Extensions	52,657
Loans/Grants	
Number	2,469
Dollar Value	$286,075

Service in Military Hospitals

No. of comfort kits distributed at cost of $57,000: 85,000.
No. of patients provided Red Cross basic welfare services: 22,957.
No. of hospital staff provided Red Cross basic welfare services: 4,590.
No. of patients attending 14,504 recreation events on wards: 200,918.
No. of patients receiving individual instruction in craft, hobby interests, etc.: 15,810.
Financial assistance to patients and hospital staff: $21,605.
No. of uniformed volunteers giving over 3,000 hours in service at hospitals in RVN: 49.

Safety Programs

No. of swimming and lifesaving courses conducted: 74.
No. of individual certificates issued: 416.
No. of first aid courses conducted: 15.
No. of certificates issued: 193.

Approximately 9,000 personnel of the 9th Inf Div received specialized training in combat survival swimming.

While the above data are impressive in terms of their large numbers, the presentation begs the true significance of the tremendous assistance to people represented by the workload. The contribution to the morale and well-being of the persons assisted defied measurement but there was no doubt it was most significant.

(U) The young ladies serving in the SRAO performed magnificently in operating the service centers and clubmobiles throughout RVN. Occasionally under enemy fire, the young ladies went wherever they could cheer a fighting man or make his day brighter. The continued popularity of the program was indicated in March when it became necessary for MACJ1, in coordination with 7AF, to promulgate uniform criteria for the establishment of SRAO units.

(U) The Water Safety Program continued to fill a vital need of the command. The program, which included both basic survival swimming and water safety instructor training, was held throughout RVN with the preponderance of training in areas where riverine operations were

conducted. In January, over 1,300 men of the 9th Inf Div participated in the program. In XXIV Corps, all members of an MP battalion received the valuable training.

(U) In June the annual ARC fund drive was held and $36,000 was collected throughout the command.

(U) In August ARC personnel handled a significant increase in emergency communication service as the result of Hurricane Camille which ravaged the Gulf Coast and portions of the eastern seaboard of the US. Welfare inquiries were sent to CONUS on behalf of both military and civilian personnel in RVN having families in the disaster areas. In many instances, the ARC reports furnished the basis for emergency leave authorizations for military personnel. A supplementary fund drive in RVN netted over $14,000 for Camille victims.

(U) As units commenced redeployment there was a realignment of ARC staff personnel. The SRAO units with the 9th Inf Div were reassigned on 20 Aug to other areas where commanders had outstanding requests for such personnel. The EMI staff also were redistributed where deactivations and redeployments resulted in no further requirements at sites vacated by departing troops. At the end of September, ARC strength in RVN was 430 members.

(U) In October, field directors reported a sharp rise in the number of requests for assistance from Vietnamese wives of US servicemen. The requests involved assistance in satisfying immigration requirements. The rising trend was expected to increase as there was an increasing number of marriages involving US servicemen and Vietnamese girls.

(U) The last two months of the year were particularly busy ones for the ARC in RVN. There were the usual holiday parties, visits to hospitals, and the omnipresent ditty bags. Of particular significance was the dramatic increase in literally tons of unsolicited mail and gifts that arrived from CONUS. The gifts ranged from Christmas decorations to more elaborate and expensive items such as tape recorders and polaroid cameras. Officials viewed this response as a measure of the support from the "Silent Majority" in response to the President's 3 Nov address.

(U) At the end of the year there were 390 ARC staff members in RVN.

ARC Efforts to Aid PWs

(U) In October the ARC intensified its efforts to open channels of communication and relief to US servicemen being held as PWs in North Vietnam. A resolution sponsored by the American society urging that PWs be given the benefits and protection of the Geneva Conventions was adopted without a dissenting vote in September by the representatives of 77 governments and 91 national Red Cross societies attending the quadrenial International Conference of the Red Cross in Istanbul. The ARC followed this action with a cable message to the Red Cross society of North Vietnam to take appropriate steps to ensure that US prisoners received the humane treatment called for in the Conventions. The Red Cross societies also were urged to have their governments address similar appeals to the government of North Vietnam. Department of Defense reports showed that 413 American officers and enlisted men were known to be PWs in North Vietnam and 918 others were missing and believed captured. Both through the world Red Cross organization and through diplomatic and other channels, the ARC had sought unceasingly to assist US prisoners since the beginning of the conflict. While the NVN Government had signed the 1949 Geneva Conventions covering the treatment of prisoners of war, it had refused

to permit delegates of the ICRC to visit prison camps where US prisoners were held. The Hanoi government also had refused to provide ICRC with the names of US prisoners they held or to permit the regular flow of mail between the prisoners and their families.

(U) The purpose of the Red Cross in the renewed appeal was to strip the issue of political and all other partisan considerations, and simply, in the name of humanity and all mankind to urge Hanoi to lift its curtain of silence and provide relief and comfort to the men and their families.

USO

(U) In keeping with its 28-year old "home away from home" tradition, the USO served the US fighting man in RVN in 1969. The organization's well known symbol was seen wherever servicemen were stationed and the USO was as familiar to the serviceman as MPC and the malaria pill. It was a touch of home, providing a constant reminder that the servicemen and women in RVN had not been forgotten. The USO continued to maintain their tradition of helpful friendliness and warm hospitality at the 16 USO facilities located from the DMZ to the Delta.

(U) The six agencies which formed the United Service Organizations, Inc. -- each represented by a star on the USO banner -- were the YMCA, YWCA, Salvation Army, National Catholic Community Service, National Jewish Welfare Board, and the Traveler's Aid Association of America. The USO in RVN operated at the request of DOD and was supported by voluntary donations (chiefly through Community Chest, United Fund, and Combined Federal Campaign).

(U) The USO meant different things to different people. To some servicemen it meant a stateside hamburger and milkshake, a couple of the latest songs on the juke box, and a short game of pool before going back to post. Some men, in from the field, looked forward to the free hot showers and shaves offered at some USO facilities. A man could pick up a free paperback book, a recorded tape, or write a letter home, or catch the floor show while passing through a USO club. Some liked to just sit and watch TV, browse through the gift shops, or play cards. Some of the clubs offered package-wrapping, others had photo lab facilities or close access to a beach. In fact, there were so many things going on in the USO facilities that every serviceman could find a little diversion, relaxation, and maybe even a laugh or two.

(U) Many of the clubs provided musical instruments that could be checked out for those men who would like to beat out their frustrations on the drums or blow the lonely feelings through a trombone. The man who was not receiving enough mail could pick up a letter from the mail call basket from someone in the USA who wanted to write to a serviceman in RVN.

(U) In addition to the normal facilities, the USO provided a variety of standing programs such as table tennis and card tournaments, jazz shows, quiz shows, and films of various types. Staff members also arranged special events such as dinners and barbecues and, on many occasions, entertainment by both professional and amateur talent.

(U) A well-known and appreciated feature of the USO operation was the USO shows. Through national USO Headquarters, in the US, and the USO-Hollywood Overseas Committee, arrangements were made for the frequent tours of the nation's foremost entertainers. During 1968 and 1969, some of the stars who visited Vietnam were: Bob Hope, Martha "Marsh" of the Boondocks"

Raye (on her seventh trip), Sebastian Cabot, "Mission Impossible's" Greg Morris, George Jessel, Gypsy Rose Lee, Troy Donahue, Ron "Tarzan" Ely, Joey Bishop, "The Cascades," "The Lively Set," and a variety of renowned figures from the sports world.

(U) The USO staff in RVN, in addition to maintaining the club facilities, constantly searched for new and unique program ideas. One club featured a Tom Sawyer Day complete with a fence painting contest, greased pig chase, and a barbecue. Another club held a volley ball tournament between military units stationed in their area and a Montagnard ARVN unit. For Father's Day, one club featured a diapering contest with two-month-old baby pigs as the babies.

(U) The attendance dramatically testified to the success of the USO in RVN. The first club had opened in Saigon in April 1963, with an average daily door count of 350. Since then the number of facilities had steadily increased, as well as the number of servicemen attending these facilities. In 1969 the USO in Vietnam entertained more than half a million US servicemen each month.

(U) In an effort to reach every US serviceman in RVN, the USO also presented a daily half-hour radio program of music and information about USO activities at 1230, seven days a week, over the American Forces Vietnam Network. The program's hostess, a USO staff member, featured celebrity interviews, top-forty musical hits, and up-to-date news about USO happenings throughout RVN.

(U) In the Saigon USO, a jointly operated (commercial-military) overseas telephone exchange functioned daily from 0830 to 2000. Additionally, branch lines fed throughout RVN. During 1969, the switchboard averaged over 8,000 calls per month to US.

(U) Other USO facilities, in addition to the Saigon USO, operated in Danang (4), Nha Trang, Di An, Chu Lai, Qui Nhon, Cam Ranh Bay (3), An Khe, Can Tho, Tan Son Nhut, and Vung Tau.

(U) The USO operations in the Pacific areas were not restricted to RVN. Clubs also were located in Tokyo, Manila, Taiwan, and Thailand, and more clubs were planned.

(U) The USO constantly received large quantities of donated gifts from the US, especially during the Christmas season and other major holidays. Such donations included books, toilet articles, cake and cookies, and stationery. USO staff members also made trips into the field to pass out these gifts to the servicemen who were unable to get to one of the clubs. For those servicemen who had access to a USO facility, the clubs were jammed with gifts for distribution to troops. The USO in RVN also acted as a "clearing house" and distribution center for the millions of letters received from individuals, organizations and officials in the US expressing their support of US effort in RVN.

(U) At the end of the year there were over 50 USO club staff members in the RVN, professionals in such fields as recreation, social work, art, drama, history, and business. They were all volunteers, each having expressed their willingness to serve in RVN and their interest in helping make the US servicemen's tour more pleasant. Their normal tour of duty was from 18 months to two years.

(U) In general, wherever there was a need in the RVN, the soldier, sailor, airman, Marine or Coast Guardsman found a peaceful and friendly atmosphere in a USO "home away from home."

Post Exchange

General

(U) During 1968 considerable progress had been made in improving management practices and overall operational efficiency of the Vietnam Regional Exchange (VRE). In spite of the problems presented by a largely indigenous and TCN work force, lack of adequate and secure storage, vast number of outlets throughout RVN, and vulnerability of facilities and operations to enemy action, the VRE had provided essential services to its customers. Major improvements during 1968 had been:

1. Categorization of exchange outlets and establishment of standard stockage assortments based on volume of business and space available.

2. Initiation of a store inventory system which provided central cognizance over most outlet stocks on a monthly basis.

3. Assignment of specific responsibilities for in-transit security on VRE merchandise.

4. Improvement in use of MP saturation patrols so as to suppress truck diversions.

5. Increase in covered storage space.

6. Authorization for the use of Sea Land vans and containerships for redistribution of stocks within RVN.

See 1968 MACV Command History, pp. 821-829 for further coverage of 1968 operations.

1969 Operations

(U) At the beginning of 1969, the VRE was operating the retail facilities with known additional requirements as indicated below:

Type	Number	Known Additional Requirement
Main Stores	46	
Base Stores	62	
Troop Stores	110	1
Imprest Funds	93	1
Cafeterias	13	6
Snack Bars	30	6
Snack Stands	27	4
Central Kitchens	2	1
Porta Kamps	33	18
Mobiles	35	
Trailers	20	1
Clubs/Messes	951	

These facilities were doing over $40 million worth of business monthly in providing vital morale and welfare services throughout RVN. 39

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VRE ORGANIZATION




FIGURE XIV-7

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(U) The VRE was organized on a geographical basis as shown in Figure XIV-7. From it's headquarters in Cholon, command and control was exercised to the area exchanges by function. The major depot was moved to Long Binh during the year and it was planned to move the entire depot activity ther when storage and warehouse space became available.

(U) At the end of the year the VRE was operating the following facilities for supported elements:

Type	Number
Main Store	48
Base Store	67
Troop Store	108
Imprest Fund	105
Cafeteria	14
Snack Bar	49
Snack Stand	30
Food Plant	5
Porta Kamp	44
Mobiles	44
Food Trailer	11
Beer Bar	1
Bakery	1

(U) Figure XIV-8 contains significant data relative to VRE system operations for 1969. Except for February, when operations were affected by the enemy's Tet high point, the system's total sales exceeded $40 million monthly with March and June being the peak months.

Losses

(U) As in previous years the system continued to experience difficulty with losses during 1969 as the data in Figure XIV-8 indicates and as evidenced by the continued ample supply of obvious exchange merchandise on the black market. While some of the illicit merchandise undoubtedly reached the black market through authorized exchange purchases and subsequent unlawful resale, there was little doubt that significant amounts were continuing to be diverted and otherwise illegally removed from the VRE system. During the year considerable improvement was made in the recovery of lost merchandise. (See Table XIV-6.)

(U) A major and most significant loss occurred at Danang on 22 Apr when a grass fire ignited an ammunition dump. The resultant explosions heavily damaged the recently-opened Freedom Hill Base Exchange, causing a $200,000 loss of equipment and merchandise. This exchange was closed completely on 27 Apr after an enemy rocket attack destroyed another $27,000 worth of merchandise.

(U) On 20 Aug another major loss occurred. The China Beach Exchange incurred damages in excess of $250,000 when an electrical fire destroyed the concession arcade and the electrical repair shop. Another fire on 1 Oct at the Danang beer and soda yard resulted in a $103,000 loss of stock. This fire was caused by the failure of a MHE operator to use proper procedures in refueling his forklift.

TABLE XIV-6

VRE OPERATIONS
(Dollars)

	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN
Losses:						
Enemy Action	1,728	2,381	17,794	9,113	1,169	none
Other	160,723	191,100	145,555	367,863*	249,795	168,296
Recoveries	8,179	850	25,143	34,103	27,155	114,812
Net Retail Sales	32,264,929	31,552,982	37,899,414	36,047,630	33,855,982	39,290,687
Food	2,078,820	1,763,560	2,124,249	2,053,909	1,673,141	1,604,790
Services	10,518	8,576	10,756	13,017	12,813	14,839
Concessions	6,108,915	3,513,351	6,388,799	6,221,129	5,951,955	5,529,720
TOTAL	40,463,182	36,838,469	46,423,218	44,335,685	41,493,931	46,440,036
Inventory/Sales Ratio	2.97	3.24	2.57	2.58	2.70	2.33

	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
Losses:						
Enemy Action	5,000	6,001	4,955	132	none	none
Other	52,166	395,234	160,680	192,973	211,818	234,324
Recoveries	133,745	51,972	39,539	80,918	65,094	71,383
Net Retail Sales	36,670,943	33,815,837	33,150,542	34,675,480	34,999,369	33,400,560
Food	1,746,277	1,738,372	1,982,713	2,082,478	2,033,407	1,952,137
Services	15,839	13,914	16,630	18,038	21,729	19,945
Concessions	5,879,080	6,176,497	6,462,242	6,970,096	7,615,189	6,928,293
TOTAL	44,312,139	41,744,620	41,612,127	43,744,092	44,669,694	42,300,935
Inventory/Sales Ratio	2.65	3.10	3.27	2.86	2.70	2.76

* Includes $200,000 loss incurred when grass fire occurred at Danang ammunition dump on 22 April.

[redacted]

(U) During the fourth quarter, enemy losses were minimal with none occurring during November and December. This was not the case with other losses as those from other than enemy action totaled over $600,000 in value. A significant portion of the losses occurred at the Saigon Depot and during transit from Saigon to the depot. There were three instances of entire containers beings diverted by LN employees. In all three instances the containers contained high value items such as tape recorders and cameras. Also US Military Policemen diverted a truckload of Martel cognac, a highly-valued black market item, worth $21,120 to an ARVN compound. While the subjects were apprehended, the merchandise was not recovered.

Curtailing Black Market in PX Goods

(U) In 1968 steps had been taken to limit the use of US exchange privileges for ROKFV and PHILCAGV personnel. These limitations had resulted from flagrant abuses by some shoppers, particularly with respect to heavy purchases of rationed and high dollar value items and other merchandise sought by the black market. (See 1968 MACV Command History, p. 625.) In April 1969 a system of designating certain exchanges for exclusive use of ROKFV and RTFV personnel was implemented in Saigon and subsequently expanded to include all FWMAF and all VRE outlets for the purchase of both rationed and nonrationed items. The Allied commanders concurred in this system and the commander of VRE was charged to ensure a fair and equitable distribution of merchandise throughout the system. [40]

(C) In spite of the efforts described above, there was little doubt that PX goods were continuing to fuel black market activities in RVN. Notwithstanding repeated efforts by commanders and VRE staff there was a steady flow of PX products into illicit sources. The October promulgation (See Discipline, Law and Order.) of intensive controls to reduce black market activities included the following measures directly affecting VRE operations.

1. Subject to availability of physical facilities, FWMAF were limited to purchases in their own PXs and all goods to all PXs were allocated on a troop strength basis.

2. Cigarettes were no longer sold to clubs and messes.

3. Liquor, beer, soda, and other supplies, were allocated to clubs and messes on the basis of membership.

4. Diamond and fur concessions were terminated.

5. Other high dollar value items (those over $100) for sale in exchanges and concessions were reviewed on an individual basis for selective retention or withdrawal, the aim being to balance their availability to the soldier from other sources and their importance to his morale vis-a-vis their desirability on the black market.

6. All other items carried in PXs were reviewed on a continuing basis to assure that they were actually required by troops, and the quantities were needed for individual use. Particular scrutiny was made of any new items proposed for the inventory. [41]

(C) The restriction had full support of the entire US Mission and the elimination of the luxury items of high dollar value from PX inventories, and denial of US PX access to FWMAF were strongly urged by the Embassy. [42]

[redacted]

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(U) In October a disorder occurred at the Cofat PX in Cholon when US CID personnel were collecting evidence of Thai military personnel engaged in black market activities. The CID personnel were photographing Thai soldiers making purchases in the exchange, and as CID personnel were departing the PX at the end of the afternoon, they were surrounded by a group of Thais who demanded the film from camera. The CID personnel left the scene with camera and film intact. At about noon the next day, Thai personnel at the PX again protested the CID picture-taking. An estimated 100 Thai soldiers gathered at the scene, and several made menacing gestures with weapons toward CID personnel. One Thai soldier apparently fired two rounds from his carbine but fortunately did not hit anyone. The USAHAC Provost Marshal was called to the scene and discussed the situation with the RTVF CofS and, subsequently, the RTVF Deputy Commander. Order was restored when all agreed to the Provost Marshal's suggestion that each record the facts and meet later to discuss the incident.[43]

Personnel Problems

(U) The efforts by the Mission to reduce TCNs in RVN (See Chapter IV, Third Country Nationals) had an impact on VRE operations. The overall goal was to reduce the number of TCNs by 90 percent over a three-year period. By 30 Sep, the number of TCNs authorized for VRE had been reduced to 792 from a high of 1,361 in April. As the TCN draw-down progressed it became necessary to increase US civilian and military authorizations as LN employees could not be hired and trained in the numbers and with the skills needed to replace TCNs.

(U) At the end of the year, VRE's middle management workforce, the TCN, and assigned military personnel had diminished due to GVN pressures and US troop redeployments and the situation was regarded critical. Qualified replacements were not to be had and there was no significant reduction in the number of outlets. The VRE carefully reviewed authorizations and requirements and made reorganizations where appropriate; however, it was feared that any sudden repatriation of TCN employees would have damaging effects on the system's operations.

Container Shipments

(U) A Sea Land Inc. contract to provide second destination deliveries in RVN became effective in January. Utilization of this service during the initial month of operation was as follows:

1.	Vung Tau	19 containers
2.	S-2 (Cofat)	55 containers
3.	Long Binh Depot	44 containers
4.	Retail Accts Saigon/Long Binh	13 containers
	TOTAL	131 containers

The service was monitored by Movement Control Center, Saigon Support Command, to determine whether Sea Land could support all container customers in Saigon Area with this service.[44]

(U) The use of container shipments proved highly successful. Pilferage was reduced significantly and damage in transit was minimized. The Sea Land containers were used for the remainder of the year for intratheater shipments.

Unauthorized Concessionaires

(U) In February the VRE complained that its revenues were being eroded by the relatively large number of unauthorized concessionaires operating throughout RVN. Many of these outlets were adjuncts to clubs and messes and they operated without the VRE system thus denying capture of profits into appropriate welfare funds. Further the operation of such outlets was clearly prohibited by MACV directives. To bring the concessionaires into the system, COMUSMACV directed subordinate commanders and components to survey their respective activities and either legitimately bring all concessionaires into the VRE or replace the existing concessionaire with a properly-negotiated one within the aegis of VRE. [45]

PROJECT MACONOMY

> The Project MACONOMY has the overall objective of attaining the most effective and efficient utilization of resources within all elements of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam. [46]

(U) The Project MACONOMY program was established for the achievement of greater management effectiveness among all elements and at all levels within MACV. The program initiated in October 1967, was specifically aimed at:

1. The elimination of malpractices and nonadherance to established logistic policies.

2. Analysis and revision of logistic systems and management practices to correct or improve logistic support structure, concepts, and doctrine.

3. Achieving maximum management effectiveness in the command while ensuring responsive and uninterrupted support of the command mission.

4. Improvement of management and operating practices in all echelons and the stimulations of positive management improvement actions to ensure the achievement of requisite military capability at the most economical cost.

5. The encouragement of personnel motivation by providing command attention and support for the program at all levels within MACV.

6. Monetary savings reported under Project MACONOMY for FY 1969 were $336,697,870. In addition 1,929 manpower spaces were realigned.

[redacted]

FUNDING

(C) Budget functions of the MACV Comptroller were to prepare and monitor budgets for the headquarters, the MACV Field Advisors, and the Rural Development Cadres. The headquarters was financed by Navy Operations and Maintenance funds allotted CINCPAC. The MACV Comptroller's office prepared the budget request and forwarded it to CINCPAC. The MACV Field Advisors included all US Field Advisors (RD Cadre, PHOENIX, etc.). These were financed by Army funds (O and M, A). The budgets were prepared by the MACV comptroller branch and submitted to USARPAC through USARV. The budget for the RD Cadre, less the advisors, was preapred by CORDS and submitted to MACV for review and consolidation. The request was then forwarded to CINCUSARPAC via USARV. For the Intelligence Data Handling System and Studies and Observations Group the budgets were prepared by those divisions and forwarded to MACV Comptroller for review. These were funded by CINCPAC. A second budget from SOG, was classified and was prepared by SOG and forwarded directly to CINCPAC. Switchback funds supported CIDG and the 5th SFGA; the budgets for this program were prepared by 5th SFGA and reviewed by MACV, then returned to 5th SFGA for submission to CINCUSARPAC. The AID/DOD Realignment budget was prepared by MACJ4 and submitted to MACV comptroller for review and submission to CINCUSARPAC.

(C) Funding of the RD Cadre Program became the responsibility of COMUSMACV on 1 Jul. The program was transferred from the Office of the Special Assistant, American Ambassador to ACofS, CORDS. The major problems in providing financial support to the program with Operations and Maintenance, Army (OMA) funds were identified. OSD/JCS were requested to provide COMUSMACV with special authority to allow: (1) payment of salaries and allowances to RD cadremen at the province level; (2) accountability for material to be dropped at point of issue to the RDC Program; and (3) construction and maintenance of GVN facilities. The authority was granted 30 Jun by Joint SECDEF/CIA message. The SECDEF designated DA as funding agent with responsibility for accounting for and disbursing support in RVN. Funding channels were from DA to COMUSMACV through CG, USARPAC and CG, USARV. To permit time for the development of special financial systems required for support of the RDC Program, it was agreed that OSA would continue to provide financial systems and disbursing support to the program through September.

(U) In FY 69, fund support for Major Equipment was provided to Hq, MACV and the MACV Field Advisory elements from the O and M, N allotments. At the request of Department of the Navy and upon decision of OSD responsibility for the funding of Major Equipment was transferred from the Department of the Navy to DA.

(U) As a result of recommendations forwarded by the MACV Comptroller to OSD new funding channels were approved. Prior to 1 Jul all Hq, MACV and the MACV Field Advisory Elements operations and maintenance fund support was provided by the CNO through CINCPAC. Subsequent to 1 Jul funding for the headquarters remained in the CNO-CINCPAC channels, however; funding for the MACV Field Advisory Elements became the responsibility of DA. The principal advantage which accrued from the two changes was the elimination of a complex and unresponsive billing reimbursement procedure that existed to permit payment of DA by CNO for supplies and equipment issued to the field elements. The Hq MACV FY 71 Budget including the Field Advisory Elements, was $13,472,000, $786,000 over the FY 70 figure.[47]

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INSPECTOR GENERAL

General

(U) The Office of the Inspector General, MACV, (MACIG) was a joint activity providing COMUSMACV with inspector general service concerning matters within RVN. This involved relations with all RVNAF/US/FWMAFs. The organization and activities was perhaps unique worldwide as no other US command inspector general office encompassed the range and variety of matters within the cognizance of MACIG. (See Figure XIV-8.)

(U) During 1969 as a greater degree of stability returned to the RVN many acts began to surface that had transpired during the build-up under the expediency of war. Allegations of corruption, inefficiency, waste, and atrocities required immediate attention by the Command. Many of the investigations conducted were of events that occurred two and three years prior to the time they were reported. MACIG in performing its regular IG mission was required to investigate the allegations and report the facts and circumstances to COMSUMACV.

(U) In 1966-1967 MACIG was primarily concerned with its inspection role, however, based on the many new requirements for investigations, emphasis during 1968-1969 shifted to development of its investigative capability. Figure XIV-9 depicts the cumulative number of investigations conducted by MACIG for the period 1966-1969.

(U) During the same period personnel requirements increased as the IG mission expanded. Authorized and assigned strength for the period were as follows:

YEAR	AUTHORIZED	ASSIGNED*
1966	2	6
1967	2	12
1968	8	26
1969	21	56

*Average strength

(U) In the fourth quarter an internal reorganization of the Investigations Division was directed by MACIG to provide greater authority and control over assigned personnel. During the reorganization, the Complaints Branch was removed from the Investigations Division and formed as a separate division reporting directly to the Deputy Inspector General. Figure XIV-8 shows MACIG organization at the end of 1969.

(U) MACIG improved internal operations by requiring development of operating procedures for the divisions which would be used in establishing continuity for replacement personnel. A program of instruction was conducted as orientation for incoming personnel which included overall inspector general regulations; organization of MACIG; relations with components; conduct of inspections; and the advisory functions.



MACIG ORGANIZATION
INSPECTOR GENERAL
DEPUTY
EXEC OFF
ADMIN
ADV DIV
COMP DIV
INSP DIV
INV DIV
SMJ

FIGURE XIV-8

MAJOR MACV IG INVESTIGATIONS (CUMULATIVE)




FIGURE XIV-9

(U) In order to process the large volume of investigative and inspection reports handled by the office, a Magnetic Tape Selectric Typewriter (MTST) and Xerox 3600 copier were acquired in the fourth quarter.

Inspections

(U) In contributing to the accomplishment of the MACV mission the Inspections Division made 102 inspections and inquiries in 1969, covering all MACV advisory elements from Mobile Advisor Teams to province level Area Logistical Commands, divisions, and CTZs, including USN and USAF teams. All but nine province and two division advisory teams were included among the activities inspections. In addition to these inspections, other representatives of the MACV personnel in the field were provided opportunity to present individual complaints and grievances. The visits also provided the MACIG with opprotunities to identify unresolved problems and to followup on corrective actions taken by units in response to observations and findings of previous inspections and visits.

(U) Four special inspections of the support complexes at Danang, Qui Nhon, Cam Ranh and Saigon were directed by COMUSMACV as followup to the recommendations of the Cole Board of Inquiry. The matters addressed were: (1) control of entry and circulation of individuals, (2) security and protection of US installations, and (3) control and accountability of US property.[48] When COMUSMACV approved the Cole Board recommendations he followed with a letter to the DCG, USARV, directing that actions be taken to implement the recommendations of the board.[49] Additionally, he sent another letter to component commanders directing a joint onsite security survey of the Cam Ranh Bay Peninsula areas and all military installations thereon.[50] As a followup to these actions, the Chief of Staff directed MACIG, in early 1969, to inspect the support activities at Cam Ranh Bay, Danang, Qui Nhon, and Saigon to determine the extent to which the three areas of inquiry discussed by the Cole Board had been improved. These inspections were conducted as special inspections and were directed only to inquire into the three main subjects of the board report. Cam Ranh Bay was inspected during the period 17-24 Mar; Danang was inspected 31 Mar-6 Apr; Qui Nhon was inspected 14-20 Apr; and Saigon Support Command (less the US Army Depot, Long Binh) was inspected 20-24 Oct.

(U) On 29 Jan, the Chief of Staff directed MACIG to make a vertical inquiry of the entire MAT/MALT structure to determine effectiveness of the concept and to identify strengths and weaknesses in the system and any problems relating to mission performance, discipline, efficiency, and economy.[51] During the period 7-15 Feb, 47 MATs in the 42d DTA and 92 of the 96 MATs in the III CTZ were visited. Since it was found that the observations concerning most of these units were similar, it was decided that during the inspections of province/sector advisory teams, MACIG inspectors would visit each MAT team in the area.

(U) Because of the concern of COMUSMACV and DEPCOMUSMACV over reported conditions of ARVN personnel and RF/PF family housing conditions in Kontum Province, MACIG in coordination with the IG (RVNAF) made a special combined inspection of personnel conditions and family housing in Kontum City and Kontum Province during June and July. Another combined inspection of RVNAF hospitals and medical facilities was conducted during the period 29 Jul-11 Oct.

(U) An investigation conducted during the summer of 1969 revealed that serious deficiencies existed in the operations and management of open messes and nonappropriated fund activities.[52] In establishing a sound basis for operations, MACIG formed a special inspection/audit team to inspect, audit, and assist those messes which were under the direct control of MACV advisory elements. This team became operational 22 Sep and completed inspections and audits of 13 open messes prior to the end of the year.

(U) Among the activities which were inspected by MACIG for the first time during 1969 were the advisory teams located at the five Area Logistical Commands and the installations and activities of the JGS Schools and Training Centers. The activities of the JGS Schools and Training Centers required the IG team to visit 60 separate locations scattered throughout RVN.

Complaints

Introduction

(U) The Complaints Division was the primary recipient of complaints initiated within the Headquarters, MACV, Complex. Statistics as presented in Tables XIV-7 through XIV-10, provide detailed information as to the source and type of complaints received during the period January-December 1969.

(U) Action on receipt of a complaint was to provide local resolution, a referral for information upon which to base a reply, or accomplishment of final action by the Inspector General/Force Inspector to which the case was referred. Case monitoring continued after transfer of final action responsibility as information copies of close out actions were provided MACIG by the command or staff agency to which they were referred.

(U) The 1969 case load of 824 cases was comparable to the 1968 case load of 827 cases. This reflected a healthy situation and was attributed to a better understanding by military and civilian personnel of the advice and assistance which the Complaints Division provided in resolution of complaints and requests for assistance.

(U) Two conclusions may be drawn from the case load which remained at the same level as 1968:

1. Personnel concerned were convinced of the integrity inherent in the inspector general complaints and requests for assistance system and could rely on it.

2. The inspector general complaints and requests for assistance system, with the high level of acceptance apparent in the case load, was a major contributing factor in controlling complaints and grievances of servicemen.

Complaint Category Analysis

(U) A comparison of complaints and requests for assistance received in 1969 with 1968 indicated a dimunition of 14 of the 28 categories and an increase in a like number over the 1968 figures.

(U) Major improvements in the area of assignment, retirement and tour curtailment, promotion, discrimination and prejudice, personal property and baggage, pay and allotments, and compassionate leave were noted, as follows:

1. During 1969 only two cases concerning discrimination or racial prejudice were registered with inspectors general serving HQ, MACV, or MACV units in the field. In neither case were the allegations substantiated. When compared with seven similar complaints in 1968 it became apparent that orientation programs and sensitivity of the command in this area had a beneficial effect.

2. The reduction of complaints concerning promotion from 96 to 34 was a positive indication that all concerned had a better understanding of the enlisted promotion system.

3. The reduction of complaints concerning assignments demonstrated improvement in personnel management matching personnel capabilities to job requirements.

4. A marked reduction in pay and allotment complaints indicated that the incidence of lost or misplaced Finance Data Record Files had been brought under control. This had been the major cause of pay complaints in the past.

(U) Problem areas continued concerning awards and decorations, punishment, leaves, transportation, and military duties.

1. Confusion over requirements for award of the Combat Infantry Badge accounted for the increase of complaints in the awards and decorations category. Clarification of requirements brought this problem under control.

2. Complaints concerning leave involved ordinary or compassionate leave to CONUS, special leaves and the problem of late returns to RVN. There were indications that conditions under which the various types of leave were granted were not understood by all individuals going on leave.

3. Military duties continued to cause complaints which were almost exclusively related to the MACV Provisional Defense Force (PDF). The basic problem was back-to-back tours of those personnel eligible for this duty caused by large numbers of personnel being excused. MACIG conducted an inquiry into this problem in September which resulted in a temporary easement of the problem. The exemption rates again started to rise and this problem would require continuing attention. The morale problem engendered by PDF was therefore subject of a special study by Complaints Division. [53]

Conclusions

(U) There was a general improvement in administrative procedures and if this trend continued, complaints and requests for assistance were expected to decrease. There was a need for further improvement in the area of "people-to-people" communication. The use of "Open Door" policies at all levels of command was given further emphasis. In the case of Hq MACV personnel, where there were no scheduled Troop Information or Commanders Hour, a periodic information bulletin written for all soldiers which contained new or changed requirements and desired standards in the many areas of direct [illegible] would be useful in reducing problems that result in complaints and requests for assistance.

COMPLAINTS BY TYPE
1969

MONTH	PERS ADMIN		UNIT ADMIN		SUPPORT ACTIVITIES		PAY ALLOTMENTS		PERSONAL PROBLEMS	
	J	UJ	J	UJ	J	UJ	J	UJ	J	UJ
January	11	12	17	15	16	6	7	3	2	3
February	7	9	12	11	17	8	5	4	7	2
March	6	9	15	16	9	9	7	2	5	5
April	12	18	6	16	8	6	6	4	6	1
May	11	15	5	14	9	13	5	5	3	4
June	12	14	6	24	10	4	9	4	4	4
July	6	12	11	9	7	8	4	10	5	3
August	6	11	7	3	7	14	4	2	9	5
September	7	10	3	5	1	4	2	1	8	10
October	4	10	5	2	2	3	1	3	6	7
November	6	5	5	5	4	2	3	1	7	7
December	2	3	2	2	1	0	1	0	7	9
Total	90	128	94	122	91	77	54	39	69	60

COMPLAINTS AND REQUESTS FOR ASSISTANCE
CATEGORY OF PERSONNEL

MONTH	TOTAL	EM	OFF	CIV	% OFF
January	93	70	21	2	22
February	81	54	22	5	27
March	83	49	31	3	37
April	83	62	16	5	19
May	84	70	10	4	11
June	91	70	20	1	21
July	75	64	10	1	13
August	68	52	15	1	22
September	51	37	10	4	19
October	43	33	08	2	18
November	45	29	14	2	31
December	27	17	09	1	33
Totals	824	607	186	31	

COMPLAINTS AND REQUESTS FOR ASSISTANCE
1969 CASE SUMMARIES

MONTH	OPENED	PENDING	CLOSED	
			JUSTIFIED	UNJUSTIFIED
January	93	0	53	40
February	81	0	48	33
March	83	0	42	41
April	83	0	38	45
May	84	0	33	51
June	91	0	41	50
July	75	0	33	42
August	68	0	33	35
September	51	0	20	31
October	43	0	18	25
November	45	0	25	20
December	27	0	14	13
Totals	824	0	398	426

JUSTIFIED: 48%

COMPLAINTS AND ASSISTANCE REQUESTS
1 January - 31 December 1969

GROUP/CATEGORY	JUSTIFIED	UNJUSTIFIED
I. Personnel Administration		
Transfer (1)	23	36
Assignment/Instructions (2)	19	38
Extension/Enlistment (4)	13	13
Curtailment/Retirement (5)	5	14
Promotion (7)	14	20
Records (24D)	14	3
Totals	88	124
II. Unit Administration		
Awards/Decorations/Efficiency Reports (8)	9	26
Military Duties/Details (10)	35	34
Punishment/Liability (11)	26	34
Discrimination/Prejudice (13)	0	2
R&R/Leave (17)	22	22
Flagging Actions (24B)	3	0
Security (24C)	2	4
Totals	97	122
III. Support Activities		
Port Call/Proccessing (3)	6	7
Mail (16)	5	1
Transportation (19)	20	13
Hold Baggage (20)	3	3
Quarters (21)	28	23
Mess/Commissary (18)	21	20
PACEX (22)	3	3
Treatment: Medical/Dental (14)	5	3
Combat Support/Leadership (15)	2	4
Totals	93	77
IV. Pay/Allotments (12)	57	38
Totals	57	38
V. Personal Problems		
Compassionate Leave/Assignment (6)	2	2
Marriage/Dependents/Friends (9)	14	9
Personal Propery (24E)	7	2
Corruption/Currency Control (24A)	12	20
Requests for Assistance (23)	36	41
Totals	71	74

Total figures exceed 824 due to multiple categories appearing on the Inspector General Action Request Form

Advisory Division

General

(U) The MACIG provided advice and assistance to the continuing development of the IG Directorate of RVNAF JGS throughout the year as related in the following principal events.

Improvement of Procedures Used by the Complaints Office of the Investigations Division, RVNAF-IG Directorate

(U) As a result of meetings and conversations between the IG Advisor and officers in the Complaints and Investigations Office, RVNAF IG Directorate, certain shortcomings came to light which needed to be corrected. With the assistance of the MACIG Advisory Division, the following improved procedures in RVNAF IG Directorate were implemented:

1. Categorization of complaints as justified or unjustified.

2. Establishment of a system to search for trends.

3. Maintenance of separate statistics on investigations and complaints.

4. Refined and more meaningful statistics.

DA Inspector General Orientation Course

(U) To further assist the RVNAF develop and maintain an effective Inspector General System, MACIG requested DA send a team of instructors from the office of the Inspector General, DA, to RVN to conduct two IG Orientation Courses for RVN officers in 1969. The first course began on 31 Mar. Approximately 110 officers attended the two courses which included instruction in the US Army techniques of conducting and of reporting Annual General Inspections; methods of conducting investigations; and effective means of processing complaints and requests for assistance. The courses were augmented with instruction presented by appropriate members of the RVNAF IG Directorate. Certificates of completion were presented to 44 Vietnamese Inspectors General upon completion of the second course.

Special Inspection of Hospitals

(U) Based on the allegations of RVNAF senior commanders and complaints from other sources, the JGS-IG recommended to the Chief, JGS, that a series of special inspections be made of all military hospitals. He approved this recommendation and the inspection plan was developed with the first of 47 hospitals inspected on 29 Jul. MACIG suggested, and JGS-IG concurred, that a representative of MACV Command Surgeon be included on the team. By the end of 1969 all 47 hospital inspections were completed.

Inspector General Conferences

(U) MACIG held conferences of inspectors general and inspector general advisors in subordinate units on 1 Aug. The purpose was to bring inspectors general of the command up to date on IG activities within MACV and RVNAF.

(U) Also MACIG hosted a Combined MAC/JGS conference for the inspectors general and inspector general advisors of the command on 14 Nov. MACV, RVNAF, component CTZ and DTA representatives attended.

(U) The JGS IG Directorate held a conference for inspectors general on 5-6 Dec. Corps, division, CMD, and Special Forces inspectors general and representatives of the inspections divisions of the Central Training Command, Central Logistics Command, POLWAR Agency, and the Mobilization Directorate of the JGS attended. The MACIG Advisor attended in an advisory status.

Investigations

General

(U) The need to conduct detailed and professional investigations into matters of interest to the command increased materially over previous years. The Investigations Division handled 68 separate investigations in 1969. Of this total, 48 were cases that were investigated by officers assigned to the division. Twenty other cases were referred to component or subordinate commands for investigation. These investigations, when returned to MACV, were subjected to detailed analysis by MACIG investigators before they were forwarded to the CofS for his action.

(S) A unique category of investigation embraced those investigations of mutual interest to both Vietnamese and US officials. Such investigations were handled by combined teams of officers representing both nations. The mutual support and close cooperation evidenced by representatives of both nations produced investigations which significantly impacted on policies related to the conduct of the war.

RVNAF Corruption/Maleficence

(S) The following two cases were long term investigations conducted in phases by a permanently assigned investigating team composed of US and RVNAF officers representing MACV and JGS respectively.

1. CIDG CASE. The case was initiated on 18 Jan. It concerned the determination of facts and circumstances regarding alleged undisciplined behavior by Vietnamese Special Forces, Civilian Irregular Defense Group, and US Army Special Forces personnel, and irregularities in the management, control, and accountability of US funds and property at certain CIDG camps. The first of a series of investigations was conducted at Camp Thien Ngon, III CTZ, beginning 6 Feb. This report of investigation was approved by COMUSMACV on 23 May. On 3 Apr, the second of this series of investigations began at Camp Trang Sup, III CTZ. A series of combined MACV/JGS-IG followup inspections to verify compliance with appropriate regulations and directives began on 24 Sep with the first camp being Camp Thien Ngon. These inspections and investigations were also conducted at CIDG camps in I, II, III, and IV CTZs.[54]

2. RUNG SAT SPECIAL ZONE (RSSZ) CASE. On 21 and 29 Mar, COMNAVFORV sent letters to COMUSMACV concerning the military situation in the RSSZ. It was alleged that the five Hoa Hao RF companies in the RSSZ had poor leadership, lack of discipline, refused to accept new commanding officers, were ineffective, padded their payrolls, and allowed some

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soldiers to work on the Saigon docks rather than perform their military duties. As a result of that information COMUSMACV directed a combined investigation. The investigation was conducted during the period 3 May-9 Aug. With the exception of ineffectiveness of the Hoa Hao companies and refusal to accept new commanders, the basic allegations of poor leadership, lack of discipline, pay irregularities, and allowing personnel to pursue civilian occupations rather than perform military duties were substantiated. The problems in the RSSZ were long standing, and the environment in which these problems occurred was created from a lack of unity of effort due to the separation of the military command and civil authority. On 2 Sep the report of investigation was approved by the CofS and copies were forwarded to MACJ3, MACCORDS, COMNAVFORV, and CG, II FFORCEV for information and appropriate action. A followup visit was made on 17 Dec to determine if the recommendations made in the final report had been acted on. The visit stopped at Gia Dinh Province where it appeared that basic implementing instructions had not been received at province level. A second followup visit was scheduled for 1970. [55]

Dong Tam Cement

(S) This case was investigated by an ad hoc team of officers provided by MACIG and JGS IG. In a letter from MACV CofS, to CofS, JGS, 8 Sep, it was reported that truck loads of cement had been removed from Dong Tam, Dinh Tuong Province (IV CTZ), and sold on the civilian market. In a return letter to MACV CofS, on 12 Sep, JGS CofS requested a combined MACV/JGS investigation to determine the facts relative to two allegations: (1) that truck loads of cement had been removed from Dong Tam and sold on the civilian market; (2) that a number of air conditioners, fans, desks, and cabinets had been looted by military personnel from Dong Tam Base. It was determined that no evidence was available to substantiate either allegation. A small number of fans was stolen, but the thefts were considered insignificant in comparison to the 1,900 originally installed. It was substantiated, however, that the internal security of Dong Tam Base, to control looting, was inadequate. On 22 Nov, the interim report of investigation, containing recommendations to preclude recurrence, was submitted to MACV CofS. The final report in English and Vietnamese was submitted to MACIG on 26 Nov. Results of the investigation were forwarded to MACJ4, MACPM, MACDC, DEPCORDS and CG, DMAC. [56]

Illicit Activities of ROKFV

(S) The following three cases represented efforts to keep the command informed about the illicit activities of the ROKFV:

1. C-DAY. On 13 Aug, the CofS received a communication alleging that ROKFV personnel were engaged in illegal activities on 11 Aug, the day designated as C-Day for conversion to a new series MPC. (See Discipline, Law, and Order, this chapter) The matter was referred to MACIG for investigation on 15 Aug. The investigation, conducted during the period 15-30 Aug, determined that the ROKFV units ignored MACV Directive 37-10 and written instructions from MACCO and were totally unprepared for C-Day. Instead of being confined to their compounds on C-Day, while the old MPC was collected, Korean troops were out among the population engaging in large scale illicit currency manipulation. Conversion documents prepared by ROKFV units throughout RVN in order to convert old series MPC were fraudulent. Some of the official funds submitted by ROKFV collection officers were questionable and lacked supporting documents. The ROK exchange system in Qui Nhon for example attempted to convert approximately $270,000 which allegedly represented three days receipts. The report of investigation was approved by the CofS and noted by COMUSMACV on 18 Sep. Copies of the report were referred to MACJ5, MACPM, MACCO, and MACJA for information and appropriate action. The case was closed 19 Sep. [57]

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2. BRASS. On 27 Feb, COMUSKOREA advised COMUSMACV of an illicit shipment of 210 tons of US brass shell casings that had arrived at Inchon from RVN aboard a ROK Navy LST on 3 Mar. MACV CofS directed that the matter be investigated. The investigation determined that at least two large illegal shipments of brass had been moved from RVN to ROK during 1968 on ROK Navy LST or LSM vessels and that brass in small amounts was constantly being moved out of RVN in the personal baggage of returning ROK soldiers. The investigation recommended that a system be developed to guarantee early detection of brass stockpiling and to provide procedures to ensure that ROKFV comply with MACV directives. The recommendations were approved by the CofS on 26 Oct. [58]

3. KOREAN POST EXCHANGE. On 23 Sep, the CofS directed MACIG to investiage irregularities in the ROK "Tiger" Division Exchange system. The investigation addressed the following two allegations: (1) that ROK officers assigned to the division exchange system attempted to defraud the USG; (2) that VRE employees submitted false reports to VRE Headquarters in Saigon and PACEX Headquarters in Hawaii. It was determined that ROK officers of the Tiger division exchange system presented for conversion on C-Day $270,000. Since this amount appeared grossly disproportionate to what their exchange system should have had, US officers refused to convert the money without proof that it was legally acquired. Subsequently, the ROK officers produced false sales slips and attempted to intimidate and bribe VRE employees in an effort to get the money converted. When the approaches failed, the Tiger Division reported a drop of $279,417.50 in PX inventory in an attempt to justify the money they presented on C-Day for conversion. Despite strict and clear instructions to the contrary, two VRE employees, one through fear of the ROKs and the second through sheer stupidity, almost succeeded in legitimizing the drop in the ROK inventory. Conspiracy with ROKFV was not a factor in these offenses. The report was approved by the CofS, MACV, on 26 Nov. Copies were forwarded to MACCO, MACJ1, MACPM and Hq VRE, for information and appropriate action. [59]

Illegal Acts by US Forces

(S) Investigation into the illegal acts of US personnel are represented by the following two cases:

1. Alleged Fraud, Misconduct by a US Officer. An anonymous letter written to the Vietnamese Minister of Finance on 16 Mar, alleged that Mrs. Dang Thi Quyen and a US major assigned to HQ MACV, conspired to embezzle Assistance-In-Kind (AIK) funds from the GVN. MACIG was directed to conduct an investigation to determine the facts and circumstances surrounding the allegation. The investigation determined that the US major was a USAF major, James D. Lindsey, who was the AIK custodian assigned to MACCORDS-CA. Major Lindsey cohabited with Mrs. Quyen and circumstantial evidence revealed that Lindsey used his position to falsify documents which allowed his girlfriend, Mrs. Quyen, to draw checks from the GVN for contract services and supplies that were never rendered. It was concluded that Lindsey forged contracts for Mrs. Quyen and prepared payment vouchers authorizing payment to her for two contracts that were never legally awarded. Mrs. Quyen received approximately $VN 13,000,000 from the Vietnamese treasury. It was recommended the proper USAF agencies take appropriate disciplinary action against Lindsey and RVN authorities take appropriate legal action against Mrs. Quyen. [60]

2. Alleged Conspiracy Involving US Army NCO/EM Open Messes. In March 1969, US Senate investigators obtained information which connected CSM William O. Wooldridge with Marmed, Inc., a California firm doing business with NCO/EM open messes in RVN. Previously the company had been organized as a partnership under the name of Maredem. Chief of Staff of

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the Army advised COMUSMACV on 23 Jun that CSM Wooldridge was a suspect and that CID assistance would be provided from Office of Provost Marshal General. On 30 Jun the case was referred to MACIG. The investigation determined that the Maredem partnership was formed during the period September-December 1967, consisting of Sergeants Seymour T. Lazar, William E. Higdon and Narvaez Hatcher and CSM Wooldridge. These men used their positions within their respective commands and/or mess systems to enhance their company through large purchases. This constituted both a conflict of interest as defined by para 3, AR 600-50 and a conspiracy. The report of investigation was approved by COMUSMACV on 7 Aug. Copies of the report were handcarried to the Chief of Staff of the Army. The result of this investigation was that Maredem was barred from doing business with nonappropriated fund activities in RVN. Directives were published requiring that club secretary-custodians declare their involvements in any company doing business with NCO club systems and requiring a CID file check of all secretary-custodian personnel. MACIG investigation/inspection capability was augmented to include auditors to accomplish inspection/audit coverage of MACV clubs to preclude recurrence of similar incidents. The case was closed 9 Aug. 61

Illicit Activity by US Civilians

(U) The following represents a type case involving illegal activities or improper business practices of civilian firms and/or their officers under contract to an agency of the USG. The frequency of this type case appeared to be increasing. In a letter dated 17 Oct from CPT Gerald H. Early to MACIG, he stated that Choung 11 Express Company, Ltd., a VRE concessionaire, was charging exorbitant prices for storage of personal items at the Army replacement and R&R processing activity at Tan Son Nhut Air Base, Camp Alpha. The inquiry directed by MACIG on 7 Nov was completed on 30 Nov. It was found that charges for storage of personal items were exorbitant but did not exceed the rates authorized by contract #VN 682-133. Two allegations of attempted bribery of MAJ Schmidt, CO, Camp Alpha by representatives of Choung 11 Express Company, Ltd., were substantiated as was the allegation that attempts by the CO, Camp Alpha, to reduce the cost of storage fees, were unsuccessful. The inquiry was approved 23 Dec by the CofS and copies of the inquiry were forwarded to VRE, PACEX and MACAG for information and necessary action regarding: termination of employment of Mr. Won Choi (PACEX), revision of concession inspection procedures (VRE), and debarrment of Choung 11 Express Company, Ltc., and cancelation of its contracts. 62

Assistance to VN Civilians

(FOUO) The final type case, of itself, was insignificant in comparison to the other types of investigations, however, it was representative of the type case which was increasing in frequency. Most important, it was a type case which clearly demonstrated the interest and compassion of the command for the Vietnamese citizen in need of assistance.

(FOUO) In a letter to COMUSMACV, dated 19 Apr, Mrs. Ha Thi Nhung alleged that her husband, SFC Phan Van An, was injured by a US truck, evacuated by US ambulance, and then disappeared. She requested assistance to locate her husband, to determine if he was dead or alive, and to obtain compensation if warranted. MACIG investigators determined SFC An was involved in an accident on 3 Jan involving a US vehicle and was evacuated to the 25th Medical Battalion Dispensary, Cu Chi, to receive medical treatment for head injuries. It was also determined SFC An's identity was inadvertently, switched with another ARVN sergeant, and when SFC An subsequently died of his injuries on 12 Jan, he was buried under the other sergeant's name. Copies of the report were furnished MACMD; MACJ1; CG, 25th Inf Div and USARV

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Foreign Claims Division. Mrs. Nhung was also informed of the results of the investigation. The case was closed on 17 July 1969.[63]

(U) In addition to the increase in the number of cases referred to MACIG, the cases themselves increased in complexity. The number of man hours required to complete a case increased significantly. The long range continuing CIDG Camp Case described earlier required over 20,000 man hours during the year. On the average 700 manhours were required to complete an investigation. This increase in work had required a corresponding increase in manpower. The strength of the division increased from nine officers and one enlisted man at the beginning of the year to 15 officers, eight enlisted men and three civilians at the end of the year.

OTHER SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES - XIV

1. MACV Directive 27-9 (U), 2 Nov 69, Subj: Legal Services - Prohibited Activities.

2. Msg (U), MACJ15, 010235Z Apr 69, Subj: Campaign Against Narcotics.

3. Interview (U), LTC Starkey, USA, MHB, and Mr. Dick, Department of Justice, Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs representative, Hq MACV, 8 Sep 69.

4. Ibid. See also Msg (U), MACJ15, 270659Z May 69, Subj: Marihuana Detecting Dogs.

5. Msg (C), MACJ1, COMUSMACV to CG, USARV, 080349Z Aug 69, et al., Subj: None, Gp-4.

6. Msg (U), MACJ1 (35041), 140001Z Jun 69, Subj: Check Payment by NAF Activities.

7. Msg (C), MACJ4 (40625), 120704Z Jul 69, Subj: TCN Mandatory Dollar Remittances (U), Gp-4.

8. Msg (C), MACCO 51050, COMUSMACV to CINCUSARPAC, 060847Z Sep 69, Subj: Conversion of Vietnam Series-661 MPC to Series-681 MPC (U), Gp-4.

9. Msg (U), CINCPAC to SECDEF, 220217Z Oct, Subj: Ambassador's Mission Policy Statement - Black Market and Illicit Money Transactions.

10. Pacific Stars and Stripes, 18 Nov 69, p. 3.

11. Msg (C), AMEMB SAIGON to SECSTATE, 031022Z Dec 69, Subj: Ribicoff Hearings - Gurney Inquiry on Black Market (U), Gp-4.

12. Msg (U), AMEMB SAIGON to SECSTATE, 23983, 2 Dec 69, Subj: None; Pacific Stars and Stripes, 1 Dec 69, p. 7.

13. Rpt (U), MACPM, 15 Jan 70, Subj: Provost Marshal Activities Report, December 1969.

14. Ibid.

15. Pacific Stars and Stripes, 28 Nov 69, p. 1.

16. MACV Directive 37-9 (U), 14 Nov 69, Subj: Policy Relative to the Acquisition of Military Payment Certificates, US Dollars, and Piasters by Free World Military Assistance Forces.

17. Ltr (C), MACPM, 29 Sep 69, Hq USMACV, Subj: Serious Incident Reports with Racial Overtones (U), Gp-4.

18. Msg (U), MACJ12, 030133Z Dec 69, Subj: Visit by Acting OASD (Civil Rights).

19. Rpt (U), MACPM, 18 Aug 69, Subj: Provost Marshal Activities Report July 1969.

20. Rpt (C), MACJ1, 13 Jan 70, Subj: Command Historical Program (U), Gp-None; Memo (S), MACJ12, 1 Dec 69, Subj: American Presence in Saigon (U), Gp-4.

21. Rpt (U), MACAG-PD, 7 Jan 70, Subj: Workload Data - Decorations and Awards for period of January-December 1969.

22. Msg (C), MACJ3, 8640, COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 111115Z Feb 69, Subj: Designation of Vietnam Campaigns (U), Gp-4.

23. Msg (C), MACJ1 59558, COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 230630Z Oct 69, Subj: Designation of Vietnam Campaigns (U), Gp-4.

24. Msg (U), MACJ13, 291050Z Jun 69, Subj: Diversion of R&R Flights from Penang, Malaysia to Singapore; Msg (C), AMEMBASSY 1942, 260930Z May 1969, Subj: R&R Flights to Malaysia (U), Gp-4.

25. Msg (C), AMEMB MANILA to SECSTATE, 261002Z Jun 69, Subj: Use of Commercial Aircraft for R&R Manila, Gp-None; Msg (C), MACJ13 42212, 210119Z Jul 69, Subj: Use of Commercial Aircraft for R&R Manila (U), Gp-4.

26. Msg (S), CINCPACREP, PHIL to CINCPAC, 181011Z Sep 69, Subj: R&R Program (U), Gp-4.

27. Msg (U), CINCPAC to COMUSMACTHAI, 280311Z Mar 69, Subj: Optional Wear of Civilian Clothing while Traveling on R&R Aircraft; Msg (U), COMUSMACTHAI to CINCPAC, 020719Z Apr 69, Subj: Optional Wear of Civilian Clothing while Traveling on R&R Aircraft.

28. Rpt (C), MACJ1, 13 Jan 70, Subj: Command Historical Report (U), Gp-4.

29. Msg (U), MACJ13 5563, 271308Z Jan 69, Subj: R&R Program for ROKFV Personnel; Msg (C), UK 57366 DJ-JTB, COMUSKOREA to CINCPAC, 180185Z Feb 69, Subj: R&R Program for ROKFV Personnel (U), Gp-4.

30. Msg (C), CINCPAC to JCS, 230224Z May 69, Subj: R&R Program for ROKFV Personnel to Korea (U).

31. MSG (C), CINCPAC to COMUSMACV, 140002Z Sep 69, Subj: Prepesal to Standardize Number of Nights at R&R Sites (U), Gp-4; Msg (U), MACJ1 62646, 091043Z Nov 69, Subj: R&R Policy.

32. Msg (U), MAOCOM/MAODCS, 111930Z Sep 69, Subj: Extended In-Flight Service for R&R Aircraft; Msg (U), MACJ1 60958, 301149Z Oct 69, Subj: Extended In-Flight Service on R&R Aircraft.

33. Msg (U), CINCPAC to COMUSMACV, 02040222 Dec 69, Subj: Extended In-Flight Service for R&R Aircraft.

34. Embtel (U), 502432, AMCONSUL HONG KONG to AMEMBASSY SAIGON, 110951Z May 69, Subj: Growing Severity of HKG in Dealing with American Servicemen Bringing Narcotics into Colony.

35. Msg (U), MACJ13, 250410Z Dec 69, Subj: R&R Incident Sydney.

36. Msg (U), CINCPAC to COMUSMACV, 122142Z Feb 69, Subj: Proposed Amendment to Public Law 90-206 to Forbid Commercial use of SAM and PAL Mail; Msg (U), MACJ1 15590, COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 141931Z Mar 69, Subj: Proposed Amendment to Public Law 90-206 to Forbid Commercial use of SAM and PAL Mail; Msg (U), MACJ1 05520, COMUSMACV to CG, USARV, 071114Z Aug 69, et al., Subj: Space Available Mail (Including Parcel Airlift Mail).

37. Rpt (U), MACAG, 25 Jan 70, Subj: Quarterly Historical Report.

38. Data in the following discussion were obtained from monthly unclassified reports of ARC Southeast Asia Area Headquarters, Subj: Red Cross Activity Report.

39. Rpt (U), RCS AAFES .029, VRE, Subj: Report of AAFES Operations, Jan 69. Unless otherwise indicated all data in this section has been taken from this monthly report of VRE.

40. Ltr (U), MACJ13, 8 Apr 69, Subj: Designation of Exchanges.

41. CofS Action Memo 69-70 (U), 28 Oct 69, Subj: Curtailing Black Market in PX Goods.

42. Memo (C), CofS to AMEMB Mission Coordination, 23 Oct 69, Subj: PX Support to Free World Military Assistance Forces (U), Gp-None.

43. Embtel (C), AMEMB SAIGON to SECSTATE 19 Oct 69, Subj: Disturbance Involving Thai and US Military Personnel (U), Gp-None.

44. Msg (U), MACTMA-S/T, CO, TMA-MACV to CG, USARJ, 271103Z Jan 69, Subj: Intratheater Container Service.

45. Ltr (U), MACJ13, 25 Feb 69, Subj: Sales and Services in Competition with the Vietnam Regional Exchange (VRE); Ltr (U), MACJ13, 15 May 69, Subj: "Capture" of Unauthorized Concessions.

46. Project MACONOMY (U), FY 69 Year-end report 30 Jun 69.

47. Rpt (U), MACCO-M to MHB, 21 Oct 69, Subj: Historical Summary 3d Quarter 69.

48. Rpt (C), MACIG, 14 Sep 68, Subj: Board of Inquiry Conducted during the period 20 September to 8 October 1968 by a Board of Officers Presided over by BG Earl F. Cole, at Cam Ranh Bay, pursuant to COMUSMACV, Ltr Order No. 9-835 (U), Gp-4.

49. Ltr (U), MACCORDS, COMUSMACV to DCG, USARV, 11 Dec 69, Subj: Installation Coordination for Cam Ranh Bay Peninsula.

50. Ltr (U), COMUSMACV, to Cdr 7AF, et al., 11 Dec 68, Subj: Joint On-Site Survey of Cam Rnah Peninsula and Physical Security Survey of Military Installations Thereon (U), Gp-4.

51. Memo (U), MACJ02, 29 Jan 69, Subj: Directive for Inquiry (Mobile Advisory Teams (MAT)/ Mobile Advisory Logistics Teams (MALT).

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52. Rpt (C), MACIG, MIV-23-69, 7 Aug 69, Subj: Report of Investigation Concerning Alleged Conspiracy Involving US Army NCO/EM Open Messes (Report of Investigation Concerning the Possible Conflict of Interest and/or Conspiracy Involving CSM William O. Woolridge) (U), Gp-4.

53. Rpt (C), MACIG-INV, 8 Sep 69, Subj: MACV Defense Force (MDF) (U), Gp-4.

54. Rpt (C), MACIG, 26 May 69, Subj: Report of Combined Investigation Concerning Alleged VNSF Corruption (U), Gp-4.

55. Rpt (S), MACIG, 1 Sep 69, Subj: Report of Combined Investigation of the Military Situation in the Rung Sat Special Zone (RSSZ) (U), Gp-4.

56. Rpt (FOUO), MACV-IG, 20 Nov 69, Subj: Report of Combined Investigation Pertaining to Looting Allegations at Dong Tam Base.

57. Rpt (S), MACIG, 16 Sep 69, Subj: Report of Investigation Concerning Illegal Activities of ROKFV on C-Day (U), Gp-4.

58. Rpt (S), MACIG, 16 Oct 69, Subj: Illicit Activities of ROKFV (Diversion of Brass to Korea) (C), Gp-4.

59. Rpt (C), MACIG, 24 Nov 69, Subj: Illicit Activities of ROKFV, Volume III (Illicit Activities of ROK Tiger Division) (C), Gp-4.

60. Rpt (FOUO), MACV-IG, 8 Nov 69, Subj: Report of Investigation Concerning Alleged Fraud and Misconduct by an American Officer Assigned to Headquarters MACV.

61. Rpt (C), MACIG, 7 Aug 69, Subj: Investigation Concerning the Possible Conflict of Interest and/or Conspiracy Involving CSM William O. Woolridge (U), Gp-4.

62. Rpt (FOUO), MACIG, 29 Dec 69, Subj: Report of Inquiry Concerning Exorbitant Prices Charged for Storage of Personal Items at 178th Replacement Company (Camp Alpha) Tan Son Nhut Air Base, RVN.

63. Rpt (FOUO), MACIG, 15 Jul 69, Subj: Report of Inquiry into the Facts and Circumstances Surrounding the Evacuation and Disposition of SFC Pham Van An (U), Gp-1.

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ANNEX A
LIST OF GROUND OPERATIONS
BY
CORPS TACTICAL ZONE




FIGURE A-1

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TIME FRAME OF GROUND OPERATIONS IN I CTZ (CONT)




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GROUND OPERATIONS IN I CTZ

CODE NAME	MAJOR UNIT	PROVINCE	COMMENCED/ TERMINATED	FRIENDLY CASUALTIES		ENEMY LOSSES	
				KIA	WIA	PERSONNEL	WPNS
Apache Snow	9MarRgt 101AbnDiv 1ARVNDiv	Quang Tri/ Thua Thien	10May/7Jun	135	733	977	752
Cameron Falls	9MarRgt	Quang Tri	29May/23Jun	24	137	120	85
Dewey Canyon	3MarDiv	Quang Tri	21Jan/18Mar	121	803	1355	1341
Fayette Canyon	196LtInfBde	Quang Nam	15Dec68/28Feb	2	17	322	66
Frederick Hill	196LtInfBde	Quang Tin	18Mar-	----------	----------	-continues-	----------
Fulton Square	1Bde, 5InfDiv (Mech)	Quang Tri	22Oct-	----------	----------	-continues-	----------
Geneva Park	198LtInfBde	Quang Ngai	18Apr-	----------	----------	-continues-	----------
Herkimer Mountain	4MarRgt	Quang Tri	9May/17Jul	25	219	137	40
Hung Quang 1/03	51ARVNRgt	Quang Nam	26/31Jan	20	68	215	53
Hung Quang 1/05	51ARVNRgt	Quang Ngai	14Feb/5Mar	26	130	268	NVAL

CODE NAME	MAJOR UNIT	PROVINCE	COMMENCED/ TERMINATED	FRIENDLY CASUALTIES		ENEMY LOSSES	
				KIA	WIA	PERSONNEL	WPNS
Hung Quang 1/05/D (VN)	51ARVNRgt	Quang Nam	24/27Feb	27	89	178	61
Idaho Canyon	3MarRgt	Quang Tri	16Jul/25Sep	95	450	565	203
Iron Mountain	11LtInfBde	Quang Ngai	18Mar-	----------	----------	-continues-	----------
Iroquois Grove	5InfDiv (Mech)	Quang Tri/ Thua Thien	19Jun/25Sep	13	130	134	80
Kentucky	3MarDiv 9InfDiv	Quang Tri	31Oct67/28Feb	525	3078	3921	1133
Kentucky Jumper	101AbnDiv	Thua Thien	1Mar/14Aug	61	409	317	309
Lamar Plain	101AbnDiv	Quang Tin	16May/13Aug	105	332	524	318
Lamson 245	54ARVNRgt	Thua Thien	2Aug68/24Apr	41	219	636	768
Lamson 261	1ARVNRgt	Thua Thien/ Quang Tri	11Sep68/24Apr	40	217	724	618
Lamson 271	2ARVNRgt	Quang Tri	16Oct68/24Apr	98	367	603	267
Lamson 274	7ARVNCav Sqdn	Thua Thien	22Apr/13Jun	7	58	112	51

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CODE NAME	MAJOR UNIT	PROVINCE	COMMENCED/ TERMINATED	FRIENDLY CASUALTIES		ENEMY LOSSES	
				KIA	WIA	PERSONNEL	WPNS
Lamson 275	11CavSqdn (ARVN)	Quang Tri	25Apr/30Jun	35	136	116	NVAL
Lamson 276	1ARVNRgt	Quang Tri	25Apr/30Jun	27	111	397	645
Lamson 277	2ARVNRgt	Quang Tri	22Apr/30Jun	97	254	541	183
Lamson 278	3ARVNRgt	Thua Thien	25Apr/7Jun	22	106	224	437
Lamson 279	54ARVNRgt	Thua Thien	25Apr/30Jun	8	64	167	142
Lamson 340	1ARVNRgt	Quang Tri	1Jul/30Sep	14	40	366	192
Lamson 341	2ARVNRgt	Quang Tri	1Jul/30Sep	9	32	157	82
Lamson 342	3ARVNRgt	Thua Thien	1Jul/30Sep	32	49	280	93
Lamson 343	54ARVNRgt	Thua Thien	1Jul/30Sep	4	32	111	144
Lamson 345	[illegible]ARVNRgt	Quang Tri	1Oct/31Dec	12	21	242	113
Lamson 348	TF7(Mech) 7ArmCav Sqdn	Quang Tri	27Oct/31Dec	17	42	137	43
Le Loi I	1RgrGp	Quang Nam	8Dec68/10Feb	103	398	695	42
Le Loi IV	1RgrGp	Quang Nam	27Feb/20Jun	98	467	688	127
Lien Ket 54	5ARVNRgt	Quang Tin	20Apr/26Aug	22	72	297	75

CODE NAME	MAJOR UNIT	PROVINCE	COMMENCED/ TERMINATED	FRIENDLY CASUALTIES		ENEMY LOSSES	
				KIA	WIA	PERSONNEL	WPNS
Lien Ket 63	6ARVNRgt	Quang Ngai	2May/31Aug	30	104	347	39
Lien Ket 414	4ARVNRgt	Quang Ngai	25Aug/31Dec	61	195	710	44
Lien Ket 531	5ARVNRgt	Quang Tin	26Aug/31Dec	67	170	542	65
Lien Ket 612	6ARVNRgt	Quang Ngai	1Sep/31Dec	58	244	432	28
Maine Crag	3MarRgt	Quang Nam	15Mar/2May	21	134	157	435
Marshall Mountain	9InfDiv 3MarDiv 5InfDiv (Mech)	Quang Tri	9Dec68/28Feb	8	142	156	141
Massachusetts Striker	101AbnDiv	Thua Thien	1Mar/8May	72	259	176	893
Montana Mauler	5InfDiv (Mech)	Quang Tri	23Mar/3Apr	38	218	271	29
Montgomery Rendezvous	101AbnDiv	Quang Tri/ Thua Thien	8Jun/15Aug	87	408	393	221
Muskogee Meadow	5MarRegt	Quang Nam	7/20Apr	16	121	162	20
Nantucket Beach	198LtInfBde 6ARVNRgt	Quang Ngai	20Jul-	----------	----------	continues	----------

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CODE NAME	MAJOR UNIT	PROVINCE	COMMENCED/ TERMINATED	FRIENDLY CASUALTIES		ENEMY LOSSES	
				KIA	WIA	PERSONNEL	WPNS
Nevada Eagle	101AbnDiv 82AbnDiv	Thua Thien	17May68/28Feb	205	1822	3299	3701
Oklahoma Hills	7MarRgt 51ARVNDiv	Quang Nam	31Mar/29May	53	487	596	212
Phi Phung 20/69A	6ARVNRgt	Quang Nam	4Sep/5Oct	6	30	117	17
Phi Phung 33/69	4RF Cos OPCON Sector	Quang Nam	11Nov/13Dec	11	47	198	47
Pipestone Canyon	1MarRgt	Quang Nam	26May/7Nov	55	543	488	193
Purple Martin	4MarRgt	Quang Tri	23Feb/8May	79	268	252	202
Quyet Thang 22	2ARVNDiv	Quang Ngai	24Feb/10Mar	107	311	777	123
Quyet Thang 25	4ARVNRgt	Quang Ngai	20/31Mar	49	184	592	78
Quyet Thang 600	6ARVNRgt	Quang Tin	25/26Feb	6	9	168	21
Randolph Glen	101AbnDiv	Thua Thien	7Dec-	----------	----------	--continues--	----------

OPN NAME	MAJOR UNIT	PROVINCE	COMMENCED/ TERMINATED	FRIENDLY CASUALTIES		ENEMY LOSSES	
				KIA	WIA	PERSONNEL	WPNS
Republic Square	101AbnDiv	Thua Thien	29Sep/6Dec	11	65	192	157
Russell Beach	198LtInfBde	Quang Ngai	13Jan/21Jul	56	268	158	61
Scotland II	3MarDiv	Quang Tri	15Apr68/28Feb	463	2435	3311	1211
Taylor Common	1MarDiv	Quang Nam	6Dec68/7Mar	160	1371	1399	633
Utah Mesa	9MarRgt	Quang Tri	12Jun/9Jul	35	169	309	145
Vernon Lake II	11LtInfBde	Quang Ngai	2Nov68/28Feb	25	158	455	109
Victory Dragon IX	2ROKMCBde	Quang Nam	1Mar/7Apr	4	63	301	131
Victory Dragon X	2ROKMCBde	Quang Nam	1/30Apr	8	46	261	156
Victory Dragon XVII-I	2ROKMCBde	Quang Nam	12Nov/1Dec	4	55	211	69
Victory Dragon VIII	2&3ROKMC Bdes	Quang Nam	3/28Feb	15	59	211	88

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CODE NAME	MAJOR UNIT	PROVINCE	COMMENCED/ TERMINATED	FRIENDLY CASUALTIES		ENEMY LOSSES	
				KIA	WIA	PERSONNEL	WPNS
Virginia Ridge	3BdeRgt	Quang Tri	1May/17Jul	108	490	560	175
Vu Ninh 3	51ARVNRgt	Quang Nam	5May/7Jul	30	130	206	79

TIME FRAME OF GROUND OPERATIONS IN II CTZ




FIGURE A-2

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GROUND OPERATIONS IN II CTZ

OPER NAME	MAJOR UNIT	PROVINCE	COMMENCED / TERMINATED	FRIENDLY CASUALTIES		ENEMY LOSSES	
				KIA	WIA	PERSONNEL	WPNS
Baek Ma 10	29ROKRgt	Khanh Hoa	4/20Jun	4	12	170	73
Bee Ho 23	1ROKRgt	Binh Dinh	7/21Jun	2	20	182	74
Binh Tay 48	24ARVNDiv 22&11Rgr Cn	Pleiku	4/21Jan	31	71	251	85
Binh Tay 49	24ARVNDiv	Pleiku	21/27Jan	30	61	356	4
Binh Tay 50	24ARVNDiv	Pleiku	28Jan/8Feb	1	24	252	9
Bolling/ Dan Hoa	1CavDiv	Phu Yen	19Sep68/31Jan	72	307	715	258
Bun Kae 7	CapROKDiv	Binh Dinh	12/23Aug	8	9	109	87
Bun Kae 68-9	ROKACav Rgt	Binh Dinh	29Dec68/15Jan	5	16	170	272
Chang Kwan Ky Nyon	CapROKDiv	Binh Dinh	2/19Oct	19	31	116	193
Cochise Green	503Abn	Binh Dinh	31Mar68/31Jan	144	870	929	255
Dan Phu 47/10	22ARVNDiv	Phu Yen	22Apr/26Sep	97	262	239	81
Dan Phu 47/10	22ARVNDiv	Phu Yen	5Nov/31Dec	40	216	118	NVAL

CODE NAME	MAJOR UNIT	PROVINCE	COMMENCED/ TERMINATED	FRIENDLY CASUALTIES		ENEMY LOSSES	
				KIA	WIA	PERSONNEL	WPNS
Dan Quyen 3/6	3CavSqdn (ARVN)	Pleiku	6Aug68/23Apr	12	62	408	127
Dan Quyen 38	23RgrBn	Kontum	6Apr/15May	21	107	216	16
Dan Quyen 38A	42ARVNRgt	Kontum	15May/1Jun	79	455	945	27
Dan Quyen 41	24STZ controlled	Kontum	8/28Jun	21	107	254	35
Dan Quyen 43	24STZ controlled	Kontum	22/25Jun	17	94	214	18
Dan Thang 69	22ARVNDiv	Binh Dinh	18Apr/31Dec	152	623	507	NVAL
Dan Tien 33B	23ARVNDiv	Quang Duc	1Nov/28Dec	138	330	746	80
Dan Tien 40	23ARVNDiv	Quang Duc	12Nov/28Dec	133	445	1012	106
Darby Trail II	101AbnDiv	Binh Dinh	8Feb/15Apr	5	28	181	52
Do Kai Bee 13	9ROKDiv	Phu Yen	7/21Jul	4	24	136	43
Do Kai Bee 14	9ROKDiv	Phu Yen	18Sep/3Oct	6	1	167	97


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CODE NAME	MAJOR UNIT	PROVINCE	COMMENCED/ TERMINATED	FRIENDLY CASUALTIES		ENEMY LOSSES	
				KIA	WIA	PERSONNEL	WPNS
Dong Bo 2-18	9ROKDiv	Ninh Thuan	31Jul/7Aug	0	0	106	48
Dong Bo 7	9ROKDiv	Khanh Hoa	9/2[illegible]May	3	1	155	57
Gaffey Blue	4InfDiv	Binh Dinh	5/25Aug	4	13	100	3
Green Ace	4InfDiv	Pleiku	5Aug/16Oct	7	36	102	24
Green Bear	4InfDiv	Kontum/ Pleiku	16Oct-	----------	----------	--continues---	----------
Greene Thunder	4InfDiv	Pleiku	1/1[illegible]Feb	20	50	106	1
Hae San Jin 6	26ROKRgt	Phu Yen	20Jan/8Feb	6	20	107	57
Hae San Jin 9	26ROKRgt	Phu Yen	7/20Jul	8	28	202	74
Hodges Black	4InfDiv	Pleiku	21Oct/20Nov	16	52	113	9
Macarthur/ Bien Tay	4InfDiv 173AbnBde	Pleiku/ Kontum	12Oct67/31Jan	955	4437	5731	1553
McClain/ Dan Thang	1CavDiv 1AbnDiv	Binh Thuan	20Jan68/31Jan	69	568	1042	373
Putnam Panther	4InfDiv	Kontum	1Feb/21Jun	42	238	250	64

CODE NAME	MAJOR UNIT	PROVINCE	COMMENCED/ TERMINATED	FRIENDLY CASUALTIES		ENEMY LOSSES	
				KIA	WIA	PERSONNEL	WPNS
Putnam Tiger	4InfDiv	Kontum/ Pleiku	22Apr/22Sep	81	245	563	58
Walker (Marshall)	173AbnBde	Binh Dinh	17Jan68/31Jan	42	313	272	85
Washington Green	173AbnBde	Binh Dinh	15Apr-	-------	-------	-continues-	-------
Wayne Grey	4InfDiv	Kontum	1Mar/14Apr	99	357	608	115
Wayne Javelin	8InfDiv	Binh Dinh	13Apr/18Oct	21	139	554	43

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FIGURE A-3

GROUND OPERATIONS IN III CTZ

CODE NAME	MAJOR UNIT	PROVINCE	COMMENCED/ TERMINATED	FRIENDLY CASUALTIES		ENEMY LOSSES	
				KIA	WIA	PERSONNEL	WPNS
Toan Thang II	RVNAF 5ARVNDiv 18ARVNDiv	All III CTZ	1Jun68/16Feb	4264	20032	25432	6217
Toan Thang III	25ARVNDiv ARVNAbn Div	All III CTZ	17Feb/31Oct	3431	20228	41803	10222
Toan Thang IV	3, 5, 6Rgr Grps A&BBde VNMC US 1InfDiv 1CavDiv (Ambl) 25InfDiv 11ACR 3Bde, 82Abn Div 3Bde, 9Inf Div 199LtInfBde FW RTAVF ATF	All III CTZ	1Nov-	-------	-------	--continues--	-------

Note: Units listed in "MAJOR UNIT" column apply to all Toan Thang Operations.

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TIME FRAME OF GROUND OPERATIONS IN IV CTZ




FIGURE A-4

GROUND OPERATIONS IN IV CTZ

CODE NAME	MAJOR UNIT	PROVINCE	COMMENCED/ TERMINATED	FRIENDLY CASUALTIES		ENEMY LOSSES	
				KIA	WIA	PERSONNEL	WPNS
Quyet Chien	7ARVNDiv 9ARVNDiv 21ARVNDiv 44STZ (ARVN)	All IV CTZ	17Jul68/4Mar	2402	11181	15953	NVAL
Quyet Chien 21/45	21ARVNDiv	All IV CTZ	26Dec68/7Jan	9	15	378	81
Quyet Thang	7ARVNDiv 9ARVNDiv 21ARVNDiv	All IV CTZ	1Jan/31Dec	6220	2747	37874	NVAL
Quyet Thang 7/11/36	11ARVNRgt	Dinh Tuong	25/28Mar	17	80	115	44
Quyet Thang 9/3	15ARVNRgt	Sa Dec	12/28Jan	5	69	109	25
Quyet Thang SD 9/3	9ARVNDiv 15InfRgt (ARVN)	Sa Dec	12/28Jan	4	51	101	0
Quyet Thang 9/38*	9ARVNDiv	Chuong Thien	4/30Nov	53	331	459	108
Quyet Thang 9/39	9ARVNDiv	Dinh Tuong	8/24Dec	53	457	203	41

*Was conducted in 2 phases. Also includes Opn Quyet Thang/SD/9.

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CODE NAME	MAJOR UNIT	PROVINCE	COMMENCED/ TERMINATED	FRIENDLY CASUALTIES		ENEMY LOSSES	
				KIA	WIA	PERSONNEL	WPNS
Quyet Thang 21/04	21ARVNDiv	Phong Dinh	27Jan/3Feb	16	109	115	13
Quyet Thang 21/15	21ARVNDiv	Chuong Thien	17/29Mar	30	110	119	50
Quyet Thang 21/17	21ARVNDiv	Chuong Thien	10/12Apr	4	24	106	22
Quyet Thang 21/26	31ARVNRgt	Chuong Thien	17/28Jun	23	67	216	37
Quyet Thang 21/31	21ARVNDiv	Chuong Thien	24Jul/11Aug	25	107	262	93
Quyet Thang 21/35	21ARVNDiv	Kien Giang	2Sep/18Nov	49	369	299	142
Quyet Thang 21/36	21ARVNDiv	Chuong Thien	11Sep/8Dec	107	404	469	92
Quyet Thang 21/38	32ARVNRgt	An Xuyen	29Sep/31Dec	71	283	721	124
Quyet Thang 44/6	43ARVNRgr Gp	Chau Doc	20/27Jan	19	44	113	292
Quyet Thang 44/12	41ARVNRgr Gp	Chau Doc	25/26Feb	3	52	157	35

CODE NAME	MAJOR UNIT	PROVINCE	COMMENCED/ TERMINATED	FRIENDLY CASUALTIES		ENEMY LOSSES	
				KIA	WIA	PERSONNEL	WPNS
Quyet Thang 44/14	32, 44RgrBn	Chau Doc	5/17Mar	9	23	136	219
Quyet Thang 44/19	4RgrGp	Kien Tuong	5/9Apr	5	17	102	428
Quyet Thang 44/29	44STZ	Chau Doc	13May/13Jun	29	90	158	21
Quyet Thang 44/32	44STZ	Chau Doc	18/24Jun	0	1	250	3
Quyet Thang 44/42	44STZ	Chau Doc	4/16Sep	17	73	235	31
Quyet Thang 44/43	44STZ	Chau Doc	17Sep/25Oct	18	131	152	38
Quyet Thang 44/47	12ArmdCav Sqdn(ARVN)	Chau Doc	5Nov/4Dec	7	48	233	15
Rice Farmer	9InfDiv	All IV CTZ	1Jun/31Aug	44	452	1860	246
Speedy Express	9InfDiv	All IV CTZ	1Dec68/31May	242	2385	10899	748

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ANNEX B -- WEATHER IN SOUTHEAST ASIA [1]

(U) Two basic weather patterns dictated to a large degree the operational areas and concepts of both the enemy and the FWMAF during 1969. They were the Northeast and Southwest Monsoons. Contrary to popular opinion, the term monsoon is not necessarily associated with a period of heavy, prolonged rain. Meteorologically, the word is used to describe periods of prolonged, recurring low level wind flow.

(U) During the first four months of the year, the Northeast Monsoon was in effect (See Figure B-1 - Northeast Monsoon). It produced a hot, dry season extending from the main ridgeline of the Annam Mountains, which lie along the Vietnam-Laos border, to the southwest across Laos, Cambodia, and Thailand. Those months also comprised the dry season for certain portions of the RVN, namely the II Corps highlands, III Corps, and IV Corps.

(U) The low level northeasterly flow which characterized the SEASIA winter and spring months originated over the cold expanses of Siberia and the Northwest Pacific. In its course southward into equatorial regions, the cold dry air was gradually heated and moistened by contact with the China mainland and the South China Sea. It moved into the coastal regions of I and II Corps as a comparatively warm, moist air stream of shallow depth. As the low level air encountered the eastern slope of the Annams, it was forced to lift, a motion which reduced its moisture retainability. The result was condensation of the layer's moisture into stratiform, low level cloudiness and ensuing fog, light rain and drizzle which characterized the general weather pattern over much of I Corps and coastal II Corps during the monsoon (See Figure B-2 NE Monsoon photo).

(S) Two basic disturbances periodically intensified the monsoonal weather pattern. They were surges in the generally light air flow and "crachin." ("Crachin" is a term which is used to describe prolonged, recurring periods of widespread fog and drizzle or light rain which affected the climate of Vietnam during the Northeast Monsoon, See Figure B-4 Crachin). Surges occurred as a result of frontal systems which formed over mainland China and moved toward the south and east. The cold fronts sometimes reached as far south as Vietnam, however, they were usually modified to the extent that they scarcely retained their identities after penetrating so far into the tropics. More often, strong winds behind the fronts pushed through and advanced rapidly to the south. The result was surface winds gusting occasionally in excess of 40 knots at exposed locations in the mountains and along the east coast of the RVN. During such periods, rainfall east of the Annams increased with occasional shower activity being reported in addition to steady light rain and drizzle (See Figure B-3 NE Monsoon precipitation). The stronger winds also pushed the low level cloudiness through the passes and other low areas along the main ridgeline of the Annams. This low cloud spillover greatly deteriorated flying weather over the eastern route structure of STEEL TIGER.

(U) The weather pattern associated with the "crachin" phenomenon was characterized by cloud ceilings consistently below 1,000 feet and often below 500 feet. Visibilities during these periods were predominantly below 1 mile and frequently fell to less than 1/2 mile. "Crachin" periods occurred most frequently during 1969 along the coast of I Corps north of Danang. However, they occasionally extended as far south along the coast of II Corps as Nha Trang. The duration of "crachin" periods ranged typically from two to five days, though occurrences of longer nature were recorded.

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

NORTHEAST MONSOON
SOUTHWEST MONSOON
HAIPHONG
VINH
DONG HO
DA NANG
NHA TRANG
PLEI
SOUTH VIETNAM
SAIGON
CAN THO
PHNOM PENH
CAMBODIA
UBON
NKP
UDON
VIENTIANE
LAOS
THAILAND
BANGKOK
HEAVY RAIN
LIGHT RAIN

FIGURE B-1



FIGURE B-2


AVERAGE MONTHLY PRECIPITATION
NORTHEAST MONSOON

AVERAGE MONTHLY PRECIPITATION
SOUTHWEST MONSOON

LESS THAN 1 INCH
1 - 10 INCHES
10 - 20 INCHES
GREATER THAN 20 INCHES

FIGURE B-3

CRACHIN



AVERAGE CRACHIN DAYS
PER YEAR 1952-1956

HANOI	68
DONG HOI	48
HUE	53
DANANG	41
NHA TRANG	10

AVERAGE DAYS PER
MONTH AT DONG HOI




FIGURE B-4

(S) With the burning of rice fields across the dry regions during the Northeast Monsoon, the visibility was sharply reduced over the two southern RVN CTZs, Laos, Cambodia, and Thailand. The restriction began in mid-January and presented a significant operational problem until April. The reduced visibility condition made target acquisition in the STEEL TIGER area difficult and sometimes prevented it entirely. Visibilities frequently fell below three miles in the smoke and haze.

(U) The spring transition from the Northeast to the Southwest Monsoon took place in May. The period of transition was marked by a decrease in the stratiform cloudiness that persisted east of the Annam Mountains during the winter months. It also produced a general increase in cloudiness west and south of the mountains, particularly in the form of convective clouds, the most severe of which are the cumulonimbus or thunderstorm clouds.

(U) The Southwest Monsoon was characterized by low level air streaming across SEASIA (See Figure B-1 - Southwest Monsoon), which had originated in the Southern Hemisphere over Australia in a relatively dry source region. As the air traversed the Indian Ocean, it became quite moist and unstable. The result was a preponderance of afternoon and evening cumuliform clouds across the land areas of SEASIA lying west of the Annams (See Figure B-5 - SW Monsoon photo). Whereas dominant cloud cover was typically stratified during the Northeast Monsoon, the Southwest Monsoon cloudiness exhibited much more vertical development. Thunderstorms and rainshowers were an almost daily occurrence in many areas, particularly those regions directly exposed to the moist southwesterly winds.

(U) The associated rainfall (See Figure B-3 - SW Monsoon precipitation) was markedly different from the light rain and drizzle that characterized the rainfall across wet areas of the Northeast Monsoon. With showers and thunderstorms comprising most of the Southwest Monsoon precipitation, greater rainfall amounts were recorded over shorter time spans. The reported totals showed that wet areas in the Southwest Monsoon received significantly more rainfall than their Northeast Monsoon counterparts.

(U) Climatological averages reveal the Fall transition period, from the Southwest Monsoon to the Northeast Monsoon, to be the time of heaviest rainfall along the coastal stretches of I and II CTZ. The underlying reason for the locally wet periods is that the fall transition season normally poses the greatest threat for a typhoon or tropical storm to cross the South China Sea into SEASIA. Only one tropical storm struck the coast of Vietnam during 1969 - tropical storm Doris which entered the coast near the DMZ in September. No typhoons struck the coast of Vietnam during 1969 although a very early unusually strong frontal system did move into the RVN from China. The front became stationary over northern I CTZ where it joined with a weak tropical disturbance which was the remains of tropical storm Tess. The ensuing, greatly intensified system produced extremely heavy rainfall over the CTZ, and as a result, Hue/Phu Bai was believed to have established two all time percipitation records for the RVN. They were: most rainfall during a 24 hour period, 21.65 inches recorded on 5 Oct, and most rainfall for a single month, 75.06 inches.

(U) By mid-October, the Northeast Monsoon was once again established over SEASIA and the weather pattern had adopted the characteristics familiar to the first four months of the year. Considerable low cloudiness developed east of the Annams while a clearing trend commenced west of the chain.

(U) The probability of favorable flying weather, which was arbitrarily equated with ceilings greater than 3,000 feet and visibilities greater than 3 miles, at three different installations in

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FIGURE B-5

RVN is reflected in Figure B-6 - Flying weather. At Pleiku, in the western highlands, the Northeast Monsoon constituted good flying weather. The chance of favorable conditions climbed from near 50 percent in September through 80 percent during the transition months of October and more or less stabilized at a plateau of 90 percent during the months of November through April. However, at Quang Tri, in the vicinity of the DMZ, the converse was true, with the weather at its best from May to August. The pattern began a steady decline in September which leveled off with flying weather meeting the stipulated criteria for favorable conditions only 50 percent of the time during December. A similar deterioration the previous year left the first two months of 1969 in a similar condition. Also it was during this period that the general area around the DMZ experienced ceilings below 1,000 feet and visibilities below 2 miles most hours of the day for two to five days at a time.

(U) At Tan Son Nhut, near Saigon, the overall picture was one of generally favorable conditions throughout the entire year. During the Southwest Monsoon, the probability of favorable flying weather dropped to a low of 80 percent. During the Northeast Monsoon, particularly after the first of the year, low cloud ceilings were rarely encountered.

FAVORABLE FLYING WEATHER
(% OF TIME > 3000 FT/3 MI)




FIGURE B-6

WEATHER IN SOUTHEAST ASIA - B

1. Prepared by the MACV J2 Meteorological Office.

ANNEX C -- COMMANDERS AND PRINCIPAL STAFF OFFICERS*

Hq, MACV

COMUSMACV			
Creighton W. Abrams	GEN	USA	
DEPCOMUSMACV			
Andrew J. Goodpaster	GEN	USA	
William B. Rosson	GEN	USA	May 69
DEPCOMUSMACV for Air Opns/Cdr, 7th Air Force			
George S. Brown	GEN	USAF	
DEPCOMUSMACV for CORDS			
William E. Colby	AMB	Civ	
Chief of Staff			
Charles A. Corcoran	MG	USA	
Elias C. Townsend	MG	USA	Mar 69
Deputy Chief of Staff			
William E. Bryan, Jr.	BG	USAF	
James M. Vande Hey	BG	USAF	Jun 69
Asst Deputy to COMUSMACV for CORDS**			
Roderick Wetherill	MG	USA	
ACofS Personnel, J1			
Frank B. Clay	BG	USA	
Albert H. Smith, Jr.	BG	USA	Jun 69
ACofS Intelligence, J2			
Phillip B. Davidson, Jr.	MG	USA	
William E. Potts	BG	USA	May 69
ACofS Operations, J3			
Elias C. Townsend	MG	USA	
Edward Bautz, Jr.	MG	USA	Mar 69

*First named incumbent occupied the position on 1 January 1969 or upon arrival of his unit in-country, or upon creation of the position. Date of successor is indicated.

**Position abolished in May 1969.

Science Advisor			
Dr. William McMillan	GS-18	Civ	
Dr. Nils F. Wikner	GS-18	Civ	Jan 69
John E. Kirk	GS-18	Civ	Jul 69
Command Surgeon			
Hal B. Jennings, Jr.	BG	USA	
Spurgeon H. Neel, Jr.	BG	USA	Feb 69
Richard R. Taylor	BG	USA	Aug 69
Comptroller			
Melvin E. Richmond	COL	USA	
Richard G. Fazakerley	COL	USA	May 69
Chief, Studies & Observations Group			
Stephen E. Cavanaugh	COL	USA	
Director, Construction Directorate			
William T. Bradley	MG	USA	
Elmer P. Yates	BG	USA	Jul 69
Director, Training Directorate			
Hubert S. Cunningham	BG	USA	
Wallace L. Clement	BG	USA	Aug 69
Chief, Free World Military Assistance Office			
Walter E. Revis	COL	USA	

MACV Advisory Units

Chief, USAF Advisory Group			
Charles W. Carson	BG	USAF	
Kendall S. Young	BG	USAF	Aug 69
Chief, Naval Advisory Group/COMNAVFORV			
Elmo R. Zumwalt	VADM	USN	
Senior Advisor I CTZ/CG III MAF			
Robert Cushman	LTG	USMC	
Herman Nickerson, Jr.	LTG	USMC	Mar 69
Senior Advisor II CTZ/CG I FFORCEV			
William R. Peers	LTG	USA	
Charles A. Corcoran	LTG	USA	Mar 69
Senior Advisor III CTZ/CG II FFORCEV			
Walter T. Kerwin, Jr.	LTG	USA	
Julian J. Ewell	LTG	USA	Apr 69

ACof S Logistics, J4			
Henry A. Rasmussen	MG	USA	
Raymond C. Conroy	MG	USA	Mar 69
ACofS Plans, J5			
Richard F. Shaefer	MG	USAF	
ACofS Communications-Electronics, J6			
John E. Frizen	BG	USAF	
Geoffrey Cheadle	BG	USAF	Jul 69
ACofS for CORDS			
George D. Jacobsen	GS-18	Civ	
ACofS for Military Assistance (MACMA)			
James V. Galloway	BG	USA	
Frank L. Gunn	BG	USA	Aug 69
Deputy ACofS for CORDS			
Glen C. Long	BG	USA	
Louis H. Steman (Acting)	COL	USA	Dec 69
Secretary Joint Staff			
Patrick W. Powers	COL	USA	
Bertram H. Curwen, Jr. (Acting)	COL	USMC	Jun 69
Thomas J. Hanifen	COL	USA	Jul 69
Chief of Information			
Winant Sidle	BG	USA	
Lucius G. Hill, Jr.	COL	USA	Mar 69
Joseph F. H. Cutrona	COL	USA	Sep 69
Inspector General			
Robert M. Cook	COL	USA	
Adjutant General			
Sidney Gritz	COL	USA	
Thomas B. Mancinelli (Acting)	LTC	USA	May 69
Louis J. Prost	COL	USA	Aug 69
Staff Judge Advocate			
Robert H. Ivey	COL	USA	
Bruce C. Babbitt	COL	USA	May 69
Larry H. Williams	COL	USA	Sep 69
Chaplain			
Gerhardt W. Hyatt	COL (CHAP)	USA	
William R. Fitzgerald	COL (CHAP)	USA	Oct 69

CG, CMAC			
Fillmore K. Mearns	MG	USA	
Walter B. Richardson	MG	USA	Apr 69
Charles J. Girard	BG	USA	Nov 69
CG, DMAC/SA USAAG IV CTZ*			
George S. Eckhardt	MG	USA	
Roderick Wetherill	MG	USA	Jun 69

Component Service Commanders

Air Force

Vice Commander, 7AF			
Royal N. Baker	MG	USAF	
Robert J. Dixon	MG	USAF	Aug 69
Commander, 834th Air Division			
Burl W. McLaughlin	MG	USAF	
John H. Herring, Jr.	BG	USAF	Jun 69

Army

DEPCG, USARV			
Frank T. Mildren	LTG	USA	
CG, XXIV Corps			
Richard G. Stilwell	LTG	USA	
Melvin Zais	LTG	USA	Jun 69
CG, 1st Logistical Command			
Joseph M. Heiser, Jr.	MG	USA	
Walter J. Woolwine	MG	USA	Aug 69
CG, USA Engr Command			
Davis S. Parker	MG	USA	
John A. B. Dillard	BG	USA	Nov 69
CO, USA Hq Area Command (HAC)			
George I. Taylor	COL	USA	
Robert M. Young	COL	USA	Nov 69
CG, 1st Cav Div (Ambl)			
George I. Forsythe	MG	USA	
Elvy B. Roberts	MG	USA	May 69

*Senior Advisor, IV CTZ was redesignated as CG, Delta Military Assistance Command/SA, US Army Advisory Group, IV CTZ in April 1969.

CG, 1st Inf Div			
Orwin C. Talbott	MG	USA	
Albert E. Milloy	MG	USA	Aug 69
CG, 4th Inf Div			
Donn R. Pepke	MG	USA	
Glenn D. Walker	MG	USA	Nov 69
CG, 9th Inf Div*			
Julian J. Ewell	MG	USA	
Harris W. Hollis	MG	USA	Apr 69
CG, 23d Inf (Americal) Div			
Charles M. Gettys	MG	USA	
Lloyd B. Ramsey	MG	USA	Jun 69
CG, 25th Inf Div			
Ellis W. Williamson	MG	USA	
Harris W. Hollis	MG	USA	Sep 69
CG, 101st Abn Div (Ambl)			
Melvin Zais	MG	USA	
John M. Wright, Jr.	MG	USA	May 69
CG, 1st Avn Bde			
Robert R. Williams	MG	USA	
Allen M. Burdett, Jr.	MG	USA	Mar 69
CG, 1st Signal Bde			
William M. Van Harlingen, Jr.	BG	USA	
Thomas M. Riensi	BG	USA	Feb 69
CO, 1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech)			
James M. Gibson	COL	USA	
John L. Osteen	COL	USA	Jun 69
William A. Burke	BG	USA	Nov 69
CG, 173d Abn Bde			
John W. Barnes	BG	USA	
Hubert S. Cunningham	BG	USA	Aug 69
CG, 199th Inf Bde (Lt)			
Frederick E. Davison	BG	USA	
Warren K. Bennett	BG	USA	May 69
William R. Bond	BG	USA	Nov 69

*The 9th Inf Div (-) completed redeployment in August. At that time, the remaining element (3d Bde, 9th Inf Div) was placed under OPCON of the 25th Inf Div.

CG, 3d Bde, 82d Abn Div			
George W. Dickerson*	BG	USA	
CO, 3d Bde, 9th Inf Div**			
Dale J. Crittenberger***	COL	USA	
Andrew J. Gatsis	COL	USA	Sep 69
CO, 11th Armd Cav Regt			
George S. Patton	COL	USA	
James H. Leach	COL	USA	Apr 69
Donn A. Starry	COL	USA	Dec 69
CO, 5th Special Forces Group			
Harold R. Aaron	COL	USA	
Robert B. Rheault	COL	USA	May 69
Alexander Lemberes	COL	USA	Jul 69
Michael D. Healy	COL	USA	Aug 69

Navy

DEPCOMNAVFORV			
William H. House	RADM	USN	
William R. Flanagan	RADM	USN	Feb 69
DEP DIR, PACNAVFACSEA/OICC			
Henry J. Johnson	RADM	USN	
COMNAVSUPPACT/NAVFORVREP, Danang			
Emmet F. Bonner	RADM	USN	
Robert E. Adamson, Jr.	RADM	USN	Dec 69
Cdr, 3d NCB			
James R. Bartlett	RADM	USN	
John G. Dillon	RADM	USN	Mar 69

*Departed RVN upon redeployment of the 3d Bde on 11 Dec.

**Upon redeployment of the 9th Inf Div (-) in August, the 3d Bde was reorganized as a separate brigade.

***Killed in a helicopter crash on 17 Sep.

USMC

DEP CG, III MAF			
Carl A. Youngdale	MG	USMC	
George S. Bowman, Jr.	MG	USMC	Jul 69
CG, 1st Mar Div			
Ormand R. Simpson	MG	USMC	
Edwin B. Wheeler	MG	USMC	Dec 69
CG, 3d Mar Div			
Raymond G. Davis	MG	USMC	
William K. Jones*	MG	USMC	Apr 69
CG, 1st MAW			
Charles J. Quilter	MG	USMC	
William G. Thrash	MG	USMC	Jul 69
CG, Force Log Cmd			
James A. Feeley, Jr.	BG	USMC	

*Departed RVN 7 Nov upon redeployment of Headquarters 3d Marine Division.

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ANNEX D

REDEPLOYMENT OF 9TH INFANTRY DIVISION

General

(C) The 9th Inf Div (-3d Bde) was the first major US Army unit to be redeployed from the Republic of Vietnam. What made this redeployment unique was that it involved disengagement and replacement of fighting forces in an environment of active combat. Lack of experience or precedent necessitated the development of procedures which required constant revision throughout the redeployment process. Many problems were encountered and solved while still other problems were anticipated and eliminated by preventive action. This annex is a summary of problems encountered, actions taken, and observations made during the 9th Inf Div's redeployment. It is included as a source of historical information and guidance for staff officers who may be confronted with operations of a similar nature.

(C) On 12 Jun 69, the 9th Inf Div was notified of its impending redeployment from RVN. This was the largest unit to redeploy in Operation KEYSTONE EAGLE which directed redeployment of 25,000 US troops from RVN during July and August. The mission given the division was fourfold:

1. Reorganize the 3d Bde as a separate brigade to remain in RVN.

2. Disengage the remainder of the division from combat.

3. Redeploy the 2d Bde and elements of the division base to CONUS for inactivation.

4. Redeploy, at 85 percent authorized personnel strength, the 1st Bde with the Div (-) to Hawaii to become part of the PACOM Reserve.

(C) Shortly after notification of its redeployment, the division formed a Redeployment Planning Group (RPG). The RPG was established, not as an action agency, but rather to isolate and identify problem areas or obtain decisions, then turn them over to the appropriate staff section or action agency of the division for execution. The RPG prepared all redeployment plans, closely monitored all redeployment activities of the division in coordination with the general and special staff, and kept the commanding general informed of the redeployment status through daily briefings.

(C) Some of the division's subordinate units formed similar, separate redeployment planning groups. These groups maintained liaison with the division RPG in order to obtain advance notice of pending actions and to keep their commanders informed. Units which had these RPGs performed better during redeployment operations than those which did not.

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(C) Redeploying from a hostile environment entailed continuation of combat operations and normal support operations until units were able to stand down, return to Dong Tam base, and begin preparations for redeployment. Since the first unit, the 3d Bn, 60th Inf, was scheduled to redeploy on 8 Jul, immediate coordination began with the 7th ARVN Div for the replacement of 9th Inf Div elements. Tactical coordination was facilitated by the 7th ARVN Div having the same Tactical Area of Responsibility (TAOR) as those units of the 9th Inf Div which were to be redeployed.

(C) The sequence in which units redeployed was 2d Bde, 1st Bde, division troops, support command, and division headquarters. The stand downs and departures of the maneuver elements were phased to maintain maximum pressure on the enemy, and to provide a gradual and orderly rollup of forces into Dong Tam base where there was only a limited amount of space which could be used to accommodate withdrawing forces.

(C) Each infantry battalion initially stood down within its fire support base (FSB) and conducted local security operations until turnover of the FSB to an ARVN or RF/PF unit was accomplished. Following the turnover, the organization moved to Dong Tam, where, due to space limitations, it was billeted aboard barracks ships provided by NAVFORV's TF 117.

(C) Artillery displaced to Dong Tam with its supported unit; however, artillery continued firing even after its supported unit began preparations for redeployment. Stand down of artillery units was phased to permit the maximum number of tubes to remain in action as long as possible.

(C) By 23 Jul, all divisional combat elements slated for movement, either for stationing in Hawaii or for inactivation, had stood down. Security of Dong Tam (TAOR KUDZU) was provided by TF CARLSON--6th Bn, 31st Inf (Reinf). On 26 Jul, the division passed from operational control of Delta Military Assistance Command (DMAC) to operational control of USARV. Official recognition of the division being under USARV operational control after 26 Jul facilitated coordination with that headquarters and Saigon Support Command. Also on 26 Jul, the division released operational control of the 3d Bde to CG, II FFORCEV who in turn placed it under the operational control of CG, 25th Inf Div.

(U) Notwithstanding the short time for preliminary planning and the lack of initial guidance available in-country, the division was able to redeploy within the allotted time, and on 18 Aug the division colors officially passed Hawaii.

FACTORS INFLUENCING THE REDEPLOYMENT

(C) The following factors influenced the redeployment:

1. The division was alerted on 12 Jun to redeploy not later than 31 Aug (within 80 days), with the first battalion to redeploy on 8 Jul (within 26 days).

2. The division was engaged in continuous combat operations throughout its redeployment and until the last units departed Dong Tam.

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REDEPLOYMENT PLANNING GROUP (RPG)




FIGURE D-1

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3. The 7th ARVN Div TAOR coincided geographically with the TAOR of those 9th Inf Div units which would redeploy.

4. A USARV Planning and Operations Group was constituted immediately after the redeployment was announced and was available to provide decisions and guidance for the division during the entire redeployment.

5. Dong Tam had the distinct advantage of being serviced by adequate land, water, and air LOCs which provided direct routes to ports of embarkation.

6. All support requests from the division were fulfilled effectively and expeditiously by the Saigon Support Command.

7. There were significant shortages of many critical items of equipment throughout USARV which required the division to leave much of this equipment in-country to fill the shortages.

8. Personnel turbulence was a major problem throughout the redeployment.

9. There was no prepositioned PSYOP material for use during redeployment. No effective PSYOP program was initiated above division level.

ORGANIZATION

(C) The USARV Planning and Operations Group (UPOG), a liaison assistance group, physically moved to Dong Tam and provided invaluable support to the 9th Inf Div and higher headquarters during the planning phase, as well as during the actual redeployment. The UPOG was delegated certain decision making authority and had direct access to the USARV CofS for decisions outside of its authority. As a result of this close working relationship, many potential problems were eliminated as soon as they were identified and there was minimal lost time waiting for decisions which could not be made locally. In addition, the UPOG arranged for outside technical assistance in specialized areas of the redeployment process and in the transfer of responsibility to ARVN for its base camp at Dong Tam.

(C) The redeployment of the 9th Inf Div necessitated two reorganizations:

1. Internal Staff Reorganization. As indicated earlier, the division formed an RPG with division-wide representation to supervise all redeployment activities upon receiving notification of its redeployment. This permitted the division general and special staff to continue to focus on tactical planning and operations. The RPG was not a suprastaff, but was conceived as a focal point for all redeployment matters. It prepared and monitored all redeployment activities, identified redeployment problems and obtained decisions which were subsequently delegated to appropriate general or special staff or action agencies of the division for execution. (See Figure D-1.) The RPG served as a useful tool in redeployment planning for the 9th Ind Div; however, it had been established only after careful consideration of its need, function, composition, and authority. The RPG met each evening. Each member of the RPG informed the other members of his progress and the problems encountered in his area of interest. Representatives from subordinate units often attended these meetings in order to obtain advance information for their commanders.

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2. Unit Reorganization. With the announcement of the 9th Inf Div's redeployment, the division was required to split into the three elements mentioned earlier and reorganize as follows:

a. The 3d Bde with four infantry battalions (one mechanized) would be reorganized as a separate light infantry brigade and remain in RVN. Initial planning called for it to have a space ceiling of 5,854. This would allow flexibility to accommodate organizational requirements due to peculiarities of operations in the Delta. However, this space ceiling fluctuated and it was not until late June that it was approved at 5,588. This delayed critical planning for certain redeploying units which was contingent upon receiving the approved brigade organization. Changing guidance required preparation of five separate organizational proposals, each resulting in a loss of time for the division. Thus, fragmenting any unit, particularly a combat unit, during redeployment was believed undesirable. When this happened the subelements had to be augmented with combat support and combat service support capabilities. Reorganization combined with redeployment created additional problems with personnel instability and subsequently lowered combat efficiency. (Unit integrity should be maintained during redeployment and any reorganization should be done as a separate action.)

b. The 2d Bde with three infantry battalions, an artillery battalion, and a brigade slice of the division base would return to CONUS for inactivation. The strength figures for the brigade slice were based on required spaces rather than the TOE/MTOE organizational structure of the units. This required the division to select for inactivation those companies, platoons, sections, and individuals which would minimize detrimental impact on the new mission of the division (-) in Hawaii. It was apparent that in the selection of space levels for the division base returning to CONUS for inactivation, full consideration was not given to the impact of redeploying and inactivating spaces for which there was no established chain of command. In those cases where spaces were not comparable to an organizational structure, provisional units had to be organized with adequate command and control prior to redeployment.

c. The 1st Bde with three infantry battalions and the division (-) would redeploy to Hawaii as part of the PACOM Reserve. As a result of the aforementioned unit reorganizations, certain spaces were eliminated from the division base redeploying to Hawaii. This was another situation where figures did not relate to TOE/MTOE organizations and would have resulted in nonfunctional units in the division base after redeployment to Hawaii. To correct this deficiency, a division representative was sent to USARPAC to determine operational requirements and to assist in drafting a viable organizational structure. Delays were incurred due to a lack of secure voice communications between Hawaii and the 9th Inf Div. These communications were required to obtain the division commander's views and concurrence; USARV was used as an intermediary to accomplish this coordination. Another reorganizational problem was encountered when USARPAC requested the division elements redeploying to Hawaii to reorganize from riverine to a light infantry TOE before leaving RVN. This request for reorganization within RVN was not practical as unique MOSs, personnel spaces, individuals, and materiel were all involved. Additionally, it would have required an unacceptable delay in redeploying the division. In view of the time limit of 31 Aug established by the Presidential announcement, this requirement was revoked.

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REDEPLOYMENT OPERATIONS

(C) As in any operation, planning for redeplcyment should proceed in a logical sequence. In the case of the 9th Ind Div's redeployment, however, many decisions and actions were necessary prior to the receipt of complete and critical information. For example, unit redeployment schedules were required for KEYSTONE EAGLE before complete information was available concerning the units to be redeployed or their destinations. This created an almost intolerable planning situation at all levels and precluded sequential determination of redeployment strengths, tonnages, tactical constraints, and other factors. One method of coping with this situation in the subordinate units was distribution of draft plans and orders, with continual liaison and concurrent planning amoung the counterpart staffs of higher and subordinate headquarters concerned. This illustrated the need for firm, timely, and complete information and guidance from higher headquarters.

(C) Close scheduling was required to accomplish redeployment within the limited time available. Initially, PERT-type diagrams were prepared for each redeploying unit (See Table D-1). From the information obtained from the PERT diagrams, a flow chart was prepared for the divisions's redeployment. Proceeding in this manner critical functions and facilities were identified. This permitted further analyses and detailed scheduling.

(C) It was anticipated that the division would undergo an extensive learning process during its redeployment. Therefore, in addition to considering the planning factors discussed previously, unit movement dates were scheduled so that the inital redeployment dates had a period of several days between them. After the fourth unit was redeployed, a long period was scheduled during which no unit redeployed. These buffers provided time to reanalyze procedures, reevaluate requirements, and resolve problems which had arisen. Also the buffer periods provided the time to refine procedures to better enable the division to redeploy within the time allotted. Transportation scheduling was required prior to completion of most of the remaining redeployment planning. The inclusion of buffer periods into redeployment schedules permitted judgments based on lessons learned.

(C) The airlift schedule for the 9th Inf Div redeployment was established at a mid-June conference in Hawii. The 9th Inf Div was not represented. Through a misunderstanding, the resulting movement schedule did not correspond to the planned movement schedule of the division. This misunderstanding was later corrected at considerable effort and expense, but might have been avoided had the division been represented at the movement planning conference. The KEYSTONE EAGLE movements program addressed transportation with respect to troops and units to be redeployed. While equating the redeployment of 25,000 troops, it did not necessarily relate to in-country, on-hand strengths at any given time, nor could it be considered a prime document with respect to space reduction. Clear guidance stating actual numbers of people to be redeployed, spaces to be reduced, and their relation to in-country strength must be made early.

(C) Space at Dong Tam was a critical constraint. The 9th Inf Div's TAOR was located in the upper Mekong River Delta, high ground was at a premium, and the only suitable staging area was the Dong Tam Base. Dong Tam's population, already high, was increased by the influx of non-divisional personnel necessary to support the redeployment. Space for these units, as well as for equipment processing, was obtained by relocating tenant units. Therefore, the bulk of maneuver units could not be accommodated at Dong Tam as they vacated their FSBs. Direct coordination was made with the Navy's TF 117 to use barracks ships to

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PERT CHART

FUNCTION

UNIT	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	TOTAL TIME (DAYS)
Division HHC*	-	15	7	1	5	1	2	1	1	1	17
Brigade HHC	2	9	8	1	5	1	2	1	1	1	14
Brigade HHC (Inactivating)	2	4	2	1	5	1	2	1	1	1	10
Div Arty HHB*	-	10	7	1	5	1	2	1	1	1	15
DISCOM HBD*	-	10	7	1	5	1	2	1	1	1	9
Infantry Bn	4	9	11	1	5	3	4	1	1	1	21
Infantry Bn (Inactivating)	4	9	8	1	5	3	4	1	1	1	14
Artillery	4	9	9	1	5	2	3	1	1	1	17
Artillery Bn (105) (Inactivating)	4	8	5	1	5	2	3	1	1	1	16
Artillery Bn (Comp)	2	9	9	2	5	2	3	1	1	1	17
Engineer Bn*	-	14	14	1	5	3	4	1	1	1	17
Signal Bn*	-	14	14	1	5	2	3	1	1	1	18
Aviation Bn*	-	23	14	1	5	2	3	1	1	1	30
Medical Bn*	-	14	14	1	5	1	2	1	1	1	18
Maintenance Bn*	-	23	14	1	5	2	3	1	1	1	27
S&T Bn*	-	14	14	1	5	1	2	1	1	1	19
Administration Co*	-	10	7	1	5	1	2	1	1	1	16
MP Co*	-	15	7	1	5	1	2	1	1	1	17
Medium Boat Co (Inactivating)	4	14	7	3	5	2	3	1	1	1	23

*Unit was not required to relocate to stand down area since it was already located at Dong Tam.

Note: Across the top are listed the functional numbers keyed to the PERT diagram. The type units redeployed by the division are listed in the left-hand column, and the total time used by each type unit is listed in the right-hand column.


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TABLE D-1

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9TH INF DIV OPERATIONAL LOCATIONS UPON NOTIFICATION OF REDEPLOYMENT



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billet the maneuver units as they stood down and prepared for redeployment. Since TF 117's capacity was only two battalions, it was necessary to schedule carefully each unit's stand down and redeployement dates.

TACTICAL OPERATIONS

(C) When notified of its redeployment, the 9th Inf Div was engaged in operations against the enemy in Kien Hoa, Dinh Tuong, and Long An Provinces (See Figure D-2). Units were dispersed over an area of approximately 5,000 square kilometers and were located in widely scattered fire support bases. The division concentrated on conducting numerous small unit operations in order to achieve a large area coverage and to prevent the enemy from gaining the initiative. An average day's operations for the division included approximately 90 platoon-sized day operations and 45 platoon-sized night operations. Several factors required careful planning during the disengagement and redeployment.

1. Maintaining Pressure on the Enemy. The division was faced with the problem of maintaining maximum pressure on the enemy within its TAOR at the same time it was required to prepare for redeployment. It was imperative that each maneuver unit continue operations as long as possible for the following reasons:

a. The enemy continued to pose a threat throughout the division's redeployment.

b. The division became increasingly vulnerable as units disengaged and redeployed.

The normal area of operations of the 9th Inf Div units which were to be redeployed coincided with the 7th ARVN Div TAOR. Special emphasis was placed on combined operations with 7th ARVN Div. This afforded them increased use of the 9th Inf Div's airmobile assets. In this manner, a gradual phaseout of US troops was accomplished as the 7th ARVN Div units intensified operations throughout their TAOR. Each redeploying unit continued normal tactical operations until it stood down. After stand down, the affected unit conducted local security operations in the vicinity of its FSB until displacing to Dong Tam.

2. Turnover of Fire Support Bases to RVNAF. Prior to vacating a FSB, coordination was necessary to provide for a smooth turnover to RVNAF. The 9th Inf Div turned over six FSBs to RVNAF. These ranged in size from the smallest which contained a battalion headquarters, one artillery battery, and one infantry company to the largest which accommodated a brigade headquarters, an infantry battalion, three artillery batteries, and supporting units. Close coordination was made with the 7th ARVN Div and the territorial forces (RF/PF) to determine who would occupy the base and when they would assume responsibility for it. Each FSB was turned over with permanent installations intact. A small ceremony was conducted to recognize the official transfer of responsibility to RVNAF.

3. Security of Convoys and Troop Movements. Throughout the redeployment, it was necessary to provide security for the numerous road convoys moving to and from Dong Tam and for the air movement of troops to the aerial port of embarkation. Road convoys included troops and equipment to Dong Tam as each FSB was turned over to RVNAF, redeploying equipment en route to Newport which was the surface port of embarkation, and retrograde equipment en route to depots for disposition. Troops were airlifted by CH-47 helicopters from Dong Tam to Bien

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Hoa, the aerial port of embarkation. Each helicopter mission consisted of 94 unarmed troops which composed a C-141 load. The divisional engineer battalion provided daily mine sweeps of roads. Following stand down of the engineer battalion, this responsibility was assumed by the non-redeploying 3d Bde's organic engineer company. The ARVN forces intensified operations along major roads and accepted the responsibility for ground security. Air cover was provided by the divisional aviation battalion until it stood down, at which time required air cover was provided by DMAC. Prior arrangements were made for augmentation of both air and ground forces from non-organic sources to permit organic elements of the division to prepare for redeployment.

4. Base Camp Security. It was necessary to provide for the security of Dong Tam throughout the redeployment operations. The division's Support Command and other support troops manned berm positions on the Dong Tam perimeter until these units were in the final phases of redeployment. Task Force CARLSON (6th Bn, 31st Inf Reinf), a highly mobile covering force composed of non-redeploying units, was planned and provided by the 9th Inf Div early in the redeployment process to conduct operations in the area around Dong Tam (TAOR KUDZU). This TF included one infantry battalion, one assault helicopter company, an air cavalry troop, one medium artillery battery, one light artillery battery, and two ranger teams. As redeployment progressed, the number of tenant units at Dong Tam diminished until the base was unable to secure itself. This required TF CARLSON to gradually decrease operations in TAOR KUDZU and commit a sizeable number of troops to berm security. Assistance was obtained from RF/PF forces in the vicinity and the 7th ARVN Div, who maintained pressure on the enemy in the area around Dong Tam. In addition, maximum use was made of tactical air support and those US naval forces of both TF 116 and TF 117 which were in the vicinity. The 3d Bde, 9th Inf Div was prepared to reinforce Dong Tam, if necessary. The 6th Bn, 31st Inf reverted to the operational control of the 3d Bde on 31 Aug when the 7th ARVN Div assumed responsibility for the security of Dong Tam.

5. Phaseout of Division Tactical Operations Center. With the stand down of the maneuver battalions and the accompanying phase down of tactical operations, activities in the division's tactical operations center (DTOC) were reduced proportionately. As units stood down, the work load on DTOC personnel decreased. Key personnel were retained for required tasks to include those involved in the daily briefings for the commanding general and his staff. Personnel who were to be reassigned in RVN were released individually as they were no longer required. The DTOC operations ceased on 15 Aug. However, essential communications were retained until the division headquarters departed so that the command group could keep abreast of the tactical situation.

ARTILLERY SUPPORT

(C) The fire support plan for the 9th Inf Div's redeployment had to provide for three separate activities: the direct and reinforcing field artillery support required by the brigades until withdrawal into Dong Tam; the field artillery support provided the infantry battalion operating in the area surrounding Dong Tam; and, the artillery's portion of defense against rocket and mortar attack (DARMA) operations for Dong Tam Base as division artillery units stood down and redeployed. Each of these activities is discussed in subsequent paragraphs.

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1. Artillery Situation Prior to Redeployment. The 1st Bde conducted operations in TAOR KUDZU with one infantry battalion, even prior to redeployment. Close artillery support for this battalion was provided by one battery from the direct support battalion of the 1st Bde. The fires of this battery, located on Dong Tam Base, were controlled by the Dong Tam Artillery, the 9th Inf Div Artillery general support (GS) battalion. The GS battalion also operated the Dong Tam Air Warning Control Center (AWCC) and executed the field artillery portion of DARMA. Dong Tam Base DARMA were normally supported by fires from several field artillery and heavy mortar units positioned at Dong Tam or in the vicinity.

2. Direct and Reinforcing Field Artillery Support. This aspect of artillery support during redeployment presented few problems since the normal artillery tactical missions applied during this phase of the operation. The DS and GS reinforcing field artillery units remained in their normal areas of operation providing continuous support. As infantry elements withdrew, field artillery units were displaced back to Dong Tam. When the latter units arrived in Dong Tam, they occupied firing positions and were placed under the control of the Dong Tam Artillery fire support coordination center (FSCC).

3. Field Artillery Support for TF CARLSON Infantry Battalion. One 105mm howitzer battery of the 1st Bde's DS battalion was always positioned in Dong Tam to provide close support for the KUDZU infantry battalion. As field artillery batteries displaced to Dong Tam, they began firing in support of the base. The available field artillery support reached a high point on 26 Jul when three 105mm howitzer batteries, three 155mm howitzer batteries, and one 8-inch howitzer battery were located in firing positions at Dong Tam. This situation lasted until 6 Aug, when one 105mm howitzer battery stood down to prepare for redeployment. The remaining division artillery units were taken out of action during the period 6-9 Aug. The 105mm howitzer battery supporting TF CARLSON was organic to the DS field artillery battalion of the 3d Bde and, therefore, was not scheduled for redeployment. It was recognized that medium artillery would be required after division artillery stood down. The division requested and received a 155mm howitzer battery from II FFORCEV. This battery (-) of four 155mm howitzers became operational on Dong Tam base one day before the last divisional medium artillery battery stood down.

4. Provision of an Artillery Control Headquarters. The GS battalion responsible for Dong Tam Artillery DARMA had to stand down to prepare for redeployment. The problem was to provide an element to control the fire units, operate the AWCC, and plan the DARMA operations. This was considered too complex a mission to be assumed by a battery; therefore, a separate element was necessary. Two solutions were considered:

a. Form a provisional field artillery element with personnel and equipment authorized on a temporary basis.

b. Task an adjacent field artillery battalion and augment that organization with additional personnel and equipment. The later solution was selected because it presented the added advantage of having a field artillery battalion available to satisfy unforeseen needs of the control element and a senior field artillery officer to supervise fire support activities after the departure of division artillery. The 2d Bn, 4th Arty, the 3d Bde's DS battalion, was tasked with operating the Dong Tam FSCC when the GS battalion terminated operations to prepare for redeployment. Necessary personnel and equipment were identified and transferred to the 2d Bn, 4th Arty from the Dong Tam Artillery prior to the date designated for assuming this mission.

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5. Countermortar Radar Support. During redeployment, the division base camp population increased significantly and became a lucrative target for indirect attacks by fire. This crowded condition, combined with a reduction in tactical operations outside TAOR KUDZU, increased the possibility of mortar and rocket attacks. Even before the redeployment announcement, Dong Tam Base was recognized as the most vulnerable military target in the division's TAOR; therefore, countermortar radar units (AN/MPQ-4A) were positioned around Dong Tam. This radar coverage for Dong Tam Base was continuous throughout the redeployment under the operational control of the Dong Tam Artillery.

6. Ground Surveillance Radar Support. The 9th Inf Div had used ground surveillance radars (AN/PPS-5, AN/TPS-33, and AN/TPS-25) for intelligence and target acquisition, with each radar tied into an artillery FDC. Prior to the announcement of the division's redeployment, one AN/TPS-33 and one AN/PPS-5 were positioned in TAOR KUDZU. As the 1st and 2d Bdes withdrew and the intensity of operations decreased, it was recognized that additional radar assets were required to provide adequate coverage of the area around Dong Tam. Experience had shown that an artillery battalion fire direction center (FDC) was capable of handling a maximum of five radars. By positioning two large radars at Dong Tam and three small radars in locations throughout TAOR KUDZU, all sectors could be covered continuously without dead spots.

(C) The redeployment of 9th Div artillery assets demonstrated that careful prior study and consideration must be given to the redeployment of artillery--depending upon the missions performed by the artillery. In IV CTZ, the 9th Inf Div Arty had provided considerable general support area coverage as well as direct support. The redeployment of the 9th Div caused an immediate reduction of artillery support, which amounted to three artillery battalions. The relieving 7th ARVN Div could not restore this deficit immediately with organic artillery assets. Reduced combat strengths, with no reduction in a TAOR, tended to increase combat support requirements; therefore, the redeployment demonstrated the vital necessity for higher headquarters (US and RVNAF) to implement contingency plans for the expeditious reinforcement of artillery support in areas from which US artillery was redeployed.

SIGNAL SUPPORT

(C) The disengagement of combat elements prior to the cessation of hostilities necessitated the continuation of adequate and responsive command and control communications throughout all phases of redeployment. Sufficient communications were required so that units had the capability of immediately resuming effective defensive or offensive posture as the tactical situation dictated. Nonorganic signal support, both personnel and equipment, was necessary to permit the release of redeploying unit assets for processing and shipment. Special communications circuits were requested from USARV C-E to provide a sole user capability for the division's Redeployment Planning Group direct to the USARV Army Operations Center and to the air and sea ports of embarkation. In addition, a point-to-point teletype circuit was installed from division headquarters to Schofield Barracks, Hawaii. These circuits were invaluable in providing instant coordination that would have taken excessive periods of time using common user channels. Communications systems were operated and maintained by divisional personnel until stand down, rather than requiring nonorganic personnel support. A definite advantage was gained from having a 1st Sig Bde installation at Dong Tam. This permitted continuous operation of the base telephone system throughout redeployment. In addition, existing IV CTZ VHF systems were available for priority tactical circuits which permitted the timely stand down of

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divisional equipment. The USARV C-E staff provided a liaison officer who remained with the division throughout redeployment to coordinate all C-E activities and assist in the disposition of nondeploying signal equipment.

(C) Redeployment of 9th Inf Div signal units was not accomplished without revealing the need for effecting timely, detailed, and continuous communications coordination and planning at all echelons of command. The following cases in point illustrate this necessity:

1. Three unrelated US signal elements (Co B, 52d Sig Bn; 9th Sig Bn; a detachment of the 1st Sig Bde Regional Commo Gp) were located at Dong Tam with no common chain of command below USARV.

2. 9th Div signal units provided personnel and equipment for access to the overall in-country communications system to the USS Benewah (flagship for the Mobile Riverine Force) which was located on the Mekong River in the vicinity of Dong Tam. Redeployment of the 9th Inf Div created confusion and concern on the USS Benewah as to who would replace the existing vital communications link, when, and under what authority.

3. Lack of a combined US/RVNAF communications plan for redeployment of 9th Inf Div signal units at Dong Tam with concurrent RVNAF assumption of responsibility generated many problems that otherwise could have been alleviated.

ENGINEER OPERATIONS

(C) As military operations in the 9th Inf Div's TAOR was phased out, division engineer support in these areas was also phased out. Engineering projects in progress, related to pacification or civic action, were continued until completion. In those provinces where important projects had been programmed, but not yet started, coordination was initiated with the 9th Div suggesting concerned provinces assume project responsibility.

(C) With redeployment plans including concurrent restationing of the 3d Bde within RVN, engineer units were faced with the urgent requirement to enlarge the 3d Bde headquarters complex at Tan An and Tan An Airfield, and also to construct a battalion-sized base camp at Can Giuoc. Engineer elements released from projects in IV CTZ were immediately shifted to Long An Province to augment the forces constructing these 3d Bde facilities.

(C) The principal construction constraints encountered by the engineer units were a critical shortage of construction materials and the limited time allowed for construction due to the programmed stand down and redeployment of the division's organic 15th Engr Bn and the 86th Engr Bn from the 34th Engr Gp. To relieve these constraints, bunkers were removed from closed fire support bases, all unused lumber at Dong Tam was collected, and materials held as contingency reserve for bridge construction in case of road interdiction were used and elements of the 93d Engr Bn were given the mission of assisting in the construction at Can Giuoc.

INTELLIGENCE

(C) The 9th Inf Div recognized that its intelligence collection capability would rapidly

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decrease during the redeployment period--a time in which the unit's vulnerability would invariably increase. As a preventive measure, the Division G2 Section increased liaison with intelligence agencies within the 9th Inf Div's TAOR.

(C) Redeployment revealed a major shortcoming in the division's intelligence procedures. Agreements between agent handlers and sources did not include termination conditions. Agreements should have been made at the time of initial employment, permitting either party to terminate at his own discretion. Termination pay should have been clearly defined and sufficient funds set aside to permit rapid cancellation of agent/agent handler contracts. In addition, attempts to find new employment for agents terminated as a direct result of redeployment should have been made.

CIVIC ACTION PROGRAMS

(C) The 9th Inf Div conducted extensive Military Civic Action Programs (MILCAP) and Medical Civic Action Program (MEDCAP) throughout its TAOR. With notification of redeployment, the division realized that any interruption in these programs would provide an opportunity for dissatisfaction on the part of the people which could be exploited quickly by the enemy. Every possible effort had to be made to ensure continuation of these programs.

1. MILCAP. Construction projects which were in progress at the time of redeployment notification were completed. Coordination was initiated with the civil affairs platoons of those provinces in which projects were in the planning stage, with a view to having them assume responsibility for their completion. In several instances, the 9th Inf Div provided materials and funds to these provinces for completing the planned projects.

2. MEDCAP. The MEDCAP schedule ceased when 9th Inf Div units stood down and prepared for redeployment. The relieving 7th ARVN Div indicated a willingness to assume responsibility for the program; however, it did not have the capability to assume the complete MEDCAP schedule of the 9th Inf Div. With more advance notice, some system might have been established to provide the supplies and personnel to increase the 7th ARVN Div's MEDCAP capability.

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

(C) The 9th Inf Div did not receive any redeployment PSYOP guidance from principal US PSYOP agencies (JUSPAO/MACJ3-11) until after redeployment orders had been issued. Neither had the GVN (Vietnamese Information Service/General Political Warfare Department) issued guidance in this matter to their subordinate agencies. This made a coordinated US/GVN effort impossible and delayed the start of any PSYOP campaign in the Upper Delta region until five days after the enemy began his PSYOP exploitation of the redeployment. As a result, the friendly redeployment PSYOP efforts in the 9th Inf Div's TAOR had little or no impact.

(C) It was apparent that PSYOP guidance should have been disseminated throughout the 9th Inf Div's TAOR immediately after the division was selected for redeployment. General policies should have been developed with specific themes indicated for exploitation.

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PERSONNEL TURBULENCE

(C) Personnel turbulence within the 9th Inf Div was a major problem throughout the redeployment. It was primary attributed to personnel redeployment criteria which were changed several times during the 30 days following the original announcement. With each change, much initial planning was invalidated. This resulted in doubt and confusion which was magnified successively at subordinate units; efficiency and morale suffered accordingly. These consequences caused the 9th Inf Div to resort to crises management in which personnel decisions were made in response to short deadlines.

(C) During the early stages of redeployment, it was thought that the reduction applied to personnel spaces. This proved to be a wrong assumption and, with the later interpretation that it applied to actual strength, complicated the overall strength figure. This new interpretation required the redeployment of considerably more personnel than originally planned.

(C) Each unit within the 9th Inf Div contained all categories of redeploying personnel (i.e., personnel redeploying to CONUS, Hawaii, and those remaining in RVN), most of whom had to be reassigned prior to their unit's redeployment. Those men who were considered critical to the operation of their old unit had to be retained, either until their unit began final processing or their old unit redeployed. This situation distorted transportation estimates and created a late "ballooning" of reassignments and unprogrammed returnees. Many of these men had in excess of 10 months in-country and were rotated separately to CONUS through the 90th Repl Bn.

(C) The majority of personnel particularly career personnel, scheduled for redeployment to CONUS or Hawaii, did not want to leave RVN without credit for a completed tour. Credit for a completed tour required a minimum of 10 months in-country. The DA and USARPAC letters of instruction allowed personnel to volunteer to remain in RVN to receive tour credit or to qualify for the early release program. (Based on the precedent established in the Dominican Republic, whereby tour credit was granted for six months spent there, the 9th Inf Div's Redeployment After-Action Report indorsed a six month criterion as a means of reducing personnel turbulence.)

(C) Approximately one-third of the 9th Inf Div's personnel were not eligible for transfer to Hawaii (individuals having served 10-12 months before the unit redeployed). Filling the units scheduled for redeployment to Hawaii required that personnel be assigned involuntarily to an overseas tour in Hawaii to meet the directed redeployment strength.

PERSONNEL PROCESSING

(U) During redeployment, each person was required to undergo a number of out-processing actions which included: shipping hold baggage; verifying supply, medical, finance, and AG records; certifying war trophies; manifesting; processing accompanying baggage; exchanging currency; and receiving the final customs check of individual and personal baggage prior to departure. To ensure each inspection was made and each action was taken in a timely and efficient manner the 9th Inf Div decided to centralize all out-processing. The selected site was

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Reliable Academy. It had performed the division's functions of processing replacement, R and R, and PCS personnel, in addition to training those replacements who were new arrivals in-country. Augmented with appropriate personnel and equipment, the academy now accomplished the task of redeployment out-processing for the entire division.

(U) Out-processing was divided into three phases with each phase divided into distinct stages. The individual was required to complete each stage within a phase, sequentially, so that control could be maintained.

1. Phase I. This phase consisted of six stations and an out-processing control headquarters. The control headquarters monitored the entire out-processing program and conducted the initial orientation. All stations in Phase I processing were designed to accommodate 300 men per day.

a. Station 1 (Hold Baggage). This was the initial out-processing station and served to free the soldier of his personal belongings which were to be shipped. At this station all hold baggage was received, inspected for unauthorized items, documentation prepared, and crated for shipment. Experience indicated that only about 41 percent of the redeploying personnel processed hold baggage.

b. Station 2 (CTA 50-901 Turn-in Point). At this station all TA 50 equipment was turned in by soldiers assigned to inactivating units, and each individual's clothing record was screened. This station required a storage area for equipment that was to be packaged for turn-in through supply channels.

c. Station 3 (Supply Issue Point). This station was responsible for providing all items authorized for issue to out-processing personnel (e.g., fatigues, boots, and caps).

d. Station 4 (Medical Detachment). This station screened all medical records, administered innoculations as required, and issued malaria pills.

e. Station 5 (Finance Detachment). This station was responsible for locating, receiving, screening, and updating individual finance records. Additionally, locator cards were prepared for each individual and partial payments were made to those desiring them.

f. Station 6 (AG Detachment). This station was responsible for screening and updating DA Forms 20 and 66; completing emergency data and postal locator cards; checking identification cards and tags and taking action to obtain any of these if missing; and lastly, collecting all records which were to be shipped with the unit (e.g., 201 File, Form 20 or 66, medical, clothing).

2. Phase II. Phase II processing consisted of two stations--flight manifesting and the war trophy and baggage check. Units reported for this processing by manifest element (a manifest element was the 94 soldiers scheduled to depart on one C-141). The capacity of both stations was adjusted to handle all personnel to be redeployed on a given day.

a. Station 7 (Flight Manifest Check). This station manifested each individual to include seat and sortie number for the CH-47 flight to Bien Hoa and the mission and seat number for the C-141 flight to final destination. The manifest element of 94 personnel was divided into three CH-47 groups of 32, 32, and 30 men respectively. A manifest for each group was typed and then all three combined to form a single manifest for the C-141 manifest element. It proved desirable to have the 94 personnel pre-assigned to each manifest element by the unit

concerned and to have a roster of the manifest elements furnished to the Division Transportation Officer. When this practice was followed, manifests could be pre-typed and only one man was needed at Station 7 to check the manifest and account for all personnel.

b. Station 8 (War Trophy and Baggage Inspection). This station was responsible for the initial customs inspection of all accompanied baggage and the inspection and proper labeling of all war trophies. Required forms (i.e., baggage tags and personnel data cards) were filled out prior to a group's arrival at this station. Three substations were established as follows:

(1) War Trophy Inspection. This point was responsible for inspecting all individual war trophies and ensuring that no unauthorized item was allowed to accompany the individual to the aircraft.

(2) Baggage Inspection. This inspection area consisted of a long counter with 7-10 stalls. After completing the baggage inspection, soldiers proceeded to a holding area to await further instructions while their baggage moved to the final substation.

(3) Baggage Loading. This substation was responsible for the loading of all personal baggage into Sea Land containers. Only one manifest element was loaded per container to ensure that each soldier's baggage would be placed on the proper aircraft at Bien Hoa. The Sea Land containers were sealed and convoyed to the aerial port of embarkation where the baggage was placed and secured on pallets for loading into the C-141 aircraft.

3. Phase III. This stage of processing was accomplished on the day of departure and consisted of Stations 9, 10, and 11. All personnel departing on the same day reported for Phase III processing by manifest element for ease of control in meeting the departure schedule.

a. Station 9 (Currency Conversion Point). Prior to arrival at this station, all forms required for currency conversion were completed. This station then checked these forms and directed the troops to one of its four cages for actual money conversion. Prior to converting his MPC to US currency, each man was given the opportunity to convert VN currency to MPC. If Phase III processing was conducted within one or two days of payday, the men were paid in US dollars by the finance personnel at the time of their Phase III processing, thereby eliminating excessive transactions.

b. Station 10 (Final Customs Inspection). This station was organized with separate areas set aside for the collection of prohibited items to prevent personnel being inspected from recovering any seized items. An amnesty box was provided where unauthorized items could be surrendered without question prior to the inspection.

c. Station 11 (Staging for Shipment). This station exercised overall supervision of the group movements through the Phase III stations. It was composed of one OIC and six senior NCOs. Here, the departees were manifested; Customs Declaration Certificates (DD Form 40R) were completed and given to the flight commander. After processing the troops moved to the CH-47s which subsequently transported them to the aerial port of embarkation. No one was allowed to leave after reaching Station 11 (since customs inspections had been completed) and the group was essentially quarantined until reaching the port of embarkation. American Red Cross girls also participated in this last phase, providing refreshments and cheerful conversation.

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(U) A key to the success of the out-processing operation was coordination between Reliable Academy and the unit being out-processed. Each out-processing unit provided a liaison representative to Reliable Academy during the period that the unit was actually processing. In addition, final coordination meetings were held one day prior to a unit's entering Phase II processing. Each unit departing on a given day was required to attend the coordination meeting and each interested staff agency was also represented. Unit representatives were throughly briefed on necessary prior arrangements and events which would occur during Phase II and III processing. In this manner, procedures were explained in advance, most problems were avoided, and positive controls were established to preclude disruptions.

PROVOST MARSHAL

(C) The division's Provost Marshal was responsible for the following activities during the redeployment: conducting the division's customs processing; maintaining effective discipline, law, and order at Dong Tam to cope with the anticipated population increase; and phasing out the division detainee collection point.

1. Customs Processing. The Provost Marshal's office was given the mission of conducting customs inspections of all personnel and equipment. Individual and accompanied baggage inspections were made during the Phase II and Phase III out-processing at Reliable Academy. Hold baggage was inspected by the Saigon Support Command representative in charge of the hold baggage facility as each unit processed through Phase I. Equipment and CONEX containers were inspected prior to being transported to Newport. The 9th Inf Div exercised a highly effective customs inspection program which was based on the following:

a. Highly motivated and thoroughly trained personnel to perform the customs inspections.

b. Amnesty boxes whose use was clearly understood by all personnel.

c. An officer or senior NCO from the unit being processed to act as liaison officer with the customs inspectors.

d. Inspection of vehicles used to transport personnel from the holding area to the aircraft to ensure items hidden prior to the customs inspection were not later recovered.

e. Marijuana detection dogs, when available. These dogs were of great assistance in locating marijuana that was not discovered during the normal customs inspections.

2. Discipline, Law, and Order. Requirements for discipline, law, and order remained constant throughout the redeployment. An increase in the number of MP patrols was necessary because of the rise in troop population as units moved to Dong Tam in preparation for redeployment and to safeguard buildings vacated as units departed. Unannounced musters and random checks of ration, ID, and currency control cards were used to apprehend AWOL personnel.

3. Criminal Investigation. With the announcement of the inactivation of the division, all case records and evidence logs were sent to Hawaii with the advance party. Current cases were transferred to the 8th MP Group (CI) for completion and storage.

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4. Detainee Collection Point. On 16 Aug the division collection point at Dong Tam was phased out. At this time, the forward collection point located with the 3d Bde at Tan An became the only operational collection point for the division. Resources were provided to expand the 3d Bde collection point to the capacity required for a separate brigade, prior to the transfer of detainees from Dong Tam to Tan An.

5. Increase in Traffic Density. The problems of increased traffic density at Dong Tam and subsequent accident probability were met by the use of intensified control measures, such as roving and stationary traffic control personnel. Initially, the number of vehicles in the Dong Tam area increased. As each unit redeployed, the number of vehicles decreased rapidly, but the traffic density remained constant until the bulk of the division had redeployed. Rigorous command interest led to increased accident prevention measures which remained in effect throughout the redeployment period.

FINANCE

(U) The 9th Inf Div's redeployment required the Finance Office to reorganize to manage the finance records of three categories of personnel: those redeploying to CONUS, those redeploying to Hawaii, and those remaining in-country.

(U) Unit Processing. In most cases, personnel did not redeploy with their original unit but were assigned to a new unit. As a result, the soldier's Financial Data Records Folder (FDRF) often was not available when his new unit began processing. Initially, machine-produced rosters were used for identifying the pay records of personnel who were to process on a given day. However, because of the number of last minute changes, these rosters were not accurate and direct coordination was necessary between deploying units and the supporting finance office in order to obtain accurate rosters of assigned personnel. Close coordination was also required with the Division Transportation Office to obtain aircraft manifests to ensure that the FDRFs were boxed in manifest order to accompany each redeploying planeload.

(U) Exchange of MPC to US Dollars. The exchange of MPC to US dollars had to be accomplished during the final phase of processing on the morning of departure, thereby precluding US dollars for falling into the hands of unauthorized individuals. Rigid control procedures were established to ensure efficient and proper operation of this exchange.

(U) Continuous Pay Service. Continuous pay service for units redeploying to Hawaii and CONUS, and for those remaining in-country had to be maintained throughout the division's redeployment. In the latter part of July the Division Finance Office began to separate its operations: one group managed the records of the 3d Bde which remained in-country, and the other group managed the records of the units redeploying to Hawaii. (The last element of the 2d Bde had redeployed to CONUS by early July.) To facilitate continued finance functions in Hawaii and at Dong Tam, the Deputy Finance Officer and approximately 30 men were designated to establish a Class B finance office in Hawaii.

(U) The Finance Officer was able to provide the necessary records management and out-processing functions only after direct coordination with each redeploying unit. It was determined that records management could be improved if personnel reassignments were accomplished and accurate rosters produced in sufficient time to have financial records reorganized in redeploying unit order prior to out-processing.

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STAFF JUDGE ADVOCATE (SJA)

(U) When the announcement was made that redeployment would divide the division into three elements, several legal problems became apparent:

1. Availability of Witnesses. Due to the rapid departure of units and the many personnel transfers, it was quite difficult to ensure the presence of witnesses for courts-martial. To preclude the loss of witnesses, commanders were advised to indicate the estimated departure date of all witnesses when forwarding a charge sheet. Further, if a prospective witness was transferred to another unit, the losing unit was required to notify the SJA office so that the whereabouts of the witness would remain known.

2. Confinement Cases. CG, USARV directed that special courts-martial convening authorities suspend the unexecuted portion of confinement sentences for individuals eligible for rotation. Individuals not eligible for rotation were transferred to units remaining in RVN.

3. Increase in Courts-Martial. Announcement of redeployment caused a number of AWOL personnel to return to military control in the belief that they would be allowed to redeploy with their units. To cope with this development, the SJA created an additional trial team to dispose of these cases as quickly as possible. Units with the earliest redeployment dates received priority in obtaining the service of the trial team. It was apparent that all personnel were not aware that time spent in confinement did not count toward completion of the RVN tour; thus, a number of men with confinement records were ineligible for redeployment.

4. Legal Service Support. Due to the requirement for packing and shipping equipment, the SJA office could provide legal services until approximately ten days prior to departure. After stand down of the SJA office, provisions were made for assumption of jurisdiction by II FFORCEV.

PUBLIC INFORMATION

(U) Press coverage increased dramatically from the time the announcement was made that the 9th Inf Div would redeploy until 8 Jul when the first unit departed RVN. During this period, civilian news correspondents from nearly every continent visited Dong Tam. Judicious handling was required to ensure good press relations, yet preclude delays caused by the large numbers of visitors. The Information Office accordingly was tasked with two additional aspects of press relations--providing transportation for the press and arranging billeting while press personnel remained in the division area.

(U) The Office of the Chief of Information, Department of the Army, and other information offices in RVN, Hawaii, and at Fort Lewis, Washington, required unit historical backgrounds, action photographs, and biographical sketches and photographs of the commanders of the redeploying units. The brigade information sections assisted in supplying this necessary data. The compiled material was forwarded to the requesting agency by courier or, when feasible, with the redeploying unit's advance party.

(U) Redeployment of the 9th Inf Div marked the end of publication of the Old Reliable, the division's weekly newspaper, and the "Octofoil", its quarterly magazine.

TRANSPORTATION

(U) Comparison of Transportation Modes. Highway transportation was determined to be the most feasible method available to meet the critical time schedule in redeploying the 9th Inf Div for the following reasons:

1. The excellent road to Newport, the surface port of embarkation (POE), and the proximity of this POE to Dong Tam (2-1/2 hours).

2. There was generally a high availability of nondivisional transportation throughout the period of the redeployment.

3. Although water transportation was capable of moving heavy, bulky cargo and was quite flexible in the Delta's many navigable waterways, there was a serious drawback--water transportation was slow and difficult to schedule because of the paucity of floating assets.

4. Air transportation was restricted by its high cost, low availability, and limited capability to move bulky cargo. It was, however, fast and almost completely safe from ambush.

(U) Fortunately, the 9th Inf Div was located with good access to air, highway, and water lines of communication. The optimum solution for meeting the transportation requirements of redeployment was a combination of all three modes of transportation. Divisional and nondivisional truck convoys fulfilled a preponderance of the division's transportation requirements while water transportation (barge and LST) handled heavy or bulky items. Air transportation handled the fragile and high priority equipment, plus all personnel movements.

(U) Lift Requirements. Initial estimates for lift requirements had to be accurate to ensure that the proper type and number of vehicles and CONEX containers were provided. In the 9th Inf Div, however, the original estimate for CONEX containers was over 1,400 while the final requirement was approximately half that number. This reduction occurred primarily because a large number of critical items were redesignated by higher headquarters to remain in-country.

(U) Scheduling. Careful scheduling of transportation was necessary to meet time schedules.

1. Stake and Platform Trailers. Stake and platform trailers had to be spotted in unit areas for loading CONEX containers but could not be scheduled too early as any unused time was a waste of this critical transportation resource. Tractors were also critical and were scheduled to move stake and platform trailers only after they were loaded, banded, and inspected.

2. Sea-Land Containers. Sea-Land containers were spotted in unit areas for loading of post, camp, and station property (including cantonment mess equipment) just before a unit cleared its area for redeployment.

3. Light Truck Platoon. A light truck platoon from the Saigon Support Command was centrally dispatched on a priority basis to meet normal divisional requirements after the division's organic vehicles had been shipped to port or turned in to the depot.

4. Water Assets. Barges, LSTs, and LCM-8s were requested and scheduled, as needed, to supplement road convoys for the heavier or bulkier loads and equipment which were retrograded to a depot or to property disposal yards.

5. Air Assets. Helicopters were requested and scheduled to move troops to Bien Hoa Air Base to meet departure times of C-141 aircraft. Army and Air Force aircraft were also used to move fragile and critical equipment.

6. Materials-handling Equipment (MHE). The majority of redeployment requirements for MHE was furnished by the 9th S&T Bn. Shortage of forklifts, cranes, and wreckers at Dong Tam, along with stand down of the 9th S&T Bn, made it necessary for the 9th Inf Div to exercise centralized control over all organic and non-organic MHE assets.

(U) Convoys. Convoys consisted of 15 to 50 vehicles from various divisional elements and moved to the POE in unit groups. Meeting were held each evening prior to the following day's convoy to coordinate the clearance, security, communications, and other details required. Qualified line officers, familiar with the convoy overwatch system and methods of coordinating air cover and artillery fires, were habitually used as convoy commanders. Since many units used convoy drivers not normally assigned to the vehicles, it was necessary to have supervised motor stables to ensure satisfactory condition of the vehicles before departure.

(U) Preparation of Vehicles. Vehicle preparation requirements and standards were provided through MACV Transportation Management Agency (TMA) prior to the movement of vehicles to the port. All vehicles were required to meet Department of Agriculture standards of cleanliness. To assist units in preparing their vehicles for shipment, a static demonstration of properly prepared and correctly documented equipment and vehicles was held at the Dong Tam convoy staging area on 19 Jul. Items displayed were: "piggy-backed" trailers; 1/4-ton, 3/4-ton, 2 1/2-ton, and 5-ton trucks with banded bows; wooden containers; and CONEX containers. Units were then required to attain the demonstrated standards in packing and documenting their own equipment and vehicles.

DIVISION TRANSPORTATION OFFICE

(U) The Division Transportation Office required reorganization along functional lines to fulfill its role in redeployment operations (See Figure D-3). It was augmented with additional personnel and equipment.

(U) Division Movement Control Officer. The Division Movement Control Officer was in charge of the requisitioning, positioning, loading upon trailers, and movement to port of CONEX containers. This was a normal extension of his duties as Division CONEX Control Officer. He was familiar with existing CONEX locations, serviceability criteria, handling, and movement procedures.

(U) Banding Teams. Two banding teams were formed and placed under the supervision of the CONEX Control Officer. They were provided with transportation and banding materials and had the responsibility for ensuring CONEX containers and similar loads were securely banded to trailers for movement to the port. The banding team concept was necessary because of the limited amount of banding materials and tools, and the lack of loading and banding experience within the division.

(U) Convoy Control Officer. An additional officer was assigned to the Division Transportation Office as Convoy Control Officer. His responsibilities included planning, organizing, clearing, and checking all redeployment convoys. He was provided a direct telephone link to Newport to facilitate collection and verification of shipment and movement data.

GENERAL LOGISTICS

(U) Complex logistic requirements were placed on the division support elements by the three separate actions required within the division--inactivation, redeployment, and reorganization. Continuation of combat operations until stand down by divisional elements placed a dual requirement on the logistic support elements--retrograde and redeployment of equipment while still providing combat service support.

(U) Logistic Responsibilities. As the Division Support Command stood down, the Saigon Support Command established a Logistics Operations Group. This provisional organization assumed responsibility for the combat service support of the division and provided logistical advice and assistance throughout the redeployment. The supply and transportation elements of the Logistics Operations Group assumed the mission of the 9th S&T Bn. Assumption of Class I, III, and V activities were usually accomplished without difficulty. The mission of the division's 709th Maint Bn was assumed by the 238th Light Equip Maint (LEM) Co on 20 Jul. A problem developed when the 238th LEM Co did not have trained personnel to support all artillery equipment in the division. By reorganizing and obtaining the expertise necessary from the 709th Maint Bn, the 238th LEM Co provided the required maintenance support. (Figure D-4 shows the organization of the Logistics Operations Group and Table D-2 outlines Saigon Support Command personnel at Dong Tam.)

(U) Installation Coordinator. The CO, Division Support Command, remained as the Installation Coordinator until the final stages of the redeployment--at which time the CG, DMAC, assigned this responsibility to the CO, 93d Engr Bn (Const).

(U) Coordination with Ports. Coordination was established with surface and aerial ports of embarkation to determine requirements and criteria for all shipments. Direct telephone circuits were established from the Division's Redeployment Planning Group headquarters to facilitate coordination. Reciprocal liaison visits were made by division personnel and port representatives. Continuous coordination permitted early resolution of problem areas.

(U) Requisition Policy. It was necessary to determine the status of requisitions as early as possible. This was complicated by different policies applying to units depending on their status--inactivating, redeploying, or remaining in RVN. For example:

ORGANIZATION OF THE LOGISTICS OPERATIONS GROUPS

UNIT	OFF	EM	TOTAL
Command Group	4	5	9
Collection, Classification and Salvage (53d General Support Group)	1	5	6
29th General Support Group	1	7	8
238th Light Equipment Maint Company	4	140	144
Supply and Service	4	49	53
Logistical Support Activity	3	150	153
Movements Control Center	2	2	4
Mess and Mortuary	0	4	4
64th Quartermaster Battalion	0	1	1
543d Transportation Company	1	30	31
604th Care and Preservation Company	2	76	78
TOTAL	22	469	491

1. Requisitions for 2d Bde units (inactivation) were cancelled immediately except for priority repair parts needed to remove critical equipment from deadline.

2. Requisitions for the 3d Bde (remaining in RVN) continued uninterrupted. One problem experienced was that newly organized units did not have unit identification codes and initially could not submit requisitions.

3. The 1st Bde and the Division (-) (redeployment) were authorized to submit requisitions in Hawaii, once activity address codes and unit identification codes had been confirmed.

(U) Since those divisional elements redeploying to Hawaii were to be reorganized under new MTOEs, their new Prescribed Load List (PLL) and Authorized Stockage List (ASL) authorizations differed from those currently in effect. The division supplied an entire listing of ASL (less marine items) to the United States Army, Hawaii (USARHAW). Upon receipt of the ASL listings, USARHAW requisitioned 50 percent of each line item. Priority for disposition of 9th Inf Div ASL items in-country was given to filling completely the ASL of the 3d Bde. All PLLs for Hawaii were recomputed, based on a full fill of MTOE items. The PLL on hand within ploying units was packed and sent to Hawaii and the shortfall was requisitioned through the Supply and Maintenance Center in Hawaii. Upon announcement of the redeployment, all outstanding requisitions, other than Red Ball requisitions and requisitions for equipment deadlined for parts, were cancelled; thereafter, the division was authorized to requisition only parts for deadlined items. Individual units submitted requisitions to divisional direct support elements which were processed on a fill-or-kill basis. This procedure served to provide needed parts for units and to draw down parts on hand within divisional direct support elements.

(U) Preparation of Equipment for Turn-in. Equipment turn-in was accomplished by unit supply personnel in conjunction with unit maintenance personnel. The average time lapse for turning in a piece of equipment was two days. The normal turn-in procedure began with a technical inspection at Dong Tam by Saigon Support Command personnel. The following percentages of items were found "unserviceable, not repairable" on station: 100 percent of 155mm towed howitzers, 40 percent of automotive vehicles, 10 percent of all classes of small arms, and 5 percent of signal items.[1] Of the total automotive and signal items found not repairable in RVN, 75 percent met retrograde standards for the Closed Loop Program. Only one-third of all unserviceable items were salvaged while two-thirds were suitable for rebuild. (Divisional elements redeploying to Hawaii reported that additional vehicles were determined unserviceable in Hawaii, as a result of normal technical inspections performed by USARVHAW depot maintenance personnel.) In summary, the quantity of items declared salvage or "unserviceable, not repairable" was quite small. After the equipment had been returned to the unit and corrective action had been completed, the unit prepared the necessary documentation and turned in the equipment.

(U) Critical Items. An important factor affecting redeployment shipments and turn-ins was the USARV-generated Critical Items List (CIL). This list contained items which were in short supply in RVN and which were to remain in-country to fill these shortages. The CIL consisted of two groups:

1. The 100 percent CIL contained items which were not permitted to leave RVN.

2. The Limited Critical Items List contained those items which could be taken by the division to Hawaii in specified numbers.

Problems associated with the CIL were as follows:

1. The composition of the CIL constantly changed during the first month after announcement of the redeployment. This situation caused additional repacking and resulted in unnessary delays.

2. The CIL was quite extensive, which made it difficult for Saigon Support Command representatives at Dong Tam to store and handle the many items turned in to await redistribution.

3. The unit readiness posture in Hawaii would have suffered significantly as many of the TOE/MTOE items required for mission accomplishment were on the CIL.

(U) Ammunition. Turn-in of ammunition was accomplished with little difficulty. The Division Ammunition Office coordinated with the supporting ammunition supply point (ASP) and redeploying units to ensure that turn-in criteria had been received and was understood. Simple turn-in procedures prevented ammunition from being abandoned. Units were advised to report unserviceable ammunition to enable the explosive ordnance disposal unit to destroy items not suitable for retrograde. Turnover of ammunition to ARVN units also proved to be a satisfactory method for units to dispose of ammunition, although prior approval from USARV was necessary before transferring available supply rate items to RVNAF. When ammunition was transferred to RVNAF, an RVNAF official was required to sign a Transportation Order (DA Form 581). Packing materials for much of the ammunition in the hands of troops had been discarded. When redeployment was announced, all units were advised to save all packing materials. Sufficient wooden boxes were turned in by artillery units (105mm boxes) and aviation units (2.76-inch rocket boxes) to pack all retrograde items received without sufficient packing materials.

(U) Captured Material. Within the 9th Inf Div, captured material could be processed in one of three methods:

1. Items could be donated to the division historian for storage and shipment to Hawaii as part of the William B. Cronin Museum. When given to the museum, material became the property of the Army Museum System and was properly accounted for, documented, and secured by a custodian or curator.

2. Certain items could be kept as individual war trophies if properly licensed, documented, and shipped.

3. Trophies could be turned in to the 1st Log Comd for use in DA training programs.

(U) Equipment Redistribution. All equipment of the 2d Bde, scheduled for inactivation in CONUS, was turned in at Dong Tam. Priority for redistribution of this equipment was: first, fill the shortages existing in the 3d Bde; second, fill shortages in the 1st Bde and the division base; and finally, the remainder was turned in to the Saigon Support Command for redistribution to other units as directed by USARV. Temporary unit requirements for equipment during rede-

especially suited for this type of packing. Control of packing materials initially was a problem, due to the failure of units to plan properly for their special packing requirements. Packaging materials were expended rapidly, necessitating a control system. The best arrangement developed was for the Division CONEX Control Officer to control the issue of packaging materials, thus ensuring that appropriate quantities of each were available. This section also assured that additional packaging materials were requisitioned on a timely basis.

(U) Preparation of Equipment for Shipment. When an item was ready for shipment, the unit customs officer conducted necessary inspections and ensured that stenciling, customs certificates, and transportation documentation were accomplished properly. Documentation for equipment shipped was accomplished by the individual units. Instructions on documentation procedure was provided at Dong Tam by a team from 1st Log Comd. This team conducted classes which explained the correct preparation of Transportation Control and Movement Document, (DA Form 1384) (TCMD) and also distributed a "mini-MILSTAMP" manual, which described in detail the preparation of the TCMD, and the proper marking, labeling, and preparation of cargo for shipment. Two representatives of 4th Trans Cmd were assigned as liaison representatives to check and advise units on documentation matters. They worked at the vehicle processing point and with the CONEX dusting and entomology teams. This enabled them to check documentation of vehicles or CONEX containers at the time of final preparation and inspection. They made on-the-spot corrections and ensured documentation, labeling, and cargo to be shipped were all in agreement.

(U) CONEX Containers. The preparation of CONEX containers was best controlled by one officer with a wall trained detail of men. Their function was to ensure that all CONEX containers, which were to be shipped by the unit, were thoroughly cleaned and properly stenciled. Each unit or section was responsible for packing its own equipment into CONEX containers. This was closely supervised by the unit customs officer who ensured no contraband was placed inside the containers. After a CONEX was packed, the division dusting team was scheduled. This team made the final inspection, dusted, and sealed the CONEX with a railroad car seal. The CONEX was then reported to the Division Transportation Office for movement to the port. Lack of guidance on procedures and standards for the dusting and sealing of CONEX containers initially hindered operations. Many units used improper techniques in their haste to begin packing, as Department of Agriculture standards were not known. These problems were later controlled by the use of Inspecting and Dusting Requests and a CONEX Inspection Certificate. Department of Agriculture certification was not conducted in RVN, but was accomplished at final destination.

(U) Hold Baggage. After a customs inspection was conducted at the hold baggage facility, shipping orders were prepared and baggage was crated to protect it against possible damage during shipment. Personnel with intertheater transfers, assigned to the 9th Inf Div from another unit in RVN, were permitted to ship hold baggage from their original station. This preshipment of hold baggage eliminated the personal inconvenience of having the soldier transport his hold baggage to Dong Tam for shipment to Hawaii. The soldier's local hold baggage facility shipped his baggage to Hawaii upon presentation of orders assigning him to the 9th Inf Div. At the time of the announcement of the division's redeployment to Hawaii, tariff rates for hold baggage had been established only to CONUS. This required an amendment to the shipper's contract to permit shipments of hold baggage directly to Hawaii.

(U) To Accompany Troops (TAT) Cargo. The TAT cargo was packed by each unit, prior to departure, using standard-sized packing crates and boxes. To facilitate load planning, units

deployment (e.g., 90 AN/PRC-25 radios were required on the Dong Tam perimeter for communications) were filled by hand receipting equipment from the Saigon Support Command representative at Dong Tam. The amount of equipment generated by inactivation of the 2d Bde was not as great as might have been expected, since this brigade was basically organized under a riverine TOE and had significantly less equipment than a standard light infantry unit.

(U) Equipment Processing.

1. Equipment to Remain in RVN. Equipment that was to remain in RVN was processed in much the same manner as equipment to be shipped out of country; however, different documentation was required, e.g., Request for Issue of Turn-in (DA Form 3161) was prepared on equipment that was turned in and was to remain in country, whereas Transportation Control and Movement Document (DA Form 1384-2) was prepared on those items being shipped out of RVN.

2. Equipment Shipped to CONUS and Hawaii.

a. No equipment was shipped to CONUS except unit colors.

b. All TOE/MTOE equipment, less items on the Critical Items List, was shipped to Hawaii. Even after it was announced the division would be inactivated, all equipment scheduled for shipment was shipped, except for a few selected items which were diverted to other locations by USARV.

c. Discretionary items on the MTOE and in the possession of the unit were shipped to Hawaii It was USARV policy that no discretionary item shortages would be requisitioned.

(U) Processing, Packaging, and Preservation (PPP). Expert advice concerning organization of the PPP area should have been made available upon initial notification of redeployment. PPP technicians, however, did not arrive at Dong Tam from CONUS until 17 July--over one month after the redeployment announcement. An earlier arrival would have facilitated the division's organization of the PPP area. An adequate PPP area was necessary at Dong Tam to ensure expeditious processing of supplies and equipment. Hard-surfaced roads, hard stands, overhead weather protection, and wash racks were desirable. Several facilities which had been constructed at Dong Tam for other purposes were suitable facilities. For example:

1. Wash racks had been built in the base area several months before the redeployment was announced and were used for cleaning vehicles and equipment.

2. Hangars in the heliport at the north end of the post provided storage are for packing materials, and a processing point for banding and inspecting the division's vehicles and equipment prior to movement to the port.

3. Overhead weather protection was provided by the shop buildings of Co E, 709th Maint Bn, in which small arms and signal equipment were turned . . processed, and packaged.

(U) Packing Materials. Contracts to manufacture boxes for packing were awarded to PA&E. Unserviceable foot lockers were also used to pack equipment and supplies. Soft pack machines were provided by Saigon Support Command. These machines dispensed a liquid substance that filled the void around boxed equipment and then hardened into a cork-like material, providing a resilient package for shipment of sensitive equipment. Radios and optical gear were

were furnished aircraft pallet spaces, pallet dimensions, and weight restrictions. Type loads using standard packing materials were also furnished. The TAT cargo was inspected by unit customs officers, marked with Air Shipment Label (DD Form 1387), and loaded into vans spotted in unit areas. Vans arrived at the APOE approximately 18 hours prior to scheduled aircraft departure where loads were palletized for air movement. Entomological inspection of TAT cargo was accomplished by aerial port personnel during palletization. The TAT vehicle air shipments were limited by size and weight to only 1/4-ton trucks and trailers, which occupied one pallet each. Vehicles were prepared for air shipment and labeled as dangerous cargo, with a DD Form 1387-2, in accordance with AF Manual 71-4. They were shipped in operational configuration with a half tank of fuel and with batteries connected. Vehicles were driven to the APOE by unit personnel in convoy. Unit personnel were also required to assist in final cleaning and preparation, prior to loading on aircraft.

(U) Accompanied Baggage. Some units required individuals to carry their TA 50 equipment to Hawaii as accompanied baggage. This procedure created an unnecessary hardship for the individual who was only authorized 66 pounds for his personal belongings.

(U) Mess Halls. Clearance of mess halls was critical. The phasing out of units near the end of the redeployment period was rapid and required a close scheduling of messing facilities to permit removal of cantonment or TOE mess equipment. It was necessary to close unit messes from two to four days prior to actual departure of the unit. This procedure required satelliting early departing units upon the messes of units scheduled for later departure, and concurrently providing a sufficient mess capacity to accomodate them. Detailed schedules were prepared at division level to satisfy all messing requirements. Two messes were taken over by the Logistics Operations Group personnel several days before departure of the last units, thus relieving redeploying units from further responsibility in this area.

(U) Property Books and Supply Accountability. In many cases, unit supply records did not accurately reflect the actual authorized and on-hand status of unit property. Inactivating a unit required property books to be zeroed; therefore, it was essential that complete physical inventories be made. Hand receipt reviews were inadequate in fixing property accountability. The process of zeroing a TOE property book for a standard light infantry battalion was found to require a minimum of 15 days.

1. Lateral Transfers of Equipment. Property book officers from both losing and receiving units performed a joint inspection when laterally transferring equipment from one unit to another. When agreement was reached on the quantity and condition of equipment, the lateral transfer was completed. In view of the limited time for redeployment, it would have been more desirable from the division's standpoint if equipment not being taken with a unit had been turned in through supply channels with no requirement for lateral transfer to other agencies.

2. Combat Losses and Reports of Survey.

a. Used in a proper and timely manner, the Combat Loss (DA Form 2408-7), was an effective tool in property accountability.

b. During redeployment it was essential that the 9th Inf Div receive special handling on reports of survey. Headquarters, USARV, indicated they would forward approved within 24 hours of receipt of a survey. This expedited processing was rarely needed, however. The agreement did accelerate the approval process and aided in the clearing of property books within

the time available.

3. PC&S Property. Some post, camp, and station property was required to be shipped to Hawaii for use by the division (-) at Schofield Barracks; the remainder was used to fill 3d Bde requirements, or turned into Saigon Support Command representatives at Dong Tam. To facilitate redeployment, all equipment (less beds and mattresses) was turned in several days before a unit departed Dong Tam. This required close monitoring to ensure the units cleared their areas promptly and that required storage and transportation assets were provided. Experience indicated most units did not have an accurate count of PC&S property on hand.

(U) Unauthorized Disposal. The 9th Inf Div discovered much excess in post, camp, and station property. Action was required to ensure these excesses were turned in to the Division Supply Office rather than disposed of in some other manner. Isolated instances were observed of units discarding equipment in the sanitary fill and other areas. To correct this problem, a "no questions asked" turn-in of excess was instituted by the Division Supply Office/Saigon Support Command personnel, and guards were placed at the sanitary fill entrance to check vehicles for supplies and equipment prior to entry into the sanitary fill area. Vehicles with supplies were returned to their unit area. To preclude scavenging and other illegal transfers of property, the MPs at the main gate inspected all vehicles leaving Dong Tam. Unless a driver had a lateral transfer document, an issue slip, or an authorization from one of six control personnel at Dong Tam, he was not allowed to take property off post. This control effort significantly curtailed losses of government property.

(U) Morale, Welfare, and Recreation. The Division Post Exchange was transferred to the 93d Engr Bn (Const) and was operational during the entire redeployment. The special service club, swimming pool, library, and miniature golf course remained in operation until the middle of August to provide recreational activities for the assembled troops.

(U) Real Property Clearance. A preinventory of all real property was conducted by the occupant and personnel from PA&E in order to establish ownership of such items as ceiling fans and air conditioners. It normally took one day to complete the preinventory of a battalion-sized unit and usually several more days to resolve ownership problems. The preinventory facilitated the actual turnover of the real property to PA&E when the unit cleared the area and redeployed. Building clearances were completed at least one day in advance of a unit's departure. Covered vans were positioned in unit areas for loading post, camp, and station property, at least two days prior to departure. On the final night before departure, the only items remaining in the barracks were beds and mattresses. These were outloaded the morning of actual departure. Final police of buildings and grounds was then conducted and buildings were turned over to PA&E.

(U) Dong Tam Rearm/Refuel Facility. The Dong Tam helicopter rearm/refuel facility was taken over by the 164th Cbt Avn Gp (CAG). The equipment for the facility was signed over, in place, from the 9th Inf Div by the 164th CAG.

(U) Allocation and Control of Real Estate. With permission and concurrence from MACV, real estate at Dong Tam was allocated to the 7th ARVN Div, US Navy, and remaining US Army units. Coordination meetings of all parties concerned were held at Dong Tam before transfer and receipt of the property. (See Chapter IX, Base Transfers)

(U) Maintenance Program for New Station. The 9th Inf Div developed an extensive maintenance program for implementation in Hawaii to ensure that all units would attain a satisfactory

maintenance posture as rapidly as possible. The program was planned to be of four months duration and to have three phases:

1. Phase I was to last 30 days and was to consist of a series of maintenance inspections. The areas to be inspected in each unit were personnel and training; publications and reports; deadline reporting procedures; shop operations; tools and test equipment; facilities; and safety SOPs, programs, and practices. In addition, extensive use was to be made of a roadside spot check system.

2. Phase II, also to last 30 days, was to emphasize maintenance administration. Division teams would investigate unit proficiency in the Army Equipment Records System, validate equipment serviceability criterion, and review PLL and Maintenance Request procedures.

3. Phase III, lasting 60 days, would consist of a division-conducted CMMI program in which two units per week would be inspected. Re-inspection would be conducted, as necessary, to ensure attainment of high standards.

REDEPLOYMENT OF 9TH INFANTRY DIVISION - D

1. Rpt (C), HQ, 9th Inf Div, 27 Aug 69, Subj: Redeployment After Action Report (U), Gp-4.

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ANNEX E -- COMMUNIST STRATEGY AS REFLECTED IN LAO DONG PARTY AND COSVN RESOLUTIONS [1]

Synopsis

(C) Since 1959, the broad outlines and major shifts in enemy strategy to take over the RVN have been contained in resolutions issued by the Lao Dong (Communist) Party in Hanoi and the Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN) in the South. Lao Dong Party Resolution 15, passed in 1959, set the war in motion by escalating the insurgency in the RVN into its "Military Phase." Lao Dong Party Resolutions 12 and 13, issued in 1965 and 1966, respectively, outlined the strategy of matching the US troop buildup and defeating the Allied Forces on the battlefield, a strategy that was followed until Tet of 1968. In the wake of the 1968 Tet Offensive, COSVN Resolution 6 called for a further offensive designed to win a quick, total, military victory for the Communists. COSVN Resolution 7, issued in the summer of 1968 after the failure of the May post-Tet Offensive, called for yet a third general offensive. In the fall of 1968, COSVN passed Resolution 8 which outlined plans for a final military victory during the 1968-1969 Winter-Spring Campaign. Lao Dong Party Resolution "C," promulgated by the Hanoi leadership in April 1969, and COSVN Resolution 9, issued in July 1969, set forth a new, pragmatic strategy that dismissed the possibility of a total Communist military victory over US/GVN Forces. This current enemy strategy (as of the end of 1969) sought to parlay limited military victory into withdrawal of US troops, establishment of a neutralist coalition government, and ultimate Communist political victory in the RVN.

Lao Dong Party and COSVN Resolutions

Introduction

(C) In 1959, the Hanoi leadership decided to commence military efforts to take over the RVN, setting as its ultimate goal the reunification of Vietnam under a Communist government. Since that time, the broad outlines and major shifts in enemy policy have been contained in resolutions promulgated by the Lao Dong (Communist) Party in Hanoi and the Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN) in the South. This annex presents an analysis of the evolution of Communist strategy over the past decade, as manifested in these resolutions.

Lao Dong Party Resolutions, 1959 to 1965

(C) Lao Dong Party resolutions were passed by the Party Politburo in Hanoi. These resolutions constituted basic statements of domestic and foreign policy. From 1959 to 1967, the guidelines for the war in the South were formulated in periodic Lao Dong Party resolutions. Each of these statements of strategy was reiterated and disseminated to the Communist leadership in the South through means of corresponding and complementary resolutions issued by COSVN.

(C) In January 1959, the Lao Dong Party passed its 15th Resolution and thereby set in motion forces which would bring years of war and devastation to Vietnam. Resolution 15 was

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the basic document which formally approved the report of Le Duan, First Secretary of the Lao Dong Party in 1969, concerning the Communist insurgency in the RVN. In this report, Le Duan declared that the time had come to move rapidly into the "military phase" of the insurgency.

(C) In furtherance of this goal, the Communists established the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NFLSVN) on 20 Dec 60 as a front organization appealing to the masses but controlled by the Communists. To provide this political mass organization with an armed force, the Communists established on 15 Feb 61 the South Vietnam Liberation Army (SVNLA), in 1969 officially called the People's Liberation Army (PLA).

(C) In October 1961, COSVN became the central organ for the entire southern branch of the Lao Dong Party. When the Communist People's Revolutionary Party (PRP) was established on 1 Jan 62, COSVN then became the Central Committee of this new Communist Party for the South. Establishment of the PRP was a tactical maneuver prompted by Hanoi's strategy of portraying the revolution as being purely indigenous to the South. However, through a series of interlocking directorates, Hanoi maintained overall control of the insurgency in the RVN. Most of the senior members of COSVN have been members of the Central Committee of the North's Lao Dong Party, and most senior military officers at COSVN and SVNLA HQ were also members of the high command of the NVN Army. Although fundamental PRP policy was dictated by Hanoi, it should be noted that the infrastructure of Communist cadre in the RVN was composed largely of indigenous Southerners.

(C) Meanwhile, following the passage of Resolution 15, the Lao Dong Party began a new numbering series for its resolutions. The chronological gaps in the numbering of Lao Dong Party and COSVN resolutions were due to one of two factors: (1) in some instances, the Communists appeared to skip or even invert numbers deliberately when identifying Party resolutions, and (2) it was also possible that all past Communist resolutions have not yet been revealed to Allied intelligence through captured documents or PW interrogations. Resolution 3, issued in September 1960, approved a report on the 1960 Moscow Conference given by Le Duan. Resolution 4, passed during the first half of 1961, stressed the need for increased ideological study at all levels. This was followed in July 1961 by Resolution 5, which set forth a policy framework for agriculture in NVN's First Five Year Plan (1961-65). A complementary policy framework for industry in the First Five Year Plan was contained in Resolution 7, issued in April 1962. The next Lao Dong Party Resolution, Number 8, passed in April 1963, outlined overall goals for production, consumption, and investment during the Five Year Plan. A review of these resolutions indicated that, while initiating and setting up the machinery for insurgency in the South, the Hanoi leadership was also preoccupied with domestic considerations and goals between 1960 and 1963.

(C) In December 1963, the Lao Dong Party tackled the delicate problem of Hanoi's relationship with the feuding Communist super-powers, the Soviet Union and Communist China. Resolution 9 contained an in-depth treatment of the Sino-Soviet ideological split. The resolution attempted to walk a middle line, but on several issues it carefully defined a position more in agreement with Communist China. It is noteworthy that Resolution 9, which was passed in the aftermath of the assassination of Ngo Dinh Diem and during a time of political instability for the GVN, called for preparations for an all-out attack and general uprising in the South. Resolution 9 also declared that NVN would aid "in all aspects" the revolution in the South. Lao Dong Party Resolution 10, passed a year later in December 1964, contained a communique on trade and prices.

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(C) In the spring of 1965, the Lao Dong Party issued Resolution 11 which confronted the problems posed by a rapidly increasing introduction of US troops into the RVN and sustained US aerial bombardment of NVN. This resolution contained directives on increased mobilization for armed forces, infiltration to the South, and repair of bomb damage.

Lao Dong Resolutions 12 and 13

(C) In December 1965, the Hanoi leadership promulgated Lao Dong Party Resolution 12, which outlined the basic strategy followed by the Communists until the Tet Offensive of 1968. This resolution reordered NVN priorities, and placed primary emphasis on the war. Domestic planning and priorities receded into the background. The 12th Resolution stated that Communist strategy was geared to defeating the US "under any circumstances." Faced with a massive US and FWMAF build-up, the Communists nonetheless professed confidence in their ability to match and finally overcome this armed strength. Resolution 12 asserted that even if the US should increase its troop strength in the RVN from 200,000 to 400,000, the Communists would kill 60,000 US troops, 20,000 ARVN troops and down 1,000 US aircraft. According to this scenario, the US "scheme of aggression" would be thwarted within two years and US forces would be compelled to withdraw from the RVN. Significantly, the 12th Resolution dealt with the possibility of a negotiated settlement with the US. According to the resolution, the US had begged the Soviet Union to arrange for a coalition government in the RVN as a solution to the war. The resolution asserted that, if approved by Hanoi, a coalition could be set up in the South within one month. However, the document pointedly remarked that if this solution were adopted, "we will expect to meet new difficulties in the future." Therefore, the resolution indicated that some time in the future the Communists would enter into negotiations with the US in order to project an image of concern for peace, but that in reality they would negotiate nothing away, would not enter into a coalition government, and would fight on to final victory.

(C) Lao Dong Party Resolution 13 was issued in the late fall of 1966, and essentially reaffirmed the policies of the 12th Resolution. It is noteworthy that this resolution referred to the possibility of the Communists achieving victory in a relatively short period of time. This reference to a quick, total victory might have been an early indication of Le Duan's "General Offensive and General Uprising" strategy that was climactically to be attempted during Tet of 1968.

(C) There have been references in captured documents to Lao Dong Party Resolution 14, issued in the fall of 1967. This resolution allegedly contained the highly dramatic military and political tactics to be implemented in the 1967-68 Winter-Spring Campaign (including Tet of 1968) which were disseminated during the late fall and winter of 1967-68 to cadre and troops in the South. Also, there have been scattered references to a possible Lao Dong Party Resolution 15 (issued perhaps in 1968) and to a possible Lao Dong Party Resolution 16 (issued perhaps in early 1969). Captured documents suggested that the possible 16th Resolution concerned in part the disposition of NVN troops in Laos.

COSVN Resolutions 6 and 7

(C) An unnumbered COSVN resolution, issued early in 1966, declared that COSVN was in complete agreement with the 12th Resolution promulgated by the Lao Dong Party in Hanoi several months earlier. It was standard Communist practice at that time for resolutions

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outlining basic strategy first to be formulated by the Lao Dong Party and then to be reaffirmed by a similar COSVN resolution. It appeared that this procedure was changed after the death of NVN Senior General Nguyen Chi Thanh, who had headed COSVN since 1964. Thanh died in the summer of 1967 apparently from injuries sustained during a B-52 strike. In September 1967, NVN Deputy Premier Pham Hung arrived in the RVN to take charge of COSVN. After Hung assumed this position, the Lao Dong Party apparently issued no resolutions of its own regarding the war in the South for the next year and a half, and COSVN independently promulgated Resolutions 6, 7, and 8. This did not signify that COSVN was operating on its own, however. Before each COSVN resolution was passed, a delegate from COSVN visited Hanoi and received instructions concerning policy, strategy, and content. The resulting COSVN resolutions stipulated that the policies contained therein had been issued in agreement with the Lao Dong Party Politburo.

(C) In the wake of the Communist Tet Offensive, which began on 29 Jan 68, COSVN passed Resolution 6 in March or April. Written after the close of the "First General Offensive," the resolution called for continued adherence to a policy of "General Offensive and General Uprising." It also stressed the need to consolidate Communist gains in the countryside and called for the creation of rural "revolutionary administrations" at the village and hamlet level throughout the RVN. Le Duan was the principal architect of the massive Tet Offensive. He believed that a co-ordinated country-wide, massive offensive would topple the GVN, send US and FWMAF forces reeling, and spark a spontaneous uprising of popular support for the Communist "liberators" throughout the GVN, particularly in the cities. In fact, however, Communist forces suffered enormous casualties during the Tet Offensive and were unable to hold Saigon, Hue, or other RVN cities. Nonetheless, COSVN Resolution 6 outlined plans for a post-Tet Offensive. Despite their great setbacks during Tet, the Communists still believed that a determined, general offensive could gain for them a quick, total victory over the GVN and the US. Although the enemy achieved a temporary advantage in certain areas during the May post-Tet Offensive, once again he was pushed back by US, FWMAF, and ARVN forces and forced to sustain heavy losses.

(C) COSVN responded to this second consecutive and punishing setback by passing Resolution 7 in June or July of 1968. This resolution planned for yet a "Third General Offensive," to be waged in August and September. Despite the beating taken by the Communists during the Tet and post-Tet Offensives, they clung to the conviction or hope that one more major offensive would bring them victory. Resolution 7 emphasized the continuing validity of the strategy enunciated in the 6th Resolution. Resolution 7 additionally stressed the deterioration of ARVN, called for increased sabotage, liberation of rural areas, and upgrading of forces to prepare for the "Third General Offensive."

(C) It is noteworthy that ordinarily two months were required for a COSVN resolution to be disseminated down to district-level cadre. However, in the case of COSVN Resolutions 6 and 7, this process was greatly accelerated and dissemination was accomplished within approximately two weeks. The Communists felt compelled to communicate these resolutions to their cadre as quickly as possible in order to rationalize the failure of the previous offensives and to justify the necessity of a similar enormous effort in the immediate future.

(C) COSVN Resolutions 6 and 7 both promised total victory in a relatively short period of time. Resolution 7 was passed after four months and two phases of the General Offensive. The enemy had not been able to hold any major city or installation, he had taken serious losses, and he had failed to incite massive popular support. However, he believed that he had forced the US into a defensive posture, and that the US probably would not attempt a large counteroffensive before the enemy could launch his "Third General Offensive." The goal of all three phases of the 1968 Communist Offensive was the same--complete destruction of the GVN and total victory.

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COSVN Resolution 8

(C) Aggressive Allied counteroffensive and spoiling actions kept the Communists off balance and aborted their plans for a successful third offensive in August-September 1968. Faced with a third major frustration in Communist planning in eight months, COSVN formulated in September and October 1968 its Resolution 8.

(C) The 8th Resolution was intended as a blueprint for the 1968-69 Winter-Spring Campaign. Despite the failure of the Communists to achieve total victory during the previous three phases of general offensive, the resolution characterized these offensives as successfully having broken US will, placed America on the defensive, and forced President Johnson to devise some way to extricate the US from the war.

(C) Resolution 8 re-affirmed the "General Offensive and General Uprising" strategy calculated to gain total victory as outlined in the 6th and 7th COSVN Resolutions. The 8th Resolution stated that "presently, the strategic opportunity and practical conditions are favorable for us to rush forward to win decisive victory." The strategic objectives as outlined in the resolution made clear that the enemy still sought a total military victory: "Annihilate and disintegrate the Puppet Army. ...//regain// control of the entire government for the people. Destroy the main elements of the US forces.... By so doing, we //can force the US// to accept their failure in South Vietnam and stop their acts of war against North Vietnam. By so doing, we can gain the immediate objectives of the revolution in South Vietnam, which include independence, democracy, peace, and neutrality in South Vietnam, as well as peace and the reunification of the country."

(C) Although Resolution 8 called for a total Communist military victory, as had the 6th and 7th Resolutions, it differed from the earlier statements of strategy in that the theme of a quick victory was tempered by the call for a more gradual, though equally decisive victory. The 8th Resolution set two stages for achieving "decisive //total// victory." Intensified military and political activity in the first stage was to create "favorable conditions" for a steadier and more widespread offensive during the second one. Communist forces were to carry the struggle from the rural areas to the cities so as to isolate them. In the final offensive, according to the resolution, there would be an attack upon Saigon. Resolution 8 additionally referred to an imminent halt in US bombing of NVN, citing it as a Communist victory and an admission of US defeat.

Lao Dong Party Resolution "C" and COSVN Directives 81 and 88

(C) On 23 Feb 69, shortly after the Tet holidays, the Communists launched coordinated attacks-by-fire against more than 100 cities and military bases in the RVN. During March, attacks by fire recurred, and Saigon was often the target of enemy rockets. However, during the same period US forces engaged in continuous counteroffensive sweeping missions that kept the enemy off balance. Sizeable caches of enemy weapons and supplies were uncovered, thereby denying Communist troops critical in-place forward supply points necessary for a major offensive against Saigon. Heavy B-52 strikes demoralized the enemy and thwarted his attempted offensive probes. In short, the Communists were precluded from launching an all-out Winter-Spring Offensive in the early months of 1969.

(C) In the late spring of 1969, COSVN issued a series of directives which modified Resolution 8, manifesting new realism and a basic shift in Communist strategy. It is noteworthy

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that directives were passed periodically by COSVN to amplify, expand upon, or in some cases modify basic COSVN resolutions. COSVN Directive 55, probably issued in early April, contained guidelines for enemy activities in May. In contrast to the bold language of Resolution 8 which called for an all-out offensive leading to total victory, Directive 55 cautioned that "under no circumstances should we risk our entire force in one attack, but instead we should preserve our combat potential for sustained action in the future."

(C) A major shift in war strategy was formulated at the highest levels in Hanoi and delineated in Lao Dong Party Resolution "C," issued in April. The new Communist strategy was transmitted to cadre in the South by means of a series of directives passed by COSVN in April, May, June, and July. These directives possibly served as early drafts of COSVN Resolution 9, which was promulgated in July.

(C) The earliest and most detailed evidence in the South of the change to a more pragmatic Communist strategy was contained in COSVN Directive 81 and its supplement, Directive 88. Directives 81 and 88, formulated in late April, probably reflected newly issued Lao Dong Party Resolution "C," and provided COSVN guidance on the 1969 Summer Campaign. For the first time, there was no reference to a total military victory to be achieved in a relatively short period of time. Instead, the directives set forth "a course of action through which we repulse the enemy one step at a time and attain a piecemeal victory. Why is this so? This is because the enemy still has more than 1,000,000 troops and it is just impossible for us to destroy or to wipe out 1,000,000 men." Therefore, Directives 81 and 88 described the "General Offensive and General Uprising" not as a quick and total victory but rather as "a hard and difficult campaign, full of rigors, sacrifices, and hardships."

(C) The directives clearly reflected a bluntly realistic assessment of Communist limitations in the face of superior Allied military prowess: "We do not intend to attain the victory overnight or in a single phase, nor do we plan to obtain the victory in any predetermined phase after conducting many phases. The victory will not come to us in such an easy way, but it will come in a difficult and complicated way. It will be a limited victory and not a clear-cut, complete victory."

(C) In Directives 81 and 88, the Communists mapped a strategy that focused more critically on antiwar political pressures in the US than on military victories in the RVN. The enemy realized that he had no hope of defeating the Allies on the battlefield, but he calculated that by inflicting unacceptably high casualties and material losses on US forces, he could heighten antiwar pressure, thereby forcing President Nixon to withdraw troops or accept a coalition government or both. The directives noted that the "honeymoon" period for the Nixon administration was over, and that increasing Democratic and public opposition to the war was not far off. The Communists were convinced that President Nixon had to adopt a position on Vietnam that would enable him to be successful in the 1970 Congressional elections. Therefore, the directives called for more small unit tactics and attacks by fire designed to minimize Communist losses and maximize American casualties.

(C) Directives 81 and 88 summarized the importance of the 1969 Summer Campaign: "It is a very important phase intended to compel the enemy to adopt a policy, to accept serious negotiations with us, to withdraw troops, to recognize the Front, and to accept a coalition government. Consequently, the summer phase can in no way be considered as a decisive phase. It should be regarded as a phase of special significance, aimed at forcing the Americans to adopt a policy 'in our direction'."

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(C) The new Communist policy of limited military victory leading to ultimate political victory soon manifested itself in major enemy political maneuvers. On 8 May 69, the NFLSVN delegation at the Paris Peace Talks presented a 10-Point Peace Proposal. While calling for the withdrawal of all US forces from the RVN, the NFLSVN proposal set forth detailed recommendations for the formation of a provisional coalition government, the election of a constituent assembly, the drafting of a new constituion, and the installing of a permanent national coalition government.

(C) COSVN Directive 89, issued later in May, stressed the importance of the 10-Point Peace Proposal and lauded it as a significant step forward on the diplomatic and political fronts of the struggle for mastery over the RVN.

(C) On 10 Jun 69, the same day that President Nixon and President Thieu announced at Midway agreement on an initial redeployment of 25,000 US troops, the Communists announced the establishment of the Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG). With revolutionary committees throughout the countryside providing a rural administrative base, and with the PRG acting as a "national leadership" and as a recognized delegation at the Paris Peace Talks, the Communists had constructed a rival, alternative, shadow government to the GVN.

(C) Within a week of the official unveiling of the PRG, COSVN passed Directive 95, which claimed that the NFLSVN 10-Point Peace Plan of 8 May had been received enthusiastically by people throughout the RVN.

(C) COSVN Directive 106, promulgated in July, commented on President Thieu's proposal for free elections in the RVN before 1971, in which the Communists would be allowed to participate as a legal political party if they would abandon their goal of forceful takeover. Directive 106 rejected President Thieu's plan, characterizing it as a trick which had been induced in any case by US pressure upon the GVN leadership.

COSVN Resolution 9 and the Future

(C) In July, COSVN issued Resolution 9, the latest comprehensive statement of Communist strategy. The resolution proclaimed that it was a basic review and restatement of Communist policy in the South, formulated and disseminated in compliance with Lao Dong Party Resolution "C." Resolution 9 spelled out current COSVN policy and stated the objective of the 1969-70 "Winter-Spring Campaign." COSVN would continue to pursue the objectives which were not accomplished during the 1969 Summer Campaign. These goals were to attain a limited victory by compelling the US to withdraw completely its combat troops from the RVN and to accept a coalition government with VC participation.

(C) It is noteworthy that the term "decisive victory" as used in Resolution 9 had the same meaning as "limited victory" -- i.e., US withdrawal and a neutral RVN. On the other hand, in COSVN Resolution 8 "decisive victory" meant total military victory over the GVN and the US in a relatively short period of time.

(C) Resolution 9 contained a sophisticated analysis of President Nixon's plans for "Vietnamization" of the conflict in the RVN. Formulated in the aftermath of the Midway meeting at which the withdrawal of 25,000 US troops was announced, the 9th Resolution attacked President Nixon's program of "Vietnamization" as an insidious attempt to minimize US public opposition

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to the war by slowly withdrawing US combat forces. The Resolution further calculated that while de-escalating US involvement with deliberation, President Nixon would strengthen the RVNAF and provide continuing air and artillery as well as economic support in hopes of sustaining the present GVN administration in power indefinitely. The Communist strategy to foil US plans for "Vietnamization" was to continue causing large numbers of US and RVN casualties, thereby bringing domestic antiwar pressure to such a pitch that President Nixon would be forced to withdraw all US troops and accept an ostensibly neutralist, coalition government which would soon be dominated by the Communists.

(C) According to Resolution 9, the war would evolve in one of two possible directions. The first possibility was that of an early "decisive victory" for the Communists, characterized by withdrawal of US troops and establishment of a neutral government. The second possibility envisioned the US attempting to remain indefinitely in the RVN at a reduced strength, while supporting the GVN and RVNAF. The Communists worked toward the first possibility, whereby "the Americans will be forced to end the war earlier through a political settlement against their will," resulting in a decisive Communist victory. However, the Communists recognized that President Nixon might be able to successfully de-Americanize the war at his chosen speed, leaving the insurgents to face a strengthened RVNAF backed by US artillery and air support. In this situation, the Communists reserved the option to employ the protracted war strategy of Truong Chinh, by which they might avoid exposing their forces to major military confrontations while continuing to cause US and ARVN casualties through use of small unit tactics, high points, and attacks-by-fire. If forced to resort to a protracted war strategy, the Communists believed that they would still prevail; their decisive victory would come later, however.

(C) The enemy believed that it held the initiative in the war, as witnessed in a statement from Resolution 9: "The development of the war will depend exclusively on our //offensive// capabilities, and also on the difficulties that the Americans will encounter in South Vietnam, in the United States, and in the world, in the military, political, and economic fields."

(C) It is significant that the Communists viewed the military and political struggle apart from the diplomatic struggle and as the key to victory. Even during a period of cease fire or neutral coalition, the Communists would go underground and continue their armed and political struggle for ultimate power. According to Resolution 9: "In the event that //the Americans// are completely defeated and forced to sign an agreement, they will take a long time to withdraw all their troops from South Vietnam.... During that time, the war will be continued in a very complicated aspect and we will be required to be extremely alert."

(C) In order to achieve his political goals of forcing the US to (1) withdraw all troops as soon as possible, and (2) acquiesce in a neutral government with Communist participation, the enemy planned to take several steps militarily. It would attempt to inflict heavy US casualties, prevent the US "clear and hold strategy," and paralyze GVN/ARVN elements and make them incapable of replacing US forces. Quite different from past enemy documents, Resolution 9 did not insist on a conventional offensive against the cities. It did indicate, however, the desirability of terrorist and sabotage activities in city areas, as well as the need to control the city outskirts. In the 1969-70 Winter-Spring Campaign, particular emphasis was placed on the seizure of strategically important areas, particularly the Mekong Delta in IV CTZ and the highlands in III CTZ. Additionally, the pacification and Chieu Hoi programs were termed "most serious threats," and the resolution stressed that those programs should be neutralized in order to defeat "Vietnamization" of the war. Therefore, it seemed likely that immediate Communist efforts would be focused in rural areas, with the aim of expanding control around the major cities in the RVN.

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(C) With regard to the PRG, Resolution 9 hailed the Communist shadow government as a great political and diplomatic victory which enhanced the Communist position throughout the RVN, at Paris, and around the world. The resolution warned, however, that many cadre had failed to appreciate the critical significance of the PRG as a vehicle for victory in the political struggle with the GVN for ultimate control of the RVN. To correct this deficiency, Resolution 9 called for vigorous and effective development of the PRG at the village, district, and province levels. It is noteworthy that the resolution stipulated that the PRG would not be activated at the military region level. Perhaps the Communist intention was to match the GVN organization, which existed at the village, district, and province (but not regional) level.

(C) Directive 103, issued by COSVN in August, called for an intensification of political, military, and propaganda activities from August through September. COSVN Directive 105, also passed in August, outlined propaganda activity to be directed against the RVNAF between August and October. Directive 111, a third document issued by COSVN in August, called for special emphasis in proselyting activities directed against the civilian populace of the RVN between 15 Nov and 15 Dec. The directive stated that the people should be motivated to take part in revolutionary activities and support the PRG.

(C) Reacting to President Nixon's announcement on 18 Sep of a second redeployment of 35,000 US troops from the RVN, COSVN issued in late September its Directive 116. The directive likened the September withdrawal to the initial redeployment of 25,000 US troops announced in June. The redeployment was pictured as a token measure and as a trick to reduce US antiwar opinion. In short, the Communists viewed "Vietnamization" as a hoax by which the US intended not to get out but rather to remain indefinitely in the RVN (although at a reduced level).

(C) There was strong evidence that COSVN issued a supplementary resolution, possibly Resolution 10, at approximately the same time that COSVN Resolution 9 was promulgated. This unprecedented step of disseminating two COSVN resolutions at the same time might have been prompted by the fact that Resolution 9 was the most comprehensive and complicated document ever to be issued from COSVN. Thus, it seemed that the Communists felt a supplementary resolution was needed to explain, amplify and add to certain points in the 9th Resolution.

(C) In addition to reiterating main points of Resolution 9, the supplementary resolution outlined three new plans of action. The first of these called for military proselyting activities targeted against RVNAF and Free World Military Forces. The aim was to turn in place Allied soldiers, as distinct from previous Communist efforts encouraging RVNAF soldiers to desert to the VC cause. By creating traitors in place within FWMAF ranks, the Communists would have valuable tools with which to erode Allied morale and sabotage Allied operations in the field.

(C) The second new point called on VC/NVA forces to capture more heavy armor. These vehicles would be operated by NVA experts infiltrated into the South who could drive US, Soviet, and CHICOM armor. According to the resolution, the enemy would employ armor in order to expand Communist reserve strength in the field.

(C) Finally, the supplementary COSVN resolution announced the formation of the People's Democratic Peace Front (PDPF) in the RVN. After a cease fire, the PDPF would replace the PRG, the Alliance of National, Democratic and Peace Forces, and the NFLSVN, and would cover members of these organizations under the umbrella of the New Front. Once a "provisional coalition government" was established in the RVN--that is, a government composed of PRG, neutralist and former GVN personalities reconciled to collaboration with the Communists--the PDPF

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would be surfaced legally and its name would be changed to the People's Democratic Peace Alliance. According to the Communist scenario, this new alliance would act as the ruling political organization behind the provisional coalition government.

(C) Current enemy strategy, as of the end of 1969 and as set forth in COSVN Resolution 9 and the supplementary COSVN resolution, sought, therefore, to parlay limited military victory into a total withdrawal of US troops, an interim neutral coalition government, and ultimately a Communist political victory in the RVN.

A Chronological Digest of
Lao Dong Party and COSVN Resolutions and Directives
(1959-1969)

1.	1959 (January)	*Lao Dong Party Resolution 15: This was the basic resolution which formally approved the report of Le Duan that the time had come to move rapidly into the "military phase" of the insurgency in the South. Following this resolution the Communists began a new numbering system.
2.	1960 (September)	Lao Dong Party Resolution 3: Report on the 1960 Moscow Conference given by Le Duan.
3.	1961 (pre-July)	Lao Dong Party Resolution 4: Need for increased ideological study at all levels.
4.	1961 (July)	Lao Dong Party Resolution 5: Policy framework for agriculture in the First Five Year Plan (1961-65); targets were increases in acreage, mechanization and cooperativization.
5.	1962 (April)	Lao Dong Party Resolution 7: Policy framework for industry in the First Five Year Plan; established 10-year program to make NVN self-sufficient in general machinery.
6.	1963 (April)	Lao Dong Party Resolution 8: Policy framework for First Five Year Plan; overall goals for production, consumption, and investment.
7.	1963 (December)	*Lao Dong Party Resolution 9: In-depth treatment of Sino-Soviet ideological split. Resolution attempted to walk a middle-line, but on several issues carefully defined a position more in agreement with Communist China.
8.	1964 (December)	Lao Dong Party Resolution 10: Communique on trade and prices.
9.	1965 (Spring)	*Lao Dong Party Resolution 11: Directives on increased mobilization for armed forces, infiltration into the south, and repair of bomb damage.

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10. 1965 (December) — *Lao Dong Party Resolution 12: Basic document and underpinning of Communist strategy until Tet Offensive of 1968. Re-arranged policy objectives, giving number one priority to the war. Also acknowledged split of war into three theaters (North Vietnam, the RVN, and Laos). This was widely disseminated in the RVN during the spring of 1968.

11. 1966 (late Fall) — *Lao Dong Party Resolution 13: Often referred to as "Supplement" to Resolution 12. Essentially, reaffirmed policy of Resolution 12, but included considerable discussion on meaning and significance of negotiations. This was widely disseminated in the RVN during the spring of 1967.

12. 1967 (November) — *Lao Dong Party Resolution 14: Disseminated during the late fall and winter to cadre and troops in the South. Outlined the highly dramatic military and political tactics to be implemented in the 1967-68 Winter-Spring Campaign (to include the 1968 Tet Offensive).

13. 1968 (March-April) — *COSVN Resolution 6: Basic document written after close of "First General Offensive," or Tet Offensive. Resolution called for continued adherence to line of "General Offensive-General Uprising," designed to result in total military victory over US/GVN forces. Also stressed the need to consolidate countrywide and to create "revolutionary administrations."

14. 1968 (June-July) — *COSVN Resolution 7: Emphasized importance and validity of COSVN Resolution 6. Stressed deterioration of ARVN. Also devoted considerable space to restoration of "peace and independence, and ultimate re-unification" of Vietnam. More immediately, resolution called for increase in sabotage, liberation of rural areas, and consolidation and upgrading of forces to prepare for "Third General Offensive."

15. 1968 (September-October) — *COSVN Resolution 8: Laid outline for 1968-69 Winter-Spring Campaign. Also devoted space to political-diplomatic matters, including references to an imminent bombing halt, its significance, and effect it would have on tactics. Resolution stressed political matters and stated that the RVN should engage in a period of "Independence, Democracy, Peace, and Neutrality (i.e., the four propaganda themes of the NFLSVN) before completing a nationalist and democratic revolution which would lead to a reunification of the whole country." Resolution called for an eventual Communist military victory in the RVN, and set a two-stage plan for achieving "decisive (total) victory."

16. 1969 (April) — COSVN Directive 55: Contained guidelines for Communist activities in May 1969. Also stressed conservation of forces and warned against risking entire force in one attack.

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17. 1969 (April) — *Lao Dong Party Resolution "C": Outlined major shift in Communist strategy for victory in the RVN. Resolution acknowledged that total victory over US/GVN forces was impossible, and outlined instead a strategy of limited military victory leading to ultimate political victory.

18. 1969 (April) — *COSVN Directives 81 and 88: Directive 81 and its supplement, Directive 88, probably reflected new strategy outlined in Lao Dong Party Resolution "C." These directives warned that it was impossible to destroy 1,000,000 RVNAF/US soldiers, and called for "a limited victory and not a clear-cut, complete victory."

19. 1969 (May) — COSVN Directive 89: Stressed the importance of the NFLSVN-10 Point Peace Proposal (presented at Paris on 8 May 69).

20. 1969 (June) — COSVN Directive 95: Claimed that the Communist 10-Point Peace Plan had been warmly received by the people of the RVN.

21. 1969 (July) — COSVN Directive 106: Rejected President Thieu's proposal for free elections to include VC candidates if Communists renounced goal of violent takeover of the RVN.

22. 1969 (July) — *COSVN Resolution 9: The most comprehensive and complicated basic document ever to be issued by COSVN. Resolution was based on Lao Dong Party Resolution "C" (April 1969), and spelled out in great detail the new Communist strategy for victory in the RVN. Major emphasis was placed on defeating President Nixon's "Vietnamization" program by causing increased US casualties. According to the resolution, this would increase US antiwar pressures and force President Nixon to withdraw troops faster than the RVNAF could pick up the slack of "Vietnamization." Resolution emphasized strategic importance of Mekong Delta and highlands of III CTZ, as well as the city outskirts. Called for "decisive victory," which now meant not total victory (see COSVN Resolution 8) but withdrawal of US troops and establishment of neutralist, coalition government in the RVN, which would soon be dominated by Communists.

23. 1969 (July) — *Supplementary COSVN Resolution/COSVN Resolution 10: There was strong evidence of a "Supplementary COSVN Resolution" issued as a complement to COSVN Resolution 9. Possibly this was COSVN Resolution 10. "Supplementary Resolution" reiterated basic points of Resolution 9, and added three new approaches: (1) military proselyting program designed to turn Free World soldiers in place in the RVN, thus creating a fifth column of traitors within RVNAF/US ranks, (2) VC/NVA were urged to capture more heavy armor, and (3) formation of People's Democratic Peace Front (PDPF) to take the place of PRG, Alliance of National, Democratic and Peace Forces, and NFLSVN once cease fire was declared.

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24.	1969 (August)	COSVN Directive 103: Called for intensification of political, military, and propaganda activities during August, September, and October 1969.
25.	1969 (August)	COSVN Directive 105: Called for propaganda activities directed at members of RVNAF between August and October 1969.
26.	1969 (August)	COSVN Directive 111: Called for special proselyting activities directed at civilian population of the RVN between 15 Nov and 15 Dec 69.
27.	1969 (September)	COSVN Directive 116: Labeled President Nixon's second phase redeployment of 35,000 US troops as token gesture and as cunning trick to damp down antiwar sentiment in US.

*Key resolutions and directives are indicated. Gaps or irregularities in the numbering of resolutions or directives were due either to the vagaries of Communist accounting or to the possibility that certain basic enemy documents have not yet come to the attention of Allied intelligence.

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COMMUNIST STRATEGY AS REFLECTED IN
LAO DONG PARTY AND COSVN RESOLUTIONS - E

1. Rpt (C), MACJ233, 26 Nov 69, Subj: Communist Strategy As Reflected In Lao Dong Party And COSVN Resolutions (U), Gp-4.

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ANNEX G--THE DEFENSE OF FIRE SUPPORT BASE CROOK

(U) Throughout warfare the skillful application of fundamentals has invariably resulted in success. This is equally true today in the jungles of Vietnam as the US soldier and his Allied counterparts struggle to defend that country from the insidious aggression of the VC and NVA.

(C) During June of 1969 a near classic application of the fundamentals of defensive combat occurred at an isolated fire support base near the Cambodian border as 25th Inf Div troops inflicted staggering losses on an enemy force seeking to overrun their fire support base (FSB). The defenders were Co B, 3d Bn, 22d Inf reinforced with Bty A, 7th Bn, 11 Arty and supporting elements of the Hq Co, 3d Bn, 22d Inf. This force through its deliberate and meticulous planning of ground and air support fires, diligent preparation of its position, skillful use of sensors, and violent execution of its battle plans, killed over 400 enemy soldiers and captured a large quantity of enemy weapons and ammunition during a two day period.

(C) In the evaluation of FSBs as employed in the 25th Inf Div TAOR, FSB CROOK represented the third and final stage. The first phase in this evaluation had taken place from August 1968 to March 1969. During this phase FSBs were more or less elliptical. They were generally manned from one to three companies and their mission was purely defensive. The perimeter was highly fortified. The main objective was to prevent the enemy from overrunning the perimeter. The second phase had been elaboration of the first in which three major changes occurred: the perimeter became nearly circular and the number of bunkers was reduced; the base was occupied by a company and possibly an additional platoon, not three companies; and the base was to be employed in phases which were at first defensive and changed to offensive. The first stage was fought as usual. The enemy attacked and was engaged by the defensive fires of the FSB. As the enemy started to slacken his fires and he commenced to withdraw, the base defensive fires were shifted to block the enemy's avenues of withdrawal, and the orientation of the FSB forces became offensive.


(C) Under the phase III concept which started in June 1969, an enemy attack on a FSB triggered essentially offensive reactions from the FSB. That is, the FSB was actually a bait for the enemy--a lure to attract the enemy toward a seemingly easy target. Then, when the enemy was close enough, all available combat power was brought to bear just at the time when he was the most highly concentrated and most vulnerable to supporting fires. A prime example of this concept was FSB CROOK.

(C) Fire Support Base CROOK was located northwest of Tay Ninh City in western Tay Ninh Province. The area surrounding the position was flat and generally forested. The area to the east was triple-canopy jungle. To the north, there was scattered double-canopy jungle. The area to the south was secondary growth, while to the southwest and west were abandoned rice paddies. The Soui Ben Da stream flowed from north to south, some 300 meters west of the base. Fields of observation and for direct artillery fire were good. They extended from a minimum of 220 meters on the east to 350 meters on the north and south and up to 1,000 meters to the southwest. Fields of fire for small arms were excellent out to 200 meters. The wooded areas to the east and northeast offered the best avenues for approach. There was, however, a destroyed village to the south with broken ground and brush which offered a secondary approach to within 200 meters of the base. The base was positioned astride an east-west road, and there was a north-south trail east of the base. These provided rapid approaches into the general area.

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FIGURE G-1

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The only significant obstacle to movement in the area was the Soui Ben Da stream on the west which was not fordable in the immediate vicinity of the base, although there was a footbridge at the road crossing. See Figure G-1.

(C) The physical defenses of the base provided excellent frontal, rear, lateral, and overhead protection for the defenders, and these fortifications were constantly being improved. Three rows of barbed wire obstacles encircled the bunker line, and flat, well-cleared fields of fire surrounded the base. The firepower of all weapons in the base could be used against an attacking force. See Figure G-2. Six howitzers, four mortars, 12 machine guns, automatic rifles, recoilless rifles, grenade launchers, claymore mines, and "Super Claymores" provided a ring of fire around the base. (A "Super Claymore" consisted of a 15-pound electrically-detonated, shaped charge pointed in the direction of the enemy with a roll of barbed wire placed in front of the shaped charge.) Additional artillery supporting these forces consisted of a battery of 155mm howitzers at FSB WASHINGTON, a platoon of 175mm guns at FSB SANTA BARBARA, a platoon of 8-inch guns at Tay Ninh Base Camp, and one platoon of ARVN 155mm howitzers at Cao Xa. On the first day, 5-6 Jun, close air support was provided by 10 Army and 14 USAF aircraft. The second day, air support was provided by 11 Army and 15 USAF aircraft.

(C) The initial indication of the impending attack on FSB CROOK came at 2000 hours on 5 Jun when the base monitored seismic sensor activations which indicated heavy enemy activity 950 meters east and 550 meters northwest of the base. These two areas were taken under fire by supporting artillery and the seismic sensor activations ceased. At this time the AN/PPS-4 radar mounted on the observation tower began to detect groups of three to four men moving in the woodlines all around the base; approximately 18 sightings were made between 2000 hours and 0100 hours. The direction and distance of each sighting was relayed to the artillery battery within the FSB which then placed direct fire, with time fuzes, onto each location. Beginning at 2130 hours the battalion executive officer requested interdictory artillery fires on the trails and likely assembly areas around the base. The base was placed on 100 percent alert. As the cloud cover cleared shortly after midnight, an observer with a starlight scope in the tower began to sight the same small groups that had been detected by radar. From 0130 hours to 0255 hours the movement around the base generally ceased. Nevertheless, the interdictory fires were continued.

(C) At 0255 hours the enemy initiated an attack by fire. Rocket, recoilless rifle, mortar, RPG, and small arms fire began to impact in and around the base. The rate of indirect fire was estimated at 80 rounds per minute for the first five minutes and approximately 50 rounds per minute for the next hour and a half. Most of the rockets passed over the base and impacted outside the wire to the east. One man was killed by a mortar round as a listening post to the west was withdrawn. There was little damage and there were few casualties within the perimeter. Coordinated with the attack-by-fire, the enemy launched a battalion-size assault from the south and east. The troops within the base laid down a heavy volume of grazing fire, as the howitzers fired time-fuzed direct fire to a range of 150-200 meters all around the base. The supporting 155mm artillery was used to hit the enemy attack positions in the woodline to the south, while the 8-inch artillery fired deeper into this area. The 81mm and 4.2-inch mortars in the base fired on the woodline to the east, and 175mm artillery was used to suppress the enemy firing positions to the north. Although these intense defensive fires slowed the enemy ground assault, a 16-man element did reach the outer wire on the south and breach it with bangalore torpedoes; however, the men on the bunker line stopped this group with automatic weapons fire and claymore mines.

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


FIGURE G-2

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(C) Although the attack was stopped, the bulk of the enemy force remained in the open, firing small arms and RPGs at the bunkers. At approximately 0400 hours AC-47 and AC-119 gunships, helicopter fire teams, and USAF fighter aircraft arrived over the area. The 175mm artillery shifted fire 1 km to the north, thus clearing the area to the north and west of the base for engagement by the gunships. The AC-47 gunship poured fire into the open area around the entire perimeter of the base. As the helicopters moved in to support, they were engaged by an estimated fifteen .51 caliber machineguns around the area, with the heaviest concentration of fire coming from the west. One observation helicopter was damaged and the brigade command and control ship received fire hits. As the helicopter suppressed the antiaircraft fire, the intense friendly supporting fires forced the enemy to withdraw into the jungle. By 0530 there was only sporadic enemy fire from the surrounding area, but artillery and TACAIR support continued to hit suspected targets. Co B sent a platoon through the break in the wire to search the area to the south at 0645 hours. As they moved into the old village area, they were engaged at close range by a group of 10 to 15 NVA soldiers who had remained concealed in spider holes; the company commander and three radio operators were wounded by grenades. The platoon moved back to the bunker line by bounds and the area was engaged with 155mm artillery and TACAIR strikes, forcing the remaining NVA to flee into the forest to the south. When the search of the battle area was resumed, 76 NVA bodies, 15 small arms, one RPG launcher, 10,000 rounds of small arms ammunition, and numerous RPG rounds were recovered. The NVA soldiers were dressed in khaki uniforms and wearing "Ho Chi Minh" sandals. Each man had been equipped with an AK-47 rifle, a bandolier, 8-10 hand grenades, a cup-type gas mask and was carrying an extra five RPGs. The bodies were significantly free of intelligence-worthy material such as documents, diaries, or other personal effects. Three infiltration passes were found which identified the battalion as an element of the 272d NVA Regiment.

(C) Later that morning, Co's A and C of the infantry battalion were inserted by helicopter into an area approximately 5 kms north of FSB CROOK to sweep south toward the base. At 1245, Co A was engaged by fire by an enemy force of unknown size and light contact continued until 1545. Due to this contact, the search of the area north of the base was not completed on 6 Jun. That evening, the pattern of activity was repeated in an almost identical fashion. From 2000 to 2030, the seismic sensors northwest and east of the base indicated extensive enemy activity. The radar detected two groups of approximately 40 men each, moving 1,500 meters north of the base. From 2000 to 0100, the radar continued to detect small groups of 3-5 men in the woodlines all around the base. Each area of activity was engaged with mortar and artillery fire or direct fire from the howitzers within the base.

(C) By 0100, the majority of the movement had ceased, but all areas continued to be engaged with direct fire beehive rounds and indirect fire. At 0200, a helicopter, supporting the action, detected large groups of enemy moving along the road from the east toward the base. Artillery fires were immediately shifted to engage these groups. Then at 0255, the enemy attack-by-fire began, with even greater intensity than on the previous night. For the first five minutes the rate of enemy incoming fire was 150 rounds of rocket, mortar, and RPG fire per minute, and approximately 50 rounds per minute for the next hour and a half. Three US soldiers were wounded by the initial volley. Coordinated with the attack-by-fire, the enemy launched a ground assault with two battalions, one moving out of the woodline to the northeast and the second attacking from the northwest. The base engaged the attacking enemy with beehive

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rounds and automatic weapons. A helicopter strafed the enemy coming out of the jungle to the northeast, while two helicopter fire teams hit the battalion on the northwest with machine gun and rocket fire. These gunships were followed by TACAIR strikes which dropped napalm and fragmentation bombs on this force. One AC-47 and helicopter gunships engaged the .51 caliber machine guns which were firing from west of the stream. Artillery fire was placed on the jungle to the northwest, while mortar fire and other artillery fires were used to suppress the enemy firing from positions to the east and south. The area was under continuous illumination by the AC-119 gunship which also covered the area outside the wire with machine gun fire. The enemy coming from the northwest managed to breach the first wire barrier, but was stopped by the intense defensive fires. The infantry attack from the northeast was halted by fire even before it reached the wire. The continuous defensive fires forced the enemy to attempt to withdraw, but the volume of automatic fire and bursting munitions was so great that the majority of the attacking infantry were trapped and cut down in the open. Those who did reach the jungle had to move through concentrations of mortar and artillery fire which were gradually shifted outward in pursuit of them.

(C) By 0530 those enemy who could, had withdrawn. At 0815 Co A of the infantry battalion was air-landed southeast of the base and began a sweep to the west. Then Co C landed east of the base at 0845 and began a search of that area. The battalion reconnaissance platoon and two platoons from Co D were brought in to reinforce Co B, and to assist in a sweep to the north. This reconnaissance around the base disclosed 323 NVA bodies, 10 PWs, 39 AK-47 rifles, two light machine guns, two 60mm mortars, 90 rounds of 60mm ammunition, two RPG launchers, 230 RPGs, 500 hand grenades, 84 satchel charges, 10 bangalore torpedoes, and 3,000 rounds of small arms ammunition.

(C) That evening at 2000 the FSB commander ordered a test firing of all weapons as a precaution in the event of continued enemy attacks. Moments after the test firing began, the base received several 75mm recoilless rifle rounds and small arms fire from all directions. Within 15 minutes the position also received light incoming mortar and rocket fire. The defenders returned the fire with automatic weapons, beehive rounds, and artillery. This duel lasted until 2130 when the firing ceased. A third enemy attack had been aborted by the initiation of the test fire. Three NVA bodies were recovered from this attack.

(U) The successful defense of FSB CROOK depended on many factors. The most important, however, was preparation. The physical structure had been readied to give the defenders the best possible advantage. The personnel had been trained and drilled. Communications, ammunition supply, weapons maintenance, and medical aid were specifically structured to function under heavy attack. Supporting fires were thoroughly preplanned, and the plans were understood by all. Skillful use was made of sensors, and fires were placed in response to the sensor activations. Supporting fires were used to pursue and destroy the withdrawing enemy after the failure of his ground attacks. The result of this preparation was that the defenders lost 1 KIA and 7 WIA, while the attackers lost 402 KIA and 10 PWs.

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THE DEFENSE OF FIRE SUPPORT BASE CROOK - G

1. Rpt (C), USARV, 12 Jul 69, Subj: Combat Lessons Bul. No. 10 (U), Gp-4.

2. Ltr (C), AVDCMH, CO, 18 Mil Hist Det, 25th Inf Div to Hq, DA, Subj: Combat After Action Interview Report (U), 30 Jun 69, Gp-4.

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ANNEX H -- THE ARVN BEN HET-DAK TO CAMPAIGN [1]

(U) The interest and emphasis on Vietnamization of the war created much concern as to how RVNAF would react "when the chips were down." The first major independent RVNAF operation occurred during May and June of 1969 in northern Kontum Province where ARVN forces acquitted themselves well in extremely heavy combat against NVA forces. Vietnamese commanders held sole tactical responsibility in a sizeable special tactical zone (STZ) and, though supported by US advisors and combat support elements, the operation was basically an ARVN "show." The Vietnamese leaders and troops displayed the ability to face and defeat the NVA in combat.

(U) This annex provides a background of the situation, a brief description of the operation, and a summary of lessons learned. The purpose is one of historical exposition, not criticism. The lessons learned in this successful operation are already being utilized to develop further the command and staff capabilities of the Vietnamese military in accomplishment of the key MACV mission of improvement and modernization of the RVNAF which is essential to Vietnamization of the war effort.

(S) The geographical area concerned is a challenging one. The operation was conducted in a region adjacent to the tri-border area, along the western boundary of RVN, which permitted NVA elements to pull back into Cambodian and Laotian sanctuaries at will and to conduct attacks-by-fire from non-Vietnamese positions. (See Figure H-1)

(S) In January, CG IFFORCEV, reached verbal agreement with CG, II ARVN Corps, on the ARVN assumption of responsibility for northern Kontum Province. This agreement, however, was never reduced to writing. The designated ARVN force (Hq, 24th STZ and the 42d ARVN Regt) was unable to assume responsibility by the agreed-upon date, 1 Feb, because of tactical reasons.

(S) On 11 Apr, therefore, after extensive verbal discussion with CG, II ARVN Corps, the new CG, IFFORCEV addressed a written proposal to the ARVN Corps CG in which the imperative nature of early assumption of responsibility by ARVN for upper Kontum Province was set forth. This letter was the first official step taken in this direction.

(S) When CG, II ARVN Corps indicated general agreement to the proposal, a draft Memorandum of Agreement was drawn up and signed by both commanders on 24 Apr. On that date, the exchange of forces was all but complete. The conditions of the memorandum were met in every detail by both parties.

(S) These actions gave the II ARVN Corps, for the first time, direct responsibility for territory continually contested by VC/NVA forces. Military activity remained at a high level throughout the period, commencing with the ARVN assumption of tactical responsibility, but only minimum US combat support, mainly artillery, signal, engineer, and aviation, under the protection of ARVN ground elements, remained in the area.

(C) During the period 5 May - 5 Jun, ARVN and CIDG forces located in northern Kontum Province were heavily engaged with a two-regiment NVA force supported by an NVA artillery

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regiment. The campaign was conducted in the general area immediately east of the Cambodian, Laotian, and RVN tri-border area. The ARVN and CIDG forces were primarily oriented on the protection of Ben Het, a CIDG camp located astride Route 512 and within enemy artillery range of Laos and Cambodia. The high ground southeast of Ben Het, "Rocket Ridge," was secured early in the campaign by ARVN forces and used as a base for patrolling and combat assaults against the enemy. (See Figure H-2.)

(C) Actions in the time frame of this discussion, 5 May-5 Jun, comprised three phases: Phase I (5-15 May) involved forces of three ARVN and two MSF battalions screening the tri-border area west of Ben Het; Phase II (16 May-3 Jun) was a six battalion-plus offensive conducted southeast of Ben Het targeted against elements of the NVA 66th Inf, 28th Inf, and 40th Arty Regts; Phase III (3-5 Jun) consisted mainly of BDAs by multi-battalion ARVN forces and establishment of defensive patrol screens around the Dak To- Tan Canh area.

(C) The 24th STZ Hqs was one of three major ARVN subordinate maneuver headquarters in II CTZ. Because it was staffed to control up to two ARVN regiments, this command element could be compared to a US brigade headquarters. Normally, the 24th STZ Hqs controlled the 42d ARVN Regt, three scout companies, and elements of an armored cavalry squadron. Often, one or more ranger battalions had been placed under its operational control but, as a general rule, it had never more than three maneuver battalions committed up to this time. As of 5 May, however, four maneuver battalions were committed and, throughout the operation, committed battalions varied from three to eight each day, while at least one to two scout companies also were committed daily.

(C) Phase I. On 5 May, the 42d ARVN Inf Regt was deployed with one battalion northwest of Ben Het, screening the major infiltration route into the Dak To area; another battalion at FSB 5 on "Rocket Ridge," a third battalion and the regimental headquarters at Tan Canh, and a fourth battalion located at Kontum, south of the operational area.

(C) Around Ben Het, two MSF battalions screened to the west and southwest and six CSF companies provided local security to the CIDG camp itself. Some 40 US and ARVN artillery pieces were capable of providing supporting fires.

(C) Indications of a significant enemy buildup had been noted in late April and the enemy concentration increased to almost divisional size during the first week in May.

(C) On 6 May, TF LIEN (COL LIEN was commander of 24th STZ) was formed and given operational control of all forces in the area. Desirable for unity of command, this organization placed an unduly heavy burden on the STZ staff which was not trained or manned to handle this larger force. An additional handicap was the employment of MSF elements in sustained battle. These units, designed for reconnaissance in force and surveillance missions, were neither equipped nor trained for prolonged combat against strong enemy forces.

(C) ARC LIGHT strikes were employed against the enemy concentrations throughout the period 7-11 May. Added strength to the south of Ben Het was provided by the deployment of the 3d Bn, 42d ARVN Inf on 10 May. Light contact on 11 May led to the movement of the 1st Bn, 42d ARVN Inf from Ben Het to Kontum to cover an area vacated by the earlier shift of the 3d Bn. On 12 May, the 23d Ranger Bn was moved into the AO and deployed west of Ben Het to accomplish BDA of an ARC LIGHT strike made on the previous day. This 24-hour delay unfortunately provided time for the enemy to recover, police the battlefield, and reorganize for offensive action.

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The jungle covered terrain was extremely difficult to traverse and units moving on foot into the strike area lost vital time. This shortcoming, which provided an advantage to the enemy, continued to occur throughout the operation. Also on 12 May, the 22d Ranger Bn was moved to FSB 6 on "Rocket Ridge" and operated in a reconnaissance role to the soutwest.

(C) The initial contacts of significance came on 12-13 May when the 3d Bn, 42d ARVN Inf moving south from Ben Het, ran into major opposition. The enemy suffered 97 KIA, mostly from artillery and close air support fires, while friendly casualties were 13 killed and seven wounded. At the same time, the 4th MSF Bn, southwest of Ben Het, experienced numerous contacts and, with strong air support, accounted for 58 enemy KIA while its own losses were only three killed and four wounded. The 3d MSF Bn, operating west of Ben Het, and the 3d Bn, 42d ARVN Inf, to the south, were pulled back to the Ben Het area on 13-14 May. As enemy contacts significantly decreased on 14-15 May, these units were airlifted out to Kontum and Pleiku respectively on 15-16 May.

(C) Phase II. COL LIEN the TF commander now altered his tactics; instead of continuing with the wide dispersion of his forces to provide protection over an extensive area, he shifted to a concept of massing his strength for the destruction of a major enemy concentration. By shifting the battalions west of and in the Ben Het area, he was able to concentrate a six-battalion force against enemy strength which was massed south of Highway 512, between Ben Het and Dak To. Following ARC LIGHT strikes on 15-16 May against this target area, the 1st Bn, 42d ARVN Inf on "Rocket Ridge" screened and blocked in the eastern portions as two ranger battalions moved down from the north to clear the target area. Meanwhile, a new unit (4th Bn, 47th ARVN Inf) arrived in Dak To and sent forward a company to reinforce FSB 6 on "Rocket Ridge." On 17 May, further shifts in forces were made: the 1st MSF Bn was deployed southeast of Ben Het as a screening force and the 2d Bn, 42d ARVN Inf took over the blocking position at FSB 6, relieving the 4th Bn which returned to the Tan Canh Base Camp. Action was light on the 17th but on the 18th of May, the 23d Ranger Bn ran into strong enemy reaction and killed 51 enemy; the rangers continued to see heavy fighting through 1 Jun. On 18-19 May, the 4th MSF Bn was pulled back from its screening mission southwest of Ben Het into the base camp and then transferred out of the area. This shift, planned as a part of the general repositioning on 15 May, had been held up by the delayed deployment of a replacement unit, another weakness which plagued the friendly forces throughout the operation. The 5th MSF Bn did not arrive in the area until 19 May. During 19-21 May, a series of ARC LIGHT strikes were targeted on the enemy concentration area, west of FSB 6 between "Rocket Ridge" and the southward advancing ranger battalions. To complete the isolation of the enemy and prevent his withdrawal southward, the newly arrived 5th MSF Bn was lifted by helicopter into a blocking position south of the target area on 20 May and the following day was joined by the 1st MSF Bn, shifted to reinforce this blocking element. These two units immediately were engaged in heavy fighting. The 5th MSF Bn incurred five killed and 66 wounded while scoring three enemy KIA. The 1st MSF Bn also had five killed and 25 wounded while killing seven of the enemy. In the north, enemy opposition to the ranger battalions also increased from the moderate contacts of the previous five days and on 23 May, in a major engagement, the 22d Ranger Bn killed 146 while taking casualties of six KIA and 47 wounded. Next day, the 1st MSF Bn in its southern blocking position was hit by a heavy ground attack and took casualties of 16 KIA and 91 wounded. Enemy losses were 50 KIA, mainly from air and artillery fires. A new unit, the 4th Bn, 47th ARVN Inf, was moved onto "Rocket Ridge" to reinforce the eastern blocking force. On the following day, the battle weary 22d Ranger Bn on the north of the target area was replaced by the 11th Ranger Bn and, a day later, the 1st and 5th MSF Bns were extracted from their blocking positions in the south. The newly-arrived 11th Ranger Bn became heavily engaged as it advanced into the target area; with close

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air support and artillery fires, the rangers killed 262 enemy while their own losses were 11 KIA and 37 wounded. The 23d Ranger Bn on their flank had 11 KIA and 39 wounded while killing 26 enemy. As further security to the north of the target area, the 2d Bn, 42d ARVN Inf was shifted from "Rocket Ridge" to a blocking position north of the ranger battalions and the 2d MSF Bn was brought into Ben Het. On the following day, this new unit was deployed in a reconnaissance and screening mission southwest of the camp while the 4th MSF Bn was shifted from Ben Het to perform a similar mission between "Rocket Ridge" and Dak To. The ranger battalions continued fighting at a moderate level from 27-30 May but very heavy fighting erupted on 31 May and 1 Jun, resulting in 295 enemy KIA. Friendly casualties were two KIA and 95 wounded. Because of the difficult and heavily-forested terrain, the 1st Bn, 42d ARVN Inf was airlifted into the area to assist in the evacuation of casualties and to add strength to the ARVN forces. Following this renewed fighting, there was a general pull back of friendly forces with the extraction of the 11th and 23d Ranger Bns from the north of the target area and the 1st, 2d, and 3d Bns, 42d ARVN Inf from the eastern blocking position. During the closing days of Phase II, numerous ARC LIGHT strikes were placed in the area of the heaviest previous contacts. The 22d Ranger Bn, after almost a week of recuperation, moved onto "Rocket Ridge" to replace elements of the 47th ARVN Inf.

(C) Phase III. The final phase of the campaign began with the arrival of the 2d Bn, 47th ARVN Inf which deployed on "Rocket Ridge" with the 4th Bn, 42d ARVN Inf which also had been in reserve in Tan Canh since 17 May. ARC LIGHT strikes continued on 3 and 4 Jun after which the two fresh battalions moved westward from "Rocket Ridge" on search and clear and BDA missions. Again, the slowness of the advance in this jungle-covered terrain and the need to exploit rapidly the ARC LIGHT bombings resulted in the helicopter-borne movement of the 3d Bn, 42d ARVN Inf directly into the target area on 5 Jun. The ARVN troops soon made contact with enemy remnants. The 2d Bn, 47th ARVN Inf moving west from FSB 6 met heavy resistance and had two KIA and 25 wounded as they killed 16 enemy. The final troop deployment was the shift of the 2d MSF Bn from its screening position, southeast of Ben Het, to reinforce the reconnaissance screen of the 4th MSF Bn between "Rocket Ridge" and Dak To. On 6 Jun, friendly troops were in possession of the battlefield and unopposed as the NVA forces had withdrawn into their sanctuaries across the RVN border. The ARVN forces had acquitted themselves well in extremely heavy combat against strong NVA Main Force elements. While there was much refinement yet to be done, the basic "steel" was proven to exist.

(U) A description of the logistical support aspects, primarily tactical airlift, of this campaign is contained in Chapter IX, Transportation, Air.

(S) The ARVN assumption and execution of responsibility in northern Kontum Province was highly successful. Repeated attacks by a division equivalent NVA force failed to dislodge the ARVN defenders or to attain even one of their critical objectives. The NVA forces lost over 1,200 killed in action (body count), while the combined losses of ARVN, US, CIDG, RF/PF numbered less than 200, a kill ratio in excess of 6 to 1. The extent to which the ARVN forces bore the brunt of the operational casualties is indicated by the following: of the total friendly KIA (187), 156 were non-US; only 92 of the 1,254 enemy KIA resulted directly from US action. That this favorable ratio was, in large measure, attributable to the effectiveness of US fire support, is clear. Nevertheless, total tactical responsibility and operational command and control was in ARVN hands.

(S) Recommendations based on lessons learned could be summarized as follows:

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1. TRANSFER OF RESPONSIBILITY: The transfer of areas of responsibility should be undertaken only after thorough and comprehensive development of a memorandum of agreement. An efficient transition will have as its basis an agreement embodying the interests of both parties.

2. COMMAND CONTROL AND COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS:

a. While recognizing that the development of an overall staff capability is a long term effort, US advisors and JGS should consistently strive to train qualified ARVN staff officers. They were essential to the success of future independent ARVN operations.

b. ARVN commanders should be encouraged to utilize fully intermediate headquarters in order to reduce the span of control of directing headquarters.

c. When planning an operation and establishing a task force headquarters, ARVN commanders should act on anticipated communications requirements.

d. Higher ARVN headquarters should provide qualified staff personnel when units cannot meet requirements from their own resources. This was a matter which required close attention from the top ARVN echelon down.

3. PLANS AND OPERATIONS:

a. Rotation of ARVN units should be closely monitored; rotation should be based on the situation and unit capability as criteria, and not dictated by number of days of operation.

b. The MSF elements should be used primarily for reconnaissance, screening, and surveillance operations and, when employed in conventional infantry roles, should be given appropriate combat support and missions consistent with their capabilities in such roles.

c. Movement of CIDG elements should be monitored closely and regulated to ensure timely deployment. Their propensity for late assembly should be a recognized planning consideration.

d. Continuing emphasis should be given to the correct conduct of BDA, with particular attention given to immediate insertion directly into the target area after B-52 strikes with sufficient friendly combat forces to counter enemy reaction.

e. US advisory effort and ARVN command emphasis, commencing at the JGS level, should be given to the need for advanced planning, notification and forecasting of requirements.

4. INTELLIGENCE AND INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT:

a. When a headquarters is augmented with additional troop units and a forward tactical headquarters established, the ARVN intelligence staff should be augmented with additional qualified personnel by higher headquarters (corps or JGS).

b. The US advisors should perform in an advisory capacity and eschew active participation in or takeover of the intelligence effort

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c. An intelligence plan including essential elements of information (EEI) and other intelligence requirements (OIR) should be developed and followed as a corollary to the operations plan. Tasking of available assets should conform to this plan.

d. Military Security Service (MSS) should investigate the possibility of security leaks within ARVN tactical headquarters and conduct periodic background investigations of assigned personnel.

e. Communication security monitoring should be employed to determine the extent of information available to the enemy through intercept of friendly radio and telephone communications within ARVN tactical headquarters.

f. The US advisory and ARVN command emphasis should be placed on the development and use of all sources of intelligence, particularly PWs, documents, and ralliers and other forms of battlefield intelligence.

g. A reconnaissance plan, employing all available ground and air assets should be developed to provide close and continuous monitoring of enemy movements and activity. The plan should task alternate surveillance means to provide coverage when tactical, technical or weather factors preclude the employment of the scheduled means.

h. A briefing should be prepared by the appropriate US agency explaining the uses and limitations of infrared (IR) intelligence prior to commencement of an operation such as this. The briefing should be presented to all US intelligence personnel who handle IR information.

5. COMBAT SUPPORT:

a. When a combined US/ARVN agency is to be established, all steps should be given prior planning and coordination in detail. The fire support coordinator should be an ARVN artillery commander.

b. Physical organization of FSCCs must serve the need for effective coordination of combat support elements, including US/ARVN counterpart collocation. The TACPs, both USAF and VNAF, must be in the forward TOC.

c. The ARVN staff elements should be instructed in the priorities of support. A central agency should have the responsibility of coordinating the use of US and ARVN assets.

d. Extensive training in ARC LIGHT procedures must be given to US advisors and ARVN staff/commanders.

e. A priority system of employment of gunships should be initiated by the Aviation Officer in conjunction with the G3 Air.

f. Planning for employment of USAF/VNAF assets should be carefully developed and closely coordinated.

g. Additional training should be given to ARVN units in techniques of helicopter combat assaults, use of gunships, and MEDEVAC procedures.

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6. SUPPLY AND LOGISTICS:

a. The ARVN aerial resupply problems should be addressed on a priority basis at JGS level while ARVN continues to rely on the use of US airlift.

b. The possibility of an operational ration more palatable to the ARVN soldier should be investigated, with US support provided.

c. Capabilities of ARVN medical companies should be analyzed with a view to their expanded mission. The ARVN forces should continue to improve medical triage.

d. Efforts to assist ARVN logistics should be directed at advising ARVN commanders to plan for sustained operations and take proper action through ARVN logistical channels. Emphasis should be placed on advisor restraint in attempting to solve ARVN logistical problems through advisor channels.

e. The ARVN logistical staff officers at corps and higher levels should visit tactical units in action to discover problem areas, taking action rather than awaiting formal requests from units.

7. PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT:

a. The JGS should examine the entire replacement system with a view to adoption of a more efficient system of providing timely replacements for sudden and heavy combat losses and providing a replacement stream sufficient to counteract heavy losses over prolonged periods.

b. The ARVN commanders should receive training in the command responsibilities for personnel accounting, to include accurate reporting of casualties and replacement requirements to higher headquarters.

c. The MACV advisory system should increase efforts to influence personnel management in developing ARVN for the greater role it must assume in the conduct of the war.

8. CIVIL OPERATIONS AND REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT SUPPORT:

a. Planning for changeover of tactical responsibility should include all affected commanders and advisors.

b. Contingency provisions must be made by corps and JGS headquarters for continued support of pacification in the event that assigned pacification forces are temporarily redeployed.

c. Whenever a direct link between province authorities and ARVN commanders supporting pacification was weakened, liaison officers should be designated.

(S) In retrospect, the following broad conclusions were reached:

1. The campaign of Task Force LIEN introduced a new dimension to ARVN warfare -- the requirement to plan and conduct prolonged, large scale operations. This was not anticipated

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in the initial ARVN planning for the campaign at JGS, CTZ and STZ levels. In sustained combat ARVN's posture was less than adequate: (ARVN) staff functioning was unsatisfactory, higher headquarters support was absent, the replacement system was unresponsive, and ARVN displayed nearly total reliance on US assistance to fill the void in these areas.

2. A change was required in ARVN emphasis from JGS to the lowest level of ARVN command. The ARVN force posture was critical; ARVN forces needed to be postured and trained to fight sustained battles. The ARVN staff structure needed to be strengthened and all supporting systems needed to be focused on major battle areas and geared to execute the administrative and support tasks of sustained combat. Reliance on US assistance needed to be curtailed wherever possible.


3. The ARVN forces demonstrated considerable professional effectiveness: they needed to prepare to face greater demands. Considering the markedly changed circumstances of the northern Kontum campaign and the nature of the engagements, the results reflected quite favorably on the dedication and durability of ARVN fighting units. However, the same results could have been obtained at a much reduced cost in human and material terms. Many errors were made in staff planning and field execution of tactical operations. The RVN needed to accelerate its training effort so as to hasten the preparation of its fighting forces for sustained combat and improved staff functioning. The ultimate goal should be the development of a professional competence to conduct imaginative tactical operations which would inflict maximum damage to the enemy at minimum loss to ARVN ranks.

4. The ARVN experience in the 24th STZ underscored the continuing requirement for US advice, training, and assistance. While the general approach of the Combat Assistance Team (CAT) concept was to be followed, it was clear that a significant level of US advisory effort would still be needed at the division and STZ level. This effort was important to the development of ARVN professionalism and the effective utilization of US combat resources.

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THE BEN HET-DAK TO CAMPAIGN




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FIGURE H-1

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FIGURE H-2

THE ARVN BEN HET-DAK TO CAMPAIGN - H

1. This annex has been prepared based on information contained in ltr (S), AVFA-GC, 24 Jun 69, Hq, IFFORCEV to CG, USARV, Subj: ARVN Operation DAN QUYEN, 24 Apr-5 Jun 69 (U), Gp-4; Ltr (S), MACJ3-051, 24 Aug 69, Subj: Lessons Learned Case Study of ARVN Assumption of Responsibility in Northern Kontum Province (U). Gp-4.

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ANNEX I -- THE PENTALATERAL AGREEMENT OF 1950

(U) The Pentalateral Agreement was so called because the document itself was signed by five countries: Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, France, and the United States. The official designation was Agreement for Mutual Defense Assistance in Indochina, and it was executed in Saigon on 23 Dec 50.

(U) The basic portion of the agreement concerned the delivery, receipt, and utilization of such equipment as would be furnished by the US for use in Indochina. The agreement also provided for support of USG administration and operating expenses in connection with the agreement. Article IV provided duty free treatment and exemption from taxation upon importation, exportation, or movement of material furnished, and the reception of US personnel as might be required for the purposes of the agreement. Annex B of the agreement defined the jurisdictional status of USG personnel entering the area pursuant to the agreement in terms of persons performing similar work within the diplomatic mission.

(U) The tax and jurisdictional arrangements have gained primary emphasis in the agreement since the expansion of the US military effort in RVN expanded in 1961. The provision for support of USG activities also found great importance in connection with the real estate requirements of our military units.

(U) The following is the verbatim transcript of the agreement:

PENTALATERAL AGREEMENT

The Government of the UNITED STATES of AMERICA, and the Governments of CAMBODIA, FRANCE, LAOS and VIETNAM:

- Recognizing the common interest of the free peoples of the world in the maintenance of the independence, peace, and security of nations devoted to the principles of freedom;

- Considering that the Governments of CAMBODIA, FRANCE, LAOS and VIETNAM are engaged in a cooperative effort toward these goals as members of the FRENCH UNION;

- Considering that, in furtherance of those common principles, the Government of the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA has enacted Public Law 329, 81st Congress which permits the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA to furnish military assistance to certain other nations dedicated to those principles;

- Desiring to set forth the understandings which shall govern the furnishing of military assistance by the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA under Public Law 329, 81st Congress, to the forces of the ASSOCIATED STATES and the FRENCH UNION in INDOCHINA; [1]

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

Any assistance furnished under this agreement will be governed by the following basic considerations:

1. All equipment, material and services, made available by the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA under the terms of this agreement to the States signatory to it, in accordance with their needs, will be furnished under such provisions, and subject to such terms, conditions, and termination provisions of Public Law 329, 81st Congress, as amended, as affect the furnishing of such assistance, and such other applicable UNITED STATES OF AMERICA law as may hereafter come into effect.

2. In accordance with the principles of mutual aid, each Government receiving equipment, material, or services from the Government of the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA under this agreement agrees to facilitate the production, transport, within its means, and the transfer to the Government of the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA for such period of time, in such quantities and upon such terms and conditions of purchase as may be agreed upon of raw and semi-processed materials required by the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA as a result of deficiencies or potential deficiencies in its own resources, and which may be available in their territories.

The conditions governing such transfers will be the object of particular agreements and will take into account the needs of these states and the normal requirements of the FRENCH UNION with respect to internal consumption and commercial export of such materials.

ARTICLE II

The signatory powers, recognizing that the effectiveness of military assistance will be enhanced if maximum use is made of existing facilities;

have resolved that:

1. The Governments of CAMBODIA, FRANCE, LAOS, and VIETNAM shall cooperate to assure the efficient

reception, distribution and maintenance of such equipment and materials as are furnished by the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA for use in INDOCHINA.

2. Each Government receiving aid from the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA shall, unless otherwise agreed to by the Government of the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, retain title to all such equipment, materials or services so transferred.

3. Each Government receiving aid from the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA shall also retain full possession and control of the equipment, material or services to which they have such title, taking into account the accords and agreements which now exist between CAMBODIA, FRANCE, LAOS and VIETNAM.

4. With respect to aid received from the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, each State shall designate a member or representative of the High Military Committee and authorize such person to receive from the Government of the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA the title to the materials received. Each State shall, as the need exists, provide for such extensions of that authority as may be necessary to insure the most efficient reception, distribution and maintenance of such equipment and materials as are furnished by the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

5. For aid received from the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA destined exclusively for forces of the FRENCH UNION in INDOCHINA, the Commander in Chief of the FRENCH FORCES IN THE FAR EAST or his delegate shall be the person authorized to accept title.

ARTICLE III

Taking into consideration the military conventions concluded between FRANCE and the Governments of CAMBODIA, LAOS, and VIETNAM, each Government receiving grants of equipment, material or services from the Government of the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA pursuant to this agreement,

Undertakes:

1. To use effectively such assistance only within the framework of the mutual defense of INDOCHINA.

2. To take appropriate measures consistent with security to keep the public informed of operations under this agreement.

3. To take security measures which will be agreed upon with the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA in each case to prevent the disclosure or compromise of classified articles, services, or information received under this agreement.

4. To take appropriate action to prevent the illegal transportation into, out of, and within the area of INDOCHINA, including the territorial waters thereof, of any equipment or materials substitutable for or of similar category to those being supplies by the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA under this agreement.

5. To provide local currency for such administrative and operating expenses of the Government of the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA as may arise in INDOCHINA in connection with this agreement, taking into account ability to provide such currency. An Annex to this agreement will be agreed between the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA on one hand the States of CAMBODIA, FRANCE, LAOS and VIETNAM on the other with a view of making arrangements for the provision of local currency within the limits of an overall sum to be fixed by common agreement.

6. To enter into any necessary arrangements of details with the Government of the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA with respect to patents, the use of local facilities, and all other matters relating to operations in connection with furnishing and delivering of materials in accordance with this agreement.

7. To consult with the Government of the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, from time to time, to establish means for the most practicable technical utilization of the assistance furnished pursuant to this agreement.

ARTICLE IV

To facilitate operations under this agreement, each Government agrees:

1. To grant, except when otherwise agreed, duty-free treatment and exemption from taxation upon importation, or movement within INDOCHINA, of products, material or equipment furnished by the UNITED STATES in connection with this agreement.

2. To receive within its territory such personnel of the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA as may be required for the purposes of this agreement and to extend to such personnel facilities freely and fully to carry out their assigned responsibilities, including observation of the progress and the technical use made of the assistance granted. Such personnel will in their relations to the Government of the country to which they are assigned, operate as part of the diplomatic mission under the direction and control of the Chief of such missions of the Government which they are serving.

ARTICLE V

1. This agreement shall enter into force upon signature. Any party may withdraw from this agreement by giving written notice to all other parties three months in advance.

2. The Annexes to this agreement form an integral part thereof.

3. This agreement shall be registered with the SECRETARY GENERAL of the UNITED NATIONS in compliance with the provisions of Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations. [2]

In witness thereof the respective representatives, duly authorized for this purpose, have signed the present agreement.

Done in quintuplicate in the English, Cambodian, French and Vietnamese languages at SAIGON on this 23rd day of December, 1950. [3]

All texts will be authentic, but in case of divergence, the ENGLISH and FRENCH shall prevail.

DONALD R. HEATH

HUU VORABONG

V. SAI (SEAL) G. de LATTRE

ANNEX A. (PENTALATERAL AGREEMENT)

In implementation of paragraph 5 of Article III of the agreement for Mutual Defense Assistance in INDOCHINA, the Governments of CAMBODIA, FRANCE, LAOS and VIETNAM will deposit piasters at such times as requested in accounts designated by the diplomatic missions of the UNITED STATES at PHNOM PENH, VIENTIANE, and SAIGON, not to exceed in total 6,142,230$ piasters for the use of these missions on behalf of the Government of the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA for administrative expenses in the States of CAMBODIA, LAOS and VIETNAM in connection with carrying out that agreement for the period ending JUNE 30, 1951.

The piasters will be furnished by each of the Governments of CAMBODIA, FRANCE, LAOS and VIETNAM in accordance with percentages agreed upon among the four Governments, taking into consideration the amount of military aid received by each Government. This Annex will be renewed with appropriate modifications for the fiscal year ending JUNE 30, 1952 and similarly thereafter before the end of each current fiscal year, for the duration of the agreement.

ANNEX B. (PENTALATERAL AGREEMENT)

In recognition of the fact that personnel who are nationals of one country, including personnel temporarily assigned, will in their relations with the Government of the country to which they are assigned, operate as part of the Diplomatic Mission of the Government of their country under the direction and control of the Chief of that Mission, it is understood, in connection with Article IV, paragraph 2 of the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement, that the status of such personnel, considered as part of the Diplomatic Mission of such other Government, will be the same as the status of personnel of corresponding rank of that Diplomatic Mission who are nationals of that country.

The personnel will be divided into 3 categories:

(a) Upon appropriate notification of the other, full diplomatic status will be granted to the senior military member and the senior Army, Navy and Air Force officer assigned thereto, and to their respective immediate deputies.

(b) The second category of personnel will enjoy privileges and immunities conferred by international custom, as recognized by each Government, to certain categories of personnel of the Diplomatic Mission of the other, such as the immunity from civil and criminal jurisdiction of the host country, immunity of official paper search and seizure, right of free egress, exemption from customs duties or similar taxes or restrictions in respect of personally owned property imported into the host country by such personnel for their personal use and consumption, without prejudice to the existing regulations on foreign exchange, exemption from internal taxation by the host country upon salaries of such personnel. Privileges and courtesies incident to diplomatic status such as diplomatic automobile license plates, inclusion on the "DIPLOMATIC LIST", and social courtesies may be waived by both Governments for this category of personnel.

(c) The third category of personnel will receive the same status as the clerical personnel of the Diplomatic Mission.

It is understood among the five Governments that the number of personnel in the three categories above will be kept as low as possible.

ANNEX C. (PENTALATERAL AGREEMENT)

All the countries which are signatory to the agreement for Mutual Defense Assistance in INDOCHINA agree that the benefits of any modifications or ameliorations of the agreement in favor of any one of the contracting parties will be extended to all the countries party to the agreement.

THE PENTALATERAL AGREEMENT OF 1950 - I

1. 63 Stat. 714; 22 U.S.C., Section 1571 - 1604.

2. Treaty Series 993; 59 Stat. 1052.

3. Also Laotian text.

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ANNEX J--HISTORICAL BACKGROUND ON THE ADVISORY EFFORT IN VIETNAM

(U) On 23 Dec 50, the US signed the Pentalateral Agreement (Annex I), a multilateral mutual defense assistance treaty for Indochina, with France and the associated states of Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam. In accordance with the agreement, the US committed itself to furnish military material (and equipment) to combat the spread of communism in SEASIA through the Mutual Defense Assistance Program (MDAP). DOD established the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG), Indochina to administer the equipment sent to the French (and indirectly through the French to indigenous forces in the area) and to explain to Congress, as necessary, how the equipment was used. MAAG Indochina from 1950 until Feb 55 was primarily a small logistical group. [1]

(S) In Jan 54, by which time political and military events had made it clear that a complete communist takeover of Indochina was possible, the JCS, in coordination with CINCPAC, directed LTG John W. (Iron Mike) O'Daniel, then CG, USARPAC, to go to Saigon on temporary duty of an indefinite duration to determine the efficacy of the existing US assistance program. LTG O'Daniel was also to ascertain what additional assistance might be necessary and he was, if possible, to secure a voice in matters concerning strategy and training. He was not to have any connection with MAAG Indochina other than in his capacity as senior US officer in Vietnam, and he was to keep the US Ambassador informed of all items of interest. He was to make all contacts with the French and Associated States civil authorities through the AMEMB.

(S) For political reasons, General Henri-Eugene Navarre, Commander of French Union Forces in Indochina, did not desire overt US participation at a high level, but did consent to periodic visits by LTG O'Daniel and agreed to accept five liaison officers to the French forces. Upon his return to USARPAC, LTG O'Daniel recommended the establishment of a small joint staff to prepare detailed operational and training plans and to develop advice that could be furnished in a coordinated manner through liaison officers to all levels of the French command. Since MAAG Indochina was a logistics staff in being, the logistical function of the proposed organization was to be limited to joint planning and coordination. [2]

(S) In May 54, LTG Paul Ely took over command of the French Union Forces and discussions on US participation in training the Vietnamese armed forces continued. By mid-July 54, when a cease fire in Vietnam appeared imminent, LTG Ely agreed informally that the US should assume training responsibility for Vietnamese forces, and Prime Minister Bu Loc of Vietnam requested formally that the US assume this responsibility.

(S) Based upon the informal agreement with LTG Ely, French and US planners worked out the details for implementing a training program. However, the JCS, upon learning of the agreements, indicated that work should be suspended temporarily since other arrangements were being considered for this same area. Meanwhile, in the summer of 1954, MAAG Indochina asked the JCS to assign additional officers to its staff so that, if and when training instructions were received, the training program could be implemented. The new officers would also be used as reinforcements for the MAAG staff in anticipation of the possibility that cease fire restrictions might prevent assignment of additional personnel. [3]

(U) On 20 Jul 54, the Indochina Cease Fire Agreement (Geneva Accords) was signed and Vietnam was divided along the 17th Parallel. The French immediately began to withdraw their

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combat forces and the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) took direct command of its own troops. About the same time, MAAG Indochina split into MAAG, Vietnam (MAAGV) and MAAG, Cambodia. MAAGV's mission was to assist the RVN government (GVN) in raising the military capabilities of the RVN Armed Forces (RVNAF) through planning for, developing, and administering the Military Assistance Program (MAP). The Geneva Accords limited the size of MAAGV to 342 officers and enlisted men who, according to the Pentalateral Agreement, had the same status as US Diplomatic Mission personnel of corresponding rank.[4]

(U) From Jul 54 to Feb 55, MAAGV made plans for the training of the RVNAF and, in the latter month, the JCS officially gave MAAGV the additional mission under the overall direction of the French High Command in RVN and on 12 Feb 55, LTG O'Daniel became the Chief of MAAGV, assuming responsibility for the training mission.

(S) Because MAAGV was to be closely associated with the French in training but not in MDAP logistical support and because of an acute shortage of personnel to accomplish the training assignment, a separate Training Relations and Instruction Mission (TRIM) to the RVNAF was established under the direction of the Chief, MAAGV. TRIM, a tri-country organization composed of personnel from France, RVN, and the US, was considered necessary as a combined effort of all three nations in producing rapid training progress. The Vietnamese were reluctant to participate in the program until they became convinced that the French and Americans would be only advisors and would remain in the background.

(S) TRIM's mission was to assist the GVN in the organization and development of sound, effective armed forces -- a program that was to encompass improvement of the Vietnamese command and staff organization and procedures, all planning, operational, and logistic activities of the armed forces and the training of all units and individuals. TRIM consisted of two echelons: a staff that advised the Ministry of Defense, the Joint General Staff, and the Arms and Services Directorates; and a group of advisors that assisted and advised subordinate headquarters, units, schools, training centers, agencies, and installations of the RVNAF. TRIM assumed a two-fold training objective. First, an army of divisional units with supporting arms and services was to be developed by 1 Jan 56; second, a continuous effort was to be made to develop the Army into a well-disciplined, highly trained ground force of all arms and services. The full development of combat infantry divisions possessing the dual capability of providing protection to the people, both by maintaining internal security and by providing a blocking or counteracting force against external attack, was to be achieved as soon as possible.

(S) Aiding TRIM in accomplishing its training missions were US Mobile Training Teams (MTTs) consisting of MAAGV personnel and technical service teams assigned to RVN on a TDY basis. On 25 Aug 55, the International Control Commission (ICC) -- a mission created to supervise adherence to the Geneva Accords -- informed MAAGV that all TDY personnel had to be included in the 342 military personnel ceiling. One plan, among several, made to meet this contingency was to employ US civilian teams. One such team from Michigan State University assisted in the development of the Civil Guard. Training the RVN Army (ARVN) was further complicated when French advisors to TRIM withdrew on 28 Apr 56, terminating TRIM and making MAAGV solely responsible for training the Vietnamese Navy (VNN) and Air Force (VNAF) until May 1957.[5]

(U) When MAAGV took over the training responsibilities for the RVNAF, its mission was to streamline the ARVN of 250,000 into a smaller force of 150,000 organized to meet any possible threat from the north.[6]

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(S) US military assistance developed under certain diplomatic and political constraints. Any consideration of the advisory effort should be made in light of the most significant of these:

1. Initial US actions in RVN were coordinated with and approved by the International Control Commission (ICC). Though US actions in support of RVN were bilateral, they were also with the cognizance of the ICC, as in late 1960 when the ICC "approved" an increase of MAAGV to 685 men.

2. In the early days, US military assistance was tied directly to President Diem and support of his regime. In April of 1961, President Diem was re-elected and the following month, President Kennedy announced his decision to provide increased military assistance to RVN and his appointment of Ambassador Frederick E. Nolting to head the US program. The nature and scope of the US military program were greatly influenced by the controversial, ambivalent, and opaque policies of the Diem government.

3. The development of RVNAF -- and US assistance -- never could be predicted on a firm set of assumptions. The RVN political and economic structure was in a state of continual flux. Long range military programs were an impossibility and therefore it was necessary to adopt short range plans which offered concrete results; in other words, to operate in the realm of the possible.

4. The war from the start had not been a war for the possession of land objectives. Objectives were, as they continue to be economic development of the country, improvement of the living standards of the people, establishment of orderly and responsive government from the capitol to the provinces, development of reliable lines of communications and above all, to create a sense of national identity.[7]

(S) The year 1961 was significant in that it marked a rapid build-up of the advisor effort. Near the end of 1960, the ICC had approved an increase of the advisory group to 685 men. Then, on 2 May, MAAGV was authorized to provide advisors to artillery, armor, and separate Marine battalions with the caveat to take every reasonable precaution to avoid assignment that would expose such personnel to capture or cause embarrassment to the US government.[8]

(U) On 13 May, Vice President Johnson and President Diem issued a joint communique announcing that the US defense and economic development programs with RVN would be expanded in response to the worsening situation. Shortly thereafter, MAAGV extended its training effort to instructiong Self-Defense Corps (SDC) cadre. This corps was the forerunner of the present Popular Forces.[9]

(S) In June, the US agreed to increase its advisor group beyond the 685-man level which was most opportune, for August and September brought a steady increase in guerrilla activity, and the GVN announced its decision to expand RVNAF to 200,000 men with commensurate increase in the Civil Guard (later Regional Forces) and the SDC. As the situation in RVN worsened during the summer, President Kennedy sent General Maxwell Taylor and Walt W. Rostow, a White House aide, on a mission to Saigon in October. The Taylor-Rostow report recommended increasing the US role by placing US advisors throughout RVNAF and GVN, with the intent of improving the level of performance. President Kennedy agreed to an enlarged advisory effort, including the addition of two US Army helicopter companies which were deployed to support ARVN and to train RVNAF helicopter units.[10]

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(S) At a 16 Dec conference, MAAGV was authorized to provide an advisor to each province chief and advisor teams down to battalion level for operational RVNAF units in the field. Although advisors had trained some 32,000 SDC troops during the preceding seven months, the SECDEF directed that training of the Civil Guard and SDC be expedited which required opening new training centers and increasing advisor support. The vital need for an improved US-GVN intelligence capability was also recognized and US intelligence specialist advisors were integrated into RVNAF corps, division, and province headquarters, as well as higher level staffs.[11]

(U) Thus, the expansion of the RVNAF, the acceleration of their training programs, and the more extensive advisor coverage accounted for the rapid increase in US advisory effort during the last quarter of 1961. Over 3,000 military personnel were in-country by the end of the year.[12]

(S) In Jan 1962, and in extension of US advisors to battalion level, MAAGV was authorized to permit advisors to accompany their units on operational missions. It was recognized that the advisor could better assist his RVNAF counterpart in operational, signal and logistical matters, the establishment and operation of aerial resupply, and the provision of additional communications advice and support. Although armed, US advisors were directed not to participate in the combat except for their own protection.

(S) In recognition of the growing complexity of the US effort, Headquarters Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) was established on 8 Feb under the command of General Paul D. Harkins with responsibility for advising GVN on all matters relative to security, organization, use of RVNAF, and of other counterinsurgency and paramilitary forces.

(S) Advisor support was required for continued development of a combined US-GVN intelligence communication capability and the establishment of a Jungle, Swamp, and Mountain Training Center which commenced a training cycle for 200 men in April. The increased strength of US forces in-country brought the deployment, in mid-spring, of an Army field hospital and establishment of three USAF dispensaries to provide medical and hospital support.

(S) Noting the rapid build-up of advisor strength, COMMUSMACV directed a review of advisor effectiveness. It was determined that the 5-man battalion team was too large and it was reduced to a 3-man team. The released personnel were re-assigned to fill advisor requirements at corps, division, and various schools. Advisors were also assigned to advise the Civil Guard and Self-Defense Corps, both paramilitary organizations.[13]

(S) In May, USMACV and the Combined Studies Division (CSD) of the US Mission agreed that activities of the US Army Special Forces would be coordinated fully, especially those involving Civilian Irregular Defense Groups (CIDG). In July, SECDEF directed transfer of CIDG support from CSD to the US Army. This was a phased transition scheduled for completion by 1 July 63 which placed under COMUSMACV the portion of the counterinsurgency effort previously directed by the US Mission. In Aug 62, the US decided to increase greatly its economic assistance to RVN, from $150 million in FY 63 to approximately $225 million in FY 64. These actions underscored the collection of military operations under COMUSMACV and economic operations under USAID, and they permitted organization of the US Mission Council essentially as at present -- a coordinating body which afforded representation to all US agencies in RVN and provided a forum through which the US Ambassador articulated policy.[14]

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(S) The intensive US program of training and equipping RVNAF for guerrilla warfare was almost completed at the end of 1962. The RVNAF had achieved a modicum of success during the year which furnished a basis for optimism. As a result of the pressures applied by RVNAF and US success in teaching the techniques of counterguerrilla warfare, the military trends shifted from favoring the VC at the beginning of 1962 to favoring the GVN by the end of the year. Frequent airmobile operations were being conducted by ARVN using US helicopters under the operational control of US advisors accompanying the ARVN units. Some 64,000 Civil Guards and 60,000 Self-Defense Corps personnel had been trained or were completing their training. As the year ended, there were approximately 11,000 US advisory and support personnel in RVN.[15]

(S) In 1963, the optimism generated by the developments of 1962 continued into the new year. A group of civic action medical personnel arrived in-country to administer medical treatment and train RVNAF medical personnel. US Civil Affairs/Civic Action officers were assigned as advisors at corps and division levels while US Army Engineer Control and Advisory Detachments were assigned at province level for civic action assistance.

(S) In a conference on 6 May, SECDEF indicated the need to expedite GVN self-sufficiency and reduce US strength in RVN. Accordingly, JCS requested through CINCPAC that units, rather than individuals, be withdrawn. Unfortunately, this action conflicted with current increases which were building up AF units. After further coordination, a 1,000-man reduction was made and this included some individuals from MAAGV.[16]

(S) Despite the increasingly bright military picture, political clouds on the horizon soon created a storm that almost caused the loss of RVN to the Communists. With the mid-year outbreak of Buddhist anti-government activity, COMUSMACV, on 10 June, ordered US military advisors not to report to their assigned RVNAF units if such units were being used to quell the Buddhist demonstrations.[17]

(S) Martial law was declared on 21 Aug, with concurrent raids on pagodas and mass arrests of Buddhists. On 9 Sep, the US advised the GVN that the removal of Diem's brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu, was vital, and warned of possible cuts in the aid program. This position was affirmed when a resolution was introduced in the US Senate on 12 Sep, calling for withdrawal of all US troops from RVN and stopping all aid unless the Diem government abandoned its policies. On 16 Sep, martial law ended but during October all US economic aid to RVN was at a virtual standstill. The UN voted to send a factfinding mission to RVN to investigate the Buddhist problem and the US announced that financial aid to the RVN Special Forces was being withheld as long as they were not being used to fight the VC. The denouement came on 1 and 2 Nov when Diem and Nhu were killed in the course of a military coup.[18]

(S) In 1964, against a background replete with riots, revolts, strikes, and personal feuds, the stability of the GVN deteriorated sharply. Unfortunately, each successive government proved equally incapable of marshalling resources of the nation for a concerted counterinsurgency effort. Frequent changes in top echelon personnel of the government were accompanied by corresponding shifts among subordinate civil and military leaders and administrators. This process, repeated several times, interrupted constructive programs and deferred progress of the pacification campaign.[19]

(S) To ensure that continued detailed attention was focused on the advisory effort, a DEPCOMUSMACV was authorized to undertake, as his principal concern, the vital task of the

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advisory structure and all forms of support to the RVNAF. LTG William C. Westmoreland became the first DEPCOMUSMACV on 27 Jan 64.[20]

(S) After some discussion and investigation, it was determined to combine MAAGV and MACV and this was accomplished on 15 May. The growing military support organization was thus combined with the military advisory effort under unified direction. This change eliminated duplication, facilitated coordination, economized on personnel and simplified coordination and performance of advisory efforts with the Vietnamese. The Navy section of MAAGV became the Naval Advisory Group, MACV; while the 2d Air Division (later 7th Air Force) assumed command and control of the Air Force Advisory Group.[21]

(S) The possibility of extending the US advisory program to the district level had been under study by the US and RVN in late 1963 and early 1964. Pilot teams were deployed to 13 districts in provinces neighboring Saigon. Although faced with initial difficulties, gradual improvement was noted. District chiefs gained new prestige and the US obtained fresh insight into local conditions, activities, requirements, attitudes, and aspirations of the people.[22]

(U) In April, President Johnson called for "more flags" in RVN and requested third country support for the people of RVN in their struggle against Communist aggression. New Zealand responded in late May stating their intention of sending 24 military advisors and later Australia and the Philippines also reported the dispatch of noncombatant military advisors to RVN.[23]

(S) At a special meeting on SEASIA in Honolulu on 1-2 June, US leaders decided to increase the US effort as a means of influencing the planning and execution of the GVN pacification program. The increase in strength of advisor teams for tactical units and the extension of US advice to lower echelons of the GVN, an expansion of the district advisor effort, was approved.[24]

(S) On 20 June, Gen William C. Westmoreland replaced Gen Harkins as COMUSMACV. In early August, US destroyers on patrol in the Gulf of Tonkin were attacked by NVN PT boats and the initial air strikes were made against NVN in retaliation for these unprovoked attacks. August and September were marked by continued political turmoil in Saigon.[25]

(S) After much high level consideration, DA designated the 5th Special Forces Group for assignment to duty in RVN to support the Special Forces advisor effort on a permanent basis rather than the use of temporary duty personnel as in the past. By the end of the year, the 1,300 officers and men of this unit had arrived in RVN.[26]

(U) Responding to increased emphasis on pacification, COMUSMACV created a special MACV staff agency, the Revolutionary Development Division, to coordinate the military support of the pacification program directed by the Embassy.[27]

(S) DA had, during the year, developed special courses at the USA Special Warfare School and the USA Civil Affairs School to train sector Civil Affairs advisors in PSYOP and civic action. Early observation of the efforts of these graduates indicated that these courses had provided needed improvement in the caliber of advisors. At year's end, missions and duties of the advisor effort were under revision better to meet the changing situation.[28]

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(S) The period of Nov 63 - Mar 65 was one of many changes -- changes in organization and commanders, in US commitments, in US Ambassadors, in enemy capability and in the RVN government. The US advisory effort for training was generally marked by an impatience to get programs implemented and training quotas filled. This impatience on the US side was opposed on the Vietnamese side by a reluctance and often a complete inability to meet programmed goals. The existing force level would not support both operational requirements and training quotas. Toward the end of the year, COMUSMACV recommended RVNAF force structure increase of over 30,000 in the regular forces and almost 110,000 increase in paramilitary forces with an accompanying increase of US advisor strength.[29]

(S) VC gains throughout 1964 and into 1965, both political and military, were significant and showed clear signs of continuing. Beyond this threat was the rapidly increasing infiltration of NVA units. The US responded to the enemy challenges in RVN with a series of major decisions significantly deepening the US military involvement. The buildup started with the dispatch of US troops necessary for the security of US installations which the RVNAF and National Police had not been able to provide. From a total US force of about 23,000 a steady increase of US troops continued until it reached 184,000 by the end of 1965. MP units were deployed to areas of high troop concentration and, in May, MACV corps advisory detachments were augmented to provide security for various advisory elements.[30]

(S) Changes in the US advisory effort included an increase of advisory teams at subsector level and a POLWAR directorate on the MACV staff, plus expansion in the intelligence field. More Naval advisors were assigned to the River Assault Groups and to the Coastal Force. Additional USAF advisors were assigned to newly activated VNAF squadrons.[31]

(S) Throughout the year, advisory support continued to grow: the increasing role played by Regional Forces (formerly Civil Guard) both tactically and logistically; heavy requirements on training centers and the need for training, logistic, POLWAR, and additional divisional and administrative advisors. November brought increased air advisors at corps, division, special zone, and sector levels due to the increased air support being provided and the need for close control.[32]

(U) On 20 July, US Army Vietnam (USARV) was established to provide a control element for the US Army in RVN. On 1 Sep, logistical support of the field advisory program was transferred to USARV. The senior US tactical unit commander within each of the CTZs was named senior advisor to the CG of the respective corps.[33]

(C) At the end of the year, a total of 5,377 personnel were authorized in the field advisory elements compared with a begining of the year figure of 4,741.[34]

(S) At the 31 Jan 66 Mission Council Meeting, the Ambassador indicated concern as to whether the number of advisors, both military and civilian, was excessive. COMUSMACV directed a review of the military advisory effort for possible reduction. A study was made and a MACV J1/J3 team visited each CTZ for a detailed on-the-spot review. This investigation resulted in a net reduction of 288 spaces. The subsequent reduction was difficult because of the lack of uniformity in sector and subsector teams; each was tailored to meet the particular needs of the location and situation. In addition, continual changes were occuring and new requirements were constantly arising. As an example, the SECDEF directed MACV to furnish 25 (later reduced to 20) officers with agricultural background for full time duty with USAID as

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agricultural advisors in selected provinces. Deployment for this mission began in March.[35]

(U) The US Ambassador created the Office of Civil Operations (OCO) which assumed responsibility for all civilian support of the RVN Revolutionary Development effort and all US civil operations in the pacification field. Concurrently, MACV elevated the MACV Revolutionary Development staff element to a directorate and provided further emphasis on the importance of this effort by heading it with a general officer. MACV recognized that there was no way to separate security considerations from pacification operations; in fact, MACV military advisors at the province and district levels were central to the pacification effort. Thus, by mid-1966, the Military Assistance Staff of MACV was working jointly for COMUSMACV and OCO.[36]

(U) On 1 Apr, US Naval component command functions were transferred from CG, III MAF to COMNAVFORV which was established. On that same date, 2d Air Division was redesignated 7th Air Force with no shift in command relationships.[37]

(C) On 1 Sep, logistical advisory functions were transferred from MACV to USARV with the exception of those staff advisory functions of the MACV staff.[38]

(U) In October, SECDEF approved a MACV proposal for a minimum tour of 2 years for a limited number of selected officers who were occupying key command, staff, and advisory positions. This step was considered essential to ensure continuity and stability in the MACV organization and to further raise the caliber of the advisory effort.[39]

(S) Meanwhile the Saigon Port had become a major problem area with vessels clogging the Saigon River awaiting discharge. On 4 Sep, the 125th Transportation Terminal Command arrived and immediately set to work. This advisory unit was tasked to assist and support the Director General of Ports in all aspects of his mission with the primary objective of improving the management and operation of Saigon Port. Tackling the problem in depth, this advisory effort began to show results by December.[40]

(C) Although the major US emphsis in 1966 appeared to have been US buildup and operations, the advisory effort nevertheless received comparable emphasis -- it expanded as RVNAF expanded, as Revolutionary Development gained momentum and as new territory was wrested from VC domination. The MACV staff continued to function in three areas: as an advisory staff to RVNAF, as a subordinate unified command under CINCPAC, and as the senior US ground tactical headquarters. Separate advisory teams existed for the USN, USMC, and USAF but the USA advisory effort, except for the field element, was integrated into the joint staff. DEPCOMUS-MACV continued to dedicate the majority of his time to the building of a viable RVNAF. Each MACV headquarters staff section had major elements that worked on developing the RVNAF and advising their counterparts in the JGS.[41]

(C) At the beginning of 1967 there were approximately 6,900 advisors in RVN. In mid-January, COMUSMACV observed that, in accomplishing the massive buildup of the RVNAF over the past years, there had been a tendency to negate simultaneous efforts to achieve qualitative improvements in leadership, organization, and operations. The activation of new units had required new cadres which continuously sapped the already marginally effective officer and NCO corps, thus further reducing the quality of leadership available to operational units. He believed it was necessary to create an environment wherein improvement and upgrading could be made. Accordingly, action was taken to stabilize force levels of the RVNAF; improve current

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RVNAF units by eliminating unauthorized elements and excessive special duty personnel; and to perfect better administrative procedures for the elimination of ineffectives. A comprehensive Command Leadership Program was instigated. US advisors were called upon to express their own leadership and to set a high personal example. A rotation system for the retraining of combat battalions was established and the improvement of logistical operations at all levels was stressed.

(C) The need for a comprehensive assessment of progress led to the COMUSMACV-CJGS agreement to provide US advisors to the RVNAF Inspector General and subordinate commands and agencies. An IG school was established at JGS level.

(C) As a result of a visit by the Chairman of the JCS, an investigation was made as to whether the essential RVNAF forces were imbued with the vital importance of the security task and whether or not it would be wise to assign US officers as advisors to all RVN local security detachments of company size or larger. The resulting MACV study on this question developed an affirmative recommendation based upon the following advantages:

1. Improved combat effectiveness.

2. Enhanced unit effectiveness in winning the support of the people toward the GVN.

3. Improved unit civic action and PSYWAR activities.

4. Expedited completion of the Revolutionary Development process.


(C) A further outcome of this study was the development of Mobile Training Teams to advise ARVN battalions which were being designated to support the pacification program.[42]

(U) Increasing support was devoted to the Revolutionary Development program and the GVN was encouraged to assign enlarged responsibilities to RVNAF in support of pacification.[43]

(C) It became more and more evident that the Main Force war and the pacification effort were basically interdependent. On 9 May, by National Security Action Memorandum No. 362, COMUSMACV assumed the operational responsibility for the entire spectrum of US support of pacification while the AMEMB retained the responsibility for advising the GVN on political and economic matters at the national level.[44]

(U) To direct the civil programs within the MACV organization, the office of Assistant Chief of Staff for Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) was created. As further evidence of the critical importance of this aspect of the war, Ambassador Robert W. Komer was assigned to MACV as DEPCOMUS for CORDS. The ACofS, CORDS assumed responsibility for the field functions of the former Office of Civil Operations to include the Refugee, Chieu Hoi, Psychological Operations, Revolutionary Development Cadre, New Life Development, and Public Safety Programs. The MACV Revolutionary Development Support Directorate was likewise incorporated into the new CORDS office.[45]

(C) The diffusion of responsibility for the advisory effort among the various MACV staff sections caused COMUSMACV to direct an overall review of the advisory authorizations and supervision to ensure a sound base for the development of future requirements. Two concurrent studies were initated:



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1. The Flanagan Study (BG Flanagan headed the study group) examined the current MACV advisory effort to validate existing strength authorizations and requirements, identify imbalances, and make appropriate recommendations for changes to improve efficiency and utilization of advisor resources.

2. Project 640 reviewed the MACV staff organization in relation to the advisory effort to determine the best means of providing proper control and coordination.

(C) The Flanagan Study resulted in a redistribution of over 460 advisor spaces within MACV while the Project 640 study resulted in the establishment, in November, of the office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Military Assistance on the MACV staff. The importance of this new agency was emphasized by the assignment of BG Donnelly Bolton, USA, to head the 26-man office. Another outcome was the assignment of Regular Force and Popular Force (RF/PF) advisory activities to ACofS, CORDS.

(U) On 3 July General Creighton W. Abrams assumed command of MACV.

(S) During 1967, therefore, the direction of the military advisory effort, both for the RVNAF and in support of pacification, was reorganized to permit supervision and control by COMUSMACV through two new MACV staff agencies, ACofSCORDS and ACofSMA. The expansion of the advisor effort for the RF/PF and other pacification activities created another surge in advisor strength to a JCS-approved total of 8,543 at the end of the year. [4]

(U) In 1968, the accomplishments of the overall US advisory effort reflected, in a sense, the degree of political stability in the RVN. In 1966 as political stability increased, the advisory program gained momentum. By 1967, COMUSMACV was able to project a comprehensive development program for an RVNAF of such size, quality, and balance that it could progressively assume a greater share of the fighting. RVNAF successes against the enemy's Tet attacks created a new spirit of confidence. The RVN national mobilization program continued to fill the ranks and ease the expansion. Training had greatly improved with particular attention being paid to security and combat in cities. The program for arming RVNAF with modern weapons and equipment continued to progress rapidly and on schedule. Good military leadership began to emerge and leaders in all grades began to exhibit promising signs of independence and a seeking of responsibility. [47]

(S) An outcome of the battles in the Saigon area during Tet and the subsequent May offensive was the establishment of the Capitol Military Assistance Command (CMAC) with the commanding general also serving as senior advisor to the ARVN commander of the Capitol Military District in the Saigon/Gia Dinh area. CMAC had operational control over all ARVN, RF/PF, and the National Police advisors in this area. By the end of 1968, US advisor strength totaled over 10,000 personnel. [48]

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ANNEX K -- LAW 019/69 OF DECEMBER 30, 1969
ESTABLISHING PRESS REGULATIONS

CHAPTER I

FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES

Article 1 - Press freedom is a fundamental right in the Republic of Vietnam.

The exercise of Press freedom shall not be harmful to personal honor, national security or traditional morality.

No suspension of publication shall be made except by due judicial process.

Article 2 - Press censorship is prohibited.

CHAPTER II

CONDITIONS GOVERNING PRESS PUBLICATION

Article 3 - Persons or corporate bodies having Vietnamese citizenship shall be entitled to publish a newspaper or a magazine after making a formal declaration at the Ministry of Information.

Court action shall be instituted against any publication which has not made such formal declaration.

The term "publication" used in this edict covers daily newspapers and periodical magazines.

Article 4 - A formal declaration shall consist of the following:

1. A declaration made in three copies bearing the notarized signature of the publisher and listing the name of the newspaper or magazine, its policy and objectives, the full names, pen-names and addresses of publisher, editor and manager, plus the address of the newspaper or magazine's office;

2. Certificates of residence of the publisher, editor and manager;

3. Certificates of birth of the publisher, editor and manager;

4. Legalized copies of diplomas or certificates of experience in presswork of the publisher and editor;

5. Copies of judicial Form 2 (criminal record) issued to the publisher, editor and manager within the preceding three months;

6. Copy of contract, if any used to capitalize the publication.

Any false declaration or forgery of above mentioned papers shall result in prosecution under provisions of Article 43 of the present law as well as legal prosecution by a court.

Article 5 - Each daily newspaper or periodical must have a publisher, an editor and a manager.

A publisher can also assume the role of editor.

Article 6 - The publisher, editor and manager shall fulfill the following requirements: be of Vietnamese citizenship; be at least 25 years old at the time of declaration; not have been sentenced to more than three months' imprisonment for criminal or minor offenses, except those resulting from carelessness or violations of press rules, excepting violations stipulated in Articles 27, 28 or 29; not to make propaganda for Communism or to practice Communism; at least one among the three following people: the publisher, editor and manager may not be Deputy or Senator.

The publisher and editor must be in possession of one of the following: a degree in journalism; a university diploma; a certificate of work on an editorial staff for a period over one year; a certificate of work as a reporter for at least two years with a newspaper, information agency, or radio station having legal status in Vietnam; a certificate of work as publisher or editor for at least six months.

Article 7 - The Ministry of Information shall issue a temporary receipt as soon as it receives the formal declarations from the publisher.

Within one month after the issuance of temporary receipt, the Ministry of Information shall issue a formal license to the publisher. The declaration papers will be considered valid at the date the Ministry of Information issues the formal license.

If within one month the Ministry of Information does not issue a formal license or does not reject the request by a decision, the declaration shall be automatically considered valid.

In its decision to reject the request for publication license, the Ministry of Information shall have to specify the reasons why.

Article 8 - In case of rejection the applicant may appeal to the Council of State.

The Council of State shall have a maximum period of three months in which to examine the case. The declaration request shall be automatically considered as valid from the date the Council of State passes a judgment to repeal the decision of the Ministry of Information.

Article 9 - Three months after the declaration becomes valid, the publisher must begin publication or the license for publication shall automatically become invalid.

Article 10 - A daily newspaper which stops publication for two months or a periodical which stops publication for four successive issues shall be considered as having voluntarily suspended publication.

Article 11 - A daily newspaper or periodic magazine shall clearly state:

-- full name of publisher and managing director;
-- full name or pen name of the editor;
-- address of the publication;
-- the name and address of its printing house;
-- the price per copy and the subscription rate.

Article 12 - Before each daily distribution, every newspaper must deposit if printed in Saigon-Gia Dinh:

-- 10 copies at the Ministry of Information;
-- 2 copies at the Prosecutor's Office of the Court of First Instance;
-- 2 copies at the Ministry of Interior;
-- 2 copies at the National Archive.

If printed outside the Saigon-Gia Dinh area:

-- 2 copies at the local Information Office;
-- 2 copies at the Prosecutor's Office of the local tribunal;
-- 2 copies at the Province or District Administrative Office;
-- 2 copies at the National Archive.

The deposited copies must bear the signature of the newspaper's publisher or managing director.

Article 13 - Copies of a daily newspaper may be issued from the printing house no earlier than two hours after its copies have been deposited at the agencies specified in Article 12.

A six-hour time limit is allowed for periodicals.

Article 14 - The publisher must be present at the publishing house. If he is to be away for over two months he must designate someone to replace him temporarily. The latter must meet the conditions as required by Article 6. The above agencies must be informed of the appointment of such caretaker.

Article 15 - Any change of editor, manager, newspaper office or publishing house, as well as any alteration of capital invested in the publishing of the daily must be reported to the Ministry of Information no less than fifteen (15) days before it occurs. The origin of the capital increase must be justified.

Article 16 - Leasing of publication licenses under any form is strictly prohibited.

Article 17 - Foreigners desiring to publish a newspaper in Vietnam must abide by the provisions of this decree-law-except for that related to citizenship- and must obtain a license from the Minister of Information with the concurrence of the Minister of Interior.

CHAPTER III

RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE PRESS

Article 18 - Publications shall not be suspended, either temporarily or permanently, without a decision by the Judiciary.

Article 19 - With a view to safeguarding national security, public order and good morals, the Minister of Interior - for the Saigon-Gia Dinh press - and the Mayors and Province Chiefs - for the provincial press - may order the confiscation of the copies of a daily or periodical before or after it is put in circulation;

However, prosecution before an authoritative criminal court must be made by the authorities ordering the confiscation within eight (8) days after such confiscation.

Pending the decision of the court, the publisher of the confiscated daily newspaper or periodical has the right to continue publication.

Article 20 - In cases provided for by the preceding Article 19, if acquitted by the court, the publisher of the prosecuted daily newspaper or periodical may lodge a counter-action for damage indemnification in the same session of the court. The indemnification, in proportion to the damages, shall be covered by public funds.

Article 21 - The press is granted freedom of information and opinion, provided that the exercise of this freedom does not prejudice individual honor, national security or traditional morality.

Article 22 - The press may keep its sources of information secret.

Article 23 - The press shall not be prosecuted for reporting or reproducing faithfully:

- public debates held by the National Assembly or its Committees;
- political statements made by Deputies and Senators;
- documents or reports read in public sessions of the National Assembly, or any unclassified documents officially issued by it.

Article 24 - Publications have the right to criticize government policies and projects, provided that the criticism is not aimed at propagandizing for Communism or pro-Communist neutrality.

Article 25 - Publications shall not be prosecuted for printing of translated excerpts or articles from foreign dailies and periodicals whose circulation is authorized in Vietnam, provided that the translation is faithful and the publication is bona-fide.

Article 26 - Persons or legal entities who are mentioned by name or by indirect allusion in an unmistakable manner in press articles, can require the publisher to insert free of charge their reply to or rectification of the article.

The publisher is bound to insert the reply or rectification in one of the three next issues of the daily newspaper after its receipt. As far as periodicals are concerned, the insertion must be made in one of the two subsequent issues of the periodical after receipt of the reply or rectification.

The insertion must be carried at the same column or columns and with the same type size and face as the incriminating article, but it may not exceed twice the length in words of the incriminating article.

If the insertion is not made within the above-specified time and according to the above rules, the publisher shall be liable to a fine ranging from VN$5,000 to VN$50,000, notwithstanding civil damages to the plaintiff.

Refusal to make the insertion shall render the publisher liable to a penalty of from six days to two months of imprisonment, and/or a fine ranging from VN$10,000 to VN$100,000, notwithstanding civil damages to the plaintiff.

The court shall decide on the complaint within ten (10) days following its receipt. In addition to penalties and compensation for damages, the publisher shall be ordered to publish a reply or correction from the plaintiff. The sentence is temporarily applied in full to order the publisher to print the reply or correction regardless of counter-charge or appeal.

During an election period, the time limit as provided for in the second paragraph of this article shall be reduced to 24 hours. The correction or reply must be forwarded to the newspaper's office six hours before the duty copy is deposited. The time allotted to the Court for judgment of the action is reduced to 24 hours.

Article 27 - The press shall not be used to:

a. incite people to commit theft, robbery, murder, willful assault, or arson;

b. incite people to violate domestic or external security;

c. incite military men to disobey military discipline;

d. praise the aforesaid offenses.

As far as the cases cited in paragraphs a, b, and c, are concerned, even if the incitements do not lead to actual offenses, they must be considered as consummated crimes and punished in accordance with provisions of this law.

Article 28 - The press shall not be used to disseminate speculation, false news, or true news published with the intent of causing one of the following consequences:

a. jeopardize national security or public order;

b. jeopardize national economy and finance;

c. undermine the army's discipline and morale;

d. sow division between religions, localities and races.

Article 29 - The press shall not be used to publicize information, documents or arguments aiming at extolling the theories, policies or actions of Communism or pro-Communist neutrality.

Article 30 - Any allegation, report or imputation of a fact that infringes upon the honor or esteem of a person, agency or group may be regarded as slander.

Any outrageous, contemptible or invective expression may be regarded as insults.

Article 31 - Evidence of the truthfulness of the facts regarded as slanderous must be established. However, it is strictly forbidden to establish that truthfulness when:

1. the facts are related to the private life of a person;

2. the facts go back to more than ten years;

3. the offense has been pardoned or eliminated, or the sentence has been expunged either by rehabilitation or reversal.

If the truthfulness of the fact regarded as slanderous is established, the accused shall be acquitted.

In any circumstances in which evidence of truthfulness is to be established, if the slanderer is being prosecuted before a criminal court, or is under investigation by the Inspectorate General concerning facts constituting the slander, the trial of the slanderous offense shall be temporarily deferred until completion of the prosecution or inquiry.

Article 32 - The press shall not be used to insult:

a. the President and Vice-President of the Republic of Vietnam or their successors;

b. the Heads of State, Ambassadors, Envoys or Consuls of countries having diplomatic relations with the Republic of Vietnam;

c. the Legislative, Executive and Judiciary branches, popularly-elected agencies and legally-established bodies;

d. members of the National Assembly, members of the Government, magistrates of the Supreme Court, agents of the public authority and citizens temporarily or permanently entrusted with a public or electoral mandate, regarding actions related to their duty or functions;

e. individuals, be they persons or legal entities;

f. the memory of the dead, with intention to harm the honor and prestige of their living heirs, spouse or legatees.

Article 33 - The press shall not be used to slander:

a. the President and Vice-President of the Republic of Vietnam, or their successors;

b. the Heads of State, Ambassadors, Envoys or Consuls of countries having diplomatic relations with the Republic of Vietnam;

c. the Legislative, Executive or Judiciary branches, popularly-elected agencies and legally-established bodies;

d. members of the National Assembly, members of the Government, magistrates of the Supreme Court, agents of the public authority and citizens temporarily or permanently entrusted with a public or electoral mandate, regarding actions related to their duty and functions;

e. individuals, be they persons or legal entities;

f. the memory of the dead, with intention to harm the honor or prestige of their living heirs, spouse or legatees.

Article 34 - The press shall not publicize bills of indictment or other procedural papers of criminal proceedings before their public reading before a hearing, except when the publication of such documents is requested in writing by the prosecutor.

From the moment when the criminal court takes a lawsuit in charge until delivery of its verdict, the press shall not print information or commentaries which might influence the court's impartial judgment.

The press shall not report on the pleading of proceedings of any lawsuit for slander, insult, declaration of paternity, divorce or judicial separation, or on any lawsuit for civil damages, the publication of which has been forbidden by the court.

Article 35 - The press shall not be used to publicize articles, pictures and drawings infringing upon traditional morality.

CHAPTER IV

PRESS DISTRIBUTION

Article 36 - Persons or corporate bodies have the right to distribute the newspapers or periodicals they publish.

Eight (8) days before commencing operations, the distributor is required to inform both the Information and Interior Ministries of:

- distributing office,

- names of employees in charge of distribution,

- names and addresses of distributing agencies in country.

Article 37 - Persons or corporate bodies who distribute newspapers published by other people, besides abiding by the conditions stipulated in Article 36 shall deposit at the Directorate General of the Treasury a sum of VN$500,000 and shall send a duplicate receipt to the Information and Interior Ministries within fifteen (15) days before commencing operations. Any infringement of this provision shall lead to the closing of the distributing house and punishment as provided for in Article 43.

Article 38 - Renting out newspapers, in any form, is strictly forbidden. Anybody who rents out or himself rents a newspaper is punishable in accordance with Article 42 of this law.

CHAPTER V

PRESS COUNCIL

Article 39 - The Press Council chosen by the Press Congress shall be invested with juridical status and be entitled:

1. to act as official representative of the press corps;

2. to execute the Press Code drafted by the Press Congress;

3. to contact and to discuss with the government and press groups questions related to the press.

The composition, functions and number of members of the Press Council shall be fixed by the Press Congress.

Article 40 - The Press Congress shall comprise:

-- the president or a representative of the executive committee of all legally - recognized press groups;

-- the publishers of newspapers and magazines in circulation;

-- a journalist representing each newspaper and magazine in circulation.

Any person receiving wages under any form, permanently collaborating with newspapers, periodicals or press agencies in the capacity as special correspondent, member of the editorial staff, cameraman, illustrator or translator of articles for the press is considered a journalist.

Journalists must have a professional card issued by the publisher of the newspaper or periodical, or the director of the press agency for which they work. This professional card must be registered with the Ministry of Information.

Article 41 - The first Press Congress shall be convoked by the Ministry of Information within three (3) months after the promulgation of this law.

CHAPTER VI

PENALTIES

Article 42 - Violation of one of the Articles 11, 12, 14, 15, 36, and 38 shall be penalized by a fine ranging from VN$5,000 to VN$50,000.

Article 43 - The violation of one of the Articles 4, 13, 16, 32 paragraphs c, d, e, g, and 37 shall be punishable by imprisonment ranging from six (6) days to two (2) months and/or a fine ranging from VN$10,000 to VN$100,000.

Article 44 - The violation of one of the Articles 32, paragraph b, 34 paragraphs c, d, e, g, 35 and 36 shall be punishable by imprisonment ranging from 15 days to three months and/or a fine ranging from VN$50,000 to VN$300,000.

Article 45 - The violation of one of the Articles 3, 17, 27, 32, paragraph a, 33, paragraph b, and 67 shall be punishable by imprisonment ranging from one to six months and/or a fine ranging from VN$100,000 to VN$500,000.

Article 46 - The violation of Articles 28 and 33, paragraph a, shall be punishable by imprisonment ranging from three months to one year and/or a fine ranging from VN$200,000 to VN$1,000,000.

Article 47 - The violation of Article 30 shall be punishable by imprisonment ranging from one to five years and a fine ranging from VN$300,000 to VN$1,500,000.

Article 48 - In case a newspaper or periodical is found guilty of violation of Articles 27, 28, or 29, the court may impose suspension, either for a fixed period or indefinitely.

Article 49 - In case a newspaper or periodcial is found guilty of violation of Articles 27, 28, 29, 32, paragraph b or 33 paragraph b, the court may order the confiscation or destruction of all the issues in which such violations occur.

In case a newspaper or periodical is found guilty of violation of Articles 32, paragraphs a, c, d, e, g, or 33, paragraphs a, c, d, e, g, the court may, upon request of the civil plaintiff, order the publication of either all or part of the court findings and sentence in the three daily newspapers authorized to publish judicial communiques. The culprits shall be held jointly responsible for the expenses arising from such publication.

CHAPTER VII

PROSECUTION PROCEDURES

Article 50 - In application of the Articles on penalties stipulated in this law, the following persons may be prosecuted as responsible parties, in the following order:

1. the publisher or manager;

2. in the default of the above-named, the editor or author;

3. in the default of the above-named, the owner of the publishing house or printing house;

4. in the default of the above-named, the sellers or distributors.

The convicted persons shall be held jointly responsible for the indemnification of moral and material damages.

Article 51 - If the publisher, manager or editor is prosecuted, the author shall also be prosecuted, as an accomplice. The penalty prescribed for the accomplice shall be the same as that prescribed for the principal responsible party.

Article 52 - All infringements upon press regulations lie within the jurisdiction of the Criminal Court of First Instance, except in the case of criminal acts.

Article 53 - The competent court is that in the locality in which the newspaper or periodical is published.

Article 54 - The prosecution of the offenses committed by the press shall be undertaken upon request of the Public Prosecutor, except:

1. In the case the slander or insult is aimed at an agency of the public authorities or of a legally-recognized group, prosecution shall take place on complaint made by the manager of the agency or group.

2. In case the slander or insult is aimed at an agent of the public authorities regarding actions related to his functions, prosecution shall take place on complaint made either by the interested party or by the Minister, Ministry or Office to which they belong.

3. In case the slander or insult is aimed at the Chiefs of State or representatives of countries having diplomatic relations with the Republic of Vietnam, prosecution shall take place upon their request for prosecution addressed through the Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Minister of Justice.

4. In case of insult or slander against a member of the National Assembly, the action shall be taken only at the request of the plaintiff.

5. In case of insult or slander against a private individual, the action shall be brought by the person concerned. But the Public Prosecutor shall institute legal proceedings if the insult or slander aims at a group of individuals belonging to a local religion or ethnic minority with a view to sowing division and hatred.

Article 55 - If the Public Prosecutor begins legal proceedings, he must enumerate and describe the offenses against which the action is brought, as well as indicate the texts of laws whose application is requested, lest the indictment be declared void.

Article 56 - If action is taken at the request of the plaintiff, the writ of summons must include, besides the details mentioned in Article 55, the locality where the plaintiff makes his domicile within the jurisdiction of the competent court before which the matter is laid.

Article 57 - The writ of summons shall be delivered to both the defendant and the Public Prosecutor. The time limit separating the notification of the summons from the appearance before the Court is twenty (20) days.

However, in case of insult or slander against a candidate for an elected office during the electoral period, that time limit will be reduced to 18 hours, and both Articles 59 and 60 shall not be applied. The case shall be tried within two days after the action is taken.

Article 58 - The defendant shall not be detained awaiting trial, except in case of violation of Articles 27, 28 or 29 of this law.

Article 59 - When the defendant asks to bring evidence substantiating the veracity of the disputed facts, in accordance with Article 31, the defendant must, within ten days after receiving the writ, inform both the Public Prosecutor and the plaintiff of:

1. the facts alleged to be slanderous, the veracity of which he seeks to prove;

2. copies of the documents to be submitted at the Court;

3. the names, professions and addresses of the witnesses through whom he wishes to submit proofs of his innocence.

The defendant in the above notification shall attest to a domicile within the jurisdiction of the court having competence in the lawsuit on penalty of being deprived of the right of establishing the veracity of the disputed facts.

Article 60 - Five days after receipt of the above notification, or in any case at least three days before the hearing, the plaintiff or the Public Prosecutor, depending upon the circumstanes, shall be bound to provide to the accused at his elected domicile copies of all documents submitted at the court and the names, professions and addresses of the witnesses through whom the plaintiff or the Public Prosecutor wishes to give proof to the contrary, on pain of being deprived of this right.

Article 61 - If he judges the presence of one or more witnesses advanced by either the plaintiff or the accused may be harmful to public order or traditional morality, the Public Prosecutor may suspend delivery of the summons.

However, the presiding judge in charge of the lawsuit may revoke the above-mentioned public prosecutor's decision.

Article 62 - In all cases of slander or insult, the withdrawal of the plaintiff's complaint shall invalidate the prosecution. The withdrawal of the complaint shall be accepted in every procedural phase, even before the Supreme Court.

Article 63 - Aggravation of penalties resulting from repetition of the offense shall not be applied to the offenses provided for in this law.

However, this provision shall not be applied in cases in which there is repetition of the offense twice in one year.

Article 64 - Public prosecution and civil action related to minor offenses provided for in the present law shall be prohibited after a period of three full months counting from the day the offense shall have occurred, or the first day of prosecution of the offense.

Article 65 - Civil action shall not be separated from public prosecution except in case of death of, or amnesty to, the accused.

Article 66 - Article 463 of the Revised Criminal Code, and Article 415 of the Hoang Viet Penal Code are applicable in all cases stipulated in the present law. However, in any case of extenuating circumstances, the pronounced verdict shall not be less than half of the minimum penalty provided for the offense.

CHAPTER VIII

GENERAL PROVISIONS

Article 67 - Newspapers and periodicals presently in circulation are regarded as legally published. However, in order to regularize their situation, the publishers shall submit a dossier including the documents listed in paragraphs 1, 2, and 6 of Article 4 of this law, within three months after the promulgation of this law.

Thereafter, those newspapers or periodicals having not yet submitted the above-mentioned documents shall be suspended.

Violation of the preceding paragraph shall be punishable under the penalties prescribed in Article 45 of this law.

Article 68 - All regulations contrary to the provisions of this law are abrogated in particular the provisions related to the press established in the following documents:

-- Law of July 29, 1881 on freedom of the press in South Vietnam;

-- Decree of August 24, 1939 on the control of the press;

-- Decree of August 24, 1941 requiring previous authorization by regional administrative authorities before the publication of newspapers or periodicals;

-- Decree Law No. 2/64 of February 19, 1964, recognizing freedom of speech and freedom of the press;

-- Decree Law No. 10/64 of April 30, 1964 on free publication and organization of the press.

Article 69 - This law shall be published in the official gazette of the Republic of Vietnam.

Saigon, December 30, 1969
(signed) Nguyen Van Thieu

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COMUSMACV 1969 COMMAND CHRONOLOGY

JANUARY

1 -- FWMAF strength is 1,428,301: US - 536,040; RVN - 826,500 (EST); ROK - 50,003; Aus - 7,661; NZ - 516; Thai - 6,005; Phil - 1,576.

-- The following major US/FWMAF operations continue into 1969:
I CTZ - MARSHALL MTN, SCOTLAND II, DAWSON RIVER, NEVADA EAGLE, TAYLOR COMMON, VERNON LAKE II, KENTUCKY, FAYETTE CANYON, HARDIN FALLS;
II CTZ - WALKER, McLAIN/DAN THANG, COCHISE GREEN/DAN SINH, MACARTHUR/BINH TAY, BOLLING;
III CTZ - TOAN THANG II;
IV CTZ - SPEEDY EXPRESS, QUYET CHIEN.

-- Three US PWs released in battlefield meeting between representatives of VC and CG, II FFORCEV in Tay Ninh Province.

3 -- Explosion, believed to have been a mine, in mess hall of 20th Engr Bde at Cu Chi Base Camp results in 15 killed and 26 wounded.

-- Dr. N. F. Wikner assumes duties as Science Advisor to COMUSMACV.

6 -- Le Minh Tri, GVN Minister of Education, assassinated in Saigon.

7 -- VC command-detonated floating type mine damages bridge across Highway 4, 5 km southwest of Gia Rai, Bac Lieu Province. Another command detonated mine later destroys bridge. No bypass available.

11 -- ROK Mar Bde, finds 225 tons of rice and small quantities miscellaneous small arms ammo and documents 10 km southwest of Hoi An, Quang Nam Province.

12 -- Unknown size enemy force attacks Can Tho Airfield with B-40 rockets, 60mm mortar, satchel charges, and automatic weapons. Enemy overruns part of airfield. (Five US KIA, 17 (12 US) WIA, 18 helos destroyed or damaged.)

14 -- 48th Trans Gp convoy engages unknown number of enemy in Tay Ninh Province (En: 122 KIA, 3 I/W, 1 C/S; Frd: 7 KIA, 10 WIA).

-- DELTA BLACKHAWK forces contact large enemy force in Kien Phong and Kien Tuong Provinces (En: 139 KIA, 17 Det, 66 I/W and C/S, large quantity of miscellaneous ammo and explosives, including first 107mm rockets captured in IV CTZ; Frd: 5 KIA, 21 WIA).

-- ROK Army elements terminate 18-day operation west-northwest of Phu Cat, Binh Dinh Province (En: 170 KIA, 16 Det, 246 I/W, 26 C/S; Frd. 5 KIA, 16 WIA).

19 -- Negotiating teams meet for more than five hours in Paris and complete procedural discussions.

20 -- ARVN Ammunition Supply Point explodes vicinity Qui Nhon in Binh Dinh Province. Explosion may have been caused by hand flare or mortar illumination round used to illuminate perimeter (Estimated 2,762 STON ammo destroyed).

-- Richard M. Nixon assumes office of President of the United States; Melvin R. Laird assumes office of SECDEF, Henry Cabot Lodge becomes head of US negotiating team in Paris.

21 -- USS Tom Green County (LST-1559) receives direct hit by 122mm rocket during attack on LST piers at Vung Tau. Ship suffers heavy damage (Frd: 2 KIA, 14 WIA).

-- Elements of 2d Bde, 1st Cav Div, discover one of largest caches of the war southeast of Kontum; 30-ton cache consists of mortar and small arms ammo, and various explosives.

-- Operation BINH TAY 44 (TTV), ARVN operation in Pleiku Province, terminates (En: 251 KIA, 44 I/W, 41 C/S; Frd: 31 KIA, 71 WIA).

24 -- 1,000th helicopter lost in combat operations in RVN.

25 -- Negotiating teams meet in Paris for first substantive talks.

-- GVN announces plans for elections in districts and towns considered pacified. Elections to be held in March in 600 villages and 2,000 hamlets.

26 -- Enemy attacks Binh Tien Ward Office on Phu Dinh Street in 6th Precinct, Saigon, using 10 B-40 RPG, 2 hand grenades, and small arms. Four civilian Self-Defense cadre wounded, building 50 percent destroyed. First attack within Saigon city limits since May-June Offensive.

28 -- Operation QUYET CHANG 9/3, Sa Dec Province, under OPCON 9th ARVN Division, terminates (En: 167 KIA, 18 Det; Frd: 9 KIA, 108 WIA, 1 MIA).

29 -- NFLSVN announces 7-day stand-down for Tet from 150700 to 220700 Feb.

30 -- Prisoner disturbance in PW camp on Phu Quoc Island results in 4 prisoners killed and 21 wounded.

-- D/2/8 Cav, in Operation TOAN THANG in Tay Ninh Province, finds underground hospital complex under construction 19 km northeast of Pho Khuong. Hospital contains 5 operating rooms, 6 wards (capacity 15-18 persons each), 2 mess halls (capacity 200 persons), 12 tunnels each 20' deep 5' in diameter, 100-125 bunkers each 10' x 15' by 6' w/ overhead cover connected to 2 fighting positions each, 2 bunkers 15' x 150' w/overhead cover, 45 bunkers 4' x 5' x 8' w/overhead cover, 6 additional mess areas (2 partially underground).

31 -- Elements of 2d Bn, 12th Cav (Ambl) participating in Operation TOAN THANG, Tay Ninh Province, find 2 enemy caches totalling over 69 tons of rice.

-- Terrorists attempt to assassinate MG Nguyen Van Kiem, CofS, Special Staff, Office of GVN President, 4 blocks from Presidential Palace. MG Kiem suffers broken leg.

-- Accelerated Pacification Campaign which began on 1 Nov 1968 terminates. Goal of 5,000 Hoi Chanh exceeded by over 70 percent as 8,651 VC return to GVN cause during this period.

-- The following I FFORCEV operations terminate:

Opn WALKER, which commenced 17 Jan 68 (En: 272 KIA, 269 Det, 72 I/W, 13 C/S; Frd: 42 KIA, 313 WIA),

Opn COCHISE GREEN which commenced 31 Mar 68 (En: 929 KIA, 2,062 Det, 233 I/W, 22 C/S; Frd: 144 KIA, 870 WIA),

Opn McLAIN which commenced 20 Jan 68 (En: 1,042 KIA, 415 Det, 333 I/W, 40 C/S; Frd: 69 KIA, 568 WIA),

Opn BOLLING which commenced 19 Sep 68 (En: 715 KIA, 2,488 Det, 237 I/W, 21 C/S; Frd: 72 KIA, 307 WIA),

and, Opn MACARTHUR which commenced 12 Oct 68 (En: 5,731 KIA, 1,707 Det, 155 Ret, 1,383 I/W, 170 C/S; Frd: 955 KIA, 4,437 WIA, 7 MIA).

-- US military strength in RVN is 541,715.

FEBRUARY

1 -- GVN accepts pledge of FULRO (dissident Montagnard tribal organization) to cooperate in war against Communism.

-- GVN launches 1969 Pacification Program. Basic strategy represents extension of recently completed Accelerated Pacification Campaign. New concepts include focus on the village as the basic echelon of rural administration.

8 -- HAE SAN JIN 6, 19-day operation conducted by 26th ROK Regt, terminates (En: 107 KIA, 23 Det, 48 I/W, 9 C/S; Frd: 6 KIA, 20 WIA).

-- GEN R.E. Haines, CINCUSARPAC, arrives in RVN for 8-day visit.

10 -- Operation LE LOI I terminates in I CTZ (En: 695 KIA, 17 Det, 14 I/W, 28 C/S; Frd: 103 KIA, 398 WIA).

11 -- LTG Frederick C. Weyand, USA, named as Military Advisor to US negotiating team in Paris.

14 -- Last contingent of Thai Black Panthers arrives in RVN. Thai strength in RVN now approximately 11,250.

15 -- NFLSVN-announced 7-day cease fire commences at 0700.

-- Units of VNMC discover cache 10 km northwest of Minh Thanh, Binh Long Province. Cache includes 213 I/W and 61 C/S, numerous rockets, mortar ammunition, and various other war material. Largest cache to date discovered by RVNAF.

16 -- Phase II of TOAN THANG Offensive, which began on 1 June 1968, terminates: Phase III of the combined operation involving ARVN and FWMAF in III CTZ commences (En: 25,248 KIA, 10,724 Det, 10,285 I/W, 2,307 C/S; Frd: 1,798 KIA, 10,465 WIA).

-- GVN announces temporary cessation of offensive operations from 161800 to 171800.

17 -- Enemy attacks FSB CUNNINGHAM with 13 sappers utilizing RPG, satchel charges, mines, and grenades. All sappers killed outside perimeter. Ground attack follows by enemy force using small arms and automatic weapons (En: 37 KIA, 8 I/W, 3 C/S, assorted small arms ammo and 2 radios; Frd: 4 KIA, 40 WIA).

-- Operation GREENE THUNDER in Pleiku Province terminates (En: 106 KIA, 1 I/W, miscellaneous rockets and ammunition; Frd: 20 KIA, 50 WIA).

-- GVN and FW 24-hour cessation of offensive operations terminates at 1800. Ninety-three significant enemy violations (casualties incurred) of the cease fire noted.

-- ADM J. J. Hyland, CINCPACFLT arrives in RVN for 2-day visit.

18 -- President Nixon announces that MG C. A. Corcoran, CofS MACV, will replace LTG W. R. Peers as CG, I FFORCEV. MG Corcoran will be promoted to LTG.

20 -- 2d Bde, 9th Inf Div engages enemy in day-long contact 12 miles east-southeast of Ben Tre, Kien Hoa Province (En: 99 KIA, 7 I/W; Frd: 6 KIA, 8 WIA).

22 -- FSB DIAMOND, 8 km southwest of Go Dau Ha, Tay Ninh Province receives ground attack from unknown size enemy force (En: 125 KIA, 16 I/W, 3 C/S; Frd: 15 KIA, 12 WIA, 1 MIA).

-- Company from 9th Regt, 3d Mar Div, conducting sweep operations south-southeast of Quang Tri City, engages estimated enemy battalion positioned in large bunker complex. Marines are supported by artillery and tactical air (En: 105 KIA; Frd: 10 KIA, 51 WIA).

23 -- Enemy launches series of indirect fire harassing attacks against more than 100 cities and bases throughout RVN. Several attacks-by-fire are accompanied by ground attacks of varying intensity. Seven 122mm rocket rounds impact in Saigon; first rocket attack against Saigon since 1 November 1968.

-- Thai elements and elements of 11th Armd Cav Regt and MP forces make contact with enemy 2 km east of Long Binh Post, Bien Hoa Province (En: 244 KIA, 60 Det, 190 I/W, 14 C/S; Frd: 12 KIA, 105 WIA).

-- During early morning hours, estimated two battalion enemy force enters outskirts of Tam Ky, Quang Tin Province, and secures the high ground to ambush relief columns. ARVN and US elements attack (En: 107 KIA; Frd: 5 KIA, 104 WIA).

24 -- GEN J. J. Nazzaro, CINCPACAF, arrives in RVN for 4-day visit.

25 -- Elements of 41st ARVN Ranger Bn with four RF companies and one troop of 3/12 Cav (ARVN) in Operation QUYET THANG 44/12 make contact with two VC companies 6 km northwest of Chau Duc City (En: 187 KIA, 17 Det, 21 I/W, 2 C/S; Frd: 3 KIA, 52 WIA).

-- MG R. A. Hay replaces MG A. L. MacDonald as Cdr, Australian Task Force.

-- Elements of armd cav of Americal Div and ARVN 6th Regt, 2d Inf Div, engage unknown size enemy force 5 km south of Tam Ky (En: 157 KIA, 5 I/W, 4 C/S; Frd: 2 KIA, 13 WIA).

-- Captured letter from VC cadre labels enemy's present activities as an "all-out offensive and uprising."

26 -- Enemy again conducts number of indirect fire harassing attacks against FW/RVN units and installations in all four CTZs in fourth day of current offensive. Population centers also receive indirect fire attacks. Approximately 50 locations, country-wide, are attacked. Several enemy ground probes also reported.

27 -- RADM W. R. Flanagan assumes duties of COMRIVFLOT ONE/COMRIVSUPPRON SEVEN/CTF 117.

-- Ammunition-laden LCU explodes in loading area in Danang. One LCU, one YFU, and two buildings destroyed, loading area receives heavy damage, and LCU receives moderate damage, one 25-ton crane severely damaged and 344 tons of ammunition destroyed (Frd: 8 KIA, 58 WIA, 20 MIA). Cause of explosion is undetermined.

28 -- Operation NEVADA EAGLE, a multi-battalion search and clear operation conducted by the 101st Abn Div (Ambl) and the 3d Bde, 82d Abn Div, 15 km southwest of Hue, Thua Thien Province terminates. Operation commenced 17 May 1968 (En: 3,299 KIA, 5,292 Det, 3,379 I/W, 322 C/S; Frd: 205 KIA, 1,822 WIA).

-- Operation VERNON LAKE II, a multi-battalion search and clear operation conducted in Quang Ngai Province by 11th Lt Inf Bde terminates. Operation commenced 2 November 1968 (En: 455 KIA, 181 Det, 140 I/W, 5 C/S; Frd: 23 KIA, 158 WIA).

-- Operation FAYETTE CANYON, a multi-battalion search and clear operation conducted in Quang Nam Province by 196th Lt Inf Bde, terminates. Operation commenced 15 December 1968 (En: 327 KIA, 43 Det, 52 I/W, 14 C/S; Frd: 2 KIA, 17 WIA).

-- Operation SCOTLAND II, a multi-battalion search and clear operation conducted in Quang Tri Province by 3d Mar Div, terminates. Operation commenced 15 April 1968 (En: 3,311 KIA, 384 Det, 968 I/W; Frd: 463 KIA, 2,555 WIA).

-- Operation KENTUCKY, a multi-battalion search and clear operation conducted in Quang Tri Province by 3d Mar Div, terminates. Operation commenced 31 October 1967 (En: 3,921 KIA, 680 Det, 922 I/W, 210 C/S; Frd: 520 KIA, 3,079 WIA).

-- Elements of 9th Regt, 3d Mar Div find two caches 50 km south-southwest of Quang Tri City. Caches are estimated to weigh approximately 350 tons, 90 percent of which are new weapons and munitions. Largest quantity of weapons and munitions captured in any one area to date.

-- US military strength in RVN is 541,847.

MARCH

1 -- 1,005 Hoi Chanh reported for week ending 1 March. Highest number in one week since March 1967.

-- Elements of the 3d Bn, 503d Abn Inf find cache containing 346 tons of rice 23 km south-southeast of Bao Loc, Lam Dong Province.

2 -- BG J. N. McLaughlin, USMC, assumes duties as Acting MACJ3.

-- First of four consecutive Sunday village and hamlet elections held. Nearly 90 percent of registered voters turn out to elect 692 village and 233 hamlet officials. VC harassment is light with few elections postponed for security reasons.

3 -- MG E. C. Townsend, USA, assumes duties as CofS, MACV.

-- Ben Het CIDG Camp receives ABF followed by ground attack. Ten tanks (USSR PT-76) and six trucks support ground forces. Six vehicles and two tanks destroyed. First use of armor by enemy in II CTZ and first use in RVN since 7 Feb 68.

4 -- ARVN Campaign QUYET CHIEN (IV CTZ) terminates. Campaign began 17 July 1968 (En: 15,953 KIA, 15,832 Det; Frd: 2,402 KIA, 11,181 WIA, 162 MIA).

5 -- Assassination attempt directed against GVN Prime Minister Tran Van Huong in downtown Saigon. PM escapes injury; two suspects detained.

-- 100,000th Hoi Chanh returns to GVN cause.

-- Elements of 9th Mar Regt discover another significant enemy munitions cache (55 tons) 30 miles south-southwest of Quang Tri City. Total amount of weapons and munitions captured by 9th Marines since 21 Feb is 435 tons.

-- 2d Bde, 25th Inf Div makes contact with estimated NVA battalion on 4 March and an unknown-size NVA force on 5 March 8 km northeast of Trang Bang, Hau Nghia Province (En: 179 KIA, 59 I/W, 8 C/S; Frd: 11 KIA, 33 WIA).

-- RADM J. G. Dillon assumes command of 3d Nav Const Bde.

6 -- SECDEF Melvin R. Laird arrives in RVN for four-day visit.

-- President Nixon announces appointment of LTG R. E. Cushman, USMC, CG, III MAF, as Deputy Director, CIA.

-- Enemy again launches indiscriminate attack by 122mm rocket fire against Saigon, the third such attack since the start of the current offensive. Six rounds impact into I, IV, and IX Precincts, killing 22 VN civilians and wounding 43.

-- Elements of 1st Bde, 4th Inf Div, while in night defensive positions 42 km west of Kontum City, attacked by estimated NVA battalion (En: 112 KIA, 20 I/W, 3 C/S; Frd: None).

8 -- Elements of 1st Bde, 1st Cav Div (Ambl), in night defensive positions 6 km northeast of Phu Khuong, Tay Ninh Province, attacked by estimated NVA battalion (En: 154 KIA, 23 I/W, 8 C/S; Frd: 11 KIA, 30 WIA).

-- Operation TAYLOR COMMON, a multi-battalion search and clear operation controlled by the 1st Mar Div, terminates. Operation began on 7 December 1968 and was centered in an area 17 km west-southwest of An Hoa, Quang Nam Province (En: 1,398 KIA, 322 Det, 610 I/W, 23 C/S; Frd: 156 KIA, 1,327 WIA).

-- Marines of the 9th Regt discover additional arms and munitions caches 49 km south-southwest of Quang Tri City. Total amount of weapons and ammunition captured by 9th Marines since 21 February is 452 tons.

9 -- VC release Renate Kuhnen, German nurse captured 3 March 1968 in Kontum.

-- Elections held in 563 hamlets and 193 villages throughout RVN. Nine hamlet and 4 village elections postponed. VC harassment is light and ineffective. Preliminary reports indicate voter turnout is in excess of 90 percent.

-- SECDEF Laird presents Presidential Unit Citation to 1st ARVN Div for operations during the period 1 Jan 67 to 25 Feb 68.

10 -- Operation QUYET THANG 22, a combat operation in Quang Ngai Province, terminates. Operation commenced 24 February under OPCON 2d ARVN Div and included the 5th ARVN Regt and 11 RF companies (En: 777 KIA, 19 Det, 105 I/W, 18 C/S; Frd: 107 KIA, 311 WIA, 2 MIA).

12 -- President Nixon announces General A. J. Goodpaster, DEPCOMUSMACV, will assume duties as Supreme Allied Command Europe/Commander, US European Command.

-- Four US Army airmen released by RKG. Men captured by VC on 12 February in Tay Ninh Province after reconnaissance plane downed by ground fire.

14 -- LTG C. A. Corcoran, USA, assumes duties as CG, I FFORCEV.

15 -- COL L. G. Hill, Jr., USA, assumes duties as MACV CINFO.

-- BG J. G. Wheelock, III, USA, assumes duties as MACJ3.

16 -- MG R. C. Conrey, USA, assumes duties as MACJ4.

-- Enemy conducts 65 mortar and rocket attacks on military installations and population centers in South Vietnam. Highest number of attacks since first day of current offensive. Seven 122mm rockets land in Saigon area.

-- Elements of 196th Inf Bde discover 40 mass graves containing 152 enemy bodies 15 km west of Tam Ky, Quang Tin Province. Enemy had been killed approximately four days earlier by artillery, air strikes, and small arms.

-- Elections held in 182 villages and 747 hamlets th: ughout RVN, out of a total of 194 villages and 800 hamlets scheduled. No reports of VC interference. Voter turnout in excess of 92 percent reported.

18 -- Operation DEWEY CANYON, a multi-battalion search and clear operation under the control of 3d Mar Div and centered in an area 47 km south-southwest of Quang Tri City, terminates (En: 1,355 KIA, 14 Det, 1,126 I/W, 215 C/S; Frd: 121 KIA, 803 WIA).

22 -- Elements of 2d Bn, 3d Mar Regt participating in Operation MAINE CRAG discover enemy cache 17 km southeast of Khe Sanh, Quang Tri Province. Cache includes 356 tons of rice, 3.5 tons of salt, 100 lbs lard, 1 ton canned food, 1 ton powdered milk, 2.5 tons of TNT, 600 meters comm wire, 3 trucks, 44 122mm rockets, 9,044 rounds 82mm mortar, 587 rounds 60mm mortar, 3,503 rounds RPG, 7,500 rounds 12.7mm ammo, 100 rounds 57mm, 854,280 rounds small arms ammo, 339 I/W, and 13 C/S.

23 -- Village and hamlet elections held throughout RVN for fourth consecutive Sunday. A number of elections postponed due to VC activity but, where elections held, voter turnout is in excess of 90 percent. Elections held in 120 villages to elect 911 officials and in 1,479 hamlets to elect 1,535 officials. Since 2 March, total of 589 village elections held (4,663 officials elected) and total of 3,031 hamlet elections held (3,143 officials elected).

24 -- President Nixon announces that LTG W. R. Rosson will replace General Goodpaster as DEPCOMUSMACV and that MG J. J. Ewell, CG, 9th Inf Div, will replace LTG W. T. Kerwin, Jr, as CG, II FFORCEV.

25 -- President Thieu announces GVN "prepared to hold private face-to-face meetings with NLF."

-- 39th ARVN Rgr Bn in night defensive position 17 km west of Hoi An, Quang Nam Province attacked by estimated two enemy companies (En: 120 KIA, 12 I/W, 1 C/S; Frd: 5 KIA, 15 WIA).

-- Elements of 1st and 2d MSF Bns make contact with enemy 22 km northwest of Xuan Loc, Long Khanh Province (En: 190 KIA, 70-80 I/W destroyed; Frd: 29 KIA, 84 WIA, 36 MSF MIA).

26 -- NFLSVN rejects GVN offer of "private face-to-face talks".

-- LTG H. Nickerson, Jr. assumes duties of CG, III MAF.

27 -- Elements of 1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech) engage unknown-size NVA force 10 km northwest of Cam Lo (En: 120 KIA, 7 I/W, 3 C/S; Frd: 15 KIA, 30 WIA).

28 -- Elements of 1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech) engage unknown-size NVA force 10 km northwest of Cam Lo, Quang Tri Province (En: 68 KIA, 16 I/W; Frd: 1 KIA, 30 WIA). Enemy losses in last two days in this area total 188 KIA.

29 -- US KIA in Vietnam War surpass 33,629, number of KIA in Korean War.

-- 1,043 Hoi Chanh reported for period 23-29 March. Highest number for one week period since March 1967.

31 -- BG E. Bautz, Jr., USA, assumes duties as MACJ3.

-- US military strength in RVN is 540,306.

APRIL

1 -- Elements of 30th ROK Regt attack enemy force 24 km northwest of Phan Rang, Ninh Thuan Province (En: 92 KIA, 29 I/W; Frd: 1 WIA).

-- SECDEF announces B-52 strikes will be reduced from 1,800 to 1,600 per month due to reduction in defense spending.

2 -- MG H. W. Hollis, USA, assumes command of 9th Inf Div.

3 -- Operation MONTANA MAULER, a 12-day reconnaissance-in-force operation in Quang Tri Province conducted by 1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech), terminates (En: 271 KIA, 23 I/W, 6 C/S; Frd: 38 KIA, 218 WIA).

-- LTG J. J. Ewell, USA, assumes command of II FFORCEV.

5 -- Estimated NVA battalion attacks FSB occupied by element of 2d Bde, 25th Inf Div 11 km south of Go Dau Ha, Tay Ninh Province (En: 73 KIA, 10 I/W, 1 C/S; Frd: 4 KIA, 13 WIA).

-- Elements of 12th ARVN Armd Cav and 41st and 43d ARVN Rngr Bns make contact with enemy 32 km west-northwest of Mộc Hoa, Kien Tuong Province (En: 81 KIA, 3 Det, 410 I/W, 15 C/S, 200 cases of small arms ammunition, 3,000 grenades, 5 tons TNT, 45 lbs documents; Frd: 1 KIA, 12 WIA).

8 -- US Army Advisory Group, IV CTZ redesignated as Delta Military Assistance Command (DMAC); SA IV CTZ redesignated as Commanding General, Delta Military Assistance Command/Senior Advisor, US Army Advisory Group, IV CTZ (CG, DMAC).

11 -- The MACV and USASF Compounds in Tay Ninh City receive 40 107mm rockets. Ammunition storage areas at both locations are ignited. Casualties are: 30 RF KIA, 77 RF WIA, five civilians killed and nine wounded; 50 detainees, PWs, and draft dodgers in building were killed and eight wounded, 15 trucks and two gas tankers destroyed, 22,000 kilos of rice, 130,000 liters POL products, and an estimated 372 tons of ammunition (including more than 20,000 mortar and artillery rounds) also destroyed.

14 -- Operation WAYNE GRAY, a I FFORCEV-controlled operation which began on 1 March, terminates (En: 608 KIA, 16 Det, 98 I/W, 17 C/S; Frd: 99 KIA, 357 WIA, 6 MIA).

15 -- Patrol Base DIAMOND Number Three (elements of 2d Bn, 27th Inf), 10 km southwest of Go Dau Ha, Tay Ninh Province, receives indirect fire and ground attack (En: 198 KIA, 8 Det, 40 I/W, 42 C/S; Frd: 13 KIA, 9 WIA).

-- Operation DARBY TRAIL II, a I FFORCEV-controlled operation which began on 8 Feb, terminates (En: 181 KIA, 387 Det, 52 I/W; Frd: 5 KIA, 28 WIA).

-- Elements of 1st Bn, 501st Inf find munitions cache 17 km southeast of A Shau, Thua Thien Province. Cache is estimated at 9.5 tons and includes over 2,000 mortar rounds.

16 -- Elements of the 4th Bn, 23d Inf (Mech) in Operation TOAN THANG III find 93 NVA bodies in area 20 km northwest of Ben Soi, Tay Ninh Province. Enemy KIA by TACAIR strikes on 6 April.

-- RF elements, in a one day sector-controlled operation, discover PW camp 5 km northwest of Vung Liem, Vinh Long Province. Ninety-eight male and 19 female VC civilians are released.

17 -- USG formally recognizes RKG for first time since 1965. GVN simultaneously agrees to open discussions on disputed RVN-Cambodian boundaries.

19 -- RKG rejects US initiation to reestablish diplomatic relations.

20 -- Operation MUSKOGEE MEADOW, a multi-battalion search and clear operation conducted by elements of the 1st Mar Div centered in an area north of An Hoa, Quang Nam Province, terminates. Operation commenced on 7 April (En: 162 KIA, 52 Det, 18 I/W, 2 C/S; Frd: 16 KIA, 121 WIA).

21 -- VNAF plane with number of high-ranking persons aboard crashes and burns on takeoff from Vung Tau. Following persons are injured: Tran Ba Phuoc, VN Defense Minister; Paul Edmonds, NZ Ambassador to RVN; Anastacio Bartolome, Philippine Charge d'Affaires; and Paul Nur, RVN Minister for Ethnic Minorities.

25 -- Elements of 2d Bn, 17th Cav, participating in Operation KENTUCKY JUMPER, discover 42-ton munitions cache 22 km north-northwest of A Shau, Quang Tri Province.

-- Operation LAM SON 265, a combat operation conducted in Thua Thien Province by elements of the 3d ARVN Regt, terminates. Operation commenced 18 Sep 68 (En: 160 KIA, 20 Det; Frd: 22 KIA, 95 WIA).

-- Operation LAM SON 245, conducted in Thua Thien Province by elements of the 54th ARVN Regt and two RF Cos, terminates. Operation commenced 2 Aug 68 (En: 626 KIA, 608 Det; Frd: 37 KIA, 207 WIA).

26 -- In ceremonies at Can Tho, 6th Bn, 77th Arty completes turnover of equipment to 213th ARVN Arty Bn. This is first in a series of support and service units which will go through the same procedures as a part of the overall program of upgrading ARVN.

-- Fire support base occupied by element of 1st Bde, 25th Inf Div 20 km south of Tay Ninh City is attacked by estimated two enemy battalions. Ground assault preceded by heavy

indirect fire attack consisting of about 300 rounds of 82mm and 107mm mortar and rocket fire. Army artillery, helo gunships, AC-47 and AC-119 gunships, and TACAIR support (En: 213 KIA, 6 Det, 35 I/W, 15 C/S; Frd: 7 WIA).

-- A mechanized infantry element of the 3d Bde, 9th Inf Div engages unknown size enemy force while sweeping area 5 km southeast of Tan An (38 km south-southwest of Saigon) (En: 63 KIA, 4 I/W, 6 C/S; Frd: 2 KIA, 14 WIA).

-- Element of 44th ARVN Rngr Bn discovers PW camp 10 km east of Kien Long, Chuong Thien Province and liberates 71 VN PWs. Prisoners had been without food or water for three days.

27 -- Estimated enemy battalion assaults night defensive position of an element of the 2d Bde, 25th Inf Div, 10 km northeast of Trang Bang (En: 100 KIA, 1 Det, 32 I/W, 23 C/S; Frd: 10 KIA, 3 WIA).

-- Grass fire started by burning refuse from civilian trash disposal area goes out of control at 1045 and ignites a quantity of unservicable ammunition at ASP#1, Danang. Fire spreads to main ammunition storage and ammunition continues to explode until midnight when fire brought under control. Over 39,000 tons of ammunition destroyed; Hq, NMCB 5 is 50 percent destroyed; four buildings of III MAF transient facilities destroyed; numerous other buildings and three bulk fuel tanks collapsed from blast overpressure; 842 civilian houses are destroyed. US casualties are one killed and 14 injured. Value of ammunition destroyed is in excess of $103 million. Low casualties are due to prompt action by US forces to evacuate the area.

29 -- Element of 3d Bde, 101st Abn Div (Ambl) discovers significant enemy cache 39 km south west of Hue. Total weight of the cache is 32 tons and includes 20 tons of rice and 168 complete 122mm rockets.

30 -- US military strength in RVN is 543,482.

MAY

1 -- LTG Lee Sec Ho, former CO of 6th ROK Corps, assumes duties as Cdr, ROKFV.

-- LTG Rosson assumes duties as DEPCOMUSMACV. General Goodpaster departs RVN for Europe to assume duties as Commander, USEUCOM.

-- BG William E. Potts, USA, assumes duties as MACJ2.

-- Elements of 5th F.A, 2d ARVN Inf, engage enemy force 7 km northwest of Cam Lo, Quang Tri Province (En: 55 KIA, 4 I/W, 3 C/S, 2.5 tons of miscellaneous munitions and a hospital complex and two field kitchens destroyed; Frd: None).

-- MACV announces that counterfeit MPC have been detected in circulation in Saigon area.

2 -- Operation MAINE CRAG, a multi-battalion search and clear operation under the OPCON of the 3d Regt, 3d Mar Div and centered 6 miles south of Khe Sanh, Quang Tri Province,

terminates. Operation commenced 15 March (En: 157 KIA, 52 Det, 444 I/W, 21 C/S; Frd: 21 KIA, 134 WIA).

5 -- An element of the 1st Bde, 1st Cav Div (Ambl) in night defensive position 11 km south of Katum, Tay Ninh Province receives ground attack from unknown size NVA force. Unreported number of enemy penetrate the defenses but are driven out (En: 101 KIA, 29 Det, 48 I/W, 23 C/S; Frd: 9 KIA, 62 WIA).

6 -- President Nixon nominates MG Melvin Zais for promotion to LTG and announces he will replace LTG R.G. Stilwell as XXIV Corps Commander.

-- A US Army CH-47 helicopter transporting ARVN troops experiences an inflight mechanical failure and crashes in an area 3 miles southwest of Phuoc Binh, Phuoc Long Province. The aircraft is destroyed, 32 ARVN soldiers are killed and 34 others are injured in the crash. Two US personnel are killed and one is injured.

8 -- Operation MASSACHUSETTS STRIKER, a clear and search operation which commenced on 1 March and was conducted in Thua Thien Province, terminates (En: 176 KIA, 2 Det, 859 I/W, 34 C/S; Frd: 72 KIA, 259 WIA).

-- Operation PURPLE MARTIN, a clear and search operation which commenced 23 February and was conducted in Quang Tri Province, terminates (En: 252 KIA, 6 Det, 192 I/W, 10 C/S; Frd: 79 KIA, 268 WIA, 1 MIA).

9 -- GVN announces it will observe 24-hour cessation of offensive operations on 30 May in observance of Buddha's Birthday.

-- Element of 5th Regt, 1st Mar Div engages an estimated 400-600 enemy in an area 10 km northeast of An Hoa, Quang Nam Province. Tactical air and artillery support (En: 239 KIA, 3 Det, 44 I/W, 3 C/S; Frd: 23 KIA, 58 WIA).

-- Elements of 3d Bde, 25th Inf Div engage unknown size enemy force 8 km southeast of Dau Tieng, Binh Duong Province (En: 102 KIA, 1 Det, 8 I/W, 1 C/S; Frd: 2 KIA, 9 WIA). A 24-ton rice cache is also captured.

10 -- General R.E. Haines, Jr., CINCUSARPAC, arrives in RVN for six-day visit.

-- Operation APACHE SNOW, a multi-regimental US/ARVN operation with 3d Mar Div units operating in the Da Krong Valley and 101st Abn Div (Ambl) and 1st ARVN Div units operating in the A Shau Valley, commences. Units in the Da Krong Valley will interdict enemy LOCs from the Laotian Border; forces in the A Shau Valley will destroy enemy caches, forces, and installations and reduce enemy infiltration into RVN.

11 -- Element of 1st Bn, 4th ARVN Inf Div, while on search and clear mission 20 km northwest of Duc Pho, Quang Ngai Province, finds 40 enemy bodies killed by B-52 strike on 9 May.

-- COMUSMACV departs for Washington for consultation with President Nixon.

12 -- Enemy greatly increases number of indirect fire harassing attacks with 159 attacks reported during night of 11-12 May. Of these, 70 are considered significant. Several of the indirect fire attacks against US forces are followed by ground attacks or probes. Casualties and damage at US installations are reported as light. Locations receiving attacks by fire include Hue, Saigon, Danang, and Long Binh.

-- Elements of 39th ARVN Rgr Bn and 21st ARVN Rgr Bn are attacked by enemy force 17 km northeast of An Hoa, Quang Nam Province (En: 116 KIA, 1 Det, 32 I/W, 7 C/S; Frd: 6 KIA, 15 WIA).

-- An element of the 3d Bde, 1st Cav Div (Ambl) occupying night defensive position in a fire support base 22 km southeast of Katum, Tay Ninh Province receives more than 200 rounds of mixed 82mm mortar and 107mm rocket fire followed by a ground assault by an unknown size enemy force. Some of the enemy penetrate a portion of the perimeter but are killed or repulsed (En: 72 KIA; Frd: 7 KIA, 35 WIA).

-- A mechanized infantry element of the 3d Bde, 9th Inf Div engages an estimated enemy battalion while sweeping an area 6 km northwest of Tan An, Long An Province. Troopers are supported by helicopter gunships, artillery, and TACAIR (En: 83 KIA, 6 I/W, 12 C/S; Frd: 2 KIA, 33 WIA).

-- Elements of the 3d Regt, 1st ARVN Inf Div find a 71.6-ton cache 48 km southeast of Khe Sanh, Quang Tin Province. Cache includes one 122mm howitzer, 20 tons of mixed SA ammo, 8 60mm mortars, 8 Molotova trucks, 50 bicycles, and 78 I/W.

13 -- Elements of the 2d Bde, 25th Inf Div while sweeping an area 15 km northeast of Trang Bang, Hau Nghia Province, make contact with unknown size enemy force in fortified positions (En: 50 KIA, 18 I/W, 8 C/S; Frd: 3 KIA).

14 -- SECSTATE William P. Rogers arrives in RVN for three-day visit.

-- Admiral J.S. McCain, Jr., CINCPAC, arrives in RVN for one-day visit.

-- Elements of the 3d Bde, 101st Abn Div (Ambl) engage an unknown size NVA force while sweeping an area 47 km west-southwest of Hue (En: 53 KIA; Frd: 1 KIA, 18 WIA).

-- An infantry element, reinforced by mechanized infantry troopers from the 2d Bde, 25th Inf Div, sweeping an area 16 km west of Ben Cat, Binh Duong Province, observe and attack an unknown size NVA force (En: 34 KIA, 13 I/W, 3 C/S; Frd: None).

-- An element of the 1st Bde, 25th Inf Div in night defensive positions 7 km northwest of Dan Tieng, Binh Duong Province receives ground attack by unknown size NVA force (En: 51 KIA, 4 Det, 17 I/W, 6 C/S; Frd: 2 KIA, 3 WIA).

15 -- LTG W.B. Rosson, DEPCOMUSMACV, is promoted to General.

-- An element of the 3d Bde, 101st Abn Div (Ambl) contacts and engages an unknown size NVA force while sweeping an area 48 km west-southwest of Hue (En: 74 KIA; Frd: 1 KIA, 47 WIA).

16 -- Two 82-foot Coast Guard cutters, the Point League and the Point Garnet, are transferred to the Vietnamese Navy in ceremonies in Saigon. These are the first USCG ships to be turned over to RVN.

18 -- An element of the 3d Bde, 101st Abn Div (Ambl) engages an unknown size NVA force occupying fortified positions 48 km west-southwest of Hue (En: 125 KIA; Frd: 12 KIA, 79 WIA).

-- A Marine F-4 Phantom collides in mid-air with a Marine KC-130 refueler transport aircraft refueling two other Marine F-4s over the South China Sea about 12 km northwest of Phu Bai, Thua Thien Province. One of the refueling F-4s disengages and returns safely to base. The other refueling F-4 is damaged by fragments from the collision but disengages and the crew ejects and is rescued. The KC-130 and the F-4 which collided both crash.

20 -- SECNAV J. F. Chafee arrives in RVN for seven-day visit.

-- Operation DONG BO 7, conducted by the 30th Regt, 9th ROK Div, in II CTZ, terminates (En: 155 KIA, 1 Det, 7 Ret, 54 I/W, 4 C/S; Frd: 3 KIA, 1 WIA).

-- Operation DARING REBEL, a search and clear operation which commenced on 5 May, terminates. The operation was centered in an area 20 miles south-southwest of Danang and involved US and ROK Marines and ARVN forces. US forces account for 105 enemy KIA. US Casualties are 2 KIA, and 59 WIA.

-- Elements of the 3d Bde, 101st Abn Div (Ambl) and an element of the 3d Regt, 1st ARVN Inf Div seize Hill 937 (Hamburger Hill) in A Shau Valley after three major engagements on 18, 19, and 20 May (En: 629 KIA, 2 Det, 143 I/W and C/S; Frd: 55 KIA, 307 WIA, 3 MIA).

22 -- Troopers from the 3d Bde, 101st Abn Div (Ambl), operating in Operation APACHE SNOW, discover the bodies of 53 NVA soldiers while searching enemy positions on Hill 937. The enemy apparently had been killed by recent fighting in the area.

-- An element of the 1st Bde, 9th Inf Div engages an estimated enemy battalion while sweeping an area 14 km west of Cai Be, Dinh Tuong Province. Infantry men are supported by helicopter gunships and artillery (En: 117 KIA, 21 I/W; Frd: 4 WIA).

23 -- SECAF R. C. Seamans, Jr., arrives in RVN for three-day visit.

24 -- An element of the 1st Bde, 1st Inf Div engages an unknown enemy force 8 km west-southwest of An Loc, Binh Long Province (En: 96 KIA, 1 Det; Frd: 2 KIA, 46 WIA).

-- An element of the 2d Bde, 9th Inf Div engages an estimated enemy platoon 10 km northwest of Ben Tre, Kien Hoa Province. An infantry element of the brigade reinforces and helicopter gunships support (En: 92 KIA; Frd: 4 WIA).

25 -- Colonel B. C. Babbitt, USA, assumes duties as Staff Judge Advocate.

-- MG J. M. Wright, Jr., assumes command of the 101st Abn Div (Ambl).

-- NFLSVN announces 48-hour cease fire for Buddha's Birthday commencing 290700H.

-- An element of the 2d Bde, 1st Cav Div (Ambl) discovers a significant enemy cache while sweeping an area 24 km southeast of Katum, Tay Ninh Province. Cache includes over 60 tons of food and seven tons of munitions.

26 -- The 22d ARVN Rngr Bn, the 2d Bn, 42d ARVN Inf, and the 1st and 2d MSF Bns engage enemy in five separate actions during the period 19-26 Jun (En: 209 KIA; Frd: 29 KIA, 260 WIA, 11 MIA).

-- While sweeping an area 10 km southwest of Dak To, the 11th ARVN Rgr Bn attacks an estimated reinforced enemy company. Artillery, gunships and TACAIR support (En: 262 KIA, 4 I/W, 1 C/S; Frd: 1 KIA, 14 WIA).

28 -- Operation LE LOI IV, conducted by the 21st and 37th ARVN Rgr Bns in Quang Nam Province, terminates. Operation commenced on 27 Feb (En: 688 KIA, 7 Det; Frd: 97 KIA, 461 WIA).

29 -- NFLSVN-announced 48-hour cease fire commences at 0700H.

-- Element of the 3d Bde, 25th Inf Div engages unknown size enemy force 12 km northeast of Trang Bang, Hau Nghia Province. Troopers are supported by Army helicopter gunships, artillery, and TACAIR (En: 59 KIA, 30 I/W, 13 C/S; Frd: 1 KIA, 4 WIA).

-- Operation OKLAHOMA HILLS, a multi-battalion search and clear operation centered in an area 33 km southwest of Danang, terminates. Operation was controlled by the 7th Regt, 1st Mar Div and commenced on 31 Mar (En: 596 KIA, 198 Det, 167 I/W, 45 C/S; Frd: 53 KIA, 487 WIA).

30 -- GVN-announced 24-hour cessation of offensive operations commences at 0600H.

31 -- The 6th Bn, 77th Arty, which turned its equipment over to the ARVN on 26 April, is deactivated.

-- GVN-announced 24-hour cessation of offensive operations terminates at 0600H. A total of 158 incidents (85 significant) are recorded during this period.

-- NFLSVN-announced 48-hour cease fire terminates at 0700H.

-- RF elements, supported by US helicopters, attack an estimated enemy company 14 km northwest of Kien Dinh, Kien Giang Province (En: 45 KIA; Frd: None).

-- Element of the 2d Bde, 4th Inf Div engages unknown size enemy force 10 km northwest of Plei Mrong, Pleiku Province (En: 88 KIA; Frd: 10 KIA, 21 WIA).

-- Operation SPEEDY EXPRESS, the dry season campaign in IV CTZ, terminates. Operation commenced on 1 Dec 68 under OPCON of CG, DMAC (En: 10,899 KIA, 2,579 Det, 688 I/W, 60 C/S; Frd: 242 KIA, 2,385 WIA, 10 MIA).

-- US military strength in RVN is 540,429.

JUNE

1 -- BG J. V. Galloway assumes command of USA Element, USMACV.

-- MG L. B. Ramsey assumes command of the Americal Division.

2 -- One 122mm rocket impacts in Saigon's 4th Precinct and one impacts in the 9th Precinct. Two VN civilians are killed and 25 are wounded; four civilian homes are destroyed and seven others are damaged.

-- Hoi Chanh for 1969 reach 18,748 and now exceed the 1968 total of 18,171.

5 -- An element of the 1st Bde, 25th Inf Div ambushes an unknown size enemy force 12 km northwest of Go Dau Ha, Tay Ninh Province. Army helicopter gunships, artillery, and TACAIR support (En: 45 KIA, 7 I/W, 2 C/S; Frd: 1 KIA, 14 WIA, 3 MIA).

-- An element of the 2d Bde, 25th Inf Div and an element of the 49th Regt, 25th ARVN Inf Div engage an unknown size enemy force while sweeping an area 10 km northeast of Trang Bang, Hau Nghia Province (En: 72 KIA, 3 Det, 24 I/W, 4 C/S; Frd: 7 KIA, 23 WIA).

6 -- A mechanized infantry element from the 1st Bde, 1st Inf Div contacts and engages an estimated enemy company 5 km northwest of An Loc, Binh Long Province. Artillery, helicopter gunships, and TACAIR support (En: 115 KIA, 9 Det, 26 I/W, 10 C/S; Frd: 3 KIA, 13 WIA).

-- An element of the 5th ARVN Abn Div in night defensive position 10 km southwest of Tay Ninh City receives a ground attack (En: 60 KIA, 21 I/W, 10 C/S; Frd: 22 WIA).

-- FSB CROOK, 22 km northwest of Ben Soi, Tay Ninh Province, and occupied by an element of the 1st Bde, 25th Inf Div, receives a ground attack (En: 76 KIA, 2 Det, 17 I/W; Frd: 1 KIA, 2 WIA).

7 -- General J. J. Nazzaro, CINCPACAF arrives in RVN for four day visit.

-- FSB CROOK receives an attack-by-fire followed by another ground attack. TACAIR, gunships, and artillery support (En: 323 KIA, 10 Det, 39 I/W, 4 C/S; Frd: 2 WIA). Enemy unit is identified as the 9th VC Div. This raises to 399 the number of enemy killed in last two days.

-- Mechanized infantrymen from the 1st Bde, 1st Inf Div and troopers from the 11th ACR, in tanks and APCs, engage an estimated two NVA companies while sweeping an area 6 km southwest of An Loc, Binh Long Province (En: 95 KIA, 27 I/W, 12 C/S; Frd: 3 KIA, 7 WIA).

-- Operation APACHE SNOW, a multi-regiment operation centered in an area 50 km west-southwest of Hue, terminates. The 9th Regt, 3d Mar Div and the 3d Bde, 101st Abn Div (Ambl) participated in the operation which commenced on 10 May. An element of the 1st ARVN Div also participated (En: 977 KIA, 5 Det, 609 I/W, 143 C/S; Frd: 135 KIA, 733 WIA).

9 -- President Nixon, President Thieu, and General Abrams arrive at Midway Island for meeting. This is seventh meeting between US and GVN heads of state since 1961.

-- Elements of the 5th Regt, 1st Mar Div make contact with two groups of NVA northwest of An Hoa, Quang Nam Province (En: 155 KIA, 52 I/W, 1 C/S; Frd: 3 KIA, 19 WIA).

-- Mechanized infantry troops from the 1st Bde, 25th Inf Div contact and engage unknown size NVA force 18 km east of Tay Ninh City (En: 51 KIA; Frd: 3 KIA, 18 WIA).

10 -- President Nixon announces the redeployment of a division-equivalent of 25,000 US troops from RVN. Redeployment is to start within 30 days and is to be completed by 31 August.

-- Twenty-five river assault craft of River Assault Division 92 are turned over to the Vietnamese Navy during ceremonies held aboard APL-30. River Assault Squadron 9 and River Assault Division 92 are decomissioned.

-- NFLSVN announces establishment of a government called the "Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam".

-- A 4th Inf Div convoy travelling Highway 14 is ambushed 15 km north of Pleiku (En: 42 KIA, 4 I/W; Frd: 1 KIA, 1 WIA).

11 -- Prince Sihanouk announces RKG will reestablish diplomatic relations with USG at the charges d'affaires level.

-- DOD announces that troops to be redeployed will include combat units as well as support units.

13 -- DOD announces that major units departing RVN will be two brigades of the 9th Inf Div and RLT 9 of the 3d Mar Div.

14 -- Operation QUYET THANG 44/29, a combat operation conducted by ARVN and RF elements in Chau Doc Province, terminates (En: 153 KIA; Frd: 29 KIA, 88 WIA, 1 MIA).

15 -- A fire support base occupied by an element of the 3d Bde, 101st Abn Div (Ambl) located 44 km southwest of Hue receives a ground attack by an unknown size NVA force (En: 52 KIA, 3 Det, 8 I/W, 6 C/S; Frd: 7 WIA).

16 -- Five rounds of 122mm rocket impact 2 km west-northwest of Tan Son Nhut Air Base. No casualties or damage are reported as a result of the attack.

-- Elements of the RTAVF at BEARCAT receive an attack-by-fire followed by a heavy ground attack by an estimated enemy battalion. Artillery and gunships support (En: 212 KIA, 1 Det, 16 I/W, 20 C/S; Frd: 6 KIA, 34 WIA).

-- Long Binh airfield and heliport is officially dedicated as Sanford Army Airfield in memory of Major Jack W. Sanford, a highly decorated 1st Abn Bde pilot who gave his life in combat on 16 June 1965.

17 -- Admiral J.S. McCain, Jr., CINCPAC, arrives in RVN for two-day visit.

-- Elements of the 3d Regt, 3d Mar Div contact the enemy in five separate engagements in the general area 4 km southwest of Gio Linh, Quang Tri Province (En: 102 KIA, 25 I/W, 8 C/S; Frd: 17 KIA, 34 WIA).

18 -- B-52s mark the end of the fourth year of participation in the war.

19 -- Elements of the 1st Bde, 25th Inf Div, occupying a fire support base 10 km northwest of Tay Ninh City receive attack by fire followed by ground attack (En: 35 KIA, 6 Det, 9 I/W, 2 C/S; Frd: 14 WIA).

-- An element of the armored cavalry squadron of the 25th Inf Div, while sweeping an area 8 km southeast of Tay Ninh City, engages an unknown size enemy force. Gunships and artillery support throughout the day (En: 85 KIA; Frd: 2 KIA, 13 WIA, 1 MIA).

-- A company of the 6th ARVN Abn Bde makes contact with an unknown size enemy force 9 km southwest of Tay Ninh City. Two companies of the 6th ARVN Abn Bde, one company from the 6th VNMC Bn and one company from the 25th Inf Div reinforce (En: 101 KIA, 23 I/W, 24 C/S; Frd: 11 KIA, 95 WIA).

-- An enemy force, estimated to be from one to two companies, enter the north portion of Tay Ninh City. The enemy is engaged by RF elements and elements of the 8th ARVN Abn Bn supported by artillery and aerial rocket artillery. As a result of enemy action and action taken to dislodge the enemy, 200 houses are destroyed, 75-100 homes damaged, five civilians are killed and 73 civilians are wounded.

20 -- Landing Zone IKE, located 19 km south of Katum, Tay Ninh Province, and occupied by an element of the 1st Bde, 1st Cav Div (Ambl), receives an attack-by-fire followed by a ground attack by an estimated reinforced NVA battalion. Gunships and field artillery support (En: 90 KIA, 5 Det, 33 I/W, 21 C/S; Frd: 7 KIA, 18 WIA).

21 -- Operation PUTNAM PANTHER, a combat operation conducted by elements of the 4th Inf Div in Kontum Province, terminates (En: 250 KIA, 53 Det, 61 I/W, 3 C/S; Frd: 42 KIA, 238 WIA).

22 -- Admiral J. J. Hyland, CINCPACFLT, arrives in RVN for two-day visit.

-- Elements of the 21st ARVN Inf Div operating 11 km northwest of Kien Long, Chuong Thien Province contact unknown size enemy force. TACAIR, artillery, and gunships support (En: 98 KIA (25 KBA), 5 Det, 15 I/W; Frd: 2 KIA, 3 WIA).

23 -- Operation CAMERON FALLS, a multi-battalion search and clear operation which commenced on 29 May in an area 32 km west-southwest of Quang Tri City, terminates. The operation was under the control of the 9th Regt, 3d Mar Div (En: 120 KIA, 5 Det, 77 I/W, 8 C/S; Frd: 24 KIA, 137 WIA).

25 -- Sixty-four USN river gunboats are transferred to VNN. This represents largest single turnover of U.S. military hardware thus far in the war. Included in the transfer are 4 CCBs, 7 Mons, 35 ATCs, 16 ASPBs, and 2 refuelers.

-- BG A.H. Smith, Jr., assumes duties as MACVJ-1 and assumes command of the USA Element, USMACV.

26 -- The Ben Het CIDG Camp is shelled for the 19th consecutive day. A total of 1,539 rounds are received during this period. One rallier states that intentions are to destroy the camp to support the Paris conference. If Ben Het can be occupied, enemy will claim another Dien Bien Phu.

27 -- Elements of the 25th Inf Div engage the enemy in two separate contacts 13 km northeast of Tay Ninh City. Enemy unit is later identified as the 9th VC Div (En: 94 KIA, 30 I/W, 2 C/S; Frd: 2 KIA, 16 WIA).

-- A Mobile Strike Force Bn engages an unknown size enemy force in the Seven Mountains area of Chau Doc Province (En: 48 KIA; Frd: 9 WIA).

28 -- An element of the 2d Bde, 1st Cav Div (Ambl), while sweeping an area 28 km south-southwest of An Loc, Binh Long Province, discover the bodies of 54 enemy soldiers. The bodies appear to have been killed by artillery about one month ago.

-- A reconnaissance element of the 1st Mar Div observes an estimated 400 enemy in an area 18 km east of An Hoa, Quang Nam Province and calls in TACAIR strikes. The bodies of 40 enemy are counted in the area after the action.

-- Operation DAN QUYEN 41, an ARVN-controlled search and clear operation conducted in Kontum Province, terminates. Operation commenced on 8 June (En: 313 KIA, 6 Det; Frd: 31 KIA, 165 WIA).

29 -- Enemy continues to maintain pressure on the Ben Het CIDG Camp, but the intensity of the attacks decrease. The camp receives 21 rounds of 75mm recoilless rifle fire which kills three Allied soldiers and wounds three.

30 -- USN turns over to VNN the USS Coconino County (LST-603) in ceremonies at Guam, M.I. Ship is renamed VNS Vung Tau (HQ-503). This is the 167th naval craft transferred to VNN since June 1968.

-- Five AC-47 SPOOKY gunships are turned over to VNAF as part of the Improvement and Modernization Program.

-- Elements of the 1st Bde, 5th Inf Div at a fire support base 14 km south-southwest of Khe Sanh, Quang Tin Province receive an attack-by-fire followed by ground probe from unknown size NVA force (En: 31 KIA, 8 I/W, 5 C/S; Frd: 3 WIA).

-- Project MOOSE (Move Out Of Saigon Expeditiously) terminates. Over 13,000 personnel are moved out of the downtown Saigon area as a result of this program.

-- US military strength in RVN is 538,714.

JULY

1 -- General J. J. Nazzaro, CINCPACAF, arrives in RVN for three day visit.

-- BG E. P. Yates, USA, assumes duties as Director, MACV Construction Directorate.

-- A mechanized infantry element of the 1st Bde, 25th Inf Div operating in an area 13 km northeast of Tay Ninh City engages an unknown size enemy force. TACAIR, helicopter gunships, and field artillery support (En: 44 KIA, 11 I/W, 1 C/S; Frd: 1 KIA, 1 WIA).

2 -- An element of the 2d Bde, 1st Cav Div (Ambl), operating in an area about 10 km east of Phu Khuong, Quang Ngai Province engages an unknown size enemy force in fortified positions. Field artillery and TACAIR support (En: 32 KIA, 1 C/S; Frd: 5 WIA).

-- An element of the 11th Armd Cav Regt discovers an enemy tunnel complex 13 km southwest of Lai Khe, Binh Duong Province. Two enemy soldiers rally, and when a riot control agent is unsuccessful in emptying the tunnel, a tank is used to cave it in. The bodies of 25 enemy soldiers are found in a search of the complex. There are no US casualties.

5 -- Two rockets of unknown caliber impact 3 km east of the center of Saigon. One lands in the Saigon River and the other lands in a swampy area to the east of the river. Neither causes any damage or casualties.

-- River Assault Flotilla ONE and the 2d Bde, 9th Inf Div are awarded the Presidential Unit Citation for outstanding performance during the Tet Offensive of 1968.

6 -- The Nationalist Chinese-owned merchant ship Welfare hits a mine on the Nha Be River 13 km southeast of Saigon and sinks near the US Navy piers at Nha Be. Ship does not block the shipping channel. This is the first ship to be sunk in this area since August 1966. Several crewmen are slightly injured but there are no fatalities.

-- A person, claiming to be a VC captain, contacts a USN PBR and states he has 300 VC who want to Chieu Hoi. Arrangements are completed by 44th SZ and Border Control Center and by end of the day a total of 231 persons had crossed with a total of 108 individual and 14 crew served weapons. Incident occurs 18 km northwest of Tri Ton, Chau Doc Province.

8 -- The 3d Bn, 60th Inf, 3d Bde, 9th Inf Div, departs RVN for CONUS from Tan Son Nhut AB. These are the first troops to leave country as part of the 25,000 troop reduction, announced at the Midway Conference, to be effected before 31 August. The unit will move to Fort Lewis, Washington for inactivation at a later date.

9 -- Operation UTAH MESA, a multi-battalion search and clear operation under control of the 3d Mar Div, terminates. Operation was conducted in an area centered 6 km northwest of Khe Sanh, Quang Tri Province (En: 309 KIA, 7 Det, 114 I/W, 31 C/S; Frd: 35 KIA, 178 WIA).

10 -- Admiral J.S. McCain Jr., CINCPAC, arrives in RVN for two-day visit.

11 -- GVN President Nguyen Van Thieu calls for a national vote to settle the war and offers participation to all political parties and groups if they renounce violence and pledge to accept election results.

13 -- Marines of the 9th RLT begin redeploying to Okinawa as part of the 25,000 man Phase I troop reduction.

15 -- GVN announces that more than 1,000 dissident soldiers have rallied to the government since 25 June. The 600 KKK and 400-500 Hoa Hao who rallied piecemeal over the last three weeks have been officially accepted by the Ministry of Chieu Hoi as ralliers.

16 -- CJCS General Wheeler and CINCPAC Admiral McCain arrive in RVN for four-day visit.

-- Operation VIRGINIA RIDGE, a search and clear operation conducted by elements of the 3d and 9th Regts, 3d Mar Div, terminates. Operation commenced on 1 May 1969 and was centered in an area 7 km west-northwest of Cam Lo, Quang Tri Province (En: 560 KIA, 17 Det, 141 I/W, 34 C/S; Frd: 106 KIA, 490 WIA).

-- Operation HERKIMER MOUNTAIN, a search and clear operation conducted by elements of the 4th Regt, 3d Mar Div, terminates. Operation commenced on 9 May and was centered 15 km north-northwest of Khe Sanh, Quang Tri Province (En: 137 KIA, 66 Det, 34 I/W, 6 C/S; Frd: 25 KIA, 219 WIA).

18 -- Mechanized infantrymen of the 25th Inf Div engage unknown size enemy force 10 km north-northwest of Tay Ninh City (En: 27 KIA; Frd: None).

19 -- Elements of the 2d Bde, 25th Inf Div, engage an unknown number of enemy 10 km northeast of Trang Bang, Hau Nghia Province. Artillery, LFT, and TACAIR support (En: 47 KIA, 10 Det, 17 I/W, 10 C/S; Frd: None). Enemy unit is later identified as a NVA element of the 9th VC Div.

-- Elements of the 2d ARVN Inf, operating in an area 32 km southwest of Quang Tri, find 15 bunkers containing 680 cases of small arms ammunition and 1,950 rounds of mixed RR, mortar, and rocket ammo. Total weight of the cache is 36.2 tons. Cache and bunkers are destroyed.

20 -- John E. Kirk assumes duties as Science Advisor to COMUSMACV.

-- Elements of the 32d ARVN Inf make contact with an estimated enemy company 14 km east-southeast of Thanh Tri, Ba Xuyen Province (En: 36 KIA, 1 Det, 3 I/W; Frd: None).

-- Operation HAE SAN JIN 9, a combat operation conducted by elements of the 26th ROK Regt in Phu Yen Province, terminates. Operation commenced on 7 July 1969 (En: 202 KIA, 73 I/W, 1 C/S; Frd: 8 KIA, 28 WIA).

-- Operation DO KAE BEE 13, a combat operation conducted by elements of the 9th ROK Div in Phu Yen Province, terminates. Operation commenced on 7 July 1969 (En: 136 KIA, 2 Det; Frd: 4 KIA, 25 WIA).

21 -- Elements of the 1st ARVN Div, while searching area 26 km southwest of Quang Tri, find 118 enemy bodies in graves.

-- Operation RUSSELL BEACH, a clear and search operation conducted by elements of the 198th Lt Inf Bde in Quang Ngai Province, terminates. Operation commenced on 13 January 1969 (En: 158 KIA, 211 Det, 55 I/W, 6 C/S; Frd: 58 KIA, 268 WIA).

26 -- A reconnaissance patrol from the 1st Bde, 4th Inf Div finds the bodies of 30 enemy soldiers while sweeping an area 25 km north-northeast of An Khe, Binh Dinh Province. Enemy were apparently killed by USAF TACAIR strikes. The bodies of 25 additional enemy soldiers also KBA were discovered on 25 July, raising to 55 the total of enemy KBA in this general area.

-- Operation JAE KOO 22, a search and clear operation conducted by the Capital ROK Inf Div in Binh Dinh Province, terminates. The operation commenced 21 July (En: 69 KIA; Frd: 2 WIA).

27 -- Helicopter gunships from the 1st Cav Div (Ambl) engage enemy in two contacts 30 km southwest of Song Be, Phuoc Long Province. Twenty-nine enemy are killed in the two engagements. There are no US casualties.

-- An element of the 2d Bde, 25th Inf Div engages an unknown size NVA force 5 km northeast of Trang Bang, Hau Nghia Province (En: 24 KIA, 14 I/W, 1 C/S; Frd: None).

28 -- Infantrymen of the 2d Bde, 25th Inf Div contact and engage an unknown size enemy force while sweeping an area 7 km northeast of Trang Bang, Hau Nghia Province. US forces are supported by helicopter gunships and artillery (En: 53 KIA, 3 Det, 28 I/W, 5 C/S; Frd: 3 KIA, 14 WIA).

-- Elements of the 1st Bn, 54th ARVN Inf make contact with an unknown size enemy force (En: 17 KIA, 21 I/W, 7 C/S; Frd: None).

29 -- CIDG elements contact and engage unknown size enemy force while sweeping an area 24 km west-southwest of Duc Hoa, Hau Nghia Province. Elements of the 3d Bde, 25th Inf Div reinforce (En: 63 KIA, 1 I/W, 1 C/S; Frd: 10 KIA, 12 WIA).

-- Helicopter gunships from the aviation battalion of the 25th Inf Div observe unknown size enemy force 30 km northeast of Tan An, Hau Nghia Province. Enemy is engaged with rocket and aerial MG fire (En: 20 KIA; Frd: None).

-- US Navy personnel from the destroyer USS Renshaw rescue five NVN fishermen from a sinking sampan in international waters, 25 miles northeast of Dong Hoi, NVN. Fishermen are taken to Danang pending disposition.

30 -- President Nixon arrives in RVN for discussions with President Thieu and with US embassy and military officials.

-- US Navy personnel from the destroyer USS Meredith rescue five NVN fishermen from three rafts adrift in international waters 70 miles north of Dong Hoi. A total of 10 NVN fishermen have been rescued in last two days.

31 -- LTG Chaveng Youncharoen assumes command of RTAVF.

-- US military strength in RVN is 537,914.

AUGUST

1 -- A ranger element from I FFORCEV TF SOUTH engages an unknown size enemy force 10 km northeast of Song Cau, Binh Thuan Province. Elements of the 44th ARVN Inf Regt reinforce (En: 24 KIA; Frd: 2 KIA, 12 WIA).

-- Combat elements of three battalions of the 31st ARVN Inf and an element of the 9th ARVN Cav continue contact with estimated enemy battalion 7 km east of Rach Gia, Kien Giang Province. Contact was first made with enemy on 30 July (En: 88 KIA, 4 Det, 19 I/W, 10 C/S; Frd: 12 KIA, 25 WIA).

2 -- Admiral John S. McCain, Jr., CINCPAC arrives in RVN for two-day visit.

-- Colonel Richard Taylor, USA, assumes duties as Command Surgeon.

-- Helicopter gunships from an air cavalry element of the 4th Inf Div observe an unknown size enemy force in an area 20 km north of An Khe in Binh Dinh Province. Enemy is engaged with aerial machine gun and rocket fire (En: 23 KIA; Frd: None).

3 -- Elements of the 3d Bde, 9th Inf Div, while sweeping an area 24 km west of Duc Hoa, Hau Nghia Province, engage an unknown size enemy force. Helicopter gunships and artillery support (En: 29 KIA, 7 Det, 6 I/W, 2 C/S; Frd: 4 WIA).

-- Operation BUN KAE 6, a search and clear operation conducted in Binh Dinh Province by elements of the Capital ROK Infantry Division, and which commenced 30 July, terminates (En: 59 KIA, 1 C/S; Frd: None).

-- A reconnaissance team from the 1st Cav Div (Ambl) engages an estimated enemy platoon 18 km southeast of Phuoc Binh, Phuoc Long Province (En: 23 KIA; Frd: None).

4 -- Dr. Norman Vincent Peale arrives in RVN for three-day visit.

-- Helicopter crewmen from an air cavalry element of the 4th Inf Div sight an unknown number of enemy soldiers 33 km north of An Khe, Binh Dinh Province. Helicopter gunships engage the enemy with aerial machine gun and rocket fire (En: 24 KIA; Frd: None).

-- Operation GREENE ORANGE III, an operation in support of pacification conducted by the 3d Bde, 4th Inf Div in Pleiku Province, terminates. Operation commenced on 5 May (En: 83 KIA, 51 Det; Frd: 3 WIA).

-- NVN releases three PWs (2 USN, 1 USAF) to a representative of a US anti-war organization in Hanoi.

5 -- An element of the 1st Bde, 25th Inf Div and an element of the 2d ARVN Abn Bn in a combined sweep 18 km northeast of Go Dau Ha, Tay Ninh Province, engage an unknown number of enemy (En: 35 KIA, 8 I/W; Frd: 1 KIA, 1 WIA).

6 -- General L.C. Chapman, Jr., Commandant, US Marine Corps, arrives in RVN for four-day visit.

7 -- A number of satchel charges, apparently placed by enemy sapper personnel who infiltrated the area over the beach, detonate within a US Army convalescent hospital at Cam Ranh Bay. Two US patients killed and 98 wounded. One hospital ward is destroyed and three are heavily damaged.

-- Operation DONG BO 2-18, a search and clear operation conducted in Ninh Thuan Province by elements of the 9th ROK Div, terminates. Operation commenced on 31 July (En: 106 KIA; Frd: None).

-- Enemy detonates estimated 60 pound charge in a small automobile outside the USAF language school in Saigon's 5th Precinct. Nine VN civilians and three VN military personnel are killed; 56 military (28 USAF) and six civilians are wounded. The school is heavily damaged; two nearby houses are destroyed.

-- An element of the 1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech) engages an estimated NVA company while sweeping an area 6 km west-southwest of Con Thien, Quang Tri Province (En: 56 KIA, 23 I/W, 3 C/S; Frd: 3 KIA, 13 [illegible]).

8 -- General Charles H. Bonesteel, III, CINCUNC/CG, 8th Army/CG, US Forces Korea, arrives in RVN for two-day visit.

-- Helicopter crewmen from an air cavalry element of the 11th Armd Cav Regt observe an unknown size enemy force in an area 15 km west of An Loc, Binh Long Province. The enemy is attacked with aerial machine gun and rocket fire and air cavalry troopers are air assaulted into the area (En: 38 KIA, 6 Det; Frd: None). Sixteen km to the north, helicopter gunship crewmen from an element of the 1st Cav Div (Ambl) observe an estimated 90 enemy in the open. The enemy is engaged with aerial rocket and machine gun fire (En: 25 KIA; Frd: None).

9 -- Department of the Army announces plans for the immediate inactivation of the 9th Inf Div. The 3d Bde, the only brigade of the 9th Inf Div remaining in RVN, will be redesignated.

-- An element of the 3d Regt, 3d Mar Div, finds an additional 20 bodies in an area where they had engaged an estimated two NVA companies on 7 August (En: 41 KIA; Frd: 4 KIA, 11 WIA).

-- An element of the 3d Regt, 3d Mar Div, 9 km north-northwest of the ROCKPILE, receives two small ground probes by an unknown size enemy force (En: 37 KIA; Frd: 19 KIA, 80 WIA). In action over the past two days in this general area, elements of the 9th Regt, 304th NVA Div have been identified. This makes the first appearance of elements of this regiment in RVN since the Battle of Khe Sanh which ended in April 1968.

10 -- General Bruce Palmer, Jr., Vice Chief of Staff, US Army, arrives in RVN for four-day visit.

-- An element of the 3d Regt, 3d Mar Div, in night defensive positions 9 km north-northwest of the ROCKPILE, are attacked by an unknown size NVA force employing automatic weapons, grenades, and satchel charges (En: 37 KIA; Frd: 19 KIA, 80 WIA).

-- An air cavalry troop of the 11th Armd Cav Regt observes and engages an estimated enemy company in the open 14 km northwest of Tuc Trung, Long Khanh Province (En: 31 KIA, 4 Det, 4 Hoi Chanh; Frd: 5 WIA).

11 -- COMUSMACV announces C-Day--the day for conversion to Series 681 Military Payment Certificates. This is the first conversion since 21 October 1968.

-- Enemy initiated activity picks up sharply in III CTZ. Action consists mainly of scattered shellings, including a two round rocket attack on Saigon.

-- Operation QT/21/31, a combat operation conducted by elements of the 21st ARVN Inf Div, 2 VNMC battalions, and RF elements in Chuong Thien Province, terminates. Operation commenced on 24 July 1969 (En: 198 KIA, 136 Det; Frd: 19 KIA, 46 WIA).

12 -- Enemy initiated activity increases sharply throughout the RVN. There are 149 attacks-by-fire recorded countrywide of which 68 are considered significant.

-- An element of the 11th Armd Cav Regt and an element of the 5th ARVN Inf Div in night defensive positions at a landing zone 6 km west-southwest of An Loc, Binh Long Province are attacked by an unknown size enemy force (En: 78 KIA, 2 Det; Frd: 2 US KIA, 2 US WIA).

-- An element of the 196th Bde, 23d Div, 30 km west of Tam Ky, Quang Tin Province is attacked by an unknown size enemy force (En: 50 KIA, 2 Det, 5 I/W; Frd: 4 WIA).

-- An element of the 1st Bde, 1st Cav Div (Ambl), in night defensive positions 11 km southeast of Katum, Tay Ninh Province, is attacked by an unknown size enemy force (En: 59 KIA, 4 C/S; Frd: 13 KIA, 42 WIA).

-- The base camp of the headquarters of the 3d Bde, 1st Cav Div (Ambl) and elements of the 11th Armd Cav Regt, 6 km northeast of An Loc, Binh Long Province, are attacked by an unknown size NVA force (En: 48 KIA, 7 Det; Frd: None). The enemy is later identified as elements of the 271st and 272d Regt, 9th VC Div.

-- An element of the 11th Armd Cav Regt is attacked by an unknown size enemy force while sweeping an area 7 km southwest of An Loc, Binh Long Province (En: 53 KIA; Frd: 1 KIA, 23 WIA, 3 MIA).

-- A mechanized infantry element of the 3d Bde, 1st Inf Div, providing security to a convoy on Highway 13 en route from Di An, Bien Hoa Province to Quan Loi, Binh Long Province, is attacked by an unknown size enemy force in an area 12 km south of An Loc (En: 61 KIA, 2 Det, 9 I/W, 3 C/S; Frd: 2 KIA, 2 WIA).

-- Elements of the 7th Regt, 1st Mar Div contact and engage an unknown size enemy force 6 km northwest of An Hoa, Quang Nam Province. A short distance to the east another element of the same unit engages an unknown number of enemy while sweeping the area (En: 169 KIA, 4 Det, 39 I/W, 13 C/S; Frd: 15 KIA, 101 WIA).

13 -- An element of the 11th Armd Cav Regt contacts and engages an unknown size enemy force while operating in an area 4 km west-southwest of Loc Ninh, Binh Long Province (En: 79 KIA, 27 I/W; Frd: 2 US KIA, 6 US WIA).

-- Operation DURHAM PEAK, a cordon and search operation conducted by elements of the 5th Regt, 1st Mar Div, in Quang Nam Province, terminates. Operation commenced on 20 July (En: 76 KIA, 8 Det, 70 I/W, 3 C/S; Frd: 16 KIA, 65 WIA).

-- Operation LAMAR PLAIN, a cordon and search operation conducted by elements of the 1st Bde 101st Abn Div (Ambl) in Quang Tin Province, terminates. Operation commenced on 16 May (En: 524 KIA, 433 Det, 2 Ret, 256 I/W, 62 C/S; Frd: 105 KIA, 332 WIA).

14 -- Elements of the 1st ARVN Abn Bn, in night defensive positions 8 km southwest of Tay Ninh City, are attacked by an unknown size enemy force (En: 73 KIA, 2 Det, 37 I/W, 10 C/S; Frd: 14 KIA, 43 WIA).

-- Operation KENTUCKY JUMPER, a multi-battalion search and clear operation conducted by elements of the 101st Abn Div (Ambl) in Thua Thien Province, terminates. Operation commenced on 1 March (En: 317 KIA, 489 Det, 5 Ret, 254 I/W, 55 C/S; Frd: 61 KIA, 409 WIA).

15 -- An element of the 1st Bde, 25th Inf Div and an element of the 25th ARVN Inf Div engage an unknown number of enemy 24 km west of Tay Ninh City (En: 31 KIA, 2 C/S; Frd: 1 US KIA, 1 WIA).

-- Operation MONTGOMERY RENDEZVOUS, a cordon and search operation conducted by elements of the 3d Bde, 101st Abn Div (Ambl) in Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces, terminates. Operation commenced on 8 June (En: 393 KIA, 7 Det, 174 I/W, 47 C/S; Frd: 87 KIA, 408 WIA).

18 -- Elements of the 196th Bde, 23d Inf (Americal) Div make contact with an unknown size enemy force 37 km west-northwest of Tam Ky, Quang Tin Province (En: 91 KIA, 2 I/W; Frd: 10 KIA, 27 WIA).

-- Other elements of the 196th Bde make contact with an unknown size enemy force 30 km west of Tam Ky, Quang Tin Province (En: 97 KIA; Frd: 6 KIA, 2 WIA).

19 -- Elements of the 1st ARVN Inf Div make contact with an enemy force 7 km southwest of Con Thien, Quang Tri Province (En: 51 KIA, 1 Det, 2 I/W, 5 C/S; Frd: 1 WIA).

-- Operation QT/44/37, a combat operation conducted by MSF and RF/PF elements in Kien Phong Province, terminates. The operation commenced on 14 August (En: 63 KIA, 6 Det; Frd: 3 KIA, 16 WIA).

-- Elements of the 7th Regt, 1st Mar Div observe 48 enemy soldiers near a tree line 15 km southeast of An Hoa, Quang Nam Province and call in TACAIR and artillery (En: 36 KIA; Frd: None).

20 -- Secretary of the Army Stanley H. Resor arrives in RVN for an eight-day visit.

-- General R.E. Haines, CINCUSARPAC, arrives in RVN for a five-day visit.

-- Elements of the 9th Inf Div contact and engage an estimated enemy company while operating in an area 8 km north of Can Duoc, Long An Province (En: 35 KIA, 2 Det, 2 I/W; Frd: 1 KIA, 2 WIA).

-- Elements of the 196th Bde, 23d (Americal) Div are attacked by an unknown size enemy force 37 km west of Tam Ky, Quang Tin Province (En: 103 KIA; Frd: 2 KIA, 22 WIA).

22 -- Operation LIEN KET 45, a combat operation conducted by elements of the 4th ARVN Regt in Quang Ngai Province, terminates. Operation commenced on 19 April (En: 561 KIA, 82 Det; Frd: 88 KIA, 240 WIA).

23 -- Operation BUN KAE 7, a search and clear operation conducted by elements of the Capital ROK Inf Div in Binh Dinh Province, terminates. Operation commenced on 12 August (En: 114 KIA; Frd: 8 KIA, 240 WIA).

24 -- Elements of the 2d Bde, 25th Inf Div engage an unknown size enemy force 12 km southwest of Ben Cat, Binh Duong Province (En: 48 KIA, 1 Det, 21 I/W; Frd: 2 KIA, 4 WIA).

-- Operation DONG BO 1-14, a search and clear operation conducted by elements of the 9th ROK Inf Div in Ninh Thuan Province, terminates. Operation commenced on 16 August (En: 81 KIA; Frd: None).

25 -- The Mobile Riverine Force is disestablished. The mission and responsibilities of this force will be assumed on 1 September by VNN Amphibious Task Force 211.

-- An element of the 196th Bde, 23d Inf (Americal) Div, on a reconnaissance patrol, contacts and engages an unknown size enemy force in an area 36 km west of Tam Ky, Quang Tin Province (En: 74 KIA, 10 I/W; Frd: 1 KIA, 49 WIA).

-- Operation GAFFEY BLUE, a search and clear operation conducted by elements of the 4th Inf Div in Binh Dinh Province, terminates. Operation commenced on 5 August (En: 100 KIA, 3 Det; Frd: 4 KIA, 13 WIA).

-- An ARVN element observes an enemy force 27 km west of Tam Ky, Quang Tin Province and calls for US artillery support (En: 52 KIA; Frd: None).

-- An ARVN element, participating in Operation FREDERICK HILL, while on a sweep 27 km west of Tam Ky, Quang Tin Province, finds 100 enemy KBA at an unknown time.

26 -- Operation LIEN KET 54, a combat operation conducted by elements of the 5th ARVN Regt in Quang Tin Province, terminates. Operation commenced on 20 April (En: 445 KIA, 73 Det; Frd: 38 KIA, 168 WIA, 3 MIA).

-- An unknown number of suspected VC terrorists throw four hand grenades into a building in which a meeting between villagers and RVN RD cadre was being conducted 8 km northwest of Phu Cat, Binh Dinh Province. The resulting explosions kill 24 VN civilians and wound 81 others. In terms of casualties, this is the worst single terrorist act of the year and one of the worst recorded in the war.

-- Operation JUN JIN 21, a search and clear operation conducted by elements of the Capital ROK Inf Div in Binh Dinh Province, terminates. Operation commenced on 23 August (En: 51 KIA, 2 Det; Frd: 7 KIA, 10 WIA).

27 -- Regional Force elements engage unknown size enemy force while operating in an area 24 km northwest of Gia Rai, Bac Lieu Province. The ARVN elements reinforce and US Army gunships support (En: 44 KIA, 4 C/S; Frd: 1 US KIA, 1 US WIA).

-- Number of Hoi Chanh in 1969 surpasses the 30,000 mark.

28 -- Admiral T. H. Moorer, Chief of Naval Operations, US Navy, arrives in RVN for a five-day visit.

-- A 1st Mar Div reconnaissance team observes a number of enemy in an area 10 km east-northeast of An Hoa, Quang Nam Province and calls in TACAIR (En: 48 KIA; Frd: None).

-- Operation QT/BL/58, a one day combat operation conducted by ARVN and RF elements in Bac Lieu Province, terminates (En: 71 KIA, 9 Det; Frd: 19 KIA, 27 WIA).

31 -- South East Asia Deployment Program 7 becomes effective. Authorized space ceiling is reduced to 524,500.

-- Operation RICE FARMER, the US campaign in IV CTZ conducted by elements of the 3d Bde, 9th Inf Div, terminates. Operation commenced on 1 June (En: 1,860 KIA, 922 Det, 233 I/W, 13 C/S; Frd: 44 KIA, 452 WIA).

-- US military strength in RVN is 509,569.

SEPTEMBER

3 -- COL L. H. Williams assumes duties as MACJA.

4 -- Radio Hanoi announces death of NVN President Ho Chi Minh on 3 September.

-- VC Liberation Radio announces that military forces will observe a three-day cease fire in observance of Ho Chi Minh's funeral. Cease fire will commence at 080100H.

5 -- Mechanized infantry elements from the 11th ACR contact and engage an estimated enemy company while operating in an area 2 km northwest of An Loc, Binh Long Province (En: 63 KIA; Frd: 2 KIA, 15 WIA).

6 -- Elements of the 11th ACR engage unknown size enemy force 5 km west of Loc Ninh, Binh Long Province (En: 70 KIA, 5 Det; Frd: 3 KIA, 31 WIA).

-- A 1st Inf Div convoy, escorted by an element of the 3d Bde, 25th Inf Div and an element of the 2d Bde, 1st Inf Div, is attacked by an unknown size enemy force 6 km north of Chan Thanh, Binh Long Province (En: 55 KIA, 4 Det, 8 I/W, 5 C/S; Frd: 1 KIA, 6 WIA).

8 -- US and RVN commands announce that Allied military operations during the three-day cease fire proposed by the VC will be scaled to match Communist activities.

10 -- COMUSMACV departs RVN for meetings with President Nixon in Washington.

11 -- The Chi Lang ARVN Training Center, located 10 km north of Tri Ton, Chau Doc Province, receives an attack-by-fire and a ground attack by an unknown size enemy force. Friendly forces support with artillery and AC-47 and helicopter gunships (En: 49 KIA, 4 Det, 2 I/W, 2 C/S; Frd: 4 KIA, 19 WIA).

-- An element of the 1st Bde, 25th Inf Div and an element of the 1st ARVN Abn Bn engage an unknown size enemy force 4 km west-southwest of Phu Khuong, Tay Ninh Province (En: 49 KIA, 1 Det; Frd: 2 KIA, 11 WIA).

13 -- A combined action platoon and a PF unit in night defensive positions 21 km northwest of Quang Ngai receive an attack by fire followed by a ground attack from an estimated two enemy companies. An unknown number of enemy also attack nearby An Thong village and three surrounding hamlets, destroying 260 houses (En: 116 KIA, 1 Det, 6 I/W, 1 C/S; Frd: 10 KIA, 7 WIA).

15 -- A IFFV ranger element observes an enemy company armed with RPG rocket launchers and AK-47 rifles 33 km north-northeast of Phan Thiet, Binh Thuan Province. An element of the 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div (Ambl) is air assaulted into the area and the enemy is engaged by gunships and ground forces (En: 58 KIA; Frd: None).

16 -- President Nixon announces that 35,000 more US troops will be redeployed from RVN. Redeployment is to begin immediately. Authorized troop ceiling will be 484,000.

17 -- Operation QT/44/42, a combat operation conducted by ARVN elements in Chau Doc Province, terminates. Operation commenced on 4 September (En: 138 KIA, 35 Det; Frd: 8 KIA, 42 WIA).

19 -- Operation QT/32/71, a combat operation conducted by ARVN elements in Ba Xuyen Province, terminates. Operation commenced on 15 September (En: 54 KIA, 1 Det; Frd: 3 WIA).

20 -- A USAF F-4 of the 366th Tactical Fighter Wing collides in mid-air with an Air Vietnam DC-4 approximately 2 miles northwest of Danang Air Base. The F-4 pilot lands safely at Danang after the navigator ejects safely. The DC-4 crashes 1 mile northwest of the base killing 75 persons aboard and two on the ground.

22 -- Hq USMC announces that Marine tours in RVN will be reduced from 13 to 12 months.

-- Operation PUTNAM TIGER, a combat operation conducted by elements of the 2d Bde, 4th Inf Div in Kontum and Pleiku Provinces, terminates. Operation commenced on 22 April (En: 563 KIA, 50 Det, 47 I/W, 11 C/S; Frd: 81 KIA, 245 WIA).

25 -- Operation IDAHO CANYON, a cordon and search operation conducted by elements of the 3d Mar Div in Quang Tri Province, terminates. Operation commenced on 16 July (En: 565 KIA, 5 Det, 155 I/W, 48 C/S; Frd: 95 KIA, 450 WIA).

-- Operation IROQUOIS GROVE, a cordon and search operation conducted by elements of the 1st Bde, 5th Inf Div in Quang Tri Province, terminates. Operation commenced 16 June (En: 134 KIA, 79 Det, 69 I/W, 11 C/S; Frd: 13 KIA, 130 WIA).

-- ROKFV marks four years of combat operations in RVN.

30 -- US military strength in RVN is 510,530.

OCTOBER

2 -- DOD announces that US casualties in the past week (21-27 September) are the lowest in more than two years. Casualties include 95 KIA.

3 -- Operation DO KAE BEE 1-14, a search and clear operation conducted by elements of the ROK 9th Div in Phu Yen Province, terminates. Operation commenced on 18 September (En: 167 KIA, 1 Det; Frd: 6 KIA, 21 WIA).

-- COL (CHAP) W.R. Fitzgerald assumes duties as MACV Command Chaplain.

4 -- CJCS General Wheeler arrives in RVN for a three-day visit.

6 -- Republic of the Philippines President Marcos announces in Manila that PHILCAGV will "probably be withdrawn from RVN sometime after the Philippine national elections." Elections are scheduled for 11 November.

9 -- DOD announces that US casualties in the past week (28 September - 4 October) are the lowest in nearly three years. Casualties include 64 KIA.

10 -- US Navy turns over 80 PBRs to the VNN in ceremonies at Saigon. This turnover brings to 229 the number of USN craft turned over since June 1968.

11 -- Operation WAYNE BOULDER, a search and clear operation conducted by elements of the 1st Bde, 4th Inf Div in Binh Dinh Province, terminates (En: 93 KIA, 6 Det, 6 I/W; Frd: 3 KIA, 15 WIA).

-- DOD announces that US casualties in the past week are the lowest in nearly three years. Casualties include 45 KIA.

12 -- An element of the 3d Bde, 82d Abn Div discovers a significant enemy weapons and munitions cache 8 km southwest of Ben Cat, Binh Duong Province. The cache includes 90 SKS rifles, 21 light MG, 12,500 rounds of small arms ammunition, and 200 81mm mortar rounds.

13 -- An element of the Capital ROK Div finds a 12-ton ordnance cache and has several small contacts 22 km northwest of Phu Cat, Binh Dinh Province (En: 4 KIA, 1 Det; Frd: 3 WIA). Cache includes 10 I/W, 3 C/S, 140,000 rounds of small arms ammunition, 18,400 rounds of 50-caliber machine gun ammunition, and miscellaneous other ammunition, and spare parts.

15 -- (US date) Hundreds of thousands of people observe the Vietnam War Moratorium. Marches, rallies, and vigils are held throughout the US and in some foreign capitals--Geneva, Paris, Rome.

-- The SS KIN WAH, a 1,260 ton freighter of Panamanian registry, is mined and sunk by saboteurs in Nha Trang harbor. The main ship channel is not blocked. Three crew members and two guests aboard are killed.

16 -- DOD announces that casualties during the past week (5-11 October) remained near the lowest levels of the past three years. Casualties include 82 US KIA. This is the third consecutive week in which US KIA are less than 100.

-- Operation GREEN ACE, a search and clear operation in support of pacification conducted in Pleiku Province by elements of the 2d and 3d Bdes, 4th Inf Div, terminates. The operation commenced on 5 August (En: 100 KIA, 135 Det, 22 I/W, 2 C/S; Frd: 7 KIA, 41 WIA).

17 -- VNN patrol boats fire on a USSR trawler off Danang. The ship is fired upon when it is intercepted inside RVN's territorial limits and refuses to stop or identify itself.

18 -- Operation SEA LORDS, the US Navy's offensive against enemy infiltration in III and IV CTZs, marks the end of its first year of operations. The operation thus far has accounted for over 2,000 enemy killed and over 550 tons of enemy weapons and supplies captured.

-- Operation WAYNE JAVELIN, an operation in support of pacification conducted in Binh Dinh Province by elements of the 1st Bde, 4th Inf Div, terminates. The operation commenced on 13 April (En: 551 KIA, 285 Det, 2 Hoi Chanh, 38 I/W, 5 C/S; Frd: 21 KIA, 140 WIA).

19 -- Memorial Operation of the ROK Anniversary terminates. The operation commenced 2 October (En: 116 KIA, 140 I/W, 53 C/S. Cache contains 54 tons of ammunition; Frd: 19 KIA, 32 WIA).

20 -- PFC Jesse P. Harris, Jr., of the 101st Abn Div, captured 8 June 1969 is released by Communist forces in I CTZ.

21 -- The 10 NVN fishermen rescued in international waters off the DMZ in July are returned by sea to NVN.

-- A total of 1,310 Hoi Chanh are reported for the week of 12-18 October. This is the second highest weekly total recorded since the inception of the program.

-- DOD announces American casualties for the week 12-18 October include 78 killed.

22 -- The 6,000th aircraft in connection with the war in Vietnam is lost. This figure includes combat and non-combat losses, fixed and rotary wing aircraft.

23 -- US Military strength in-country dips below 500,000 to 497,300, the lowest figure since 17 February 1969.

24 -- Elements of the 3d Bde, 25th Inf Div engage an unknown number of enemy 15 km northeast of Trang Bang, Hau Ngia Province (En: 47 KIA, 12 I/W, 3 C/S; Frd: 10 KIA, 12 WIA).

-- GEN Sir John Wilton, KBE, CB, DSO Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee, Australian Department of Defense arrives for a four day visit to commanders of US and FWMAF in RVN.

25 -- DOD announces that US casualties during the week 19-25 October resulted in 102 KIA. This is the first time in 4 weeks American losses exceeded 100 killed.

26 -- An element of the 3d Bde, 1st Inf Div discovers an enemy cache containing 97 SKS rifles, 31 Soviet small arms, 13 machine guns, 114 rocket-grenades and 174 57mm recoilless rifle rounds.

27 -- NVA delegates in Paris announce that "extremely important information on U.S. POWs will be released".

-- Operation PUTNAM COUGAR conducted by elements of the 2d Bde, 4th Inf Div terminates (En: 94 KIA, 2 Det, 1 Hoi Chanh, 103 I/W, 11 C/S; Frd: 4 KIA, 15 WIA).

28 -- A VC terrorist throws a hand grenade into the market place in Hoa Hoi hamlet, located 3 km north of Phu Cat, Binh Dinh Province, killing 8 VN civilians and wounding 47 others. Elements of the 12th Co., 1st ROK Inf Div react, detaining 6 VC ages 11-14.

30 -- GVN frees 88 VC PWs and President Thieu orders amnesty for 310 civilian prisoners. Among the civilian prisoners released is Thich Thien Minh, a prominent Buddhist monk.

-- Helicopter gunships from 1st Cav Div (Ambl) engage unknown size enemy force (En: 41 KIA; Frd: None).

31 -- US fighter bombers and helicopter gunships kill 41 Communist soldiers approximately 20 km southwest of Phuoc Binh, Phuc Long Province. There were no US casualties.

-- An element of the 3d Bde, 4th Inf Div is attacked by estimated platoon 25 km northwest of Pleiku City (En: 35 KIA; Frd: 2 KIA, 13 WIA).

-- An element of the 1st Bde, 1st Cav Div (Ambl) discovers enemy cache 16 km southeast of Katum, Binh Long Province. Cache includes: 66 I/W, 82-82mm mortar rounds, 95 grenades.

-- Phase III of the Toan Thang Offensive, which began 16 February 1969 terminates (En: 41,803 KIA, 3,299 Det, 13,723 I/W, 2,889 C/S, caches 1,000 tons of foodstuffs and munitions; Frd: 1,553 KIA, 10,462 WIA).

-- US military strength in RVN is 496,274.

NOVEMBER

1 -- First elements of the 3d Bde, 82d Abn Div depart RVN as part of Phase II redeployment.

-- Fire Support Base KATE, a II CTZ base occupied by RVN CIDG troops and a 1 FFV artillery unit receive several ground attacks coupled with 85mm and 105mm artillery by

unknown-sized enemy force. Three damaged artillery pieces were destroyed as the base was evacuated. Friendly casualties were light.

3 -- Enemy attacks Landing Zone BUTTONS one mile southwest of Phuoc Binh in Phu Yen Province. Troops from the 2d Bde, 1st Cav Div (Ambl) and support forces respond (En: 63 KIA; Frd: 2 KIA, 26 WIA).

-- MG R. B. Dawson, CB, CBE, DSO, Chief of the General Staff, NZ Army arrives for six-day visit.

-- DOD announces US casualties for the week 26 Oct - 1 Nov included 83 killed.

4 -- President Richard M. Nixon's major Vietnam policy address to the nation is heard live by forces in RVN.

-- Enemy attacks four US positions in III CTZ (En: 152 KIA; Frd: 3 KIA, 61 WIA).

5 -- The 377th Cbt Spt Co, an Army Reserve unit from Wisconsin, departs RVN to be deactivated at Ft. Riley, Kansas and reconstituted in Manitowoc, Wisconsin.

-- Communist troops release three US Army prisoners. This brings to 27 the number of American military personnel released since February 1967.

-- With appropriate ceremony, the Coastal Surveillance Center at Qui Nhon, Binh Dinh Province, is turned over to VNN.

6 -- The Honorable Winton M. Blount, Postmaster General of the US, arrives in RVN for four-day visit in connection with postal operations.

-- The ARVN 14th Arty Bn takes over equipment of Btry B, 6th Bn, 33d Arty.

7 -- Estimated 70 VC, move toward Saigon. National police react (En: 5 KIA; Frd: 1 KIA, 5 WIA, 3 MIA, 4 I/W lost).

-- MG W. K. Jones, CG 3d Mar Div, departs RVN as Hq 3d Mar Div redeploys to Okinawa in accordance with Phase II redeployment.

-- Operation PIPESTONE CANYON terminates. The multi-battalion search and clear operation began 26 May. Operational control was from 1st Regt, 1st Mar Div with resources from 51st ARVN Inf Regt and 2d ROK Mar Bde (En: 488 KIA, 174 I/W, 18 C/S; Frd: (US) 54 KIA, 540 WIA).

8 -- Operation NORTON FALLS, which commenced 10 Oct terminated 8 Nov. The Control Hq of the 3d Bde, 101st Abn Div (Ambl) with the 1st and 2d Bns, of 506th Inf, 101st Abn Div (Ambl) engages the enemy with the following cumulative results: (En: 60 KIA, 1 Det, 23 I/W, 2 C/S; Frd: 5 KIA, 21 WIA).

-- Co D, 87th Inf is inactivated as part of Phase II redeployment.

-- Gov George A. Wallace arrives for five-day fact finding visit to RVN.

10 -- GVN announces year's Hoi Chanh rate passes the 40,000 mark.

11 -- Admiral B.A. Clarey, Vice Chief of Naval Operations, arrives for one day visit to Danang.

12 -- The first aircraft of a squadron of USAF AC-119K SHADOW gunships arrives in RVN. They are to replace the AC-47 SPOOKY gunships transferred to GVN.

-- In Quang Nam Province, RF troops, supported by VNN junk fleet boats, tactical air, and artillery strikes, engage estimated enemy battalion (En: 71 KIA, 58 Det, 18 I/W; Frd: 2 KIA, 10 WIA).

-- Elements of the 1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech) engage unknown size NVA force in Quang Tri Province, 9 km southwest of Con Thien (En: 108 KIA; Frd: 26 KIA, 70 WIA).

-- ROP announces that 1,500 man THILCAGV will be withdrawn from RVN.

13 -- DOD announces US KIA during week 2-8 Nov were 97. This is the seventh reporting period during 1969 that US KIA have been below 100.

-- Attacks by elements of 27th NVA Regt against the 1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech) in Quang Tri Province near the DMZ over the preceding three days is repulsed (En: 178 KIA, 2 Det, 15 I/W, 4 C/S; Frd: 14 KIA, 52 WIA).

15 -- (US date) Anti-war demonstrations occur in the United States, the second in a series scheduled during the remainder of the year.

-- Unknown number of enemy penetrate perimeter of Camp Radcliff at An Khe, Binh Dinh Province, and employ satchel charges. Security personnel engage the enemy within the compound (En: Unk; Frd: 1 KIA, 11 WIA).

16 -- Asst SECDEF David Packard arrives for five-day orientation visit.

17 -- Navy PBR engages enemy squad operating on canal 30 km north-northwest of Rach Gia, Kien Giang Province (En: 8 KIA, 8 I/W, 12 120mm mortar, 20,000 AK-47 ammo; Frd: None).

-- Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 11 (NMCB-11) begins redeployment to Port Hueneme, Calif. where it will be deactivated.

-- Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) begin in Helsinki, Finland between negotiators of the US and Soviet Union.

18 -- Element of the 196th Bde, 23d Inf (Americal) Div discovers cache containing 9.5 tons of rice.

19 -- An element of the 7 Regt, 1st Mar Div operating 10 km southeast of An Hoa, Quang Nam Province, di er 5,000 pounds of rice in a cave.

-- Troops of the 3d Bde, 9th Inf Div find a cache 21 km north-northwest of Tan An, Long An Province, containing seventeen 21-pound boxes of TNT, 106 CHICOM grenades, 5,000 rounds small arms ammo, 74 rifle grenades, and 72 rounds of B40 rockets.

20 -- Naval Construction Battalion 62 begins redeployment to Gulfport, Miss. as part of the Phase II redeployment.

-- The last National Guard unit leaves RVN as Co D, 151st Inf (Rngr), Indiana National Guard departs RVN.

-- Elements of the 7th Regt, 1st Mar Div discover arms cache consisting of 4 CHICOM flame throwers, one 12.7mm AAA machinegun, 6 rifles, 40,000 rounds small arms ammo, 20 NVA uniforms, and miscellaneous other munitions.

21 -- Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, US representative to Paris Peace Talks, announces his resignation effective 8 Dec.

-- Elements of the 7th Regt, 1st Mar Div discover caches near An Hoa, Quang Nam Province containing one flamethrower, 45 AK-47, 14 SKS, two hundred and eleven 60/82mm mortar rounds, 3,262 CHICOM grenades, 27 bangalore torpedoes, and 1,300 pounds of rice.

-- A cache discovered 8 miles from the Cambodian border near Phuoc Binh, Phuoc Long Province by troopers of the 1st Cav Div (Ambl) consists of [illegible] rifles, four machine guns, two rifle scopes and two grenade launchers.

22 -- A food cart pushed to an area across the street from the Hong Kong BOQ in Cholon by 15 year old boys explodes causing minor window damage and slightly injuring a Vietnamese child. There were no US casualties. EOD personnel find 100 pounds of unexploded TNT and plastic explosive remaining in the cart.

23 -- Selective Service headquarters announces January draft call will be 12,500 less than the 35,000 expected and will be the first conducted under President Nixon's new lottery system.

-- Civil Rights team, headed by L. Howard Bennett, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Civil Rights, arrives in RVN for seven-day routine visit.

24 -- The Department of the Army announces it has ordered 1LT William L. Calley, Jr. to be tried by general court-martial on charges of premeditated murder of 109 Vietnamese persons, which allegedly took place during March 1968 in My Lai Hamlet, Quang Ngai Province.

25 -- Final units of the 3d Mar Div redeploy to Okinawa ending nearly five years of combat by the division in 120 major operations in RVN.

26 -- The White House announces a decision for a 10 percent cut in American Direct Hire Personnel serving abroad. The approximately 1,500 direct hire DOD civilians in RVN will be reduced by at least 10 percent by 30 Jun 70.

27 -- A list containing the names of 59 US PWs is released in Chicago by R.C. Davis, an anti-war leader, who states the list was furnished by Xuan Oanh, a member of the NVN Paris Delegation.

-- Element of the 1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech) engages an unknown size NVA force 7 km northwest of Cam Lo, Quang Tri Province (En: 23 KIA, 5 I/W, 5 C/S; Frd: 2 KIA, 12 WIA).

-- DOD announces that Phase II redeployment of 35,000 has been exceeded and that US in-country strength is below 484,000.

29 -- Helicopters from the 2d Bde, 1st Cav Div (Ambl) and TACAIR from the 3d, 31st, and 35th Tactical Fighter Wings kill 69 enemy with no US losses.

30 -- US military strength in RVN is 478,701.

DECEMBER

1 -- ROK Marines complete 18-day operation on Barrier Island, 18 miles southwest of Danang (En: 242 KIA, 5 Det, 88 I/W and C/S; Frd: 4 KIA, 39 WIA).

-- Fifty men of the PHILCAGV contingent depart RVN as withdrawal of the 1,500-man unit begins.

2 -- Elements of the 7th ARVN Div with assistance from Navy OV-10 aircraft make contact with unknown number of enemy near Phu Vinh, Vinh Binh Province (En: 36 KIA, 10 I/W and C/S, 220 Pounds of TNT; Frd: 3 KIA, 1 WIA).

3 -- NVA Bn attacks Tuyen Binh District town, Kien Tuong Province. RF/PF forces defend with organic weapons and assistance from TACAIR and helicopters from 164th Cbt Avn Gp (En: 160 KIA, 1 Det, 48 I/W, 6 C/S, 300 hand grenades, 200 pounds TNT; Frd: 6 KIA, 27 WIA).

4 -- RVN President Nguyen Van Thieu announces RVN will observe a 24-hour cease fire at both Christmas and New Year's Day, from 1800 hours, 24 Dec until 1800 hours, 25 Dec and 1800 hours, 31 Dec 1969 - 1800 hours, 1 Jan 1970.

5 -- Elements from the 5th and 7th Regts, 1st Mar Div discover caches of rice totaling eight tons in the vicinity of An Hoa, Quang Nam Province.

-- An element of the 1st Cav Div (Ambl) contacts unknown size enemy 18 miles northeast of Tay Ninh City (En: 23 KIA; Frd: 3 WIA).

6 -- CIDG and 1st Cav Div (Ambl) troops engage unknown number of enemy in two actions 22 miles northeast of Tay Ninh City (En: 53 KIA, 19 I/W, 2 C/S; Frd: 1 KIA, 4 WIA).

8 -- An element of the 1st Bde, 1st Cav Div (Ambl) engages enemy 15 km southeast of Katum, Tay Ninh Province. The enemy force withdraws after two hours (En: 33 KIA; Frd: None).

9 -- The USCG cutter Point Ellis is turned over to the VNN at Cat Lo. This is the sixth USCG craft to be turned over to RVN.

10 -- Two Army aviators return to US control after being released as PWs by the enemy. WO Peterson and Sgt Shepard were captured 2 Nov after their aircraft was shot down in the vicinity of Duc Lap.

11 -- Troops of the 7th Regt, 1st Mar Div engage unknown number of enemy 14 km southwest of Hoi An, Quang Nam Province (En: 35 KIA; Frd: None).

-- In two contacts with enemy forces, elements of the 1st Cav Div (Ambl) return fire with organic weapons and call in helicopter gunships, artillery and tactical air support resulting in 59 enemy killed with no friendly casualties.

-- Astronaut Col. Frank Borman arrives in RVN for 10-day person-to-person tour.

12 -- PHILCAGV turns over their base to the 1st Cav Div (Ambl) as they prepare to redeploy to the Philippines.

13 -- Troops of the 23d Inf (Americal) Div engage estimated company of enemy 5 miles northeast of Quang Ngai City with support of helicopter gunships (En: 53 KIA, 14 Det, 10 I/W, 16 grenades; Frd: 3 WIA).

14 -- Friendly forces find 13.8 tons of rice in caches in I CTZ during the past two days.

-- Members of the 3d Bde, 1st Cav (Ambl) discover munitions cache 14 km north-northwest of Song Be, Phuoc Long Province containing: 50 CHICOM sub-machine guns, 10 rifles, 86,000 rounds of small arms ammunition, 449 mortar rounds and 269 rocket grenades.

15 -- (US Date) President Nixon announces that the third US troop redeployment will be a reduction of 50,000 to be completed 15 Apr 70.

-- Elements of the 5th ARVN Inf Div and 11th Armd Cav Regt engage an estimated enemy company 4 km southeast of Bu Dop, Phuoc Long Province (En: 53 KIA, 15 I/W, 7 C/S; Frd: 6 KIA, 41 WIA).

16 -- Prime Minister John Gorton of Australia announces that there will be a withdrawal of an unspecified number of Australian troops which would coincide with US troop redeployments after the Phase III redeployments.

17 -- In two contacts involving elements of the 1st Cav Div (Ambl), in an area 18 miles northeast of Tay Ninh City, an NVA Co is engaged (En: 32 KIA; Frd: 2 WIA).

18 -- General Creighton W. Abrams departs RVN for conferences with President Nixon.

19 -- Four 122mm rockets detonate in a Vietnamese civilian housing area within the confines of Tan Son Nhut Airbase in Saigon. Casualties are 1 Vietnamese civilian killed, 13 wounded, and 5 US WIA.

20 -- VNN Shipyard launches first ferro-cement PCF.

22 -- Reconnaissance element of the 1st Mar Div observes 51 enemy soldiers 10 km east of An Hoa, Quang Nam Province. Artillery is called to engage (En: 20 KIA; Frd: None).

-- GEN Creighton W. Abrams returnes to RVN.

23 -- SECSTATE announces that Communist infiltration into RVN has tapered off for the last three weeks and is down about 60 percent compared with one year ago.

-- Madeline Duckles and Cora Weiss, leaders of the anti-war movement, turn over to the State Department a list of US PWs held by the NVA. The State Department says only four new names are contained in the list.

-- In three sightings within 17 miles of An Hoa, Quang Nam Province, 60 enemy are observed. Artillery from the 1st Mar Div engages (En: 32 KIA; Frd: None).

-- A terrorist's bomb explodes in an open-air theater, 10 km southwest of Hoi An, Quang Nam Province, during a Christmas play. Two Vietnamese civilians are killed and 62 wounded.

24 -- Allies suspend combat operations at 1800 for a period of 24 hours in Christmas truce.

-- Elements of the 1st Regt, 1st Mar Div are attacked 16 km northeast of An Hoa, Quang Nam Province. The 60 enemy strike nearly three hours after the commencement of the Christmas truce. Marines with organic weapons and artillery support repulse the enemy (En: 31 KIA, 3 Det, Frd: 1 WIA).

26 -- The Allied Command announces 115 enemy violations of the 24 hour Christmas truce (En: 101 KIA, 13 Det, 34 I/W; US: 3 WIA).

28 -- LTG William R. Peers arrives in Saigon for 10-day visit in connection with the investigation of allegation of a US massacre of RVN civilians at My Lai hamlet during Mar 68.

-- Helicopter crewmen from the 1st Cav Div (Ambl), in two separate actions 8 miles northeast of Phuoc Binh, Phuoc Long Province, with support of Army artillery and tactical air engage an enemy force (En: 46 KIA; Frd: None).

-- GEN Creighton W. Abrams is admitted to 3d Field Hospital for treatment of pneumonia.

29 -- A USN PBR from CTG 196.4 patrolling 8 miles south of Ben Cat, Binh Duong Province engages enemy troops in crossing attempt. SEAWOLVES support the PBR (En: 27 KIA, 1 Det; Frd: None).

30 -- Elements of the 7th ARVN Div discover cache in Giao Duc District, Dinh Tuong Province containing 660 pounds of medical supplies.

-- A reconnaissance element of the 1st Mar Div observes 50 enemy soldiers crossing a river 19 km northeast of An Hoa, Quang Nam Province. The enemy is engaged by artillery (En: 22 KIA; Frd: None).

31 -- At 1800 hours, Allies observe 24-hour New Year's truce.

-- Hoi Chanh returnees for 1969 are 47,023 compared with 18,171 for the previous year an increase of 257 percent.

-- End of year friendly military strength in RVN is: US, 483,326; RVN, 969,256; Korea, 48,869; Australia, 7,672; New Zealand, 552; Thailand, 11,568; Philippines, 189.

-- US casualties since 1 Jan 61 are KIA: 37,270.

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GLOSSARY

AA	Antiaircraft
AAA	Antiaircraft Artillery
A&AFES	Army & Air Force Exchange Service
AAFPS	Army Air Force Postal Service
AATT	Australian Army Training Team
AB	Air Base
ABC	American Broadcasting Company
ABCC	Airborne Communications Center
ABCCC	Airborne Battlefield Command and Control Center
ABD	Accumulated Bomb Damage
ABF	Attack-by-fire
ABN	Airborne
ACS	Air Commando Squadron
ACTIV	Army Concept Team in Vietnam
ACTOV	Accelerated Turnover to Vietnamese
ACTOVLOG	Accelerated Turnover to Vietnamese Logistics
AC&W	Aircraft Control and Warning
ACY	Armed Combat Youth
AD	Air Defense
ADA	Air Defense Artillery
ADLMS	Aerial Delivered Land Mines System
ADP	Automatic Data Processing
A&DSL	Administrative and Direct Support Logistics Company
AEW	Airborne Early Warning
AF	Air Force
AFB	Air Force Base
AFC	Automatic Frequency Control
AFGP	Air Force Advisory Group
AFLS	Armed Forces Language School
AFP	Armed Forces of the Philippines
AFPCS	Air Force Postal and Courier Service
AFRTS	American Forces Radio and Television Service
AFVN	American Forces Vietnam Network
AFTU-V	Air Force Test Unit, Vietnam
AFV	Australian Force Vietnam
AGIL	Airborne General Illumination Light Set
AHB	Assault Helicopter Battalion
AID	Agency for International Development
AIK	Assistance in Kind
AIRA	Air Attache
AKL	Light Cargo Ship
ALC	Area Logistical Command
ALCC	Airlift Control Center
ALO	Air Liaison Officer
AM	Amplitude Modulated
AMBL	Airmobile

AMAMB	American Ambassador
AMC	Army Materiel Command
AMEMB	American Embassy
AMMC	Aviation Materiel Management Center
AMMI	A Navy Pontoon Barge
AMMO	Ammunition
AMPHIB	Amphibious
AMS	Army Map Service
ANDPF	Alliance of National Democratic and Peace Forces
ANL	Net Laying Ship
ANGLICO	Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company
ANZAC	Australian & New Zealand Army Corps
AOA	Amphibious Objective Area
AOB	Air Order of Battle
AO	Area of Operation
APB	Barrack Ship (Self-Propelled)
APC	Armored Personnel Carrier
APC	Accelerated Pacification Campaign
APD	Airborne Personnel Detector
API	Armor Piercing-Incendiary
APOE	Aerial Port of Embarkation
APO	Army Post Office
APPROX	Approximately
APT	Armed Propaganda Team
ARA	Aerial Rocket Artillery
ARAAV	Armored Reconnaissance Airborne Assault Vehicle
ARG	Amphibious Ready Group
ARG/SLF	Amphibious Ready Group/Special Landing Force
ARL	Landing Craft Repair Ship
ARMD	Armored
ARPA	Advanced Research Project Agency, Research and Development Field Unit, Vietnam
ARTY	Artillery
ARVN	Army of the Republic of Vietnam
ASB	Amphibious Support Battalion
ASD (I&L)	Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installation and Logistics)
ASID	Air-Deliverable SEISMIC Intrusion Detector
ASL	Authorized Stockage Lists
ASOC	Air Support Operations Center
ASPB	Armored Support Patrol Boat
ASR	Available Supply Rate
ASRT	Air Support Radar Teams
ASTA	Aerial Survey and Target Acquisition
ATC	Armored Troop Carrier
ATG	Amphibious Task Group
ATF	Amphibious Task Force
ATF	Australian Task Force
ATK	Attack

AUTODIN	Automatic Digital Network
ATSB	Advance Tactical Support Base
AWOL	Absent Without Leave
AW	Automatic Weapons
AWSP	Automatic Weapons Self-Propelled
BA	Base Area (VC/NVA)
BAR	Browning Automatic Rifle
BAS	Basic Allowance for Subsistence
BBL	Barrel
BDA	Bomb Damage Assessment
BDE	Brigade
BEQ	Bachelor Enlisted Men's Quarters
BIAS	Battle Illumination Airborne System
BLT	Battalion Landing Team
BN	Battalion
BOC	Barrier Operations Center
CAD	Corps Advisory Detachment
C&D	Cover and Deception
CAP	Country Assistance Program
CAG	Civic Action Group
CAS	Controlled American Source
CAV	Cavalry
CBU	Cluster Bomb Unit
CCB	Command Communication Boat
CCF	Corps Contingency Force
CCP	Combined Campaign Plan
CCRSFF	Commander, Central Region SEATO Field Forces
CD	Combat Development
CDEC	Combined Document Exploitation Center
CDS	Container Delivery System
CDTCV	Combat Development Test Center, Vietnam
CERO	Corps Epidemiological Reference Office
CG	Guided Missile Cruiser
CG	Commanding General
CG USARYIS	Commanding General, US Army Ryukyus Islands
CHECO	Contemporary History Evaluations of Combat Operations
CHICOM	Chinese Communist
CHINAT	Chinese Nationalist
CHJUSMAGPHIL	Chief, Joint United States Military Advisory Group, Philippines
CHJUSMAGTHAI	Chief, Joint United States Military Advisory Group, Thailand
CHKMAG	Chief, Korea Military Advisory Group
CHNAVADGP	Chief, Naval Advisory Group
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CICV	Combined Intelligence Center Vietnam
CID	Criminal Investigation Division
CIDIV	Command Information Division

CIDG	Civilian Irregular Defense Group
CINCPAC	Commander in Chief, PACIFIC
CINCPACAF	Commander in Chief, Pacific Air Force
CINCPACREPPHIL	Commander in Chief, Pacific Representative Philippine
CINCPACFLT	Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet
CINCPACINST	Commander in Chief, Pacific Instruction
CINCPACREP	Commander in Chief, Pacific Representative
CINCUSARPAC	Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific
CINCSAC	Commander in Chief, Strategic Air Command
CINCSTRIKE	Commander in Chief, Strike Command
CINCTAC	Commander in Chief, Tactical Air Command
CINFO	Chief of Information
CINCVNN	Commander in Chief, Vietnamese Navy
CIO	Central Intelligence Organization
CIOCC	City Intelligence and Operation Coordination Center
CIP	Commodities Import Program
CIV	Civilian
CJCS	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
CJGS	Chief of the Joint General Staff
CLC	Central Logistics Command
CLIP	Country Logistics Improvement Plan
CLOP	Country Logistics Offensive Plan
CMAC	Captial Military Assistance Command
CMD	Captial Military District
CMEC	Combined Materiel Exploitation Center
CMIC	Combined Military Interrogation Center
CMIT	Combined Mobile Improvement Team
CMMI	Command Maintenance Management Inspection Program
CMTT	Combined Mobile Training Team
CMR	Captial Military Region
CNO	Chief of Naval Operations
CO	Company
COB	Combat Operating Base
COC	Combat Operation Center
COCIOP	Coordination of Clandestine Intelligence Operational Proposals
COFRAM	Controlled Fragmentation Munitions
CofS	Chief of Staff
COIN	Counterinsurgency
COL	Colonel
COLA	Cost of Living Allowance
COMCRUDESGP	Commander Cruiser Destroyer Group
COMD	Command
COMDT	Commandant
COGARDACTV	Cost Guard Activity, Vietnam
COMAFV	Commander, Australian Force, Vietnam
COMCARDIV	Commander Carrier Division
COMDESDIV	Commander Destroyer Division
COMINT	Communications Intelligence
COMROCMAGV	Commander, Republic of China, Military Assistance Group, Vietnam
COMNAVFORV	Commander, Naval Forces, Vietnam

COMNZVF	Commander, New Zealand Vietnam Force
COMPHIBPAC	Commander Amphibious Force Pacific Fleet
COMPHILCONV	Commander Philippine Contingent, Vietnam
COMRIVFLOTONE	Commander River Flotilia One
COMROKFV	Commander, Republic of Korea Forces, Vietnam
COMSEC	Communications Security
COMSERVPAC	Commander Service Force Pacific
COMSEVENTHFLT	Commander, Seventh Fleet
COMSTSFE	Commander, Military Sea Transport Far East
COMUSMACV	Commander, United States Military Assistant Command, Vietnam
COMUSJAPAN	Commander, US Japan
COMUSMACTHAI	Commander, United States Military Assistant Command, Thailand
CONUS	Continental United States
CORDS	Civil Operations and Rural (formerly Revolutionary) Development Support
COSDIV	Coastal Division
COSFLOT	Coastal Flotilla
COSURVFOR	Coastal Surveillance Force
COSVN	Central Office for South Vietnam
CPA	Central Purchasing Agency
CPAF	Cost Plus Award Fee
CPDC	Central Pacification and Development Council
CPFF	Cost Plus Fixed Fee
CPSA	Central Procurement and Supply Authority
CPT	Captain
CRC	Central Recovery Committee
CRDC	Central Revolutionary Development Council
CRRC	Central Rural Reconstruction Council
CSAF	Chief of Staff Air Force
CSC	Coastal Surveillance Center
CS	A Riot Control Agent Type of Tear Gas
C/S	Crew-Served Weapon
C&SC	Command and Staff College
CSAS	Common Service Airlift System
CSF	Camp Strike Force
CSU	Casualty Staging Unit
CTA	Central Training Agency
CTF	Carrier Task Force
CTG	Commander Task Group
CTOC	Corps Tactical Operations Center
CTU	Commander Task Unit
CTZ	Corps Tactical Zone
CVA	Attack Carrier
CVS	Anti Submarine Aircraft Carrier
CWCH	Civilian War Casualty Hospitals
CW	Continuous Wave
CY	Calendar Year

DA	Department of the Army
DART	Deployable Automatic Relay Terminal
DASC	Direct Air Support Center
DCA	Defense Communications Agency
DCG	Deputy Commanding General
DCO	Dial Central Office
DCofS	Deputy Chief of Staff
DCPG	Defense Communications Planning Group
DCS	Defense Communications System
DD	Destroyer
DDR&E	Director, Defense Research and Engineering
DE	Destroyer Escort
DEPCOMUSMACV	Deputy Commander, United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
DEPSECDEF	Deputy Secretary of Defense
DER	Radar Picket Escort Ship
DGBFA	Director General, Budget and Foreign Aid
DGFA	Director General of Finance and Audit
DGOH	Director General of Highways
DGWVA	Director General of War and Veterans Affairs
DGRR	Director General for Rural Reconstruction
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
DIOCC	District Intelligence and Operation Control Center
DIST	District
DISUM	Daily Intelligence Summary
DIV	Division
DLIR	Downward Looking Infrared Radar
DM	Adamsite
DMS	Distance Measuring System
DMZ	Demilitarized Zone
DOD	Department of Defense
DRC	Defense Research Corp
DRV (GNVN)	Democratic Republic of Vietnam (NVN) or Government of North Vietnam
DSA	Deputy/District Senior Advisor; Defense Supply Agency
DTA	Division Tactical Area
DTC	Division Training Center
DTE	Dial Telephone Exchange
DZ	Drop Zone
ECAD	Engineer Control Advisory Detachment
ECM	Electronic Counter Measures
E&E	Escape and Evasion
ELAT	English Language Aptitude Test
ELINT	Electronic Intelligence
ELMS	Elements
ELT	English Language Training
EMBTEL	Embassy Telegram
EM	Enlisted Men

ENGR	Engineer
ENSURE	Expediting Non-Standard Urgent Requirements for Equipment
EOD	Explosive Ordnance Disposal
EVAC	Evacuation
FAC	Forward Air Controller
FADSID	Fighter Aircraft Delivered Seismic Detector
FAN	Forces Armees Neutralist (Laos)
FAR	Forces Armees Royales (Laos)
FARK	Forces Armees Royales Khmers (Cambodia)
FATOC	Field Army Tactical Operations Center
FFORCEV	Field Force, Vietnam
FIS	Fighter Intercepter Squadron
FLC	Force Logistical Command
FLIR	Forward Looking Infrared Radar
FLR	Forward Looking Radar
FLSG	Force Logistical Support Group
FLT	Flight
FLSU	Force Logistical Support Unit
FMFPAC	Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
FOB	Forward Operating Base
FOM	French Patrol Boats
FPO	Fleet Post Office
FRAG	Order Dispatching Single or Multiple Aircraft Sortie
FRG	Federal Republic of Germany
FSB	Fire Support Base
FSCC	Fire Support Coordination Center
FSI	Force Structure Increase
FSO	Foreign Service Officer
FSR	Force Service Regiment
FTR	Fighter
FUO	Fever of Unknown Origin
FW	Free World (Forces)
FWD	Forward
FWF	Free World Forces
FWMA	Free World Military Assistance
FWMAC	Free World Military Assistance Council
FWMAF	Free World Military Assistance Forces
FWMAO	Free World Military Assistance Office
FWMAPC	Free World Military Assistance Policy Council
FY	Fiscal Year
GEN	General
GLO	GVN Liaison Officer
GMT	Greenwich Mean Time, Z or Zulu Time
GNZ	Government of New Zealand
GO	General Order
GOA	Government of Australia
GOK	Government of South Korea
GOP	Government of the Philippines
GOS	Government of Spain

GP	Group
GPES	Ground Proximity Extraction System
GPW	Geneva Prisoners of War Convention
GPWD	General Political Warfare Department
GRC	Government of the Republic of China
GRD	Ground
GVN	Government of Vietnam
HAC	Headquarters Area Command
HANDSID	Hand Emplaced Seismic Intrusion Dector
HCU	Habor Clearance Unit
HELOSIDE	Helicopter Deliverable Seismic Intrusion Detector
HES	Hamlet Evaluation System
H&I	Harrassment and Interdiction
HLZ	Helicopter Landing Zone
HMM	Marine Helicopter Squadron Medium
HQ	Headquarters
HR	Hour
IAD	Information Advisory Division
ICC	International Control Commission
ICCV	Inventory Control Center, RVN
ICEX	Infrastructure Intelligence Coordination and Exploitation
ICP	Inventory Control Point
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
ICM	Improved Conventional Munitions
ICS	Integrated Communications System
IDC	Industrial Development Center
IDCSS	Initial Defense Communications Satellite System
IDHS	Intelligence Data Handling System
I&E	Information and Education
I FFORCEV	I Field Force, Vietnam
II FFORCEV	II Field Force, Vietnam
IFS	Inshore Fire Support Ship
IG	Inspector General
IID	Infrared Intrusion Detector
ILA	International Longshoremens Association
ILC	International Logistics Center
I&M	Improvement and Modernization
INF	Infantry
INTSUM	Intelligence Summary
IO	Information Office/Officer
IOC	Initial Operational Capability
IR	Infrared
IRGFD	Infrared Gun Flash Detector
IRHA	Injuries Resulting from Hostile Action
IRS	Internal Revenue Service
ISA	International Security Affairs
ISC	Infiltration Surveillance Center
ISSA	Interservice Support Agreement
ITACS	Integrated Tactical Air Control System
IVS	International Voluntary Services
I/W	Individual Weapon

IWCS	Integrated Wideband Communications System
JAMTO	Joint Airlines Military Traffic Office
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JGS	Joint General Staff
JOSS	Joint Overseas Switch
JPRC	Joint Personnel Recovery Center
JRATA	Joint Research and Test Activity
JSOP	Joint Strategic Objectives Plan
JTACC	Joint Tactical Air Control Center
JTD	Joint Table of Distribution
JTOC	Joint Tactical Operations Center
JUSMAAG	Joint US Military Assistance and Advisory Group
JUSMAG PHIL	Joint US Military Advisory Group Philippines
JUSMAGTHAI	Joint US Military Assistance Advisory Group, Thailand
JUSPAO	Joint US Public Affairs Office
JUWTF	Joint Uncoventional Warfare Task Force
KBA	Killed by Air
KCAG	Korean Civic Action Group
KCS	Kit Carson Scout
KIA	Killed in Action
KKK	Khmer Kampucha Krom (Cambodian dissident group)
KLSC	Korean Logistic Service Corps
KMAG	Korean Military Advisory Group (US)
KM	Kilometer(s)
KR	Khmer Rouge
KS	Khmer Serei
KSCB	Khe Sanh Combat Base
LAA	Light Antiaircraft
LAAM	Light Antiaircraft Missile
LAAT	Logistics Advisory Assistance Team
LAPES	Low Altitude Parachute Extraction System
LASL	Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory
LAW	Light Anti-Tank Weapon
LCC	Amphibious Command Ship
LCCT	Lao Cong Chien Twong, Apprehended Deserters used as Laborers by ARVN
LCM	Landing Craft Mechanized
LCOP	Logistical Control Office Pacific
LCU	Landing Craft Utility
LCVP	Landing Craft Vehicle Personnel
LDNN	Lien Doi Nhuoi Nhai (Frogman Group) VNN
LF	Local Force
LFR	Inshore Fire Support Ship
LHFT	Light Helicopter Fire Team
LKA	Amphibious Cargo Ship
LLDB	Vietnamese Frogmen
LLLTV	Low Light Level TV
LN	Local National
LNO	Liaison Officer

LNRS	Limited Night Recovery System
LOC	Line of Communication
LOH	Light Observation Helicopter
LOI	Letter of Instruction
LOTS	Logistics-Over-The-Shore
LPA	Amphibious Transport
LPD	Amphibious Transport Dock
LPH	Amphibious Assault Ship
LRP	Long-Range Patrol
LRRP	Long-Range Reconnaissance Patrol
LSD	Dock Landing Ship
LSIL	Infantry Landing Ship Large
LSM	Landing Ship Medium
LSSC	Light SEAL Support Craft
LSSL	Support Landing Ship, Large
LST	Landing Ship Tank
LTC	Lieutenant Colonel
LT	Lieutenant
LTG	Lieutenant General
LT INF	Light Infantry
LVT	Landing Vehicle Track (Amphibious Tractor, AMTRAC)
LZ	Landing Zone
MAAG	Military Assistance Advisory Group
MAB	Marine Amphibious Brigade
MAC	Military Airlift Command
MACAG	Military Assistance Command Adjutant General
MACCOC	Military Assistance Command Combat Operation Center
MACDC	Military Assistance Command Construction Director
MACIG	Military Assistance Command Inspector General
MACMA	Military Assistance Command, Military Assistance Director
MACMD	Military Assistance Command Surgeon
MACOI	Military Assistance Command, Office of Information
MACCORDS	Military Assistance Command, Civil Operations and Rural Development Support Director
MACPD	Military Assistance Command, Psychological Operation Director
MACSA	Military Assistance Command, Science Advisor
MACSOG	Military Assistance Command, Studies and Observation Group
MACTHAI	Military Assistance Command, Thailand
MACV	Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
MACVDAC	Military Assistance Command, Vietnam Distribution and Allocation Committee
MAF	Marine Amphibious Force
MAG	Marine Air Group
MAGROCV	Military Advisory Group, Republic of China, Vietnam
MALT	Mobile Advisory Logistics Team
MAI	Military Assistance Institute

MAP	Military Assistance Program
MARDIV	Marine Division
MARADVU	Marine Advisory Unit
MAR REGT	Marine Infantry Regiment
MARS	Military Affiliate Radio Station/System
MASF	Military Assistance Service Funding
MATA	Military Advisor Training Assistance
MAT	Mobile Advisory Team
MATSB	Mobile Advanced Tactical Support Base
MATTLO	Military Attache Liaison Office
MAW	Marine Air Wing
MBBL	Thousand Barrels
MCI	Army Meal Combat Individual
MCID	Multipurpose Concealed Intrusion Detector
MCS	Mine Countermeasure Support Ship
MDAP	Material Defense Assistance Program
MDEM	Ministry for Development of Ethnic Minorities
MECH	Mechanized
MEDCAP	Medical Civic Action Program
MEF	Marine Expeditionary Force
MF	Main Force
MFR	Memorandum For Record
MG	Major General
MHB	Military History Branch
MHE	Materials Handling Equipment
MIA	Missing in Action
MICH	Minister of Information Chieu Hoi
MI	Mile
MILCAP	Military Civic Action Program
MILCON	Military Construction
MILPHAP	Military Provincial Hospital Assistance Program
MILSTAMP	Military Standard Transportation and Movement Procedures
MILSTRIP	Military Standard Requisitioning and Issue Procedure
MINRON	Mine Squadron
MIP	Motivation Indoctrination Program
MIUWSU	Mobile Inshore Undersea Warfare Surveillance Unit
MIUWG	Mobile Inshore Undersea Warfare Group
MLG	Mission Liaison Group
MM	Millimeter(s)
MMD	Merchant Marine Detail
MOB	Military Operational Boundary
MOD	Ministry of Defense
MOD&WV	Ministry of Defense and War Veterans
MOH	Ministry of Health
MOI	Minister of Information
MONEVAL	Monthly Evaluation Report
MON	Monitor
MOOSE	Move Out of Saigon Expeditiously

MOP	Measurement of Progress
MORD	Ministry of Revolutionary Development
MP	Military Police
MPC	Military Payment Certificate; Mission Press Center
MPW	Ministry of Public Work
MR	Military Region
MRB	Mobile Riverine Base
MRF	Mobile Riverine Force
MRS	Military Railway Service
MSB	Minesweeping Boat
MSC	Minesweeper Coastal
MSD	Minesweeper Drone
MSF	Mobile Strike Force
MSGT	Master Sergeant
MSO	Minesweeper Ocean
MSTS	Military Sea Transport Service
MSTSFE	Military Sea Transport Service, Far East
MTDA	Modified Table of Distribution & Allowance
MTOE	Modified Table of Organization & Equipment
MTDS	Marine Tactical Data System
MTMTS	Military Transport Management Terminal Service
MTT	Military Training Teams
MTON	Metric Ton
NAF	Nonappropriated Fund
NATO	North Altantic Treaty Organization
NAVADGP	Naval Advisory Group
NAVFORV	Naval Forces, Vietnam
NAVSUPPACT	Naval Support Activity
NBI	Nonbattle Injuries
NCB	Naval Construction Brigade
NCO	Noncommissioned Officer
NCR	Naval Construction Regiment
NDC	National Defense College
NETT	New Equipment Training Team
NFA	Not for Attribution
NFL	See NFLSVN below
NGFS	Naval Gunfire Support
NIC	National Interrogation Center
NICP	National Inventory Control Point
NISOV	Naval Investigatory Service Office, Vietnam
NLC	National Leadership Committee
NLC	National Legislative Council
NLD	New Life Development
NFLSVN	National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (also known as NLF or NFL)
NLHS	Neo Lao Hak Sat (Lao Patriotic Front)
NMCB	Naval Mobile Construction Battalion
NMCC	National Military Command Center
NOD	Night Observation Devices
NOFORN	Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals

NORM	Not Operationally Ready, Maintenance
NOR	Not Operationally Ready
NORS	Not Operationally Ready for Reason of Supply
NP	National Police
NPFF	National Police Field Force
NRDU-V	United States Navy Research and Development Unit, Vietnam
NSAD	Naval Support Activity, Danang
NSAM	National Security Action Memorandum
NSAS	Naval Support Activity, Saigon
NSD	Naval Supply Depot
NTC	Naval Training Center/National Training Center
NVA/PAVN	North Vietnamese Army/People's Army of North Vietnam
NVN	North Vietnam, also North Vietnamese
NVNAF	North Vietnam Air Force
NVNN	North Vietnamese Navy
NWP	Naval Warfare Publication
OA	Objective Area
O&M	Operations and Maintenance
OASD/ISA	Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
OASD/PA	Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Public Affairs
OCO/PSD	Office of Civil Operations/Psychological Directorate
OCRD	Office of the Chief Rural (formerly Revolutionary) Development
OCS	Officer Candidate School
OIC	Officer in Charge
OICC	Officer in Charge of Construction
OIR	Other Intelligence Requirements
OJT	On The Job Training
OPCON	Operational Control
OPLAN	Operations Plan
OPMG	Office of Provost Marshal General
OPN	Operations
OR	Operational Readiness
ORI	Operational Readiness Inspection
OSA	Office Secretary of the Army
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
OSD/ARPARDFUV	Projects Agency, Research and Development Field Unit, Vietnam
OSI	Office of Special Investigations
OSS	Overseas Switch
O&T	Organization and Training
OTC	Officer in Tactical Command
PACAF	Pacific Air Force
PACES	Pacification and Evaluation System
PACEX	Pacific Exchange System
PACFLT	Pacific Fleet

PACNAVFACV	Pacific Naval Facility, Vietnam
PACOM	Pacific Command
PACV	Patrol Air Cushion Vehicle
PA&E	Pacific Architects & Engineers, Inc.
PAMPA	PACOM Movements Priority Agency
PAN AM	Pan American Airways
PAT	People's Action Team
PBR	River Patrol Boat
PC	Patrol Craft
PCE	Escort Patrol Ship
PCF	Patrol Craft Inshore
PCS	Permanent Change of Station
PD	Pacification and Development
PDC	Propaganda Development Center
PERT	Program Evaluation and Review Technique
PF	Popular Forces
PFTC	Popular Force Training Center
PGM	Patrol Gunboat Medium
PG	Patrol Gunboat
PHD	Public Health Director
PHIL	Philippines
PHILCAGV	Philippines Civic Action Group, Vietnam
PHILCON	Philippine Contingent
PI	Physically Impaired
PIACCS	Pacfic Interim Automated Command and Control System
PID	Public Information Division
PIOCC	Provincial Intelligence and Operations Coordination Center
PIRAZ	Positive Identification Radar Advisory Zone
PL	Pathet Lao
PLC	People's Liberation Committees
PLL	Prescribed Load or Prescribed Load List
PLT	Platoon
PMDL	Provisional Military Demarcation Line
POI	Programs of Instruction
POL	Petroleum, Oil and Lubricants
POLWAR	Political Warfare
P&P	Plans and Policy
PPC	Printing and Publications Center
PRAISE	Program Review and Analysis Improvement System
PRC	Personnel Recovery Center
PRG	Provisional Revolutionary Government
PROV	Province
PRP	People's Revolutionary Party
PRU	Provincial Reconnaissance Unit
PSA	Province Senior Advisor
PSDF	People's Self Defense Force
PSID	Patrol Seismic Intrusion Detector
PSP	Pierced Steel Planking

PSYOP	Psychological Operations
PSYWAR	Psychological Warfare
P&T	Postes and Telecommunications
PUB	Publication
PTAI	Pacific Technical Analysts, Incorporated
PTT	Postes, Telegraphes, Telephones
PW	Prisoner of War
PX	Post Exchange
QL	Qvoc Lo (National Highway)
QTR	Quarter
R	Refrigerated Rations
RAAF	Royal Austrailan Air Force
RAG	River Assault Group
RAID	River Assault and Interdiction Division
RAMMS	RVNAF Automated Materiel Management System
RAR	Royal Australian Regiment
RATS	Remote Area Terminal System
RAS	River Assault Squadron
RBE	Red Ball Express
RC	Revolutionary Committee
RCDC	Radar Course Directory Central
RCT	Regimental Combat Team
R&D	Research and Development
RD	Rural (formerly Revolutionary) Development
RDC	Rural (formerly Revolutionary) Development Cadre
RDFU	Research and Development Field Unit
RDPG	Rural (formerly Revolutionary) Development People's Group
RDSD	Rural (formerly Revolutionary) Development Support Directorate
RDS	Rounds
RDST	Rural (formerly Revolutionary) Development Support Training
RDT&E	Research, Development, Testing and Evaluation
RDW	Rural (formerly Revolutionary) Development Workers
RECON	Reconnaissance
REGT	Regiment
REGTL	Regimental
REINF	Reinforced
RESP	Rural Elementary School Program
RET	Returned
RF	Regional Force
RFCOTT	Regional Force Company Training Teams
RFI	Radio Frequency Interference
RGR	Ranger
RIF	Reduction in Force
RIVASRON	River Assault Squadron
RIVDIV	River Assault Division
RIVFLOTONE	River Flotilla One

RKG	Royal Khmer (Cambodia) Government
RLAF	Royal Laotian Air Force
RLF	Royal Laotian Forces
RLG	Royal Laotian Government
RLT	Regimental Landing Team
RMK-BRJ	Raymond-Morrison-Knudsen/Brown-Road-James (Civilian Construction Firm)
RNZ	Royal New Zealand
ROC	Republic of China
ROE	Rules of Engagement
ROK	Republic of Korea
ROKA	Republic of Korea Army
ROKFV	Republic of Korea Forces, Vietnam
ROKG	Republic of Korea Government
ROKMC	Republic of Korea Marine Corps
ROP	Republic of the Philippines
RP	Route Package
RPC	River Patrol Craft
RPG	River Patrol Group
R&R	Rest and Recuperation
RRU	Radio Research Unit
RSR	Required Supply Rate
RSSZ	Rung Sat Special Zone
RTA	Royal Thai Army
RTAFB	Royal Thai Air Force Base
RTAF	Royal Thai Air Force
RTAFCONV	Royal Thai Air Force Contingent Vietnam
RTAVF	Royal Thai Army Vietnam Forces
RTFV	Royal Thai Forces, Vietnam
RTF	Reconnaissance Task Force
RTG	Royal Thai Government
RTMAGV	Royal Thai Military Assistance Group, Vietnam
RTN	Royal Thai Navy
RUDD	Remote Underwater Detection Device
RVN	Republic of Vietnam
RVNAF	Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces
RVNAFLS	Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces Language School
RWD	Rounds Per Weapon Per Day
S	Non-Refigerated Rations
(S)	Secret
SA	Senior Advisor
SAC	Strategic Air Command
SACMD	Senior Army Advisor Capitol Military District Special Zone
SAEDA	Subversion and Espionage Directed Against the United States Government
SAM	Space Available Mail; Special Air Mission; Surface-to Air Missile

SAPOV	Sub-Area Petroleum Office, Vietnam
SAR	Search and Rescue
SAS	Special Air Service
SATS	Short Airfield Tactical Strip
SAW	Special Air Warfare
S&D	Search and Destroy
SCATTOR	Small Craft Assets, Training and Turnover of Resources
SDS	Supplemental Data Sheet
SEACOORD	Southeast Asia Coordinating Committee
SEAITACS	Southeast Asia Integrated Tactical Air Control System
SEAL	Sea, Air, and Land
SEALORDS	Southeast Asia Lake-Ocean-River Delta Strategy
SEASIA	Southeast Asia
SEATO	Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
SECDEF	Secretary of Defense
SEVENTHFLT	Commander, Seventh Fleet
SECSTATE	Secretary of State
SECORD	Secure Voice Cordless Switchboard
SEER	System for Evaluating the Effectiveness of RVNAF
SEVAC	Secure Voice Access Console
SF	Special Forces
SFCP	Shore Fire Control Party
SFGA	Special Forces Group, Airborne
SFG	Special Forces Group
SHEDS	Ship Helicopter Extended Delivery System
SIAF	Small Independent Action Force
SICR	Specific Intelligence Collection Requirement
SIGINT	Signal Intelligence
SJA	Staff Judge Advocate
SJR	Special Joint Report
SLAM	Search, Locate, Annihilate and Monitor
SLAR	Side Looking Airborne Radar
SLF	Special Landing Force
SMA	Senior Marine Advisor
SMP	Special Munitions Package
S/O	Stockage Objective
SOFA	Status of Forces Agreement
SOG	Studies and Observation Group
SOI	Signal Operating Instructions
SOR	Specific Orders and Requirements
SOS	Special Operations Squadron
SP	Self-propelled
SPD	Special Projects Division
SPOS	Strong Point Obstacle System
SPT	Support
SPTD	Supported
SQDN	Squadron
SSAR	Southern Search and Rescue Station

SRO	Senior Ranking Officer
SSB	Single Sideband
SSI	Standard Signal Instructions
SSS	Simplified Supply System
STAB	Strike Assault Boat
STON	Short Ton (2000 lbs)
STAR	Speed Thru Air Supply
STOL	Short Take-Off and Landing
STZ	Special Tactical Zone
SVNLA	South Vietnam National Liberation Army
SWIFT	A 50 foot, 32 knot, Radar Equipped Aluminum Boat
SYNCOM	Synchronous Communications Satellite
TA	Table of Allowance
TACAIR	Tactical Air
TAC	Tactical Air Command
TAC/AFSC	Tactical Air Command/Air Force Systems Command
TACAN	Tactical Air Navigation
TACC	Tactical Air Control Center
TACP	Tactical Air Control Party
TACS	Tactical Air Control System
TADC	Tactical Air Direction Center
TAOR	Tactical Area of Responsibility
TAOR/I	Tactical Area of Responsibility or Interest
TASE	Tactical Air Support Element
TASS	Tactical Air Support Squadron
TC	Training Center
TCN	Third Country Nationals
TCP	Traffic Control Point
TD	Table of Distribution
TDA	Table of Distribution and Allowance
TDC	Target Detection Center
TDY	Temporary Duty
TE	Tactaical Emergency
TET	Lunar New Year Holiday
TF	Task Force
TFA	Task Force ALPHA
TFES	Territorial Force Evaluation System
TFS	Tactical Fighter Squadron
TFW	Tactical Fighter Wing
TG	Task Group
TIC	Troops in Contact
TIRS	Terrorist Incident Reporting System
TMA	Traffic Management Agency
TNT	Trinitrotoluene
TOC	Tactical Operations Center
TOE	Table of Organization and Equipment
TOT	Time Over (on) Target
TRAC	Target Research and Analysis Center
TRIM	Trail Road Interdiction Multi-Sensor

TRP	Troop
TRS	Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron
TRU	Technical Research Unit
TSA	Technical Supplemental Allowance
TSN	Tan Son Nhut (Air Base)
TTY	Teletype
TU	Task Unit
UAL	Unit Authorization List
UBA	United Buddhist Association
UBI	United Buddhist Institute
UCMJ	Uniform Code of Military Justice
UDT	Underwater Demolition Team
UE	Unit Equipment
UI	Unidentified
UNC	United Nations Command
UNICEF	United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund
UNK	Unknown
US	United States
USA	Unites States Army
USACDC	United States Army Combat Development Command
USAECAV	United States Army Engineer Construction Agency, Vietnam
USAF	United States Air Force
USAHAC	United States Army Headquarters Area Command
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USAIRA	United States Air Attache
USALCJ	United States Army Logistical Command, Japan
USAMC	United States Army Materiel Command
USAREUR	United States Army Europe
USARHAW	United States Army Hawaii
USARJ	United States Army Japan
USARPAC	United States Army Pacific
USARV	United States Army Vietnam
USARYIS	Unites States Army Ryukyus Island
USASF	United States Army Special Forces
USASFGV	United States Army Special Forces Group in Vietnam
USASMC	United States Army Supply and Maintenance Command
USASTRATCOM	United States Army Strategic Communication Command
USCG	United States Coast Guard
USCGC	United States Coast Guard Cutter
USD	Unattended Seismic Detector
USDAO	United States Defense Attache Office
USFJ	United States Forces Japan
USFK	United States Forces Korea
USG	United States Government
USIA	United States Information Agency
USIS	United States Information Service
USMAAGV	United States Military Assistance Advisory Group, Vietnam

USMC	United States Marine Corps
USN	United States Navy
USNS	United States Naval Ship
USO	United Service Organization
USS	United States Ship
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republic
UW	Uncoventional Warfare
VATLS	Visual Air Target Locating System
VC	Viet Cong (Vietnemese Communists)
VCI	Viet Cong (Vietnamese Communist) Infrastructure
VFR	Visual Flight Rules
VIC	Vicinity
VIP	Volunteer Information Program
VIS	Vietnamese Information Service
VMAC	Vietnam Military Assistance Command
VMFA	Marine Fighter Squadron (Attack)
VN	Vietnam or Vietnamese
VNAF	Vietnamese Air Force
VNMA	Vietnamese National Military Academy
VNMC	Vietnamese Marine Coprs
VNN	Vietnamese Navy
VNNATFG	Vietnamese Amphibious Task Force Group
VNQDD	Anti-French Nationalist Group
VNRS	Vietnamese Railroad System
VNSF	Vietnamese Special Forces
VP	Patrol Squadron
VR	Visual Reconnaissance
VRE	Vietnam Regional Exchange
VT	Varied Time
VTC	Vietnamese Training Center
VTR	Vehicle Track Recovery
VUNC	Voice of UN Command
WAAPM	Wide Area Anti-Personnel Mine
WAFC	Women's Armed Forces Corps
WAMTMTS	Western Area Military Transport Management Terminal Service
WBGP	Water-borne Guard Post
WBLC	Water-borne Logistics Craft
WESTPAC	Western Pacific
WHEC	United States Coast Guard High Endurance Cutter
WIA	Wounded in Action
WPB	Coast Guard Patrol Boat
WPN	Weapon
WRAIR	Walter Reed Army Institute of Research, Vietnam
YOG	Yard Oiler
YR	Harbor Repair Craft
YTB	Large Harbor Tug
ZIPPO	Flame Throwing LCM
ZULU	Greenwich Mean Time

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