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This Command History, 1965, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam contains a 9 page Index of Chapters which are contained.

Chapter I - The Year of Decision (deals with Situation Report, Challenge, VC Operations, Estimate of Enemy Courses of Action). Pages 1-27.

Chapter II - The Buildup (US, RVN, Free World Forces, US Advisory & Command Relationships, Logistical Support & Military Assistance). Pages 28-136.

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Chapter III - The Strategy (Plans, Concept of Operations, Phases, Contingency Plans). Page 137-160.

Chapter IV - The Employment (Types & varieties of Operations, Civic Action Program). Pages 161-256.

Chapter V - The Outcome (Buildup, Reactions, Accomplishments & Problems, The Future). Pages 257-265.

Tables, Figures, Footnotes, and Annexes A-N are contained on pages 266-482.

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

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

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CHAPTER I

THE YEAR OF DECISION

INTRODUCTION

(C) For the Free World counterinsurgency effort in Vietnam, 1964 had represented a year of change. In contrast, 1965 was the Year of Decision. While no panaceas were produced for the problems of communist insurgency, South Vietnamese internal instability, or American public confusion about Southeast Asia (SEASIA), 1965 was nonetheless a decisive year.

(C) The deterioration in the military situation was halted by the US buildup, and the unmistakable message for the enemy was that victory was now denied him. The Viet Cong/North Vietnam Army (VC/NVA) threat could no longer shelter behind the facade of "an expression of the aspirations of the South Vietnamese people." Although not all Americans chose to recognize this, the doubting minority dwindled numerically, if not vocally. And at the end of the year the American people clearly and overwhelmingly demonstrated their feelings in "Operation Christmas Star," one of the most impressive displays of support ever shown for the US fighting man.

(C) In-country, the South Vietnamese began to display traces of impatience with their nation's political, social and ethnic divisions, with personal avarice among their leaders, and with the apathetic conduct of the war. However, coups, rumors of coups and other manifestations of governmental instability continued.

(C) The year closed with an uneasy suspension of air attacks in North Vietnam (NVN), in line with a concerted political effort to crack the enemy's rigidity. On the ground, the storm was weathered; the path of military action was chosen; defeat, or any military resolution favoring the enemy, was rejected.

(U) The 1965 Command History portrays this dramatic turn of events from the point of view of General W.C. Westmoreland, the Commander, US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (COMUSMACV).

1
THE SITUATION

(C) As 1965 began, the VC were winning the war. Throughout the country, the military and political initiative was with the enemy.

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The Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) casualty rate in December 1964 was the highest of any month in that year. VC recruitment in South Vietnam (SVN) and NVA infiltration from NVN were on the rise. The Government of Vietnam (GVN) pacification program had been brought to a virtual standstill, with the great majority of rural areas either under VC control or "contested" in the VC's favor. The enemy radio claimed at the end of 1964 that three-fourths of SVN had been "liberated," and forecast "new and greater victories." VC terrorism, harassment, intimidation and sabotage were at a high level; friendly lines of communication (LOC's) were frequently closed. By the beginning of 1965, VC manpower had increased to between 93,000 and 113,000. It was apparent that the enemy was now seeking to standardize weapons in VC main force units and was also beginning to supplement these units with regular NVA elements. With the alarming buildup, it appeared that the VC intended to create a strategic base from which to isolate principal GVN centers. The enemy's psychological campaign to weaken the will of GVN supporters and uncommitted citizens was intensified. The VC strategy evidently was based on the assumption that the US would not increase its involvement and that as a result of the turmoil within the GVN a political vacuum would be created which only the VC could fill.

(C) In January 1965, the GVN was unstable and ineffective. There had been no letup in political maneuvering by various religious groups, military cliques and fragmented political parties since the fall of the Diem regime. Government ministries and provincial leaders were operating without direction, guidance or support from the central government. This near-paralysis in government affected the war effort. The morale of the populace was ebbing because of the lack of confidence in the ability of the national leadership to prosecute the war and also because of the uncertainty of the continuation and extent of U.S. support.

(C) In the field, Army of Vietnam (ARVN) units were adopting an increasingly defensive role. The number of ARVN-initiated offensives fell off drastically and soon ARVN was merely reacting to VC attacks. At the same time, GVN pacification and psychological warfare activities were stalled, and both programs needed overhauling.

(C) In the face of the rising VC threat, it was apparent that RVNAF strength was insufficient for both offensive operations and support of the pacification program. Strengths at the beginning of the year stood at approximately 246,000 regular forces, 96,000 Regional Forces (RF), 168,000 Popular Forces (PF) and 31,500 National Police (NP). ARVN, with a strength of 220,000, formed the bulk of the regular forces. The Vietnamese Marine Corps (VNMC), employed in a general reserve role, had a stable strength of about 7,000 men. The Vietnamese Navy (VNN), with about 8,000 men, was not contributing much to the war effort and its leadership was probably the poorest of

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the armed forces. The approximately 11,000 Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF) personnel were flying and supporting a total of 280 non-jet aircraft comprising 15 squadrons. VNAF fighter and helicopter squadrons were heavily engaged in direct support of ARVN. RVNAF force increases, primarily in ground combat troops, had been recognized as necessary and were requested in November 1964 following a joint US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (USMACV)/RVNAF survey of RVNAF structure. The smaller of two alternative buildup plans appeared more realistic considering the GVN's available manpower base, its limited training facilities and a shortage of trained leaders. RVNAF was equipped with Military Assistance Program (MAP) supported weapons. Little sophistication had been introduced. The VNAF was undergoing modernization, but jet aircraft were yet to be used in combat. The armed helicopter was playing an important support role. RVNAF Joint General Staff (JGS) Directive AB 139, dated December 1964, was the basic campaign plan for the war and called for increased efforts to thwart the VC and to exert GVN control over vital population and agricultural areas.

(C) The US military commitment, as the year began, consisted of a large advisory element with teams deployed to tactical units at battalion/squadron level. All sectors (43) had an advisory team assigned, and 103 subsector teams had been deployed. The Army advisory elements, Marine advisory unit (MARADVU), the Air Force Advisory Group (AFAG), the Naval Advisory Group (NAVGP), and the USMACV staff and staff advisory elements were included in a single Joint Table of Distribution (JTD) dated 1 September 1964. Approximately 400 Free World Military Assistance Forces (FWMAF) troops from six nations were also in-country. These forces, oriented toward advisory or civic action tasks, came from Australia, China, Korea, New Zealand, the Philippines and Thailand.

(C) US Army (USA) personnel totaled nearly 15,000. About one third were acting in advisory roles or as staff support for the advisory effort. The other two thirds were providing combat support and combat service support to RVNAF and US advisors.

(C) Most of the US Air Force's (USAF) 4,400 personnel in-country were occupied with training and developing the VNAF. The USAF inventory in Vietnam as of 1 January 1965 consisted of 220 aircraft of 15 types, operating from three air bases, Tan Son Nhut (TSN), Bien Hoa and Da Nang.

(C) Almost all of the 700 US Marine Corps (USMC) personnel in-country were members of a medium helicopter squadron which had been supporting RVNAF since 1962. The US NAVGP assisting the VNN had about 200 men.

(C) The small US advisory teams scattered throughout the country

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with multi-service concentrations in Saigon and other large centers were serviced by a fragmented logistical system involving 16 different agencies. There was no logistic base in-country to provide combat service support for major US troop units. But, as plans for large scale US involvement developed, logistic planning in-country became increasingly oriented to the needs of basic combat elements. At the same time, Okinawa was being considered as the site of an off-shore logistics base for Vietnam. The approval late in 1964 of additional airfield construction at Da Nang and Chu Lai signaled the start of an immense construction effort which accompanied the establishment of a combat service support base during 1965.

(C) The politico-military balance sheet in SVN as 1965 began was, in sum, significantly in the enemy's favor and represented a formidable challenge for USMACV. The detailed nature of this challenge and how it was met are described in this Command History.

THE VIET CONG CHALLENGE

VC Operations During the Year

(S) The VC made significant political and military gains in 1964 despite occasional RVNAF successes in the field. VC military strength was increasing rapidly at the end of the year partly because of stepped up infiltration of NVA units. VC forces were sufficiently strong to support more aggressive operations. The RVNAF suffered heavy losses in the major battle at Binh Gia, Phuoc Tuy Province. The VC succeeded in effectively stopping GVN pacification efforts almost everywhere in SVN. At the same time, RVNAF successes failed to make lasting inroads into areas controlled by the VC. On the political scene, the Armed Forces Council (AFC) dissolved the High National Council (HNC) on 20 December 1964.

(C) There were no indications that the VC political organization changed during 1965. The VC in the RVN were as firmly controlled by the Hanoi regime as ever through the Workers' Party of Vietnam (Dang Lao Dong Vietnam, or simply, Lao Dong), the VC appeared to have tactical control over their own actions, but policy and strategic direction came from the Hanoi regime through the Lao Dong apparatus.2

(C) The communist organization in RVN consisted of a pyramidal hierarchy of commands, each with joint military-political functions. At the top and directly responsible to Hanoi, was the Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN). The COSVN directed the plans and activities of the Vietnamese insurgent movement. Within this framework the VC military organization had only a secondary role, that of creating

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conditions conducive to VC political warfare objectives.

(C) The general increase in VC activity during February 1965 in the II Corps Tactical Zone (CTZ), coupled with confirmed infiltration of well-trained and well-armed personnel into the area, was felt to be part of an overall plan to isolate the highlands from the rest of the country in order to establish a strong political and military base there. The possibility existed that this would be accomplished by severing RVN.[3] From this secure base the VC could then aggressively drive the RVNAF forces into a defensive posture. In anticipation of these developments, the communists had improved the infiltration routes from NVN through Laos and Cambodia, continued their infiltration by sea and consolidated their logistical system.[4] During the month the VC succeeded in cutting Route 19 at Mang Yang Pass in Pleiku Province and gained virtual control of northern Binh Dinh Province with the exception of district towns and the province capital.[5] They cut the II CTZ main supply route between Qui Nhon and Pleiku and forced the GVN to relinquish control of the Dak To Valley in Kontum Province. The VC sabotaged the railroad between Nha Trang and Da Nang and the deterioration in the security situation forced the GVN to abandon any repair effort.[6]

(S) Documents, weapons, and prisoners captured during February provided the basis for a complete reevaluation by RVN and US intellegence of the VC logistical and tactical capabilities. An increased number of Chinese Communist (CHICOM) copies of the new Soviet family of small arms (7.62-mm) and anti-tank rockets had appeared in the northern provinces. The use of these new weapons, coupled with highly effective employment of mortars, indicated a state of training heretofore not accorded the VC. Some VC dead and captured appeared well fed and were dressed in khaki uniforms with CHICOM web equipment. Units comprising these individuals, possibly newly infiltrated from NVN, were better disciplined in the face of ARVN action.[7]

(S) During March and April, VC incidents continued to be relatively low, indicating that they were in preparation, training, and reorganization for a "summer offensive" campaign. The presence of an NVA battalion in Kontum Province, II CTZ, was confirmed during March.[8] This period of relative quiet ended on 6 May when an estimated main force battalion attacked Father Hoa's troops in Hai Yen District, An Xuyen Province. (Father Hoa was a Catholic Priest who led RVN military forces in the defense of an enclave in the U Minh area.) In an attempt to confine GVN control to the main population centers and to increase their freedom of movement, the VC increased road and rail sabotage both in the provinces around Saigon (Hop Tac area) and in the northern coastal provinces. VC pressure against Saigon was highlighted in May by destruction of the Danhiem-Saigon powerline and the prevention of subsequent repair work. During the month, VC activity was characterized by a renewed willingness to engage regular ARVN forces

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and an intensive campaign to subvert GVN influence in the countryside, particularly in the Hop Tac area. They concentrated on interdicting lines of communication and destroying ARVN units.[9]

(S) In June, the VC accelerated their efforts in all phases of the war: military (see Figure I-1), political, economic and psychological. The VC made significant gains in their efforts to destroy RVNAF and to neutralize GVN influence in the rural areas. The VC demonstrated their ability to coordinate the efforts of elements of three main force regiments during the attack on Dong Xoai (Phuoc Long Province, 10 June). VC objectives appeared to be control of the Phuoc Long highland area as well as to destroy ARVN units committed as relief forces. ARVN losses were heavy; VC losses were even heavier. The overall VC objectives were thwarted.[10] There was also an increasing number of less spectacular, small military actions and harassments directed against isolated RVNAF posts. These were the types of endeavor by which the VC expected to wear down the will-to-resist among both the military and civilians; discredit the GVN's ability to protect the people, and thereby steadily usurp political control.[11]

(S) Realizing the effectiveness of air strikes and hoping to offset these losses by gaining a psychological victory, the VC made numerous attempts to neutralize US and VNAF air power by a series of night attacks on airfields. On 1 July, a VC special mission team supported by 81-mm mortars and 57-mm recoilless rifles (RR), successfully raided the Da Nang airfield complex and destroyed two C-130's and two F-102 aircraft.[12] Also, the VC attacks on the Ba Gia outpost (Quang Ngai Province, 5 July) and on the Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) camp at Bu Dop (Phuoc Long Province, 20 July), with forces greater than two battalions, again proved their ability to coordinate the efforts of large forces.[13]

(S) The VC offensive was blunted in July when VC casualties reached a new high (see Figure I-2). Despite careful planning and local superiority, VC losses were heavy, largely due to the effectiveness of US/VNAF tactical air power. Although in the first week of the month they pressed their campaign to control the central highlands by their actions in Kontum Province, their activity dropped off elsewhere in the II and III CTZ's. While the VC had demonstrated their ability to maneuver large forces and to detach selected district towns temporarily from GVN control, heavy losses undoubtedly necessitated some degree of reorganization and reevaluation of their efforts and position.[14]

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(S) The month of August was almost certainly a period of decision for the Hanoi strategists. The US and FWMAF buildup in the RVN, the continued bombing of military targets in NVN since February, and the heavy casualties inflicted on the VC forces, were primary causes of an apparent deterioration of morale in the VC ranks. The pattern of activity during August hinted that the VC may have been directed to revert to guerrilla-type warfare. They tried to avoid contact with any strong ARVN or US forces whenever possible.15 They continued, however, to interdict LOC's throughout the RVN particularly in the IV CTZ in an effort to disrupt, if not control, the flow of food grains from the Mekong Delta to Saigon.16

(S) Also in August the VC demonstrated improved capabilities in firepower and mobility. In III CTZ, on 24 August, the VC employed a 75-mm howitzer in a harassing attack on Bien Hoa air base. On the same day they shelled Tan Uyen (Binh Duong Province) with a 70-mm howitzer of Japanese manufacture. They demonstrated increased mobility through the use of trucks in II and III CTZ's and motorized junks in IV CTZ.17

(S) In September, the VC made limited attacks in attempting to regain the initiative. Although fewer in number, the magnitude of the attacks increased. These actions were conducted very boldly and aggressively, particularly in Binh Dinh Province.18 On 23 September, they engaged the ARVN 23d Ranger Battalion (Bn) with about two battalions and, on 28 September, they engaged the ARVN 2d Bn, 41st Regt (Regiment), with two other battalions. The fierce fighting and the massive air support of US and VNAF forces resulted in about 2,050 VC killed in action (KIA).19 Having suffered such a great loss, the VC/NVA forces appeared to be desperately in need of a major victory for psychological reasons.20

(S) The VC made a change in their tactics in late September in their attacks in Binh Dinh Province. They reacted to US and ARVN offensives by attacking during daylight and maintained contact despite being subjected to repeated air strikes. This tactic was more similar to the conventional type employed by NVA units than it was to the usual hit-and-run tactics used by the VC.21

(S) Of further significance was the VC's ability to absorb heavy combat losses and yet remain capable of conducting large tactical operations. This could indicate only that the NVN infiltration of men and supplies had been accelerated.22

(C) The Vietnamese communists suffered an additional setback when their propaganda appeal for a general strike and an hour of silence on 15 October, to commemorate the anniversary of the execution of a VC terrorist, was largely ignored by the RVN citizenry. On 19 October, two NVA regiments attempted to overrun the CIDG camp at Plei Me and ambushed the reaction force sent to relieve the camp. On 20 October, two VC battalions unsuccessfully attempted to retake Ba Long Valley (Quang Tri Province). In each of these large scale encounters, the VC suffered heavy casualties.

(S) In November, the VC took advantage of low cloud ceiling and heavy rain to attack a series of RF/PF posts. The 18th NVA Regt attacked the 37th Ranger Bn ten kilometers south of Quang Ngai city; however, naval gunfire supported the Rangers and the attack was successfully repulsed. On 14 November the 32d and 66th NVA Regts encountered the 3d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) (3d Bde, 1st Cav Div (AM)), in the Ia Drang Valley (Chu Pong, Pleiku Province). Repeated attempts were made to overrun the US positions using human wave attacks, but these were thwarted by the 3d Bde's employment of air, artillery and armed helicopter support. This engagement was evidently a carefully planned experiment designed to test the behavior and reaction time of US forces. There were overtones of a willingness to sacrifice troops in order to inflict an impressive loss on US forces. On 27 November, the VC attacked and overran the 7th ARVN Regt at the Michelin Plantation causing 602 casualties[23] using the element of surprise and the classic application of automatic weapons fired at close range in a short, violent engagement.

(S) The VC/NVA forces began to rely more extensively on heavy, close-in fire in meeting general offensive and defensive requirements. A typical offensive tactic was movement under cover of darkness or concealment to positions near the objective. The maintenance of close contact in an attempt to discourage use of air strikes and artillery, was effective, but it also increased VC vulnerability to friendly small arms fire and grenades.[24]

(C) The largest enemy operations in December, for the most part, were in reaction to friendly incursions into VC territory. The overruning of an outpost in western Quang Tri Province and reports of infiltration through the same area suggested that the enemy was attempting to reoccupy and secure the Ba Long Valley strategic access route into I CTZ. Indications of large scale infiltration into northern Kontum and the movement of personnel from the IV CTZ to the III CTZ continued. Friendly operations in the Mekong Delta resulted in heavy enemy losses, but the

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enemy was successful in conducting harassing attacks against isolated and lightly defended outposts and watch towers.[25]

(C) In December, the VC made more pronounced attempts to shake the confidence of the people in the cities and to lower their will to resist. Terrorist activity designed to unsettle the populace and to harass US forces, and VC inspired agitation within the populace, increased. VC propaganda, both within the RVN and worldwide, stressed the theme of the US as the primary enemy of the Vietnamese people. The presence of a VC regiment, subordinate to the Saigon-Gia Dinh Special Zone Committee, with six battalions deployed around the periphery of the Capital Military Region (CMR), was confirmed.[26]

VC Tactics and Techniques

(S) The rationale for VC actions was based on the communist propaganda that the VC was truly representative of the RVN citizenry and that the VC was engaged in a just struggle to liberate the nation from those who were supported by imperialistic powers. Empowered by this belief, the VC were convinced that any action which strengthened their control and influence over the people of RVN was justified. These actions ranged from the simple threat of a terrorist to massive attacks by conventional military units. Total VC incidents during 1965 categorized in terms of attacks against military posts, attacks against new rural life hamlets, ambushes, kidnappings, other terrorist actions, assassinations, sabotage and propaganda amounted to 30,813. (See Table I-1 and Figures I-3 thru 7.)

(S) The VC tactical doctrine in 1965 emphasized offensive action and in general followed the same guerrilla warfare tactics that were developed by the Viet Minh during the French-Viet Minh War. Planning probably played the largest role in every VC operation. Observation of outposts for attacks, sand-table exercises, walk-throughs, routes of movement, bivouacs, withdrawal routes, and all other preparatory aspects received minute attention, until each participant knew exactly what to do in a given situation.

(C) VC doctrine emphasized surprise and superior forces. Essentially, they fought only on their own terms: first to deploy in the critical areas; first to open fire; first to assault. When a favorable condition could not be obtained because of enemy strength and/or terrain, the VC commander left a small element in contact and disengaged the main force. The VC very frequently employed their favorite tactic of attacking a position and then ambushing the reaction force.[27]

(S) The VC tried to counter the airmobile operations of the US/RVNAF forces by using surprise and superior manpower and preparing

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all probable landing zones within ten kilometers of the objective as helicopter ambush sites. The VC also used anti-aircraft weapons which were centrally controlled and coordinated to deny use of certain landing zones, thereby channelling the airmobile force into using landing zones covered by the VC in defensive positions.[28]

(C) VC main force units normally were employed in a triangular concept based on favorable odds of about four to one in relation to the number of RVN forces available from surrounding bases. The VC made extensive use of local people as guides, listening posts, and labor units for the preparation of, and exfiltration from, the battlefield.

(C) Command and control communications employed by VC forces countering an airmobile operation consisted primarily of radio and land line communications. The communications capabilities of the VC included voice and continuous wave, field telephones, visual signaling devices (light and smoke), and a potential for direction finding.

(C) Training facilities in NVN and RVN were designed to support both NVA and VC tactical and organizational requirements. Political indoctrination and military training were inseparable in this system. Political subjects took approximately 40 percent of the total training period. Pre-infiltration training in NVN was reportedly very thorough and predominantly, infantry oriented, but selected individuals also received courses in communications, engineering, medicine, intelligence and artillery. VC training generally was four months in duration.[29]

(S) When the year began, there were indications that the VC had introduced a new family of weapons of CHICOM manufacture in their arsenal. First captured in Ba Xuyen Province on 11 December 1964 by RVNAF, weapons were identified as CHICOM copies of the Soviet assault rifle, AR-47, SKS semi-automatic carbine, and the RPD light machine gun. All three weapons utilized a CHICOM manufactured 7.62-mm M43 intermediate cartridge of Soviet design. Introduction of these weapons was an indication of possible VC weapons standardization.[30]

(C) The VC supply of weapons and ammunition had been accumulated from several sources. Weapons cached in SVN or Cambodia after the cessation of hostilities in 1954 were still in the VC inventory at the end of 1965. Bloc weapons infiltrated from NVN and captured weapons, however, were the main sources of supply. In 1965 the VC emphasis on local manufacture in SVN seemed to be on ammunition, hand grenades, and mines [illegible] weapons. Since crew served weapons had been

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introduced in quantity in 1965, 81-mm or 82-mm mortars probably were in most main force battalions. 75-mm RR's were also believed to be in most main force artillery battalions. This enabled the VC to make considerable progress in distributing lighter weapons, such as the 60-mm mortar and 57-mm RR to the weapons company level of main and local force companies and battalions. As the year ended, unconfirmed intelligence reports indicated the existence of 120-mm mortars in-country.

Infiltration

(S) The character and intensity of infiltration from NVN had been a subject of much intelligence interest and concern for many years. In 1965 there was an increasingly critical need for accurate and detailed information regarding infiltration routes because it was confirmed that regular NVA units had infiltrated the RVN over these trails; the continued bombings of lines of communication and supply depots in NVN did not appear significantly to stem the flow of men and material through Laos to the RVN, and a campaign for effective interdiction of these passages in Laos appeared to be essential. In 1965 several studies were made on this subject, resulting in better estimates of NVN capabilities and more accurate assessments of the type of men and material which moved over the infiltration routes.[31] Information regarding infiltration routes was gathered from a number of sources including: US and GVN covert agents; ARVN sources at the district and national level; the National Police, and the Vietnamese citizenry. However, COMUSMACV based most of his estimates on the interrogation of VC/NVA captives and ralliers and on captured VC documents, because of the relative unreliability of other sources.[32]

(S) These studies revealed that a central agency in NVN, known as the Central Reunification Committee, was in charge of all matters pertaining to infiltration. The dense jungle corridor along the RVN-Laos border, and the central and western portion of the SVN-NVN border areas, offered ideal conditions for the infiltration of personnel and supplies. Infiltrating groups assigned to the Central Highlands and Central Vietnam took several routes to their destinations, including three main land infiltration routes. One was the inland route, first uncovered in 1960. It consisted of a communication-liaison line of 32 way stations from the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) through the RVN provinces of Quang Tri, Thua Thien, Quang Nam, Quang Tin, Quang Ngai, Kontum, Binh Dinh, Phu Bon, and Darlac.[33] This route was extensively used during the initial infiltration period, 1956-59. The second route was traceable from Vinh in NVN by Highway 8 into Laos through Nape, Nahaxay, by Highway 12 to the Nung Khe Ferry, Mu Gia Pass, Muong Sin Na Ni and Tchepone. From Tchepone, still in Laos, the trail

passed through Muong Nong, Tuse to Tamprill. From Tamprill, groups were split into small units and proceeded to their destinations by multiple routes.[34] The third route, which was probably most used in 1965, and known as the "Main Corridor," crossed into Laos just north of the DMZ, paralleled the Laos-RVN border and crossed into RVN in a number of places, the last of which was at the Laos-RVN-Cambodia border intersection. This route was used as early as April 1962 and was probably preferred because of the shorter time required to traverse it.[35]

(C) The NVN authorities used the sea infiltration routes primarily for supplies, weapons and ammunition. A striking discovery of the sea infiltration operations was made in February 1965. VNAF planes sank an NVN ship which had brought about 100 tons of arms and ammunition to a secluded cove in RVN. In caves near the shore of Vung Ro Bay, the VC had hidden approximately one million rounds of small arms ammunition; four thousand rounds of mortar ammunition; recoilless rifles; submachine guns; large quantities of grenades; and explosives and medicines from factories in the communist bloc.[36]

(S) According to GVN and USMACV estimates, NVN, in early 1965, had to provide weapons and equipment for a substantial number of VC/NVA units and guerrillas. While some of the supplies may have come by the sea routes, most probably were sent overland. USMACV intelligence confirmed that the 70th Transportation Group of the NVA controlled the infiltration of both men and material from NVN, through Laos, to the tri-border area of Laos and Thua Thien-Quang Nam Provinces in SVN. Initially starting with some 400 men in 1959, its strength exceeded 2,000 military personnel and porters in 1965. It was responsible for communication-liaison-transport stations along the "Main Corridor."[37] Later estimates indicated that the VC land infiltration system employed over 100 stations and at least 6,000 men. Where possible, sampans and shallow draft boats were employed. In other areas elephants and oxen were used. In the Delta, the VC used motorized junks for transporting supplies, equipment and personnel. Ships were used to transport materials to points in An Xuyen Province and Sihanoukville, Cambodia, from which they were transported overland to the western border areas of RVN.[38]

(S) With the introduction of additional NVA units and an improved logistic support system, it was logical to expect that the level of combat would increase and that enemy logistical requirements would rise. COMUSMACV estimated that the required pounds per man per day would probably reach a level of

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8.2 pounds for NVA personnel, and 3.6 pounds for VC troops.[39]

(S) The VC/NVA total LOC capacity was estimated at 234 tons per day. Under light combat conditions the enemy forces in RVN during 1965 were estimated to require about 84 tons per day from stockpiles. Thus, VC/NVA had an excess of 150 tons which could support an estimated 80 additional VC/NVA battalions.[40]

(TS) During 1965, the logistical support of the VC was derived from three bases. The population and resources of the RVN provided material support in the form of foodstuffs and clothing. From June 1963 to June 1964, all units were required to furnish 100 percent of their own subsistence. After June 1964, combat units provided 50 percent for themselves; all other units, 100 percent. NVN was the second base of supply, providing weapons and ammunition. The third base was other countries. COMUSMACV estimated that bases in Cambodia served as a convenient transshipment point for supplies from NVN and Communist China and considered that a minimum of 25 tons per day was crossing into RVN from Cambodia.[41] On 9 December 1965, COMUSMACV informed Commander in Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC) that the border area of Cambodia contained truck infiltration routes, command centers, and base training and supply areas similar to those in Laos.[42]

(S) Accumulated evidence indicated that VC base areas were still the focal point of the VC logistics system; the bases served not only as logistical support areas but also as centers for political, economic and military action. The base area concept was fundamental to the VC logistic system. Traditional Viet Minh major base areas included the Do Xa, War Zones C and D, the Dong Thap Muoi (Plain of Reeds) and U Minh areas (See Figure I-8). Toward the end of 1965, it appeared that in spite of the bombings of supply depots and LOC's in NVN, the VC still had an efficient logistic system, primitive and cumbersome though it was. However, the VC logistic system was not then capable of supporting a sustained VC/NVA offensive.[43]

(S) In early 1965, COMUSMACV estimated that the NVN regime was infiltrating the equivalent of three battalions of troops per month. By the end of 1965, there was growing evidence that NVN was sending as many as 12 battalions per month into SVN.[44] The significant feature of NVN's infiltration program for the year was not only the dramatic increase in numbers of personnel, but also the introduction of regular NVA units into RVN.[45]

(S) Hanoi leaders apparently decided to introduce regular NVA units into the RVN in order to attain the force structure necessary to maintain "strategic mobility." The enemy's logical

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objective was to amass a sufficient number of maneuver battalions so as to be capable of posing a significant threat in widely separated areas, thus tending to tie down large numbers of US/FWMAF/RVNAF in static defensive roles. This would allow them to destroy selected targets in detail at a time and place of their choice.[46]

(TS) On 21 November 1965, COMUSMACV informed CINCPAC that intelligence derived from captured enemy documents and prisoner of war (PW) interrogations indicated that there were much greater VC/NVA forces in the RVN than had been previously estimated. As of that date, COMUSMACV revised his holdings to: 16 confirmed, 4 probable and 1 possible VC/NVA main force regiments in the RVN.[47] (For 1965 order-of-battle holdings see Table I-2.)

(C) Among the 26,188 infiltrators into the RVN during 1965, 11,050 were believed assigned to the following regular NVA units: Song Lam, 18th, 32d, 66th, 95th, 101st and 250th regiments and the 195th AA Bn. About 50 percent of 1964 infiltrators and 90 percent of 1965 infiltrators were believed to be ethnic North Vietnamese.[48]

(TS) US efforts to counter these infiltrations resulted in the following operations (described in Chapter IV): MARKET TIME, BARREL ROLL, STEEL TIGER, TIGER HOUND, and SHINING BRASS. COMUSMACV established a counterinfiltration committee on 15 November to promote ideas and improvements in developing ways for more effective utilization of airpower in countering infiltrations. Recommendations made by this committee are described in Chapter IV.

Estimate of Enemy Courses of Action

(S) In November, COMUSMACV and the US Ambassador estimated that there were four broad alternatives which the communist strategists could choose: 1) major overt escalation in order to seek an early military decision; 2) continuation of their current strategy of augmenting their capabilities for the gradual transition to conventional warfare; 3) reversion to a lesser scale of insurgency; or 4) a negotiated settlement.[49]

(S) COMUSMACV and the Ambassador believed that the Hanoi strategists had apparently adopted the second alternative since there were indications that the buildup of VC capabilities were in gradual terms and leading towards eventual conventional operations. These indications included: 1) infiltration of

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additional military units from NVN; 2) the buildup of main force units at the expense of village guerrilla units; 3) captured documents of late July stating that VC goals for 1965 remained unchanged; 4) continued confidence and determination to press the war as reflected in Hanoi and Vietnamese communist statements; 5) construction of truck supply routes through Laos; 6) resumption of large-scale attacks despite losses suffered in previous actions; 7) marked increase in VC activity after October; 8) continued development of NVN's air defense capabilities, with CHICOM and Soviet support to reduce the effectiveness of US air strikes; and 9) the continuing fragility of the GVN and its vulnerability to VC pressures.[50]

(S) COMUSMACV and the Ambassador believed that the enemy would continue on his present course of action at least through the first few months of 1966. They believed that the VC were forming new main force units within RVN and would infiltrate additional units, perhaps the equivalent of one or two divisions from the north. By doing so, the communists apparently hoped to restore a strategic balance of forces in order to regain the initiative through a combination of large-scale attacks and widespread guerrilla action. The communists' purpose probably would be to expand their base areas and inflict maximum attrition on Vietnamese morale with a view toward creating a condition conducive to collapsing the GVN. COMUSMACV and the Ambassador did not expect Hanoi to direct the reversion to purely guerrilla warfare or to seek a negotiated settlement until they were convinced that their current course would not succeed. This point would not likely be reached until the capabilities of the VC/NVA forces, then being created and deployed, were neutralized or impaired in battle. COMUSMACV and the Ambassador believed that if the VC/NVA forces were allowed to regain the initiative and momentum on the battlefield, which they enjoyed earlier in 1965, it might result in increasing GVN instability--a condition which could prove decisive in the outcome of the war.[51]

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GVN INSTABILITY

Political Problems

(S) At the beginning of 1965, the GVN was still immersed in a crisis which was triggered on 20 December 1964 by the RVN AFC. At that time, a group of high-ranking military officers dissolved the HNC and arrested some of its members. During the first week of 1965, GVN Chief of State Phan Khac Suu and Prime Minister Tran Van Huong insisted that the arrest of the HNC members and its dissolution were illegal acts which had to be reversed. The AFC did not agree.[52] A joint communique issued in mid-January clarified the situation and eased the tensions between the civilian government and the military group. Arrested HNC members were released, measures were formulated to allow military participation in the GVN and plans were considered for election of the National Assembly.[53]

(C) During the week of 17 - 23 January, the United Buddhist Institute (UBI) leaders launched a hunger strike "to the death" in their effort to oust the Huong government. In Hue, security forces did not even attempt to control the large crowds which surged through the city carrying anti-Taylor, anti-Huong banners and set fire to the United States Information Service (USIS) library. The Buddhists were opposed to the Huong government because they could not control it, so they continued their opposition throughout January.[54]

(S) The AFC lost confidence in both Chief of State Suu and Premier Huong because of a deterioration of the security situation. The AFC placed the government under military control. On 27 January, General Nguyen Khanh, who had been Prime Minister in October 1964, regained power by unseating Huong and thrusting the reins of temporary power into the hands of Dr. Nguyen Xuan Oanh who accepted the position of Prime Minister. Phan Khac Suu continued as Chief of State. In its caretaker status, the Oanh government had no genuine base of support. It merely kept the government in a precarious equilibrium among the various factions that were conducting backstage maneuvering to form a new government.

(S) The anticipated new regime was installed during the week of 12 - 20 February under Dr. Phan Huy Quat. Members were appointed to the National Legislative Council (NLC). The composition of the Quat government had two characteristics which were lacking in the pre-Quat government:

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a central core of like-minded men, and a wide representation among religious and political groupings. On 19 February, a coup was attempted by a group whose nucleus was essentially the same as the plotters of the 13 September 1964 coup. Col Phan Ngoc Thao appeared as spokesman for the group. The coup forces surrounded General Khanh's residence and seized the Postes, Telegraphes, Telephones (PTT) exchange, the radio station, and TSN air base. However, radio statements criticizing the anti-Diem revolution of November 1963 and advocating the separation of religion from politics made it appear that the group's attitude was antagonistic to the United Buddhist Association (UBA). Military leaders who had initially withheld support of the coup worked against the coup attempt the next day causing its collapse. US authorities urged that bloodshed be avoided and that there be no direct clashes of the opposing forces. The attempted coup forced General Khanh's departure from GVN politics, which he had manipulated for about a year. Quat's government avoided the issue, viewing it as a struggle among military factions.

(S) On 8 February, COMUSMACV contacted Air Commodore Nguyen Cao Ky at his headquarters at Bien Hoa and urged Ky to reconsider his alleged plan to bomb the TSN airfield because of the presence of the coup leaders there. Ky replied that he did not want to bomb the airfield but felt that he had to undertake some action to check the movements of his adversaries. COMUSMACV forcefully urged the avoidance of bloodshed and suggested courses of action which were fully supported by the US Ambassador: avoid the bombing; instruct unit commanders to keep their troops in place; and assemble the AFC to discuss the differences of the opposed factions.55

(S) On 19 February, the Ambassador, with the concurrence of Premier Quat, suggested to Air Commodore Ky that he attempt to call a meeting of the AFC at Bien Hoa that evening or early the next day. He also suggested that Ky inform corps and unit commanders of the meeting and urged a standdown of troop movements. In Hue, about 200 university students had reportedly assumed control of the radio station. The students urged the public to demonstrate against the return of General Khiem (RVN ambassador to the US and a former follower of Diem). No action was taken by the local authorities. COMUSMACV instructed US advisors to stress to their counterparts that armed clashes among RVNAF groups must be avoided; that a standdown of troops, while the AFC meeting tried to reconcile differences, was a sound approach; that the US was uninformed about the coup attempt and that it did not favor any faction; and that the coup attempt, following US/GVN joint air attacks on NVN, might have an adverse affect on US and Free World opinion.56

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(S) USMACV personnel at the Air Operations Center (AOC), TSN air base contacted COMUSMACV by telephone and reported that coup leaders, including Brigadier General (Brig Gen) Lam Van Phat, had begun to realize that theirs was a hopeless cause and were getting nervous, if not desperate. Both the US Ambassador and the AFC were agreeable to their request that they be provided transportation to leave the RVN. However, ARVN airborne troops arrived at TSN air base before the agreement could be implemented and the plotters fled in civilian clothes.[57]

(S) Soon after, Radio Saigon broadcast that Chief of State Suu, acting in reference to provisional charter 20/10/64, had decreed that General Khanh be relieved as Commander in Chief Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (CINCRVNAF), and that second Deputy Prime Minister Major General (Maj Gen) Nguyen Van Thieu was temporarily appointed to succeed him. Khanh's removal was unopposed and he formally turned over his office to then Chief, JGS (CJGS) Maj Gen Tran Van Minh on 21 February. Khanh was appointed a roving ambassador and left the RVN on 25 February.[58]

(S) On 6 May, a ceremony dissolving the AFC was held in Prime Minister Quat's office; this was the culmination of a series of meetings in which the AFC had considered its own dissolution. The Prime Minister had worked quietly toward this end for weeks and the dissolution of the AFC marked the end of an organization which had encouraged military leaders to intervene in politics.[59]

(S) In the meantime, a political impasse had developed in which dissident southern Vietnamese, militant refugee Catholics and "out"-politicians tried to take advantage of a murky constitutional question raised by Chief of State Suu concerning Prime Minister Quat's authority to change his cabinet members. This was an attempt by the dissident groups to bring down the Quat government. Quat had tried to reshuffle his cabinet and appoint five new members; however, the ministers of Interior and Economy refused to resign and Chief of State Suu refused to sign a decree apointing their successors. Suu argued that the Provisional Charter required that ministers be replaced only if they resigned, or if the NLC voted to censure them, or if the premier submitted resignations for the whole cabinet. This interpretation would have in effect changed the basic structure of the GVN since it would have made cabinet ministers relatively independent of the prime minister. The dissident groups took every advantage of the issue raised by Suu to bring down the Quat government; they suspected that Quat was a pawn of the UBI and was potentially hostile to them.[60]

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(S) Quat, in desperation, summoned the cabinet in early June and got their unanimous agreement that the military should be invited to mediate the crisis. Military leaders deliberated over this invitation on 10-11 June. Chief of State Suu thereupon announced that the Chief of State and the NLC would resign and that the government would be controlled by the military. Thus, the "civil solution" to the governing of Vietnam, which dated from August 1964, came to an end and the GVN reverted to the status of November 1963, after Diem was ousted.[61]

(S) With political responsibilities thrust into their hands on 11 June 1965, the senior military leaders began to establish new governmental institutions and considered the selection of top officials. Decision #3, dated 14 June, set forth the establishment of a council to lead the nation, composed of ten senior generals. General Nguyen Van Thieu was named Chairman; General Pham Xuan Chieu, Secretary General; and Air Vice Marshal Nguyen Cao Ky, Commissioner in Charge of the Executive Branch. Thus, Thieu became chief of state and Ky, prime minister. On 19 June, Premier Ky presented his new cabinet (average age 40) and a 26-point program to the nation. His program was intended to generate momentum toward placing the country on a war footing.[62]

(S) Both the Catholic and Buddhist groups assumed an attitude of "wait and see" towards the new government. A series of announcements encouraging the people to lead more austere lives and to work toward strengthening the nation were made. The government proclaimed that a state of war existed and broke its diplomatic relations with France. Ky made trips to Hue and Nha Trang to reiterate his themes of austerity, integrity and mobilization for victory which he had set forth as the emblems of his war cabinet.

(S) On 11 September, the Convention of the Armed Forces was formed. It was an experiment in democracy within the military establishment and brought 1,600 military officers for a closed one-day session in Saigon. The conference was apparently intended to allow an airing of basic problems to be brought to the attention of the government leaders. COMUSMACV felt the conference was well received by the participants and they appeared to have acquired a better sense of unity and purpose.[63]

(S) In late September, a US Embassy assessment of the Ky government's first 100 days concluded with the observations that the Vietnamese were still largely "fence sitters," that there was no evidence of any rise in public acceptance of the Ky government and that the various political groups were still waiting to see how the government would perform. In spite of an impression of unity, there were rumblings among military elements when Ky, on

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1 October, announced the Brig Gen Cao Van Vien would be relieved as CG, III Corps, and become CJGS, and that, CJGS, Maj Gen Nguyen Huu Co would become Deputy Premier for War and Reconstruction with six key ministries under his control: Defense, Psychological Warfare, Rural Construction, Public Works, Interior and Youth. Co did not hesitate to voice his dissatisfaction over this change because he knew that during the past two years, generals who were shifted from military to political positions soon found themselves completely out of the picture. Co was later persuaded to relinquish his JGS position to Vien but kept his headquarters in the JGS compound. He was apparently influenced by COMUSMACV's personal advice on 7 October that an image of unity was essential in the interest of the nation. Co was probably still suspicious, however, of those colleagues who had decided upon his reassignment--but he accepted the position.[64]

(S) In the remaining months of 1965, a surface calm extended over the Vietnamese political scene. The government's attention was focused on the problems of inflation and commodity shortages. These issues provided politicians and the press with useful weapons for criticizing the government while avoiding any direct confrontations with the military leaders of the government. During the rest of the year, Catholic and Buddhist groups remained quiescent. Rumors of plotting and coup attempts, however, continued to cause uneasiness within the government.[65] The GVN did manage to strengthen its position on the international scene; Prime Minister Ky's visits to Taiwan, Malaysia and Thailand contributed to the establishment of better relations with these nations. Behind the shield of US power, a greater measure of security was established, although it was undeniable that there was a long road ahead toward a strong, unified government.

Economic Problems

(S) Of the many difficulties which plagued the GVN during 1965, the economic appeared to be one of the most difficult to resolve. Inflation, shortages of certain commodities, and the sharply rising cost of living were undoubtedly very real problems; but they also became magnified in the public mind and provided the political enemies of the Ky government with a "safe" weapon for attack, without a direct confrontation.

(S) Inflation in the RVN could be attributed largely to the imbalance in the GVN budget, the increase in salaries

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and wages, the ensuing increase in the demand for labor, and the influence of the US/FWMAF buildup on the economy. The shortage of foodstuffs and the increasing prices for basic commodities were particularly acute. For example, in January 1965, the wholesale rice price per 100 kilograms was 590 piasters. By May 1965, with the continuing low rice supply from the Delta region to Saigon and the GVN's decision not to import rice, the price rose to 700 piasters.[66] Difficulties encountered in shipping also contributed to these shortages. Although the GVN had planned to charter five coastal vessels to ease the shortages in central VN, this plan was not implemented because the contracting firms found it unprofitable. Congestion in the port of Saigon caused shipping to accumulate, increasing demurrage charges thus further adding to the increase in costs.

(C) Toward the end of 1965, retail price indices showed that for middle and working class families in Saigon, the cost of food was 41 percent higher than a year earlier. The general index, not including rent, for working class families was 33 percent higher and for the middle class, 30 percent higher. However, both GVN and US agencies felt that the figures understated the actual increase and that they were much too low.[67]

(S) The GVN apparently did nothing to control the distribution of rice in Saigon or to encourage a greater supply from the rural areas. The US Agency for International Development (USAID) felt that every effort must be made to impress upon the GVN the seriousness of this problem and to induce the GVN to undertake measures to alleviate the situation. By importing rice from Thailand and the US, the GVN was able temporarily to stabilize the price of rice by December 1965.

(C) At a USMACV Commanders Conference on 14 November 1965, the USAID representative pointed out that the rapid inflationary trend in 1965 was attributable largely to personal expenditures by US personnel and the greatly expanded construction programs in progress. The great amount of currency place in circulation created a surplus of purchasing power. In the meantime, the cost of the war had forced the GVN into deficit financing since budget requirements exceeded government income. The surplus of purchasing power, the VC interdiction of commodity sources and distribution systems, and the consequent short supply of materials to be sold, all contributed toward the spiraling inflation. Unless controlled, these trends might have led to political unrest with an attendant adverse effect on the war effort. Among measures considered to alleviate this situation were plans to increase the import program with US assistance, to establish a special currency fund for personal conversions of US dollars, and to limit GVN budgetary

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requirements within reasonable amounts. The following measures were considered infeasible if not detrimental: stringent crackdown on hoarders, the establishment of a ration system, tightening of controls on merchants, and devaluation of the piaster. USAID authorities felt that the best course of action was to hold the GVN budget for 1966 to a small increase, to reduce US expenditures within Vietnam (both official and personal), and to increase the flow of dollars into the GVN Treasury which could be used as an anti-inflationary tool.[68]

(S) The US Department of State felt that the Department of Defense (DOD) FY 66 military construction program in RVN of about one billion dollars would be a chief source of inflation, and queried CINCPAC and COMUSMACV about possible measures which could be undertaken to minimize the inflationary trend. Toward the end of 1965, the US Mission in Vietnam had already undertaken a concerted study as to the ways of reducing the construction impact on the local economy and the expenditures of US/FWMA forces in Vietnam.[69] COMUSMACV was in favor of encouraging personnel to go on rest and recuperation leave outside of Vietnam but was opposed to limiting the individual's pay in Vietnam owing to the unenforceable and unprecedented nature of the proposal.[70] Other measures such as revised Post Exchange (PX) stockage and a high interest incentive savings plan were also discussed. However, no decision had been reached when the year ended.

(S) Toward the end of 1965, there were only a few indications to show that the inflationary trends might be moderately checked. In addition to the major contributing factors cited above, there was a noticeable shortage of housing aggravated by the great number of refugees who had come from insecure areas. (This problem is discussed in greater detail in chapter IV). In essence, the economy was characterized by an increasing demand upon the supply system with an ever-decreasing GVN capability to provide adequate supplies. US authorities planned to import about 100,000 tons of rice during 1966 to meet projected demands and to help stabilize the market. There were also both military and economic plans to increase the collection of rice from the Delta and to improve means by which such supplies could be distributed more evenly to major population centers.

The Montagnard Problem

(C) During the year, GVN was faced with a politically embarrassing, potentially dangerous situation vis-a-vis the Montagnards. The smoldering embers of the 1964 revolt were

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again inflamed by the United Front for the Struggle for Oppressed Races (FULRO) who claimed to represent Montagnard interests. Relationships between GVN and FULRO deteriorated and resulted in two uprisings during 1965. The Montagnard situation and the challenge it presented to GVN are discussed in Annex A.

US PRESS AND THE HOME FRONT

(U) Few issues or events in American history have provoked as much public discussion as did the war in Vietnam in 1965. US congressmen, government officials, military leaders, press commentators, university professors, religious leaders, entertainers, militant mothers and youths of all persuasions joined in frequently impassioned debate throughout the year. Draft card burnings, self-immolations, blood drives for the VC and "peace" marches were widely publicized. Less dramatic, but vastly more representative of the nation's sentiments, were the massive quantities of mail and gifts sent to US servicemen in Vietnam along with tons of food and supplies donated for the Vietnamese people.

(U) Congressional opinion on the war was mixed, but the great majority in both parties demonstrably felt that the United States did have a commitment to the GVN and should therefore be heavily represented in-country. "If it is a political issue, the issue will be how the war has been waged, rather than whether we should be there," said Senator Thomas Dodd of Connecticut in an interview at the end of the year.[71]

(U) Indicative of congressional feeling at the beginning of 1965 was an Associated Press survey of senators on US policy in Vietnam. Of 81 senators questioned, 33 favored "sticking to our present course, while working toward stability in Saigon." Three favored accelerating the struggle and moving it north, ten favored negotiations, three favored US withdrawal and 32 had no comment or suggestion.[72] As the year progressed, congressional doubts were expressed on the increasing American involvement, and the search for a conclusion to the war became an issue. Though not always of the same opinion, Senators Fulbright and Mansfield urged restraint in Vietnam throughout the year. Sen. George Aiken of Vermont on 21 December stated: "Up to now Communist China is winning this war in Vietnam."[73] The widely discussed Mansfield Report, issued at the end of the year after a study mission by five senators, concluded that: "A rapid solution to the conflict in Vietnam is not in immediate prospect . . . such choices as may be open are not simple choices. They are difficult and painful choices and they are beset with many imponderables."[74]

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(U) A total of 16 senators and 57 representatives visited Vietnam during 1965, spending on the average just over four days in-country.

(U) Throughout the year the war was the major preoccupation of US newspaper columnists and editorialists. Particularly heavy attention was directed toward the buildup and role of US military forces and to the bombing of North Vietnam. Operation STARLIGHT and the Plei Me/Ia Drang Valley campaign brought widespread editorial acclaim for US fighting men. Initial disclosure of the use of riot control agents and the first B-52 raids resulted in much press criticism, virtually all of which had disappeared by the end of the year.

(U) Considerable doubt and pessimism about the US course in Vietnam were reflected in the press at the beginning of the year. The Council on Foreign Relations reported on 2 February 1965 that of about 600 community leaders questioned in 33 American cities, 80 percent approved the US objective of assisting GVN to defend its independence and consolidate its authority. But about 90 percent believed that US policy in Vietnam was failing. On 26 January 1965 the Associated Press quoted Richard Nixon as saying: "We are losing the war in Vietnam and we will be thrown out of the country in a matter of months, certainly within a year." Syndicated columnist Joseph Alsop wrote in the Washington Post on 24 January: "The specter of a catastrophic American defeat looms larger and larger . . . the aimless drift that afflicts our Vietnamese policy making calls out for explanation." Representative of much press comment was a Rowland Evans-Robert Novak column in the New York Herald Tribune of 8 January which said: "Staying in Vietnam isn't enough. To avoid being pushed out, we must do far more than we are now doing--and do it fast. But even at the highest levels of official Washington there is disagreement about how the US effort should be stepped up at all." Sen. Richard Russell was quoted by the New York Times on 12 January as calling for a "re-evaluation" of the entire US position in Vietnam. "Up to now we have been losing ground instead of gaining it," he said.

(U) Later in the year the press reflected general public support for the US policy in Vietnam along with misgivings about the extent of the American involvement. "The best efforts of poll takers and the informed opinion of reporters and others who move around the country agree that the nation is supporting the expanded war in South Vietnam," reported Tom Wicker in the New York Times of 16 July. But he added:

> It is likely also, however, that the majority of the good people pursuing their business from here to the

Pacific coast do not have a detailed understanding of what is going on, what is at stake, and what could happen in remote Southeast Asia. In such a complex situation the people have rallied round the President, taken his word and advice, and acquiesced in his management of things.

Walter Lippmann in his syndicated column of 22 July wrote:

> We are now in sight of a total war . . . . we are confronted with the proposal to replace our advisors, and to take command of the war, and --- inevitably as a result ---- to establish an American military government in Saigon to rule the native politicians and generals. Can there be any serious question that such an expansion of American military power on the Asian mainland is likely to mean a war to the bitter end, not only against the Viet Cong and Hanoi, but against China as well?

(U) On 3 September Stewart Alsop commented in the Saturday Evening Post: "The war in Vietnam now seems all but certain to become what President Eisenhower, President Kennedy and President Johnson deeply hoped it would never become — primarily an American war, rather than a war between Vietnamese." On 30 September Lippman judged the American buildup to have succeeded in preventing a Viet Cong victory and opined:

> Against the kind of force we have in Vietnam, guerrilla warfare cannot win a victory. But neither can the guerrillas be defeated decisively and put out of business. If we cannot or will not escalate the war until we have an enormous army which can occupy the country, our best course is to dig in along the coast and begin to discuss with the Vietnamese politicians the formation of a government in Saigon which can negotiate a truce in the civil war.

Denis Warner in the 16 December issue of the Reporter observed: "If the United States had not intervened directly in the Vietnam war last spring, the Viet Cong would have won. Now that the danger has passed, this is admitted here quite freely."

(U) As the year ended, press comment was predominantly cautious. On 21 December the Baltimore Sun quoted Maryland Rep. Long as saying, "We are winning battles, but we are not yet winning the war." Writing in the Washington Post on 21 December, Jack Anderson discussed the "painful decision" to escalate and said:

In the year ahead, the US commitment in South Vietnam will be doubled. This means an end to the era of war-in-Vietnam-but-peace-at-home, the end of both guns and butter. The home front must now be mobilized. Guns must come first, and the President is seriously debating whether to ask Congress for a formal declaration of war.

(U) In mid-December, a poll conducted by the Opinion Research Corporation of Princeton, N. J., revealed that 65 percent of Americans believed the US was right in staying in Vietnam and becoming involved in the fighting; 20 percent believed that the US should have pulled out, and 15 percent had no opinion. The poll, reprinted in US News & World Report on 27 December, also showed that 82 percent of Americans felt the US should insist that any negotiations on Vietnam begin while our troops were still there. Nine percent believed the US should withdraw its troops if this would bring about negotiations, and nine percent had no opinion.

DECISIONS

(U) The US responded to the enemy's challenge in Vietnam in 1965 with a series of major decisions significantly deepening the US military involvement.

(C) With VC terrorism rising early in the year, President Johnson ordered all dependents of US government-sponsored personnel evacuated from SVN, and US troops were dispatched to provide the security for US installations which RVNAF and the Vietnamese National Police had been unable to provide.

(C) The bombing of NVN, ordered originally as retaliation for VC attacks, was expanded into an intensive program aimed at stemming infiltration into SVN at its source. Marines were deployed to provide security for the Da Nang air base as the bombing raids got underway. In early April, the Marine mission was expanded to include counterinsurgency combat operations, which led to further deployments.

(U) In the face of an increasingly critical GVN politico-military situation, the decisions were made to commit US air power, to deploy sizeable US ground forces for combat and to strengthen GVN forces. USAF and US Navy (USN) jet aircraft were released for combat, new USAF units and USN vessels were deployed, and expansion of VNAF was authorized. USMC and USA elements were brought in, and higher force levels were set for ARVN, RF and PF. The USN and USCG (US Coast Guard) commenced an extensive coastal surveillance operation. Strategic Air Command (SAC) B-52's from Guam began continuous bombing of VC sanctuaries and conducted other combat support missions.

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(TS) The Secretary of Defense's (SECDEF) July visit to SVN was followed by the President's announcement of a further sharp increase of US forces in SVN. The US now decided to embark upon a three-phase, long range program designed to stop losing the war, resume the offensive, and extend GVN influence throughout SVN once VC forces were destroyed. Increased NVA infiltration in the latter part of the year raised US force requirements still further and led to new countermeasures, particularly in the Laotian Panhandle.

(U) These decisions and their effects will be discussed in detail in subsequent chapters of this history.

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CHAPTER II

THE BUILDUP

INTRODUCTION

(TS) The buildup of US/FWMAF in SVN was a response to many challenges. Although contingency plans (see Chapter III) had been developed to counter the insurgency threat, these plans could not be implemented without qualification because of the political considerations involved in the deployment of US forces to RVN, and the use of air power both in and out-of-country. Thus, each deployment, each operation, was the subject of considerable study, counter-study, and discussion among COMUSMACV, CINCPAC, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and the SECDEF. There was no clear-cut, long range basic plan that was adhered to during the first six months of the buildup. In fact, in some instances it was not possible to determine when a final decision was made on a particular deployment (e.g., even after the arrival of the 173d Airborne Brigade (Abn Bde) in RVN, strong consideration was given to its withdrawal, to the great consternation of CINCPAC and COMUSMACV).[1,2]

(TS) On 1 September 1965, COMUSMACV published his concept of operations which, reflecting CINCPAC's concept, established a three-phased operation in RVN.[3] The objectives of this "campaign" plan are discussed in Chapter III; the deployments are discussed in this chapter. This concept was the first attempt to promulgate a master plan for the further deployment of US/FWMA forces to RVN. Phase I concerned deployments through the end of 1965; Phase II: 1 January through 30 June 1966; Phase III: 12 to 18 months following completion of Phase II. In November 1965, Phase II was modified to cope with the increased NVA threat, thus adding Phase IIA to the plan. In fact, there were many modifications made in the deployment schedules of all three phases. The significant point is that a plan was developed, approved, and used as a definite guide for the buildup of US/FWMA forces in RVN.

US FORCES

(U) For the portrayal of the buildup of US forces during 1965 see Figure II-1 and Table II-1.

US Marine Corps

(S) In January 1965 there were about 700 Marines in SVN.

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Task Unit (TU) 79.3.5 (Marine Unit, Vietnam), dubbed "SHUFLY" and consisting of a staff, a Marine helicopter squadron and a sub-unit of Marine Air Base Squadron 16, had been on the ground since April 1962. Its mission was to support ARVN operations in IV CTZ. During its two and a half years in RVN, this unit developed valuable methodology, tactics, techniques and equipment and provided combat experience for hundreds of pilots, mechanics and controllers. It had also established a continuing tradition of almost 100 percent aircraft availability ever since its arrival in-country and a base of knowledge for future Marine activities in I CTZ.[4]

(S) In the latter part of 1964, hard-core VC strength jumped by 50 percent to approximately 9,000; guerrilla incidents reached a record high, and the flow of insurgents down the Ho Chi Minh trail neared a thousand men per month. Thus, 1965 portended a need for the US to provide assistance to GVN in a more concrete form than the established advisory and assistance effort. However, two obstacles had to be overcome before the US could act: the reluctance, if not animosity, of some Vietnamese leaders toward excessive foreign influence in their affairs, and the lethargy of the US public toward the "intangible" threat of a communist take-over in SVN. It was obvious to US military and government leaders, that unless the US acted, complete communist control over the country was imminent.

(TS) The President, SECDEF and JCS were in constant contact with CINCPAC, COMUSMACV and the Ambassador as the new year, heralded by VC terrorism started off with the Pleiku and Qui Nhon attacks on US forces. The initial US attacks on NVN in February were retaliatory acts. It rapidly became evident that "graduated reprisal" was not a satisfactory approach, and that "sustained reprisal" was required to give the US the initiative. COMUSMACV was constantly queried for his continuing analysis of the worsening situation which became so critical, that in February US government-sponsored dependents were evacuated to clear the decks for action.[5]

(TS) The possibility of unilateral intervention had been foreseen several years earlier in CINCPAC and COMUSMACV Contingency Plan 32-64. This plan specified that the III Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) would land in the I CTZ to provide security of the Da Nang airbase and port and to act as a blocking force across Vietnam just south of the DMZ in anticipation of overt aggression by NVN. The III MEF was selected for this role due to its accessibility on Okinawa and its capability for a rapid landing over the beach in SVN.[6]

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(TS) In late 1964, the JCS, after receiving COMUSMACV's assessment of the situation in SVN, considered strengthening the defense forces in the I CTZ by moving the US Seventh Fleet (7th Flt) Special Landing Force (SLF) to that area and moving a Marine Light Antiaircraft Missile (LAAM) (HAWK) battalion from Continental United States (CONUS) to Da Nang for air base security. At the same time, programs were initiated to deploy two USMC Battalion Landing Teams (BLT) or USA battalions to Saigon for local protection; to add more land and sea-based air power to optimize execution of courses of action; to send more CONUS or Pacific Command (PACOM) air-sea-ground units to the Western Pacific, (WESTPAC) and to alert CONUS units to be prepared to implement applicable portions of CINCPAC OPLANs 32-64 and 39-65. While none of these moves actually occurred in 1964, their feasibility was determined, alerts issued and patterns set for the future.[7]

(S) In February 1965, the Deputy Commander USMACV (DEPCOMUSMACV), surveyed the VC situation at Da Nang and the current defensive position of US/RVN forces there in order to determine the need for deployment of the programmed forces. Because of the vital importance of the Da Nang air base to COMUSMACV's plans, the high concentration of trained personnel and valuable equipment in that area, and the questionable capability of the RVNAF to stop a determined VC attack, he believed it necessary to deploy a Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) ashore.[8] COMUSMACV concurred with this appraisal.

(S) During the time DEPCOMUSMACV was making the survey of the Da Nang area, the JCS recommended to SECDEF that an eight-week program of graduated military pressures against NVN be initiated. This included movement of the 9th MEB from Okinawa to Da Nang and another MEB from Hawaii to Okinawa, both with necessary combat support and combat service support elements. Air and sea lifts were to be positioned for reaction purposes and the III MEF was to be in a state of readiness. These plans considered the possibility of NVN/CHICOM intervention, but hopefully concluded that strong action by the US plus international pressure might cause a reduction of VC activity as increasing damage was inflicted on NVN.[9]

(TS) COMUSMACV concurred with the JCS estimate of the situation and recommended that all deployments should first be cleared with the GVN, in order to insure that introduction of large US forces into SEASIA would not prejudice the US position of graduated reprisals. He urged the deployment of the 9th MEB as soon as possible. Based on COMUSMACV's reply to the JCS that the situation was worsening daily and on his rationale for deployment of the 9th MEB, Da Nang was stated as the objective for

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the MEB. COMUSMACV's rationale was substantially that previously stated by DEPCOMUSMACV. JCS notified CINCPAC and COMUSMACV on 27 February 1965 that approval had been granted to deploy the 9th MEB to Da Nang as requested. This decision indicated a determination by US leaders to press forward in achieving the limited objectives set by the US in SEASIA.[10] To help justify deployment of sizable US combat forces into SVN, COMUSMACV was requested to forward all indications linking Hanoi with the direction of the VC effort in SVN.[11]

(S) With the decision to land the 9th MEB at Da Nang, US authorities in Saigon were faced with the problem of Vietnamese acceptance of a foreign combat force on their soil. The US Ambassador met with Prime Minister Quat to inform him about US views and plans. Key Vietnamese Generals, Thieu and Minh, agreed with the US plans but expressed concern about the possible reaction of the populace. They requested that the force be brought ashore in the most inconspicuous way feasible.[12]

(S) Soon after, the Ambassador received a State-Defense message which commented that it was desirable to deploy the 173d Abn Bde from Okinawa instead of the 9th MEB.[13] COMUSMACV quickly indicated that he did not understand this sudden change and could not support it militarily. He firmly recommended that the original plan be carried out because the Marines were logistically more self-sufficient and had more badly-needed combat support elements than the 173d. Evidently this conviction, shared by the Ambassador, was strong enough to overcome objections and no further changes were proposed.[14]

(TS) The JCS still doubted whether the deployment of the 9th MEB would be an adequate response to the deteriorating situation in SVN and asked COMUSMACV if there were any indications of an imminent collapse of the GVN war efforts. The Chairman, JCS (CJCS) feared that the VC gains might have reached the point where, regardless of US actions against NVN, the RVN would fall apart.[15] COMUSMACV advised CJCS, that although the situation in all CTZ's was serious, he was confident that RVN leaders and citizenry could overcome political upheaval. COMUSMACV stated:

> History may well record that the real significance of 1964 was not major VC advance and corresponding GVN retrogression but rather that South Vietnam's social and political institutions remained remarkably intact under the powerful disintegrating blows to which subjected - most of them not of VC making . . . Nonetheless, we do have the very real asset of a resilient people and this gives hope that

there is more time available than we might think; time in which if properly exploited, the needed national leadership could evolve . . . We cannot permit the battalions of the ARVN to be defeated in open combat . . . This will require an extremely high level of pre-strike bombing and close air support . . . the VNAF A-1H's . . . fully tasked now, simply haven't the capability to provide the intensified air support envisaged . . .

COMUSMACV felt that, because of these facts, the US must increase both air and ground forces to supplement ARVN forces and to aid them in overcoming their deficiencies. He concluded with a listing of the number and type of units needed to accomplish the mission of overcoming the VC threat; among them were the 9th MEB and additional USMC helicopter squadrons.[16]

(S) CINCPAC reinforced COMUSMACV's assessment by agreeing with it fully, and by reemphasizing the following requirements to give even stronger support to his own earlier recommendations:

1) The increased use of air in RVN.

2) Necessity for tighter control over coastal shipping.

3) Requirement for use of US forces in security missions in SVN.

4) Need for a logistics base within the country.

CINCPAC emphasized that in COMUSMACV's estimation, the war had moved out of the purely guerrilla phase and into a more formalized military conflict. It became essential, therefore, that this transition be recognized and that reaction to it be immediate, with the best in US weapons and tactics. He concluded by placing an even higher priority than COMUSMACV on deployment of the full 9th MEB to I CTZ rather than the MEB (-) which had previously been planned, because of the need for insurance should ARVN's ability to resist collapse in the critical area of Da Nang, where so much was already committed.[17] CJCS informed COMUSMACV and CINCPAC that their recommendations had been forwarded to SECDEF and that the prospects for approval were excellent. Thus, step one in the buildup of forces had been taken and subsequent steps appeared to be assured.[18]

(U) The 9th MEB landed routinely at Da Nang on 8 March with no opposition from either the VC or the civilian populace.

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Girls with leis and a contingent of dignitaries welcomed the troops as they stormed ashore.[19]

(S) In early April, COMUSMACV completed a re-evaluation of force requirements, and the result was a request for two additional USMC BLT's; one to be positioned at Da Nang and the other at Phu Bai. In addition, he requested a USMC F-4 squadron and necessary MEB, Regimental Landing Team (RLT), and Marine Air Group (MAG) headquarters and control and support personnel.[20] On 3 April, JCS approved the deployment of the units requested and directed CINCPAC to expand the mission of the USMC elements to include engagement in counterinsurgency operations. This coincided with COMUSMACV's earlier rationale for the buildup, in which he had stipulated a need for US forces to supplement ARVN forces in the conduct of the war. From 4-12 April, the F-4 squadron deployed to Da Nang.[21]

(S) On 14 April the 3d Bn, 4th Marines, displaced from Da Nang to Phu Bai as scheduled, and occupied the airfield. On the same day CINCPAC requested in-country clearance for deployment of a naval Mobile Construction Battalion (MCB) to Chu Lai on or about 15 June and another MCB for Da Nang in July. The purpose was to provide support for priority engineering tasks at these two bases.[22]

(TS) DOD informed the Ambassador that the deteriorating situation in SVN required greater US involvement and that the introduction of more battalions of Marines was being considered.[23] On 17 April, JCS notified CINCPAC that deployment of 5,000 additional Marines previously requested by Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT) had been tentatively approved at the highest level. At this time, total US Marine strength in RVN was 8,767. The additional 5,000-man force was to include the Expeditionary Force HQ; HQ 3d Marine Division; 1st Marine Air Wing Advance Group, plus supporting logistical elements. D-Day for landing the Marines was not firm, but it was expected to be in early May. The landing was to take place at Chu Lai.[24]

(S) CINCPACFLT had requested the above mentioned Marine force with the concurrence of COMUSMACV. However, after closer study COMUSMACV decided that the proposed forces were inadequate to provide security for Chu Lai and that reliance upon ARVN for outer security was unrealistic except for short periods. He therefore strongly recommended to CINCPAC that a full regiment be landed at Chu Lai, together with reinforcing elements to provide a combat potential adequate to the task.[25] CINCPAC informed JCS on 29 April that he concurred in

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COMUSMACV's recommendation.

(TS) On 1 May, CINCPAC notified COMUSMACV that the JCS had authorized the deployment of the regiment, air elements and supporting logistical elements to Chu Lai upon receipt of country clearance from the Ambassador.[26]

(S) Following a conference with CG, I Corps, which clarified command relationships and other matters pertaining to the occupation of the same area by US and ARVN forces, COMUSMACV advised CINCPAC that D-Day for the Chu Lai landing of the three battalions would be 7 May. JCS then notified CINCPAC that the Term III Marine "Expeditionary" Force was politically undesirable and that henceforth the word "Amphibious" would be substituted. On 6 May, Maj Gen W. R. Collins, USMC, reported to COMUSMACV as CG, III Marine Amphibious Force (III MAF). Later on that day, the 9th MEB submitted its last situation report and phased out.[27]

(S) The amphibious task force entered the Chu Lai landing area at 070500H May 1965, and the signal "Land the Landing Force" flew at 0600H. The first wave touched down at 0800H. By 071900H May 1965, all major ground units were established ashore. These units consisted of two BLT's, one RLT HQ shore party, 3d Recon Bn (-), a direct support artillery battalion, and MCB-10. The MCB was under direct control of CG, III MAF, and was used to assist the Marine engineer group in constructing the air strip and performing other critical engineering tasks at Chu Lai. The ground units were to be followed by the approved air elements as soon as the Marine Short Air Tactical Strip (SATS) was completed. The Morests (catapult and arresting gear) were installed and sufficient runway was prepared to accept aircraft by 28 May.[28]

(S) On 16 May, CINCPAC reported to JCS his intentions to deploy to Chu Lai the three USMC A-4 squadrons of MAG-12 which were included in the task organization of the Chu Lai landing force. One squadron was to land early on 28 May, another was to land later the same day and one would stand by on call from Cubi Point, Republic of the Philippines (ROP), until the airfield was ready to accept it.[29] This was the last major deployment of Marine tactical units until early summer. In July, the expeditionary airfield at Chu Lai (made of AM-2 matting) was completed.

(S) By June 1965, seven battalions of the 3d Marine Division were in SVN. Of the remaining two, one BLT was ready to deploy from Okinawa at the request of COMUSMACV.

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The remaining BLT was the 7th Flt SLF. One RLT (7th Marines), approved by JCS, had been deployed from Eastern Pacific during the month, and was poised at Okinawa for deployment into SVN. On 4 June Brig Gen L. W. Walt, USMC, relieved Maj Gen W. R. Collins as CG III MAF. By the middle of June there were 16,500 Marines in the three enclaves - Da Nang, Chu Lai and Phu Bai, with more to come.[30]

(TS) On 7 June, COMUSMACV advised CINCPAC and JCS that the planned buildup of ARVN forces would not be realized, owing to excessively high desertion rates and high casualties. Several battalions had been decimated by the VC. These factors caused a moratorium on new accessions and caused the force ratios to continue to change in favor of the VC. COMUSMACV saw no alternative to reinforcing US efforts in SVN with additional US or other FWMAF. He therefore recommended deployment of the remaining two BLT's of the 3d Marine Division on Okinawa, and appropriate support and air elements (approximately 8,000 troops), previously programmed, and reconstitution of the SLF. He also recommended that planning be initiated to program an additional Marine brigade to reinforce the III MAF.[31]

(TS) JCS responded by disapproving the request for the two Marine BLT's on Okinawa and held up the decision to move the other requested US forces. In an unforeseen and perplexing move, JCS proposed that CINCPAC and COMUSMACV consider moving units out of SVN even before they arrived.[32] CINCPAC promptly protested and stated that the situation in SVN was critical and that the two BLT's were needed immediately if US forces were to prevail.[33]

(TS) On 27 June COMUSMACV submitted to JCS a new requirements forecast which included seven USMC helicopter squadrons, three fighter squadrons and three attack squadrons. These forces were in addition to his 7 June request which had included both ground and air units.[34] On 29 June, JCS informed COMUSMACV that the forces he had requested were on the way and would be in-country at the end of July. They included the two Marine BLT's requested in June and one F-4B squadron which would complete deployment of 3d Marine Div and the major part of 1st Marine Air Wing (MAW). An additional USMC brigade, a USMC fighter attack (VMFA) squadron and necessary supporting elements and the medium helicopter (HMM) squadrons would be provided later.[35]

(S) On 14 August, the 7th Mar Regt (-), the additional brigade mentioned in the preceding paragraph, landed and raised the strength of the Marines to 30,500 in the three enclaves of SVN. At the end of September, USMC strength in SVN was 38,000: 2,000 at Phu Bai; 23,000 at Da Nang; and 13,000 at Chu Lai.[36]

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Coupled with combat support and combat service support units, the deployment of the Marine air units requested in June created the difference in strength figures between August and December. At the end of September, CG, III MAF, estimated the situation of his command and declared unequivocally to COMUSMACV that in order for him to perform his mission, the optimum US ground force requirement for the three enclaves would be two Marine Divisions and appropriate supporting air. Furthermore, he stated, "if III MAF is assigned the responsibility extending from Quang Ngai to the DMZ, at least three more battalions will be needed."[37]

(S) October, November and December saw multi-battalion unilateral and combined US/ARVN operations against the VC. The Marine units also actively participated in pacification activities and civic action. The Tactical Areas of Responsibilities (TAOR) were constantly expanding, thinning out the Marine strength to a dangerous degree. In October, there were 292 Marine rotary-wing and fixed-wing aircraft in SVN which averaged 4,624 flying hours per month.[38] No additional battalions joined the III MAF during October and November, although there was an exchange of infantry battalions between I CTZ and Okinawa in accordance with CG, Fleet Marine Force Pacific's (FMFPAC) rotation program. As of 7 December there were 38,554 Marines in the III MAF area of responsibility.[39]

(TS) In mid-December, the SECDEF approved COMUSMACV's previous request for accelerated deployment of Phase II combat forces. JCS approved deployment of one BLT for each of the first three month of 1966. This would give CG, III MAF, his optimum combat force of two Marine divisions and appropriate supporting air.[40] This accelerated deployment caused consternation in PACOM due to the fact that programmed deployments had seriously depleted PACOM reserves. CINCPAC requested that both Army and Marine reserves be reconstituted.[41]

(S) On 20 December, the 2d Air Division (AD) was tasked with determining the feasibility of absorbing III MAF's requirements for ten fighter squadrons. After considering the results of these studies, COMUSMACV approved the recommendation for the deployment of ten fighter squadrons to SVN with eight of them supporting USMC ground forces and two to be allocated to support of other in-country forces.[42] This was included in COMUSMACV's proposals to CINCPAC for the US force buildup in 1966.

(S) In December 1965, CG, III MAF, requested an expansion of the 1st Radio Battalion, an additional communication battalion and an MP battalion. He also requested that the III MAF HQ be expanded so that he could perform his many functions as CG, III

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MAF, Naval Component Commander (NCC), Senior Advisor I Corps, and Area Coordinator, in an efficient manner. This request called for an additional 80 officer spaces to the 81 then authorized and an additional 215 enlisted spaces to the 157 already authorized for III MAF HQ. COMUSMACV approved the request and recommended that CINCPAC concur.[43]

(TS) At the end of 1965, the equivalent of nearly two USMC divisions was in SVN. When added to a supporting air wing, combat support elements, combat service support elements, and elements enroute, the total USMC strength was about 40,000. Plans for 1966 indicated that USMC strength would rise to about 65,000. If these plans were fully implemented, RVN would contain the largest concentration of USMC "Forces in Readiness" since World War II.[44,45] (For the location of the major units of III MAF, see Figure II-2.)

US Army

(S) Of the 14,697 USA personnel in SVN at the beginning of the year, approximately one-third were working directly under COMUSMACV as field advisors or staff officers. The remaining two-thirds were assigned to USA units providing combat support and combat service support to RVNAF forces.[46] The 5th Special Forces Group (SFG) (Abn) and various Army aviation units were the major USA units in Vietnam at that time.[47]

(S) With the VC attacks on the US installations at Pleiku and Qui Nhon in early February, it became increasingly clear that the war had entered a new phase. On 11 February, JCS recommended to the SECDEF that a brigade from the 25th Inf (Infantry) Div be deployed to Thailand; the 173d Abn Bde be alerted for movement to SVN, and necessary support elements be deployed to back-up the recommended forces.[48]

(S) In early March, responding to a JCS message requesting his views on the situation in SVN, COMUSMACV stated that the VC held the initiative and continued to gain even greater control; the situation in all four CTZ's presented an unfavorable picture for the GVN. In predicting the future without additional US/FWMAF forces, he stated that in six months the RVNAF would be clustered around the main population centers and the GVN would be beset by "end the war" groups seeking a negotiated settlement. COMUSMACV's evaluation was that the VC would succeed if there were no changes to the direction and degree of US effort. He recommended the full use of all available US tactical air resources to support RVNAF, improvement of coastal surveillance, deployment of an MEB (-) to Da Nang and improvement of target acquisition and intelligence resources and capabilities in SVN. He also

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stated that among other actions under consideration were the deployments of three more USA helicopter companies and three tailored companies of observation aircraft to increase the forward air control and surveillance capability. In summation, COMUSMACV felt that his recommendations would create a new basic US policy toward the war in SVN and that the US should be committed to do whatever was militarily necessary to prevent defeat. He said that the measures he suggested, if taken, might halt the adverse trends and present challenges which the VC would not care to meet.[49] CINCPAC concurred with COMUSMACV's views and recommended approval of the requested forces.[50] The JCS also supported COMUSMACV's views, and stated that the prospects for SECDEF approval of his recommendations were excellent.[51]

(S) The request for three additional helicopter companies was reiterated to the Chief of Staff US Army (CofSA) during briefings held in Saigon on 7 March and was approved later in the month.[52] The need for additional O-1 aircraft was also mentioned at the briefing, and was subsequently approved.[53] Also presented to CofSA was the USMACV "enclave concept". This concept envisioned a series of well defended areas, with sea and airfield facilities, located in those areas that had the best potential for maintaining US presence in SVN, despite VC efforts.[54]

(U) Following JCS's approval[55] of COMUSMACV's request[56] for additional forces to augment GVN security forces in greater Saigon, the first USA battalion-sized unit, a Military Police (MP) battalion, arrived in SVN during 19-21 March. One platoon was deployed to each CTZ pending arrival of additional security troops; the remainder of the battalion was stationed in Saigon.

(TS) In a message to JCS on 21 March, COMUSMACV stated, with CINCPAC's concurrence, that the US had to be ready to deploy combat troops in SVN in the near future in order to secure major airfields and ports. COMUSMACV had considered the use of a highly mobile Army brigade to be stationed at Bien Hoa and Vung Tau. He had also formulated a concept for the employment of a division along the Qui Nhon-An Khe-Pleiku axis, for which he favored the 11th Air Assault Division (later designated as the 1st Cav Div (AM)). COMUSMACV believed the enclave concept was essential to all deployment plans and designated Da Nang as a pilot operation. He also considered Qui Nhon, Nha Trang, Tuy Hoa, Phan Thiet, and Chu Lai as sites for future deployment.[57]

(TS) On 26 Mar 65, COMUSMACV published an estimate which outlined the enemy capabilities and the courses of action open to the US. In his analysis, the assumption was made that the retaliatory and punitive actions would, in time, cause NVN to terminate its support to the insurgents in SVN. COMUSMACV

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favored the adoption of a course of action which would include a maximum buildup of RVNAF, plus the commitment of a US division along the Qui Nhon-Pleiku axis, a separate brigade at Bien Hoa-Vung Tau and a MEB (+) in I CTZ, for a total US commitment of approximately 33,000 troops. The principal advantages of this proposed course of action would be the attainment of military objectives and the support it would contribute to GVN political stability. The estimate also dealt with the force ratios which would be obtained by the introduction of US units. A determination was made that ARVN and VC battalions were rated equal in combat power (ARVN air and artillery support offset the qualitative and motivational advantages of the VC); a USA battalion was equal to two ARVN battalions, while a USMC battalion was equal to three ARVN battalions. Deployment of these 33,000 troops would result in a force increase equivalent to 63 ARVN battalions by March 1966 (32 battalion-equivalents from USA-USMC forces; 31 new ARVN battalions from a buildup in ARVN strength). COMUSMACV recommended that the deployment of these forces be completed by June 1965.[58] On 30 March, COMUSMACV requested a field command headquarters to control planned US and FWMA forces in SVN.[59]

(C) In early April, JCS concurred with COMUSMACV's estimate of the situation and his recommendations, and proposed that a conference be held in Hawaii to develop a plan for deploying combat and logistical units to SVN.[60]

(S) At the Hawaii conference (8-10 April) CINCPAC recommended to JCS that a USA division be deployed as soon as logistically feasible, for employment in the highlands or elsewhere, as COMUSMACV directed. The 173d Abn Bde should expeditiously move from Okinawa to Bien Hoa-Vung Tau. Lastly, a USA corps headquarters should be deployed concurrently with the division, to assume operational control of US and certain FWMA forces planned for deployment in II and III CTZ (See Annex B). Thus COMUSMACV's earlier recommendations were all supported.[61]

(S) The 173d Abn Bde was approved for temporary deployment to SVN on 14 April.[62] On that same day Commander-in-Chief Strike Command (CINCSTRIKE) was tasked to replace the 173d as soon as possible with a brigade from CONUS so that the 173d could return to PACOM reserve.[63] COMUSMACV espressed his desire for an airborne brigade to replace the 173d.[64] The unit scheduled to replace the 173d was the 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div.

(S) The conference also established the need for a separate brigade to secure the enclave area of Qui Nhon-Nha Trang-Cam Ranh Bay and to extend the secure areas of Qui Nhon to allow the additional deployments of logistical units. It was recommended that this brigade be obtained from the 1st Inf Div.[65,66]

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(S) At a subsequent conference in Hawaii later that month, attended by the SECDEF, the US Ambassador to RVN, CINCPAC and COMUSMACV, it was decided that the 173d Abn Bde would deploy to Bien Hoa-Vung Tau by 15 June, with a corresponding increase of logistical units and personnel to support the buildup. The conferees also planned for the deployment of the airmobile division to Qui Nhon-Pleiku-Kontum by 1 August and the concurrent deployment of the USA corps hqs to Nha Trang. They also recommended the deployment of the 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div and the 2d Bde, 1st Inf Div, to SVN. The results of this conference thus met fully COMUSMACV's previous recommendations.[67]

(S) The main body of the 173d Abn Bde began to arrive on 5 May, and constituted the first US Army ground combat unit deployed to SVN. COMUSMACV directed that the brigade (-) be stationed at Bien Hoa, with a battalion task force in Vung Tau. The mission of the 173d Bde was to render combat support to RVNAF and to engage in combat counterinsurgency operations as directed by COMUSMACV.[68]

(S) In early June, COMUSMACV again expressed concern over the deteriorating SVN situation and the need for additional US troops to offset the rising enemy capabilities. Earlier estimates of force ratios were no longer valid due to increased NVA infiltration and ARVN losses. He desired to retain the 173d in SVN and stated that additional deployments above the 23 maneuver battalions previously recommended should include the remainder of the 1st or 101st Divisions and additional helicopter, artillery, and HAWK units. He recommended that planning for deploying these units begin.[69]

(S) Later that month the JCS concurred in the earlier proposal to deploy the 1st Cav Div (AM), and stated that, with the arrival of the separate brigades which had been requested earlier (identified as the 2d Bde, 1st Inf Div, to secure the Qui Nhon-Nha Trang-Cam Ranh Bay enclave and the 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div, to replace the 173d Abn Bde), COMUSMACV would have 23 US maneuver battalions, the number he had requested earlier. Any decision to withdraw or replace units in or enroute to SVN would be made later.[70]

(S) COMUSMACV took strong exception to any mention of withdrawing any troops from SVN[71] and to any suggestion that 23 USA/USMC maneuver battalions was the upper level of commitment. He reminded the JCS that he had previously requested another division in addition to those forces they had recommended. He also asked for additional artillery units, particularly 175-mm gun battalions, and more airmobile companies to support the ground forces. COMUSMACV concluded with the statement that no novel arrangement would achieve quick results. More troops were needed in SVN, and soon.[72]

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(TS) On 22 June, CJCS stated that in addition to plans to deploy the airmobile division (eight bns) to SVN, consideration was also being given COMUSMACV's earlier request for additional forces resulting in the deployment of the remainder of the 1st Inf Div (six bns), one MAB (three BLT's), and a Republic of Korea (ROK) division (see Annex B), plus helicopter, artillery, and air defense units. The forces in-country, or scheduled for deployment added to those considered for deployment, would total 44 maneuver battalions. In reply to a CJCS inquiry as to whether this force would convince the VC/NVA that they could not win,[73] COMUSMACV stated that there was no evidence the VC/NVA would alter their intentions, no matter what the US did in the next six months, but the 44-battalion force should establish a favorable balance of power by the end of the year. He felt that substantial increases would be necessary in 1966, since the US would be too busy building our forces in 1965 to seize the initiative from the enemy during the year.[74]

(S) On 27 June COMUSMACV expressed the need for 13 airmobile companies and several airlift platoons to support the infantry brigades and non-divisional artillery units. He realized the magnitude of his requirements, but felt they were necessary.[75]

(S) The location of USA combat units in, or requested for, SVN was the subject of a message from COMUSMACV to CINCPAC on 2 July.[76] COMUSMACV's plan, which was concurred in by CINCPAC[77] and JCS,[78] was to deploy the 2d Bde (-), 1st Inf Div, to Bien Hoa; a battalion combat team (BCT) of this brigade to Cam Ranh Bay; the 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div, to Dong Ba Thin, near Nha Trang-Cam Ranh Bay; 1st Cav Div (AM) to Qui Nhon; the 1st Inf Div (-) to III CTZ, and the 173d Abn Bde would be assembled at Bien Hoa as a rapid reaction force for use throughout the country.

(C) During July, two separate brigades arrived in SVN; the 2d Bde, 1st Inf Div, and the 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div. The brigade from the 1st Div offloaded a battalion with supporting units at Cam Ranh Bay on 12 July to provide security, and the brigade (-) deployed to Bien Hoa.[79] The 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div arrived at Cam Ranh Bay on 29 July and relieved the battalion of the 2d Bde, 1st Inf Div, allowing it to join its parent organization at Bien Hoa. The 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div had originally been ordered to deploy to SVN to replace the 173d Abn Bde but, on 2 August,[80] approval was granted to retain the 173d in SVN on a permanent basis,[81] giving COMUSMACV the two highly mobile brigade forces he had requested for rapid reserve/reaction operations throughout SVN.

(C) Arrival of the two separate brigades was followed closely by the establishment of a corps-size HQ, designated Task Force Alpha. This HQ, which had been requested by COMUSMACV on 30 March, was to control all US ground forces in II and III Corps. With the

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arrival of additional forces, the HQ was later redesignated Field Force, Vietnam (FFORCEV).[82]

(S) During the SECDEF's visit to SVN on 16 July, he was informed of COMUSMACV's[83] position concerning troop requirements for SVN, deployment schedules, expected results, and probable requirements for 1966. At this time there were 16 USA maneuver battalions in SVN or scheduled for arrival. The total JCS-recommended or approved additional deployments at the time included 26 US-FWMAF maneuver battalions which would bring the total number of US-FWMAF maneuver battalions to approximately 44; 22 of which would be USA battalions.[84]

(S) COMUSMACV's concept, as presented to the SECDEF, indicated a need for 44 maneuver battalions in 1965, operating from enclaves and secure bases, with the largest possible proportion being held in a mobile reaction and combat role. The force development levels were based on force ratios, objectives and priorities, and the military tasks which were to be performed. The need for additional forces in the future was projected, contingent upon VC strength increases and/or increasing lags in the ARVN buildup.[85] In addition to the 44 maneuver battalions, COMUSMACV expressed a requirement for 22 artillery battalions, four Hawk battalions, 13 engineer battalions, 20 USA helicopter companies, seven USMC helicopter squadrons, and three helicopter battalion and service support units, some of which were then in SVN.[86] These forces were referred to as Phase I forces.

(S) COMUSMACV further informed the SECDEF during the conference that RVNAF had lost the initiative, andthe people of SVN had displayed a loss of confidence in the GVN because of increasing VC attacks and the inability of RVNAF to hold and secure critical rural areas and lines of communication. It was apparent that RVNAF was unable to cope with the VC threat; and unless the requested US/FWMA forces were deployed, there was little chance of arresting the trend. If the forces were not deployed, the VC would attain more favorable force ratios, the stability of the GVN would be further weakened, and the introduction of even greater US resources on a more urgent basis, against greater odds, would be inevitable.[87]

(S) In answering SECDEF's question as to what additional forces would be needed in 1966 to gain US objectives in SVN, COMUSMACV stated that it was anticipated that a need would exist for an increase of 24 maneuver battalions; 14 artillery battalions; three air defense (Hawk) battalions; eight engineer battalions; 12 helicopter companies; six helicopter battalions, and additional support units.[88]

(TS) Another conference was held in Hawaii in early August to develop a deployment plan for those forces requested by COMUSMACV. The conference developed a coordinated program for the deployment of

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forces during the remainder of 1965 and into 1966. In early August, there were eight USA infantry (maneuver) battalions in SVN as well as 13 1/3 helicopter companies. An additional eight maneuver battalions were approved for deployment--the 1st Cav Div (AM)--and 17 1/3 helicopter companies were either enroute or had been approved.[89]

(TS) The final plan developed at the conference called for movement of:

1) Remainder of the 1st Inf Div (six battalions) to III CTZ during the period 1-17 October. The 1st Inf Div had been alerted on 31 July.

2) Six artillery battalions (two 105-mm howitzer, two 175-mm gun, two 8-in howitzer) to locations in II and III CTZ's during 1-2 October. These units, with control elements, had received orders on 31 July to deploy to SVN.

3) 13 2/3 helicopter companies (light) and four helicopter companies (medium) to various locations in SVN from 15 November 1965 to 1 October 1966.

4) Two US Army air defense battalions (Hawk), (one to TSN and one to Qui Nhon) by 1 October. Both battalions received deployment orders on 31 July.

5) Three USA CV-2B (Caribou) companies by 31 December, for various locations in SVN.[90]

(TS) COMUSMACV's concept of operations in SVN, published in late August, outlined a 3-phase program, each with its own time frame, objectives and military tasks, designed to achieve the US/FWMAF/GVN goals.[91] (See Chapter III.) To support the concept, a force-requirements conference was held in Saigon in early September. The conferees outlined the tasks to be performed during the three phases and decided that the move from Phase I to Phase II operations would be a gradual shift from strategically defensive operations to a posture employing the strategic offensive. The major additional USA units needed for Phase II operations were two infantry divisions, an armored cavalry regiment, another field force HQ, another infantry battalion for the 173d Abn Bde, and support forces numbering about 30,000 US Army personnel.[92]

(TS) The initial plan for Phase II forces was to employ an infantry division generally along the southern coastal plain in II CTZ, with a second infantry division operating largely in Hau Nghia Province, northwest of Saigon. The armored cavalry regiment was to operate closely with the division located

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along the southern coastal plain and to secure the southern portion of Highway 1 in II CTZ. The field force HQ was to be established in III CTZ and assume operational control of US/FWMA combat forces operating there. [93]

(TS) The purpose of the CINCPAC conference in early October 1965 was to identify and program the necessary Phase II forces for deployment to SVN. The two divisions requested by COMUSMACV were identified as the 4th and 25th Inf Divs; the 4th Div to operate in II CTZ and the 25th in III CTZ. The initial element of the 25th Div, a brigade with support forces, was programmed to arrive in SVN by 31 January 1966, and was planned for attachment to the 1st Inf Div until the remainder of the division arrived in September 1966. The first element of the 4th Div, also a brigade-size force, was programmed to arrive during June 1966 and the division (-) scheduled to close in December 1966. The armored cavalry regiment was programmed to arrive during September 1966 with the remaining combat, combat support and combat service support units programmed for arrival throughout 1966 and, in some cases, into the middle of 1967. [94]

(U) By the end of October, nearly all of the combat forces requested for deployment during 1965 had arrived in SVN. The arrival of the 1st Cav Div (AM) on 12 September, and the arrival of the remainder of the 1st Inf Div on 7 October, completed the deployment of the then-planned major USA combat units in 1965. [95]

(TS) The planned buildup of USA units was substantially revised in late November largely because of new intelligence estimates, which indicated a large influx of NVA forces. [96] COMUSMACV stated that the enemy was increasing his forces at a rate which more than doubled the previous estimate. The force ratios were taking an adverse trend and were then down to 2.8 to 1. Projecting this late 1965 enemy buildup rate into 1966, it was estimated that the force ratios would decline to 2.2 to 1 by the end of 1966, even if all Phase II forces arrived as scheduled. Earlier estimates had predicted a 3.3 to 1 ratio by the end of 1966. [97]

(TS) The SECDEF and CJCS, were back again in SVN on 28 November for discussions regarding the revised intelligence picture, the anticipated VC/NVA buildup, and the necessity for a greater commitment of US forces. During the briefings, COMUSMACV expressed a need for an additional division (which could be ROK) for deployment along the coastal plain in II CTZ, thereby freeing the 4th Inf Div, scheduled for arrival in 1966, for operations further inland. Another USA division

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was needed for employment in the upper Delta in the area contiguous to Saigon, for a total of three USA divisions around the capital city. A separate brigade for FFORCEV was necessary to reinforce the 1st Cav Div (AM), and assist in the defense of the base area at An Khe. Two air cavalry squadrons were needed to support the 4th Inf Div and 1st Cav Div (AM), as was another airmobile infantry battalion for the 1st Cav Div (AM), to give that division a balanced force of three 3-battalion brigades.[98] The revised deployment plan was referred to as Phase IIA (add-on).

(TS) The total number of USA personnel requested for Phase IIA was 52,000; this coupled with Phase I's 133,916 and Phase II's 82,106, called for an in-country USA strength of 268,022 by the end of 1966.[99]

(TS) In summarizing the additional requested deployments, COMUSMACV stated that even with approval of the Phase IIA forces, it was estimated that if the enemy continued to increase into 1967 at the projected 1966 rate, an additional requirement would exist for at least a three-division corps. COMUSMACV recommended that such a force be readied for deployment during 1966. He further recommended that the Phase IIA forces be approved and a deployment planning conference be held in Hawaii as quickly as possible to develop the full troop list and deployment schedules.[100]

(TS) After the briefings, COMUSMACV requested CINCPAC to dispatch two brigades of the 25th Inf Div to SVN as soon as possible. One brigade was needed to back up the 1st Cav Div (AM) in the vicinity of Pleiku and the other to strengthen the area around Saigon, specifically the LOC from Saigon to Vung Tau. COMUSMACV based his request on an intelligence estimate which held that there were five VC/NVA division-equivalents operating in I and II CTZ's and along the II/III CTZ boundaries. COMUSMACV expressed his desire that one brigade of the 25th Inf Div be airlifted directly to Pleiku; and that sealift of the second brigade previously scheduled for Saigon during January as a Phase II force be expedited so it would close the Saigon area not later than 20 January 1966.[101] The accelerated deployment request was approved on 11 December 1965.[102]

(TS) The 3d Bde, 25th Div, flown directly from Hawaii to Pleiku, began arriving in SVN on 29 December.[103] The arrival of that brigade ended the USA buildup in SVN during 1965, with the strength of USA personnel totaling 116,755 at the end of the year.[104] (For the location of the major units of the US Army, see Figure II-2.)

US Air Force

(C) At the beginning of 1965 the 2d AD's resources in SVN consisted of 6,901 PCS and TDY personnel and some 222 aircraft. This inventory of aircraft consisted of the following: [105]

1) Two air commando squadrons at Bien Hoa with a total of 48 A-1E aircraft.

2) Four troop carrier squadrons equipped with a total of 72 C-123B aircraft, three squadrons of which were stationed at TSN and the remaining one at Da Nang.

3) Ten B-57 aircraft at Bien Hoa; three RB-57's at TSN.

4) A TDY squadron of F-100's based at Da Nang with approximately 30 aircraft.

5) Six F-102 aircraft at TSN.

6) Twelve RF-101 aircraft at TSN.

7) A tactical air support squadron of 22 O-1F's at Bien Hoa.

(C) In Thailand, 2d AD assets consisted of 22,719 PCS and TDY personnel and 83 aircraft. These aircraft were distributed as follows: [106]

1) One squadron of 18 F-105 aircraft, located at Korat.

2) One squadron of 15 F-100 aircraft, located at Takhli.

3) Four F-102's, based at Don Muang.

4) Ten T-28's and ten RT-28's, based at Udorn.

5) Eight helicopters (Air Rescue), also based at Udorn.

(S) The changes in missions and great expansion of US Air Force in the RVN during 1965 are traceable to a COMUSMACV request on 24 January to Cdr, 2d AD, for a study of how the air effort in RVN could be increased. This analysis, completed on 17 March, summarized the factors which limited air force activities in the RVN. It also clarified the assumptions and listed the available resources which would be involved in considerations for an expansion of the air effort in RVN. On 24 March, COMUSMACV concurred with all the recommendations made by Cdr, 2d AD. Subsequently

approved by top US authorities, these recommendations thus formed the initial basic guidelines for USAF developments in RVN during 1965. The principal recommendation was that the JCS requirement for a VNAF pilot/observer on board A-1E "Farmgate" [107] aircraft be revoked, permitting the overt use of USAF in-country strike aircraft against targets in SVN.

(C) In the meantime, there were other developments which influenced changes in policies governing the use of air power in the Vietnamese conflict during 1965. On 7 February, USN aircraft bombed targets in NVN in retaliation for the VC bombing of a US Bachelor Enlisted Quarters (BEQ) in Pleiku earlier that day. On 8 February USAF and VNAF aircraft also participated in raids over NVN. On 19 February, B-57 jet aircraft based at Bien Hoa were committed against the VC in SVN. [108] F-100 aircraft based at Da Nang were also similarly used.

(S) In February, the JCS foresaw the need for deployment of nine additional tactical fighter squadrons from CONUS to WESTPAC and the deployment of 30 B-52 aircraft from CONUS to Guam to support the forces in SVN. JCS had recommended four strikes per week by US and VNAF aircraft against NVN targets south of the 19th parallel, [109] and requested CINCPAC and COMUSMACV for comments regarding the desirability of deploying six more fighter squadrons from CONUS. [110] Later in February COMUSMACV concurred with the buildup of airpower in SVN, [111] and stated that a large number of US aircraft was available in RVN and Thailand, and should be used in support of the RVNAF. COMUSMACV further recommended that an eight-week program of graduated military pressure against NVN be undertaken. [112]

(C) On 18 March, three F-100 fighter squadrons from CONUS began rotational TDY operating out of Da Nang. [113] By mid-April, a squadron of F-104C aircraft arrived at Da Nang, the first F-104 organization to be assigned to SVN. [114]

(C) In mid-April 1965, JCS directed through CINCPAC the ROLLING THUNDER bombing operations against NVN, using US aircraft based in RVN and on the 7th Flt aircraft carriers. [115] The ROLLING THUNDER strikes doubled the 2d AD's support requirements and severely taxed its resources. [116]

(S) ROLLING THUNDER enabled the USAF to exploit a relatively new type of restricted warfare, bring into action new model aircraft and improvedcontrol systems. The mainstay of USAF's strike force against NVN targets was the F-105 aircraft (later joined in June 1965 by F-4C aircraft). [117] The Tactical Air Control Center (TACC) at TSN air base, which had been controlling the out-of-country air reconnaissance program since August 1964, was expanded

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to direct the control of US-VNAF strikes against NVN in addition to SVN strikes. The 7th Flt provided a liaison officer at the TACC. To augment the 2d AD staff in handling the increased workload, USAF personnel were brought in-country on temporary duty status.

(S) Augmentation of US forces in SEASIA, approved in March by the JCS, called for deployment of five USAF tactical fighter squadrons [118] to the WESTPAC, of which one F-100 squadron was to be based at Da Nang AB. Other approved USAF units for deployment to RVN-Thailand had been: [119]

		ETA
1)	One F-4C sqdn to Ubon/Udorn AB, Thailand.	7 Apr 65
2)	One F-105 sqdn to Takhli, Thailand.	11 Apr 65
3)	One Reconnaissance Task Force (RTF) (six RB-66) to Clark/TSN, RVN.	10 Apr 65
4)	Three O-1 sqdns to RVN.	20 Aug 65

(S) Furthermore, during March, COMUSMACV assisted in updating target selections and planned air strikes against NVN. [120] COMUSMACV recommended to CINCPAC additional targets south of the 19th parallel in NVN, with attack requirements and proposed priorities for an eight-week pressure program. On 31 March, COMUSMACV also recommended to CINCPAC an air strike program to follow the eight-week series of strikes.

(TS) Eight tactical fighter squadrons were to be identified for deployment to SEASIA, initially on a rotational assignment, for beddown at jet-capable bases most accessible to SVN. [121] Missions would be flown in-country as well as out-of-country. Aircraft based in RVN and Thailand were designated to support the RVN in-country effort as directed by COMUSMACV, under operational control of the 2d AD. [122] They were also on call for air strikes against NVN under PACAF direction and control. Further deployment to RVN and Thailand was contingent upon availability and construction of jet-capable bases. [123]

(C) In order to make the necessary adjustments involved in these accelerated developments, a force deployment-support planning conference was convened by CINCPAC on 9 April at PACOM HQ [124] in anticipation of the SECDEF's visit scheduled later in the month. Among the conferees were representatives of the JCS, CINCPAC, the component commands, COMUSMACV, COMUSKOREA (Commander United States Forces, Korea), COMUSMACTHAI (Commander United States Military Assistance Command, Thailand). The purpose of the CINCPAC conference was to develop deployment

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plans and movement schedules for the additional logistical and other supporting units required on a time-phased order of priority basis.[125] Insofar as USAF deployments were concerned, the conference served to clarify deployments of types of aircraft rather than to generate new requirements for deployment of squadrons.[126]

(S) By-mid-1965, the force buildup began to appear as a massive air effort in SEASIA, particularly in RVN. It provided the USAF (and through its advisory efforts, the VNAF)[127] both with a challenge and an opportunity to test its capability in a new type of fighting. Actions of previous years had not drawn heavily on USAF technological capacity but increased intensity of the war in RVN in 1965, and the consequent buildup, brought in a new range of aircraft and weapons. Although the conflict was still largely a ground action in a tactical theater of war, CONUS air commands other than USAF's Tactical Air Command (TAC) had become involved.[128] SAC used B-52's in attacks on enemy bases and concentrations. The Air Force Systems Command (AFSC) gave SEASIA requirements top priority. The development of the new F-5C tactical fighter was expedited by AFSC for operational tests under combat conditions in RVN. The AFSC established special teams to study new means of finding and destroying the enemy forces and protecting friendly elements.[129] Air Force Logistics Command (AFLC), charged with maintaining an 8,000 mile "pipeline," was keeping practically all SEASIA-based aircraft at an operational ready rate of well over 80 percent.[130] Force buildup efforts through mid-1965 already had changed the USAF role from a limited counterinsurgency action with emphasis on training, to a full-scale theater air effort employing the latest aircraft, weapons, and equipment.[131]

(S) In June 1965 it became obvious to COMUSMACV that the buildup of US forces programmed at the April conferences would not be adequate to cope with the deteriorating situation in SVN. He required additional ground troops and, to support a general increase in tempo of combat operations, additional tactical fighter squadrons were needed. Late in the month, COMUSMACV presented new requirements for fighter squadrons.[132] Whereas earlier in June JCS had recommended increases of one USMC and four USAF squadrons, COMUSMACV felt that a squadron in addition to those recommended by JCS was essential to provide adequate support of additional US ground forces. To this, CINCPAC added the need to revitalize RVNAF, step up B-52 and other in-country sorties, maintain steady pressure on NVN by increased strikes and reconnaissance sorties, and lift the restrictions on bombing north and northwest of Hanoi, regardless of possible MIG reaction.[133] COMUSMACV and CINCPAC both supported an increase in B-52 sortie rate to 800 per month, although not all of these missions could be exploited by ground

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follow-up.[134] On 17 July, COMUSMACV informed the SECDEF, then in Saigon, that the rate of NVA infiltration into RVN had been increasing. This brought about a revision of USAF requirements in support of ground forces deployed to check infiltration through the southern Laotian Panhandle and the DMZ. The new requirement called for the deployment of a total of 18 fighter/attack squadrons with a total of 4,716 personnel. At that time, five fighter/attack squadrons and their reconnaissance task force located in Thailand, were to be moved to RVN upon availability of bases.[135]

(TS) As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the July SECDEF conference generated the Phase I, II and III COMUSMACV concept of operations which subsequently was published on 30 August. A complete reevaluation of USAF deployment requirements was conducted during August in conjunction with other service requirements, and formed the basis for the deployment requirements contained in the concept of operations. Based on the buildup of US/FWMAF ground maneuver battalions and the projected sortie totals required to provide close support to these units, a total of 23 USAF/USMC squadrons were required by the end of Phase I (31 December). Seven more squadrons would be added during the first half of 1966 (Phase II) in order to raise this total to 30. It was recognized, however, that air base as well as squadron availability would not permit the buildup to progress according to the month-by-month schedule contained in the plan, but the projection of requirements versus availabilities intersected in June 1966.[136]

(U) The USAF organization in SEASIA underwent some adjustments to meet the rapidly expanding missions of its various elements in support of COMUSMACV and CINCPAC. In July, six air bases in Thailand (Don Muang, Takhli, Korat, Ubon, Udorn, and Makon Phanom) were transferred from the 2d AD to the 13th Air Force, Clark Air Base, Philippines. Organizational unit designations in both Thailand and RVN were changed when tactical fighter wings were established at Bien Hoa, Da Nang and Korat. Other 2d AD and 13th Air Force combat support units were designated combat groups. In RVN, new combat support groups were established at Pleiku in central Vietnam and Binh Tuy Province. Later, tactical fighter wings were established at two new jet bases at Cam Ranh Bay and Phan Rang, in November and December 1965 respectively. With the addition of these two bases, COMUSMACV had five jet-capable bases in SVN,[137] when added to Da Nang, Bien Hoa and TSN.

(S) Throughout the summer, capability studies were made in Washington; HQ, PACOM; and HQ, USMACV, to identify measures by which USAF effectiveness could be improved in SEASIA and SVN. On 17 September, the SECDEF requested the JCS to recommend measures which would improve air defense and early warning capabilities to

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protect adequately RVN and US forces in SVN.[138] On 21 September, the SECDEF announced that 12 F-5A aircraft would be sent to SVN during autumn so that a performance evaluation of this multi-purpose plane under combat conditions could be made under the code name SKOSHI TIGER.[139]

(C) On 30 September, the JCS directed Chief of Staff, USAF (CSAF), to deploy four tactical fighter squadrons and necessary support personnel, totaling 5,607 personnel, to SVN by 1 November.[140]

(TS) As USAF fighter squadrons deployed in and out of RVN and Thailand in increasing numbers, increased efforts were made to develop an appropriate enemy target list. Because of the base load problems in RVN, some reconnaissance units were based in Thailand. The Secretary of State (SECSTATE) on 7 October, requested the Government of Thailand to allow the deployment of a detachment of five RV-66B reconnaissance aircraft (Brown Cradle) and 110 personnel to Takhli in support of operations in SEASIA.[141] Nine RF-4C aircraft, equipped with AN/AAS-18 scanners, arrived in SVN on 29 October as the first increment of a total of 18 RF-4C's equipped with the latest infrared reconnaissance equipment. They were used immediately upon arrival and by 30 November had flown 291 sorties. The remaining increment of this RF-4C squadron arrived in December.

(S) CINCPAC notified JCS and COMUSMACV on 29 October that authority had been granted for immediate deployment of one F-4C squadron to Clark Air Base in the Philippines. The squadron would be phased for later onward movement to Da Nang, for air defense and air escort duty in exchange for F-102 and F-104 detachments stationed there.[142] As of 31 October, the USAF had 23 types of aircraft operating in SVN.[143]

(TS) In early October, CINCPAC advised that the earlier planning factor of six sorties per day, to support each ground maneuver battalion used to develop Phase I and II fighter squadron deployments, was no longer considered valid. He stated that a figure based on four or five sorties per day per battalion should be considered. Using the latter factor, CINCPAC concluded that 15,400 sorties by US jet aircraft in support of 72 battalions would require 24 squadrons compared to the original estimate of 30 squadrons[144] (end of Phase II projected strength).

(C) COMUSMACV indicated that the planning factors used appeared realistic particularly when viewed in terms of the additional capabilities afforded by increased B-52 strikes, armed helicopters and separate artillery. He conditionally concurred in the proposed reduction pending further study by his headquarters.[145]

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(S) Aircraft congestion and the limited number and space of jet-capable airfields were problems which delayed scheduled arrival of Phase I aircraft squadrons. COMUSMACV advised CINCPAC on 15 November that, because of airfield saturation in SVN, the F-105 squadron could not be accepted in-country if it were to displace another squadron required to support in-country air efforts. The F-105 aircraft which were scheduled for beddown at Da Nang air base in 1965 thus could not be accepted. Additional ramp space at Da Nang was expected to become available in April 1966.[146]

(S) Following the SECDEF's late November visit to RVN, and the completion of the tactical air support program for Vietnam, COMUSMACV recommended to CINCPAC that: 1) a total of 23 US jet strike squadron-equivalents be deployed in-country, six USMC and 17 USAF, 2) one aircraft carrier (CVA) continue on Dixie Station (South China Sea, offshore SVN) for in-country strike support until sufficient aircraft were in-country to meet strike requirements, and 3) all services be requested to insure adequate flying hour programs support to provide a 1.2 aircraft sortie per day utilization rate.[147]

(TS) On 3 December, plans were formulated for an "action-list" requirements planning conference to be held at HQ, PACOM, to clarify troop lifts and deployment schedules for Phase II and IIA, resulting from the November[148] SECDEF conference. The conference was scheduled for 6-21 January 1966.[149] Sortie rates, to include B-52 sortie rates, munitions, CVA, airfield and tactical fighter squadron requirements were on the agenda.[150]

(S) The increasing tempo of air action involving both USAF and VNAF aircraft in combination with the 7th Flt and USMC aircraft, necessitated a review of in-country strike aircraft requirements in November.[151] In an early December USMACV staff briefing to COMUSMACV, the following conclusions were drawn:[152]

1) That the VNAF could do better; while their strike capabilities trend was encouraging, USMACV advisors must continue to work on increasing their capability.

2) The A-1 aircraft appeared to be the best all-around strike vehicle if it could be properly stationed throughout the country.

3) The next best in-country aircraft was the F-100.

4) The A-4 aircraft would be fully competitive with the F-100 if it had sufficient ordnance and if spares were programmed to increase its capability.

5) The F-4C appeared to be an improvement over the F-100 both in bomb load carrying capability and in its dual role as an air defense weapon.

6) All factors considered, including offshore support, the carrier sortie was equivalent to the ground-based sortie.

7) USMC aircraft effectiveness was adversely affected by a shortage of ordnance.

8) Whereas the absence of B-52 strikes would have increased the requirement for tactical strikes, the B-52 strikes had not decreased the requirement for in-country tactical air strikes.

9) The average number of sorties per battalion could be reduced from six to five; however, plans would have to be ready to reinforce the existing tactical air capability should experience factors show this reduction to be an insufficient sortie rate. Plans would provide the beddown of at least three more tactical air squadrons in-country to meet a surge in air operations.

10) A number of factors could, singly or in combination, increase the sortie requirements. Further heightening of the war, an improving target acquisition capability and the substantial increase in VC antiaircraft weaponry were noted as examples. It could be necessary, for example, to fly flak suppression missions in addition to the armed helicopter support being provided to airmobile operations. USMC experience had indicated this tactic contributed to fewer hits sustained by the escorted helicopters.

11) A stepped-up air campaign against NVN, a program beyond COMUSMACV's direct cognizance, could conceivably generate requirements for more tactical aircraft to be based in SVN.

(TS) In December 1965, the 2d AD priorities for ground air defense units were modified. Hawk unit site priorities were established in the following order: Phan Rang, Tuy Hoa, An Khe in SVN, and Udorn, Ubon, Korat, Takhli, Don Muang and Sattahip in Thailand. This plan would necessitate diversion of some Phase II and IIA units to Thailand. Also, M-42/M-55 (40-mm gun and .50 cal. machine gun air defense weapons systems) priorities were listed in the following order: Da Nang, Chu Lai, Cam Ranh Bay-Nha Trang, Tan Son Nhut-Bien Hoa and An Khe.[153]

(S) USAF strike and support forces experienced a significant increase in RVN during 1965.[154] This resulted in a phenomenal increase in available firepower to meet the VC/NVA threat. At the end of the year, total USAF aircraft in SVN was 365.

While USAF in RVN had a basic advisory function at the beginning of the year, it was actively engaged in combat operations at year's end, with 11 fighter squadrons, eight air commando squadrons, two tactical reconnaissance squadrons, one fighter interceptor squadron and eight combat support squadrons on eight bases in SVN. At the end of 1965, USAF personnel strength in RVN had risen to 20,620 of whom 18,394 were PCS in-country. (For location of the major units of 2d AD in SVN see Figure II-2.)

US Navy

(U) At the beginning of 1965, COMUSMACV's naval personnel were either assigned to an advisory role under the Chief, Naval Advisory Group (CHNAVGP), or were employed in an administrative and logistic support role. Thus, he had no operational naval combat forces under his control.

(C) The discovery of a VC mystery ship in Vung Ro Bay, in Phu Yen Province in February 1965, represented a major turning point in the history of naval operations in SVN. Infiltration by sea had long been a tantalizing but unconfirmed explanation as to how the VC successfully transported large quantities of men, arms, and ammunition undetected into RVN. This incident verified that infiltration by sea was taking place, though the scale of such operations was not known. The large arms cache found in the area indicated that more than one trip had been made or that more than one boat had made the journey. As a result of the implications of the Vung Ro incident, a planning conference was held at USMACV HQ on 3 March to develop a basic concept for a combined USN-VNN anti-sea infiltration effort. A committee, initiated by COMUSMACV and composed of USMACV, NAVGP and 7th Flt representatives developed a concept of operations based on the assumption that probable sea infiltration consisted of two categories: 1) coastal junk traffic mingling with the thousands of junks off the coast and 2) seagoing craft of trawler size or larger that approached the coast more or less perpendicularly. The first type was considered less susceptible to USN detection and it was thought best to inspire the VNN to increase the quantity and quality of its searches. It was believed that interdiction of the second type of infiltration could best be done by utilizing conventional USN ships and aircraft on patrol employing radar and visual techniques. The proposed patrol called for eight patrol areas from the DMZ to the Cambodian border with USN and VNN ships, junks, and patrol aircraft to be phased in on an incremental basis. The program was approved by JCS on 16 March and placed under the operational control of Commander 7th Flt (COMSEVENTHFLT) and designated Operation MARKET TIME. The original plan was to initiate the proposed patrol

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with the following force levels: one destroyer, four minesweepers, two multi-engine patrol aircraft (SP-2), three single-engine carrier based aircraft, two photo-recce carrier based aircraft, 16 VNN patrol ships and 100 VNN junks. By the end of March MARKET TIME was in full operation with a total of more than ten USN destroyers and minesweepers, 126 VNN junks and patrol craft and ten USN surveillance aircraft.[155]

(C) Operation MARKET TIME continued to grow during April as the USN ship total rose momentarily to 28 and then was reduced to a steady level of 15-20. While it had been intended that VNN would take care of close inshore patrolling, the consistently poor performance of the VNN coastal force commander; the need for improvement in efforts to interdict shallow water junk and sampan traffic; and the vastly superior capabilities of the SWIFT (PCF) patrol boat to any other craft available to either VNN or USN with its high speed, potent armament and radar detection gear, led to a discussion of plans for use of SWIFT's in Vietnam at the Honolulu Conference, 10-13 April 1965. Shortly after the conference the SECDEF approved the purchase of 20 of these boats to be manned by USN crews. Coupled with this decision was the subsequent announcement on 30 April by SECDEF that operational control of all US MARKET TIME forces would eventually be transferred to COMUSMACV with CHNAVGP acting as his agent for such direction. This resolved the problem which would have arisen if the SWIFT's had been operating under 7th Flt in conjunction with Coastal Forces of the VNN, which were advised by NAVGP personnel rather than personnel immediately responsive to COMSEVENTH-FLT direction.[156]

(C) Apparently the use of other resources to enhance MARKET TIME was discussed at the Honolulu Conference for, on 29 April, it was announced that a USCG squadron consisting of 17 small Patrol Boats (WPB) would be deployed to Vietnam in the near future.[157]

(C) Subsequent to the deployment of eight WPB's to Da Nang on 20 July and nine WPB's to An Thoi (Phu Quoc Island, Gulf of Thailand) on 31 July, MARKET TIME forces consisted of nine destroyer-minesweeper patrol ships, two Landing Ship Tank (LST) support ships, five SP-2H patrol aircraft based at TSN, and the 17 WPB's. Earlier approval had been granted for the deployment of 20 SWIFT's but they had not yet arrived.[158]

(C) During his July 1965 visit, the SECDEF expressed concern about the lack of progress being made in counter-

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infiltration operations at sea. He wanted to know if the recently expanded program had reduced infiltration; if not, why not and were additional forces needed? He was informed that according to a study directed by COMUSMACV, there was insufficient present and planned surface forces to patrol the long coastline adequately; patrol aircraft available were inadequate; harbor entrance control posts were required; VNN forces were needed for amphibious type raids; base development plans had not anticipated additional forces requested by the study; and there was little control over waterways and rivers at the Cambodian border. As a result the decision was made during the conference to procure 34 more SWIFT's, raising the total to 54, plus three patrol air-cushion boats (PACV) for use with the SWIFT's. 159

(C) In August, COMUSMACV requested an increase in patrol ships for MARKET TIME operations from nine to 25 in order to enhance significantly the surveillance capability. As a result of the request, representatives from CINCPAC, COMUSMACV, CINCPACFLT, CNO (Chief of Naval Operations) and CHNAVGP met in Saigon in early September and recommended the following actions: increase patrol ships from nine to 14; double patrol aircraft coverage by placing four aircraft on patrol at all times; increase inshore patrol coverage by increasing the number of SWIFT's from 54 to 84 and USCG WPB's from 17 to 26; increase the number of LST's providing radar coverage of the Mekong River mouths from three to four; and inaugurate an extensive river patrol with 120 patrol craft. 160

(S) Two increases in MARKET TIME forces occurred in October. Seaplanes based at Cam Ranh Bay were employed for the first time during the latter half of the month and provided continuous flights over the southern surveillance track. Secondly, SWIFT boats arrived at An Thoi on 30 October to provide inshore patrol capabilities for MARKET TIME operations. 161

(C) Following up on the recommendations of the September conference to review MARKET TIME requirements, GAME WARDEN was established on 18 December. Its mission was to assist the GVN in denying the enemy use of the major rivers of the Delta and Rung Sat Special Zone (RSSZ), a VC infested area southeast of Saigon. CHNAVGP and Commander, MARKET TIME Task Force, was assigned additional duty as Commander, GAME WARDEN Task Force. The task force was to consist of 100 river patrol boats (PBR) and 20 Landing Craft, Personnel Light (LCPL's) all manned by USN personnel and six HU-1B helicopters manned by the USA. VNN liaison personnel were to be attached to the surface units. 162

(C) Four LCPL's were in-country at the end of 1965 and

it was expected that all 20 would arrive by mid-May 1966. The PBR construction had begun in the US and a training program for the crews was being conducted at Coronado, California. The first units were expected to arrive in-country about 20 February 1966 and would be assigned to RSSZ. The full force of 100 boats was expected to be in SVN by 1 May 1966.[163]

(C) It was planned that the 30 PBR's patrolling the lower Delta would initially operate from an LST and Landing Ship Dock (LSD) anchored about six miles off shore. These units were undergoing conversion during December to comply with the requirements of the PBR's and to serve as landing platforms for the HU-1B's. The LSD was scheduled to arrive 15 February 1966, and the LST on 1 March. Four specially outfitted LST's were scheduled to eventually replace the LSD and LST in September 1966.[164]

RVN FORCES

General

(U) In 1965, the combat organization of RVN consisted of three military and three paramilitary forces. The military forces were: a regular force made up of ARVN, VNN, VNAF, and VNMC (see Figure II-3); RF; and PF. The paramilitary forces were: NP; the CIDG; and vestiges of the Armed Combat Youth (ACY).

(S) Authorized strengths at the end of 1964 were 243,287 men in the regular forces, 107,983 in RF and 174,185 in PF. Paramilitary forces were authorized a total of 51,600 (see discussion of CIDG, NP and ACY below). In November 1964 a joint USMACV/RVNAF JGS survey of RVNAF structure was conducted. It was concluded that there was need for substantial increases in RVNAF personnel. Two alternatives were proposed.[165,166] Alternative 1 provided for an increase of 30,309 men in regular forces, 35,387 in RF, and 10,815 in PF. It was believed these forces would provide for progress in the Hop Tac area (see Chapter IV) and would arrest VC operations in a number of high priority areas. Alternative 2 provided for an increase of 47,556 in regular forces and the same RF/PF increases as Alternative 1. This was considered adequate to permit substantial progress in pacification but would take considerable time to recruit, train and equip.[167]

(S) Alternative 1 was considered preferable because of limited manpower resources, lead time required to procure and train leaders, training center limitations and equipment lead time. On 24 November 1964, COMUSMACV recommended to CINCPAC Alternative 1 be approved for MAP support.[168] The US could not

limit the size of GVN forces, however, JCS approval was required to procure MAP support for any increases. GVN habitually recognized MAP support figures as authorized strengths.

(S) On 23 January 1965, Alternative 1 forces increases, with some modifications, were formally approved for MAP support by SECDEF. The force levels were fixed at 275,058 for regular force, 137,137 for RF, and 185,000 for PF.[169]

(S) Because of the rapidly deteriorating situation, J3, USMACV, recommended to COMUSMACV that Alternative 1 increases be accelerated, and that Alternative 2 increases be implemented upon completion of Alternative 1.[170] On 20 March, COMUSMACV requested authority from CINCPAC to implement Alternative 2;[171] and on 13 April, JCS approved the accelerated schedule and approved Alternative 2 increases of 17,247 spaces for RVNAF.[172]

(S) On 5 November, COMUSMACV submitted a request to increase the force level of the regular forces to 311,458 in FY 66 and to 325,256 in FY 67.[173] The FY 66 increases were primarily to flesh-out existing structure in the areas of command, control support, polwar, and the pipeline to preclude units from absorbing the transient load. FY 67 increases included 3 infantry battalions (to replace those traded-off in FY 66 to form two additional airborne battalions), one infantry regiment, 1 artillery battery (105), 2 MP companies, 1 Marine battalion, 1 Civil Affairs company, 4 psywar companies, 81 RF companies (to accommodate an expanding rural construction program), 5,280 spaces to absorb 40 CIDG companies proposed to be transferred into the RF and 15,000 PF spaces plus augmentations to increase the capability of existing RVNAF units.[174] COMUSMACV felt a much larger increase was needed, but the available manpower would not support it.[175] These increases were verbally approved by SECDEF at a conference in Saigon on 28 November.[176]

(S) COMUSMACV felt the requested force increases represented the maximum strength that the available manpower base could support.[177] It was estimated that accessions of 20,000 per month would be required to attain and sustain these levels, and that maintenance of these levels past 1969 would require recovery of significant manpower resources from VC controlled areas or the extension of military terms of service and recall of veterans.[178] The manpower shortage was qualitative as well as quantitative. It was difficult to obtain and train leaders for the rapidly expanding forces.[179]

(S) Draft deferments for military age males considered to hold essential non-military jobs tended to reduce the available manpower pool. COMUSMACV urged the use of women, veterans, and personnel otherwise unqualified for military service, for these

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jobs. He recommended that rural construction cadre, when drafted, be returned to their jobs after training to serve in a type of reserve status, available to the province chief if needed.[180] The SECSTATE expressed fear that the draft of essential people would adversely affect other programs.[181]

(C) The conscription of skilled technical personnel adversely affected operations in a number of areas. One such example, the object of a special study by the USMACV staff, pertained to employees of the VNN shipyard in Saigon and the control tower at Tan Son Nhut. Over the last nine months of the year, six percent of the total labor force at the shipyard had been lost but this loss included 20 percent of the section heads, 16 percent of the subsection heads, 10 percent of the gang leaders and 25 percent of the supervisors. A similar problem applied to the Civil Aviation Agency Air Controllers. At the close of the year COMUSMACV suggested that these specialists be exempted from the draft or that the shipyard and the Civil Aviation Agency be augmented with military spaces to permit personnel to remain on the job when drafted.[182]

(C) During the year RVNAF was plagued with high desertion rates (see Table II-2). Approximate desertion rates for the year per 1,000 personnel were 14 for regular forces, 12 for RF, 28 for PF and 23 for CIDG. Studies indicated many causes for this high desertion rate.[183] Included were:

1) Overly restrictive leave policy.

2) Family separation.

3) Lack of command attention to personnel management and soldier welfare such as pay, housing and promotions.

4) General dissatisfaction with military life.

5) Tolerance of military and civil authorities toward desertion.

6) Apparent public apathy toward the war.

7) Increasingly heavy combat losses.

8) Poor apprehension and punishment of offenders.

9) Misuse of certain types of units (Ranger and PF) by higher headquarters.

(C) This desertion problem was the subject of a great

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deal of advisory attention throughout the year, but at year's end little change had been noted, either in desertion experience or in public attitude.

(C) Extraordinarily high combat losses had an adverse effect on the buildup and caused further drain on the manpower base (see Table II-2). Losses were so high that 11 of the 15 battalions in training in July had to be temporarily disestablished to provide fillers for the older battalions of the regiments.[184]

(S) The buildup placed a heavy strain on both training and transportation facilities. VC interdiction of the surface transportation nets placed a heavy load on air transportation. This, coupled with the US buildup, caused a reduction in the administrative troop lift available to RVNAF.[185] The influx of large numbers of trainees exceeded National Training Center (NTC) capacities. It was necessary to expand facilities and establish division training centers. Facilities and instructors were not up to standard.[186] RF/PF was dependent upon ARVN training facilities for specialist training. The increase in the ARVN training requirements resulted in a reduction of the number of allocations available to RF/PF and thereby hampered the RF/PF training effort.

ARVN and Paramilitary Forces

(C) The ARVN consisted of infantry, airborne, Ranger and support units, and was charged with the missions of destroying or driving off organized VC forces from areas planned for pacification; harassing VC bases and LOC's; controlling the borders of RVN; providing elements of general, corps, division and sector reserve, and other secondary missions.[187]

(S) The ARVN force increases under Alternatives 1 and 2 consisted mainly of an increase from 119 combat battalions (93 infantry, 20 Ranger and 6 airborne) to 150, by adding one battalion to each regiment.[188] In August, JCS expressed a desire to activate two additional airborne battalions as add-ons. COMUSMACV concurred with the recommendation, but decided not to request additional MAP authorization for the units. He decided rather to use the already authorized spaces for three infantry battalions for them.[189] This dropped the 1965 authorization to 149 combat battalions.

(S) Three separate regiments, the 43d, 48th, and 52d, existed in the III CTZ. COMUSMACV and JCS felt it was desirable to create a new division out of these three regiments. On 5 May, COMUSMACV requested authority to support activation of the 10th ARVN Div.[190] On 9 June, JCS approved the activation and fixed the ARVN force ceiling support figure at 261,155.[191]

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The 10th Div had been activated by JGS on 16 May.[192]

(S) At year's end, all 149 ARVN battalions that had been authorized under Alternatives 1 and 2 had been recruited and all except four had been deployed or were undergoing training. Three were in training centers but training had not commenced. One battalion had not yet been sent to a training center.[193] (See Table II-4 and Figure II-4.)

(C) The RF consisted of rifle companies, river boat companies and support units. Its mission was to perform pacification, defense and security tasks. These included: protection of key installations and LOC's, providing public security, providing elements of subsector and sector reserve, assisting ARVN as required during the security subphase, harassing VC secret bases and LOC's, and identifying and destroying the VC infrastructure.[194] RF companies were recruited within each province, and were to be employed within the boundaries of that province.

(C) The RF increases under Alternatives 1 and 2 were aimed at attaining a year-end FY 66 strength of 137,187. In July 1965, this figure was reduced to 134,999 as a result of transferring the Railway Security Group, formerly a part of RF, to ARVN. FY 66 strength consisted of 959 rifle companies. The request for force increase submitted by COMUSMACV on 5 November 1965 did not include any additional increases for the RF in FY 66; however, for the FY 67 program, 121 additional rifle companies were included (81 new rifle companies and personnel spaces to accommodate the transfer of 40 CIDG companies to RF).[195]

(S) RF buildup did not progress as rapidly as anticipated, since it depended entirely upon volunteers; however, it was able to reach approximately 98 percent of its authorized strength ceiling by the end of the year. Approximately 85 percent of the companies programmed were activated during the year.[196] (See Table II-4 and Figure II-5.)

(C) The PF consisted of rifle platoons and separate squads to provide villages with organic troops to assist in pacification, defense and security. PF was charged with the same primary missions as RF and was to assume these missions upon relieving RF and until relieved by the NP.[197] PF units were recruited locally and were to be used only as security forces at their home villages or hamlets. As mentioned earlier, PF were often misused, thus contributing to the high loss and desertion rates.

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(S) Alternatives 1 and 2 fixed the PF strength of 185,000 for FY 66. No additional increases were requested in FY 66 although a ceiling of 200,000 was requested for FY 67. PF force ceiling for FY 67 was deliberately set at levels higher than those anticipated to be attained in order to insure that sufficient authorizations would be available within USMACV for expansion into high priority rural construction areas as these areas came under GVN control.[198]

(S) PF strengths showed a drastic decline, rather than an increase, in 1965. There was a decline of approximately 25,000, owing primarily to desertions. The inability of PF to offset the desertions with accessions was caused by severe recruiting restrictions placed upon PF by JGS. On 6 January, JGS issued Memo 22/TTL, which prohibited recruiting of personnel 20 to 25 years of age. On 2 July, JGS Memo 0815/TTL halted recruitment of all personnel between 17 and 30, and was made retroactive to 1 January, thus making the status of some 17,000 recruits in the restricted age group illegal. This placed many young men in the paradoxical situation of not being permitted to join local forces to protect their homes, unless they joined or were conscripted into the regular force and consequently, were left to be recruited or drafted by the VC.[199]

(S) Following a meeting on 14 September, recruiting restrictions were relaxed until 1 January 1966, and the status of the 17,000 recruits in the restricted age group was clarified, PF being permitted to retain them. These changes came too late to compensate for the losses of the first nine months of the year.[200]

(S) COMUSMACV expressed the belief that PF was one of the keys of the rural construction effort, and felt that they were not getting the proper attention from GVN.[201] The largest authorized increases within the RVNAF buildup were in RF/PF forces, yet these were the forces which were most neglected in the recruiting effort, depending entirely upon volunteers. PF found itself competing with the National Police, [redacted] and the CIDG, all of which were undergoing expansion. (See Table II-4 and Figure II-6.)

(C) US-supported and advised, the CIDG was a paramilitary organization composed of civilians organized into companies and stationed in camps along the border or near VC infiltration routes. Its five primary missions were to

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harass and block infiltration corridors, harass and block lines of communications between secret bases, harass VC secret bases, collect intelligence and to participate in special operations directed by JGS.[202]

(TS) CIDG was authorized 20,100 men at the beginning of the year. Force level increases brought their authorized strength to 200 companies and 27,500 personnel by the end of 1965. Force levels of 249 companies and 37,350 men by the end of FY 66 were requested and approved.[203] The CIDG was successful in attaining and maintaining its year-end goals.

(C) In February 1965, COMUSMACV decided it would be wise to have all armed forces in RVN responsive to the central government and initiated a study on conversion of CIDG to RF. A group composed of representatives from the USMACV J1, J4, RF/PF Advisory Detachment, Comptroller and 5th SFG met on 11 May to formulate a detailed plan calling for this conversion by 31 December 1966. This study group recommended a tentative schedule for 20 CIDG companies to be converted by 1 July 1965, 69 more by the end of 1965, 45 more by the end of June 1966 and the remaining companies by the end of 1966. The USMACV staff agreed that this conversion could be supported. The 5th SFG felt that some camps were not suitable for conversion and pointed out a similar conversion attempt had failed in 1963.[204] Due to the political situation at the time no action was forthcoming from JGS until 15 September 1965.

(C) On 15 September, JGS agreed in principle with the conversion, but recommended a phased conversion starting first with those camps in relatively secure areas; but by no means, they felt, should the project be completed before 1 January 1967. CIDG cadres would be absorbed into RF ranks in compliance with the same rules applied to cadres for religious sect units—namely, that appointments would be temporary, pending completion of qualifying schools. Conversion would be voluntary.[205]

(S) COMUSMACV felt there was sufficient agreement to warrant further action, and he recommended to JGS that a slow and deliberate attempt be made at conversion. He recommended two or three camps for conversion as pilot models to develop policies and procedures. As an alternative, he suggested placing CIDG directly under district chiefs. This would be less burdensome and would accomplish the goal of increased responsiveness to GVN.[206]

(S) A portion of the RF expansion requested by COMUSMACV in November (mentioned earlier in this chapter) was to be accomplished by conversion of 40 CIDG companies to commence

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during the first quarter of 1966. Even though the ultimate goal of the conversion was to eliminate the CIDG, the 40 companies lost through the initial conversion were to be reconstituted in other remote locations to defend against VC/NVA infiltration.[207]

(C) At the close of 1965, the conversion question had not been fully resolved and all target dates had been withheld, pending completion of pilot conversions in 1966.[208] (See Table II-4 and Figure II-7.)

(C) The NP is a national force, formed at province, district and village level, to maintain law and order and to provide security and public safety. They are charged with the missions of penetrating the VC infrastructure, developing informant networks, assisting the military as required, establishing population and resources control, assuming missions of PF on a progressive basis and conducting normal police functions. The NP are supported and advised by USAID.[209]

(S) NP were authorized 31,500 spaces at the beginning of the year. Force structure increases brought their authorized strength to 51,500 by the end of 1965, and would bring it to 72,000 by the end of FY 66.[210] They were successful in attaining and maintaining their authorized year-end goals.

(TS) The ACY, which had augmented PF in local defense, had been ordered disbanded in July 1964 with its members to be recruited into PF as soon as practicable. For the most part, this assimilation had taken place by the end of 1965. However, because of the PF strength ceiling, recruiting restrictions and other causes, it was estimated that some 39,000 ACY remained at the end of the year.[211] No positive count existed, as this force was not formally recognized by GVN; it received no MAP support; and no records thereon were maintained.[212] (See Table II-4 and Figure II-8.)

VNAF

(C) At the beginning of 1965, VNAF consisted of 10,521 personnel,[213] 282 aircraft (including helicopters), four tactical fighter squadrons equipped with T-28/A-1 aircraft, four helicopter squadrons equipped with UH-19/CH-34 aircraft, two troop carrier squadrons equipped with C-47 aircraft and four liaison squadrons equipped with O-1A/U-17 aircraft, plus other miscellaneous units and eight U-6

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aircraft.[214,215]

(C) Replacement of VNAF aircraft was well underway by the beginning of 1965. Some of the older aircraft were still on hand, but were in storage and/or were being phased out of the inventory. The T-28 was being replaced by the A-1H single-seat fighter aircraft and A-1G, the two seat version of the A-1 aircraft. These newer aircraft were far more versatile, had more speed and carried much more ordnance than the T-28. The last of the T-28's was transferred out of the inventory in April 1965.[216]

(C) Continuing the replacement program, the UH-19 helicopter was phased out and replaced with the more modern CH-34. This change-over was almost complete by the beginning of 1965. The last of the UH-19's was removed from the inventory in May.[217]

(C) Subsequent to SECDEF's visit to RVN in May 1964, and in response to his concern over VNAF's ability to cope with the increasing strength and activity of the VC, an expansion of VNAF A-1 squadrons from four to six was considered essential by COMUSMACV. This expansion was subsequently approved in 1964 and the two squadrons were scheduled for activation by 1 May and 15 September 1965, although considerable efforts were being made by VNAF to obtain B-57 jet aircraft as a substitute for A-1's in the sixth squadron.[218]

(C) In spite of VNAF's jet aspirations the two squadrons were activated with A-1 aircraft, thereby raising the January 1965 inventory from 89 to an end-of-year total of 146. The fifth squadron was activated in May, and the sixth in August.[219]

(S) The liaison fleet of aircraft increased considerably during the year. The O-1A fleet more than doubled in size from 37 in January to 84 in December. U-17 aircraft, a new off-the-shelf liaison aircraft, also increased almost 100 percent from 25 in January to 46 in December 1965.[220]

(S) The number of C-47 and U-6A aircraft remained relatively constant throughout the year. However, one additional transport squadron was authorized and programmed for MAP FY 66, making a total of three squadrons. The overall increase of the VNAF aircraft inventory amounted to 108 aircraft, for an increase of 28 percent during the period.[221]

(S) As mentioned above, the Vietnamese, particularly Prime Minister Ky, were vitally interested in the acquisition of a jet capability. Early in the year, Prime Minister Ky had

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pressed for acquisition of a B-57 capability within one of the A-1 squadrons. In August he was somewhat mollified when four B-57 aircraft were presented to VNAF.[222] It was not until toward the end of the year, however, that Vietnamese crews were trained to fly the B-57's.[223] Therefore, interest in a jet capability continued, strongly backed by the fact that NVN possessed such a force as did Thailand and Cambodia.[224]

(S) Therefore, in September and October the Chief, Air Force Advisory Group (CHAFAG), studied methods of providing VNAF with a jet capability. In mid-October he proposed and Cdr, 2d AD, concurred in his plan for modernizing VNAF. This proposal provided for the following:[225]

1) Conversion of two A-1 squadrons to F-5's with the first squadron in FY 66 MAP.

2) Conversion of the two C-47 squadrons to C-119G (U/E 16) aircraft, one per year beginning FY 67.

3) Conversion of the four CH-34 squadrons to UH-1D (U/E 20) helicopters, one per year beginning FY 67.

4) Conversion of the RC-47 reconnaissance force to the reconnaissance version of the F-5.

5) No change in the allocation of O-1/U-17 aircraft to the four liaison squadrons and training center units.

(S) After a study, COMUSMACV proposed to CINCPAC that the additional transport squadron programmed for MAP delivery in FY 66 be equipped with the C-119G aircraft. CINCPAC approval was expected early in 1966.[226]

(S) Apparently, CHAFAG and Cdr, 2d AD felt that ultimately all A-1 squadrons should be converted to F-5 aircraft for, on 2 November, they so recommended to COMUSMACV during a briefing on the subject. COMUSMACV did not concur, however, because of the proven value of the A-1 to the counterinsurgency environment. On 6 November COMUSMACV strongly endorsed the original recommendation and submitted it to CINCPAC for approval.[227]

(S) During SECDEF's visit to SVN in late November COMUSMACV, as a result of further study of VNAF's ability to convert to an F-5 capability, recommended, and SECDEF tentatively approved, the conversion of one A-1H squadron in FY 67 rather than FY 66, as previously recommended. Prime Minister Ky agreed with this program when discussed

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with him in early December and stated that two squadrons of F-5's would be sufficient as the A-1H was particularly suited to the close support role.[228] As a result, during COMUSMACV's meeting with CINCPAC in mid-December plans for modernization of VNAF were finalized and submitted to JCS for approval.[229]

(S) CHAFAG visualized that the two jet squadrons would be deployed in central Vietnam to provide quick reaction to the north or south as required and to assume a future air defense role. The four A-1 squadrons would be positioned so that one squadron would provide close air support for each corps. CINCPAC proposed therefore that one squadron of A-1's be converted during 3d quarter FY 67 and the other squadron be deferred until the 1st squadron of F-5's was fully operational. Justification of this specific conversion was based on the following considerations: [230]

1) The A-1's ability to carry heavy armament and ordnance, plus its loitering capability over the target area, made its retention in VNAF highly desirable.

2) Conversion of some squadrons would reduce the requirements for A-1's, for which a deficit was foreseen in future years, and would prove to be a morale boost to RVNAF enhancing US-GVN relations.

3) While JCS had requested consideration of converting to F-84 or F-86 aircraft, their performance capabilities were significantly inferior to the F-5 and to enemy MIG's. These older aircraft were being phased out of US MAP inventories and, hence, their maintenance would pose a serious problem. The Vietnamese could also be expected to view such an offer as an affront since other MAP supported countries were receiving F-5's, yet RVN was the only such country engaged in hostilities.

(S) At the end of 1965, VNAF personnel strength had risen to 12,976 [231] (see Table II-4) and the aircraft inventory had increased to 398; consisting of six fighter squadrons of A-1H aircraft, four helicopter squadrons of CH-34 aircraft, two troop carrier squadrons of C-47's, four liaison squadrons of O-1's, a flying school squadron of U-17A's and a detachment of U-6A's. [232] This was about double the force strength of July 1962 when USAF was first committed in SVN. [233]

VNN

(C) At the beginning of 1965, VNN was authorized 8,162 personnel for a Sea and River Force. The River Force consisted

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of six assault groups (RAG's) located at bases throughout the Delta region of RVN. A paramilitary group known as the junk force, later called the Coastal Force worked in conjunction with the regular VNN forces. The junk force consisted of 25 divisions located along the coast and was a part of the RF organization. The River and Coastal Forces were designed specifically for counterinsurgency operations, while the Sea Force was organized similar to other small MAP-supported navies. The River Force was capable of conducting river-canal, combat assault operations; participating in amphibious landings within the river-canal complex of the Delta; sweeping electrically activated mines in rivers and canals, and providing river transportation and river transportation escort. The Sea Force participated in small amphibious landings, provided sealift and resupply for RVN forces, and conducted sea patrols in suitable areas. Coastal Force junks conducted coastal patrol (counterinfiltration) and participated in small amphibious landings. [234]

(C) In late 1964, plans were made to expand the counter-insurgency effort along the inland waterways. These plans called for an expansion of the existing RAG's and the formation of a new group, RAG-27. The existing RAG's were expected to continue their utilization of the LCM-6 while the new RAG would be outfitted with LCM-8's and a new-design RPC. The new equipment and additional personnel were scheduled to be phased-in throughout 1965.[235] RAG-27 was ultimately activated at My Tho on the Mekong River on 1 July.

(C) Many research and development projects were undertaken to increase efficiency in search, detection and counter-ambush methods. A junk construction program was initiated and two large piers were completed during 1965. The An Thoi naval base was occupied by the VNN in March and the badly-needed repair facility at Rach Soi was completed in December. Additional LST/LSM (Landing Ship Medium)beaching facilities, completed at Da Nang during the year, were greatly appreciated by port authorities. [236] A determination was made that the Landing Ship Support Large (LSSL) and the Landing Ship Infantry Large (LSIL) were the ideal types of ships for counterinsurgency operations in the Delta. [237] During March Japan authorized the return of five MAP-furnished LSSL's to the US to be transferred to VNN for use as counter-insurgency ships.[238]

(C) Because of poor security and curtailment of night patrolling, a junk division located in I CTZ, close to Chu Lai, was overrun by the VC in July 1965. Several personnel were killed, including two USN advisors and the junk division

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executive officer. As a result of this incident, better security in the form of 874 additional VNN spaces and artillery support were added for defense of five junk bases.[239]

(C) Plans to increase MARKET TIME operations resulted in new requirements for communications, junk repair, armanment and night observation equipment, at a projected total cost of $8,180,314.[240] The effectiveness of the Coastal Force was improved by the consolidation of junk bases, improvements in dependent housing, expansion of psywar operations, revision of VNN command organization and enforcement of curfews.[241]

(C) At the beginning of 1965 the Coastal Force was made up of RF personnel. However, because the Coastal Junk Force was considered to have significant potential, both militarily and for psywar purposes, the RVNAF JGS decided to consolidate the paramilitary force into full status as an integral part of the VNN. Integrated in July, it increased the VNN strength by 3,444 personnel.[242]

(C) On 29 September, CHNAVGP provided to Commander in Chief Vietnamese Navy (CINCVNN) the schedule for delivery of several new ships being procured under MAP. The ships, ranging from LSSL's to RPC's were scheduled for delivery from October 1965 to July 1966.[243]

(C) In May a team of technical experts arrived from the US Navy's Ship Repair Facility, Guam, and inspected older VNN ships. Two ships were determined to be unseaworthy and it was recommended that they be decommissioned after receipt of new LSSL's; however, when the two new LSSL's were turned over to the VNN during September, the old ships were not decommissioned and were still being used at the end of 1965. Also during the month, base development became an item of increased emphasis. In addition to the Cam Ranh Bay development, CHNAVGP selected Vung Tau and Qui Nhon and An Thoi as additional facilities for improvement and requested the VNN to enlarge the Cat Lo naval base. By providing for a PCF/WPB base at Cat Lo, USN personnel would be able to offer technical assistance to the VNN ships and craft supported from there.[244]

(C) At the end of 1965, the strength of the VNN was approximately 14,274; the integration of the 3,444 Junk Force personnel into the VNN accounted for over 98 percent of the increase of VNN personnel during 1965. (See Table II-4.) New ships, craft, and patrol boats gave it the material capability of performing effectively and efficiently. However, many adverse circumstances precluded maximum performance. Mutiny, incompetent leaders, and lack of discipline frustrated most efforts toward improvement.

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VNMC

(C) At the beginning of 1965, the VNMC consisted of 7,209 officers and men organized into one brigade of five infantry battalions and one amphibious support battalion. Although efforts were made to expand the brigade, no significant changes occured during the year.

(C) In July 1965, the Vietnamese JGS proposed that the Marine brigade be increased by an additional battalion. They believed that an equally proportionate buildup among all the branches of the armed services was desirable for maintaining a political balance of forces within the RVNAF, among other reasons. However, the Senior USMC Advisor recommended that no expansion be authorized until middle or late 1966. He estimated that the additional personnel and equipment would not be available until that time. COMUSMACV agreed and recommended to the JGS that the expansion be held in abeyance until CY 66.[245]

(C) Included in the FY 67 RVNAF force structure plan was one additional Marine battalion for the VNMC brigade. As a means to persuade the RVNAF to utilize the VNMC in amphibious operations, COMUSMACV directed that the authorized strength of the five existing Marine battalions be reduced from 931 to 876 since the VNMC was not being utilized in this capacity. Personnel spaces deleted from the existing five battalions plus an additional authorization of 635 spaces were to be utilized to form the sixth battalion and to provide an augmentation to the Amphibious Support Battalion. COMUSMACV agreed to reinstate the personnel spaces taken away from the battalions when the VNMC demonstrated an ability to perform amphibious operations. The sixth battalion was scheduled for activation in the 2d Qtr FY 67.[246,247,248]

(S) In September 1965, a five-year MAP buildup plan was begun, which called for a long range, carefully controlled rate of growth leading to an eventual division-size unit with austere combat support, combat service support and staff elements. The planned gradual expansion envisaged a VNMC strength of about 13,000. However, there were also provisions which would allow termination at any point, while maintaining a balanced and effective structure. By the end of 1965, this long range plan had not as yet been finalized.[249] The strength of the VNMC brigade at the end of 1965 was 7,519, or an increase of only 183 personnel during the year.[250] (See Table II-4.)

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FREE WORLD MILITARY FORCES

(U) This section contains a brief synopsis of the military assistance rendered to the RVN by nations of the Free World other than the US. Annex B contains detailed information on this subject.

(U) During April 1964 the President publicly requested that other nations of the Free World contribute military assistance to the RVN in its counterinsurgency efforts.[251] Prior to this request Australia was the only nation, in addition to the US, that was actively supplying military assistance. In 1962, Australia had furnished a small Army training team of some 30 members which was integrated into the American advisory program.[252] Following the President's appeal, COMUSMACV established a special staff agency to deal with the international military assistance program. On 22 December 1964, the International Military Assistance Office (IMAO), later redesignated the Free World Military Assistance Office (FWMAO), was established under the staff supervision of J5, USMACV.[253] One of the first accomplishments of the FWMAO was to prepare a Policy and Procedures Guide to be used in dealing with the military assistance forces from other nations. This guide was staffed and published as a CINCPAC manual in August 1965.[254]

(U) See Table II-5 for monthly figures on FWMAF buildup.

(S) During August 1964, Australia augmented her training advisors with an aviation detachment which was made part of the SEASIA air lift and was composed of six Caribou aircraft and 74 personnel.[255] In May 1965, the Government of Australia (GOA) agreed to send a task force to SVN composed of the following elements: Headquarters, Australian Army, Far East; First Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment (RAR) (+); 79th Signal Troop; and a logistical support company.[256] This contingent arrived in SVN during the early part of June and was attached to the 173rd Abn Bde, operating from Bien Hoa.[257] A military working arrangement had already been signed between Commander, Australian Army Forces, Vietnam (COMAAFV) and COMUSMACV on 5 May that provided for overall operational control of the Australian troops by COMUSMACV and also for complete US administrative and logistical support.[258] In a financial working arrangement, signed on 7 September, it was agreed that the GOA would repay the US for this support on a reimbursable basis.[259] On 30 September, an augmentation to the battalion arrived, consisting of a 105-mm howitzer battery, a field engineer troop, an armored personnel carrier (APC) troop, and an air reconnaissance flight. An additional signal troop was also deployed, bringing the year-end Australian strength in SVN to 1,557.[260,261]

(S) On 20 July 1964, New Zealand furnished a military engineer team that was assigned various civic action projects.[262] In May 1965,

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the Government of New Zealand (GNZ) decided to replace this detachment with a combat force and announced the decision to deploy a 105-mm howitzer battery to SVN. This unit arrived on 21 July and was also attached to the 173d Abn Bde, under operational control of COMUSMACV, with a primary mission of support for the Australian battalion.[263] A military working arrangement was signed on 9 June and once again the US agreed to furnish field administrative support.[264] Although no financial working arrangement had been signed by the end of 1965, New Zealand also reimbursed the US for the cost of this support.[265] At the end of the year, 119 New Zealand military personnel were stationed in SVN.[266]

(TS) COMUSMACV's long range objective was for the nations of Australia and New Zealand jointly to deploy a full Australia-New Zealand Army Corps (ANZAC) brigade during 1966. As a short range goal, he hoped for the immediate deployment of an additional Australian battalion. This matter was handled by the SECSTATE through diplomatic channels, but was unresolved at the end of 1965.[267]

(TS) The nation supplying the greatest amount of assistance to the RVN in 1965, next to the US, was the ROK. In August 1964, in answer to the requests from the US President and the GVN, a ROK team, composed of a mobile army surgical hospital (MASH) and a small group of Taekwondo (Karate) instructors, was sent to SVN.[268] In early January 1965, the GVN requested that ROK deploy additional noncombatant forces to assist in civic action programs. In response, a task force composed of an Army engineer battalion (+) with associated support and self defense troops was deployed.[269] The main party of the ROK Dove unit, as this civic action element was called, arrived on 16 March and was based at Di An, Bien Hoa Province.[270] In a military working arrangement signed on 8 February between COMUSMACV and the ROK commander, it was stated that this task force would function under operating parameters established by what became known as the Free World Military Assistance Policy Council (FWMAPC) consisting of the CofS, USMACV, who was later replaced by COMUSMACV, the senior ROK commander and CJGS, the Council chairman. In addition, the Dove unit would be "responsive" to the overall commander in any given area.[271] In response to a GVN request and US exhortations, the ROK Government on 12 August approved deployment of an Army infantry division (-), one Marine Corps regiment, and one Field Support Command composed of Army and Marine elements with normal support troops, to SVN. Prior to arrival of the division, a new military working arrangement was negotiated, which contained no reference to command and control except for the clause that the FWMAPC would continue to provide operational guidelines;[272] COMUSMACV would furnish full logistical support.[273] The ROK Capital Infantry Division (-) and ROK Marine Brigade were completely deployed by 8 November, and were

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assigned to security duties at Cam Ranh Bay and Qui Nhon. After discussions between the ROK commander and COMUSMACV, it was determined that CG, FFORCEV would have de facto operational control over the ROK forces although orders would be phrased as requests.[275] At the end of 1965 20,620 Korean troops were in SVN and there was considerable discussion regarding additional ROK troops for service in SVN.[276] Negotiations were underway in diplomatic channels.[277]

(S) By the end of 1965 three other nations had given military aid to RVN in the form of noncombatant personnel to act in either advisory or civic action roles. These nations were the Republic of the Philippines, the Republic of China (ROC) and the Royal Thai Government (RTG).

(S) The Philippines supplied medical teams and civic action/psychological warfare teams. The first contingent arrived in August 1964.[278,279] Action was taken throughout 1965 to obtain additional Philippine representation in the form of a 2,000 man civic action group (CAG); however, owing to domestic political problems a final decision on this matter by the Philippine Government was not made.[280,281] No formal working arrangement was signed between COMUSMACV and the commander of the Philippine contingent, although informal agreements did exist to enable day to day operations.[282] At the end of 1965, this team was composed of 72 Philippine personnel.

(S) The ROC provided 20 political warfare advisors who worked with counterparts in the RVNAF JGS. These individuals arrived in October 1964, in response to a request from the GVN.[283] Under a military working arrangement, COMUSMACV provided full administrative and logistical support for this contingent.[284] On 25 November the ROC furnished VNAF with two C-46 aircraft, on a trial basis, with Chinese crews, to serve as cargo carriers.[285] Additional support from the ROC in the form of shallow draft shipping and additional pilots and air crews was expected for 1966.[286]

(S) The RTG provided a small group to aid in the training of VNAF personnel. These men arrived on 29 September and received no assistance from USMACV except for PX and commissary privileges.[287] There was no military working arrangement between COMUSMACV and the Thai element, although one had been proposed and was being staffed in Thailand.[288] Feelers had been received, indicating that Thailand was interested in providing additional assistance, perhaps in the form of cargo aircraft and shallow draft shipping.[289] Total Thai commitment at the end of 1965 was 17 men.[290]

(TS) At the end of 1965, a new drive was underway in Washington to convince other Free World nations either to begin assistance,

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or increase assistance presently given, to the RVN. As a result, the Free World buildup could be expected to continue during 1966.

THE US ADVISORY PROGRAM

(U) Although the spotlight shifted during 1965 from the advisory effort to the commitment of US combat power, advisors continued to work with counterparts at all levels. Rather than undergoing a reduction in strength, as might be expected, the advisory effort actually increased during the year as each of the US Services increased the level of advisory support provided the RVNAF.

USMACV Advisory Program Expansion

(C) In 1965, the USMACV staff was organized to perform three major roles: as advisory staff to RVNAF; as a subordinate unified command, and as the senior US ground command tactical HQ. The integration of Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG), Vietnam, and USMACV in 1964, resulted in separate USN and USAF Advisory Groups but, as there was no separate Army HQ in RVNAF, the USA advisory effort, except for field elements, was integrated into the joint staff.[292] Each staff section had an advisory responsibility to a counterpart section of RVNAF JGS. Some sections were organized with separate and distinct advisory branches, while others, notably J2 and J3, were not. These sections had a coequal advisory and staff function. (See Figure II-9 for USMACV advisory organizational structure.)

(C) When 1965 began, HQ USMACV was operating under a proposed JTD of 1 September 1964, which covered the staff, the Army-Marine field advisory elements, the NAVGP and the AFAG. This document which authorized 1,128 spaces to the staff, was used as the basis for requisitioning personnel.[293] Prior to the approval of the 1 September 1964 JTD, COMUSMACV requested an additional 461 spaces for the staff. These were requested to keep pace with the buildup of field advisory personnel and the RVNAF buildup which began late in 1964. The JTD was approved, with minor additions, on 6 April 1965.[294]

(C) Several recommended changes were incorporated into a JTD revision on 1 May 1965, which requested 1,819 military spaces for the HQ staff.[295,296,297] This request separated the staff, the Army-Marine advisory elements, the NAVGP and the AFAG into four separate JTD's. Another revision to the HQ USMACV JTD was submitted on 15 November, which requested

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2,439 spaces, but provided little change in the advisory structure within the joint staff.[298] By the end of 1965, neither the 1 May nor the 15 November JTD had been approved, but the HQ was operating under the latter JTD since, in August 1964, JCS had granted authority for COMUSMACV to requisition personnel concurrent with the submission of JTD change requests.[299] The HQ USMACV grew from a proposed authorized strength of 1,128 at the first of the year to a proposed authorized strength of 2,439 by year's end.

US Army Advisory Program

Army-Marine Field Advisory Elements

(C) At the beginning of 1965, the USMACV HQ JTD of 1 September 1964 authorized a total of 4,741 US military spaces for USA-USMC field advisory elements.[300] On 15 March 1965, Change 1 to the JTD requested 446 additional spaces to provide advisors to RVNAF units formed under Alternative 1 strength increase,[301] raising the total authorization to 5,187. Included in the request were 16 battalion advisory teams and 31 regimental staff advisors, as well as RF S4 advisors, administration and logistics company advisors, and assistant RF/PF advisors for each sector advisory team. These increases were prompted by the buildup and by the increasing role played by RF both in tactical and logistical fields.[302]

(C) On 1 May, the JTD was revised and, at JCS request, the USMACV field advisory elements were incorporated into a separate document.[303] The 1 May JTD authorized 5,240 personnel for the USA and USMC field advisory elements. This JTD gave a field security section to each corps advisory detachment, to provide outlying advisory teams with security personnel, tailored to the requirements of each team. It also provided additional advisors to support the RVNAF Alternative 2 force buildup.[304] On 14 May, the USMC requested deletion of 129 enlisted security guard spaces, stating security for their field advisory elements would be provided from TOE (Table of Organization and Equipment) units. This adjusted strength ceiling of 5,111 spaces was approved by JCS on 12 August.[305,306]

(C) Change 1 to the 1 May JTD was submitted on 14 September, and consisted of an increase of 177 additional field advisory spaces.[307] Force increases placed heavy requirements on national training centers. This change provided additional training advisors, S4 advisors, and psychological warfare advisors to the training centers. It also provided for the 10th ARVN Div advisory detachment, and additional administrative personnel for the various advisory detachments to cope with the increasing workload that accompanied the increase in advisory teams.[308,309] Change 2 to the 1 May JTD

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was submitted on 10 November, and requested 89 G2/G3 air advisory personnel. The rationale for this change was that these personnel were required at corps, division, special zone and sector level owing to the substantial increase in air support provided by all services during the year and the need for close control over such operations. 310 JCS approved 176 of the spaces requested under Change 1 to the 1 May JTD on 2 December. This raised the authorized strength of USMACV field advisory elements to 5,287 spaces. 311 On 22 December, JCS approved Change 2 to 1 May JTD, and 90 additional spaces were authorized. 312 As 1965 ended, USMACV was authorized 5,377 personnel in field advisory elements compared to 4,741 at the beginning of the year.

Subsector Advisory Program

(U) Most of the area of the RVN is rural in nature and the people have little contact with the central government. Before 1964, the US advisory program extended no lower than province level. In early 1964, a decision was made to initiate a pilot program to place US advisors at district (subsector) level, and bring assistance closer to the people. In April and May 1964, 13 two-man teams were deployed. Early results were favorable enough for COMUSMACV and the US Ambassador to recommend expansion of the program during the Honolulu Conference of June 1964. The decision was made to expand the program with 100 additional subsector teams throughout the country. 313 Initial assignment of teams to 45 subsectors in eight top priority areas was directed in August 1964. The standard team consisted of two officers and three enlisted men, but could be tailored to meet local requirements. 314 By the end of 1964, 103 subsector advisory teams consisting of approximately 500 personnel deployed and were operational. 315

(C) The program continued to expand in 1965. On 1 February, COMUSMACV directed that a sixty-day test be initiated at two CIDG camp locations in IV CTZ, to determine the feasibility of employing US Army Special Forces (USASF) detachments as subsector advisory teams. The requirements were that the CIDG be the dominant military element in the area and that the detachment must be collocated with a district HQ. Tests indicated this plan to be feasible without diluting the CIDG or other USASF missions. 316 Of 181 subsector teams planned for deployment by the end of 1965, 152 were to be provided by USMACV and 29 by USASF. Assignment of eight teams was deferred to permit corps senior advisors to assign them as the situation required. 317 The changing situation in many subsectors, and the increased participation of USASF in the program, necessitated up-dating requirements to a total of 186 teams required for FY 66, to include 145 USMACV teams by the end of 1965 and 41 USASF teams by the end of June 1966. 318

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(C) The corps senior advisors exercised operational control over USMACV teams through the appropriate division and sector senior advisors, and over the USASF detachments assigned to subsector advisory roles through the sector advisor, except in matters pertaining to CIDG. Their control over CIDG matters was through the senior USASF commander in each CTZ. Corps senior advisors had authority to withdraw or redeploy subsector teams in the event they were endangered by VC hostile actions. 319,320

(C) At the close of 1965 a total of 169 subsector advisory teams had deployed, including 133 USMACV teams and 36 USASF teams, with a total strength of approximately 1,100. Advisory teams were assigned to all 43 sectors in RVN. USMACV teams were located in 38 sectors and USASF teams were located in the remaining five. 321

(U) Much effort was devoted in 1965 to improving the rural construction program. Most subsector advisory teams spent about 35 percent of their time on non-military programs such as rural construction and medical civic action. Subsector teams in more secure areas were estimated to spend as much as 80 percent of their time on these activities. 322

(C) A survey was conducted in March 1965 to determine personnel requirements needed if subsector teams were individually tailored to their mission. The survey produced a request for personnel possessing certain hard skills. However, it was not practical to attempt a broad infusion of these personnel without first developing more specific requirements. On 16 June, a pilot program was announced to augment the corps with additional medical advisors (E5 or E6), engineer advisors (E6 or E7) and MP operations advisors (E6), for a total of 49 men. The objectives of the pilot program were to determine actual requirements for these skills, and to determine the best means of assigning to subsector teams, e.g., by direct assignment of selected teams or extended TDY to selected subsectors, or to maintain a personnel pool or support team at sector level or higher. 323 The program was not completed at year's end, but on 27 November, corps senior advisors were asked for a preliminary evaluation by January 1966. 324 Preliminary recommendations were that these personnel be assigned at sector level and be sent on TDY to subsectors as requirements dictated. These findings were to be further examined in 1966. 325

Special Forces Advisory Program

(C) The USASF mission to advise the CIDG in RVN was conducted on a TDY basis prior to 1 October 1964. After that date 5th SFG (Abn) was assigned to United States Army Pacific (USARPAC) for permanent assignment in RVN. 326 On 1 January 1965, USASF in the RVN consisted of four C detachments, five B

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detachments, 44 A detachments, and support units.[327] The C detachments were assigned to each CTZ to provide command and control for all USASF elements in the CTZ. B detachments were intermediate control elements and A detachments were small 12 - 13 man teams which provided the major portion of the advisory support to CIDG.

(C) On 7 March 1965, a Troop Unit Change Request (TUCR) was submitted, requesting modification to 5th SFG (Abn) TOE's. Specifically requested were civil affairs and psychological warfare personnel for teams having a sector or subsector mission.[328] These changes were approved by USARPAC General Order (GO) 196 on 28 June and USARPAC GO 287 on 10 September.

(C) On 20 June the 5th SFG (Abn) recommended to COMUSMACV that ten additional A detachments be requested. COMUSMACV recommended approval of this increase to SECDEF during his visit to Saigon on 19 July. SECDEF approved the request and directed that a plan be developed for further USASF increases of up to a total of 24 A detachments, if they were deemed necessary by COMUSMACV. At the same time he gave approval for 5th SFG (Abn) to commence the buildup employing TDY teams from Okinawa until PCS teams became available. As a result of SECDEF's visit a countrywide new camp location study was conducted with the corps commanders and their advisors which produced a requirement for five additional B detachments and 24 A detachments. A new TUCR was prepared for the requested changes, and was submitted 24 August.[329] This would raise the total number of USASF detachments to four C detachments, 16 B detachments and 72 A detachments, plus necessary support elements.[330]

(C) As of 31 December 1965, there were four C detachments, 11 B detachments, and 62 A detachments deployed in RVN. Fifty-two of the A detachments were PCS and ten were TDY.[331] In terms of personnel buildup, the 5th SFG (Abn) increased nearly 50 percent with 1,264 personnel assigned on 1 January and 1,828 assigned on 31 December.[332,333]

(S) In addition to providing advisory support to the CIDG program, and to the sectors and subsectors assigned to them by COMUSMACV, the USASF provided advisory support to five other programs. These programs were the Apache Force program, the Mike Force program, the Delta Force program, the CIDG motivational program and the SHINING BRASS program.

(C) The Apache Force concept envisioned using small, highly mobile teams of personnel indigenous to the area in which they operated, to work with US units and under the control of

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the US unit commander. Each team would be commanded by a USASF officer and would be used to find and fix an enemy force until larger and stronger units could be brought in. They would also be used to secure drop zones and landing zones, to locate enemy LOC's, and to provide intelligence to the US commander. Each team was to consist of four Pathfinder, Reconnaissance and Combat (PRC) teams to find the enemy, and three CIDG companies to fix him in place. When US forces were committed, the Apache Force would come under the operational control of the US commander for the duration of the operation.[334] At year's end, the program had not been officially implemented but troops had been recruited in all four CTZ's and CIDG units in the II CTZ were providing this type of support on an informal basis to the 1st Cav Div (AM).[335]

(C) Mike Forces were Nung companies recruited and held in reserve by each of the C detachments and at HQ 5th SFG, (Abn), Nha Trang, to provide reaction forces in support of CIDG units within the zone. (Nungs were ethnic Chinese living in SVN, traditional mercenaries.) These units were not a part of CIDG; they were recruited and paid by USASF.[336]

(C) Delta Forces were similar in concept to Apache Forces. The Delta Force was advised by a USASF detachment, and consisted of 12 ten-man hunter/killer teams, each composed of two USASF and eight Vietnamese Special Forces (LLDB) volunteers; and four ARVN Airborne/Ranger companies with USASF advisors down to platoon level. This force was supported by four VNAF H-34 helicopters and two VNAF C-47 aircraft. The mission of the Delta Force was to infiltrate VC-controlled territory, within the borders of RVN, and gather intelligence. The Airborne/Ranger elements permitted the force to exploit lucrative targets immediately. Throughout the year, the hunter/killer teams were used successfully in gathering target intelligence and in assessing B-52 airstrikes. The Airborne/Ranger companies were also used in support of besieged camps, notably Plei Me in Pleiku Province (see chapter IV).[337]

(C) The CIDG motivational program consisted of two groups of approximately 50 VC defectors recruited, trained and equipped by USASF, and used successfully in I and IV CTZ's to move into areas under pacification, provide their own security, perform civic action and provide motivational indoctrination to the indigenous population. Each team had eight USASF advisors.[338]

(S) USASF participation in SHINING BRASS operations is covered in Annex M.

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Interaction - US Buildup & Advisory Program

(C) The introduction and rapid buildup of US combat units led to much press comment that the war in SVN was evolving into a "U. S. War" and that the advisory effort had become secondary.[339] In fact, the US buildup had mixed effects on the advisory effort. The field advisory personnel of USMACV and USASF were increased, concurrent with the tactical unit buildup. The CO, 5th SFG (Abn), felt the introduction of US units had assisted the Advisory program. It provided increased air and engineer support as well as strike and reaction forces theretofore unavialable.[340]

(C) The buildup of both US and RVNAF units caused competition between the two for transportation, communication facilities, real estate, service facilities and supplies. It created competition between the US units and USMACV for personnel, and upon occasion, key personnel programmed for USMACV were diverted to US units. RVNAF troop movements were cancelled or delayed because troop lift priority was given to US units. Lack of transportation prevented advisors and their counterparts from making needed visits, thereby limiting their effectiveness.[341,342]

(U) In light of a growing tendency on the part of the joint staff to favor US units by diverting support and personnel from USMACV, the J1, USMACV, on 9 September, recommended to COMUSMACV that the staff be realigned and separated into different branches of US and RVNAF advisory effort, each branch having equal status.[343]

(U) On 12 September, COMUSMACV published a letter outlining his position on the advisory effort. In it, he stated the primary mission of USMACV was to:

> aid RVNAF in the development and effective employment of combat-capable units . . . introduction of US units into RVN has added a new dimension to the mission. Nonetheless, the deployment and utilization of US forces in RVN is designed to supplement, and not to substitute for, the overall RVNAF effort and its US advisory adjunct . . . therefore, I desire that addressees take immediate and continuing action: to . . . insure that the advisory effort is fully responsive to RVNAF's needs.[344]

(C) On 18 September, the USMACV Comptroller submitted a staff study on the advisory program. This study included the policies and command structure under which it was being conducted; the effect of assignment of operational control, and possible future command, of the field advisory effort to senior US tactical commanders; the role of United States Army, Vietnam (USARV) in advising RVNAF JGS; and the

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role of the USMACV staff in advising RVNAF JGS. The recommendations of the study were: 1) in those staff sections where the principal staff officer deems it appropriate, to reorganize the section into two divisions—a US activities division and a VN advisory division; 2) to assign operational control of US field advisors to the senior US tactical commander in the CTZ; and 3) to transfer the logistical support responsibility for field advisors to USARV.[345] Logistical support of the field advisory program was transferred to USARV on 1 September.[346] The senior US tactical unit commander within I, II and III CTZ's was named senior advisor to the CG of each corps. This was done prior to its being formalized by USMACV Directive 10-11 on 10 November, and is discussed later in this chapter. Implementing the recommendation that staff sections be divided into two divisions was left to the discretion of the principal staff officer involved.

US Encadrement

(S) On 15 April 1965, DOD requested COMUSMACV's position regarding the feasibility of providing US cadres for ten ARVN battalions, as a measure to increase the effectiveness of RVNAF units.[347] DEPCOMUSMACV considered three methods of encadrement: 1) assumption of officer and senior NCO command positions within the ARVN battalion by US personnel; 2) assignment of US personnel as staff officers, and in technical and specialist positions within the ARVN battalion, and 3) the employment of US troops as fire support elements within the ARVN battalion.[348] These methods of encadrement were studied in relation to language, security, support, mutual US/ARVN acceptance problems, and conditions and capabilities within ARVN units. Problems common to all three methods were the language barrier, increased exposure of US personnel, the difficulty of US personnel adapting to ARVN living conditions and the greatly expanded support requirement that would be generated.[349] DEPCOMUSMACV took the position that US assumption of command was neither feasible nor desirable, owing to the language barrier as well as the probable non-acceptance by the GVN. He felt that assignment of US personnel to ARVN staff and technical positions would not materially improve ARVN capabilities. Therefore, the assignment of US personnel in a fire support role appeared to be the only concept that would benefit ARVN and not significantly detract from GVN morale. A fire support element of six US officers and 49 enlisted men was suggested.[350] Because of the difficulties in supply and service support, medical support, leadership in ARVN battalions, and anticipated morale problems among the US personnel assigned to ARVN battalions, DEPCOMUSMACV opposed the adoption of the principle of encadrement. He recommended that COMUSMACV not support the concept and, that if it were directed, it be initially applied to only one battalion.[351] COMUSMACV accepted DEPCOMUSMACV's recommendation and stated this position at

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the Honolulu Conference on 18 April.[352] The decision was made at that conference not to pursue the concept of encadrement.[353]

Infusion Program

(U) With the arrival of major US combat units in RVN, COMUSMACV recognized that they would be handicapped initially by a lack of familiarity with the climate, terrain, and customs of the country, and by a lack of experience with enemy tactics. To minimize the effect of this lack of experience, a program was set up to exchange experienced USMACV advisors with officers from newly arrived units. This was known as the "Infusion Program" and was designed to provide the tactical units with personnel having sufficient in-country experience to facilitate effective operation until the units acquired their own experience.[354]

(U) Between August and November, ten USMACV advisors were reassigned to 1st Inf Div and 25 were reassigned to 1st Cav Div, (AM) as part of the infusion program.[355] COMUSMACV considered the program to have been highly successful and at year's end the USMACV staff was engaged in a study to determine if the program should be continued for new units scheduled to arrive in 1966.

US Air Force Advisory Program

(C) During 1965, personnel assigned to AFAG increased from 309 to 391.[356] These additions, authorized by revised USMACV JTD, 1 May,[357] were primarily due to an emphasis on training and plans for modernizing the VNAF to include new jets.[358]

(C) At a July 1962 conference in Saigon, SECDEF had directed preparation of a plan which would build VNAF, within three years, to a force capable of containing the threat imposed by insurgents. The then USAF section of MAAG formulated and implemented this plan to provide for the development of VNAF objectives and concept of operations. Completion of the VNAF fighter bomber program, which basically called for six A-1 tactical fighter squadrons, was essentially accomplished in 1965 with five VNAF Wings approved and activated.[359]

(U) At the end of the year the CHAFAG noted that AFAG successfully coped with accelerated programming of VNAF forces and crew training. He stated that "much of the advisory effort during 1965 had been expended trying to keep pace with this (VNAF) explosive expansion."[360]

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(U) AFAG sections and advisory teams were collocated with their respective VNAF counterparts during 1965. This integration brought about greatly improved working relations with VNAF. Keeping pace with VNAF's expansion, three additional advisory elements were established.[361] Team No. 7 was activated at Can Tho air base on 28 January; Det 2, Team No. 6 was assigned to Pleiku on 1 August; and a directorate of management analysis was organized within AFAG at TSN air base on 13 November.

(C) AFAG assisted VNAF in the development of plans and requirements for activating two new fighter squadrons: the 522d at TSN in May, and the 524th at Nha Trang in August 1965.[362]

(S) During 1965, the AFAG current operations function was reorganized and expanded. Transport and liaison staff officer positions were added and manned. HQ VNAF adopted a conventional chain of command organization. A concept of operations was developed by AFAG for VNAF UH-1B helicopters which were to replace H-34's on a basis of one squadron per year beginning in FY 67.[363]

(C) Inclusion of VNAF in the visual reconnaissance program of RVNAF resulted largely from AFAG efforts during the year to improve the professional capability of VNAF's liaison aircraft force. In the field, AFAG team capabilities doubled when two additional advisors were assigned to each VNAF liaison squadron. This brought about the development of good liaison relations during October through December.[364]

(S) Throughout 1965, AFAG concentrated on improving the professionalism of VNAF's fighter force. Increased training in instrument and night flying was initiated. AFAG developed an A-1H/G aircraft check list for VNAF crews. Selected VNAF personnel started jet training in August at Clark Air Base, Philippines. By the end of the year, four VNAF combat-ready crews were flying with the USAF B-57 unit at Da Nang.[365] This was VNAF's first capability in jet aircraft.

(C) AFAG did much to ensure proper utilization of VNAF EC-47 aircraft through use of navigational aids. An intensive training program was started and by the end of 1965, VNAF crews were actively engaged in flight checking these aids.[365]

(C) Increased AFAG emphasis was given to the expanding VNAF training effort during 1965. AFAG prepared training objectives for VNAF to increase the number of its fighter, helicopter and liaison pilots. They also clarified the need for training an adequate number of airborne observers, mechanics, communications, electronics, and support personnel, to support the VNAF mission. AFAG considered and used every feasible means of

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MAP instruction. These included USAF units and field training detachments; USAF and USN mobile training teams; a USMC task element, and civilian contract technical service personnel. New courses and facilities were opened both at the Nha Trang training center and at base level. US instructors were assigned and more effective training aids were used. In turn, VNAF on-the-job training was used extensively to upgrade training. AFAG efforts resulted in an overall increase of training VNAF in-country, which was accomplished without a corresponding increase in offshore requirements. CONUS training provided through AFAG was limited to those skills in which indigenous assets were either unavailable or already totally committed to the SVN effort. The latter was particularly true of fighter pilot training, which was extremely important to VNAF growth and modernization. CONUS and PACAF (Pacific Air Force) training provided high quality graduates of both flying and technical courses.[367]

(S) In August 1965, AFAG obtained approval to train VNAF B-57 flying and maintenance personnel in PACAF, including six pilots, four navigators, four maintenance officers and 16 aircraft mechanics. This program was to continue into 1966. In another area of training, AFAG arranged through USAF for a team from the Office of Special Investigations (OSI) to conduct a course of OSI methods and procedures for 21 VNAF cadet officers. The course, completed on 18 December, was highly successful and provided a well-trained group for establishing a VNAF Office of Investigation.[368]

(S) Following is a summary of all training performed by and for VNAF during 1965:[369]

	Students Entered	Eliminated	Killed	Graduated
A-1 training conducted in VN:	221	32	8*	181

*Four were killed in training accidents and four killed in combat operations.

Personnel trained off-shore:		317
Personnel completing on-the-job training:		1,547
	(1964 total:	1,231)
Men taught 1965 in-country:		5,289
	(1964 total:	4,334)
Total VNAF personnel trained 1965:	7,153 (96% trained in-country)	

(C) An AFAG safety program for VNAF was formulated in September 1965. USAF advisors were assigned and collocated with the VNAF Director of Safety. An AFAG safety advisor and a VNAF safety officer were assigned to each wing. Regulations were published and VNAF accident/incident reporting procedures were initiated. An accident/incident analysis program for VNAF was

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started in October.[370] Trends disclosed, together with corrective action recommended, were fowarded to VNAF and the AFAG chiefs for information and necessary action. Pilot error was the primary cause of both major and minor VNAF aircraft accidents. In most instances, accidents resulted from loss of pilot control on take-off or landing. AFAG revealed that the VNAF overall accident rate during the first six months of the year, while flying 74,846 sorties and 87,366 hours, was 36.6. This represented one major accident for 2,338 VNAF sorties, or one per 2,730 flying hours. The VNAF overall accident rate while flying 91,744 sorties and 126,169 hours during the last six months of 1965 was 35.7. This represented one major VNAF accident for each 2,032 sorties, or one per 2,803 flying hours. VNAF experienced a heavy loss of H-34 aircraft during the last six months of 1965, with 18 destroyed in combat or by accident. AFAG requested an additional 18 replacement H-34's for the remainder of FY 66 in order to keep helicopter units at authorized strength. The safety program within VNAF was expected to decrease attrition in the months ahead. Any evaluation of this accident/incident record of a rapidly growing VNAF should note that VNAF flew a total of 118,120 operational sorties during CY 1965.[371]

(C) A corollary to the AFAG advisory effort to equip VNAF with more professional personnel, was the requirement for improved RVNAF management of its military resources. At the close of 1965, COMUSMACV initiated through AFAG a program for military assistance training in this field. He proposed to CINCPAC the creation of an in-country management school to support VNAF. AFAG stipulated that the curriculum should be designed to teach basic courses of approximately one month duration. The courses should be applicable to junior and senior officers assigned to logistics positions or those in which logistical support is critical to mission accomplishment. The curriculum would consist of:[372]

1) Inter-relationship of supply requirements.

2) In-country movement of spare parts and equipment from depot to base.

3) Transportation pipeline times and means for shipping between base, depot, and/or CONUS for repair.

4) Techniques for developing qualitative and quantitative standards in logistics.

5) Principles of inventory management.

6) Supply, transportation and management.

(C) An activation team from CONUS was to work with AFAG

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advisors and VNAF personnel in RVN to develop the curriculum and instructional plans. Team members would be from USAF, since most procedures controlling VNAF material and systems were based on USAF directives. The team would be provided by the Air Force Institute of Technology. It would teach currently-established USAF resource management courses adapted for VNAF key officers, three-week basic management courses for VNAF lieutenant colonels and majors, and five-week management courses for selected potential instructors.[373]

(C) Activation of this program would obviate the need for special courses for VNAF in CONUS. COMUSMACV recommended, however, that USAF include a 50-hour air base level management course in all USAF logistical management courses in CONUS, applicable to SVN.[374]

(S) At the close of the year, CHAFAG commented that although the VNAF expansion . . . "had diluted its management level, skill level and leadership level across the board, now is the time to stabilize and professionalize the force. When this is accomplished we are obligated to a program of modernization."[375]

(S) This program of modernization was getting underway in late 1965 as the first squadron of the new F-5 jet fighters was approved for the VNAF inventory.[376]

US Navy Advisory Program

(C) At the beginning of 1965, 98 officers and 117 enlisted men were assigned to the NAVGP, USMACV. These personnel were engaged in advising the River and Sea Forces of VNN, the Coastal Forces and the VNMC. The NAVGP anticipated the need for additional advisory personnel and requested an increase of 172 spaces in January[377] to be assigned to Junk Division bases and to individual units of the Sea Force.

(C) In support of COMUSMACV's responsibilities, the NAVGP assisted the VNN and VNMC to develop a high standard of fulfilling responsibilities for internal security, defeat of communist insurgency, and resistance to overt aggression in order to improve VNN and VNMC in all areas and to satisfy naval requirements for the RVN. To this end, advisors were attached throughout the VNN.

(C) A constant problem to CHNAVGP, during 1965, was the effective utilization of the Coastal Force. Decentralization of control of this force under province chiefs was the basic cause of this problem. Clear-cut zones and boundaries were lacking, and when efforts were made to reassign junk divisions, political considerations interfered. This resulted in the deployment of a few junk divisions in some zones and many in others. Strong support by CHNAVGP enabled

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some coastal zone commanders to request and partially obtain equitable division of forces through the intercession of CINCVNN.[378]

(C) During March another request was forwarded by CHNAVGP for a total of 250 personnel to perform fleet-shore surveillance coordination duties and to intensify the Coastal and Sea Force Advisory effort.

(C) During April, three VNN force commanders, and several other officers mutinied against CINCVNN and charged him with graft. All interested parties were initially relieved from duty during the subsequent investigation, and the commander of VNMC, Brig Gen Khang, was temporarily placed in command of the VNN. On 26 April, the VNN Chief of Staff was designated acting CINCVNN. All mutineers were returned to their posts without disciplinary action during May except the River Force commander, who was replaced. The return of these officers illustrated one of the unfortunate facts of political life in RVN, namely, key leaders who failed actively to support the winner during a coup could expect to lose prestige and possibly their jobs shortly thereafter. The episode of the deposed CINCVNN was a good example.[379,380] Although the mutiny had an initial debilitating effect on the VNN the incident passed and no continuing adverse effects were noted during the year.

(C) In order to assume operational control of MARKET TIME forces, a sizeable increase of NAVGP personnel and facilities was required. A JTD augmentation of 39 officers and 67 enlisted men was requested in May. Together with previous requests, these augmentations meant an increase of 145 percent over pre-MARKET TIME strength. The May augmentation requested 106 personnel, primarily to provide HQ, maintenance and operational support personnel, in order to plan and exercise operational control of MARKET TIME operations.[381]

(C) Port security in Saigon was a matter of great concern to COMUSMACV. The possibility of sabotage in the river had been demonstrated in May 1964 with the sinking of the USNS Card. In order to improve security measures and controls within VNN a USCG Port Security Officer was assigned to the CHNAVGP staff.[382]

(S) From a beginning figure of 215 officers and men, the naval advisory effort grew in increments throughout the year. On 31 December the total strength of the NAVGP was 666 officers and men. Authorized strength was 1,548. The

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sources of weakness and the April mutiny had had a severe adverse affect on VNN officer morale. In addition, CHNAVGP stated that the Coastal Force was the weakest link in the patrol effort because of its austere foundations and mission of passive information gathering and reporting.[386]

(S) In late 1965, the limited effectiveness of the Coastal Force indicated that the old problems of general lack of routine maintenance and untrained personnel still existed, with the result being a continued unsatisfactory status of VNN. One of the keystones to the effectiveness of each unit was the individual personality of its commander. Related to this was the fact that in most cases the executive officers of Coastal Groups suffered greatly from lack of experience and initiative. This was due to the attitude of senior officers that they must do all the thinking for their unit or suffer loss of face. The condition persisted that "if it's not my idea, it's no good." Coupled with lack of leadership this proved to be one of the most serious problems confronting the VNN.[387]

(S) The year-end evaluation of VNN by NAVGP, based on daily observation and close participation in VNN activities, was that the overall readiness of the VNN had not reached the standards set by CHNAVGP. Security for advisors was marginal in the RAG force; at other bases it was satisfactory. The overall readiness of the River Force had not met the expected level; maintenance was poor and ship utilization was minimal. The philosophy persisted that equipment operators operated and the shipyard repaired. The result was that equipment down-time showed no improvement during the year. The overall readiness of the Coastal Force was rated as satisfactory.[388]

(C) Naval advisors made strong efforts to improve the status and the standards of operation of the VNN. Some advances were made and the future looked brighter, but at the end of the year the best that could be said was that an overall evaluation found the VNN minimally satisfactory.

US Marine Corps Advisory Program

(C) As a component of the NAVGP, USMC advisors had been in RVN since 1954, guiding the development of the VNMC. In January 1965, the MARADVU, NAVGP, consisted of 20 officers and three enlisted men. There were also 27 Marine officers and 37 enlisted men advising ARVN units in the I CTZ, who were directly responsive to COMUSMACV. Plans for the VNMC to execute multi-battalion operations called for an augmentation of the MARADVU

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difference between the present for duty and authorized strength was because of a requested increase of 791 personnel submitted during November to provide for USN support and for early delivery of new equipment and ships and 14 other spaces requested at earlier intervals.[383] This expansion in the NAVGP was due primarily to expansion of roles to be played by CHNAVGP. From a purely naval advisory effort at the beginning of 1965 to the assumption of an operational command -- TF 115 in July -- and with the additional responsibility as Commander, TF 116, the requirement for personnel increases was obvious and gave promise of increased operations and responsibilities for the USN in SVN in 1966.

Evaluation of VNN

(C) As in most advisor/counterpart relationships, there existed the possibility of misunderstandings between members of NAVGP and VNN. Culture, education, sophistication, and personalities all combined to cause difficulty in communication. MARKET TIME units were an interesting illustration of this problem. The greatest single benefit from the advisory point of view, was that MARKET TIME gave VNN personnel the opportunity to observe US practices and techniques at work in the same mission assigned to the VNN. Advising proved to be best done by example, and MARKET TIME offered unique opportunities in that respect. Reports from coastal surveillance center advisors indicated that VNN officers returned from liaison duties with USN ships displaying unusual enthusiasm and a superior understanding of the job at hand. Although there might well be cases of friction in the future, past experience indicated that junk division commanders, in particular, were generally grateful for the psychological support provided by an advisor's presence.[384]

(S) Some of VNN's most pressing problems lay in the field of maintenance and repair. Reasons were similar to those encountered by all developing nations: shortage of technical and administrative talents; lack of mechanical-mindedness among the rank and file to operate equipment; rapid expansion of the navy; and inadequate resources.[385]

(C) In April 1965 CHNAVGP informed COMUSMACV of the lack of responsiveness and substandard patrol effort on the part of the VNN. In substance, CHNAVGP stated that VNN operations had never been aggressive in spite of advisory efforts. However, there were exceptions among individual units. Lack of command attention was one of the VNN's major

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to insure adequate guidance. A tentative TOE for the Marine brigade field advisory HQ was submitted, and billets requested to augment this group on a temporary duty status. The augmenting personnel, consisting of five officers and eight enlisted men, were furnished by CG, FMFPAC.[389]

(C) Requests for authorization of a colonel and a lieutenant colonel for the two top positions in the MARADVU, and for an additional major and warrant officer were also approved.[390] Part of the personnel requested, including a motor transport, an artillery and an engineer advisor, arrived in April 1965.[391]

(C) On 1 May, the VNN and VNMC were officially designated as separate and autonomous services. The great regard of the JGS for VNMC Brig Gen Khang and the then unpopular and unwholesome condition of VNN, were the primary causes for this change. The RVN military authorities held the VNN in low regard largely because the VNN leaders had backed the wrong faction in each of several coups, and because the VNN leadership lacked competence and responsibility, as amply illustrated in the April mutiny against the CINCVNN. In the latter part of May, one officer and two NCO's were added to the MARADVU.[392,393]

(C) Plans were formulated for a formal training program for FY 67 through FY 72 to support the long range force structure increase of the VNMC from a five battalion brigade to a nine infantry battalion division. This training was expected to be conducted either at formal schools or on-the-job training with US Fleet Marine Force or Marine Corps base units. This training program was to be paid for in its entirety by the US.[394]

(C) At the end of 1965, assigned strength of the MARADVU was 25 officers and five enlisted men. All requested officer increases were filled during the year, but six enlisted billets remained unfilled.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

(C) The vast changes in US involvement in the Vietnam conflict during 1965 necessitated sweeping revisions in command and control procedures at all levels. New missions were established for the USMACV staff and the other elements of the Country Team. A critical need for extensive improvement and expansion of communications media was revealed. The following is a discussion of the major changes in these fields during the year.

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(C) The dimensions and complexity of COMUSMACV's responsibilities during 1965 can be attributed to the expansions in personnel strength and base development and the problems and command relationships connected with the changing character of US involvement in the Vietnam conflict. Basically, the added responsibilities (discussed in detail throughout this history) resulted from: 1) COMUSMACV's deeper involvement in his advisory responsibilities (such as the increased subsector and sector advisory teams in the field), 2) the additional staffs necessary to effect satisfactory coordination among the increasing number of US and FWMAF units, 3) the many problems involved in the reorganization of the staff, 4) the buildup of RVNAF, 5) the new relations which followed the emergence of new agencies (such as the formation of Joint US Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO)), 6) changes in the role of US military forces in RVN, 7) actions related to the added intensity and changing character of enemy activities, 8) the extension of war activity into areas outside SVN, 9) the rapid evolution from a sub-unified staff with primarily an advisory mission to a full-fledged operational headquarters, 10) COMUSMACV's desire to control the US ground war from within HQ USMACV, 11) COMUSMACV's planning and other responsibilities as Commander, US Forces in Southeast Asia (Designate) (COMUSSEASIA) (D) and Commander Central Region SEATO Field Forces (Designate), (CCRSFF) (D), and 12) problems related to troop morale and protocol, such as the overwhelming numbers of distinguished visitors to RVN during 1965 and Operation Christmas Star which involved the distribution of tons of gifts from CONUS to US personnel in Vietnam.395

(C) The expansion of the USMACV staff continued at the same hectic pace that had characterized it in 1964. Two JTD's, dated 1 May and 15 November 1965, were out of date before they could be published. Many changes were submitted throughout the year, and personnel actions were initiated immediately upon submission. Thus, formal approval, while requiring many months, did not impede the flow of personnel. In this, as in so many other aspects of the buildup, COMUSMACV virtually had carte blanche and, naturally, the strain on resources was considerable. COMUSMACV recognized these difficulties but went on record as saying that he felt compelled to state his requirements without regard to availability.396

(C) An examination of Table II-6 reveals that the major expansion took place in the J2, J3, and J4 staff sections, and included the creation of a Combat Operations Center (COC). J2 became actively engaged in the acquisition of intelligence as a

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consequence of the capability of many US units to collect information and the need to bolster the RVNAF system to provide intelligence for all US forces in-country. J3 found that the average workload per man had increased to 80 hours per week, and that an overall expansion to meet requirements was essential. In addition, a sizable element was needed to man the COC. The J4, in the throes of directing one of the largest logistical buildups in US history, in an extremely compressed time period, also found it difficult to accomplish his missions within existing personnel ceilings. Thus, HQ USMACV reflected the increased tempo of US commitment in Vietnam with its own expansion, both in functions and personnel.[397]

(U) Many reorganizations within staff sections took place during 1965 to meet the changing requirements. Such modification will not be treated in this history. There were, however, several reorganizations of the overall staff. The situation at the end of the year is reflected in Figure II-10. A comparison with Appendix 3 of the 1964 USMACV Command History indicates the changes, which are discussed below.

Deputy COMUSMACV

(S) In May 1964, then DEPCOMUSMACV Lt Gen Westmoreland, in anticipation of assuming command, stated that, while there was no strong requirement for a deputy, he agreed with the SECDEF that DEPCOMUSMACV should be a US Army officer as the war was primarily a ground operation. CINCPAC expressed disappointment, as he believed that a joint approach was necessary to encourage a similar organization on the part of the RVNAF.[398] COMUSMACV considered that his Chief of Staff could also serve as deputy, but he later decided to defer such a combined assignment. He visualized the mission of the deputy to oversee matters of insurgency and basic ground combat, frequent negotiations with ARVN generals, and supervision of field advisors. The CSAF apparently had expressed a strong interest in appointing a USAF deputy, but COMUSMACV felt that such an officer would be more effective as Deputy Commander United States Military Assistance Command, Thailand (DEPCOMUSMACTHAI).[399] Lt Gen J. L. Throckmorton was recommended as DEPCOMUSMACV by both DEPCOMUSMACV and the US Ambassador in July 1964.

(S) The discussion over a Deputy for Air continued, particularly within the JCS, until October, when a decision was made to appoint such an officer to promote inter-service harmony.[401] However, the appointment had not been made by the end of 1964 (notwithstanding the organizational chart shown in Appendix 3 of the 1964 USMACV Command History).

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(C) On 14 May, the JCS established the position of DEPCOMUSMACV for Air Operations, and assigned Cdr, 2d AD to this position as an additional duty.[402] On 25 August, COMUSMACV issued terms of reference for the DEPCOMUSMACV (Air).[403] In this document, DEPCOMUSMACV (Air) was to provide timely advice and recommendations on matters related to air operations and coordinate all operations of air forces under COMUSMACV with VNAF. He recognized that command of the 2d AD would be enhanced by this additional role.

Joint Service Representation

(C) The issue over a DEPCOMUSMACV was actually symptomatic of a general feeling among many service officials that joint service representation on the USMACV staff was imbalanced in favor of the Army.[404]

(C) In February, a discussion over the replacement of Maj Gen C. A. Youngdale, USMC, J2, USMACV, ensued.[405] USA authorities felt that USMACV's intelligence requirements would primarily be filled by USA units. When the USMC was unable to provide a successor for Maj Gen Youngdale, Brig Gen J. H. McChristian, USA, was appointed J2 on 13 July.

(C) In March the JCS had urged increased joint representation, particularly in the J2 and J3 sections.[406] COMUSMACV agreed and proposed in early April that the position of Deputy Chief of Staff be established and filled by a USAF brigadier general and upgraded the position of CHNAVGP to that of rear admiral.

(S) While the buildup was in progress, the HQ USMACV staff persistently tried to improve the joint service representation. The new Chief of Staff (CofS), Maj Gen W. B. Rosson, on several occasions stated that staff sections should be comprised of officers from all services.[408] As reflected in the November JTD, COMUSMACV took pains to insure that there would be the best possible balance in utilizing experienced officers of all services in positions where they could best serve the Command.[409] This was noticeably reflected in the reorganization of the J3 and J4 divisions. Subsequently, COMUSMACV also decided to designate the Assistant Chief of Staff (ACofS), J6 as a USAF position upon the expected transfer of the incumbent, Brig Gen W. E. Lotz, to USARV as Signal Officer.[410]

(C) However, in spite of all of these actions, the USMACV staff remained predominantly Army (see Table II-6). This was unavoidable as:

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The reorganization which combined USMACV and USMAAG, Vietnam, resulted in separate Navy and Air Force Advisory Organizations, but because there is no separate Army headquarters in RVNAF, the Army advisory effort, except for field elements, was integrated into the MACV Joint Staff. Much of the MACV Staff, therefore, consists of purely Army advisory effort and results in a staff which appears to be heavily weighted with Army personnel. The RVNAF and JGS organizations, both predominantly Army demand a large Army contingent in the MACV Staff.[411]

Training Directorate

(U) In accordance with an agreement between the Director of Organization and Training (O&T) and J3, most of the functions of the Doctrine and Literature Branch, O&T, were transferred to J3 Force Structure Branch on 4 January 1965. Incumbents were released to J3 or assumed new functions as advisors to the Research and Publications Bureau, ARVN Training Command.[412] The Directorate of O&T was reorganized effective 26 April and redesignated Training Directorate, with the mission of advising the ARVN Training Command and providing command and control over subordinate advisory training units.[413]

POLWAR Advisory Directorate

(POUO) The Political Warfare (POLWAR) Advisory Directorate was established by USMACV GO No 931, dated 5 May.[414] It was placed under the staff supervision of ACofS J3, albeit with direct access to the CofS as appropriate. The Directorate was assigned primary staff responsibility for psychological warfare (psywar), for civic action, and for coordinating political warfare advisory activities. The Psywar/Civil Affairs (CA) Branch of J3 was discontinued.

Director of Army MAP Logistics

(U) Effective 1 May, J4 absorbed the functions and personnel of the Director of Army MAP Logistics (DAML).[415]

Free World Military Assistance Office

(U) While other countries, notably Australia, had previously provided the GVN with military assistance, it was not until the President's call for "more flags for Vietnam" in mid-1964, that USMACV staff participation in the program was required. A nucleus of officers was formed in the J5 section

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to plan and program for such assistance as was offered. By December 1964, activities had increased to such a degree that a special staff section, under the supervision of the ACofS J5, was formed and called the IMAO.[416]

(C) It became habitual to refer to those allies furnishing military assistance as Third Country forces. In the view of some contributing countries this term had some unfavorable connotations. COMUSMACV thus instructed that its use be discontinued[417] and redesignated the IMAO as the FWMAO on 1 October.[418]

Combat Operations Center

(U) The COC was originally conceived as a FATOC (Field Army Tactical Operations Center) but COMUSMACV directed that the Center become part of the USMACV organization with minimum manning,[419] thus making it a Joint Tactical Operations Center (JTOC). One reason for its organization was to improve the tactical air control system. The JTOC was to provide guidance and instructions on air matters to the TACC.[420]

(C) As contained in COMUSMACV msg 40079 11 November 1965, (C), the JTD of 15 November included a JTOC

> to serve as (a) focal point from which the supporting staff elements will accomplish operational planning and coordination. The basic . . . staff element . . . will be a part of (the) Command Section. It will act in the name of and to (the) extent authorized by COMUSMACV and the CofS. The ACofS J3 will have primary joint staff responsibility for supervision. It is proposed that the JTOC be headed by a Marine Brigadier General.

CINCPAC msg 270423Z November (C), approved its establishment; redesignated it as COC, and recommended approval to JCS of a USMC brigadier general to head this organization. On 1 December the COC was established. COMUSMACV believed that this position would improve the balance of USMC representation on the USMACV staff. The appointee to this position, Brig Gen W. K. Jones, USMC, was expected to arrive in Vietnam in early January 1966.

MAP Directorate

(U) The MAP Directorate, which had been supervised by the ACofS, J5, (as in PACOM), was formally placed under the direct supervision of the CofS on 15 December 1965.[421] This had substantially been a de facto arrangement because its mission differed from

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that of J5, which was concerned primarily with plans. The MAP Directorate was concerned with COMUSMACV's role as the representative of the SECDEF in maintaining surveillance over the MAP in RVN. [422]

Command Relationships

US Army Vietnam

(U) At the beginning of 1965, USA advisory units were under the command and control of COMUSMACV. USA combat support and combat service support units were largely under the CO, US Army Support Command, Vietnam (USASCV). These arrangements were adequate for the number of personnel involved and the tasks assigned.

(S) In March, after the decision to build up US forces in SVN, the subject of reorganization of USMACV arose. The CofSA, proposed the formation of an Army Component Command (ACC) with Lt Gen Throckmorton, DEPCOMUSMACV, as its commander. This component would relieve COMUSMACV of as many of his non-tactical and non-combative functions as possible. COMUSMACV replied, in March, that such functions were not onerous and could be coordinated with the Vietnamese much better at the USMACV level. He emphasized that he foresaw only problems, with no attendant gains, by reorganizing his HQ at that critical juncture. [423] However, he did see a need for establishing a field command, to coordinate combined forces operations in a particular part of the country, with Lt Gen Throckmorton in command. As DEPCOMUSMACV, he would be in a position to serve in this role. As ACC, Lt Gen Throckmorton could not do so, as he would have no authority over other service's forces placed under the field command, because such services were represented by component commanders of equal stature. Thus, COMUSMACV preferred that he (COMUSMACV) should also be the US ACC in RVN. [424]

(C) In March, the JCS proposed that the advisory organizations be placed under the ACC. [425] COMUSMACV was opposed, because it would reestablish a relationship which existed prior to the dissolution of the MAAG, a relationship which was so unsatisfactory as to form the basis for MAAG's inactivation. [426]

(C) In April, COMUSMACV refined his concept of command arrangements. He proposed that a tailored corps HQ be deployed if three divisions were moved to Vietnam. Lt Gen Throckmorton would command this corps, but would be returned to Saigon when a qualified senior officer could succeed him. COMUSMACV

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opposed any change in the concept of the USASCV, stating that he did not want to exercise tactical command through this headquarters.[427] Maj Gen Stilwell, his CofS, expressed the opinion that a new headquarters, USARV, acting as the ACC, could provide considerable assistance as coordinator between USMACV, USARPAC, and USASCV.[428]

(C) In June, COMUSMACV re-emphasized his opposition to the establishment of an ACC, because it would result in two large headquarters, established in Saigon, dealing with the RVNAF JGS, which functions as joint staff and also as the ARVN HQ.[429] COMUSMACV felt that the US organizational structure should be tailored to the situation and mission in SVN rather than rigid adherence to US joint service doctrine.

(C) On 20 July, USASCV was redesignated USARV with General Westmoreland as its commander and Brig Gen J. Norton, his deputy. The mission of USARV, in accordance with COMUSMACV's views, was to conduct US Army combat service support operations in SVN, including ACC support planning for COMUSMACV. Additionally, it was to exercise command, less operational control of USA combat units deployed to RVN.[430] Thus, it was not an ACC in the standard sense since it did not exercise operational control over USA combat units.

(S) In November, COMUSMACV proposed that the general officer positions on the USARV staff be increased and that an Army-level headquarters be established to support the Phase II buildup with a lieutenant general in command.[431] On 27 December, it was announced that Lt Gen J. E. Engler would become Deputy CG, USARV, in early 1966, and Brig Gen Norton, the incumbent, would become his assistant.[432]

US Army Field Force and Advisory HQ

(S) In June, JCS had proposed that the field force HQ (see discussion in the previous section regarding tailored corps HQ and field command) become a joint organization. COMUSMACV objected, stating it would control only USA and ROK ground forces. If III MAF subsequently were placed under its control, the staff would then, of course, be augmented with Marines. COMUSMACV visualized that the HQ would evolve from a provisional Task Force Alpha HQ under Brig Gen P. F. Smith commanding the two separate USA brigades, to a USA division level HQ, and then to a tailored corps (field force) HQ to command the USA and ROK divisions and the separate abn bde in II CTZ.[433]

(S) In response to a CJCS inquiry, COMUSMACV stated that the possibility of III MAF passing to the operational control of field forces HQ could not be forecast as it was contingent upon escalation

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of the war. In June, III MAF's operations were confined to the I CTZ and there was no advantage in placing it under field force HQ. However, if the conflict were to escalate to Korean conflict proportions, it might then be desirable to place III MAF under field force HQ and augment the HQ with Marines. He urged that the HQ be a stripped-down TOE corps HQ rather than a Table of Distribution (TD) organization, asserting that this was in full consonance with the Hawaiian agreements of April.434

(U) On 1 August, HQ USA Task Force Alpha, (USATFA) the field force HQ, was activated and assigned to USARV as a TD organization. A nucleus of experienced USMACV officers was assigned to aid in the establishment of the HQ.435 Maj Gen S. R. Larsen was appointed CG on 4 August.

(C) On 7 August, the I Corps Advisory Group was placed under the operational control of CG, III MAF, who was designated Senior Advisor, I Corps. This placed the advisory effort in I CTZ under the senior US ground commander in the CTZ, thus improving the total influence of US advice on ARVN.436 The former Senior Advisor was designated Deputy Senior Advisor. No restrictions were placed upon the scope of this operational control, but further integration of the Advisory Group into the III MAF structure was deferred pending additional study.437

(S) In August, COMUSMACV modified the initial scope of operational control for the field force HQ by excluding the 1st Inf Div. This modification was due to considerations of the seniority of the incumbent commanders, and the need to retain flexibility for future developments. He reiterated that Lt Gen Throckmorton would only temporarily command the organization, giving way to Maj Gen Larsen because of the need for Lt Gen Throckmorton as DEPCOMUSMACV.438 (As a matter of fact, Lt Gen Throckmorton was never appointed commander on orders; Maj Gen Larsen continued to command the organization for the remainder of the year and into 1966.) Subsequently, in Phase II planning, this was further clarified by providing for a US Marine Amphibious corps (MAC) in I Corps and three separate USA corps in the three remaining CTZ's.439

(S) On 25 September, USATFA was redesignated HQ, Field Force, Vietnam (FFORCEV) with operational control over USA units in II CTZ and the II Corps Advisory Group.440 Initially, the Senior Advisor retained his title, but because ARVN II CTZ commander, then sub-Brig Gen Vinh Loc, felt that he had lost prestige in that he was no longer advised by the senior US officer in the area, the CG, FFORCEV, on 21 October was

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designated Senior Advisor and the former Senior Advisor was designated Deputy Senior Advisor.[441,442] The precedent established in I Corps obviously had considerable bearing on this modification. Also, this change in II Corps ended consideration, then pending, to modify the position in I Corps to conform to that initially adopted in II Corps. COMUSMACV was quite willing to encourage this effort on the part of the Vietnamese to enhance their prestige, feeling that such measures were essential to the eventual attainment of their ability to stand on their own feet.[443]

(C) On 1 November, CG, 1st Inf Div, assumed operational control of USA and FWMAF elements in III CTZ, but similar control over III Corps Advisory Group was delayed to allow CG, 1st Inf Div, to become thoroughly familiar with his many responsibilities.[444] On 1 December, COMUSMACV designated CG, 1st Inf Div, as Senior Advisor to CG, III ARVN Corps, and the incumbent as Deputy Senior Advisor. The III Corps Advisory Group was concurrently placed under the operational control of the CG, 1st Inf Div.[445] Thus, by the end of 1965, all of the corps advisory groups, except IV CTZ where no US tactical units were deployed, had been placed under the respective senior US tactical ground commander.

(C) In late November, COMUSMACV initiated action for the organization of a second field force HQ in the III CTZ in the event a second division was to be deployed to the area.[446] This HQ was scheduled to become operational on 31 March 1966.[447] The advance party was due to arrive in early January with the first deployed units of the 25th Inf Div. It was scheduled to operate under a modified TOE, and its commander would assume control over USA tactical and advisory units in the III CTZ.[448]

US Air Force

(C) Throughout 1965 the command relationships among COMUSMACV, Cdr 2d AD and CHAFAG remained unchanged. COMUSMACV retained command over the AFAG in order to carry out his responsibilities to advise VNAF. The Cdr 2d AD, exercised operational control over the AFAG in his role as the AFCC.[449] Operational relationships between the 2d AD and other air elements in the command are discussed in Chapter IV.

US Navy/Marines/Coast Guard

(U) With the landing of the US Marines in I CTZ, the CG, 9th MEB, as the senior naval tactical commander ashore, became the NCC of USMACV.[450] In May, the CG, III MAF, Maj Gen W. R. Collins, assumed this role. Maj Gen (then Brig Gen) L. W. Walt succeeded him on 4 June. However, the NCC did not command or control all naval forces in USMACV, as the NAVGP and TF 115 remained a separate entity directly subordinate to COMUSMACV.

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(C) On 30 July, Task Force 115, Coastal Surveillance Force (COSURVFOR) was activated under the operational control of the CHNAVGP. Thus, the direction of MARKET TIME operations and the resources, formerly the responsibility of CINCPACFLT, were transferred to COMUSMACV. TF 115 was the USN's first command integrating sea, air and shore based units for the primary mission of countering sea infiltration. In order clearly to distinguish between the responsibilities of COMCOSURVFOR and COMSEVENTHFLT, a memorandum of understanding was signed by both commanders, outlining the MARKET TIME area; forces available; and operational procedure for ships of one force operating in the area of the other.[452]

(C) The first USCG vessels to see action in a combat zone since World War II arrived at Da Nang on 20 July. Two divisions, 11 and 12, were formed under USCG Squadron One. Div 12, CTG 115.3, was assigned as the Da Nang Support Group and Div 11, CTG 115.4, arriving Phu Quoc Island on 31 July, was assigned as the Gulf of Thailand Support Group.[453]

(C) In late September, COMUSMACV, concerned with the existence of two naval component commands, III MAF and NAVGP, asked CHNAVGP to study the problem and present a proposal which would establish a single NCC. He would then compare this proposal with the status quo and inform CINCPAC of the results of the analysis.[454] A firm proposal had not yet been developed at the end of 1965.

(U) For a listing of key personnel see Table II-7, and see Figure II-11 for command relationships within USMACV.

Combined Command Arrangements

(U) With the buildup of US forces in SVN, and the abandonment of the strictly advisory role of USMACV, it was logical that the subject of command relationships between US forces and RVNAF should arise.

(S) In mid-March, following the CofSA visit to RVN, a meeting was held at the highest level in Washington to discuss proposals for the deployment of US forces to SVN. Among these were combined command arrangements which would recognize that the US was no longer limited to the role of advising RVNAF.[455] COMUSMACV considered labeling unit advisory teams as combat support teams, to reflect their true mission. The team commander would be appointed deputy for US combat support functions to the ARVN commander. The sector and subsector advisory teams would be labeled pacification support teams. Insofar as combined

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commands were concerned, COMUSMACV felt that a gradual transition would be more palatable to the GVN. Thus, the initial phase would consist merely of cooperation between the US and RVN forces, followed by the establishment of a small, combined coordinating staff, handling only combined operations matters, headed jointly by COMUSMACV and CINCRVNAF. [456]

(TS) On 21 March, COMUSMACV formalized his concept on command relationships.[457] COMUSMACV and CINCRVNAF would act together on a coordinate/cooperate basis with a combined staff whose powers would be limited solely to coordinating combined operations under a US CofS with a VN deputy. Similar staffs would be established at lower levels, but only when collocation or common missions of units so dictated. This arrangement would be modified if and when it was acceptable to GVN and desirable for the US to take full command. DEPCOMUSMACV, would supervise the coordination process at all levels; he had the stature for this task and would be the logical commander of the combined field command if formed. [458] This concept was accepted by CINCPAC, who added that changes would be made only upon overt NVN/CHICOM aggression and implementation of a Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) or US unilateral contingency plan. [459]

(C) In early April, COMUSMACV obtained the CofSA's approval to retain Brig Gen Collins, whose departure from SVN was imminent, in SVN. He intended to designate him a special RVNAF-US headquarters, since it seemed probable that this organization might be formed in the near future. However, he added that such plans could not yet be proposed to GVN, as the time was not yet ripe to insure favorable reception. [460]

(S) On 12 April, COMUSMACV felt that the time was ripe for planning a combined staff for USMACV and RVNAF, JGS. [461] On 28 April, he brought up the matter of a combined staff with senior VN officials, Maj Gen Thieu, the Deputy Prime Minister and Maj Gen Minh, CINCRVNAF. Maj Gen Minh was particularly sensitive to the proposal. [462] As a result, it was put on the shelf for the remainder of the Quat regime.

(S) However, on 14 May, the JCS announced that SECDEF had authorized the creation of the combined coordinating staff as previously conceived by COMUSMACV, and the establishment of a formal combined authority in SVN, a concept which had not originated at USMACV. [463] In press statements, both the VNAF Commander, Air Vice Marshal Ky, and Deputy Prime Minister Thieu pointed out that they felt that a combined command was undesirable. Thus, for the US to submit any such proposal to GVN would be premature.[464] CINCPAC was so informed.[465]

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(S) The establishment of a formal combined authority was apparently intended for implementation only upon introduction of significant additional US combat formations. This would extend US influence beyond the combined coordinating staff, virtually to the point of de facto US control of the RVNAF. COMUSMACV intended to inform JCS that such a proposal should be aired with VN counterparts but it would require a discussion of future US troop deployments with the GVN, which he had no authority to do. However, local political considerations discouraged any attempt to bring this matter up with GVN.[466] This fact was also relayed to CINCPAC.[467]

(S) For the remainder of 1965, the subject of combined coordinating staffs with RVNAF was not revived. The Vietnamese seemed to be basically opposed to such a relationship and COMUSMACV sensed that further discussion probably would be fruitless. US troop commanders, in their Letter of Instructions (LOI), were told that the basic concept underlying command relations with RVNAF commanders was to be one of cooperation and coordination in the mutual interest of both commands. While US forces were not to be placed under the command of operational control of allied commanders, this policy did not preclude the temporary tactical direction of US forces by RVNAF commanders under exceptional circumstances and by mutual agreement. The temporary direction of RVN forces by US commanders, under certain circumstances, was also authorized. This latter situation became particularly prevalent in I CTZ as PF units frequently operated under III MAF unit commanders.

COMUSMACTHAI

(S) In March, a study was made of the JCS proposal that separate commanders be assigned to USMACV and USMACTHAI, thereby eliminating COMUSMACV's second "hat" as COMUSMACTHAI, a role he had held since USMACV was activated in February 1962. COMUSMACV did not concur with the proposal and stated that the same officer should remain in command of both organizations. COMUSMACV's reply to CINCPAC noted that this was a reversal of his earlier position on this question but he stated that his change in thinking was due to a change in the situation, which placed military considerations above those of a political nature.[468] This matter was again discussed at the April Honolulu conference with the SECDEF, who deferred decision on the matter until a later date.

(S) On 27 May, the SECDEF informed the JCS and CINCPAC of his decision to separate the COMUSMACV and COMUSMACTHAI commands, with COMUSMACTHAI to be established in Bangkok with a USA major general in command; COMUSMACV, as COMUSSEASIA (D), would retain policy planning control over SEATO/SEASIA matters.

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COMUSMACV recommended, and CINCPAC concurred, that the commanders retain assigned specific planning responsibilities and that any subsequent realignment be accomplished on an evolutionary basis. On 10 July 1965, United States Military Assistance Command, Thailand (USMACTHAI), was established as a separate command. 469

Communications

(C) With the US troop buildup in RVN in 1965 and the increase of COMUSMACV's span of control, it was to be expected that existing in-country and out-of-country communications facilities would require major expansion. These requirements, the actions taken to improve the communications systems, equipment and operations, and the problems which arose are discussed in Annex C. By the end of 1965 the groundwork had been prepared for an effective communications system in SEASIA. COMUSMACV obtained control over in-country communications. The major unresolved problem was that construction of communications facilities lagged behind requirements.

Inter-Agency Relationships

(C) COMUSMACV was a member of the US Mission Council under the direction of the US Ambassador to RVN. This Council developed US policies and insured the effective coordination of the complete spectrum of US activities in-country designed to achieve the multiple objectives necessary to conclude the war successfully. A discussion of COMUSMACV's interrelationships with the other members of the Mission is contained in Annex D.

EXPANDING THE BASE

(C) At the end of 1964, the then USMACV J4, Brig Gen P. A. Osmanski, commented: "I believe the first principle of counterinsurgency strategy is to secure the base; and I think we neglected that until recently." 470

(C) At the end of 1965, the USMACV J4, Brig Gen J. D. Crowley, observed:

> . . . on May 1st of this year, only seven months ago, we had a US military population of 36,000 consisting primarily of advisors, air units, and helicopter units. Our logistics system consisted of a commissary and a large supply room in Saigon . . . we now find ourselves having to support the equivalent of a field army. 471

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(C) The developments in the logistic field in Vietnam during 1965 may thus be appropriately called "expanding the base." This development was unique in that it was the first time that the US had to develop a base of logistical operations in a combat zone with no fixed areas under complete friendly control and with no area close by to serve as a logistic base, such as Japan did during the Korean conflict. SVN was thus both the combat and communications zone at the same time.472

(U) During 1964, at least 16 agencies provided logistical support for RVNAF operations and the US advisory program in RVN. Since plans at that time called for the withdrawal of all US forces during 1965, there were no attempts to establish a coordinated logistic effort. Agencies operating their own supply and support systems included: HSAS (Headquarters Support Activity, Saigon), USASF, USAF, USA, USMC, VNAF, VNN, ARVN, POL (renamed SAPOV, Sub-Area Petroleum Office, Vietnam), OICC (Officer in Charge of Construction), CARE, USAID, CAS, SOG (Studies and Observation Group), USMACV field advisors and the US Embassy. Some of these systems paralleled and overlapped each other, while in other cases, support functions were either not performed or were done in an arbitrary manner. For example, four of the systems provided utility repairs yet there was no depot level maintenance. During the latter part of 1964, much was done to consolidate and streamline the logistic function but no real base of logistic operations was obtained until 1965.473

(S) COMUSMACV encountered many problems in expanding from a large supply room in Saigon to the support of a field army equivalent; they included: developing necessary logistics systems, obtaining the requisite manpower, funding the effort, bringing supplies and equipment in-country and actual construction of required facilities.

1st Logistical Command

(S) As early as 1962 the need for a centralized US logistical organization in SVN was foreseen by COMUSMACV (General P. D. Harkins) and a study was prepared recommending the deployment of a US Army Logistical Command (Log Comd). This study was disapproved by both CINCUSARPAC and CINCPAC who felt, at that time, that the requirement was not justified. 474 In August 1964, a new plan to improve the USMACV logistical capability was developed. An essential element of the plan was the prompt introduction of a log comd and an engineer construction group to remedy the lack of a retail supply and maintenance activity outside the Saigon area, as well as to improve the base wholesale system in Saigon and provide a US military construction capability. 475

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(S) On 21 December 1964 the JCS indorsed COMUSMACV's plan and recommended that 230 men be initially dispatched to SVN as soon as possible. The SECDEF approved the plan in principle, but stated that additional justification was necessary, especially for the engineer construction group. 476

(S) To develop his position more fully COMUSMACV directed that a new study be made. Its conclusions were:

1) The log comd was required to fill two needs: a consolidated up-country common-user logistical system and a complete wholesale system in Saigon under HSAS.

2) Any additional buildup of US and other FWMAF could not be properly supported under the current informal system involving various US elements as well as RVNAF.

3) The existing system of transshipment from Saigon to other locations in-country was no longer practical.

4) The proposed log comd would provide a single source for all common-user items and gradually take over the supply and maintenance functions of HSAS, USMACV, HQ Comdt (Headquarters Commandant) and USMACV.

5) The recommended manning for this command was 3,800 logistical personnel. A 2,400-man engineer group would provide construction support. Up-country depots and maintenance shops would be established. 477

(S) The SECDEF felt that this subject was of sufficient importance for him to send a special representative to SVN. On 31 January 1965 an Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) group, headed by Mr. Glen Gibson, arrived in Saigon to discuss the deployment of a log comd and related items. This team was initially antagonistic to the idea of bringing a log comd to Vietnam; however, after four days of conferences, the team was prepared to recommend its establishment with an initial input of 350 men. COMUSMACV's objectives were thus largely achieved. The 350 men recommended could form the nucleus of the log comd and non-divisional technical service units could be assigned to this organization as they became available. The task force also recommended that the engineer construction group not be deployed at that time. 478

(S) Consequently, the SECDEF, in February 1965, approved the immediate deployment of 38 logistical planners and 37 operating personnel to become the nucleus of the 1st Log Comd. The 1st Log Comd

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Type A, (reduced), was established by USARPAC GO 95 dated 29 March to be activated on 1 April. SECDEF did not approve deployment of the engineer construction group. 479 This decision was soon reversed and by the end of April, the SECDEF had not only authorized deployment of the engineers but also the necessary increments for a full strength Type A Log Comd.[480] The 1st Log Comd was increased to a Type B unit on 6 July. Other separate major logistic elements available to the ACC by the end of 1965 included the 2d Signal Group formed in May, and the 18th Engineer Brigade that was organized in September to provide a headquarters for engineer construction elements.[481]

Logistical Support System

(S) The logistical support system developed by COMUSMACV during 1965 had its roots in a USMACV J5 study completed in March 1965. This study discussed the feasibility of establishing a series of enclaves in SVN to be secured by US troops. It envisaged the release of RVNAF from static security missions to full employment in offensive roles against the VC. These enclaves should be in locations anchored on the sea and containing port and airfield facilities. It was also recommended that detailed studies be prepared on the following locations in order of priority: Da Nang, Vung Tau, Nha Trang, Qui Nhon, Bien Hoa, Hue, Can Tho, Cam Ranh/Phan Rang, Quang Ngai, Tuy Hoa, Phan Thiet, Soc Trang, Vinh Long, and Rach Gia.[482]

(S) A serious problem in the logistic field in SVN was that of port congestion. COMUSMACV developed a support plan during the early summer of 1965 that was to result in the decentralization of logistic operations. The concept involved the development of both logistic areas and support areas.

> Support areas are balanced groups of logistical units and activities which provide services and supplies to supported units and maintain up to 30 days stockage for troops supported from the particular complex. Logistic areas are balanced groupings of logistical units and activities which provide backup to support areas, make issues and provide services to local units, and maintain a 30 day level of supplies.[483]

(S) Initially, the 1st Log Comd was to establish support areas at Da Nang, Qui Nhon, Nha Trang, Vung Tau, and Bien Hoa with logistic areas at Cam Ranh Bay and Saigon.[484] Thus the recommendations in the enclave study were applied in logistical

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planning. Each of the selected locations (with the exception of Bien Hoa, a major airfield), was located on the coast and had the potential for additional port and airfield development (see Figure II-12, US logistical concept). This support concept was modified at the 18 April 1965 PACOM conference when CINCPAC decided to give the NCC (CG, III MAF) operating responsibility to furnish common-user items of supply for all US forces located from Chu Lai north to the DMZ.[485] In early July CINCPAC extended the logistical control by the NCC to the entire I CTZ and on 13 July the Naval Support Activity (NAVSUPPACT), Da Nang, assumed responsibility for all ports, beaches, depots, and common-item support within the region.[486] The CG, III MAF, also had the III MAF Force Logistics Support Group to assist him in carrying out his logistic responsibilities.

(S) By the end of the year, the USA 1st Log Comd had primary common-item supply responsibility for US and FWMAF in the II, III and IV CTZ's, as well as total logistical support responsibility for USA elements. Logistical areas had been established at Cam Ranh Bay and Saigon with a stockage objective of 45 days (raised from 30 days owing to the long requisition lead time). Support areas had been established at Qui Nhon, Nha Trang and Vung Tau and were authorized a 15 day stock level, drawing from the logistical areas. If necessary, Da Nang and Can Tho would be established as additional support areas. The support area at Da Nang would furnish Army items not available through Navy supply channels. The Can Tho facility was to be established if US troops were to be deployed to the IV CTZ.[487] Each component commander had his own system to furnish service-peculiar items to members of his service located at various points in SVN.

(S) A key point of COMUSMACV's plan for logistical operations was the establishment of a large complex at Cam Ranh Bay. The history of this development is interesting as it describes the development of a major base in a combat area. Much of the planning was completed before there was a commitment of major US troop elements to Vietnam. In early 1965 the only significant port in SVN could not handle significant amounts of cargo.[488]

(S) For many years the Cam Ranh Bay area had been recognized as a fine natural deep water port. During World War II, it was used as an anchorage by the Japanese. During 1964 the US built a small POL facility and a single pier at Cam Ranh Bay in order to provide support for RVNAF.[489] Interest in additional development of the area was generated in late 1964 when COMUSMACV decided that an additional ammunition storage area was required to support the projected increase in RVNAF forces.[490] A USMACV J4 survey

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concluded that in spite of some construction difficulties, it would provide an ideal location for an ammunition storage facility; however, the recommendations of the survey team were not favorably considered by the J4, USMACV.[491] At the Honolulu planning conference in April 1965 COMUSMACV recommended that Cam Ranh Bay be developed as a logistical base. In addition to the fine natural harbor the area was served by National Route 1 and the Vietnamese National Railway, two of the major land LOC's in SVN.[492] Development did not receive approval at that time.[493]

(S) At a 15 May briefing, the recommendation was made to COMUSMACV that Cam Ranh Bay be developed as a "a second major deep water port and logistics complex",[494] to provide combat service support to the I and II CTZ's. Approval to use the land had already been obtained on 13 May.[495] This briefing also described the decentralized logistic support system and base development at Qui Nhon and Nha Trang.[496] It was estimated that initial construction would take one battalion-month and an additional 15 battalion-months would be necessary to achieve a standard IV level. The airfield portion was estimated to require 2.5 battalion-months of construction for emergency operations; six battalion-months for minimum operations; and 12 battalion-months to become fully operational.[497] COMUSMACV approved the plan in concept; by the end of May, the SECDEF had concurred.[498,499] On 9 June two battalions of USA combat engineers landed at Cam Ranh Bay and construction began.[500]

(FOUO) Another logistic problem of interest to COMUSMACV during 1965 was the transfer of the support functions for personnel in Saigon and field advisors from HSAS to USARV.[501] In January CINCPAC directed that plans for the development of the logistical command should include the phase-out of HSAS. As the II, III and IV CTZ's were Army oriented, it was only logical for all support functions to be under Army cognizance. The first step in this transfer occurred on 1 September when support for USMACV field advisors became the responsibility of the 1st Log Comd under USARV. On 14 September, COMUSMACV scheduled the phase-out of HSAS for completion by 30 June 1966. By 15 October a complete transfer schedule had been prepared. The HSAS mission was divided into 19 functions with a phased turnover to allow for smooth transition. Early in November the JCS approved the recommended concept. At the end of 1965 responsibility for four of the functions (translation service, port operations, dental care, and post exchange operations) had been transferred from HSAS to USARV.

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Supply and Maintenance

(TS) As the buildup of US forces in the RVN progressed, the Command experienced many supply shortages. COMUSMACV had anticipated this and had prepared a document informing incoming units of expected supply problems among which were:502

1) Arriving units must be prepared to live in the field and be generally self-sustaining.

2) Only limited maintenance support would be available. Units must bring enough repair parts for 180 days of operation.

3) There would be no station property or field fortification supply available.

4) A double basic load of Class V supplies should be brought. Some types of ammunition were not available in-country.

(S) In order simply to maintain COMUSMACV's consumption and stockage requirements, 12,000 short tons of cargo, or two shiploads, were required daily by the end of 1965. This was exclusive of AID, MAP, and military construction cargo.503 Problems of storage complicated the situation.

(C) The major incoming USA units and force packages were initially supported under a PUSH supply system which provided for 180 days of automatic resupply of all classes of supply except bulk petroleum. Items were automatically shipped in 15-day increments from CONUS. The first two increments were delivered directly to the supported units and the remainder were sent to the supporting depot or support command to facilitate establishment of supply control data.504

Class I

(C) Stockage of Class I perishables remained limited up to the end of 1965 because of insufficient refrigerated storage space. Even with two refrigerated barges, at Cam Ranh Bay and Qui Nhon, and one refrigerated ship with two additional barges at Da Nang, desired stockage levels had not been met. Stockage objectives and on-hand status of Class I as of 31 December were:505

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CLASS I SUPPLY STATUS

	Type Ration	Stockage Objective	On Hand
I CTZ	A	60 days	19 days
(III MAF/NCC)	B	60 days	35.6 days
(49,000 personnel)	Meal, Combat Individual	45 days (Included 30 days mount-out stocks)	35.7 days
II, III & IV	A	60 days	13 days
CTZ (USARV & HSAS)	B	90 days	22.7 days
(161,000 personnel)	Meal, Combat Individual		

In addition to the normal rations handled under the Class I system, COMUSMACV directed, in October, the distribution of sundries packs. These consisted of health and comfort items issued free to those units which did not have PX resources available and those deployed from base areas for more than two days.[506]

Class II and IV

(C) Class II and Class IV supplies were handled differently because of the numerous line items in these categories. There was no overall stockage objective for Class II and Class IV items. Rather, usage factors were computed on each item, reorder points were established, and individual stockage levels set. As each line item had to be handled on an individual basis, a great management problem was generated, and changes in demand caused large fluctuations in supply levels. Although component commanders had reported shortages of certain items, levels were generally adequate and shortages did not force curtailment of combat operations nor affect adversely the health and welfare of the Command. At the end of 1965, USARV had reported 105 different items as being in short supply, to include: tropical boots and fatigues; some items of field equipment; rough-terrain fork lifts; M-113 APC's; 2½-ton trucks; field wire and cable; radio installation kits; M-16 rifles; M-60 machine guns; 4.2 mortars; almost all construction material; and certain aircraft and avionics maintenance items.[507]

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(C) In early September the USMACV Quartermaster recommended that enlisted personnel be placed on an issue-in-kind clothing system instead of the monetary clothing allowance system.[508] Cash sales facilities were not available for most personnel since the one outlet in Saigon could not service those outside the immediate area. Following a study of this proposal, USAF elements remained on the monetary system. The USMC element of the NCC went under issue-in-kind on 1 September. Other USN and USCG elements remained on the monetary system (naval personnel serving with USMC followed USMC procedures). USARV adopted issue-in-kind procedures on 1 November and HQ, USMACV, on 1 January 1966.[509,510]

Class III

(C) Highly specialized storage and shipping requirements for Class III created unique problems for COMUSMACV. Before 1965 all distribution and supply was handled by three civilian oil companies: Shell, ESSO, and Caltex. Because of relatively small requirements and no military system in existence, this procedure was adequate in support of the MAAG effort.[511] During 1964, slightly over two million barrels (bbls) of fuel were consumed.[512] For 1965, the total consumed reached almost seven million bbls (including JP-4, 115/145 avgas, diesel, and mogas).[513] Of this total, over one million bbls were consumed in December alone (see Figure II-13, POL Consumption 1965).[514] It was estimated that monthly consumption by June 1966 would reach a million and a half bbls.[515]

(C) As the US buildup increased during 1965 many changes became necessary in POL handling procedures. In January, for example, military users at Nha Trang and Vung Tau consumed double the forecasted amount of aviation fuel.[516] During March - April, Shell, one of the major suppliers, ran out of JP-4; it was only by borrowing from ESSO stocks that the existing requirement was filled.[517] By May, even though a dual contract system had been initiated with ESSO and Shell to make country-wide resources available, the commercial contractors had reached their maximum supply capability.[518] At a PACOM conference in late April, it was decided that large contracts would be made with commercial suppliers, involving untouchable reserve stocks at various locations within SVN, which were to be subject to delivery on 24 hour's notice. The stock level and the rate of delivery would be such as to force these companies to build additional storage facilities.[519] Other items discussed included the need for organizing a military POL system and establishing a strong centralized control under SAPOV. At the time, some PACOM component commanders felt that giving SAPOV too much authority would impinge on service prerogatives.[520]

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(C) In early June, with shore-based storage capacity still a major problem, an MSTS T-1 tanker, USNS Petaluna, was stationed off Da Nang to provide a floating reserve and to discharge products directly to the consumer.[521] By 31 December, two MSTS T-2 tankers were also serving in this capacity. In addition, the civilian suppliers were maintaining two T-2 tankers in a floating storage configuration at the end of the year, with replacements provided as they were offloaded.[522] In order to augment the available storage capability, civilian contractors started construction of new facilities in June: Shell at Da Nang, Qui Nhon, Nha Trang, TSN, Nha Be, and Can Tho; and ESSO at Lien Chieu, Qui Nhon, Nha Trang, and TSN.[523]

(C) During July, as US logistical forces became available, and in consonance with the overall logistic support plan, component commanders were given responsibility for receipt, storage, and issue of common-user Class III products. The NCC thus became responsible for POL services in the I CTZ and the ACC in the II, III, and IV CTZ's. Because of the special nature of Class IIIA (aviation POL), each component commander operated on-base storage and dispensing systems in areas where his service was the dominant user.[524] SAPOV maintained overall responsibility for management of the entire system. The basic supply system throughout the year continued to rely on commercial capability, augmented by military resources.[525] The commercial contractors could not supply lubricant and grease outside the Saigon area because of the lack of cargo vessels. As a result, handling of these products was completely taken over by the military during July.[526]

(C) The supply points of Nha Be, just south of Saigon, and Lien Chieu, north of Da Nang filled almost all in-country POL requests.[527] The Da Nang area proper was supplied by truck, tank car, and coastal tanker, all operating from Lien Chieu. An amphibious assault fuel system was installed at Da Nang and Chu Lai, providing the capability to pump products from small tankers to collapsible tanks ashore. This system consisted of underwater flexible pipeline terminated at a mooring buoy, enabling tankers to discharge into normally unusable locations, and proved to be extremely valuable in augmenting permanent storage facilities. Qui Nhon was supplied by coastal tankers from Da Nang and Cam Ranh Bay and an amphibious assault fuel system. An Khe was supplied from Qui Nhon by military truck. Distribution to Pleiku over the road was possible only when VC activity permitted. Nha Trang was supplied from the Nha Be tank farm by coastal tanker, where although there were no commerical storage facilities, installation of an amphibious assault fuel system made limited collapsible bag

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storage possible. Cam Ranh Bay was to be the site of a major POL storage and distribution point. Pending completion of this projected facility, a temporary Army pipeline from the beach to a collapsible bag storage area was installed. TSN, Bien Hoa, and Vung Tau were supplied by tank trucks operating from Nha Be, and the Delta area received necessary POL support via barge convoys escorted by VNN. All other locations were supplied by air, using either 55-gallon drums or 500-gallon collapsible tanks. At the end of 1965, total in-country commercial bulk storage capacity was 880,000 bbls, of which approximately 60 percent was utilized for military requirements. 528 Planned future construction would provide an additional 607,000 bbl capacity.529 The total military storage capacity was 382,300 bbls, out of which only 30,833 was permanent; the remainder being collapsible bags.530 Planned military construction called for an additional 2,300,000 bbl permanent storage capability. 531

BULK CLASS III & IIIA[532]
Days of Supply
End 1965

		Stockage Objective	On Hand* Average
III MAF			
	AVGAS	30	10
	JP-4	30	5
	MOGAS	30	7
	DIESEL	30	8
USARV			
	AVGAS	45	10
	JP-4	45	5
	MOGAS	45	3
	DIESEL	45	6
2d AD			
	AVGAS	30	10
	JP-4	30	4

*Plus 15 deep reserve in commercial and floating storage.

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Class V

(S) Class V supply support, ammunition, was relatively satisfactory with about 70 percent of the stockage objective on hand at the end of the year.[533] Most of the problems involved nine items that were in world-wide short supply: 1) Cartridge 40-mm HE (M 384); 2) cartridge 40-mm HE (M 406); 3) 2.75-in rocket HE; 4) 81-mm mortar illuminating round; 5) 105-mm howitzer illuminating round; 6) 250-lb bomb Mk 81; 7) 500-lb bomb Mk 82; 8) 500-lb, 750-lb, and 1000-lb GP bombs; and 9) 20-mm HE ammunition.[534] Expenditure of these items was handled on a controlled basis, and, where necessary, substitutions were made to assure combat availability. End-of-year average daily consumption of all types of ammunition was 960 short tons per day.[535] In addition to its normal reserve stock, the 2d AD established the "Special Express" system and normally had three floating ammunition depot ships stationed in Vietnamese waters to provide an additional 9 to 12 days' supply of USAF munitions.[536] On 15 June 1965, COMUSMACV established the USMACV Ammunition Officer under the staff supervision of the J4. This office held overall supervisory responsibility for ammunition requirements, storage, and distribution for all customers in SVN.[537] End of year Class V and V-A status is shown below.[538]

CLASS V AND V-A

	STOCKAGE OBJECTIVE		ON HAND	
	Days of Supply	Short Tons	Days of Supply	Short Tons
USARV	60	59,000	47	47,163
III MAF	45	37,500	35	28,102
2d AD	30	32,500	14	16,174

Shortages

(TS) Shortly after the arrival of major US troop elements, considerable unfavorable publicity was created as a result of allegations of supply deficiencies in SVN. A Senate investigating sub-committee which visited SVN in October, found evidence of definite shortages in repair parts and construction material.[539,540] COMUSMACV's feeling at the time was that several of the complaints made to the committee were based on incomplete knowledge of the

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situation. The logistical system was still in the process of shaking down and the alleged supply shortages had in no way affected combat operations. Many of the difficulties had been caused by problems in distribution and by some world-wide item shortages.[541]

(S) COMUSMACV and higher HQ undertook measures to insure that critical items of supply and equipment would be available when required. In October the SECDEF established a task force in his office to monitor critical shortages and institute corrective action as necessary.[542] This task force was not to serve as another requisition channel but rather as an agency to expedite solutions to logistic support problems. A reporting system known as "Flagpole" was established to keep this task force advised as to current supply shortages with specific designators applied to the various commands.

(S) Soon after initiation of the Flagpole system, COMUSMACV found it necessary to submit six items for consideration.[543] Three of these dealt with logistical problems and three with operational and construction difficulties. The first Flagpole item, B-1, submitted in September, was a request for assistance in expediting release of funds for the military construction program in SVN.[544] Flagpole B-2 requested assistance in obtaining additional U-8 aircraft for the use of COMUSMACV and CG, USARV. DA was to furnish the 15 requested aircraft by January 1966.[545] A serious shortage of uniforms for ARVN and RF soldiers prompted the submission of Flagpole B-3 in November. This problem was complicated by the need to provide replacement uniforms for ROK elements. As a result of this request, OSD approved offshore procurement of the required uniforms and initial shipment was expected in January 1966.[546] The continued shortage of shallow draft coastal shipping, as reported in November by Flagpole B-4, resulted in the negotiation of a contract with a commercial shipper to provide part of the necessary service. Item B-5 and B-6 were submitted in late December and had to do with delays encountered in construction of the Integrated Wideband Communications System (IWCS).[547] Action on these items was still pending at the end of 1965. In addition to the items submitted by COMUSMACV, two were initiated by CINCPAC and eight by CINCUSARPAC.[548] The Flagpole system proved to be a valuable assistance to COMUSMACV in obtaining rapid reaction to his logistic problems at the highest level.

(S) COMUSMACV established a reporting procedure for subordinate commanders to inform him personally of any supply shortages, so that rapid command action could be initiated. On 19 November, the Secretary of the Army directed formation in

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CONUS of quick-reaction assistance teams oriented to SVN. These teams were to be prepared to leave CONUS on a 48-hour notice and to remain in SVN up to 90 days. Each team was composed of experts in specific areas of supply and maintenance assistance. These teams could be requested by COMUSMACV or deployed directly by Department of the Army (DA) if necessary.[549,550]

(S) After his visit to SVN, in November 1965, SECDEF directed DA to establish a Red Ball Express System as a temporary method of expediting the flow of repair parts to remove equipment from deadline in SVN. Main features of this system were streamlined requisitioning procedures and reserved predictable airlift capability.[551] Between its initiation on 6 December 1965 and 3 January 1966, USARV submitted approximately 8,000 Red Ball requests, of which 3,700 were filled. This action made possible the removal of 612 major items of equipment from deadline, including 481 aircraft, 12 bulldozers, 33 trucks, 51 generators, and five pieces of material handling equipment (MHE).[552] The percentage of selected items of equipment operated by USARV on deadline status on 1 January 1966 was: 1st Cav Div (AM) aircraft 16 percent; other USARV aircraft, 20 percent; bulldozers, 38 percent; trucks at Cam Ranh Bay, 24 percent; LARC's (Lighter Amphibious Resupply Cargo), 67 percent; and MHE, 21 percent.[553]

(S) The other component commanders also established special supply systems to insure that the necessary repair parts were obtained for SVN as expeditously as possible. The 2d AD utilized the "Speed Thru Air Resupply" (STAR) program, through which requests for critical parts were sent to Air Materiel Area 8 in California, necessary parts were obtained from direct support and general support depots, shipped to Travis Air Force Base (AFB) and flown to SVN. Using this system, 2d AD had an aircraft operational rate of 84.5 percent at the end of 1965, with 9.1 percent of aircraft deadlined for supply and 6.4 percent for maintenance. This exceeded USAF's world-wide standard of 71 percent aircraft operational capability.[554] The CG, III MAF/NCC, also had a high priority resupply system, initiated on 22 September, also known as Red Ball.[555] Under this system, critical items were airshipped from the USMC Supply Center at Barstow, California. Year-end deadline rate for the III MAF was: overall, 14 percent; electronic 11 percent; engineer, 32 percent; motor transport, 11 percent; and ordnance, 5 percent.[556]

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Logistic Troop Support

(TS) During the series of high level conferences that took place before and during US troop deployment, the necessity for adequate logistical troops to support combat forces was discussed in detail.[558] During the conference in Honolulu, 3 - 5 August, a preliminary Phase I troop list was prepared, including logistical support elements. A study of this proposed troop list revealed that the number of service support troops was insufficient and COMUSMACV directed the development of a new logistical troop list, the Phase I add-on. This list noted that logistical support elements, totalling some 9,863 men, were required by the end of CY 65 -- the majority being engineer and medical personnel. Projected availability dates for desired elements were such that, by the end of CY 65, only 262 men would be in-country and complete fill could not be expected until 1967.

(TS) At a subsequent Honolulu Conference, 27 September - 1 October the Phase I add-on list was presented. A decision was made, concurred in by all agencies, including JCS, DA, CINCPAC and COMUSMACV: "To accept combat forces as they became available over an extended period even though logistical support would be marginal . . ." This crucial decision was based on the fact that both combat and logistical elements could not be made available during the necessary time frame and the situation in SVN was serious enough to require immediate commitment of US combat power. During the period September through December a series of actions was taken to develop the Phase II force requirements. The initial Phase II troop list was prepared at the Saigon conference 1 - 10 September and presented at a CINCPAC conference in early October. These force requirements were incorporated into CINCPAC Phase II Program and at that time represented USMACV requirements for CY 66. The Phase II add-on list presented to CINCPAC in early December included the logistical forces required to support the added combat strength and to provide adequate combat service support. The complete Phase IIA troop list was a requirements list and included those logistical units required to overcome the shortcomings in the logistical support structure.

(TS) The COMUSMACV position at the end of 1965 was that if our logistical forces were not brought into balance with our combat elements, and unless this balance were maintained with future deployments, logistical support would become sub-marginal and sustained combat operations could not be conducted. This change in position after the October Honolulu Conference was due to the increase in combat intensity that resulted from the accelerated buildup and NVA infiltration. The calculated risk, in October, to accept the nonavailability of logistical troop elements, could not, by December, be adopted.

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(TS) The effect that the lack of prompt logistical deployment would have on operations was described to the SECDEF during his briefing by the USMACV J3 on 28 November: ". . . unless we receive by March (1966) the high priority logistic units which the J4 has described, we cannot support any add-on until the third quarter of CY 66, with all of the consequences associated with such a delay."

Port Congestion

(S) The port congestion problem consisted basically of two factors; the lack of port facilities, and the irregular schedule of shipping.[559] In all of SVN there were only 12 deep-draft berths available. Ten of these were in Saigon; the remaining two at Cam Ranh Bay were located alongside a pier which was too narrow to permit efficient discharge of even one ship. Two additional berths became available in December upon completion of a Delong pier. (See Annexes E-F). The magnitude of the problem may be judged by the fact that on 30 Oct 65, 17 vessels were awaiting discharge at Cam Ranh Bay and 25 at Saigon.[560] At the end of December there was a total cargo backlog of 164,164 measurement tons (M/T) at the various ports.[561] This situation may be summed up in the words of the Chief of the USMACV Traffic Management Agency (TMA) on 24 November 1965 as follows.. . . ten first class ports in CONUS are shipping material to SVN as fast as they can -- we have four second class ports to receive it."[562]

(U) There were six types of cargo that moved to SVN, during 1965, consisting of the following:[563]

1) Push cargo - 180 days of automatic resupply for troop units deployed to SVN from CONUS.

2) Pull cargo - material that had been ordered by US and Vietnamese forces using normal requisitioning procedures.

3) Unit equipment - equipment normally accompanying a unit upon deployment.

4) Construction material - ordered by civilian construction contractors, USA, USN, USAF and USMC.

5) USAID ordered supplies.

6) Normal civilian cargo.

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(C) The shipping agencies did not coordinate with each other during 1965 and as a result there was little connection between material being shipped and the ability to receive. Ships were often forced to remain outside ports for days or weeks before port space could be assigned. The major port of Saigon was operated by a civilian agency, and as a result, military shipping could use, on the average, only about 50 percent of the available wharf space. Shipping companies in CONUS frequently mixed various types of cargo of differing priority on one ship, resulting in the necessity of unloading low priority cargo to get at badly needed material. Shortage of adequate lighterage and coastal shipping made the movement of cargo after unloading slow and unresponsive.564

(S) The only real long range solution to the problem was identified early in the year as being the development of additional ports along the coast, to take the pressure off Saigon.565 Ports to be developed included Da Nang - Chu Lai, Qui Nhon, Nha Trang, Cam Ranh Bay, Vung Tau and Saigon. Tuy Hoa would be added in 1966. By April 1965, plans were being completed for the development of these alternate ports and JCS had approved work at Da Nang, Qui Nhon and Nha Trang.566

(S) During the early part of November, a joint study team composed of representatives from USMACV and CINCPAC made a complete survey of all ports in Vietnam. In general, this team recommended the following for all ports:567

1) Unitized packaging for all CONUS-originated and intra-theater cargoes.

2) Expedited delivery of MHE and MHE repair parts.

3) Use of full shiploads for single port offloading.

4) Maximized block segregation/stowage at CONUS terminals by consignee to facilitate loading/unloading.

5) Assurance that all shipboard cargo handling gear would be operational.

6) Loading of vessels for ease of discharge, not maximum gross tonnages.

7) Furnishing of tonnage forecasts to COMUSMACV for 30-, 60-, 90-day periods on a monthly basis.

8) Insurance that all ships destined for RVN would top off fuel and water bunkers at the last port before in-country arrival.

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(S) In addition to construction of port facilities and requests for changes in current shiploading practices, COMUSMACV recommended, on several occasions, the establishment of a Vietnamese National Port Authority.[568] This authority would be independent of the Minister for Public Works and would take over functions of management for port operation at Saigon, Da Nang, Qui Nhon, Nha Trang and Can Tho. As of the end of the year these ports were still under individual management. The possibility that COMUSMACV would take over all Saigon port operations was also discussed in December and the COMUSMACV position was that this step was, for the present, neither necessary nor desirable.[569] In October 1965, COMUSMACV asked the GVN for exclusive use, on a lease basis, of the three Messageries et Maritimes civilian quays with associated warehouses located in Saigon. The GVN took over the area and USMACV expected to begin operations after 1 January 1966.[570] Project Newport, also developed during October, was a new deep-draft port plan for Saigon, to be built by USARV. It would ultimately provide two LST berths, additional lighterage facilities, and four more deep-draft berths.[571] USMACV would have sufficient port capability in Saigon when scheduled construction and the take-over of the Messageries et Maritimes facility was completed. These actions would provide seven deep-draft berths within the Saigon harbor for the exclusive use of USMACV. (For the year end status of all ports in RVN see Annex E. Port Status.)

Lines of Communication

(S) As the US buildup progressed, the requirement for intra-theater shallow-draft shipping increased sharply. Because of the lack of adequate deep-draft ports, much material had to be unloaded in the few ports available and then forwarded to other destinations. The lack of land LOC's necessitated transport by coastal shipping.

(S) In August 1965 a joint USMACV-MSTSPE (Military Sea Transport Service, Far East) board studied the situation and established the requirement for 22 LST's to be deployed to SVN later than 15 October, in order to relieve the shallow-draft shipping problem. However, this requirement was never met; by mid-December only seven LST's were actually available to COMUSMACV for coastal shipping.[572] Commander Military Sea Transport Service, Far East (COMSTSPE) explained that his entire fleet of 25 LST's was being used in support of SVN, but could not be used continuously to move cargo along the coast because of other commitments including maintenance, shuttle runs to the Philippines, tactical troop movement requirements, and return to Japan for crew home leave.[573,574] COMUSMACV believed that even if all 25 LST's were available, they would still be inadequate to handle the shipping requirements which

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by December had reached a 78,479 M/T backlog at Saigon. Nevertheless, COMUSMACV felt that any change in deployment of LST's in the Vietnam area should be coordinated with him, to insure maximum use of limited resources. This had not been done in the past.[575] CINCPAC directed that maximum coordination be effected between COMUSMACV and COMSTSPE and considered the need for a possible redefinition of CINCPAC priority criteria.[576] Additional LST's from both theater and CONUS reserve fleet resources, were expected to arrive in early 1966.[577,578,579]

(S) A positive approach to the problem was made by COMUSMACV in November when he recommended that a commercial concern, Alaska Barge and Transport Co., be placed under contract to supply part of the much needed coastal shipping capability. This company, experienced in supplying material for DEW Line sites, had the capability to move cargo in SVN within 60 days of the contract date. A cost analysis study indicated that unit cost using this service would be less than 50 percent of that applied to equivalent MSTS LST operations.[580,581] By the end of November, SECDEF approved this concept and directed MSTS to send a representative to Saigon to negotiate a contract.[582] By 8 December a contract had been signed, and the company was scheduled to begin operations in SVN shortly, early in 1966. It was estimated that about 7,000 tons of supplies per month would be moved along the SVN coast by using this service.[583]

(U) On 15 October 1965 the USMACV TMA was activated and assumed operational control of the airlift coordination center, the sealift coordination center, the tri-service Air Transport Coordinating Office (ATCO), and five movement control teams stationed throughout SVN. It provided coordinated management of all inter-theater and intra-theater transport assets and adjustments in priorities and carriers as necessary, to obtain optimum utilization of available resources.[584]

(S) In November, CINCPAC recommended that the shifting of construction emphasis from expeditionary airfields to ports might be an additional solution to this problem. COMUSMACV did not concur because: [585,586]

1) Available funds were committed and could not be reprogrammed. Most delay was due to the fact that certain construction funds (described as Table B and Table C funds), had not been approved by Congress.[587] The problem was not construction effort, but lack of money. The new funding required congressional authority.

2) Long lead time was needed for construction facilities and material.

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3) Contractor capability had been tailored to the current effort. The plant and equipment available, therefore, were not suitable for shifting to other programs.

4) Concrete runways then under construction were to be completed expeditiously because aluminum matting (AM-2) did not seem to be as durable as had initially been thought.

(C) Normally larger amounts of supplies would be moved by rail; however, in 1965 only 30,201 short tons of cargo of all types were moved by this method.[588] This was due to several factors, the most important of which was VC interdiction. Constant sabotage made it impossible to rely on rail service for any massive military transport requirements. In addition, severe floods washed away many tracks in the I and II CTZ's and repair was very difficult because of VC actions.[589] Even though December showed a marked reduction in railway sabotage incidents (56 percent less than November), there was no indication that this would become a trend. Only with a greater degree of security could meaningful rail capabilities be projected.[590] US military cargo was moved over the Vietnamese railroad system for the first time in October 1965. At that time, the railroad was open from Saigon to Bien Hoa, Nha Trang to Phan Rang, and Da Nang to Hue. Maximum rail capacity at the end of the 1965 was approximately 1,000 tons of military cargo per week over short routes.[591] The development of the railroad could materially reduce the dependence on coastal shipping or intra-theater transport.[592] (For the status of the railroad at year's end see Figure II-14.) In mid-December, CONUSMACV was approached by Vietnamese officials who suggested that the US take over operation of the railroad on a rental basis. At the end of the year, no decision had been made.

(S) Over-the-road transport of supplies, normally a major method of logistic movement, was also limited in SVN. Outside of major cities, convoys were always subject to ambush and many of the road nets were interdicted by the VC. In addition, many of the roads in SVN were not of suitable construction or quality for substantial military traffic. At the end of 1965, Route 1, the major north-south artery, was closed in Quang Ngai, Binh Dinh, Phu Yen, Khanh Hoa, Ninh Thuan, Binh Thuan, and Dinh Tuy provinces. Route 9 was closed in Quang Tri province and Route 14 in Kontum, Pleiku, and Quang Duc provinces. Route 19 was closed west of Pleiku; Route 7 in Phu Yen province, and Route 11 in Tuyen Duc province. Interprovincial Route 1 was closed in Binh Duong and Phuoc Long provinces, and Route 20 in Long Khanh and Lam Dong provinces. Provincial Route 10 was closed in Hau Nghia province.[593] The limited availability of the highway net precluded the use of non-divisional truck companies in

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their normal long-haul mission. Therefore these truck companies were used largely in support of port and beach clearance efforts within the US/FWMAF enclaves.[594] (See Figure II-15 for location of major highways.)

(S) During 1965 a total of slightly over one million tons of cargo was moved by road, mostly on a short-haul basis.[595] Truck capabilities available to COMUSMACV at the end of 1965 included 15 1/3 non-divisional truck companies under USARV and five non-divisional truck companies under CG, III MAF.[596] This provided an optimum daily capability of 15,360 short tons of cargo and 2,400,000 gallons of POL movement on a short-haul basis.[597] This capability was augmented to a limited extent by divisional organic vehicles and some commercial contracts.[598]

(S) With the lack of reliable land LOC's, there was a general reliance on airlift for much of the logistical movement capability. During 1965, aircraft cargoes included live stock as well as ammunition. This was especially true in case of supply of small, isolated, detachments and for emergency resupply of units engaged in combat operations. The major source of aircraft was the 315th Air Commando Group operating C-130 and C-123 aircraft. Other aircraft notably the USA and RAAF (Royal Australian Air Force) Caribous, were also used extensively. During December, cargo aircraft moved a total of 40,744 tons of cargo, making a total of 250,834 tons for the year.[599] Without this airlift capability, many of the USMACV detachments could not have been supported. In December, CINCPAC ordered an increase in C-130 aircraft, bringing the average daily availability of this type of aircraft from 22 to 29.[600] Figure II-16 shows the airfields in RVN capable of accepting C-130 aircraft and Figure II-17 shows the total cargo moved in-country by all means during this year.

Base Development

(S) The only lasting solution to the supply congestion problem was port and base development. This program was hindered in 1965 by lack of funds, lack of construction equipment and material, and lack of necessary trained engineering troops.

(S) In November 1964, the USMACV J4 briefed the US Ambassador on plans for construction of a new jet airfield at Chu Lai, just south of Da Nang, and an additional parallel runway at Da Nang airstrip. This briefing was the starting point for major US base development in SVN. In December 1964, SECDEF approved construction of the second jet airstrip at Da Nang and an expeditionary airfield at Chu Lai.[601]

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(S) In order to develop US bases in SVN, substantial real estate requirements were generated. During 1964, there were no major US base complexes in SVN. Construction efforts were intended to support advisors and to provide necessary facilities for expanding USAF base requirements in support of VNAF and contingency missions. Real estate acreage requirements were minimal, although some 150 requests for land usage were processed.[602] During 1965, by way of contrast, 347 requests were submitted.[603] The US owned no land in SVN. All facilities were either leased from private owners or provided by the GVN. In the case of government land, the RVNAF Deputy Chief of Staff, Logistics (DCSLOG), JGS, was asked to provide the required acreage for US use. Normally, authority was granted by letter, with no time limit. If there were squatters on the land, the US paid the cost of indemnification and relocation. In the case of privately owned land, the government purchased the required land and was reimbursed by USMACV. Title was retained by the GVN even though USMACV paid the bill.[604] This system was relatively effective as long as small plots were involved and time was not a factor. Some of these transactions took up to nine months to complete.[605]

(S) With the date set for the arrival of a USMC regimental landing team at Chu Lai on 7 May, the real estate situation became even more acute. Several thousand US troops were scheduled to come ashore with the mission of constructing an airfield, and, as of two weeks before their arrival, no arrangements had been made to obtain the necessary land area.[606] The problem was solved on an expediency basis by sending two USA captains from HQ USMACV, an engineer and a finance officer, to inspect the required land with Vietnamese provincial officials. These officers covered an area of 24 sq kms and negotiated with the owners on the spot, paying indemnification for everything there, "each fruit tree, each banana tree, rice paddy, thatched hut and grave."[607] This involved payment of some $620,000 to 1,800 different property owners. These indemnification negotiations took place in a nominally VC-controlled area ten days before the Marines landed. Assistance in kind (AIK) piasters were used for the indemnification payment.[608] These piasters are generated by GVN from the sale of goods given to GVN through USAID. GVN furnishes AIK piasters for certain US requirements such as real estate for military installations and BEQ/BOQ's.

(S) The real estate procedure followed in the case of Chu Lai was unsatisfactory. It placed the US in the position of appearing to buy land, which actually was not the case, since the payments made were for indemnification only and the GVN retained title. Also, sufficient AIK piasters were not available to finance future projects. Discussions took place on the ambassadorial level and Prime Minister Ky agreed, in July, that the GVN should be responsible for

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all land acquisition, funding for payments, and relocation of owners. The land involved was to be furnished for the use of USMACV at no cost to the US. Funds were to be provided from the GVN budget.[609,610]

(S) By September, details of the program had been worked out by GVN and a firm procedure established for land acquisition necessary to support US and FWMAF. All tabulation of owners, decisions on amount of indemnification and actual payments were being made by GVN with no overt US participation. Procedures had also been established for emergency procurement of land before proper indemnification procedures could be set in motion.[611]

(S) As planning got underway for massive base development in Vietnam, COMUSMACV was faced with the problem of how payment for the necessary construction material and civilian construction effort could be made. By April 1965, carry-over funds available consisted of some $33 million for the most part from MAP and Military Construction (MILCON) appropriations.[612]

(S) Following the April planning conference at PACOM, a world-wide reprogramming by all services made an additional $37.0 million available for construction needs in SVN. An additional $74.9 million became available for the FY 65 supplemental appropriation. 1966 appropriations included $12.6 million from the regular funded budget and $89.9 million under the so-called Table "A" from the second special Vietnam war appropriation.[613] Total funded construction appropriation for 1965 and 1966 totalled $214.2 million by 31 December 1965.[614]

(S) COMUSMACV was not satisfied with the funding procedures; additional flexibility was desirable and construction funding was not under a wartime criteria. He felt that the responsible commander should have the authority to shift funds and reprogram projects as dictated by the situation on the ground. One of the basic problems was that funds were allocated by Congress for specific projects and, in some cases, for parts (line items) of projects. As a result, the field commander had very limited prerogatives in reacting to rapidly changing situations.[615,616,617,618]

(C) COMUSMACV's recommendations on construction funding made to SECDEF on 28 November 1965 were:[619]

1) Immediately fund the balance of the construction program to include overruns from FY 65 and FY 66 approved funds in the amount of $696 million. This was essential because of

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long lead times of procurement for material and contractor services.

2) Ease the then current line item authority and funding restrictions.

3) Change the construction reprogramming system to provide additional flexibility.

4) Establish country-wide bulk funding for the majority of the program, with provisions for an adequate contingency fund.

(TS) The initial reply to these recommendations was:

> You can't get action if you don't have Congressional authorization and you can't get it when Congress is out of session unless we anticipate our needs and get a blanket authorization. We are talking about a tremendous construction program--you just can't take care of these things over night. We have to look ahead and handle these future problems. Congress does not, and should not, give a blank check. We have to have items in the sense of reasonably defined projects...620

(S) Evidently, considerable additional planning and restatement of requirements had to be made before COMUSMACV could expect receipt of funds for his construction program.

(S) Although there was little time for planning, a lack of trained personnel, insufficient funds and limited availability of material, significant progress was made by COMUSMACV in initiating a construction program during 1965. The magnitude of the effort may be judged by comparing the construction efforts at the beginning and the end of 1965. At the beginning of the year, total construction effort available to COMUSMACV was the 2,000 personnel hired by the civilian firms of Raymond-Morrison-Knudsen (RMK) and Brown-Root-Jones (BRJ) (operating under the supervision of the OICCVN) and the limited capability of local Vietnamese contractors. At the end of 1965 there were 15 military engineer battalions (USA, USN and USMC) in-country and the RMK-BRJ payroll had grown to more than 22,000 workers.621

(TS) The USMACV construction effort was directed toward three major goals during 1965:622,623,624,625,626

1) The construction of tactical airfields to support 2d AD, 1st MAW and USA aviation units in-country with provisions for future contingency plans. Major airfields undergoing improvement were TSN, Bien Hoa and Da Nang. Jet-capable expeditionary airfields were completed at Chu Lai and Cam Ranh Bay; one was under construction at Phan Rang and one was planned for Tuy Hoa.

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Numerous other airfields were under development for USA aviation, resupply and deployment purposes. SECDEF indicated that he was considering two additional airfields of the expeditionary type. There was also the possibility that a third strip might be added to those expeditionary airfields already under construction.

2) The construction of ports and depots to support major logistical elements at Saigon, Da Nang, Cam Ranh Bay and Qui Nhon with other less extensive port construction throughout the country.

3) Construction of cantonment and logistical facilities in support of major troop concentrations, such as the 1st Cav Div (AM) establishment at An Khe.

(U) Soon after the need for base development became obvious, COMUSMACV made the decision that decentralization of effort was required. It was impractical, and an unnecessary duplication of effort, to have a large planning board at the HQ USMACV level, since the component commanders actually received the funds through service channels, and would have to carry out any program approved. The USMACV J4 Base Development Branch, Engineer Division, served as an approval agency for COMUSMACV to assure proper coordination of base development between component commanders.[627,628]

(U) Component commanders were charged by COMUSMACV for base development responsibility as indicated:[629]

1) ACC: Base development responsibility for the II, III, and IV CTZ's to include specific planning for Saigon-Cholon, Vung Tau, Cam Ranh Bay, Nha Trang, Pleiku, Kontum, Can Tho, Soc Trang and Vinh Long.

2) NCC: Base development responsibility for the I CTZ to include specific planning for Quang Ngai, Chu Lai, Da Nang and Hue.

3) AFCC: Base development responsibility for airfield development to include TSN, Bien Hoa, Nha Trang, New Can Tho, Cam Ranh Bay, Qui Nhon and Phan Rang.

(C) COMUSMACV also decided that, as a matter of policy, no component command cantonment construction would exceed Standard IV, that is, tents with wooden frames and concrete floors. This would result in equivalent living conditions for all assigned troops and maximize use of available manpower, equipment, and supplies.[630]

(S) The base development effort during 1965 started at Chu Lai. As part of the initial planning for jet-capable expeditionary airfields, a site had been selected at Qui Nhon. In late September, PACAF cancelled construction at this location because of the

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excessive amount of earth moving required and recommended that Tuy Hoa or Phan Thiet be selected as an alternative.[631,632] During October, a CINCPAC-directed coastal survey team recommended that Tuy Hoa be selected as the best available location with logistic support provided from Vung Ro.[633] After much staff discussions over priorities for airfield construction, COMUSMACV convened a joint board to determine when and where the airfield should be built.[634, 635,636,637] On 1 December, the board recommended that Tuy Hoa be selected as the site for the airfield to replace Qui Nhon. Construction, however, could not be started until late in the first quarter 1966.[638] Phan Thiet was eliminated because of overriding difficulties in construction and future support.[639] COMUSMACV concurred and notified CINCPAC, who approved the new site and directed transfer of funds from the discarded project at Qui Nhon.[640,641] Tuy Hoa was thus scheduled to become, in 1966, the fourth jet-capable expeditionary airfield in-country.

(U) Figure II-18 shows the locations of large construction projects at year's end. Figure II-19 shows the port facilities under construction at that time.

(TS) By 31 December there was a construction backlog of 212 battalion-months.[642] It was evident that, during 1966, construction efforts would continue to expand at an increasing rate to meet the ever-growing US troop requirements. (For the year end status of each base under development see Annex F, Base Development.)

Military Assistance Program

(S) In addition to providing logistical support for US troops, COMUSMACV was also charged with administering the MAP. All combat service support for RVNAF was financed through this program. MAP for RVN was conceived in terms of training, motivating, and equipping the RVNAF to enable them to create a secure climate within which the GVN could increase control over its territory and people. Long-term MAP plans envisaged that, when a stable and viable GVN was created, the emphasis would shift toward creating a strong RVNAF which would be able todefend the nation from either internal or external aggression and, militarily to aid allied nations if necessary. A peculiar characteristic of the MAP for RVN, because of the nature of the conflict, was its direct involvement in, and support for, unconventional and psychological warfare activities, civic action programs, and the mission of paramilitary forces such as the CIDG.[643]

(S) The original FY 65 MAP for RVN, totaling $214.9 million, was based on plans in the Military Assistance Planning Reference Book, RVN, which was approved by COMUSMACV after coordination with

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the country team in RVN, and published by CINCPAC on 21 August 1964. On 23 January 1965, DOD approved Alternative 1 force increase, which programmed an RVNAF total strength of approximately 596,000 for FY 65.[644] A revised cost outlay included an additional $87.4 million.[645]

(S) Before FY 65 ended, the dollar level of the FY 65 MAP stood at $372.3 million, an increase of $70 million, caused largely by price changes, increased communication requirements, equipment add-ons, and packing and crating costs in support of Alternative 1. The FY 65 MAP provided RVNAF with material and training support; developed and maintained military and supporting logistical bases; assisted RVNAF in conducting an aggressive land, sea and air offensive against the VC on a national basis; and supported the GVN's Rural Construction Program.[646]

(S) COMUSMACV clearly saw that the increase in the tempo of the war logically led to the need for an additional increase in RVNAF strength and thus a corresponding increase in the MAP. An adjustment was also necessary for the FWMAF program, particularly with reference to forces of the ROK and the Philippines. The MAP had to be a flexible instrument to cope with the changing complexity of the war. The FY 66 MAP, as projected by the August 1964 plan, totaled $181 million, excluding $19 million for packing and crating. On 29 November 1964, CINCPAC requested COMUSMACV's submission of $30 million in additional requirements, to raise the FY 66 MAP to $230 million, for congressional presentation. In addition to a 2 December 1964 requirement list totaling $30 million, COMUSMACV forwarded another list totaling $70 million on 22 December. FWMA support costs were additionally estimated at $22 million.[647]

(S) By May 1965, changes in the FY 66 MAP were again necessary. The accelerated activation of Alternative 2 force increase, which had been submitted to CINCPAC on 5 April 1965, required revision of the FY 66 MAP planning to cover the force buildup. In addition to personnel costs this plan included funding for the buildup of stockage levels of ammunition and other consumables, the construction of additional facilities, the modernization of equipment, and increased support for an anticipated high level of war expenditures. This resulted in a MAP value of $505.2 million, an increase of $305.2 million over the initial program level of $200 million.[648] After review and revision, CINCPAC submitted a $481.7 million MAP for RVN to the OSD.[649]

(S) The MAP dollar value at the end of May, $493 million, was decreased by $7 million of undistributed International Military Assistance funds. However, additional requirements, totaling $75 million, raised the MAP dollar value to $561.2 million by

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the end of August.[650] Owing primarily to the programmed costs of equipping ARVN with M-16 rifles and also necessary support for the ROK forces, the FY 66 program level stood at $761.7 million as of 31 December 1965.[651]

(S) The significant point concerning the MAP during 1965 was that the RVN continued to receive priority for operational requirements. Only one major area, the modernization of VNAF, was not handled as a COMUSMACV requirement. However, COMUSMACV's recommendations regarding VNAF were treated favorably by CINCPAC and DOD. Following COMUSMACV's updating of Joint Strategic Objectives Plan (JSOP) 70 to JSOP 71 on 10 September, a more realistic force structure was developed and forwarded to CINCPAC and JCS on 16 September. This force structure included 12 ARVN divisions, with support elements, additional artillery battalions, and miscellaneous units. In view of this force increase, the adjustment of operating costs by new experience factors was necessary. By 27 September the FY 67 MAP was estimated to require $795.4 million, or $322 million more than the May projected level of $437.7 million.[652]

(S) Subsequent to this estimate, COMUSMACV undertook a personnel acquisition study. As a result, the "armed" RVNAF force structure for FY 67 was reduced to ten divisions plus one separate regiment. The formation of an artillery battalion and other miscellaneous support units was also delayed. Should acquisition of manpower permit, activation of additional units in accordance with JSOP-71 would be requested. The personnel strength programmed for the FY 67 MAP was 675,298 including 350,042 RF/PF personnel.[653] This can be contrasted with the 631,457 supported by the FY 66 MAP.

(S) Based on this revised force structure, an adjusted FY 67 MAP was computed at $715.1 million in early November 1965. In the meantime, CINCPAC had sent COMUSMACV a message on 5 October, providing the following reasons for the great concern by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs (OASD/ISA) over the proposed increase:[654]

1) New construction of the type requested should be eliminated.

2) Long lead time items such as LST's and LSM's were not considered appropriate.

3) Future MAP should include no further investment costs, only operating costs.

4) Additional requirements over the FY 67 program must have valid justification.

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5) Ability to attain revised FY 67 program in-country was suspect.

(S) COMUSMACV responded to CINCPAC on 7 October, providing further detail and rationale for the proposed FY 67 increases. He advised that the new requirements were based on the assumption that JSOP-71 would be approved as recommended, and that additional forces contained therein were necessary to accomplish the US objectives in SVN. CINCPAC was further advised that if overriding considerations imposed limitation on FY 67 RVN MAP requirements, additional guidance was required in order to permit COMUSMACV to arrange priority within limits.[655]

(S) On 18 November OASD/ISA advised CINCPAC and COMUSMACV that the FY 67 RVN MAP budget ceiling was established at $633 million. This total was based on SECDEF planning guidance which assumed, for budget planning only, that the VN inventory was to be phased down from combat to normal levels at the beginning of FY 68. The data for the $633 million FY 67 VN MAP was furnished to the military departments for inclusion in the DOD FY 67 budget estimates. No data changes could be made to the $633 million program until after the congressional presentation material was prepared. CINCPAC advised COMUSMACV on 20 November that OASD/ISA guidance precluded submission of his program of $715.1 million to DOD at this time. On 24 November the CINCPAC message was acknowledged with the assumption that neither budget ceiling nor phase-down from combat to normal levels would limit delivery of FY 67 programmed requirements. It was also pointed out that the planned transition from combat to normal levels was considered valid only for ammunition resupply and major item attrition. The range of situations conceivable in the post-hostilities period would require RVNAF forces, in being, highly active and adequately equipped for the numerous tasks vital to ensure enduring success.[656,657]

(S) In summary, 1965 was a turbulent year for programming military assistance requirements. Military assistance plans and programs had to be adjusted to accommodate accelerated requirements and increased force structure. With regard to the MAP funding, investment costs generally paralleled the force increases, and could generally be estimated and planned with reasonable accuracy. The operating costs, however, fluctuated with the level of operations in SVN, hence, as combat and related activities increased, so did the requirement to support the economic and military effort. The year 1965 was a unique year for MAP. There never was, nor could be, a static program--no matter how well estimated and planned. In spite of the rapid acceleration of the battle in SVN, the MAP was quickly adjusted to respond to the requirements for fighting the war.

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RVN Defense Budget

(U) USMACV reviewed the RVN Defense Budget for 1965 and US Mission approval was received in late 1964. However, on order of the Ambassador, due to the political situation existing at the time, the budget was not released to the RVN until 13 January 1965.[658]

(U) The Budget approved by the US Mission totaled 26.0 million piasters of which 9.1 billion or 35% was financed with AID generated piasters (CIP & PL 480), and 16.9 billion piasters were provided from RVN resources. Of the total, 67% was for military pay and allowances. The USMACV received 1.554 billion piasters from the budget for support of US forces.[659]

(U) At the time of review and approval of the 1965 Defense Budget it became apparent that a major revision would be necessary due to the RVNAF force increases (Alternatives I & II) being considered by USMACV and the RVN. Development of a revised budget began on 6 March 1965 when guidelines for budget preparation were furnished the RVN Ministry of Defense.[660]

(U) The proposed budget revision was received from the RVN in May and June, and USMACV and the US Mission completed review and approval on 12 July. The revised 1965 Defense Budget totaled 30.4 billion piasters of which 10.5 billion, or 34%, was financed by AID and 19.9 billion was RVN financed. Of the total, 63% was for military pay and allowances. USMACV received 2.257 billion piasters from the revised budget for support of US forces.[661]

(U) Guidelines for the 1966 RVN Defense Budget were developed by USMACV and approved by the US Mission on 11 September 1965.[662] The 1966 budget proposed by the RVN began to be received and USMACV review began in November. By 31 December, all of the chapters of the proposed budget had not been received from the RVN and review and US Mission approval could not be accomplished until 17 January 1966.

(U) The 1966 budget was developed in an atmosphere of austerity in an attempt to limit its inflationary impact on the VN economy and yet provide optimum support to the maximum force levels within VN manpower resource capabilities.[663] During October-December 1965, USMACV participated with USAID, the US Embassy, and the RVN in detailed studies of budget requirements and effects on the local economy.[664]

(U) The 1966 budget approved by the US Mission totaled 35.0 billion piasters of which 13.6 billion, or 39%, was AID financed and 21.4 billion was VN financed. Of the total, 74% was for military pay and allowances. The USMACV would receive 2.5 billion piasters from the 1966 Defense Budget for support of US forces.[665]

Comptroller Advisory Efforts

(C) The Joint Financial Management Team,[666] which was represented on the RVN side by the Director General for Finance and Audit, Ministry of National Defense; the Director General for Budget and Foreign Aid; and on the US side by USAID, USMACV J3, and Comptroller, ceased to function as a unit after December 1964. The purpose of the Team was to resolve financial problems and streamline financial procedures in the Rural Construction Program. The Team was unable to function, despite the fact[667] that COMUSMACV considered it to be a great asset to the pacification effort, because of the tacit opposition and continuing negative responses on the part of the two RVN agencies involved.

(U) In June 1965 it was agreed between the Comptroller and the J3 that better results would be obtained by J3 assuming full responsibility for the financial aspects of the Rural Construction Program. An officer space was transferred from the Comptroller to the J3.[668]

(C) After the loss of responsibility in the Rural Construction Program, much greater Comptroller emphasis was placed on pay, audit, and general financial programs. The orientation of the Comptroller's field advisory effort at year's end was in that direction. It was obvious that there are significant and continuing difficulties in this regard. A few examples illustrate this forcefully: continuing complaints with regard to slowness of payment of RF/PF; complexity of personnel procedures for conscripts and enlistees; and problems in paying death gratuities. In many instances, although sufficient money was available for vital programs, the agonizing slowness in accomplishment clearly indicated serious constraints to effective budget execution in both high and low places.

(C) During the latter part of 1965 special emphasis was given to advising the Audit Division of the Office of the Director General for Finance and Audit, RVN. Within this area, emphasis was placed on visiting VN regiments and Training Centers to insure that troops were being paid on a regular basis. In the 25th ARVN Division, for example, a special audit was performed of all the regiments and separate administrative units. Payment time for new recruits was reduced from three months to one month through adoption of new procedures and vigorous follow-up. Timely death gratuity payments were also strongly emphasized resulting in a drop in payment time from above two months to under two weeks with many payments within five days.

(U) The advisory effort at the RVN Finance School was responsible for eliminating duplicate financial training in RVNAF. The school effort was redirected from an average of three classes in

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session to a program for 1966 of over six classes in session at one time.

Logistic Staff Changes

(U) The shift from a purely advisory role, to what was in effect a joint logistical staff for a theater of operations, resulted in several functional changes for the USMACV J4.[669]

(U) During early 1965, technical service advisors within HQ USMACV were assigned to the DAML. DAML was a separate staff agency operating under the staff supervision of the J4. Within the J4 organization, there was no pure technical service representation. As a result, the J4 was forced to rely upon DAML for technical assistance in the preparation of contingency plans and general assistance in planning for the Phase I buildup. In the spring of 1965, a staff study was prepared by the Deputy Chief of DAML, recommending that his organization become an integral part of the J4. This change would give the J4 a technical staff, eliminate a special staff agency and provide COMUSMACV with a single point of contact on all logistical matters.[670] COMUSMACV approved this study, and on 1 May, the J4 was reorganized to include the personnel and functions previously assigned to DAML.[671]

(U) Additional logistical consolidation was effected in July when the Corps logistical advisory teams were established as independent agencies reporting directly to the J4. Before this, they had been under the command of the Corps Senior Advisor.[672]

(C) A programmed reorganization of the staff logistical function was pending at year's end. Because of the different areas of major importance, and problems in staff supervision thus created, it was proposed to establish three deputy J4's: one for US logistics, one for RVNAF and FWMAF assistance and one for engineering. This decentralization of authority would enable the MACV J4 to better manage his diverse and extensive staff activities. In late 1965, implementation was pending approval of the newly proposed JTD.[673]

(TS) Along the same lines, the JCS recommended, on 4 December, that a major general, US Army Corps of Engineers, be added to the USMACV staff as the assistant chief of staff for construction. His function would be to supervise all engineering and base development within the RVN. This recommendation would add an augmentation of some 70 men to the joint staff.[674] COMUSMACV preferred that the then existing command and staff arrangements remain in effect. As a counter proposal, COMUSMACV recommended consolidation of all construction programming under his headquarters. This was expected to

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result in a more effective operation to include the pooling of all construction resources.[675] In spite of this position, CJCS, again urged acceptance of a "construction czar" to relieve the heavy load on the J4 and nominated Brig Gen C. H. Dunn (major general designate) for the position.[676] COMUSMACV still did not concur and stated that he thought the USMACV J4 should be upgraded to the rank of major general and perhaps be designated as an engineer position.[677] During this period, COMUSMACV convened a board of officers at his HQ to examine all facets of the situation. This board concurred in COMUSMACV's position and said that the J4 should remain in overall charge of the construction field as it could not be separated from the other logistical problems of transportation and real estate.[678] COMUSMACV's position was summed up on 10 December when he stated the belief that the on-the-scene commander was in the best position to determine the most suitable staffing for the HQ.[679] In another message, on 18 December, CJCS continued to recommend the appointment of the "construction czar" and stated that, as the effort in SVN was in excess of one billion dollars, and more than half of the total worldwide Army Engineer construction program, a powerful organization was necessary. Moreover, a construction coordinator, of the rank envisaged, would provide complete flexibility in authorizing, funding, and conducting the MILCON program in SVN. It was also mentioned that the experience and competence of the recommended individual would be recognized at the highest level, and that without his appointment it was doubted that the flexibility desired by COMUSMACV in the construction program would be granted.[680] Although this situation had not been resolved by the end of the year, it appeared that the USMACV staff soon would have a new member.

(FOUO)A description of the development of logistics during 1965 would not be complete without reference to the construction of a new USMACV HQ.

(C) On 31 March 1965 a conference was conducted by COMUSMACV relative to the construction of a new headquarters complex. The USMACV staff was scattered all over Saigon, creating serious problems in communications and security as well as making staff coordination cumbersome and time consuming. Several suitable sites were considered and the consensus was that a new headquarters complex should be constructed within the RVNAF JGS compound.[681] Maj Gen Minh, CINCRVNAF, recognized the desirability of locating the USMACV HQ in close proximity to the RVNAF HQ, but did not agree with this particular site because he felt that it might indicate a "takeover" by the US.[682] A site near the entrance to the JGS compound was selected instead and was approved by JCS on 31 July. Further study revealed that the small size of the site would require construction of a multi-story building and the time to construct such a facility would be excessive.[683] After further study by the staff during the summer, a new concept was developed in October. This was approved

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by COMUSMACV and submitted to the JCS. The study recommended that the new headquarters be constructed at Camp Petrus Ky, an RVNAF compound, and that an immediate release of design and construction funds be made in order to assure occupancy as soon as possible.[684] The JCS endorsed the project and CINCPAC authorized $300,000 for design funds. By the end of the year a construction sum in the amount of 7.8 million had been approved, with the remainder to be included in the FY 66 supplemental budget. Site clearing operations began on 5 December. By the end of calender 1966, it was planned that COMUSMACV would have available the physical plant necessary to meet his headquarters consolidation objective.[685,686,687]

(S) During 1965 the most pressing major logistical problem was establishing a base from which sustained combat operations by the US and FWMAF could be conducted. Although the base was by no means complete by year's end, COMUSMACV had made significant progress and no combat operation had failed or been delayed because of lack of adequate logistical support. At the end of the year, COMUSMACV considered the port situation, to include the resultant supply backlog, to be his single most serious problem.[688]

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CHAPTER III

THE STRATEGY

INTRODUCTION

(C) In early 1965, military operations in the RVN were conducted essentially by RVNAF with US advice and support. The RVNAF were guided basically by RVNAF Plan AB 139, published in December 1964, which delineated how the war should be conducted in 1965.[1] This plan was prepared in direct support of the Chien Thang ("Victory") Pacification Program which had been initiated in February 1964 and continued in effect during 1965.[2] (See USMACV 1964 Command History, Chapter III).

(S) During the early months of 1965, the major effort of COMUSMACV's unilateral planning activity was devoted to the development or modification of US/SEATO contingency plans. With the decision to commit US combat forces in SVN in early 1965, a modification of one of these plans, Operations Plan (OPLAN) 32-64 (Phase II, RVN, which provided the basis for meeting counterinsurgency requirements),[3] was necessary. Modifications to this basic plan continued during the first half of the year as adjustments to the changing situation became necessary. However, in mid-1965, with the impending massive buildup of US forces in RVN as indicated by the President's decision of 28 July, it became necessary to formulate an overall plan which would clarify the missions and deployment of the various forces. In response to this need, the USMACV Concept of Operations was prepared and published on 30 August.[4] This overall plan, in conjunction with AB 139, thus provided the basic strategy for defeating the enemy.

RVNAF PLAN AB 139[5]

(C) This plan provided the objectives and missions for the various branches of RVNAF in terms of 1) defense of lines of communication and strategic bases, 2) harassment of VC bases and lines of communication, 3) surveillance of border and coastal areas and 4) support of the Pacification Program. (See Table III-1 for missions assigned to the various components.)

(S) The defense of LOC's and strategic bases was a basic responsibility of the respective corps commanders. Primarily using the RF, the corps commanders would defend the LOC's by:

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1) Determining the routes to be protected and assigning priorities,

2) providing protective measures to include: collection of route intelligence, ambushes along feeder routes, disruptive operations into nearby VC bases, defoliation along routes, establishment of New Life hamlets at population centers along the routes, defense of bridges and check points, and

3) providing convoy protection to include: air cover, quick reaction troops, irregular march tables, fire support and communications and control.

(S) In the defense of strategic bases, the corps commanders would:

1) determine bases to be protected and assign priorities,

2) establish security zones 4,000 meters wide (81-mm mortar range) around the area; within this zone conduct continuous patrols and ambushes to thwart VC attacks,

3) establish strong points within the security zone,

4) exercise population control to destroy the VC infrastructure,

5) conduct offensive operations against VC forces and bases,

6) establish ground intelligence nets, and

7) develop detailed defense plans.

(S) Corps and division commanders shared the responsibility to harass the VC bases and LOC's. They were to employ primarily ARVN and CIDG forces but would also use RF as necessary. Continuous harassment of VC bases and lines of communications was essential in order to keep the enemy on the defensive and impede his movements. The objective: to disrupt, disperse and/or destroy VC main force units, bases, and command and control. Priorities were to be established to insure proper utilization of resources. Harassment operations would be planned in terms of the following three phases:

1) The collection of intelligence would be a primary requirement in the early stages of planning but would be continued throughout all stages. Teams would be deployed to infiltrate the VC area, gather intelligence, guide raiding parties

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and direct artillery and close air support onto targets.

2) Harassment actions were to be marked with aggressiveness and surprise and conducted against limited objectives. Targets were to be attacked with the appropriate use of artillery, airpower and heliborne striking forces. Special Forces, Ranger, Artillery and Air Force elements primarily were to be employed in this phase until the bases or LOC's were neutralized.

3) In the last phase, an arrangement was to be made, such as the establishment of a base of operations or the organization of a combat intelligence network to prevent the VC from re-using the bases or LOC's.

(S) The surveillance of border areas was a corps commander's responsibility, employing ARVN and CIDG forces for this purpose. Given that a continuous defense system of the long and rugged borders of RVN was infeasible, a system of border control camps appeared to be the most practical means to survey the border areas and to block infiltration. To carry out this mission, corps commanders were to:

1) locate infiltration routes leading into SVN and VC LOC's within SVN,

2) establish border control bases to block each main route along the frontier; the CIDG-manned bases were to be interconnected so as to minimize VC alterations of their routes,

3) conduct continuous combat patrols and reconnaissance operations between bases,

4) conduct continuous air reconnaissance of the border,

5) conduct raids along the VC LOC's leading into the interior, and

6) provide heliborne reaction forces to reinforce CIDG camps.

(S) The surveillance of the coastal areas was a VNN responsibility in coordination with the pertinent corps commander. Junk force bases were to be established to block main suspected infiltration routes and coordinated with ground force counterinfiltration forces along the coastal regions. VNN authorities were to:

1) determine the techniques and routes used by the enemy in sea infiltrations,

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2) establish bases along the coastlines to block infiltrations and prescribe areas of responsibility for junk divisions operating from these bases,

3) prescribe sea and air patrol areas, "no fishing" zones, no transit zones, and contiguous land areas in which counterinfiltration operations would be conducted, and

4) establish coordination between land and naval forces.

(S) The execution of military actions in support of the pacification program was a corps commander's responsibility and would be accomplished in two phases: restoration of security and development. The restoration of security phase consisted of two subphases: in the clearing subphase, ARVN forces were to be primarily used, assisted by the RF, in clearing an area of organic main force enemy units. In the securing subphase, RF, PF and NP forces were to stabilize the area by:

1) destroying the VC infrastructure as it was reorganized,

2) providing security for the people and maintaining law and order,

3) protecting the GVN infrastructure, and

4) defending key installations and LOC's.

In the development phase, military and security forces would gradually improve their effectiveness in performing similar missions as in the securing phase.

(S) Specific corps priorities were as follows: I Corps-pacify coastal area inland to the railroad; II Corps-pacify key base areas, LOC's and vital coastal areas; III Corps-pacify the Hop Tac I area; IV Corps-pacify key base areas and districts. The VNAF was expected to provide air support to each corps to include air reconnaissance and air strikes, required airlift, and air defense of SVN. The VNN was to defend RVN's waters and vital waterways and provide coastal defense against sea infiltration and naval support within CTZ's and protect the RSSZ.

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COMUSMACV CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS[6]

(S) The first formal concept of operations for the employment of US forces in RVN, published on 30 August 1965, described the military operations and force deployments necessary, in conjunction with RVNAF, to eliminate the VC/NVA threat and establish GVN control over the nation. Discussed below are the operational concepts; the force deployments are described in Chapter II.

(S) In mid-1965, a precarious situation existed in the RVN: a series of victories scored by the enemy seemed to have deeply affected the morale and outlook of RVNAF personnel and the government installed in June 1965 had not yet had the opportunity to dispel the feeling of political uncertainty among the people. However, the entry of US combat forces into the conflict began to manifest itself, particularly by the outstanding success of operation STARLIGHT (Chu Lai area, 18-21 August 1965). The President's 28 July announcement that the US would commit additional massive military forces in SVN necessitated an overall plan clarifying the missions and deployment of the various components. COMUSMACV's Concept of Operations was prepared to fulfill this need.

(TS) COMUSMACV's objective was to end the war in RVN by convincing the enemy that military victory was impossible and to force the enemy to negotiate a solution favorable to the GVN and the US. To secure these objectives, US/FWMA forces would be built up and then employed to wrest the initiative from the enemy, secure vital areas and support the GVN in expanding its control over the country.

(TS) The concept visualized a three-phase operation:

Phase I - The commitment of US/FWMA forces necessary to halt the losing trend by the end of 1965.

Phase II - The resumption of the offensive by US/FWMA forces during the first half of 1966 in high priority areas necessary to destroy enemy forces, and reinstitution of rural construction activities.

Phase III - If the enemy persisted, a period of a year to a year and a half following Phase II would be required for the defeat and destruction of the remaining enemy forces and base areas.

(TS) Following this three-phased program, US/FWMA forces would be removed from SVN as GVN became able to establish and

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maintain internal order and secure its borders.

(TS) The overall concept was based on three assumptions:

1) That the VC would fight until convinced that military victory was impossible and then would not be willing to endure further punishment.

2) That the CHICOM's would not intervene except to provide aid and advice.

3) That friendly forces would maintain control of the air over RVN.

(TS) Specific military tasks were associated with the objectives of each phase.

Phase I:

"1) Secure the major military bases, airfields and communications centers.

2) Defend major political and population centers.

3) Conduct offensive operations against major VC base areas in order to divert and destroy VC main forces.

4) Provide adequate reserve reaction forces to prevent the loss of secure and defended areas.

5) Preserve and strengthen the RVNAF.

6) Provide adequate air support, both combat and logistic.

7) Maintain an anti-infiltration screen along the coast and support forces ashore with naval gunfire and amphibious lift.

8) Provide air and sea lifts as necessary to transport the necessary but minimum supplies and services to the civil populace.

9) Open up necessary critical lines of communication for essential military and civil purposes.

10) Preserve and defend, to the extent possible, areas now under effective governmental control."7

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Phase II:

1) All Phase I measures.

"2) Resume and/or expand pacification operations. Priority will be given to the Hop Tac area around Saigon, to that part of the Delta along an east-west axis from Go Cong to Chau Doc, and in the provinces of Quang Nam, Quang Tri, Quang Ngai, Binh Dinh and Phu Yen.

3) Participate in clearing, securing, reserve reaction and offensive operations as required to support and sustain the resumption of pacification." 8

Phase III:

1) All Phase I and II measures.

"2) Provide those additional forces necessary to extend and expand clearing and securing operations throughout the entire populated area of the country and those forces necessary to destroy VC forces and their base areas." 9

(TS) Tactics and techniques applicable to the general tasks associated with the military operations were as follows:

1) Security of base areas - US ground combat forces would be employed in such a role, frequently in conjunction with RVN forces. Area and close-in security to prevent infiltration and sabotage would be necessary. Every effort would be made to secure an area 4,000 meters outward from the base by a defensive belt, saturation patrolling, and aggressive surveillance and intelligence, beyond the range of the 81-mm mortar.

2) Offensive operations against VC bases and forces - Again, US ground combat forces would be employed in such a role, frequently in conjunction with RVN forces. Frequent incursions into VC base areas would be necessary to render them useless to the VC and destroy forces which persist in maintaining them. Intelligence, quick reaction forces, blocking forces, fire and maneuver, and relentless pursuit would all have to be actively utilized to insure the destruction of the VC forces.

3) Defense of critical population and political centers - Such a mission could be anticipated on occasion, particularly when RVNAF was unable to defeat the threat. Techniques to be employed would be similar to those outlined for the security of base areas, referred to above.

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4) Provision of reserve reaction forces - Such a quick reaction mission could be anticipated throughout RVN as a normal requirement for US forces in supporting the defense of bases, other critical areas, and in relief of other heavily committed forces. To counter anticipated VC ambushes, surprise, firepower and other counter-techniques would be employed. Command and control of combined forces would necessitate maximum use of prior planning and US advisors as liaison officers.

5) Pacification operations - US ground combat elements would conduct clearing and securing operations in order to extend secure areas around bases and population/political centers, as the initial steps in pacification. Clearing would remove the VC presence from the area; securing would prevent subsequent return. Following this, the other phases of pacification would be conducted, with US forces providing assistance to the program which would be under GVN control. These other phases would include elimination of VC infrastructure, recruiting and training of PF and local officials, and other programs necessary to establish a pacified area.

(U) Detailed concepts, tasks, and force requirements were developed for each phase in each CTZ.

Phase I

I Corps Concepts and Tasks (TS)

1) III MAF would continue the development and protection of secure base areas at Hue-Phu Bai, Da Nang and Chu Lai to prevent VC attack and conduct offensive operations in conjunction with ARVN I Corps to destroy VC forces and resources.

2) The established TAOR would be modified only as required by the subsequent situation.

3) Unilateral (with RVNAF liaison), coordinated, or combined ground operations would be conducted by III MAF.

4) Such ground operations would include search and destroy, clearing, attack on VC units or bases, day and night combat and reconnaissance patrols and ambushes to find and eliminate VC forces, bases, resources, and political-military apparatus.

5) Reserves would continue to be provided for exploitation purposes.

6) A vigorous rural construction program would be emphasized by III MAF and RVNAF. The destruction of VC and protection of the

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populace would be stressed; seizure of terrain was not an objective in itself. Thus, operations would concentrate on heavily populated areas to clear villages and hamlets in the coastal region. Such operations would require maximum mobility, discriminatory use of firepower, and flexibility in adjusting to the situation in the particular area of operations. Close control of firepower would be maintained to minimize destruction of potentially friendly life and property. RVNAF, particularly RF/PF, would be used to the maximum for securing villages and hamlets. III MAF's major contribution would be in the fields of civic action, psychological warfare, and intelligence. Overall security would be provided by vigorous offensive action to preclude the dissipation of III MAF combat units in a static security role. Security would include land LOC's within the coastal region.

7) Efforts would be made to establish combined command arrangements in which RVNAF forces would be placed under the operational control of US commanders during specific operations.

8) Offensive and defensive tactical air operations would be conducted to include close air support, interdiction, reconnaissance, air superiority, air transport, search and rescue, and others as required in the effort to defeat the VC. III MAF aviation units would devote priority support to III MAF forces; excess resources would be made available to the 2d AD in supporting other forces.

II Corps Concepts and Tasks (TS)

1) Establish and secure major bases at Qui Nhon and Cam Ranh Bay and the minor base at An Khe. Reserves for quick reaction to the VC attack would be located at each base.

2) Conduct offensive operations in coordination with RVNAF to destroy VC bases and forces operating from brigade home bases or forward operational bases at Pleiku, Kontum, Cheo Reo or Ban Me Thuot.

3) Assist RVNAF in defending province capitals, key district towns and in securing land LOC's by conducting reaction operations.

III Corps Concepts and Tasks (TS)

1) Establish and secure operational bases to include the major base at Bien Hoa and brigade bases at Ben Cat and Phuoc Vinh.

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2) Conduct offensive operations to destroy VC bases and forces thereby relieving pressure on the Hop Tac area.

3) Assist RVNAF in defending province capitals and key district towns by conducting reaction operations.

IV Corps Concepts and Tasks (TS)

No US/FWMAF deployments were scheduled for IV Corps; hence these concepts and tasks were applicable only to RVNAF:

1) Establish and defend bases at Can Tho, Vinh Long and Soc Trang.

2) Conduct offensive operations to destroy VC bases and forces.

3) Prevent the loss of province capitals and key district towns.

Phase II

I Corps Concepts and Tasks (TS)

With the increase of USMC forces in SVN to two full divisions plus supporting elements, III MAF would be expanded to a corps-sized HQ. However, because of the undesirable connotation associated with the label "corps" (see Chapter II), the HQ would remain III MAF rather than redesignated Marine Amphibious Corps.

1) First priority would be given to extending the three secure base areas of Hue-Phu Bai, Da Nang and Chu Lai into one contiguous area encompassing the entire coastal region of Quang Nam, and Quang Tin Provinces and the southern half of Thua Thien Province, followed by operations to secure the remainder of the coastal region of Thua Thien and the northern half of Quang Ngai Province. III MAF would assume the dominant role.

2) RVNAF, assisted as required by III MAF, would then secure the coastal regions of Quang Tri Province and the remainder of Quang Ngai. Land LOC's in these coastal regions would be secured and improved.

3) A continuous program of reconnaissance and surveillance would be conducted into the piedmont and mountain regions. Search and destroy, clearing, and attack operations would also be conducted to assist in the final defeat of the VC and the extension of GVN authority throughout I CTZ.

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4) Every effort would be made to extend III MAF operational control over ARVN units.

5) Continuing effort would be made to improve the RVNAF, increase their role in Phase II operations, and insure their ability to maintain control over I CTZ upon conclusion of Phase II.

II Corps Concepts and Tasks (TS)

1) Expand GVN control particularly in the heavily populated coastal areas.

2) US forces would conduct offensive operations to destroy VC bases and forces, ROK forces would provide base security, and ARVN forces would conduct clearing and securing operations to expand GVN population and area control.

3) Route 19 and portions of Highway 1 would be kept open to insure their continuous use as LOC's. Other LOC's would be opened as necessary.

4) Conduct offensive operations against VC base areas particularly in Binh Dinh and Kontum Provinces.

III Corps Concepts and Tasks (TS)

1) Implement the Hop Tac plan to clear, secure, and pacify its defined area. US/FWMA forces would assist by operating as a buffer between the Hop Tac area and the VC and conducting continuous offensive operations into War Zones C and D.

2) Protect the critical base of Bien Hoa.

3) Provide reserve/reaction forces in support of US/FWMA and RVNAF forces throughout SVN.

IV Corps Concepts and Tasks (TS)

At the time of its publication, the plan visualized no commitment of US combat units in IV Corps except temporary use of reaction forces from other CTZ's.

1) Continue expansion of GVN control particularly in the area between the Bassac and Mekong Rivers.

2) Continue to secure Can Tho, Vinh Long and Soc Trang and defend province capitals and key district towns.

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Phase III

(TS) It was expected that the following would have been accomplished during Phases I and II: the initiative would be regained in certain areas; heavily populated regions along the coast, around Saigon, and between Saigon and the Mekong would have been pacified; and offensive operations would have destroyed or neutralized a considerable portion of the VC main force.

(TS) If the foregoing should have failed to convince the enemy to halt the insurgency, an intensified campaign would be conducted to clear the entire country of his forces and pacify all areas. Operations against NVN and infiltration through Laos would be integrated with this effort. US forces would concentrate on the destruction of enemy forces, although some US/FWMA forces would be needed for continued base security. RVNAF would assist in this destruction but would devote the major portion of their effort to the military tasks of the pacification program.

Special Forces Concepts

(TS) Detachments would be committed to:

1) Further develop Montagnard forces, thereby reducing ARVN requirements in the highlands.

2) Expand the DELTA project so as to improve target acquisition capabilities.

3) Establish CIDG camps on the perimeters of War Zones C and D, thereby containing the VC.

4) Improve surveillance of the Cambodian border by increasing CIDG camps. Act as sector/subsector advisors in these locations so as to release USMACV advisory teams for deployment to critical interior provinces.

5) Establish new CIDG camps in I CTZ to extend GVN influence westward in that CTZ.

6) Develop the CIDG multi-purpose reaction force (MRF) to reinforce CIDG camps in each CTZ.

7) Form APACHE Scout Teams from CIDG assets for support of US forces.

8) Increase counter-infiltration operations in SVN.

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Naval Support of Phase I and II

(TS) The discovery of a VC supply ship in Vung Ro Bay on 16 February 1965 (see Chapter II) represented a major turning point for naval operations in SVN. It provided the impetus for MARKET TIME, a USN operation begun in March 1965 to provide coastal surveillance for the prevention of enemy infiltration by sea. The basic concept of this operation was to establish USN patrols offshore to detect such infiltration attempts and support and advise the VNN within their territorial waters in interdicting coastal traffic infiltration. Legal constraints permitted only VN personnel to board and search suspect vessels and then only when within the 12-mile limit unless flying the RVN flag, in which case boarding and searching were permitted anywhere.[10]

Phase I (TS)

US Forces

1) Patrol Ships - COMUSMACV recognized, in his concept of operations, that, even with the MARKET TIME program, the objective of positively preventing infiltration would require an excessively large number of vessels. Hence the objective was modified to make infiltration so costly to the enemy that he would cease his attempts to do so. This would be accomplished by raising the likelihood of detecting an infiltrator from the mid-1965 estimated probability of 30 percent to an end-1965 probability of 50 percent. Increased forces would be positioned to cover the center of the RVN coastline inasmuch as coastal lanes at the 17th parallel and the Gulf of Thailand appeared to be sealed.

2) Air patrols - Such patrols were established to augment the sea patrols. Patrols along the entire coast with a leg 60 miles offshore and supplemented by a night flight were considered essential. Additionally, an as-required patrol south of Hainan Island to detect southerly movement from the north was necessary. Additional resources would be necessary to improve close-in coastal surveillance and detect and react to night infiltration.

3) Base facilities - An expansion of facilities would be necessary to support the Phase I increase in forces.

4) Naval gunfire support - Increased requirements for naval gunfire would result from the buildup of US forces ashore and the need to harass and destroy VC forces and bases along

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the coastline which were the beneficiaries of the infiltration effort.

5) Intelligence - Waterborne and overland infiltration of men and supplies from Cambodia into RVN was suspected. In addition, it was suspected that such men and supplies were being moved by water or overland into Cambodia. However, no intelligence effort had been established to introduce agents into Cambodia, consolidate and centrally direct GVN resources, and improve border surveillance to detect and prevent such infiltration. Thus, such a program would be established.

6) Harbor Control - To improve coastal surveillance at the entrance of the Mekong-Bassac rivers and to provide security at the entrance of the Saigon River, a control post would be established at Vung Tau.

Improvement of VNN Forces

1) Sea, river and coastal forces - These forces were scheduled for expansion to enhance their operational missions. Supplemental construction measures would be necessary, however, to meet prescribed goals of the coastal (junk) force.

2) Offshore water control - Establishment of forbidden zones and curfew hours was essential to the coastal surveillance operation. Procedures in effect either were inadequate or were being inadequately enforced. Hence, the following zones would be established to accomplish the objective: prohibited areas in which only naval vessels would be allowed; no-fishing zones in which only transiting would be permitted; curfew areas which would include the entire coastline of RVN out to three miles and in which any vessel found in the time between 2030 and 0500 would be captured or destroyed; protected anchorages for fishermen at night, and fishing convoys which would be checked and escorted to and from fishing areas, particularly in the Mekong coastline area.

3) Coastal force equipment - Improvements in armament, detection devices and ancillary equipment would be required.

4) MARKET TIME communications - Additional equipment would be necessary to improve coordination and control of operations.

5) Security on the Mekong River - A program for detecting infiltration of supplies by vessels transiting the Mekong River was not in force. Surveillance teams would be placed aboard each vessel to inspect and secure cargoes.

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6) Cambodian border river surveillance - Waterborne infiltration from Cambodia between the Mekong River and Gulf of Thailand necessitated adequate surveillance. Thus patrols equipped to detect, halt and inspect such traffic would be established to reduce this threat. In addition, physical barriers would be constructed or the alternatives of free-attack zones and various anti-intrusion devices would be established to accomplish the overall objectives.

Phase II (TS)

US Forces

Surveillance of VC-held coastlines - Coastwatcher stations consisting of fixed and mobile stations would be employed to maintain such surveillance.

Combat and Logistical Air Support

(S) The Cdr, 2d AD, had the mission of conducting and coordinating offensive and defensive air operations, tactical airlift, air traffic control, search and rescue operations, close air support and reconnaissance operations in and out of country and exercised overall air defense responsibility within RVN.[11] His capabilities for executing these missions would be improved as follows:

In-Country Air Strike Requirements (TS)

Increased sorties, and hence increased forces, would be required in order to provide an improved air surveillance/reconnaissance program; added air support for the increase in numbers and activities of FWMAF and to meet an increased level of enemy activity.

Airlift Operations (TS)

An in-country air LOC would be established, necessitating increased airlift resources and bases, controlled by a single manager. Air traffic control facilities would be essential to minimize the increased flight safety hazard caused by increased usage of minimal airspace by a wide range of air operations. Communications would be expanded and improved. Airfield improvements would be necessary to permit the operation of C-130's for delivering troops, supplies and equipment from designated bases. Major marshalling/logistical airfields, secondary marshalling/logistical airfields, tactical employment airfields, and combat emergency landing zones would be required.

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Reconnaissance Requirements (TS)

An increase of Side Looking Airborne Radar (SLAR), infrared (IR) and visual reconnaissance requirements would be expected. USAF in-country requirements would increase to support additional forces in-country. Out-of-country requirements would also increase in order to maintain existing day reconnaissance capability, establish a night and all weather capability and increase Electronic Counter Measures (ECM) capability to a satisfactory level.

Rural Construction/Pacification

(C) The goal of the Rural Construction Program was to extend GVN control over the land and people of the nation by neutralizing the efforts and influence of the VC, encouraging the people to develop an allegiance to the RVN and to provide the means by which socio-economic conditions could be improved. All activities within the Rural Construction Program were to emphasize the central position of the GVN: the GVN was to pacify and all other forces and agencies simply would support the GVN in its plans and efforts. COMUSMACV's concept of his role in this program was thus defined in terms of advising, assisting and supporting the GVN. At the end of the year, in a revision of the GVN pacification plan, national and regional priority areas were established for pacification to insure realistic and attainable objectives (see later discussion in this chapter).

Concepts and Tasks (TS)

Phase I

1) Strengthen GVN's pacification at the national, corps and province level by improving their organization and assisting in the preparation of a realistic plan.

2) Improve US inter-agency coordination to insure a more effective contribution to the GVN program. Thus, the senior US tactical commander, acting in his role as advisor to the ARVN corps commander, would coordinate with USAID and JUSPAO representatives when furnishing advice and support related to the pacification program. These senior commanders would also provide assistance to GVN in handling refugee relief problems.

3) Follow-up in areas where pacification programs had begun to produce results in order to provide resources to insure continued progress.

4) Revitalize the Hop Tac program.

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5) Expedite the establishment of pacification programs in I, II, and IV CTZ's.

6) Develop a practical plan for security of the rural population and formation of the "Home Guard"[12] at hamlet level.

7) USMACV additionally would assist by reforming operating procedures and organization for pacification cadre, expanding GVN's ability to identify and eliminate the VC infrastructure, improving resources control measures and developing a political awareness among the rural populace.

8) As part of the NP, the National Police Field Forces (NPFF) would be formed to react to low level VC subversion and terrorism and execute an effective Population and Resources Control Program.

Phase II

Expand pacification operations rapidly into those areas newly cleared by military operations, capitalizing on VC waning interest as their military situation became more temuous.

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

(C) The objectives of US psychological operations (psyops) in SVN in early 1965 were: 1) to create, build and maintain confidence in the GVN, 2) to establish a climate of national unity behind the war effort, and 3) to expose the true nature of VC objectives and induce disaffection among VC and their supporters. In accordance with these objectives, USMACV's role consisted of advice and assistance to the RVNAF psywar structure from the JGS to sector level. The RVNAF's psywar goals were: 1) to boost the morale and encourage the sense of patriotism of its personnel, 2) to gain the loyalty of the rural population for the GVN, 3) to increase enlistments into the RVNAF and to control desertion, 4) to support combat operations, and 5) to lower VC morale and encourage defections under the Chieu Hoi program.

(C) With the introduction of massive US forces in SVN it became necessary to relate the commitment of these forces to the need for countering the mounting efforts of the VC. It was a further objective to explain the limited purpose of the US commitment and forestall communist charges of "colonialism" and "imperialism."

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(C) A sensitive element of propaganda strategy also involved maintaining the delicate balance in the highlands among RVNAF commanders and GVN officials, US Advisors and units (particularly Special Forces teams), and the Montagnard tribes. One objective was to dispel GVN suspicions that the US was trying to establish special relations with the Montagnards; a second objective was to improve GVN-Montagnard relations.

(C) The infiltration of major NVA units into SVN called for in-country propaganda, which included the VC as a target audience. Its theme was that the presence of major NVA units in SVN proved that the VC did not represent a national VN movement but were merely the instruments of foreign aggressors. The propaganda strategy also stressed that increases in the enemy's strength would be outmatched by the massed power of SVN, US and its Free World allies.

(C) Toward the end of 1965, JUSPAO developed a new National Psychological Operations Plan which redefined the broad objectives of US/GVN propaganda as follows:

1) to convince the SVN citizenry that the GVN ultimately would win against the VC and that they would be best advised to support the ultimate victor.

2) conversely, to impress upon the VC that they could not expect to win against the SVN populace, whose struggle for peace, security and independence was supported by the US and other FWMAF.

3) to create hope that the then current social revolution would produce a dynamic nation responsive to the will and aspirations of the people, and capable of finding VN solutions to VN problems and to encourage the citizens to active, personal and emotional identification with the RVN's quest for peace, humanity, social justice and a vital national identity.

4) conversely, to inform the people that NVN and the VC offered nothing but alien schemes which were oppressive and reactionary, have failed in all their endeavors and are, in fact, merely the tools of an international conspiracy and CHICOM imperialism; and to inspire the people with contempt for the VC who exposed the nation to death, destruction, misery and oppression, and who opposed the creation of a truly VN social order and the preservation of Vietnamese values and traditions.

(C) Propaganda directed at NVN audiences was initiated in April 1965; it explained US bombings of communications routes and

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warned the people to stay away from military targets. These objectives were expanded in the US Mission Three-Month Plan (15 July-15 October) as follows: 1) to warn the NVN people to stay away from installations likely to be hit, 2) to inform the NVN citizenry of the necessity of bombing at the root of the infiltration apparatus which the NVN government operates and also to place the blame squarely on the NVN regime and the Lao Dong Party, and 3) to create disaffection among the NVN citizenry with the NVN regime/Lao Dong Party by informing them of what their leaders have inflicted on SVN and how their leaders had persistently rejected the efforts of the GVN and its friends for a peaceful settlement and how slavishly their leaders acted towards their CHICOM masters.

(C) In a second Three-Month Plan, effective 15 October, a somewhat harder line was taken by substituting the following for objectives 2 and 3 cited above: to convince the NVN regime and people that the so-called liberation war in SVN was futile, that defeat in SVN was inevitable, and that unification, a common aspiration of both NVN and SVN, could be achieved only through peaceful means; and to create disaffection among the NVN citizenry with their government by informing them of the true nature of the aggressive war in SVN and relating their hardships and privations to the continuation of the war, and to stress that their government had rejected every effort made to find a peaceful solution and to suggest to the NVN population various passive resistance measures they might take individually against their government.

RVNAF PLAN AB 140/US-RVNAF PLAN AB 141

(C) A milestone was reached in December 1965 with the publication on 15 December of RVNAF Plan AB 140, basically a revision of AB 139 as required to support GVN's new rural construction program, and the combined US/RVNAF Plan AB 141, published on 31 December. This latter plan, the first US-RVN venture into combined planning, would set the stage for the military campaign in the new year that lay ahead.

RVNAF JGS Directive AB 140

(C) RVNAF JGS Directive AB 140 was the basic GVN military plan to support the 1966 rural construction plan. It was developed in coordination with the Ministry of Rural Construction and USMACV and was in consonance with the Joint Campaign Plan. The plan consisted of the basic directive and eight annexes. The basic directive included priority areas, both national

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and corps. National areas were to receive first priority and were to be cleared, secured, and development initiated in 1966. Corps priority areas were to be cleared, secured and developed to the extent of the capabilities in 1966. Corps commanders were given specific instructions to concentrate their efforts in the high priority areas and to provide military support to the rural construction program.

(C) Annex F, concept on the use of forces, listed those basic tasks for FWMAF and showed roles and missions of ARVN forces, RF, PF, NP, and CIDG in the three phases of rural construction. Annex G provided guidance and information on controlling and protecting natural resources. Annex I provided guidance on psychological operations and civic action which should be accomplished in the three phases of rural construction; placed a psywar battalion and a civic action company in direct support of each corps, directed that psywar and civic action annexes be prepared to support rural construction; and emphasized the requirement for coordination between tactical units, psywar and civic action agencies, and rural construction cadre.

RVNAF - MACV Campaign Plan AB 141

(C) The Campaign Plan established the basic mission of RVNAF and US/FWMA forces - to defeat the VC and extend GVN control in RVN. The plan established intermediate goals to accomplish the mission. Each corps commander, commanders of CMR, VNN and VNAF in coordination with their US/FWMAF counterparts, were given specific tasks which amplified and defined in detail the general tasks.

(U) The Campaign Plan consisted of the basic plan, maps depicting areas in each corps that were to be brought under GVN control in 1966, and four annexes: The Intelligence Annex, an annex outlining procedures for coordination of RVNAF and US/FWMAF operations, the Communications and Electronics Annex, and a Distribution Annex.

CONTINGENCY PLANS

(C) At the beginning of 1965, there were 15 contingency plans, the preparation for which General Westmoreland, in his three-hatted role as COMUSMACV, COMUSSEASIA (D), and CCRSFF (D), was responsible (see Table III-2).[13] A brief discussion of the objective(s) of each of these plans and new plans which evolved is contained in this section.

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(TS) COMUSSEASIA OPLAN 1-64 was a US General War plan for SEASIA in support of CINCPAC OPLAN 1-(Yr). The mission of the SEASIA Command was to conduct defensive and offensive operations in defense of SEASIA, in coordination with available Allied Forces, in order to hold as far forward as possible, insure friendly control of SEASIA, and contribute to the defeat of the Sino-Soviet bloc. Change 1 simply updated the plan.[14] No other changes were made during 1965.

(C) CCRSFF OPLAN 4-64 was a SEATO Plan with a restricted security classification.

(TS) COMUSMACV OPLAN 32-64 (Phase II, RVN) was a US plan to conduct counterinsurgency operations in the RVN in support of CINCPAC OPLAN 32-64 and SEATO OPLAN 7-(Yr). These US plans were applicable to operations short of general war and visualized four phases:

Phase I - Alert (in effect on 1 January 1965).

Phase II - Counterinsurgency (US unilateral action in RVN, Laos and Thailand).

Phase III - Overt NVN intervention.

Phase IV - Overt CHICOM intervention with or without NVN intervention.[15]

The Phase II, RVN, portions of these plans were essentially implemented by the US buildup during 1965, although on a larger scale than planned. No further revisions were therefore considered necessary.[16]

(TS) COMUSSEASIA OPLAN 32-64 (Phase III & IV) was actually two plans, one for each of the phases discussed above in support of CINCPAC OPLAN 32-64 and SEATO OPLAN 4-64. Two changes were issued during 1965: Change 5, published on 16 February, revised the staffing of COMUSSEASIA headquarters resulting from the phase-out of MAAG Vietnam in May 1964, and the requirement for a USMACV "stay behind" staff in Saigon in the event of activation of COMUSSEASIA headquarters. Change 6, published on 1 November as Annex I (Air Operations), provided guidance for the coordinated employment of the air resources of COMUSSEASIA with ground and naval operations.[17]

(TS) COMUSMACV/THAI OPLAN 33-63 provided for the employment of US forces in support of overt military operations against NVN in retaliation for specific communist insurgency

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activities in SVN and Laos. The US participation would be covert, but would include air strikes and support of raids by indigenous personnel in NVN. The plan provided a flexible means for directing operations against selected targets in NVN in order to attain the effect desired by higher authority.[18] This plan was superseded by COMUSMACV OPLAN 37-65, 4 March 1965.

(TS) COMUSMACV OPLAN 34-64 provided for USMACV advice and assistance to RVN on a covert basis to allow the RVN to engage in covert psycholgoical operations against NVN and to conduct hit-and-run attacks against selected targets in NVN in order substantially to increase the costs to NVN for its involvement in subversion and insurgency in SVN and Laos.[19] This plan was superseded by Annex X (Operations Support) to COMUSMACV OPLAN 37-65 on 21 September 1965.

(C) COMUSMACV OPLAN 34A-64 was a Special Operations Plan and is not discussed herein because of its restricted security classification. It was also superseded by Annex X, COMUSMACV OPLAN 37-65 on 21 September.

(U) COMUSMACV OPLAN 37-64 is discussed on page 163 of the USMACV 1964 Command History. This plan was also superseded by COMUSMACV OPLAN 37-65 on 4 March 1965.

(TS) COMUSMACV OPLAN 38-65 was a US plan for the defense of SEASIA, in support of CINCPAC OPLAN 38-64. Primary emphasis was placed on air and naval power to conduct operations against NVN and CHICOM forces in SEASIA as part of an overall plan to conduct military operations against those same forces in both SEASIA and Communist China.[20] No changes were made to the plan in 1965 as it was considered basically impractical and duplicatory.[21] The plan was redesignated COMUSSEASIA OPLAN 38-65 during the year (see Table III-3).

(TS) COMUSMACV OPLAN 39-65 was a US plan in support of CINCPAC OPLAN 39-65 for the employment of US forces, in conjunction with available Allied Forces, to conduct limited war contingency operations against Communist China and NVN in the defense of SEASIA. Preemptive offensive or counter-offensive operations might be made using air and naval forces with minimal ground forces to deter, prevent, or cause cessation of CHICOM aggression.[22] The plan remained basically unchanged during the year except for redesignation as COMUSSEASIA OPLAN 39-65 (see Table III-3).

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(C) COMUSMACV OPLAN 60-64 was a plan for the emergency evacuation of US and US sponsored non-combatants.[23] With the increasing concern that implementation of the plan was imminent early in the year, Change 4 was published on 11 January expanding the deployment of BLT's of the 9th MEB to TSN, Bien Hoa, Nha Trang and Da Nang instead of the single location at TSN as had been required previously, and tasking USASCV to prepare a helicopter evacuation plan in support of the basic oplan.[24] Following the implementation of a modified version of the plan in February, a revision was prepared, incorporating lessons learned from the evacuation, and published in September as COMUSMACV OPLAN 60-66 (see Table III-3).

(C) COMUSMACV OPLAN 61-64 was a plan for the physical security of critical US installations in SVN. Change 1 was published in early January to provide for more stringent security measures at all USMACV units and installations and the classifying of security conditions to permit maximum dissemination and implementation of instructions.[25] At the end of the year this plan was awaiting supersession as a result of the publication of USMACV Directives 380-8, 9 July, subj: Military Security - Physical Security, and 380-13, 3 December, subj: Military Security - Security of Key US Personnel.

(U) COMUSMACV OPLANS 98-64 and 98-64A are discussed on page 163 of the USMACV 1964 Command History. These plans were superseded by COMUSMACV OPLAN 37-65 with Annex X during the year, on those dates previously mentioned.

(U) During 1965 several new plans were developed to cope with the ever-changing situation. These plans are discussed below.

(TS) COMUSMACV/SEASIA OPLAN 22-66, a plan prepared in support of CINCPAC OPLAN 22-66, awaited approval at the end of year. It was a US plan to provide military assistance in the event of revolutionary outbreaks in NVN. It envisaged a three phase operation:

Phase I - Planning, training, intelligence, psywar and covert and overt activities.

Phase II - All measures short of direct US intervention.

Phase III - All measures including direct US intervention. Military and paramilitary forces from SVN and active and passive groups from NVN would be employed.[26]

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(TS) COMUSMACV OPLAN 37-65 was initiated in 1964 in support of CINCPAC OPLAN 37-65. The plan was published in March 1965 and superseded a number of other COMUSMACV OPLANS. The plan provided for the employment of US forces in conjunction with RVNAF for the purpose of halting NVN support of communist insurgent forces in RVN and Laos by the application of selected military pressures on Laos, Cambodia and NVN.[27] Annex X (Special Operations), which superseded several other COMUSMACV OPLANS as previously mentioned, and Change 1, minor revisions, were published in September and November, respectively.

(S) COMUSMACV's submission for Annex J to JSOP-71 was forwarded to CINCPAC on 10 September. It was based on the ultimate withdrawal of US/FWMA forces from RVN and represented a significant increase in projected RVNAF strengths over the 1964 submission. The more significant changes included:

(1) An increase of two ARVN divisions to a total of 12 in FY 67.

(2) Increase of RF/PF units.

(3) Modernizing VNAF and VNN.

(4) Providing an air defense capability by FY 70.

(5) Establishment of a reserve similar to the US National Guard by FY 71.[28]

(U) Other planning activities of COMUSMACV are discussed in Annex G, J5 Studies.

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CHAPTER IV

THE EMPLOYMENT

INTRODUCTION

(C) In 1965, the mission of US forces in the RVN was to assist and support the RVNAF in their efforts to defeat communist subversive insurgency, and to accelerate effective GVN control over the country. This required that the VC be defeated militarily, or otherwise persuaded to discontinue their efforts to overthrow the GVN.

(C) During 1965, the VC retained complete control over areas of SVN and maintained their grip over other areas by terrorism. This situation called for careful application and conduct of military forces at all times as the people in VC-dominated areas could not always be presumed to be pro-VC. While maximum effectiveness in operations was desirable, a conscious effort was made to minimize noncombatant casualties, requiring a high level of leadership, judgment and restraint not previously expected of US forces. These principles governed the tactics and techniques used in the counterinsurgency efforts of the RVNAF, US forces, and FWMAF.

TYPES OF OPERATIONS

(C) COMUSMACV conducted operations which involved ground, air and naval forces. Ground operations were primarily of three types:

1) Search and destroy - operations in VC dominated territory aimed at neutralizing the enemy's main forces and destroying his supply and operational bases.

2) Clearing - operations in enemy-controlled areas designed to remove permanently those enemy forces remaining in the area.

3) Securing - operations to stabilize and maintain control of a cleared area.

(C) Each of these three types of ground operations was supported, when needed, by reserve/reaction forces. Ground operations were assisted by close air support and artillery fire and, when appropriate, by naval gunfire and B-52 strikes.

(C) Air operations consisted mainly of close combat air support, B-52 strikes, and interdiction operations in SVN and NVN.

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(C) Naval operations consisted of DAGGER THRUST amphibious operations, naval gunfire support, and surface surveillance. The naval air arm had essentially the same tasks as, and was integrated with, the land-based air elements of USAF, USMC and VNAF.

(C) The US forces in SVN during 1965 had a unique challenge. Guerrilla fighting was not really new, but now, for the first time, the American fighting man found himself participating in civic action, in political warfare, advising and teaching—in short, he was helping to pacify, secure and rebuild a nation.[1]

US MARINE OPERATIONS

(C) After the 9th MEB landed at Da Nang on 8 March 1965 (see chapter II), it was primarily engaged in securing its assigned area. A defensive perimeter was formed and aggressive patrol, ambush, and search and destroy operations were conducted within the TAOR. Because of the brigade's limited size, it did not conduct any large-scale combat operations. As the 9th MEB grew in strength, it was redesignated the III MAF in the spring of 1965 and conducted many battalion and larger-size operations.

(C) All operations conducted in I Corps in 1965, whether unilateral or combined USMC/ARVN/VNMC, had a search and destroy mission.[2] The first significant campaign, Operation LIEN KET - 4, began on 28 July. The task force consisted of the VNMC 3d Bn (Rein); the ARVN 3d Bn, 51st Regt; and the US 2d Bn, 4th Marines. By agreement between CG, III MAF, and CG, I Corps, the operation was conducted under the tactical direction of the CO, 4th Marine Regiment.[3] (For a discussion of the scope of tactical direction see chapter II, Combined Command Relationships.) This was also the first land-based combined operation utilizing USMC and ARVN forces.

(C) Operation STARLIGHT, which began on 18 August, was planned when intelligence reports indicated a buildup of VC forces south of the Chu Lai (Quang Ngai Province) TAOR. They were identified as the VC 1st Regt, and an attached infantry battalion, reinforced with 82mm mortars and 57-and 75-mm RR. The operational plan called for BLT 2/4 (Battalion Landing Team, US 2d Bn, 4th Marine Regt) to be heli-lifted to designated landing zones (LZ's), BLT 3/3 to conduct an amphibious assault and BLT 3/7 to remain in reserve aboard the carrier Iwo Jima. BLT 2/4 and BLT 3/3 (-) were to link up with a blocking force consisting of M Co, 3/3 located north of An Trung village, across from the Mai An Ha Peninsula. The operation proceeded as planned. After the link-up, the two battalions swept north, up the peninsula, destroying the VC in their path. The operation ended on 21 August and resulted in approximately 700 VC KIA; it had thwarted an incipient

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attack on Chu Lai. Operation STARLIGHT demonstrated the great value of intelligence gained from the people as a result of civic action efforts and illustrated that a firm, sea-based position, such as Chu Lai, which could not be outflanked, would oblige the VC to mass to destroy it frontally. Thus, it provided a secure base for an air/sea attack on the VC forces.[4]

(U) The Marine victory at Chu Lai was widely applauded by the US press. "American military professionalism is starting to tell in Vietnam," the Kansas City Star said on 19 August. "One victory doesn't win a war for us, but a defeat such as this for the Viet Cong will drive it home to him there are no easy pickings in Southeast Asia," said the Detroit News on 22 August. Mark Watson of the Baltimore Sun wrote, on 24 August, that "this operation is recognized as a true text-book example of an air-sea-land attack under ideal conditions." But James Reston of the New York Times, writing from Saigon on 22 August, said the victory was not "spectacular news" for the Vietnamese people:

> Military victories, particularly at lonely military bases along the coast, will not win the country. In fact, it is almost a cliche to say in Saigon, not only in the American Embassy but even in the American military compound, that while victory at Chu Lai was important and even essential, it will be necessary in the end to win the people in order to win the war.

(C) PIRANHA (7-11 September) was a four-day search and destroy operation on the Bantangan Peninsula, 20 miles south of the Chu Lai TAOR. The plan was similar to that of STARLIGHT, in that it was a combined air-sea-ground campaign using BLT 3/7 as the helicopter landing force and BLT 1/7 as the amphibious force. Intelligence had indicated that two VC main force battalions were stretched across the eight miles of the peninsula axis, but subsequent operations revealed that the enemy forces had withdrawn from the immediate area prior to D-Day. As the assault gained momentum, more and more VC were contacted. Sporadic but spirited firefights resulted in 198 VC KIA, 38 WIA (wounded in action), and 265 VC suspects detained. US Marine casualties were one KIA and eight WIA, an example of the superiority of US forces over the VC.[5] A significant aspect of PIRANHA was that none of the approximately 3,300 dwellings in the III MAF portion of the objective area was destroyed and only 2 civilians were wounded. This was a direct result of troop indoctrination and the prudent use of supporting arms.[6]

(C) Several DAGGER THRUST operations were conducted during the fall and winter, usually with the 7th Flt SLF acting as the amphibious landing force. These operations normally lasted one to two days and were aimed at the destruction of VC installations and capturing or destroying VC personnel and material. Forces consisted

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of both surface and helicopter elements, and were supported by naval gun fire (NGF) and tactical air power. Enemy resistance was usually negligible.[7]

(C) Operation GOLDEN FLEECE was a regimental-size, unilateral operation by III MAF during September 1965. Conducted in the southern portion of the Da Nang TAOR, its mission was to prevent the VC from seizing the newly-harvested rice along the Song Cau Do, Song Yen Song Bau and Song Vian Dien Rivers. GOLDEN FLEECE consisted of search and destroy operations, continuous patrols, and ambushes in the rice harvest area. The operation was highly successful in protecting the farmers during the harvest and denying the rice to the VC. The first of a series of similar operations, it positively demonstrated US/FW/GVN intent to provide security for the rural populace.[8]

(C) Operation BLUE MARLIN was the first combined III MAF/VNMC amphibious operation. In the first phase, one amphibious force would land in the vicinity of Tam Ky village (between Chu Lai and Da Nang in Quang Tin Province), and move south to the Chu Lai TAOR searching for and destroying enemy forces. Upon completion of this operation, the force would reembark upon the transport ships. The second phase would consist of another amphibious assault in the vicinity of Hai An village near the location of the first landing, followed by a search and destroy operation up the coast to the Da Nang TAOR. The forces involved were the VNMC 3d Bn and III MAF BLT's 2/7 and 3/3.

(C) On D-Day (10 November), BLT 2/7 landed as scheduled, and covered the landing of the VNMC 3d Bn. The VNMC battalion conducted search and destroy operations as planned. On D plus 5, the VNMC battalion landed after BLT 3/3, and carried out the second phase. BLT 2/1, 7th Flt's SLF, the landing force reserve, was prepared to land by helicopter, to reinforce or to exploit gains by the landing forces or to provide a blocking force if required. As the operation developed, the expected engagement with the VC did not occur and there was no need for the reserve. The operation ended with negligible casualties in both enemy and friendly forces.[9] The most important aspect of the operation was the exposure of the VNMC to operations with their American counterparts. The operation seemed to increase the confidence of the VNMC and revealed their competence to participate actively in future amphibious operations.[10]

(C) Operation HARVEST MOON was scheduled to last 10 days and began on 8 December. It was an ARVN/USMC search and destroy operation in the Hoip Duc - Que Son - Viet An area in Quang Nam Province. III MAF units consisted of BLT's 3/3, 2/7 and 2/1. ARVN units consisted of 11th Ranger Bn; 1st Bn, 5th Regt; and 1st Bn, 6th Regt. On D-Day, the 11th Ranger Bn was hit by VC forces estimated at one battalion. The VC allowed the Rangar battalion to approach within 20 meters of their positions before delivering a heavy volume of automatic weapons

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and small arms fire. Apparently, no security was provided by the ARVN forces. The VC executed a double envelopment and overran the Ranger battalion. Attempts by the 1st Bn, 5th Regt to reinforce the Rangers were halted by enemy small arms fire and inadvertent friendly air strikes on the ARVN positions. The reaction force, 1st Bn, 6th Regt, was heli-lifted into the battle area while the 1st Bn, 5th Regt maintained its position.[11] B-52's struck suspected VC positions on 12 and 13 December. Areas struck were exploited by III MAF ground units.

(C) BLT's 3/3 and 2/1 met only sporadic resistance during the operation. BLT 2/7 made a significant contact on 18 December toward the end of the operation. In this engagement, the VC 80th Bn suffered at least 105 KIA and lost numerous weapons.

(C) The operation resulted in 407 known VC dead and possibly 636 others. Large quantities of VC stores, equipment and manufacturing installations were captured or destroyed and many tunnels and caves in the battle area were rendered useless.[12] A complete evaluation of HARVEST MOON was still pending at year's end.

(C) During autumn, III MAF units were utilized as reaction/reinforcement forces for several assaulted outposts in the I CTZ. An example was the Song Ve 6-Thach Tru operation, in which elements of BLT 3/7 were dispatched on 23 November to sweep the vicinity of a beleaguered outpost of the ARVN 37th Ranger Bn in Quang Ngai Province. The VNMC 3rd Bn and 413th APC Troop were the reaction forces. USMC/ARVN/VNMC casualties were 71 KIA, 74 WIA and 2 MIA. ARVN reportedly accounted for 300-400 VC KIA for the total operation, but USMC body count confirmed only 175 of these casualties.[13]

(C) During 1965 thousands of night and day patrols, hundreds of ambushes and small unit offensive actions, and scores of battalion and regimental-size operations were conducted by III MAF against the VC. The primary mission of these actions was to seek out, destroy and disrupt insurgent strength. While some operations were spectacularly successful, the objectives of all actions were largely met. As a yardstick of assessment, III MAF expanded from a six square-mile TAOR on 8 March 1965, to a TAOR of 600 square miles by year's end.

(C) As the III MAF's TAOR expanded several new factors arose. First, operations were extending closer to VC dominated territory. Secondly, participating forces became less able to effect mutual support. It was expected that these factors would cause the VC to become more aggressive and employ larger size forces. The forces available to III MAF were considered insufficient to provide the necessary base security, conduct extended tactical operations against the VC and maintain adequate reserves.[14]

(C) The desired solution to this problem was to obtain and

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train adequate numbers of RF/PF to take over the peace-keeping and village security tasks so that III MAF forces could concentrate on offensive actions elsewhere in I CTZ. Until a suitable solution was realized it was considered necessary to limit extension of the TAOR. The expected increase in USMC forces and improvement of the RF/PF situation in 1966, provided hopeful indications that pacification efforts and offensive operations against the VC could be accelerated.[15]

US ARMY OPERATIONS

(U) Early in 1965, as VC forces boldly struck at targets throughout SVN, it was apparent that US Army forces were needed to assist in stemming the tide. The deployment of these forces and their commitment are discussed in chapter II. The overall concepts governing their employment are discussed in chapter III. The missions of USA forces in RVN were: 1) to defend bases vital to US interests; 2) to provide a highly mobile reserve to be used as a reaction force for RVNAF; 3) to search out and destroy enemy bases and storage areas; and 4) to search out and clear selected areas of SVN and assist the GVN in pacification efforts. The 173d Abn Bde, which was the first USA ground combat unit in SVN, initially provided base security at Bien Hoa and Vung Tau, III CTZ. The arrival of the 2d Bde, 1st Inf Div and the 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div freed the 173d Abn Bde from its security roles and allowed it to become a highly mobile reaction force (see Chapt II). The arrival of the remainder of the 1st Inf Div and the 1st Cav Div (AM) opened the way for large scale search and destroy missions, and USA forces shifted from a primarily defensive role to the offensive, a role which they maintained throughout the rest of the year. Discussed below are some of the more significant offensive USA actions during 1965.

(C) During May, and until the latter part of June, the 173d Abn Bde engaged in an almost continuous series of small-unit actions in defense of its assigned TAOR and the air bases. In mid-June, the battalion which had been stationed at Vung Tau rejoined the brigade at Bien Hoa. That, coupled with the arrival of the 1st Bn, RAR, in early June and its attachment to the 173d, gave the brigade three infantry battalions for the conduct of operations.[16]

(C) During the period of 27-30 June, the 173d Abn Bde participated in a large-scale search and destroy operation in War Zone D (see Figure I-8). This was the first time in over a year that friendly forces had penetrated this VC base area and was an important "first" in fulfilling COMUSMACV's concept of denying freedom of action to the VC in these "safe havens". The operation was conducted in conjunction with two airborne battalions of the ARVN Abn

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Bde; the ARVN 48th Regt, and the 1/RAR. It resulted in over 25 VC KIA, 200 tons of food and supplies destroyed and the recovery of approximately 50 tons of rice for distribution by GVN authorities.[17]

(C) On 10 August the 173d, with the 2d Bn, 18th Inf of the 2d Bde, 1st Inf Div, moved to Pleiku, II CTZ, as a ready reaction force for RVNAF units in that area. Earlier in the month the VC had attacked the special forces camp at Duk Co west of Pleiku and, in response, ARVN units were conducting large-scale search and destroy operations in the area. Patrols were conducted around the Thanh Binh Pass area on Highway 19, and on 17 August the 173d provided protection for ARVN units withdrawing through the pass. After patrolling around Kontum the remainder of August, the brigade returned to Bien Hoa on 6 September.[18] Selection of the 173d for this mission was appropriate because of its mission as general reserve for all of Vietnam. The recently arrived brigade of the 101st Abn Div was not yet ready to assume this mission. Selection of the 2d Bn, 18th Inf to accompany the brigade was due to a need to strengthen the 173d with another battalion (the 1/RAR being confined to operations in the III CTZ).

(U) Operation HIGHLAND, begun by the 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div in the latter part of August had the mission of opening Highway 19 from Qui Nhon to An Khe and securing the base area at An Khe to facilitate the deployment of the 1st Cav Div (AM). The brigade planned to accomplish its mission in four phases: 1) move to a forward assembly area near Binh Khe (on Highway 19 between Qui Nhon and An Khe, Binh Dinh Province); 2) open Highway 19 by combat operations to permit convoy movement from Qui Nhon to An Khe; 3) provide continuous convoy security along the highway and secure the base area at An Khe; and 4) relinquish control of the base area to the 1st Cav Div (AM) and return to home base.

(C) Phases I and II were accomplished without incident. During phase III, Operation GIBRALTAR[19] was planned to destroy a VC main force battalion believed to be operating northeast of An Khe. A ground/airmobile operation, it began on 18 September with the landing of battalion elements which were to push forward to the ground blocking force. After two companies landed, however, the VC opened up an extremely heavy volume of fire, causing the remainder of the battalion to abort. The blocking force commander was ordered to move his unit to aid the surrounded force. Another force consisting of US troops and ARVN Rangers was lifted to an LZ approximately 1500 meters east of the battle area. The ground force and the helilifted force were unable to link up before dark. At 0615 the next day link-up was effected and the beleaguered force extracted. Throughout the operation, over 100 tactical fighter sorties were flown and over 11,000 rounds of artillery fired. Although surrounded and outnumbered, the two companies held their perimeter and inflicted heavy losses on the

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VC. Friendly losses were 13 KIA and 44 WIA, compared to VC losses of 226 KIA and 9 captured.[20]

(C) On 1 October the 1st Cav Div (AM) assumed responsibility for Highway 19 and the An Khe base area. The 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div continued to conduct search and destroy operations in the area until that time. Total friendly casualties for operation HIGHLAND were 22 KIA and 108 WIA while the VC lost 261 KIA and 577[21] captured. The brigade closed on its home base at Bien Hoa on 6 September, completing Phase IV.

(C) The VC attack on the Plei Me Special Forces Camp, Pleiku Province, on 19 October triggered a month long campaign by both ARVN and US forces. Operation SILVER BAYONET, conducted by the 1st Cav Div (AM), was designed to provide security and artillery support to ARVN forces around Plei Me. This operation began on 23 October with the commitment of a battalion task force which soon expanded to reinforced brigade strength. On 27 October this force, the 1st Bde, was given a search and destroy mission between Plei Me and the Cambodian border. On 1 November the brigade, having contacted a large enemy force, began to pursue VC/NVA forces west of the Plei Me camp, moving along the SVN/Cambodian border. During this pursuit the VC/NVA forces lost 216 KIA, 117 captured, and 18 suspects detained. Friendly losses were 55 KIA and 194 WIA.

(C) On 14 November, after the 3d Bde, 1st Cav Div (AM), had relieved the 1st Bde in the vicinity of Plei Me and Pleiku, the most significant phase of SILVER BAYONET began. Airmobile search and destroy operations were initiated, which resulted in very heavy and intense contacts with VC/NVA forces. COMUSMACV requested a series of B-52 strikes to support ground operations in the vicinity of Chu Pong Mountain.[22] These strikes were delivered on 16 November (see US Air Opns, this chapter).

(C) Three US infantry battalions were closely engaged, supported by tactical air sorties and artillery. The VC/NVA forces which exceeded division strength, continued active resistance to the US forces from well-entrenched positions. The battle of the 3d Bde against numerically superior VC/NVA forces continued until 18 November in the vicinity of Chu Pong and the Ia Drang Valley. Fighting was often hand-to-hand, with many small units temporarily cut off from their parent organization.

(C) On 20 November, the 2d Bde, 1st Cav Div (AM), moved to Pleiku to relieve the 3d Bde. The VC/NVA had lost 1,286 KIA, 19 captured and approximately 1,000 weapons destroyed or captured. US losses were 217 KIA, 232 WIA and 9 MIA (missing in action).[23]

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(U) In commenting on the action around Plei Me, COMUSMACV stated that the conflict was unprecedented in intensity and the degree of success achieved by friendly forces. He said:

> the performance of the American troops and the Vietnamese have been magnificent. At no time during the campaign have American troops been forced to withdraw except for purposes of tactical maneuver. When the dust of the battlefield settled, the American troops were present to clear the battlefield of killed and wounded, both friendly and enemy. The enemy had fled the scene. American casualties were heavier than any previous engagement but small by comparison with the enemy.[24]

(C) The final phase of the battle around Plei Me began on 18 November, with three battalions of the RVNAF Abn Bde conducting a search and destroy operation west of Pleiku. The operation, titled THAN PHONG 7, made light contact with the VC for two days. On 20 November, a force of unknown size was engaged and over 180 enemy were killed. When the operation terminated on 26 November, there were 265 VC KIA and 10 captured. The ARVN units, which lost 21 KIA and 61 WIA, also captured 49 individual and several crew-served weapons.[25]

(U) Press commentators in the US hailed the results of the Plei Me and Ia Drang operations and discussed the implications. The Washington News said on 30 October:

> Plei Me is not exactly Stalingrad nor the bank of the Marne nor Gettysburg, Pa. It is a miserable collection of huts, trenches and barbed wire in the Vietnam highlands. Yet in a strange way, it may mark a turning point in the Vietnamese war just as surely as did those famous battlefields in other conflicts.

The New York Journal American editorialized on 28 October that Plei Me was

> a big psychological victory for the South Vietnamese and American forces, and a big psychological setback for the enemy. The battle is heartening as an example of the revitalized morale of the South Vietnamese troops that has followed the buildup of American strength.

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The New York Herald Tribune of 19 November said the battle's significance was that "the war is developing more and more into a contest between the armed forces of the United States and those of North Vietnam, with the Communist and anti-Communist units of South Vietnam assuming a correspondingly lesser role". The Newport News Press editorialized in their 23 November issue: "Unhappily, we must face the possibility that Plei Me and the Ia Drang Valley will prove to be the forerunners of more costly actions. . .a lessening of the US military effort could only encourage Hanoi to push harder". The New Orleans Times-Picayune of 22 November said:

> One significant aspect was that the encounter proves conspicuously that at least the portion of Cambodia nearest the battlegrounds is a secure haven for Communist troops. . . .Now, it appears, regular units of the North Vietnamese army are sheltered there despite Cambodian Prince Sihanouk's categorical denials.

(C) On 5 November, the 173d Abn Bde began another search and destroy operation into War Zone D. This operation, named HUMP, marked the fifth time the brigade had been in War Zone D. Three task forces, built around three infantry battalions and one artillery battalion, were formed. These forces had the mission of launching airmobile assaults into the operational area and conducting search and destroy operations to find, fix and destroy VC personnel, supplies and installations.

(C) Intelligence developed before the operation revealed that there was a VC stronghold surrounding the junction of two rivers in the operational area as well as two VC battalions equipped with the latest family of Soviet and CHICOM weapons. Additionally, the VC had the capability to mass approximately 8,500 troops from contiguous areas within 48 hours.

(C) The operation began with two airmobile assaults by the 1st Bn, 503d Inf and the 1/RAR into separate LZ's against light enemy resistance. The two forces then established base positions in their operation areas without any major action. For the remainder of D-Day, and the next two days, the friendly forces conducted search and destroy operations. They found numerous tunnel systems and fortifications as well as several huts but no significant contact with the enemy was made.

(C) On 8 November, acting on intelligence acquired late on D plus 2 that a VC force of unknown size was located approximately 2,000 meters west, the 1st Bn, 503d Inf moved toward the area and made contact at 0800 with a company-size unit engaged by a VC

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battalion. During the ensuing battle fighting was at such close quarters that supporting fires could not be employed on the line of engagement but were used to seal off the battle area. A request for reinforcement from the 2d Bn, 503d Inf, the brigade reserve force, could not be honored due to the lack of helicopters. The VC's repeated assaults against the perimeter of the airborne troops were repulsed with heavy VC casualties.

(C) The main battle ended during the afternoon, with sporadic machine gun and sniper fire on the US units throughout the remainder of the day and night. The 1/RAR, south of the Dong Nai River, contacted a well-entrenched VC force of about 100 men during the late afternoon. During the following fire fight, four VC were killed before the VC broke contact.

(C) On 9 November, the 1st Bn, 503d Inf cut an LZ into the dense jungle through trees up to 250 feet high, to enable helicopters to evacuate the friendly forces. This was completed by 1900 that evening, ending operation HUMP.

(C) Supported by 1,747 helicopter sorties and 117 USAF tactical air strikes, the operation resulted in 403 VC KIA, 200 additional possible KIA and five VC captured. Losses by the US and Australian troops were 51 KIA and 89 WIA.[26]

(C) On 4 November the CO of the ARVN 5th Div requested that the US 1st Inf Div clear and secure Route 13 north of Ben Cat, Binh Duong Province, and provide artillery fire in support of 5th Div operations beginning on 11 November. This request was granted and the mission was assigned to the 3d Bde, 1st Div, which was stationed at Lai Khe, just north of Ben Cat. The 3d Bde further assigned the mission to the 2d Bn, 2d Inf and attached to it an artillery battery; a cavalry troop; Co A, 2d Bn, 28th Inf; and engineer elements. This operation was named ROADRUNNER.

(C) The reinforced battalion cleared and secured Route 13 on 10 November and emplaced artillery to support the movement of the ARVN 7th Regt. Advance parties of the ARVN elements passed through on the afternoon of 11 November and the battalion formed a perimeter for the night. Early on 12 November an estimated VC battalion launched a heavy mortar and automatic weapons attack, followed by repeated infantry assaults against the perimeter. Despite direct fire by artillery from within the perimeter and tactical air strikes, the VC remained in contact for six hours. After coordination with ARVN district officials, a nearby village, which was sheltering the VC, was destroyed by air strikes. Friendly losses were 21 KIA and 103 WIA, with VC losses 198 KIA.

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(C) After completion of operation ROADRUNNER, the 3d Bde was ordered by the CG, 1st Inf Div to conduct search and destroy operations south of the Michelin rubber plantation, Binh Duong Province, from 14 to 17 November to follow up and exploit B-52 strikes scheduled for 14 November. This operation, BUSHMASTER, was later extended to 22 November. Intelligence reports indicated that three VC regiments and a separate VC battalion had base areas in or near the operation area. The operation began on 14 November and continued with sporadic contact until 20 November. Late that day, while friendly elements were conducting a tactical search toward their base areas, they were attacked by VC from a village to their front and from both sides of the road. A perimeter was formed and air strikes directed against the enemy positions. This action resulted in 70 VC KIA. Friendly losses were six KIA and 38 WIA.

(C) BUSHMASTER, which terminated on 22 November, resulted in the capture or destruction of over 100 weapons, 100 tons of rice, and large quantities of ammunition and supplies. In the total operation 277 VC were killed, five captured, and 350 estimated wounded. Friendly forces lost 27 KIA, and 176 WIA. [27]

(U) During the year, as more and more USA combat forces arrived in SVN, the emphasis in USA operations shifted from passive defense of key installations with occasional forays into enemy held territory to small scale search and destroy operations. These search and destroy missions grew from battalion operations to reinforced brigade operations supported by ARVN and other services. In their role as reaction forces, USA forces increased the scale of commitment from company standby reserve to reinforced brigade pursuit operations. By the end of the year continuous USA offensive operations coupled with constant harassment from the air had uprooted the VC from many of their once impregnable strongholds and had caused them to seek new sanctuaries, and increased their vulnerability to further attack. Hundreds of tons of war materiel and foodstuffs were either captured or destroyed. Thousands of VC/NVA troops became casualties, lowering their offensive capabilities and their morale. The enemy lost the initiative in many areas and was faced with increased pressure from USA operations as 1966 arrived.

US NAVY AND VNN OPERATIONS

Market Time

(C) At the beginning of 1965, VNN forces were not sufficient to prevent enemy infiltration of men and equipment by sea. The VNN was furnishing an average of 16 Sea Force ships and 200 Coastal Force junks for coastal surveillance. However, since junks normally traveled in pairs, there was in effect only the equivalent of 100

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junks on patrol each day. This effort was not sufficient to adequately prevent suspected infiltration by sea from NVN.[28]

(S) Due to the inability of the VNN to effectively counter infiltration efforts by the insurgents it was determined that additional help in the form of USN boats, planes, personnel, equipment and facilities was necessary. With this in view a gradual buildup of forces (discussed in Chapter II) and planning for coordinated operations[29] by the USN and VNN began in January 1965. This culminated in the formation of MARKET TIME operations in March. From that point on the USN and VNN became a composite and effective force in the war effort.

(C) Flights conducted by USN SP-2 aircraft during January proved the feasibility of effective communication between US aircraft and VNN patrol units for fast reaction in developing operational and intelligence information. The flights also demonstrated to VNN flight observers that the patrol elements of Sea and Coastal Forces were not carrying out their anti-infiltration mission, a fact long known by CHNAVGP, but not previously substantiated to the satisfaction of VNN authorities. Improvement began shortly after Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (DCNO) VNN observed this evidence first hand.[30]

(C) The major development which occurred subsequent to inception of MARKET TIME was the announcement, during April, of the decision of the SECDEF (see Chapter II) to transfer operational control of MARKET TIME forces from CINCPACFLT to CHNAVGP, as agent for COMUSMACV. The decision was based on NAVGP's location in-country and experience working with VNN plus the direct impact of MARKET TIME on COMUSMACV's responsibilities for the overall war effort.[31]

(C) The Coastal Surveillance Force (TF 115) was activated on 30 July. On that day, operational responsibility for MARKET TIME was passed from CINCPACFLT to COMUSMACV and operational control was assigned to CTF 115 (CHNAVGP). This marked the creation of the US Navy's first command integrating sea, air and shore-based units for the primary mission of countering sea infiltration. CINCPACFLT retained logistic support responsibility for all surface units, through COMSEVENTHFLT.[32]

(C) Prior to 11 May, US personnel participating in MARKET TIME were prohibited from boarding any vessel. But due to pressure on the GVN by CHNAVGP and COMUSMACV authorization was approved by GVN on 11 May for TF 115 forces, to stop, search and seize vessels not clearly engaged in innocent voyage within a zone extending out to 12 miles offshore. Outside that zone, vessels were liable to search with compensation paid by GVN if suspicions proved unfounded. All boarding parties were to be led by a VNN liaison officer stationed on each MARKET TIME vessel. This change in the rules of engagement contributed

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measurably to the efficiency of the patrol by making it unnecessary to call in VNN units to investigate each suspicious ship. Much delay was avoided and both USN and VNN were able to search a larger number of vessels in any given time.[33]

(C) A new type of infiltration ship, reported by a VC captured in June, caused a realignment of MARKET TIME forces to place emphasis on the area from the 17th parallel south to Phan Thiet in Binh Thuan Province. VNN likewise shifted forces to the area where the ship was reported to be located. The information regarding this new type steel hulled ship, motorized, seventy feet long, with a sixty-ton capacity, was of sufficient consequence to expedite the formation of US Coast Guard Squadron One and procurement of Swift boats to combat this type of infiltration ship (see Chapter II).[34]

(C) The RSSZ was the only land area under the control and responsibility of VNN. It was assigned to VNN because of its inaccessibility by land. The RSSZ commander, a Lt Cdr, was placed directly under DCNO (N-3 operations) in July, which was to insure that RSSZ would receive proper attention. Other steps were also taken in July to improve the situation in the VC-saturated area: all ships were forbidden to transit the zone at night, and twice-weekly mine-sweeping operations were begun.[35]

(S) During the November visit of the SECDEF the evaluation of MARKET TIME program was again discussed (as it had been in July, see Chapter II). COMUSMACV included in his November evaluation the resources involved and a general discussion of problems involved in a coastal surveillance system in an area where numerous coastal boats, junks and larger vessels were operating. The difficulty lay in distinguishing the innocent fishermen from the infiltrator. Various regulations were inaugurated such as a curfew, and no junks were allowed in certain areas. Although these regulations were restrictive, they could not be adequately enforced because many fishermen lived in some VC-controlled areas and required access to those fishing grounds. As a result of this situation the district chiefs reserved the right to modify these restrictions as they deemed necessary.

(C) COMUSMACV's conclusions as presented to the SECDEF were: 1) in terms of reliable potential from available resources, the MARKET TIME effort was satisfactory; 2) the planned operational concept was sound; 3) the primary deficiency of inadequate shallow-draft vessels would be corrected by the spring of [illegible] when 54 Swifts would become operational (see Chapter II); [illegible] the VNN effort was less than optimum both in patrol aggressiveness and reporting accuracy. This last situation could be improved only

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by patient and deliberate advisory efforts; the GVN had made inroads on the problem of watercraft regulatory measures, but the clarity, promulgation and enforceability thereof would require further improvement. COMUSMACV concluded his evaluation by recommending that MARKET TIME continue as planned. No major changes were necessary and none were anticipated so long as programmed forces materialized.[36]

(C) During November, CHNAVGP recommended that a more adequate system of ship inspection in the Saigon River be initiated. At that time, a ship's captain simply declared his cargo and no one questioned him further. This caused a great deal of tax revenue to be lost. The CHNAVGP suggested that these vessels be "convoyed" to insure control of their movements. This suggestion was not well received by GVN authorities, because they wanted the movements of foodstuffs and produce to reach their destination without delay. So this proposal, which would have created a system of ascertaining which ships were carrying contraband, was still pending at the end of the year.[37]

RVNAF Amphibious Operations

(C) Prior to April 1965 the amphibious warfare capability of VNN's three LST's and seven LSM's had seldom been employed because of other commitments. The potential value of the capability became more apparent after the Vung Ro Bay infiltration incident as attention was focussed on possible infiltration points located in coastal VC areas. In April, RVNAF JGS directed CINCVNN to develop a permanent capability for amphibious raid operations. Initial plans called for the complement of LST 502 to begin amphibious training and to be available for operation in the latter part of May. Tentative proposals for force assignments included a VNN 3-inch gun ship, a USN destroyer for gun fire support and the LSM (H) hospital ship for medical support and paywar activities. It was anticipated that a VNN Sea Air Land/Underwater Demolition (SEAL/UDT) team would be assigned to the landing force. The major hurdle was the assignment of troops. Special Forces and local troop units not available for operations outside their own area were discussed as possibilities. Chances were dim for obtaining more than a company for use on a permanent basis.[38]

(C) During May the plans for company-sized amphibious raids were overtaken by concepts of a grander scale. JGS stepped in to take a leading role in planning. One significant step forward was the designation of units of the VNMC as the landing force, rather than the miscellaneous ARVN, RF or PF units which had been previously considered. It was hoped that by mid-June JGS would begin battalion-size operations employing each of the five VNMC battalions, with VNN sealift and VNAF/USAF air support as required. It was

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planned that from August to early October operations would be conducted using two or more VNMC battalions with VNN naval forces augmented by USN sealift and naval gunfire support (NGFS). Consideration was also given to combined VNMC/USMC operations, presumably beginning in November, but JGS desired to commence amphibious operations unilaterally. Corresponding to this "go it alone" attitude was the little interest shown in US offers to conduct demonstration landings with III MAF landing forces. The major problem confronting the VN in carrying out their unilateral intentions was the diversion of the VNN LST's and LSM's to amphibious operations would place a heavy strain on the already critical logistics situation in SVN. The logistic missions and the capacity of Military Sea Transport Service (MSTS) to take on any additional mission was severely limited.[39]

(C) This planning was overtaken by events in June 1965. The drastic increase of VC activity began to absorb reserve strength throughout the country. As the VNMC was part of the general reserve, this commitment precluded their use as the landing force for planned amphibious operations. As a result, all planning was postponed indefinitely. The only amphibious operation during the year was conducted on 10 November when the combined USMC/VNMC operation BLUE MARLIN was executed (see USMC Operations). With the advent of additional LST's and LSM/LSSL's during 1966 there was a probability for renewed interest in this type of warfare.[40]

Naval Gunfire Operations

(C) On 17 April, the GVN and USG agreed in principle to the use of US NGF in support of anti-sea infiltration efforts and in support of RVNAF and US ground operations (verbally transmitted to the US Ambassador 17 April).

(C) During April 1965, CINCPAC, in anticipation of authorization for amphibious operations and NGFS in RVN, requested COMUSMACV and CINCPACFLT to develop and submit plans for these operations on a priority basis. COMUSMACV replied on 19 April with his plan concerning the employment of US NGFS in RVN. This plan outlined a general concept for NGFS operations using MARKET TIME ships and, from time to time, other 7th Flt ships against selected VC targets and in support of US and ARVN amphibious and ground operations. At this time, COMUSMACV inquired as to the availability of an Air, Naval Gunfire Liaison Company (ANGLICO) for RVN.

(S) Representatives from CINCPACFLT, COMSEVENTHFLT, COMUSMACV, FMFPAC, and III MAF, met in Saigon 3-5 May for the purpose of developing procedures for the conduct of NGFS in RVN. The procedures formulated at the conference were agreed to by CINCPACFLT and COMUSMACV and forwarded to CINCPAC for approval. CINCPAC approved the procedures for execution on 14 May.[41] On 16 May they were issued to the corps senior advisors.

(C) The NGFS procedures were as follows:

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1) USNFG ships were provided by Commander Task Group 70.8 (Cruiser/Destroyer Force). These units were assigned NGF missions against VC targets in SVN in order to support anti-infiltration and COMUSMACV/RVNAF operations. NGF ships remained under the operational control of the cognizant 7th Flt task unit commander.

2) All NGF missions were observed by US personnel and were undertaken on order of CTF 115, in coordination with the Naval Gunfire Liaison Officer (NGLO) at the Corps Tactical Operations Center (CTOC) and responsible RVNAF officials.

3) Request for non-scheduled NGFS missions were sent to CTOC's for coordination. The NGLO would then send requests for naval gunfire through ANGLICO to the gunfire support ships in the area, or to the nearest Coastal Surveillance Center. This center would relay the request to the ship assigned to the area, or to CTF 115 if a ship had not been previously assigned. The NGLO at the CTOC would arrange for a spotter to be on station for the mission and inform CTF 115 of the mission.

4) In the case of pre-planned missions (requests for support at least 48 hours prior to the time required) the NGLO at CTOC forwarded requests to CTF 115. CTF 115 assigned a NGFS ship to the mission and informed the CTOC and Coastal Surveillance Center of the ship assigned. The NGLO and CTOC arranged for the spotter to be on station for the mission.

5) ROK requests for NGFS were channeled through FFORCEV for necessary coordination and execution.[42]

(C) In the fall of 1965, COMUSMACV published an LOI on the conduct of artillery and NGFS which set forth rules pertaining to firing on VC targets in and out of hamlets. The rules stated that henceforth unobserved fire could be used on VC forces outside of hamlets in target areas declared hostile by GVN, VN liaison personnel, observers, or Forward Air Controllers (FAC). Prior to promulgation of this procedure, unobserved fire missions were prohibited. Missions against known or suspected targets in hamlets and villages occupied by non-combatants would be controlled by airborne or ground observers, only after receipt of US/GVN/RVNAF approval, as appropriate. Hamlets or villages unassociated with ground operations would not be attacked by gunfire without prior warning. Attacks without warning, in conjunction with ground operations involving the movement of troops through the area, could be made if, in the jugement of the ground commander, his mission would be jeopardized by such warning. In the vicinity of RVN/Cambodia border only observed fire missions were allowed on targets within 2,000 meters of the border. Unobserved fire missions could be fired outside of this 2,000 meter zone. During December,

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owing to increased infiltration of VC and NVA forces, CINCPACFLT recommended these procedures be modified by authorizing CO's of NGFS ships to make emergency utilization of unobserved fires on any target in grave circumstances when friendly forces were known to be under hostile fire and when gunfire support could be effected with positive assurance that the friendly forces and/or non-combatants would not be harmed.[43] This recommendation was approved by CINCPAC on 22 December.[44]

(C) On 20 May the 7th Flt ship, USS Hamner (DD-718) conducted the first scheduled NGF mission in SVN in II CTZ. By month's end, 13 gunfire missions had been conducted and included illumination firing in I CTZ, ten gunfire missions in II CTZ and one gunfire mission in RSSZ. Results were considered generally effective. One mission fired by the USS Somers (DD-947) was credited with relieving VC pressure on a district town in Phuoc Tuy Province and resulted in 12 VC killed and 20 wounded. In addition to the USS Hamner and the Somers, other 7th Flt units provided NGFS during the first month of operations.

(C) In order to provide expert control and direction of US naval gunfire, detachments from 1st ANGLICO, FMFPAC Hawaii, were deployed to RVN. On 14 May one shore fire control party (SFCP) was in position in I CTZ and one SFCP and a radar beacon team were in position in II CTZ. Additional ANGLICO units arrived in-country 25-27 May. After briefings in Saigon, these additional units were assigned as follows:

a. II Corps - one NGF Spot (Det of SFCP) team and a radar beacon team.

b. III Corps - one SFCP.

c. IV Corps - one SFCP and one radar beacon team.[45]

(C) The ANGLICO units provided a gunfire liaison team at each CTOC and spotting teams strategically located along the coast. A control team of three officers and 27 EM were located in Saigon to provide administrative and logistic support to units in the field.[46]

(C) In May COMUSMACV determined that ANGLICO detachments would be attached to the senior US advisor to each corps to provide experienced control, coordination and spotting for NGFS in each corps. The first detachment of ANGLICO arrived in-country on 6 May and reported to CG, III MAF. On 15 May, COMUSMACV approved the NGFS employment in RVN under MARKET TIME charter. Voice fire mission requests, and activation of the Corps GVN Liaison Office (GLO) or Marine Fire Support Coordination Center (FSCC) control frequencies, would be received over the MARKET TIME Surveillance

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Coordinating and Reporting Net. All ships would guard this net.[47]

(C) By 1 June, six detachments of the 1st ANGLICO were in-country with personnel assigned to each Corps, and placed under HSAS for administrative purposes. After several months of operating under control of 7th Flt, COMUSMACV, in Directive No. 10-11 of 10 November, set forth command relationships between ANGLICO commanders and COMUSMACV. In the section outlining responsibilities and command relationships between subordinate commands and advisory elements he stated that CTF 115 would "conduct air and surface surveillance, NGFS, visit and search, psywar, combat support (such as support of commando raids, UDT and search and rescue) of US and RVN forces and other operations as directed, along the coast and in the major rivers of RVN in order to assist the RVNAF in the detection and prevention of communist water-borne movement and infiltration from the sea". Thus the groundwork was laid and the pattern set for future NGFS activities.[48]

(C) The operational control of NGFS in-country was handled by the four corps senior advisors under COMUSMACV through the CTOC's. Each Corps had assigned an SFCP, and a detachment of Sub-Unit One, 1st ANGLICO, to provide personnel and communications equipment necessary for the control of naval gunfire in each of the areas.[49]

(C) The primary mission of the ANGLICO detachments was to support US and friendly elements by providing the liaison necessary between the ground elements of the landing force and units involved in conducting close air support and naval gunfire in the amphibious assault and in other operations. This included the provision of limited support to airborne units.[50]

7th Fleet Air Support

(S) Following the NVN PT boat attack on the USS MADDOX on 2 August 1964 in international waters about 40 miles off the NVN shore, the US increased the readiness posture of US forces in the Pacific. In retaliation for the unprovoked attack on the MADDOX, US naval forces were directed by JCS to conduct air strikes on selected targets in NVN.[51]

(S) During the period August 1964 to February 1965, use of 7th Flt aircraft in both SVN and NVN was sporadic and primarily on a contingency basis. However, the attack on Pleiku Airfield on 7 February 1965 resulted in a change of concept and naval aircraft henceforth assumed a major role in the air war in SEASIA. After extensive discussion between CINCPAC and COMUSMACV, it was determined that naval air strikes on pre-planned targets approved by higher authority would be coordinated with VNAF and 2d AD.[52] In February a liaison section (air control team of two officers) from

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7th Flt was thus attached to the TACC, 2d AD for the purpose of this corrdination.[53] This close association and coordination increased air power effort during 1965.[54]

(U) In February 1965, when the President decided to enlarge the US military effort in SVN, the 7th Flt was poised off shore to participate actively in the conflict. Within minutes after receipt of the message clearing 7th Flt for action, naval aircraft were over VC and NVN facilities, dropping hundreds of tons of bombs. From February through December 1965, USN aircraft flew 37,210 sorties, 14,560 of these north of the 17th parallel. USN A4 Skyhawks, A3 Sky Warriors, F4 Phantom II's, A6 Intruders and propeller driven A1 Skyradiers attacked NVN bridges, barracks, storage and power installations. They also struck defensive positions around these facilities and the two major NVN cities of Hanoi and Haiphong.[55]

(U) One of the highlights of the year came on the evening of 20 June when two Skyradiers shot down a MIG-17 jet 40 miles south of Hanoi during a bombing raid.[56]

(U) In early November aircraft based on the carrier USS Oriskany recorded another first when they demolished a NVN missile site about 55 miles south of Hanoi. Five A4 Skyhawks bombed and strafed the SAM site with rockets and 250-pound bombs. Two missiles were destroyed and another damaged. On the morning of 22 December, 60 aircraft from three carriers dropped more than 80 tons on the Uong Bi Thermal Power Plant, 14 miles northeast of Haiphong. The plant, which supplied 25 percent of the power for NVN, was heavily damaged.[57]

(U) During 1965, 72 US naval vessels were involved in the increased role of the 7th Flt in VN waters. This fleet, operation in support of COMUSMACV, provided NGFS ships, amphibious squadrons for operations and transport of troops and replenishment of supplies.[58]

(S) Aircraft based on the three to five 7th Flt CVA's stationed off SVN during the year, participated in such air operations as BARREL ROLL, STEEL TIGER, ROLLING THUNDER, and others. Two CVA's and support elements were assigned duty at Yankee Station, 100 miles off Da Nang. This group operated largely north of the 17th parallel. One CVA was assigned to Dixie Station, 100 miles off Vung Tau, with the primary responsibility of assisting with air strikes in SVN.[59]

US AIR FORCE AND VNAF OPERATIONS

In-Country Operations

(C) In early 1965, the VC not only maintained the initiative in military actions but also had the advantage of opposing forces,

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which, though supported by US military advisors and equipped with modern weapons, were constrained by certain policies and concepts.[60] The VC were thus able to attack under advantageous conditions and regroup under the largely secure conditions of their forest hideouts. In a situation characterized by an increasing number of setbacks suffered by the RVNAF, COMUSMACV undertook studies of measures which might be employed to check and reverse these trends.[61] Air power was recognized as a means by which continuous pressure could be exerted on the VC:

> Attack aircraft now in the hands of the government constitute a unique strike force whose operations the Viet Cong cannot defeat, match, or even anticipate. . . . Air power could project the government's power to all parts of the country and keep large areas under continuous surveillance. It could strike the Viet Cong in their strongest and most remote positions--in areas where the Vietnamese Army simply does not tread.[62]

(S) The optimum use of air power in SVN was not attainable in early 1965 due to the slow reaction or unavailability of aircraft. The concept of continuous airborne alert over critical areas required resources which were not available in-country.[63] Nevertheless, airpower available made its mark. It was observed that the VC would have had the capability in 1965 to move into Phase III, the mobile, conventional warfare phase, had air strength been unavailable to support the GVN's effort. Operations on the scale of the late 1964 battles of An Lao and Binh Gia could be expected and in these operations, the application of air strikes would be extremely favorable. In late 1964, experiments in visual reconnaissance activities had proven successful as a means of finding targets. COMUSMACV believed that a coordinated visual reconnaissance effort using the aircraft resources of USAF, USA and VNAF, as well as pilot reports from commercial aircraft would provide an almost untapped source of good targets. Interpretation of aerial photography supplemented by IR (Infra-red) reconnaissance and other technical means also gave indications of probable current VC activity at fairly precise locations. Organized in 1964, the RVNAF III Corps Target Center, by January 1965 had developed 149 static targets in an area centering in Zones "C" and "D". In addition, the newly organized USMACV J2 Target Research and Analysis Center (TRAC) had identified and passed to III Corps a total of 171 transitory target indications since early November 1964. TRAC operations were planned for expansion and Target Centers were planned for I, II and IV Corps.[64]

(TS) Early in the year, decisions were made to employ the air resources which theretofore could not be used effectively.[65] A summary of the constraints affecting USMACV counterinsurgency

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operations was prepared by COMUSMACV on 13 January and forwarded to CJCS through CINCPAC on 21 January.[66] Among these were the problems of VNAF observers in FARMGATE (VNAF-marked USAF) aircraft[67] and the prohibited use of jets within SVN.[68]

(TS) No longer was there the extremely sensitive approach to military air operations which for years was looked upon as endangering the primary effort of economic and political reconstruction of SVN and winning its people over to GVN. No longer were there the great concerns of maintaining a semblance of conformity to the agreements of the 1954 Geneva Accords and of ensuring the appearance of the purely "advisory" role of US Forces in RVN.[69] The restrictions limiting target designation and air-ground coordination had to be changed:[70] more "free bomb zones", especially the main VC base areas had to be designated and air-ground coordination had to be through pure US procedures. However, much of the groundwork was already laid for increased air activity. The Tactical Air Control System (TACS) was a flexible functioning organ which could absorb additional workloads.[71] Jet fighters and bombers had been introduced into SVN following the initiation of YANKEE TEAM operations[72] in May 1964 and the Tonkin Gulf incident in early August 1964.[73] Plans were under way for increasing the VNAF from four to six squadrons.[74] New weapons such as Lazy Dog,[75] CBU (Cluster Bomb Unit)[76] and the side-firing FC-47,[77] were ready for commitment. Coordination with RVNAF ground forces, US helicopter forces and USMACV was improved and there was a greater appreciation among all services of the usefulness of air in the current phase of the struggle.[78]

(S) On 26 January 1965, COMUSMACV asked CINCPAC for authority to employ US jet aircraft in a strike role in RVN.[79] In this request, COMUSMACV described intelligence reports which indicated the possibility of impending VC attacks on critical US installations aimed at achieving a spectacular victory, the impaired capability of RVNAF due to commitment of elements to control civic disorders and the diminished efficiency of the VNAF because of its Commander's (Air Vice Marshal Nguyen Cao Ky) preoccupation with political activities. On 27 January, JCS authorized COMUSMACV to employ US jet aircraft in SVN in emergency situations under certain conditions.[80] It was specified that only COMUSMACV or his deputy could commit jet aircraft. The US Ambassador's concurrence was required and the situation had to be of such criticality that the VC would probably gain a major victory or number of American lives would be lost. Additionally, US jets would be controlled by ground or airborne observers in touch with the ground situation. Jets could be used to reinforce VNAF or FARMGATE aircraft[81] when they were unable to adequately cope with the major VC concentrations.[82] CINCRVNAF's prior clearance would have to be granted and the immediate and full explanation of the use of this emergency authority would have to be made to CINCPAC and JCS.[83] With the relaxation of the rules of engagement, COMUSMACV was

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prepared to enter the war on a new dimension.[84]

(S) The 27 January authorization greatly relieved the anxiety of US military leaders in SVN, particularly in view of intelligence reports which indicated that the VC were planning a major offensive in the central highlands.[85] Although the 2d AD had one F-100 squadron at Da Nang for operations in Laos and two B-57 squadrons at Bien Hoa for VNAF crew training, these jet aircraft could not be used tactically in SVN prior to the authorization. The US non-jet tactical combat strength available for RVNAF support had thus been limited to the southern half of SVN, particularly Bien Hoa where the then 1st Air Commando Squadron and the 602d Air Commando Squadron were located. The VNAF had one A-1H squadron at Da Nang, another at Pleiku, and two squadrons at Bien Hoa. In December 1964, Cdr 2d AD had clearly seen the shortage of tactical air power in the central area and had quickly sent from Bien Hoa a detachment of USAF A-1E Sky Raiders to Qui Nhon.[86]

(U) On 7 and 10 February, the VC attacked US BEQ's at Pleiku and Qui Nhon, cities which were the terminal points of Highway 19. Starting on 7 February, retaliatory strikes against NVN targets were conducted by USN, VNAF, and USAF aircraft. This policy of continuing attacks on NVN enabled the 2d AD to expand and reorganize, to acquire new types of aircraft and develop new control systems. On 19 February, B-57 jet aircraft were used for the first time in combat in SVN in Phouc Tuy Province; on 24 February both B-57's and F-100's were used along Highway 19 near An Khe and saved a CIDG and a Ranger unit from almost certain disaster: some 220 troops were helilifted to safety while jets pinned down the superior surrounding VC forces with bombs, napalm and cannon fire.

(S) On 19 February, VNAF was tactically paralyzed when ARVN coup aspirants took control of the TSN airbase during a major coup attempt. VNAF Commander, Air Commadore Nguyen Cao Ky, who had successfully stopped a similar coup attempt in September 1964, again diverted his attention to solving political problems. During this uneasy month, USAF jets were continually used in Binh Dinh and Quang Tin provinces causing heavy enemy casualties and frequently harassing his movements.[87]

(C) In March, there were few reported sightings of VC units larger than company size. This may have been a response to the increases in US air strikes. After a rather uneventful month, the greatest armada of aircraft (456) ever assembled over SVN participated in the bombing of a section of War Zone C in Tay Ninh Province. The intent was to apply pressure on VC base areas, where preparations were underway for the monsoon offensive, to boost ARVN morale and to encourage ARVN offensive operations into VC base areas. Naval aircraft from US 7th Flt carriers and USMC aircraft from the 9th MEB

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(which had arrived at Da Nang in March) joined in the effort. In a single day, 15 April, 443 sorties were conducted and more than 1,000 tons of bombs dropped. This was twice the average monthly tonage dropped in 1964. The jets were continually used in major close support roles and in harrassment actions, including the interdiction of VC movements. They more than doubled the airstrike power which existed prior to their authorization. A primary reason for the great increase of VC defectors, to 600 in April, was apparently due to the in-country bombing program.[88]

(C) VC prisoners interrogated in the summer of 1965, expressed amazement at the amount and intensity of airpower which had been used against them. Over the years, the meager air actions against the VC by the GVN were not taken seriously by the VC. Once bombed, they could expect to rest safely for an extended period. Many VC units operating in the northern areas, had never experienced air attacks. The bombings apparently affected the VC way of life in their strongholds as well as on operations. [89]

(C) On 19 April, the first F-104C squadron to be assigned to SVN arrived at Da Nang air base. A steady flow of A-1H and A-1E aircraft was also being unloaded from Saigon docks for transport to VNAF squadrons throughout SVN. The VNAF was building its strength up to five A-1 squadrons with a sixth scheduled to arrive in late summer 1965. The combined US-VNAF air strength available for strikes against the VC on the eve of the May monsoon season was more than triple that at the beginning of the year.[90] In the meantime, US and FWMA ground forces were also building up and moving into position, largely as security forces for US bases. [91]

(C) On 11 May the VC launched their first major monsoon attack, when an estimated VC regiment attacked Song Be, the Phuoc Long Province capital, after overrunning ARVN troops on the fringe of War Zone D. Rangers and other ARVN forces, supported by massive air strikes, drove back the heavily armed main force VC regiment, after it had occupied Song Be for seven hours, in the biggest battle of the VN war up to that time. Although the enemy's big push was expected in II CTZ, on 29 May the VC struck Ba Gia near Quang Ngai in I CTZ. Heavy fighting raged under the light of 3,000 flares dropped by C-123 and C-47 aircraft. In addition to 1,430 structures reportedly destroyed and 423 damaged, an estimated 626 VC were killed, mostly by air. Air power was thus increasingly the decisive factor in major battles and began to account for a good share of enemy casualties.[92]

(C) On 10 June, the VC launched a major pre-dawn attack on the military camp at Dong Xoai under a heavy 500-foot cloud ceiling. The enemy succeeded in taking his objective but suffered about 700 killed. CONUSMACV credited air power with inflicting heavy losses

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on the enemy forces. In this battle the VC demonstrated an improved antiaircraft capability and struck many of the Skyraiders and jet aircraft with .50 caliber ground fire.

(C) On 18 June, in the first B-52 attack on a VC target in SVN,[93] 27 Guam-based bombers dropped some 300 tons of bombs on VC targets near Ben Cat in Binh Duong Province, 25 miles north of Saigon. Two B-52's were lost when they collided over the ocean after take-off. This, then, was the prelude to the program of B-52 bombings in SVN.[94]

(U) During June, however, despite US air strikes against land routes of supply and efforts by the 7th Flt to intercept enemy supply shipping, the VC logistic system seemed to continue to provide adequate ammunition and weapons.[95]

(C) Realizing the effectiveness of air strikes and to gain a psychological victory, the VC made numerous attempts to neutralize US airpower by a series of night attacks on the airfields. On 1 July, a VC special mission team supported by 81-mm mortars and 57-mm RR, successfully raided the Da Nang airfield complex and destroyed two C-130's and two F-102 aircraft. They also used mortar fire against the Nha Trang, Cheo Reo, Bac Tranh, Bac Lieu and Can Tho airfields in late June and July. Later, on 24 August, they used a 75-mm howitzer in a harassing attack on the Bien Hoa air base.[96]

(S) As the employment of B-57 and F-100 aircraft had released the A-1 aircraft for more close support missions, the B-52 attacks similarly allowed the jet fighters and small bombers to concentrate on more immediate support missions. This development was a marked contribution to the greater flexibility and capability of air power in SVN at a time when the number of immediate requests for air support was rising in meeting the intensified VC activity.[97]

(S) Overall air activity increased sharply during July. VNAF provided over 450 sorties in support of major ground operations. USAF sorties increased by more than 2,200. Missions controlled by FAC's doubled those flown in June. SAC supported the ground effort during July with four B-52 strikes in II and III CTZ's. US Army aviation activities continued at the same high level as June and air mobile operations increased during July to 48 as compared with 29 during June. Air activity rose to a new high in July with nearly 11,000 combat sorties flown and more than 12,000 tons of bombs dropped on enemy positions throughout SVN. On 10 July F-100's rigged with 750 pound bombs, attacked a base 60 miles north of Bien Hoa where some 1,000 VC were observed. About 350 VC were killed in what Cdr, 2d AD called "the most successful USAF mission yet flown in

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Vietnam".[98]

(S) VC troop losses for July were equal to the strength of a division. Some 3,050 were killed and another 500 captured in ground attacks with another estimated 4,000 killed by air strikes. Friendly losses for the month were 1,335 killed, 1,765 wounded and 750 missing. The intensity of fighting, both in the air and on the ground, continued into August, when the VC appeared to make a major effort for the control of the central highlands. US troop strength was nearing 83,000 and friendly forces were assuming a more aggressive role. B-52 raids were becoming almost routine. F-102's joined in the fighting and the VNAF was equipped with its first jet aircraft, the B-57. Apart from B-52 raids, the number of sorties rose to some 11,500.[99]

(S) In October, 2d AD and VNAF supported ARVN infantry, airborne and armored ground operations triggered by a VC attack on the Plei Me Special Forces Camp in Pleiku province. ARVN relief columns suffered heavy casualties and equipment losses, but sustained air strikes drove off the VC; ARVN forces entered Plei Me on 25 October. The entire action was characterized by massive use of air power countered by fanatic VC air defense (one VC was found chained to his machine gun). Four aircraft were shot down and 21 were damaged. In all, 696 air strike sorties, 18 flare missions, 83 FAC missions, and 41 reconnaissance missions were flown. Confirmed enemy losses were 201 KIA and 6 VCC.[100]

(S) In November, in its operations against several NVN regiments in the Chu Pong mountain area of western Pleiku Province, the 1st Air Cav Div (AM) in Operation SILVER BAYONET had continuous air cover for several weeks when the fighting was heaviest. C-123's and FC-47's were available at night. In mid-November, the 1st Cav Div (AM) was supported by some 50 sorties daily. In the Chu Pong area the division's entire TACR was considered hostile and thus air strikes did not require the province chief's approval. This resulted in unusually timely and effective close air support operations. During Operation SILVER BAYONET, B-52's were utilized for the first time in direct support of ground operations.[101]

(S) The VC made careful studies as to how to effectively counter air attacks. They tried to avoid detection or becoming a worthwhile target by transporting supplies on their backs over tree canopied trails. They selected situations for attack when air power was least effective and dispersed and took advantage of natural cover to a degree unmatched in previous wars. They merged with civilian groups

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and moved in physical proximity to friendly elements wherever possible to render the feasibility of air strikes questionable. They dispatched trained suicide squads to attack US aircraft on their bases and developed techniques in the use of small arms and automatic weapons for antiaircraft defense purposes.[102]

(C) However, although the VC had built up momentum for a major offensive early in the monsoon season, they could not maintain it and their offensive faltered. IR reconnaissance and better intelligence were helping to pin point their sanctuaries and major supply points. Airpower played a substantial role in frustrating the VC's efforts in practically every major engagement thereafter to the end of the year.[103]

(U) At the close of 1965, Cdr, 2d AD announced that USAF tactical pilots had flown 48,510 strike sorties in support of the RVN during 1965. USAF pilots, flying jet fighter-bombers, logged about 10,570 tactical strike sorties over NVN. In addition to USAF efforts, VNAF pilots flew over 23,700 tactical strike sorties. Most of the VNAF effort was in SVN. SAC B-52 bomb crews also logged more than 1,000 sorties. During 1965, an average of 6,100 strike sorties per month were flown by USAF and VNAF. This effort was 5.5 times greater than in 1964.[104]

(S) Tactical fighter pilots of the USAF dropped over 80,280 tons of bombs. Of these, 56,670 were dropped on VC targets in SVN while 23,610 tons were dropped over NVN. VNAF fighter pilots dropped 26,600 tons of bombs.[105]

(S) The increase in tempo of USAF operations in SVN during 1965 was the direct result of VC/NVN escalation of the war and the US reaction to that escalation. The year 1965 represented the largest employment of US airpower since the Korean conflict. US/VNAF airpower was responsible for killing more than 15,000 enemy personnel during the year. In addition to destroying VC sanctuaries, USAF/VNAF airpower with USN and USMC aircraft struck VC/NVA LOC's day and night, leveled tens of thousands of enemy structures, stopped several major VC/NVA assaults on friendly positions, and made enemy existence increasingly hazardous both in and out of RVN.[106]

Control of Air Firepower

(S) With the commitment of US ground and air forces, COMUSMACV became directly concerned with the minimization of noncombatant casualties.[107] In mid-August, a rash of sensational press reports on a III MAF operation triggered a message from the CJCS which requested information concerning

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missions which might result in noncombatant casualties, namely village clearing operations and air interdiction and close air support activities.[108] COMUSMACV replied that the mission of US forces to destroy VC bases required operations in populated areas. All air strikes were made either at the request of the ground forces commander or the ARVN observer, upon clearance by a RVN province or district chief. The tendency to consider hamlets in VC controlled territory as "fair game" did, however, adversely affect pacification efforts when friendly forces entered the hamlet. This required judgment on the part of US personnel of a type never before demanded. Thus every effort was made to indoctrinate these personnel so as not to frustrate achievement of one of the USMACV missions in the performance of another.[109] CJCS inquired if it were possible to distinguish between villages/hamlets in which the populace were formerly pro-GVN and those which had never been loyal and were probably bonafide VC. He thought that the former should be struck by air only if used as a base for attack but that no restraints were necessary for the latter. He added that advisory pressure on the VN should be exerted to insure they appreciated the necessity for preventing civilian casualties.[110] COMUSMACV replied that nearly all hamlets were at one time loyal to the GVN so the issue usually was left to the judgment of authorities in the field. He clarified that living areas in the VC war zones were considered "fair game." He reemphasized that the battle was for the hamlets and that US forces could not be restricted to operations in unpopulated jungles. He proposed three measures to improve the situation: explain to the US public that the war was being fought for the control of the RVN population and their hamlets; exercise limited control of the press to prevent "self-inflicted wounds"; and intensify the indoctrination of US troops in RVN.[111]

(S) In mid-September, CJCS suggested that the designator "free strike zones" be changed to "special strike zones." The original term implied no restrictions whatsoever on air strikes whereas, in fact, such strikes in these zones were either under radar or FAC control.[112]

(S) Considering that an overall evaluation of the use of air power was due, COMUSMACV, in early September, appointed a board of officers to study the problem. He felt that eagerness of pilots to get into the war might contribute to indiscriminate and wasteful use of air strikes.[113] The terms of reference, issued to the board on 10 September, directed the accomplishment of two basic objectives: 1) design a target acquisition and identification system which

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would maximize effectiveness of air firepower and minimize non-combatant casualties and; 2) recommend necessary changes to organization, policy and procedures for air operations in RVN.[114] COMUSMACV pointed out that with the increased presence of US forces in RVN, an increase in undesirable incidents could be expected. It was essential that these incidents not be exploited to dampen US-VN relations. He wanted the board to interpret its mission in the broadest terms possible and review all systems for delivering such air firepower but to include an investigation into the following specific areas:

1) redesignation of "free bomb zones" as suggested by CJCS.

2) FAC's and strike pilots' familiarity with the area in which they operate.

3) adequacy of identification procedures for targets in villages/hamlets.

4) clarification of attitudes toward "targets of suspicion".

5) attempts to develop an airpower force structure and analyze the effectiveness of weapons/fire control equipment.[115]

(S) Conclusions of the board were:[116]

1) The existing TACS was well designed to provide the restraints necessary for the controlled application of air firepower in RVN. Incidents of errors were surprisingly few in number. Hence, changes were necessary only to cope with the US buildup in RVN.

2) Operational personnel in the field did not fully understand COMUSMACV's policies on target selection criteria and rules of engagement.

3) "Free bomb" zones should be retained because of the operational flexibility they permitted. However, there was a recognized need to limit attacks in these zones without FAC control. The term "Free Bomb Zone" implied inaccurate and adverse connotations.

4) A USA TOC was not available though considered essential to eliminate a serious deficiency in the TACS.

5) Communications suffered several serious deficiencies as did air traffic control.

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6) UC ground force senior advisors had inadequate G-2/G-3 air staffs and organic intelligence personnel.

7) There were insufficient RVNAF observers to accompany FAC's and US armed helicopters.

(S) The board thus recommended that:

1) Air attacks on known or suspected VC targets in hamlets and villages should be controlled by airborne or ground FAC's, or an RVNAF observer in the case of armed helicopters, and should be accomplished only after joint US/VN approval. Prior warning to the villagers was necessary except in conjunction with the movement of ground forces through the area. Such restrictions were also recommended for artillery and naval gunfire.

2) COMUSMACV policy on target selection and rules of engagement should be placed in a single document.

3) "Free bomb zones" should be renamed "Specified Strike Zones", portions of which would be designated "Jettison Areas" for free bombing and the remainder would require the control by a FAC of all bombing in daylight.

4) Establishment of a USMACV TOC.

5) Improvement of communications, air traffic control, advisory staffs and availability of ARVN observers, to follow-up on conclusions 5 thru 7, listed above.

(C) All of these recommendations were implemented before the end of 1965. USMACV Directive No 95-2, Subj: Aviation, Employment of and Operational Restrictions on US Military Air Delivered Firepower in RVN (U), 20 December, was the materialization of recommendation 2. This directive provided definitions, designated responsibilities, described the concept of operations and included guidance concerning target planning, specific instructions regarding use of close air support and jettison areas and operations near border areas.

B-52 STRIKES

(TS) On 4 March 1965, JCS proposed the employment of SAC B-52's in SVN. Although daylight attacks were not ruled out, it was visualized that night raids conducted at medium and high altitudes would achieve maximum surprise. JCS also recognized the possibility that these attacks might subsequently be extended to NVN.[117] CINCPAC, CINCSAC and COMUSMACV comments were solicited. CINCSAC stated that, while such

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attacks on SVN were feasible, the use of B-52's was undesirable since other available forces could do the same job.[118] He therefore recommended that B-52's be used in SVN only when weather and other conditions precluded the use of other forces.[119] CINCPAC agreed, stating that it was important to maintain a SAC quick reaction capability for NVN targets.[120] COMUSMACV's position was that military and psychological benefits might be realized by employment of B-52's; hence further study of the proposal was justified.[121]

(C) A mass tactical air raid involving 400 2d AD, 7th Flt and VNAF fighter bomber aircraft and lasting 12 hours was conducted against War Zone C on 15 April. The raid was intended to boost ARVN morale, encourage ARVN operations into VC base areas and disrupt, if not neutralize, VC preparations for a monsoon offensive. The VC apparently suffered only minor losses due largely to the ragged bomb pattern of the raid resulting from poor visibility caused by smoke and dust from earlier strikes during the raid. It was concluded that fighter bombers were not efficient for saturation bombing. This provided the necessary impetus to obtain JCS approval for B-52 raids on VC sanctuaries in SVN. On 18 June under the code name "ARC LIGHT,"[122] B-52's assigned to CINCSAC's 3d AD at Andersen AFB, Guam, commenced operations over SVN with an attack near Ben Cat in War Zone D, 40 miles NE of Saigon.[123]

(TS) The purpose of the ARC LIGHT program was the destruction of major VC command and control, training, manufacturing, supply and storage facilities.[124] After the first B-52 strike, COMUSMACV expressed to CINCPAC the need to employ B-52 forces routinely. He also urged exploitation by US troops, in view of RVNAF's failure to do so after the first strike.[125] COMUSMACV was also concerned about security leaks during the planning stages of B-52 strikes; he advised that operations orders should not be issued until the last possible moment by either USMACV or JGS to minimize the possibility of a leak.[126]

(S) In late June, both COMUSMACV and CINCPAC supported an increase in B-52 sortie rate to 800 per month although not all of these missions could be exploited by ground follow-up.[127,128] In mid-July the CJCS expressed concern that, because of the lack of post strike ground exploitations, the significance of B-52 strikes could not be properly evaluated.[129] Five ARC LIGHT strikes were made in July.[130]

(C) To offset misunderstanding and skepticism concerning the value of B-52 strikes, COMUSMACV gave a briefing to the press in late August. He felt that the connotations of

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the term "Strategic Air Command" created an undue expectation for spectacular results from B-52 raids. His evaluation of the cumulative results was:[131] 1) several VC permanent installations had been destroyed; others had to be relocated, 2) VC leaders were probably greatly disturbed over these strikes which could not only destroy their bases but also adversely affect the morale of their troops, 3) contrary to unofficial reports, some VC had been killed, 4) the destruction of munitions had been indicated by secondary explosions, and 5) the VC were considering infiltrating headquarters elements into friendly population centers as a protective measure.

(C) COMUSMACV regarded the following as advantages of B-52 raids: 1) area saturation was far more effective than that of fighter bombers, 2) highly suited to striking fixed targets, 3) sorties were not a drain on USMACV resources, 4) surprise, 5) reduced VC safe havens, and 6) encouraged ARVN operations into VC base areas.

(S) In mid-September, COMUSMACV congratulated CINCSAC for excellent execution of the B-52 raids and included the following quote from the Chairman of the National Leadership Committee Maj Gen Nguyen Van Thieu:

> Please accept here, General Commander of US Forces VN, the assurance of my warmest congratulations. Fruitful performances US Bombers B-52 have effected during Lam-Son operation over Ba-Long secret zone (Quang Tri) August 17, 1965. This accurate and timely bombardment upon VC concentration area inflicted them heaviest human casualties.[132]

(TS) The protection of non-combatants and friendly forces was of primary concern to COMUSMACV and each target was carefully scrutinized with the GVN prior to requesting a strike.[133] In mid-September, COMUSMACV in a message to CINCPAC, recommended that he (COMUSMACV) be given the responsibility for authorizing B-52 strikes. The issue arose when a strike was cancelled in Washington because of the target's proximity to a village. COMUSMACV stated that he was fully aware of this situation at the time of the request and had taken necessary precautions to prevent error. Because of the cancellation, tactical air support was directed to strike the target but only after some delay which probably allowed the VC to depart. This change in plans also caused cancellation of an exploitation operation which was to have been conducted by the 173d Abn Bde. COMUSMACV's concern was one of principle: the feasibility

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of a strike was a military decision, and the commander on the ground was in the best position to make it.[134]

(TS) The SAC forces which had been directed by JCS to support CINCPAC by strikes in SVN were provided mission/logistic support by PACOM elements.[135] On 21 September, CINCPAC outlined COMUSMACV responsibilities in nominating ARC LIGHT targets and their priorities.[136] In early October, CINCPACAF directed the 2d AD to provide Search and Rescue (SAR) support, escort and pre and post strike reconnaissance when requested in support of B-52 sorties over SVN.[137]

(U) By late September, US press reports were becoming favorably impressed by B-52 missions in SVN. For example, Joseph Alsop, syndicated US newspaper columnist report on 24 September stated:

> When SAC's great B-52 bombers began operating from Guam against targets in South Vietnam, the twaddle merchants at home and not a few misinformation merchants here in Saigon united in a loud, goose-like cackle.
>
> The American command was accused of using sledge hammers to kill gnats: there were said to be no gnats to kill anyway, and so on and on. In fact, however, these B-52 operations, which still continue, are among the most important and most interesting of the war here. They deserve to be better understood . . . For years on end the Viet Cong units coming in from operations in the countryside could enter one of these bases with perfect confidence that they would find everything they needed. The slowly accumulated stocks of supplies were, and still are truly enormous.
>
> In one VC base briefly penetrated by government forces some months ago, there was a year's supply of rice for an entire regiment. Another base visited more recently by a patrol after a B-52 attack, had contained 200,000 rounds of small arms ammunition, uniforms and cloth to make uniforms for a couple of battalions, and many other useful things as well.
>
> Nowadays, however, neither the units using the bases nor the supplies accumulated in them are secure any longer. In the first place, greatly improved collection and carefully coordinated analysis of intelligence have permitted the great majority of these formerly secret bases to be rather exactly pinpointed. And in the second place, General Westmoreland, ignoring the goose cackle, has insisted

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on continuing the B-52 operations on an accelarating tempo.

The SAC bombers are used, in part, because the tactical bomb squadrons here in Vietnam are already fully occupied. But the main reason for using B-52's is the nature of these targets, with their buried store chambers and strong fortifications. Only the heavy bombers can damage them seriously, and that is just what the B-52's have been doing, as both photo and ground reconnaissance have shown.

It is a dramatic and remarkable development - this beginning of progressive denial to the Viet Cong of the enormous base-network that has always sustained them until now.

Total denial will not be accomplished, to be sure, until the huge supplementary forces now entering this country are everywhere ready to assume the offensive. But at any rate, SAC's sledge-hammers are not being used to kill gnats.

(TS) On 29 September, the SECDEF delegated to JCS authority to approve B-52 strikes in five established special bomb zones. All other strikes required approval by higher authority.

(TS) To avoid noncombatant and friendly unit casualties, JCS on 5 October directed that all ARC LIGHT target nominations must include precise location data of friendly forces, enemy forces and noncombatants in the requested strike area.[139] Additionally, COMUSMACV must revalidate each target prior to execution.[140]

(TS) Target cancellations became a source of embarrassment for COMUSMACV in his relationships with RVNAF officials. He informed CINCPAC and JCS on 31 October that he had noted that many proposed ARC LIGHT targets were being disapproved by higher authority. These targets had been nominated only after extensive study of all aspects by competent personnel in CVN, concurrence of corps commander/senior advisor involved, personal approval by COMUSMACV and agreement by RVNAF JGS and the US Ambassador. GVN leaders found these cancellations difficult to understand. In order to derive maximum effects from B-52 strikes, COMUSMACV recommended that: he be allocated [illegible]2 sorties on a monthly basis for use in accordance with guidance by higher authority; 3d AD be given the mission of reinforcing the 2d AD in support of COMUSMACV with limitations as deemed necessary by higher authority, and that COMUSMACV or his AFCC deal directly with 3d AD in accomplishing these missions.[141]

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(S) In early November, COMUSMACV, with CINCPAC's concurrence, repeated his proposals to JCS for the decentralization of control of B-52 strikes. He felt his proposals were well founded in view of the following considerations: 1) since joint US/RVNAF target selections were approved by the GVN through the US Embassy, political problems should not arise; 2) public and press reactions to the strikes were favorable; 3) excessive time was being spent on target development because of control arrangements; 4) timely use of intelligence and quick reaction to enemy initiatives were essential; 5) the change of operational plans each time a target was disapproved jeopardized Vietnamese confidence in COMUSMACV; and 6) COMUSMACV was responsible for the outcome of these strikes regardless of who approved them.[142]

(TS) On 6 November, CINCPAC recommended that JCS promulgate a basic ARC LIGHT directive requiring CINCSAC, to provide a fixed number of B-52 sorties on a monthly basis. CINCPAC would then issue a basic directive clarifying procedures and amplifying the JCS directive to require:[143]

1) COMUSMACV's B-52 strike requests to be submitted at least 48 hours in advance to 3d AD or CINCSAC. JCS and CINCPAC would be informed of these requests. If no objections were voiced by JCS, CINCPAC or CINCSAC, approval would be automatic;

2) 3d AD to issue strike intent 24 hours prior to time-on-target;

3) direct liaison between COMUSMACV and 3d AD;

4) COMUSMACV to submit through CINCPAC for JCS approval, any special requests such as waiver of restriction or increase in monthly sortie allocation.

(TS) In mid-November COMUSMACV requested B-52 strikes in direct support of the combined US/RVNAF ground operation SILVER BAYONET near Pleiku.[144] CINCPAC promptly concurred and relayed the proposal to JCS on 16 November. Approval was granted the same day by JCS. CINCPAC and CINCSAC were allowed to delegate authority to COMUSMACV and 3d AD to coordinate directly in conducting the strikes.[145] This authorization included execution of strikes with the possibility of veto by higher authority.[146]

(TS) CINCPAC advised COMUSMACV on 17 November that in view of CINCSAC's desire to retain direct channels with CINCPAC, COMUSMACV would continue to submit B-52 target nominations to CINCPAC with information to CINCSAC, JCS and 3d AD.

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Upon approval of target nominations, CINCPAC would request CINCSAC to conduct strikes with information to COMUSMACV, JCS and 3d AD. Concurrent approval by JCS would be assumed, subject to continued monitoring and possible veto. Time-over-targets would be confirmed to all concerned as soon as possible rather than 24 hours in advance.[147] COMUSMACV found these developments satisfactory and tasked his staff with developing procedures which would permit a strike as rapidly as possible after acquiring suitable target intelligence.[148]

(TS) The SECDEF reviewed the ARC LIGHT program during his Saigon visit in November 1965 and requested COMUSMACV's evaluation and comments. COMUSMACV reported that although specific results in terms of the number of enemy casualties and the amount of supplies and facilities destroyed were not known, evidence gathered from post-strike ground operations, ralliers, prisoners, captured documents and agents revealed that the ARC LIGHT program had been highly successful. Targets were being developed faster than they could be struck. Overall improvements in USMACV's intelligence capabilities had provided abundant data on the enemy's location and his facilities. The integration of the ARC LIGHT program into USMACV's operational framework substantially increased the striking power available for use against the VC. It greatly bolstered the morale of US and ARVN forces; it demoralized the enemy with a weapon that he could not see or hear. ARVN forces became eager to penetrate areas bombed by B-52's - areas in which they had been extremely reluctant, if not unable, to tread previously.[149]

(TS) ARC LIGHT program responsiveness to the latest field intelligence was a major step in providing massive air support to troops engaged in combat. COMUSMACV commented that the authorization of minimum approval channels was an arrangement which should be continued. Quick reaction by ARC LIGHT forces was not only applicable to major ground campaigns but individually requested targets such as convoys in staging areas or VC occupied base areas.[150] Additionally, mid-November investigation of security measures involved in the planning and execution of ARC LIGHT missions revealed that they were excellent.[151]

(TS) Toward the end of the year, consideration was given to developing B-52 targets in southeastern Laos through such means as photo reconnaissance, OV-1 aircraft and SOG. The importance of destorying enemy rest camps, truck parks, supply routes, infiltration routes and marshalling areas used by VC/NVA infiltration into SVN demanded the

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use of all available forces.[152]

(TS) In his briefing for the SECDEF in late November 1965, COMUSMACV emphasized that ARC LIGHT target requirements exceeded the number of sorties that could be supported by 3d AD assets. The shortage of sorties would be substantially greater if targets in Laos were approved for execution. By late November, B-52 sortie rates had leveled off at approximately 300 per month. In anticipation of an increase in targets, modifications were being studied to allow the B-52 to double its weapon carrying capacity. If this were realized, a shortage of HE bombs in SEASIA was foreseen. B-52 aircraft carrying napalm and bomblets were to fly among other B-52's carrying iron bombs beginning in December. This was one measure which would assist alleviation of the iron bomb shortage. If strikes in Laos were approved, use of napalm on those targets was also recommended. COMUSMACV also continued to press for further decentralization of ARC LIGHT target approval procedures especially since effectiveness was directly related to timeliness. COMUSMACV recommended that: 1) ARC LIGHT target approval channels be decentralized to CINCPAC/CINCSAC with 3d AD placed in direct support of USMACV, 2) targets identified in southeastern Laos be approved for execution to include authorization to use napalm, and 3) shortage of HE bombs resulting from increased B-52 bomb carrying capacities be alleviated.[153]

(S) Of 19 ARC LIGHT missions flown in November, ten were follow up exploitations of previously struck areas. These missions involved 261 B-52 sorties in raids over six SVN provinces. On five consecutive days beginning on 17 November, strikes were conducted in support of ground operations in Pleiku Province. Tay Ninh Province target areas were struck on 2-4 November. Other provinces with targets which were struck in November were: Kien Hoa on the 7th, Binh Long on 12-14th, Binh Tuy on the 26th and 27th, and Binh Duong on the 28th.[154]

(S) On 1 December JCS requested information from CINCSAC regarding the capability and requirements, including leadtime, to increase ARC LIGHT sorties to 800 per month. JCS planned to submit a summary report to SECDEF by 3 December.[155]

(S) During December, 39 ARC LIGHT missions were flown. Target areas in eight RVN provinces and one target in Laos were struck by 306 sorties. Nine strikes were made in Binh Duong Province and five in Pleiku. Other targets struck were in the following provinces: Phuoc Tuy, Vinh Binh,

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Quang Tri and Tay Ninh. Ground forces exploited 11 ARC LIGHT struck target areas in the following provinces: Pleiku, Binh Duong, Quang Tin, Phuoc Tuy, Vinh Binh and Quang Tri.[156]

(U) Quang Tin Province received three ARC LIGHT contingency strikes on 12-14 December in support of HARVEST MOON operations. CG, III MAF praised the successful operation with the comment that the Marines "were more than impressed - they were delighted with the results. The timing was precise . . . bombing was accurate and the overall effect awesome to behold."[157]

(S) During 1965, there were more than 1,500 ARC LIGHT sorties. Flying 135 missions in support of COMUSMACV, B-52 crews dropped 31,500 tons of conventional bombs. The CSAF stated:[158]

> . . . there are several reasons for choosing the B-52 for the job in SVN. It can carry fifty-one 750 pound HE bombs, twelve under each and 27 in the bomb bay, which makes it ideally suited to thorough coverage of a large area within minutes. It can reach its target from a distant home base which is far beyond the reach of the enemy . . . It can bomb with utmost accuracy from a wide range of altitudes, day and night, and in any kind of weather.

(U) In late 1965, COMUSMACV commented to the US Secretary of the Air Force, during the latter's visit to the RVN, that "sorties flown by B-52 had not only produced a demoralizing effect on the VC but had strengthened the combat effectiveness of the US and GVN armed forces team.[159]

(U) During his last visit to the RVN in 1965, the SECDEF concluded that "no longer could the communist forces feel secure in their formerly unpenetrable jungle bases . . . these (B-52) attacks had, and will continue to have, a considerable effect on the outcome of the war in Vietnam."[160]

(TS) At the close of the year, COMUSMACV reviewed the status of B-52 strikes, projected strike plans and approved targets for submission in early 1966. He noted that USMACV was developing targets faster than available B-52 sorties could strike them, and that "he could use very easily three times the number of sorties available" at the end of the year.[161]

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In the meantime, CINCPAC had already commented on COMUSMACV's request to the JCS for an increase in B-52 sorties to 450 per month beginning with the new year, with further increase to 600 per month in April-June and 800 per month thereafter. CINCPAC recommended 300 sorties per month to COMUSMACV largely because of the limitations based on munition resources allocated to CSAF. Unallocated bomb resources were insufficient to support the expanded B-52 sortie rate requested except for a very limited period.[162]

ROLLING THUNDER

(S) ROLLING THUNDER was the code name for programmed air operations over NVN. The precedent for ROLLING THUNDER was set on 7 February 1965 when JCS directed[163] strikes against NVN in reprisal for the VC mortar attack on US installations at Pleiku on that same date. Aircraft from 7th Flt carriers attacked Thanh Hoa, NVN, on 7 February; the next day, 24 A-1H VNAF fighters, supported by 6 A-1E's and 25 USAF jets, struck Vinh Linh and Tram Bhe Barracks in NVN with 97,920 pounds of ordnance.[164] On 11 February, 28 VNAF A-1H aircraft, supported by 24 USAF F-100 and three F-101 jets, bombed Chap Le Barracks in NVN in retaliation for the VC bombing of a US Forces BEQ in Qui Nhon.[165]

(U) With these actions, there was nearly unanimous press agreement that the war had entered a new phase. Philip Geyelin, a reporter for the Wall Street Journal, on 8 February gave a typical comment: "The latest US air assault on North Vietnam significantly raises the level of the conflict in South Vietnam. It clearly deepens this country's involvement there. It also poses a grim prospect of wider, drawn-out Southeast Asian war." A USIS public opinion survey for the week ending 13 February showed " overwhelming Congressional and press support" for the bombings, with virtually all agreeing that the retaliation for the VC attack at Pleiku was "appropriate and justified."

(S) CJCS felt that the US public should understand that US/GVN air attacks over NVN were not justified simply on a reprisal basis following spectacular attacks; a sustained program could well be justified in response to the daily outrages committed by the VC; it was also militarily effective and would provide US/GVN forces the initiative.[166] On 11 February, JCS recommended to the SECDEF an eight-week program of graduated military pressures against NVN. Four US/VNAF air strikes per week were recommended against targets south of the 19th parallel.[167] SECDEF approved this program shortly thereafter which in actuality was the beginning of the ROLLING THUNDER program.

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(S) The questions of target selection and control over air operations against NVN arose almost immediately following inception of the program. COMUSMACV felt that target selection should be accomplished by USMACV in conjunction with GVN; he acknowledged CINCPAC's authority to assign targets to forces involved, since not all such forces were under COMUSMACV.[168] He stressed the importance of insuring that GVN was treated as a partner by allowing RVNAF authorities to select targets and to clear missions, so as not to create the impression that such strikes were a US show only.[169] CINCPAC pointed out, however, that the need for rapid response required preplanned targeting which precluded the arrangement proposed by COMUSMACV. After approval of CINCPAC/COMUSMACV's target list, Washington made the decision on the strikes. Reaction time would be too slow if handled as COMUSMACV recommended.[170]

(S) Another issue arose in February when CJCS expressed dissatisfaction with the handling of press briefings by the field.[171] CINCPAC urged that he, rather than COMUSMACV, handle the releases since he was the overall commander of the participating forces.[172] COMUSMACV disagreed: responsibility should not be changed because of an acknowledged slip-up; the key issue was to insure US/GVN cooperation; the latter would not adhere to US ground rules if they felt that they were not real partners in the program.[173]

(TS) In early March, COMUSMACV reemphasized to CINCPAC and CJCS that the policy and procedures for ROLLING THUNDER strikes with centralization of control in Washington tended to leave the VN out of the picture.[174] CINCPAC insisted on adherence to established procedures because the US was the major participant. He added that control should be retained in Washington while encouraging the VN to plan their portion of the operation with appropriate US authorities. Doubt concerning GVN security made it essential that targets not be assigned to VNAF until the latest possible moment.[175] CJCS sympathized with COMUSMACV's views but felt that control must be retained in Washington because of the possibility of CHICOM intervention. He believed that policy restrictions would be eased after the program got underway and that he would press for such a relaxation.[176]

(TS) Strictly speaking, the first ROLLING THUNDER strikes were conducted on 2 March when USAF aircraft hit the Xom Bang supply area, and VNAF with USAF support struck Quang Khe port. In spite of unfavorable weather, both

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strikes were very successful. Six aircraft were lost to ground fire: three F-105's, two F-100's and one A-1H. Later strikes produced poor results. However, by 15 March adequate damage level was achieved when 120 USAF and USN aircraft struck Phu Qui Ammunition Depot, inflicting heavy destruction with no loss of aircraft.[177]

(S) PACOM resources participating in ROLLING THUNDER included PACAF tactical aircraft based in Thailand, Pacific Fleet (PACFLT) (7th Flt) aircraft based on carriers located off the NVN coast in the South China Sea (location referred to as Yankee Station), and USMACV (2d AD & III MAF) aircraft based in SVN. VNAF also participated in the program. CINCPAC continued to direct the employment of these resources on ROLLING THUNDER operations as he had done during the reprisal strikes by issuing appropriate orders through his subordinate commanders (CINCPACAF, CINCPACFLT and COMUSMACV), who in turn directed their subordinate commanders to execute the missions.

(S) In mid-March, COMUSMACV informed CINCPAC that GVN authorities, particularly VNAF Commander Ky, were pressing for VNAF participation in BARREL ROLL operations (US air interdiction of NVA infiltration routes through northern Laotian Panhandle). He implied that this undesirable role for VNAF could be prevented if GVN was treated as an equal partner in ROLLING THUNDER operations. He therefore proposed that ROLLING THUNDER strike missions be executed under COMUSMACV control based on a program of preplanned targets approved by higher authorities. VNAF targets would form the basis for all strikes. VNAF and 2d AD would operate as a combined force, with 7th Flt coordinating with them and operating north of the 19th parallel.[178]

(S) CINCPAC disagreed with this concept. He felt the difficulties were caused by the insertion of VNAF into the operation, particularly in executing concurrent strikes with US forces. He felt that VNAF strikes should be coordinated with the US but that the operation would be simplified if they were not required to be concurrently executed. He also disagreed that VNAF targets should form the basis for all strikes. In a strongly worded statement, he emphasized that he intended to control the operation through CINCPACAF, CINCPACFLT and COMUSMACV with no restrictions placed on 7th Flt operating areas.[179]

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(S) In early April, in response to Washington reports reflecting disappointment with the results of ROLLING THUNDER strikes, COMUSMACV commented to CINCPAC that he felt the pilots were doing an admirable job and that consistently poor weather precluded text book results. He reaffirmed his previous position that if operational control were decentralized, there would be better results.180 In his message to JCS, CINCPAC agreed that the performance of the pilots was outstanding and noted that losses of aircraft were not excessive when compared with those of World War II and the Korean conflict. He did not consider the NVN MIG threat to be serious but did acknowledge the unfavorable psychological impact of the loss of two US aircraft on 4 April to MIG's. CINCPAC emphasized the need to continue the program and maintain the pressure on NVN.181,182

(C) In a mid-April message to CINCPAC, COMUSMACV described the coordination procedures for out-of-country air strikes. Upon receipt of instructions to execute a ROLLING THUNDER mission, the US Ambassador notified the Prime Minister, COMUSMACV notified CINCRVNAF and the Minister of Defense, and the Cdr 2d AD informed Cdr, VNAF, of his target assignments. CINCPAC assigned missions directly to the Cdr 2d AD, by-passing COMUSMACV. COMUSMACV requested authority to cancel CINCPACAF control when more lucrative targets appeared in-country inasmuch as such missions had a higher priority than out-of-country strikes.183,184

(TS) In a peace move, a standdown of armed reconnaissance and strike missions was ordered 13-18 May; during this period an intensive photo reconnaissance program over NVN was conducted. News commentary widely speculated over probable reactions by the Hanoi government to this action. A 16 May Gallup Poll survey revealed that 59 percent of Americans favored continued bombing of NVN, 21 percent thought it should cease and 20 percent had no opinion. Minority oppositions in the US included such expressions as found in the April editorial of the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists which stated:

> The present American policy of "carrying the war to North Vietnam" amounts in effect to an admission of defeat in South Vietnam . . . . Our situation is not so desperate as to call for desperate measures. Even the total loss of Vietnam would not mean the loss of Southeast Asia.

(TS) In mid-June, while considering the idea of destroying the SA-2 missile defenses in the Hanoi-Haiphong area and the MIG-capable Phuc Yen Airbase, COMUSMACV expressed the

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view that such offensive actions should include destruction of all NVN jet air bases. Preparations for reprisals, including CHICOM intervention, should be made. Special attention should be given to acts aimed at destruction of US air forces in SVN; such a loss would have a great adverse effect on the entire counterinsurgency effort.[185]

(TS) On 24 June COMUSMACV presented the following possible courses of action for US air operations against NVN: 1) use B-52's against military targets in remote areas, 2) interdict the Nanning-Hanoi-Kunming railroad which carried 10 percent of all tonnages for Hanoi, 3) mine Haiphong, 4) conduct leaflet operations and 5) continue air interdiction of LOC's. At the same time, he stated his belief that US and world opinion should be prepared for the rigors that lay ahead.[186]

(S) ROLLING THUNDER sorties increased to 900 during August 1965. The first aircraft loss to NVN SAM fire occurred on 12 August. Special mission "Iron Hand" was undertaken to locate SAM sites for armed reconnaissance missions.[187] This mission later resulted in reducing the number of sorties available for ROLLING THUNDER.

(S) On 26 September, all Hanoi newspapers published editorials, special articles, photos and statistics to support claims of destroying 600 US aircraft since August 1964. The actual number lost over NVN through 26 September was 114, 57 USAF and 57 USN. NVN public announcements obviously were meant for psychological purposes, particularly in view of the continuing sustained air operations over NVN.[188]

(TS) On 9 September a USMACV press release stated: "four USAF F-105's struck a railroad bridge in NVN approximately 17 miles south of the Chinese border and 140 miles NW of Hanoi. The target was closer to the Chinese border than any target yet hit." In a 10 September message to COMUSMACV, CINCPAC cited JCS and CINCPAC ROLLING THUNDER directives which prohibited armed reconnaissance closer than 30 miles from the CHICOM border. Investigation revealed that 2d AD reports did not confirm the action described in the press release and it was doubtful if there was an actual bombing within the 30 mile zone. In any case, CINCPAC declared that there should never have been any release to the press which was not in accordance with US policy and which emphasized closeness to the Chinese border. CINCPAC regarded it as essential

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that effective preventive measures be undertaken. It had been a hard struggle in Washington to state ground rules in a manner which would allow the tactical commander maximum latitude for effective action. But press access even to inadvertent errors could ultimately result in demands for restrictions which would seriously hamper air operations.[189]

(C) In September, US aircraft were suspected of bombing a bridge over the Ben Hai River in the DMZ on two separate occasions. Since air attacks in the DMZ were forbidden, an investigation and report of the incidents to the International Control Commission (ICC) was necessary. On 23 September, COMUSMACV reported to CINCPAC that, although he had no official cognizance over the conduct of 2d AD and 7th Flt air missions over NVN, he had, as the senior military officer in SEASIA, responsibilities for reporting DMZ military incidents to the US Ambassador so that the ICC would be informed. He directed Cdr, 2d AD and 7th Flt In O to investigate. A thorough investigation by 2d AD revealed that one F-100 based at Korat, Thailand did expend ordnance at the south end of the bridge causing considerable damage to life and property. The 7th Flt Liaison Officer (LO) reported that the evidence did not support USN involvement in the other strike. COMUSMACV recognized that there was no conclusive proof linking the strike to a carrier based aircraft but circumstantial evidence convinced him that such did occur. He informed CINCPAC that this represented a somewhat lose and awkward situation. While not suggesting a modification of operational control arrangements, COMUSMACV felt that CINCPAC might consider designating COMUSMACV his agent to handle similar investigations in the future.[190]

(TS) In an early September evaluation of ROLLING THUNDER targeting and tactics, COMUSMACV concluded that improvements were in order. On 23 September, he requested reorientation of ROLLING THUNDER targets as it was becoming increasingly apparent that a number of designated targets were no longer lucrative. Some barracks appeared unoccupied; others had been dismantled and moved. There were no secondary explosions at some ammunition depots but there were some in nearby wooded areas. A significant portion of ROLLING THUNDER efforts and resources appeared to have been wasted. COMUSMACV recommended:[191] 1) greater diversification of assigned ROLLING THUNDER targets, 2) discontinuance of strikes against targets that were obviously unoccupied and/or had been subject to multiple strikes, 3) areas adjacent to targets which could

conceal troop facilities, supplies and ammunition be designated for attack, and 4) target selection be permitted wider latitude and strikes be in an irregular time pattern. Within six weeks, COMUSMACV detected a definite improvement. [192]

(S) By mid-October, a total of 13,000 ROLLING THUNDER armed reconnaissance sorties had been flown. On 17 October, the first NVN operational SAM site was completely destroyed northwest of Hanoi. [193]

(C) In early November, CINCPAC requested information to insure maximum effectiveness in the application of air power. He pointed out to COMUSMACV that the emphasis of ROLLING THUNDER had gradually shifted from strikes on large, significant, JCS fixed targets to a wide ranging armed reconnaissance program, and that planning and analyzing for the latter program greatly differed from that for the former. The activities involved in the armed reconnaissance program required the combined efforts of component services and timely assessments of ROLLING THUNDER operations in relation to other factors. [194] COMUSMACV was in a good position to provide this data because modus operandi and effectiveness of ROLLING THUNDER were constantly being evaluated since it affected the aircraft resources available for operations in SVN and Laos. [195] CINCPAC's ROLLING THUNDER armed reconnaissance operations were divided into the following priority tasks: [196] 1) photo reconnaissance planning and exploitation in support of combat air operations, 2) route/area armed reconnaissance to collect information, to present an inhibiting presence and threat of destruction through frequent day and night surveillance, 3) attack on fleeting targets, 4) interdiction of NVN LOC's by destruction of bridges, ferries, bypasses and LOC support facilities, and 5) disruption, harassment and attrition of military support activities within authorized areas of operation.

(S) In mid-November, COMUSMACV evaluated the SA-2 missile system and concluded that the weapon was not as formidable as expected. He noted that highly effective techniques and tactics had been developed to counter it. [197]

(S) In November 1965, Cdr, 2d AD developed more specific procedures for aircraft operating near the DMZ. [198] COMUSMACV considered the plan an excellent insurance against a DMZ violation and forwarded it to CINCPACAF for CINCPAC consideration. The plan required ground radar positioning of aircraft striking targets within 20 miles of the DMZ. COMUSMACV noted, however, that COMSEVENFLT did not agree to this restriction stating that strikes on targets north of the DMZ under good

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weather conditions should be left to the pilot's prerogative insofar as navigation and target identification were concerned. COMUSMACV considered this procedure inadequate. [199]

(U) December ROLLING THUNDER operations accelerated until the 24th when terminated by the Christmas truce. [200] This halt, which was conceived originally as a one day cessation of hostilities, was extended for the remainder of 1965 and well into the new year as an effort by the President to convince the world of the US desire for a peaceful settlement of the war. While subsequent events proved Hanoi's lack of interest in such a settlement, the halt did permit a thorough evaluation of the ROLLING THUNDER program.

(S) USAF jet pilots logged 10,570 strike sorties and dropped 23,610 tons of bombs over NVN in 1965. The operations which expanded over the areas authorized for strikes covered most of the country outside of the Hanoi-Haiphong area. Several hundred bridges had been destroyed or damaged, thousands of primarily military type buildings smashed, roads and railways interdicted, runways of several airfields cratered and numerous anti-aircraft and SAM sites and radar installations attacked. During the last few months of 1965, an estimated 300 vehicles were destroyed in NVN month. [201]

(S) When ROLLING THUNDER operations began on 2 March 1965, it was hoped that Hanoi would be pressured to cease its aggression through increasing strikes on selected NVN targets accompanied with the threat of more massive losses. But even in early 1965, CINCPAC held the view that the US leaders should realize that punitive attacks and the threat of destruction of capital resources of NVN probably would not bring Hanoi to the conference table. Ho Chi Minh had never doubted victory. From CINCPAC's point of view, the prospect of eventual VC defeat might convince NVN/VC leaders that they should seek other alternatives to their objectives. The immediate objective of ROLLING THUNDER operations was thus to make it as difficult and as costly as possible for NVN to continue its support of the VC. [202]

(U) Press reports in late 1965 showed mixed reactions to NVN bombing: The US News & World Report on 6 December reported that

> Demand is growing both in the US and in South Vietnam for stepped-up actions against North Vietnam due to casualty lists that week by week are growing longer, and appearance of more and more pictures of American dead and wounded are feeding this demand. Behind the pressure for a change in the rules, to

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> permit expanded war against North Vietnam, is a growing feeling that the US is being sucked into another Korea-type war on the ground, a war that could drag on for years and still end in a stalemate.

Associated Press military writer Fred Hoffman summed up 10 months of NVN bombing on 20 November as "far from a success" because it had failed to cut down the flow of NVN soldiers and supplies to the south and had reportedly inflicted "no basic dislocation" in the north. There were conflicting reports on the effect of the bombing on the NVN population. There is no evidence that the punishment has significantly impaired the will of the NVN to carry on, Seymour Topping of the New York Times wrote from Saigon on 10 December. Writer Felix Greene, back from a visit to NVN, was quoted by the Associated Press in London on 12 December 1965 as saying: "The bombing of their country has united the NVN as nothing else could have done." But Roscoe Drummond in the New York Herald Tribune wrote from Washington on December 13:

> Civilian morale in Communist North Vietnam is beginning to hurt . . . (official) articles are insistent that much more needs to be done 'to consolidate the rear' and in their very insistence they show that Hanoi is increasingly worried about the state of public morale as the air strikes of the US and South Vietnamese mount.

(TS) However CINCPAC, in evaluating the overall effectiveness of ROLLING THUNDER, stated that there had been significant disruptions which US/FWMAF could capitalize on if operations were to be resumed after the stand-down. NVN had been forced to expend great effort to repair roads and bridges and to prepare defense of urban areas for possible attack. Necessary internal operations had been severely disrupted and military support for the VC and Pathet Lao had been slowed, but not slowed enough. Reconstruction of communications links had been designated as a primary strategic problem and numerous NVN citizens had to be organized into repair gangs. The NVA had been given the supervision of reconstruction in damaged areas, which no doubt detracted from their military duties. As a reflection of these pressures, the NVN news agency in Hanoi had been increasing the tempo of propaganda relating to US air attacks. These facts and others indicated that Hanoi had felt the pressure and that US/RVN were presuming that the NVN government was faced growing internal problems. [203]

(TS) In light of limited objectives of the air campaign

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over NVN, CINCPAC continued, ROLLING THUNDER had done quite well. On the other hand, ROLLING THUNDER operations had not been conducted in such a manner sufficient to increase the pressure on Hanoi in late 1965. Targets vital to effective military operations had not been struck in significant numbers. Military and civilian activities had accommodated to limited operations. In fact, the psychological pressure had decreased but regardless of how ROLLING THUNDER had been conducted, the important fact was that the nature of the war had changed since the NVN air campaign began. ROLLING THUNDER had not forced Hanoi to the decision which the US had sought. There was now every indication that Ho Chi Minh intended to continue support of the VC until denied the capability to do so. He had the politico-economic support of the CHICOM's which had increased his obligation to that regime. This, together with pressure from that direction to continue support, probably left him little alternative. This resolve had caused a significant change in the complexion of NVN support to the VC. With this final conclusion, CINCPAC recommended resumption of the program. [204]

YANKEE TEAM/BARREL ROLL/STEEL TIGER/TIGER HOUND

(S) In January 1964, various studies were made analyzing the reasons for the effectiveness of VC infiltration into SVN. One such study was conducted by a US group under CINCPAC. The group concluded that: 1) VC infiltration of personnel and equipment was taking place in undetermined but sufficient quantities successfully to support and supply VC military operations and 2) the primary source of supply continued to be from NVN via Laos and Cambodia with deliveries by porters on foot trails, by boat and sampans on rivers and canals and along the coast by larger sea going craft. [205] After intensive study and analysis, COMUSMACV concluded in early 1964 that control of the borders, as a means of checking infiltration, was feasible. [206]

(TS) These were the conditions which gave impetus to the concept and initiation of air operations over areas contiguous to the SVN border. On 19 May 1964, YANKEE TEAM air reconnaissance flights over Laos began using USAF RF-101 aircraft based in Thailand. The initial JCS directive provided for a short term effort of low-level photo-reconnaissance missions during daylight hours. [207] However, JCS later authorized the establishment of a continuing program for these missions. Conducted by USAF and USN aircraft, the YANKEE TEAM missions had the following objectives: 1) provide timely tactical intelligence for use by friendly forces in Laos, 2) substantiate the extent and scope of infiltration of war material, troops and resources from NVN via Laos into SVN, 3) provide a psychological boost to the Laotian, Thai and other friendly forces in SEASIA, and 4) demonstrate overtly to the

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communist forces the US concern over, and determination to stay in, SEASIA. The YANKEE TEAM forces were responsive to the requirements of the US country team in Laos and to COMUSMACV, CINCPAC, CJCS and higher authority. [208]

(S) The YANKEE TEAM program grew at a substantial rate during 1964 and was continued throughout 1965. [209]

(TS) At the beginning of 1965, COMUSMACV faced not only the harsh military reality that the "neutral" territory of Laos was being used by NVN for infiltration of thousands of soldiers, but that there was increasing evidence that Cambodia also was being used as a VC sanctuary. [210] RVNAF and US intelligence indicated that ammunition, explosives, arms and military equipment were being shipped from Haiphong, NVN, up the Mekong River to Sihanoukville, Cambodia, and then transported overland into SVN. [211]

(TS) To limit the infiltration of military materials and enemy personnel into SVN by land, COMUSMACV in 1965 launched an air bombing program in the Laotian Panhandle and in the northern Laos area. The overall objective of the bombing program was destruction of VC/Pathet Lao/NVN bases and interdiction of the enemy's overland infiltration of material and men. The air effort was designed to block passes, interdict road segments, destroy convoys moving both day and night, destroy bridges, supplies, ammunition and POL depots. Armed reconnaissance and tactical air interdiction operations over the NE portion of Laos started in December 1964 under the code name BARREL ROLL. In April 1965, BARREL ROLL operations were divided as a result of a second program, called STEEL TIGER, which covered that portion of the Laos Panhandle south of the 17th parallel. [212] In the first part of 1965 the original BARREL ROLL/STEEL TIGER target list contained 42 military installations, supply areas and bridges. By July the list of targets was expanded to 147 to include truck parks, open storage areas, road segments and choke points (road defiles). [213]

(S) During the year, air operations over Laos were conducted by Thailand, SVN and CVA based aircraft. Resources available at these bases and command relationships are discussed in Chapter II. Initially, only Thai-based aircraft were used in this program. In April, aircraft based in SVN commenced to supplement the program, and COMSEVENTHFLT allocated sorties which were excess to ROLLING THUNDER requirements. By December, COMUSMACV was authorized to allocate sorties on a priority basis from all available sources to BARREL ROLL/STEEL TIGER (see below). [214]

(S) YANKEE TEAM stepped up its photo reconnaissance operations

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starting early in 1965 to support both BARREL ROLL and STEEL TIGER. STEEL TIGER armed reconnaissance/strike missions began in April with 90 sorties flown out of 104 scheduled. During the month of June STEEL TIGER dropped to 41 sorties flown out of 73 scheduled due primarily to monsoons and strike cancellations caused by higher priority operations. BARREL ROLL, starting with 13 missions in February reached a cumulative total of 255 missions flown out of 338 scheduled by 30 June. Weather was the major limiting factor. [215]

(TS) Between 1 January and 18 June 1965, 326 BARREL ROLL/ STEEL TIGER missions were flown, of which 155 were armed reconnaissance and 163 were missions attacking highway choke points. The remaining 8 missions were strikes against military area targets only. The initial emphasis was on armed reconnaissance missions. However, in July the program was adjusted to include major strikes against fixed targets, and armed reconnaissance became, in effect, a secondary mission. [216]

(TS) COMUSMACV recognized that securing the infiltration routes through Laos would not necessarily deny communist access to RVN. The communists could extend and expand their LOC's through Cambodia, and on the sea. Therefore, COMUSMACV had to consider a naval blockade of Cambodian ports and coastal areas, and expand counter-sea infiltration efforts in RVN. Consideration had also been given to the deployment of US ground forces in Laos to block infiltration. The US Ambassador to Laos in early 1965 point out that, for political reasons, Laotian leaders would probably strenuously object to the deployment of massive US forces in their country. [217]

(TS) In July 1965, COMUSMACV believed air strikes, following possibly by hit and run ground raids with air support, was the most feasible action to reduce infiltration. A major ground action would require the commitment of excessive forces. [218] Since only meagre reliable intelligence data on NVN activities in the southern Panhandle of Laos was available, COMUSMACV stated that an expanded effort, to include cross-border operations of small intelligence gathering units, was necessary. [219] Among his recommendations to SECDEF were proposals to establish: 1) ground/airmobile observer teams in Laos; 2) a tactical air control system that could bring all of COMUSMACV's varied assets to bear on the targets; 3) "free strike" zones suspected of containing bivouacs, rest stops and supply areas; and 4) armed reconnaissance missions to cover rivers known or suspected to support infiltration. [220]

(S) In early September, in an effort to improve the detection and interdiction of infiltration through the Laotian Panhandle, COMUSMACV tasked his staff to explore the possibility of using III

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MAF's Air Wing for armed reconnaissance missions south of the 17th parallel. 2d AD had found this mission difficult to accomplish because long endurance sorties of Thai-based F-105 and in-country F-100 aircraft required refueling for which a shortage of tankers existed. [221]

(TS) On 25 September, COMUSMACV requested CINCPAC's approval of an expanded air interdiction program to check the reported increasing infiltration through the southern part of the Laotian Panhandle. [222] CINCPAC agreed that COMUSMACV could use more SVN based aircraft for additional interdiction in Laos, but advised him not to use Thailand based aircraft because of the sensitivity of US air operations based in Thailand. CINCPAC concurred in USMACV plans; execution of the program was contingent on coordination and approval of US Embassy, Vientiane. [223]

(TS) In November CINCPAC established an SOP for missions (which had been individually approved since May 1965) in which USMACV and PACFLT aircraft would conduct armed reconnaissance to strike targets of opportunity in BARREL ROLL and STEEL TIGER areas. BARREL ROLL operations were limited to the northern areas of the Laotian Panhandle bounded by a line from the confluence of Nan Ca Ding and Man Muone rivers to the Laos/NVN border at a point just north of the Nape Pass. STEEL TIGER operations were to be conducted in that portion of the Panhandle south of the BARREL ROLL areas. [224] Both BARREL ROLL and STEEL TIGER operations were restricted to targets and routes for armed reconnaissance as approved by the US Embassy, Vientiane, and promulgated by COMUSMACV, or his designated representative. COMUSMACV was designated as coordinating authority. Numerous stringent rules defined the assigned responsibilities. [225]

(TS) On 21 December the US Embassy, Vientiane, published a revised "list" for BARREL ROLL and STEEL TIGER validated targets consisting of: [226] 1) validated targets of major significance, 2) validated targets of lesser significance, and 3) validated targets, regardless of significance which could not be struck for political or military reasons. Targets remained on the "non-strike" list as long as political or other considerations by either US or Laos prevented their execution. Once targets were placed on list 1 they could be struck at COMUSMACV's direction until effectively destroyed, or it could become a target of lesser significance on list 2. If political considerations required adjustments, the target could be placed back on list 3. Target approval procedures for air operations over Laos were cumbersome and complex. Coordination with the US Embassy, Bangkok, was required when aircraft based in Thailand were used in missions flown against Laotian targets. [227] Initially, approvals were sought separately for each planned mission. In early October,

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COMUSMACV requested the Ambassador's approval of weekly target schedules. The Ambassador replied that the list of BARREL ROLL/ STEEL TIGER missions, accompanying the request, lacked detail, without which approval could not be considered. He insisted on details of the type contained in OPREP-1's such as targets to be hit and routes to be cratered. [228] In the meantime, Cdr, 2d AD expressed his concern over further restrictions imposed upon air operations over Laos. He cited a specific case in a discussion early in October with COMUSMACV regarding the Royal Laotian Government's (RLG) restrictions on STEEL TIGER strikes: no attacks on inhabited areas; no attacks more than 200 yds away from LOC's approved for armed reconnaissance; and no attacks on antiaircraft weapons' concentrations unless they interfered with mission accomplishment. [229] Positive visual identification by flight leaders prior to attack was mandatory. These restrictions sometimes made the accomplishment of missions extremely difficult. The Cdr, 2d AD requested COMUSMACV's approval for the use of FAC's to direct strike aircraft.

(TS) In October COMUSMACV in a message to CINCPAC stated that infiltration of NVA forces had been greater than expected. VC action in the SVN highlands appeared designed to protect infiltration routes and to fragment ARVN general reserve forces. COMUSMACV requested that the US Ambassador, Vientiane, fully support a strike program against infiltration routes. [230] COMUSMACV reviewed with CINCPAC the difficulties in satisfying the targeting requirements fo US Embassy, Vientiane. As a result arrangements were made for interested agencies to meet periodically with US Embassy, Vietiane to develop suitable targets. [231]

(TS) On 24 November, the US Ambassador, Vientiane, concurred with COMUSMACV's request to the JCS for B-52 strikes against VC concentrations along the Laos/SVN border. He cautioned, however, that any public statement regarding the strikes should describe it as "just another mission in SVN". [232]

(TS) On 25 November, US Embassy, Vientiane approved the use of defoliants on infiltration routes in the Panhandle of Laos. In anticipation of communist propaganda which might capitalise on this, he suggested that the US comment that air reconnaissance had been conducted over Laos at RLG request since May 1964. [233]

(TS) Sorties over Laos totaled 1,282 in November, including strike and reconnaissance flights. Beginning 20 November the interdiction program in southern Laos was substantially increased. During the week 20-26 November more than 250 sorties were flown with 21 bridges reported destroyed or damaged, 28 roads cuts reported, and our troop concentrations attacked. Strikes of this magnitude should have significantly reduced the flow of troops and supplies into the RVN, but infiltration rates appeared to remain

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on an upward trend.[234]

(S) The increasing NVA infiltration through Laos was a major concern of the Command. In late November COMUSMACV established the TIGER HOUND program to counter this buildup. A joint organization was established under the Cdr, 2d AD. USAF and USA aircraft would acquire targets using visual reconnaissance, SLAR and IR techniques which would then be struck by USAF, USMC and USN aircraft. Missions began on 5 December.[235]

(TS) During his November trip to Saigon, the SECDEF was informed that the STEEL TIGER operation had not been fully effective in containing the infiltration of men and material. The communists had been infiltrating major NVA forces into SVN through the Laotian Panhandle in increasing numbers; the enemy had devoted major engineering efforts building roads by-passing choke points, camouflaging route segments, repairing portage areas on major roads previously damaged by repeated air strikes; and was probably infiltrating up to 300 tons of supplies daily into SVN. The southeastern portion of the Panhandle contained the best potential targets, but US aircraft were not permitted to operate in any substantial degree in the southern Panhandle area until November when RLG granted limited approval for US operations in the area.[236]

(TS) Soon after the SECDEF November conference COMUSMACV changed the functional responsibilities for the Laotian bombing program. On 10 December he delegated coordinating authority to the Cdr, 2d AD.[237] The Cdr, 2d AD was assigned complete responsibility for planning, scheduling, coordinating and executing air operations in support of the Laos interdiction programs and YANKEE TEAM. COMUSMACV retained overall responsibility and furnished policy guidance in accordance with instructions from higher authority.[238] Centralizing responsibility for these programs under Cdr, 2d AD, was directed because of the need for closer coordination of plans and operations.[239]

(TS) The Cdr, 2d AD, coordinated matters pertaining to operational aspects of these programs with the appropriate US Embassy (Vientiane and Bangkok). Matters pertaining to policy, as differentiated from the actual execution of air operations, were referred to COMUSMACV. The Cdr, 2d AD, acting for COMUSMACV, submitted nominated targets to Vientiane for validation. TIGER HOUND was accorded intelligence priority support sufficient to insure rapid responsive targeting. Procedures for requesting and coordinating YANKEE TEAM reconnaissance remained in effect. The YANKEE TEAM program responsibility was

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retained by COMUSMACV. The 2d AD supported the YANKEE TEAM program in the Laotian Panhandle and in the BARREL ROLL areas in northern Laos. [240]

(TS) NVA/VC infiltration/exfiltration along the SVN/Cambodian border also concerned COMUSMACV. On 9 December, COMUSMACV informed CINCPAC that the border area of Cambodia contained motorable infiltration routes, command centers, base training and supply areas similar to those in Laos. Not until late 1965 had the full range of the enemy's effort in infiltration become apparent, and even then COMUSMACV could not produce any "legal" evidence. [241] COMUSMACV requested that he be authorized to conduct the following actions whenever US troops operated in areas adjacent to the Cambodian border: use of artillery and air strikes against enemy weapons firing against US troops from positions up to 10 kilometers within the Cambodian side of the border; maneuver of US ground troops up to 2 kilometers into Cambodia if necessary for the preservation of the force or the attainment of the objective within SVN; use of observation aircraft and airborne FAC's in support of US operations; and the flying of reconnaissance and surveillance missions within a 10 kilometer strip on the Cambodian side of the border. [242]

(TS) On 17 December CINCPAC replied to COMUSMACV that in each instance, when planning operations near the Cambodian/RVN border, advance approval of necessary actions or counter-actions against VC/NVN forces was required. [243] COMUSMACV, on 21 December, so informed his commanders. [244] He stated that, in emergency situations, US forces were authorized to take necessary counteractions in exercise of the right of self-defense against VC/NVA attacks directed at US/RVNAF forces from locations inside Cambodia. COMUSMACV would be kept closely advised. An emergency situation was considered to exist when in the judgment of the Commander, the urgency for taking timely counteractions in self-defense of US/Allied forces precluded obtaining prior approval. As necessary, such counteractions could include air and artillery strikes against enemy firing from the Cambodian side of the border against US/RVNAF troops. Also permitted was maneuver by US troops, while in actual contact with VC/VNA forces, into Cambodia as necessary for preservation of the force. This authority was to provide for the defense of RVN and of US/Allied forces, and would not be applied toward widening the war in SEASIA. The military Commander retained the right to defend his command against armed attack with all means at his disposal. Commanders were advised that in the event of such attack, immediate aggressive action would be taken against attacking forces. [245]

(U) A summary of the accomplishments and expectations for the BARREL ROLL-STEEL TIGER-TIGER HOUND programs was presented during the SECDEF's visit to SVN 28-29 November, and is discussed below. [246]

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(TS) Despite the limited effort committed to the BARREL ROLL program[247] during the rainy season, it had achieved some success in containing the communist advance in northern Laos. As an example of this effort, 400 manned strike sorties of all types were flown from 1-25 November. This included an average of about 6.3 sorties per day from the Thai-based on-call strike force. Some indications of effectiveness were:

1) Food shortages and associated native dissatisfaction with communist forces as reported by refugees and captured enemy troops.

2) Resupply of the enemy forces by road had been brought to a virtual standstill.

3) Noticeable improvement of Royal Laotian Forces (RLF) morale and aggressiveness.

However, increased air strikes during the rainy season were necessary to check communist commitments in northern Laos. These operations would have a direct effect on the war in the south by draining off NVN resources into northern Laos.

(S) The major change required to achieve success in the BARREL ROLL program was to increase the strike effort to insure that northern Laos operations were not adversely affected by ROLLING THUNDER and STEEL TIGER priorities. Effectiveness could be further enhanced by permitting more flexibility in the rules of engagement which were then as restrictive as those applicable to STEEL TIGER in southern Laos.

(TS) The STEEL TIGER operation[248] had not achieved full effectiveness in interdicting the infiltration of men and materials. Major NVA forces had been and were continuing to infiltrate through the Laotian Panhandle. The enemy also had devoted major engineering efforts to new road construction and bypass of choke points. Route segments and portaging areas were camouflaged. Major roads previously damaged by US air strikes were repaired. As a result of these efforts, it was estimated that up to 300 tons of supplies could be infiltrated into SVN daily. In mid-November, when RLG opened the southern Panhandle to US armed reconnaissance and interdiction, COMUSMACV requested 100 sorties per day in the STEEL TIGER area. A comparison of sortie rates indicates the stepped up tempo of operations in the STEEL TIGER area, particularly in the lower Panhandle. Prior to 19 November, 25 sorties per day had been allocated to STEEL TIGER. It was planned to increase this rate to 50 sorties per day for the ten day period beginning 19 November. However, because of restrictions on the timing of programmed strikes, the planned sortie

rate for the period 20-25 November was further increased to an average of 72.5 per day.

(S) However, weather and accelerated requirements for ROLLING THUNDER forced cancellation or diversion of many of these STEEL TIGER missions. An average of 17.8 sorties per day were flown prior to 20 November while an average of 39.5 sorties per day were flown from 20-25 November. Most of the sorties flown prior to 19 November had been armed reconnaissance and as a secondary mission had seeded and cratered roads, thus creating choke points. After 20 November at least 20 sorties had cratered or seeded roads daily. The peak effort for any one day was on 24 November when 55 road cratering and armed reconnaissance sorties were flown. These increased efforts were expected to result in a sizeable reduction in, or at least a slow down of infiltration activities.[249]

(TS) COMUSMACV and his staff were in constant contact with the US Ambassador, Vientiane, in an effort to improve and expand US operations throughout Laos, particularly with respect to the southeastern Panhandle area. Unfortunately there were Lao, Kha, and various Montagnard tribesmen in the areas because of which the RLG and the US Ambassador were reluctant to permit any form of a carte blanche strike program. In view of then recent intelligence, a proposal was made to the US Ambassador in Vientiane to define an area in Laos contiguous to SVN under exclusive enemy control. Within this area streamlined approval procedures would be applied to increase responsiveness in striking newly discovered targets. Target approval procedures in the past had been quite rigid and formalized, requiring extensive photography, photo interpretation, collation, and briefing. Final approval was made by RLG. This required laborious transporting of the targeting materials from Hawaii or Saigon to Udorn (2d AD's HQ in Thailand) or Savannakhet Royal Laotian Air Force (RLAF) HQ and Vientiane.

(TS) Project TIGER HOUND[250] developed and tested operationally in late December a highly responsive Airborne Command and Control system for gaining RLAF strike approval for targets discovered within a limited area by US FAC's intimately familiar with the area. Strike approval had been obtained from RLAF through an elaborate communications net until it was proposed that Lao observers fly with the US FAC's and grant on-the-spot approval. This procedure would be similar to that established in SVN where approval by the province chief was obtained prior to each strike. Although the required communications system would necessarily be more extensive and needed further testing, it seemed to be an

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acceptable method of reducing the time required for obtaining target approval.

(TS) The TIGER HOUND rules of engagement permitted unlimited armed reconnaissance along all motorable roads within a specified area of the Laos Panhandle. However, only targets of opportunity which were within 200 yards of the road could be struck. Beyond 200 yards from motorable roads or anywhere outside the specified geographical area, strikes could be made only on previously approved RLAF targets or those targets marked by RLAF FAC's. Infiltration trails or way stations could not be attacked. Napalm could not be employed.

(S) In summary, procedures and programs were being established which gave every indication of considerably enhancing US efforts to counter infiltration through Laos. The SECDEF's response to these plans indicated full support for requirements generated by them.[251]

(U) See Figure IV-1 for US/VNAF aircraft losses during 1965 in operations over SVN, NVN and Laos.

ARVN OPERATIONS

(C) In 1965, RVNAF was assigned two primary objectives: 1) to defeat VC forces in SVN and to force their withdrawal and 2) to extend GVN control in SVN. In order to accomplish these objectives, the missions assigned to ARVN were to: 1) destroy or drive off organized VC military forces; 2) harass VC secret bases and lines of communications; 3) control national boundaries and 4) provide elements of the general reserve, corps reserve, division reserve, and sometimes sector and sub-sector reserve. ARVN also had the mission to defend key installations and axes of communication in situations where RF were not available. The following summaries of selected operations illustrate ARVN attempts to fulfill these missions. They are representative of success, failure, lessons learned, or demonstration of a new tactic or trend.

(S) One of the most successful operations of the year, QUYET THANG 127, was conducted near the village of An Ninh, Binh Dinh Province, on 14 March. Intelligence reports indicated the presence of a PW camp located near the village, guarded by an estimated VC company. The operation began with the helilift of two companies of the 3d Abn Bn to an LZ near the village, with two companies in reserve. Landing at 1000, the helicopter-borne force searched the area, liberated 38 friendly PW's and evacuated them by 1215. The two companies then received a change in mission and assaulted a VC village,

killing five VC. The unit was extracted at 1800 and suffered no losses. This action was significant in its extensive use of intelligence, thorough planning and vigorous execution.[252]

(S) DAN CHI 129 was a six-battalion search and destroy operation under 21st Inf Div control, which forced an engagement on two VC main force battalions. The operation took place 4-6 April in Kien Long District, Chuong Thien Province near the edge of the U Minh forest. Operations were planned for this area because the U Minh forest was a known VC sanctuary. Friendly forces consisted of the 33d Inf Regt, minus one battalion; the 1st and 2d Bns, 31st Inf; 42d Ranger Bn; 44th Ranger Bn; four RF companies; one APC troop; the 26th RAG; and 18th River Boat Co, supported by one platoon of 105-mm howitzers and four platoons of 155-mm howitzers.

(S) The scheme of maneuver was to move the 26th RAG and 18th River Boat Co, along waterways to Kien Long District, transporting the 2d Bn, 31st Inf, which was to provide protection for the force and remove obstacles and vegetation. Two battalions of the 33d Regt were to conduct a heliborne assault into a LZ west to secure the water route for the flotilla, then move further west to the U Minh forest. The 1st Bn, 31st Inf, and the APC troop were to advance NW to an objective area at the edge of the U Minh forest. Two RF companies were to block along the province border [illegible] of the LZ. The two Ranger battalions were in reserve.

( ) The heliborne assault forces moved out as scheduled on 4 April and captured 25 VC suspects. On 5 April, at 1620, the flotilla was ambushed along the Cai Nua canal. The heliborne force, which was supposed to have secured the waterway, had a difficult time getting through the swamps and could not link up. One Landing Craft Vehicle, Personnel (LCVP) was sunk, one French Patrol Boat (PCF) damaged and one naval advisor killed. The 2d Bn, 31st Inf debarked and attacked, killing 70 VC and capturing one, while sustaining 4 KIA and 24 WIA. Since it was obvious that the 33d Inf could not link up in time, plans were changed to helilift one or both Ranger battalions into the new objective instead of ground exploitation by the 33d. On 6 April following air strikes on the new objective, the 1st Bn, 31st Inf, and the M113 troop began their attack and soon made contact. Ground fire grew in intensity and at 0925 an A-1H was downed. At 0955, two armed helicopters were downed. By this time the M113 troop was heavily engaged. Division HQ then committed the 44th Rangers. The VC force was estimated at two battalions and were well dug in. The M113 troop, 1st Bn, 31st Inf, and 44th

Rangers converged on a triangle north of the aircraft wreckage and fought steadily until 1700. The division commander then called off the engagement because the VC had a well prepared defense in depth, the endurance of friendly troops was lagging, and he wished to preserve the high fighting spirit of the troops. Friendly losses were 22 KIA (6 US), 85 WIA, one A-1H destroyed, two UH-1B's destroyed, one LCVP sunk, two M113's damaged, and one FOM boat damaged. Enemy losses were 278 KIA, 7 VCC, 25 VCS, one 75-mm RR, four MG's, two 60-mm mortars, three rocket launchers, 44 individual weapons, 200 structures destroyed and four junks sunk. This operation was noteworthy for the aggressive spirit displayed by the troops and the ability of commanders to adjust rapidly to changes in plans. For its part in the operation, the 44th Ranger Bn was subsequently awarded the US Presidential Unit Citation.[253]

(S) The battle of the An Thai hamlet, QUYET THANG 131, occurred on 7-9 April in the northernmost district of Binh Dinh Province during a road clearing operation. The 22d Inf Div intended to reopen Route 1 between Hoa Nhon District capital and the Quang Ngai Province border. On 1 April, an infantry battalion and an M113 troop task force moved north from the district capital, followed on 3 April by two VNMC battalions moving by helicopter near the province border. No resistance was encountered. On 4 April the task force pulled out, leaving the VNMC battalions to secure the northern portion of the road. One company of the 2d Marine Bn drew fire as it crossed a bridge near the village of An Thai. Even though air and artillery were called in, the VC fire was not suppressed. The company was reinforced by another from the same battalion, but still could not force its way through. Soon the remainder of the battalion closed on An Thai and the company across the river pulled back to the hamlet. Defensive positions were set up utilizing VC trenches around the hamlet. The position was attacked by, an estimated reinforced VC battalion every half hour from 0100 to 0430. At 0500, a human-wave attack penetrated the western portion of the perimeter. At first light the battalion commander ordered a counter-attack followed by a short pursuit. Friendly losses were 4 KIA and 22 WIA. The VC lost 205 KIA ten captured, 43 individual weapons, six machine guns, nine automatic rifles and one radio. This battle illustrated what could be accomplished by a highly trained unit, occupying sound defensive positions, and inspired by good leadership. In this battle these factors overcame the numerical superiority of the enemy.[254]

(S) The decision to enter the southernmost part of Kien Hoa Province, unvisited by RVN troops for 15 months, to penetrate a secret VC base, was based on three months of intelligence effort. The operation, TIEN GIANG 19/65, was planned in

three phases. The first phase, bombing of selected targets, occurred one month before troop deployment and was immediately followed by Phase II, the psywar effort, telling people to seek refuge outside the VC-controlled area. More than 3,000 villagers responded. As of 28 April when Phase III, the active part of the operation, began the known VC force consisted of two companies guarding a secret base plus 200 to 300 recruits in training. Friendly forces consisted of two infantry battalions and an armored cavalry troop as Task Force Alpha, plus one infantry battalion and one Ranger battalion as the airmobile force. Another Ranger battalion and an infantry battalion were kept in reserve. Support was furnished by an artillery battery of 105-mm howitzers and a platoon of 155-mm howitzers. The VNN and 21st RAG provided shore bombardment, blockade of the coast, and amphibious transport for the operation.

(S) The plan was to land the amphibious force (Task Force Alpha) on two beaches on the SW coast of Kien Hoa Province after a ten-minute naval bombardment and air strikes. One hour later, air strikes were to precede the landing of the airmobile force on two LZ's 8 kilometers NE of the beachhead. These two forces would make a pincer movement on the mangrove swamp where the VC camp was located.

(S) The operation proceeded as planned. Units encountered only light resistance throughout the day, capturing a VC supply officer with documents which described a weapons cache in the area. On the third day this cache was found. It contained 240 Springfield rifles, 98 Czech submachine guns, three 60-mm mortars, 21 East German light machine guns, 53 antiaircraft tripods, one 82-mm mortar, six CHICOM flame throwers and 193 cases of CHICOM 70-mm artillery rounds. In addition, 162 VC were killed and 66 captured, as opposed to friendly casualties of 3 KIA and 15 WIA.

(S) This action was an excellent example of staff planning, command and control. Intelligence was fully exploited, and influenced ground movement and air action throughout the operation. Psywar was fully integrated. Air strikes were extremely effective, accounting for most of the VC casualties.[255]

(S) On 11 May, an estimated four VC battalions attacked Song Be, the province capital of Phuoc Long Province. VC forces succeeded in penetrating the town and a suicide squad penetrated the USMACV compound, but the defenders held. A two-battalion reaction force, consisting of one Ranger and one infantry battalion, was sent in the next day. Enroute

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the Ranger battalion detected and avoided an ambush four kilometers in length. The infantry battalion, while not falling into an ambush, had a running engagement with another group of VC and succeeded in killing 40. The intent of the relief force was to reinforce Song Be, not to engage the VC outside the town. After repeated air attacks, the VC finally withdrew. Friendly losses were 63 KIA (five US) and 109 WIA (13 US) and 83 MIA. Also lost were 109 weapons, 21 radios, four armored cars, and one B-57. VC losses were 297 KIA and nine weapons.

(S) The significance of this battle was that it clearly presaged a warning of events to come--utilization by the VC of large forces to overrun and hold district and province towns and well-laid ambushes to destroy relief forces, expected to come to the town's assistance.[256]

(S) TU LUC 150 was a major battle fought 13 kilometers west of Quang Ngai City, Quang Ngai Province, on 29-30 May following an attempt to relieve ambushed forces. Friendly units consisted of the 51st Inf Regt (-), the 39th Ranger Bn, 3d Marine Bn, and one M113 troop, with one platoon of 155-mm howitzers and two platoons of 105-mm howitzers in support. The VC 1st Regt's plans, later captured, revealed a scheme to ambush an ARVN road-clearing force, then deploy and destroy the expected reaction force. This plan was executed exactly as conceived.

(S) While on a road clearing operation one company of the 1st Bn, 51st Inf, was ambushed by the VC. A second company, sent to its relief, also became heavily engaged. The battalion commander then committed the remainder of his unit minus a small reserve to reinforce the two engaged companies. The VC, expecting this, assaulted the battalion from two directions and overran it. A few survivors managed to escape. At this point the first two phases of the VC plan had worked perfectly.

(S) The plan for 30 May specified that the 2d Bn, 51st Inf, the 39th Ranger Bn, followed by the 3d VNMC Bn would move to the battle area and occupy widely separated terrain features. Once again the VC had anticipated this move, even to the correct selection of the terrain objectives. The RVN forces occupied the objectives without incident but at 1400 heavy fire was placed on the Rangers. The 2d Bn, 51st Inf, was ordered to support the Ranger battalion, but before it could do so both it and the Marine battalion were attacked. All three units, still widely separated, were subjected to numerous assaults throughout the day. The 2d Bn, 51st Inf, with the M113 troop, managed to disengage. Throughout the

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night repeated attacks were made on the Marine and Ranger positions and the center Ranger company and battalion HQ were overrun. The VC were continuously bombed and strafed which caused them to withdraw shortly before daylight. In all, 446 sorties were flown and very possibly saved the RVNAF force from complete annihilation.257 Friendly losses totaled 107 KIA, 123 WIA, and 367 MIA plus 384 individual weapons, ten crew-served weapons, and 58 radios lost. Eighty-four VC bodies were recovered and 24 weapons found, although it was estimated that the VC suffered over 800 casualties during the engagement.

(S) The VC attack on Don Luan (Dong Xoai) District town in Phuoc Long Province began shortly before midnight on 9 June with an intensive barrage against the Special Forces compound just outside the town. This barrage was followed by an assault thirty minutes later. Friendly defenders consisted of three CIDG companies, one US and one VN Special Forces A team, one RF company, an armored car platoon, a platoon of 105-mm howitzers, and a USN CB civic action team. The compound was penetrated at 0230, 10 June. Three armored cars were seized by the VC but were destroyed later by air strikes. By daylight, defenders in the compound were surrounded. At 0940, elements of the 1st Bn, 7th Inf, were lifted to an LZ three kilometers north of Dong Xoai. By 1015 these forces were surrounded and at 1030 reported being overrun. At 1255 the remainder of the 1st Bn, 7th Inf, began landing at the Thuan Loi rubber plantation six kilometers north of the town. This force was immediately attacked by mortar and small arms fire. Only 80 men were landed and contact with them was lost within twenty minutes. The other reaction force, the 52d Ranger Bn, landed on the road south of the compound at 1655 following a heavy air strike. Fire was received from the compound so it was struck by air after which the Rangers retook it. At 0920 on 11 June, the 7th Abn Bn landed near the compound, then moved to the LZ of the 1st Bn, 7th Inf. By this time the VC, subjected to constant heavy air attack, had begun to withdraw from the area and offered only scattered resistance. Total friendly casualties for the entire action were 416 KIA, 174 WIA, and 233 MIA. Also lost were 20 radios, 389 individual weapons, three crew-served weapons, three armored cars, four trucks, two ¼-ton trucks, and three armored cars damaged. VC losses were 300 confirmed with an additional 625 estimated KIA and 104 weapons captured.

(S) This action by the VC succeeded in its mission

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of overrunning and occupying a district town plus the destruction of ARVN relief forces. It was both a tactical and psychological victory for the VC. Its effect on ARVN morale was far reaching.[258]

(S) QUYET THANG 165 was an operation designed to retake the Phu Cu post, Binh Dinh Province, which had been overrun by an estimated two-company force of VC on 23 September. Friendly forces under control of the 22d Inf Div were the 2d Bn, 41st Inf; 3d Bn, 41st Inf; one company of the 4th Bn, 41st Inf; the 23d Ranger Bn; 3d Trp, 3d Armd Cav Sqdn; 731st and 732d RF companies, and the 2d Bn, 40th Inf. The 2d Bn and 3d Bn, 41st Inf were directed to attack south from Bong Son to Phu Cu. One company of the 4th Bn, 41st Inf, and the APC troop would attack north from Binh Khe to Phu Cu. Movement of both elements started at 1230. At 1540, the 41st Inf force found the front and rear of its column, blocked by an estimated VC regiment. It was then attacked in the center, splitting the column. When friendly aircraft arrived to support the ARVN force, they were fired upon by groups of VC standing in the open. One F-100 was shot down but direct hits were scored on the exposed VC with napalm and CBU causing them to break off the attack at 1900.[259] In a related battle, the 23d Ranger Bn was hit by a VC force while moving toward Phu Cu to reinforce the 2d Bn, 41st Inf. Fire fights occurred sporadically around Phu Cu from 23 to 29 September resulting in total friendly losses of 93 KIA, 116 WIA, with VC losses an estimated 2,050 killed and five captured.[260]

(S) When the VC attacked the Special Forces camp at Plei Me, Pleiku Province, on 19 October, their purpose was to ambush relief forces, not to overrun the camp. With two regiments deployed around the camp, they allowed small CIDG patrols to re-enter the camp. In response to urgent requests for relief, an armored task force was formed on 20 October, consisting of HQ 3d Armored Cav Sqdn; 3d Co, 5th Tk Bn (16 M41 tanks); 2d Trp, 6th Armored Cav Sqdn (15 M113); the 21st Ranger Bn; one platoon of 105-mm howitzers, and a platoon of engineers. On 23 October, the 22d Ranger Bn and 1st Bn, 42d Inf, were attached to this force. This relief operation was named DAN THANH 21 (Plei Me).

(S) The commander of the special zone (24th) in the area around Plei Me correctly evaluated the purpose of the attack as ambush of relief troops, and correctly located the probable ambush site to within one kilometer of its actual position. In order to relieve some of the pressure on the camp, the task force was moved to Phu My on 20 October as a feint while waiting for other forces to join it. On 21 October, two companies

of the 91st LLDB Ranger Bn, suspecting an ambush on the camp's airfield, were landed at an LZ five kilometers north of the camp. They fought their way into the camp on 22 October.

(S) On 23 October the 22d Ranger Bn and the 1st Bn, 42d Inf, were airlifted to LZ's between Phu My and Plei Me. At the same time the armored task force started toward Plei Me. The column was split with the heavily armored vehicles two kilometers ahead of the trains, which consisted of lightly armored vehicles guarded by two companies of the 21st Ranger Bn. At 1750 hours both elements were attacked simultaneously near the expected ambush site. The attack was beaten back but the trains element suffered heavy losses. The column entered Plei Me on 25 October. In a sweep around the camp the tanks and APC's encountered difficult terrain and attempted to double back. In the ensuing confusion the unit was attacked, suffering moderate casualties. After this encounter subsequent sweeps around the camp produced only one VC KIA. On 28 October the entire force returned to home stations.

(S) Friendly forces suffered 95 KIA, 222 WIA, and 19 MIA. Material losses in addition to the aircraft, were two 5-ton trucks, two gas tankers, two tank retrievers, two 105-mm howitzer truck tractors, 24 weapons, and four radios. Damaged, but repairable, were two 5-ton trucks, one tank retriever, one bulldozer, one lowboy, two 3/4-ton trucks, and two 105-mm howitzers. The VC lost 201 KIA, six VCC, 81 individual weapons, and 24 crew-served weapons.

(S) This action was significant because of the commander's correct evaluation of the reason for the attack, his correct estimation of the VC force involved, his estimate of where the ambush would occur and his avoidance of contact until he felt his force was sufficient to engage the enemy.[261]

(S) VC levies on revenue from the Michelin rubber plantation, Binh Duong Province, reached the point in October where it was uneconomical to operate the plantation. Hundreds of workers living in the plantation's 22 hamlets were thrown out of work. When the plantation owners refused to pay the levy, the VC shelled one manager's house in Dau Tieng with a 57-mm RR causing the owners and managers to flee to Saigon. In response to their pleas, the loss of revenue, and the workers' plight, the GVN decided to reestablish control over the plantation. XAY DUNG 10 and 11, the first two phases of the

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operation, were conducted jointly by the 7th Regt, ARVN 5th Div and elements of the US 1st Inf Div and were completely successful in opening the route into, and clearing, the plantation (see Opn BUSHMASTER, USA Opns). An attack on the CP of the 7th Inf Regt on 22 November was unsuccessful and resulted in heavy losses to the VC. The objective of the third phase of the operation, XAY DUNG 12, was the extension of GVN control to the area surrounding the plantation with special emphasis on the high ground northwest along the Saigon River. On 26 November, the 7th Inf Regt deployed to an area 5 kilometers north of Dau Tieng, the district capital, to conduct operations in the Cau Cong hills west of the plantation. Friendly forces at the time consisted of the 7th Inf Regt; the 36th Ranger Bn; 3d Trp, 1st Armored Cav Sqdn, 3d Btry, 51st (105-mm); and a platoon of 155-mm howitzers. The 7th Inf Regt planned to exploit B-52 strikes in the Cau Cong hills scheduled for 0900 on 27 November. The regiment, consisting of the, 1st, 3d and 4th Bns, 7th Inf, went into an overnight bivouac leaving the artillery, the M113 troop, and 2d Bn, 7th Inf, at Dau Tieng.

(U) At 0645, on 27 November, as the regiment was preparing to move, it was attacked by an estimated reinforced VC regiment. Using a walking mortar barrage, heavy automatic weapons fire, and human wave tactics, the VC quickly overran the CP and 1st Bn. Artillery and air support was not used because friendly and VC forces were intermingled. By 0800 all radio contact with the CP had been lost and some VC units began to withdraw. A reaction force of the M113 troop and the 36th Ranger Bn moved along a road to within one kilometer of the area but was turned back by VC RR fire which knocked out the lead M113. In an attempt to move cross-country the M113's were unable to ford an intervening stream because of the steepness of the banks, so the Ranger unit proceeded alone to linkup with the 4th Bn. At this time an estimated two battalions of VC could be seen evacuating weapons and bodies in the vicinity of the CP. Air strikes were directed against them and one struck the 36th Ranger Bn, killing 25 and wounding 55. At approximately 1015 the VC began their second withdrawal north leaving two companies in contact.[262] At 1030 they attacked the 3d Bn. This unit was almost annihilated and was saved only when the battalion advisor called for air and artillery on his own position. At 1200 all contact was broken. There were less than 100 survivors from this battalion.[263]

(S) This attack was well planned and emphasized the new VC tactic of close in fighting to nullify air and artillery support. The wide dispersion of the battalions

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allowed for defeat in detail. The area chosen for the bivouac was choked with undergrowth, permitting the VC to approach the defensive positions undetected. The absence of the M113 troop and artillery support, which had saved the day in the 22 November attack, proved disastrous. Friendly losses were 249 KIA, 213 WIA, and 140 MIA. Sixty VC bodies were recovered.[264]

(S) The ambush continued to be a favorite VC technique despite a thorough knowledge of this tactic by GVN troops. The three ambushes described here are similar to many which occurred in each CTZ throughout the year.

(S) At 1130 on 8 July a small outpost less than two kilometers from the district HQ in Dau Tieng, Binh Duong Province, was attacked by an estimated platoon of VC. Responding to the outpost's frantic calls for help, a relief force consisting of the 2d Bn, 9th Inf, 5th Division, was hurriedly assembled and dispatched to the scene. This force took no forward observers and did not request observation aircraft. At 1210 it was ambushed just outside of its compound resulting in 157 KIA (4 US), 33 WIA, and 199 MIA (of whom 120 returned).[265]

(S) On 6 December the 2d Bn, 49th Inf, 25th Division, minus one rifle company, was ambushed near Cu Chi, Hau Nghia Province, while on an approach march. There was no air cover and flank security was inadequate. The unit lost 22 KIA (including the battalion commander), 25 WIA (3 US) and 2 MIA plus 20 weapons and two radios.[266]

(S) This same unit ten days later, while on a road clearing mission from Cu Chi to Phuoc Hiep, was again ambushed. Again there was no air cover, the flank security was in too close, and there was no forward observer. Automatic weapons fire was received from a distance of only 50 meters. The new battalion commander and 49 of his men were killed. There were 22 WIA, 31 MIA and 85 individual and two crew-served weapons lost. US advisors did not accompany the unit.[267] This example illustrated that knowledge of counter-ambush measures, without follow-through by leaders at all echelons of command, was worthless.

(U) At the end of 1965 the ARVN soldier could look back on a number of successes and failures, acts of heroism and examples of timidity, well-planned operations and incredible blunders. In the broad view, though, he had ceased to be tied to passive defense of key installations and LOC's and had begun to seek out the VC. Although he

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was often rebuffed, sometimes disastrously, he was never subdued. The employment of US airpower and the arrival of US ground combat troops in SVN gave him a tremendous morale boost. His performance improved and gave every reason to believe that ARVN would continue to bear the brunt of the war and would eschew an attitude of "let the Americans do it."

VNMC OPERATIONS

(C) The mission of the VNMC was to execute amphibious assault operations and other operations as directed. The VNMC was assigned to CJGS, RVNAF, as a part of the general reserve. The five battalions of the VNMC Brigade were generally committed on individual battalion missions, rarely on a brigade-size operation.[268]

(C) Although the general mission of the VNMC involved commitments to amphibious operations, only one battalion-size amphibious operation was conducted during the year. This was due to the lack of shipping, requirements for commitment as general reserve throughout the country and increased VC activity during the summer. Coupled with the brigade commander's desire to operate separately from the VNN, these factors prohibited any productive use of VNMC's amphibious assault capability.[269]

(C) In January the VNMC was ordered to conduct Operation NGUYEN VAN NHO, a multi-battalion search and destroy operation, spread out over a large area in the Vung Tau special area, Phuoc Tuy Province, Long Than district of Bien Hoa Province and Xuan Loc district of Long Khanh Province. The significance of this operation was not in the results achieved but the fact several battalions were employed under a single command. In the past the VNMC had carried out battalion-size general reserve roles or had been deployed as individual battalions under tactical control of various ARVN corps commanders. The reason for separating VNMC battalions in general reserve missions was due partially to the suspicions of the JGS since the VNMC brigade had played a significant role in previous government coups.[270]

(C) Although organized prior to 1965, the 5th Marine Bn did not receive its first mission until June 1965 when it was deployed to II CTZ to operate as part of a task force with the 22d ARVN Div as II Corps reserve. The battalion operated between Kontum and Pleiku throughout the month but made only light contact with the VC and suffered only minor casualties.[271]

(C) Before June 1965, the various corps commanders had

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used battalions of the general reserve committed to their support in a piecemeal fashion. As a result, general reserve units suffered a number of severe defeats by superior VC units. On 18 June, the Minister of Defense issued an order forbidding commitment of the general reserve in less than two-battalion strength except for local operations within three kilometers of their bases. This concept had been repeatedly stressed by the senior advisor to the VNMC. This new order, backed by COMUSMACV's stern policy regarding ambushes, had a stimulating effect on the advisor-counterpart relationship.[272] During June the Commandant, VNMC, assumed an additional duty as Commander, CMR. No adverse effects on brigade operations were noticed.[273]

(C) The first joint III MAF/VNMC amphibious operation was conducted during November under the code name BLUE MARLIN and is discussed in detail in this chapter. This was the first opportunity for the VNMC to conduct a battalion size amphibious assault during the year. This first exposure of the VNMC to their US counterparts was very beneficial. Response to predeployment training was excellent and the reaction of the battalion indicated VNMC's potential ability to successfully operate in any type of amphibious environment.[274]

OTHER OPERATIONAL ACTIVITIES

(U) Annex H contains a discussion of the problems connected with the security of US personnel and installations in SVN and the steps taken in an attempt to improve the situation.

(U) Annex I contains a discussion of US efforts to insure NVN and GVN adherence to the 1949 Geneva Convention on treatment of prisoners of war.

(U) Annex J contains a discussion of the highlights of the morale and welfare program for US forces in SVN.

(U) Annex K contains a discussion of some of the more significant weapons, tactics and techniques tested during 1965 in operations against the VC and North Vietnamese.

(U) Annex L contains a discussion of political-psychological warfare matters.

(U) Annex M contains a discussion of the expanded intelligence program accompanying the introduction of US

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forces into SVN.

(U) Annex N, published separately, contains a discussion of special operations.

PACIFICATION PROGRESS

(TS) At a US/GVN meeting on Rural Construction Affairs on 5 November 1965, Rural Construction Minister Sub-Brig Gen Nguyen Duc Thang noted in his opening remarks that the ministry was becoming active after "two wasteful years."[275] A few weeks later, the US SECDEF also expressed a similar view:

> I wasn't at all reassured about what I heard yesterday regarding pacification. I have been concerned about this every time I have been here in the last two years, I don't think we have done a ...thing we can point to that's been effective in five years. I ask you to show me one area in this country, in the five years that I have been associated with it, that we have pacified.[276]

(S) Although the RVNAF JGS had accepted all US suggestions as to how the RVNAF could be employed to improve the pacification program, and had issued its implementing Directive AB-139 on 25 December 1964, the outlook for progress in the pacification program in early 1965 was not favorable.

(U) It was evident that the situation was static; plans were announced and then not implemented. Political jockeying diverted the attention of officials and military commanders, and the instability was compounded by riots and demonstrations of religious groups and students.[277] Even the Hop Tac (Working Together) Program, the special pacification program for the areas around Saigon-Cholon in the III CTZ, was at a stand still. When a stopgap allocation of three million piasters per province was made, pending release of regular funds, province chiefs were reluctant to spend the funds. They wanted specific authorization and direction from higher authorities.[278] These trends were not at all surprising to US authorities in SVN. As early as November 1964, COMUSMACV had agreed with the US Ambassador that the pacification program was not progressing "at all well under the present form of organizational and conceptual direction."[279]

(S) COMUSMACV felt there was an urgent need to consider major changes that could "drastically stiffen the GVN and give forward momentum to pacification" since he was seeking the best means of making a dramatic improvement in concept, organization and discipline of the pacification effort.[280]

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(S) Any plan to encourage the GVN in its efforts, COMUSMACV recognized, should include measures for developing US-approved plans as well as means for controlling money and people during execution of the plans.[281] He envisaged an arrangement in which the pertinent GVN agencies would be provided complete guidance in planning pacification projects. However, COMUSMACV also saw the dangers of exerting influence over the GVN, which might be interpreted as excessive, and which might boomerang on US interests. He suggested: "As a less drastic alternative, the Hop Tac idea might be extended to each of the other three corps tactical zones."[282] By this he meant that pacification efforts should be emphasized in certain priority areas in the three CTZ's as was done in the Hop Tac Program in III CTZ.

(S) At a special US Mission Council meeting on 20 January 1965, discussion on the concept of pacification revealed that the various representatives had differing viewpoints on the subject.[283] They succeeded in clarifying their differences and in drafting basic definitions acceptable to all. They revised and issued six criteria which defined the characteristics of a secured hamlet. However, in early March, they were still "trying to develop a meaningful doctrine for village/hamlet security".[284] An analysis of RVNAF J3's paper "The Organization and Operations of the Pacification System" by members of the US Mission Council, revealed that the GVN's views were at variance with US views in the following subjects: 1) The role of the corps commander in the pacification program; 2) the relationship of provinces with the proposed Bureau for Pacification Affairs; and 3) the position of the Minister of Interior in the pacification program.[285]

(C) At the 2 April Joint US Mission Council/GVN Internal Security Council meeting, changes in the GVN pacification organization were approved. The prime minister issued GVN Decree Nr. 64 on 5 April, which dissolved both the Central Pacification Committee and the Internal Security Council and established the Central Rural Reconstruction Council (CRRC). The term "pacification" was changed to "rural reconstruction" and the New Rural Life Directorate was redesignated the Directorate General for Rural Reconstruction (DGRR), as the operating arm of the CRRC. GVN authorities thought that "rural reconstruction" more accurately portrayed the intent of the program: to gain popular support through positive social and economic projects while providing the necessary security to insure project completion. The reorganization provided for better coordination and direction at the national level and defined the responsibilities

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of corps and division tactical commanders in support of provincial reconstruction activities. The Joint Mission Directive, Subj: The Concept of Rural Reconstruction and Certain Definitions and Procedures, of 10 April, reflected these changes; it was essentially a revision of the basic document prepared jointly by USAID, USIS and USMACV on 1 February.[286] On 30 July, Prime Minister Ky further decreed that the term "rural reconstruction" be replaced by "rural construction." (See Figure IV-2, Organization for Rural Construction.)

(C) On 12 May, the US Mission Council directed the testing of a plan in which a province team chief would be designated to coordinate all US activities in a province and would provide the SVN province chief with one US point of contact. Three provinces were selected for the 90-day test that started on 1 June. (See Annex D.)

(C) The US Mission Liaison Group was established on 14 May to provide closer coordination with the DGRR. It was headed by the secretary of the US Mission Council, with membership consisting of representatives from USAID, JUSPAO, CAS, and USMACV.

Extension of Hop Tac Concept

(S) A subject of persistent interest to agencies involved in the rural construction program during 1965 was the idea of establishing a Hop Tac program in the other three corps areas. The Hop Tac program, which was based on a COM-USMACV idea developed in 1964, was considered to be moderately successful in that it did blunt VC pressures in the strategically important area around Saigon. Hop Tac called for a consolidation of government resources to insure the security of the capital complex, Saigon/Cholon, by winning the war in the six provinces (Gia Dinh, Long An, Hau Nghia, Bien Hoa, and portions of Binh Duong and Phuoc Tuy) surrounding that area. By using the "oil spot" concept, government control was to be extended outward from the capital until government influence was extended to those six provinces. The Hop Tac area was divided into four roughly concentric zones (A, B, C, and D) with Saigon/Cholon being the hub. Operations were to be conducted in these areas to eliminate the VC forces and political organizations, neutralizing their productive, economic, and financial activities and to provide control and security for the population in order to give them a standard of living perceptibly better than that offered under VC control.

(S) The objective of the first phase of the plan was to

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conduct clearing operations in Zone B and secure Zone A, and at the same time, conduct search and destroy operations in Zone C and D. This phase was planned to be completed by 1 January 1965. By achieving these goals, GVN officials could travel and work freely during the day developing Zone A through civic action projects and remain overnight without unusual protective measures. The national police would be responsible for all normal security functions except for special missions requiring regular ARVN forces. The VC in the area could not make a public show of force except for isolated terrorist acts. In Zone B, all VC forces, company size and larger, would be eliminated, permitting RF/PF units to assume responsibility for security. RF/PF units would have the capability of defending against VC platoon-size attacks. Securing and clearing Zones A and B respectively would allow regular ARVN forces to continue clearing operations in Zone C and search and destroy operations in Zones D thus sealing avenues of approach into Zone B. On 1 October 1964, the GVN exercised some degree of control over 38 percent of the land mass in the Hop Tac area as compared to 37 percent under VC control, the remaining 25 percent being in dispute. By the end of 1965 government influence was extended to 43 percent of the land area while the VC increased its control to 44 percent. Gains to both sides came from the areas in dispute. Although the gain in land area was small, greater gains were made in bringing the population under some degree of GVN control. At the beginning of the program, approximately 1,925,500 people resided in the Hop Tac area, excluding the Saigon/Cholon complex. In October 1964, GVN exercised control over 75 percent of the population while the VC was considered to control nearly 25 percent. By the end of 1965, GVN influence had been extended to 85 percent while those controlled by the VC had been reduced to less than 15 percent. Substantial progress was made in those areas classified as secured. On 1 October 1964, 603,100 people (31 percent) were residing in secured areas. At the end of 1965, the total population in Hop Tac had increased to 2,097,188 of which 1,257,418 (60 percent) were residing in secured areas. On 27 February 1965, COMUSMACV had requested that the I and IV Corps senior advisors review their current programs and develop conceptual Hop Tac type programs as a basis for discussion with their GVN counterparts. COMUSMACV expected that evaluation of efforts and the application of Hop Tac principles would demonstrate the desirability of coordinating and focusing resources in the critical area in each CTZ.[287]

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(S) At the first tactical conference attended by corps commanders on 3 April 1965, Minister of Armed Forces Maj Gen Tran Van Minh directed the I, II and IV Corps commanders to develop Hop Tac type plans for each of their CTZ's. The Secretariat which directed the Hop Tac Program was charged with organizing a two-day seminar for passing the Hop Tac experience to civilian and military planners from the corps. These corps commanders presented Hop Tac type plans for their respective areas on 3 May. The CG, I Corps, originally considered Hue and Da Nang as areas which could be expanded in Hop Tac-like plans. He revised his thinking, in light of resources available and planned to concentrate his efforts on expanding the Da Nang area. CG, II Corps, selected the area around Qui Nhon as his Hop Tac base and CG, IV Corps, developed plans to expand from the Can Tho area.

(S) COMUSMACV recognized that the problems in these CTZ's differed from those in the original Hop Tac area. Special organizational arrangements did not have such great importance as had been the case in the original Hop Tac area. Under the new organization for rural reconstruction, the corps commanders had the requisite authority to follow through and correct any matter that might be obstructing progress. The corps commanders even considered using the CTZ Rural Reconstruction Council, which had the appropriate GVN membership, to guide the effort. COMUSMACV hoped that the USAID, USIS, [redacted] regional representatives would join the corps senior advisors in developing effective and cooperative support arrangements on the US side. It was critically important that the US advice and support be consistent, and attuned to the corps civilian-police-military plan.

(S) COMUSMACV thought that ministerial support in the CTZ programs would probably be more tenuous than in the original Hop Tac Program. The GVN civilian deputy on the Hop Tac council had ready access to high-level ministry officials in Saigon and was in a fairly good position to coordinate ministerial support. In the I, II, and IV Corps, the ministries were for the most part represented by low-level inspectors.

(S) For 1965, he envisaged that the scope of the Hop Tac type operations would be more restricted. Because of fewer resources and smaller secure areas, other CTZ efforts would be much smaller than in III CTZ.

(S) COMUSMACV maintained that for success in any of the corps Hop Tac operations:

[redacted]

1) There must be full integration of the civilian-military-police efforts under unified direction.

2) Ministerial support must be timely, adequate and in accordance with local plans and requirements, not Saigon-developed programs and desires.

3) Military support for clearing and support operations must be committed on a long term basis.

4) Expansion could not be pushed ahead on arbitrary schedules, but would have to parallel the development of lasting security as provided by RF/PF.

5) District and province must retain their usual authority, since they were the key echelons in rural reconstruction, but their efforts must be coordinated by the local Hop Tac councils.

(S) In May 1965, the Prime Minister indicated to the US Ambassador his dissatisfaction with the organization of the Hop Tac program. He had requested that the pertinent GVN officials consider making Region A of the Hop Tac area part of the CMR and the remaining regions part of the III Corps commander's area of responsibility. COMUSMACV's views on this subject were expressed at a Mission Council meeting as follows: the Hop Tac organizational framework should be retained for the foreseeable future; the designation of CG, III Corps, as Chairman, Hop Tac Council, would have merit since nearly all of Zones B, C and D were in the III Corps area. Because of its accessibility to the civilian ministries, the Hop Tac Secretariat should remain in its then present location, and CG, III Corps, should have a special assistant to perform his Hop Tac duties.

(C) COMUSMACV felt that the Hop Tac organization had been unique in providing a forum for the military and civilian officials to address common problems. He also felt that the program had received good publicity, stressing that, irrespective of loss elsewhere, programs had continued in the original Hop Tac area.

(C) In late May 1965, GVN officials suggested that the CG, III Corps, be designated Chairman, Hop Tac Council, and that a general officer be appointed his deputy to aid him in the direction of the Hop Tac Secretariat. A recommended clarification was that the Hop Tac Secretariat should function as a coordinating body to facilitate and

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monitor actions, but that it not be a separate command.[288] (See Figure IV-3, 1965 Hop Tac Goals.)

(C) The return of executive power to armed forces leaders in June 1965 resulted in the placement of the DGRR under the Commissioner for Rural Affairs, a civilian appointee, and one of five commissioners reporting to the Commissioner General for War.

(S) A June 1965 US Joint MACV/USAID Team Study of US-MACV subsector advisory teams revealed that about one-third of their efforts were devoted to civilian matters; that the teams supported and complemented the efforts of other US agencies very well; and that they did recognize and resist the tendency to take charge, and were striving to make the GVN system function. In response to March 1965 requests for hard skills for subsector teams, a pilot program for limited augmentation of each corps and the CMR by medical, engineers, and MP advisors was initiated.[289]

(C) During the SECDEF's visit to SVN in July 1965, he was briefed on the trend in population and area control. Statistics from USMACV, USAID, and GVN sources were used to describe important factors indicating success or failure of the counterinsurgency effort.

(C) Data on population control during 25 June 1964 - 25 June 1965, as maintained by USMACV based on monthly reports from the sector advisors, indicated that:

1) GVN lost control over an additional 6.2 percent of the total estimated population of 14.6 million people.

2) GVN controlled 45.9 percent or 5.9 million people as of 25 June 1965.

3) During the period, there was no net change in the percentage of population in the cleared and uncontested areas. Until 25 May 1965, the percentage of population in the cleared areas gradually increased from 24.3 to 27.0 percent, but this was abruptly offset in June as a result of VC successes in I and II CTZ's and in the northern provinces of III CTZ. By 25 June 1965, there were 24.3 percent or 3.6 million people in the cleared and uncontested areas.

4) During the period, the VC increased their control over an additional 6.2 percent of the total population with a peak increase of 2.8 percent occurring in June 1965. Toward the end of June the VC controlled 25.5 percent of the

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total population or 3.4 million people.[290]

(C) During the period under discussion, the GVN lost significant areas in I and II CTZ's and in the northern and eastern regions of III CTZ. Area losses occurred in Quang Nam, Quang Tin and Quang Ngai in I CTZ; all II CTZ provinces except Kanh Hoa, Ninh Thuan and Tuyen Duc; and Phuoc Long, Long Khanh and Phuoc Tuy in III CTZ.

(C) In the IV CTZ, GVN control increased, particularly in the heavily populated belt running diagonally across the central part of the Delta from Go Cong to An Giang Province. The VC continued to occupy and operate their traditional bases in the U Minh forest and along the southern coast.[291]

(C) On 22 July, USAID and COMUSMACV issued Confidential Joint Directive 1-65, Subject: Provincial Rural Reconstruction Reports, which outlined procedures and assigned responsibilities for the preparation, submission and distribution of Joint USAID/USMACV Province Rural Construction Reports. The directive discussed selected official GVN reports and clarified US counterpart responsibilities in assisting in the preparation, transmission and utilization of the GVN reports: Monthly Report of the General Situation in the Province, and Monthly Report of General Status of New Life Hamlets. Two inclosures of this joint directive provided specific guidance for the preparation of the USMACV/USAID Provincial Team Report, and the Monthly Evaluation of Provincial Situation and GVN Statistics. These reports provided the US Mission Council and its agencies with data required to assess the progress of rural construction, and with information on the status of the US and GVN counterinsurgency programs.

(C) At a joint GVN/US council meeting on 28 August, the GVN representatives made some proposals concerning the pacification program. Although COMUSMACV disagreed with some of the "facts" presented,[292] some of the proposals presented were actually suggestions made earlier by US agencies to the GVN. In addition, some of the proposals were already on the GVN statute books. He felt that difficulties in the program were not due to a lack of policy, but largely to poor execution. This was attributable to government instability, and either the incapacity or unwillingness of responsible officials to implement existing policies. Other difficulties included: the lack of understanding, or acceptance, of the concepts and techniques of pacification by some ranking GVN officials; failure to act

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according to designated priorities; the establishment of unrealistic goals, and the warping of facts to meet these goals; and the defensive position forced upon government forces by increased VC strength.

(C) Despite general concurrence in the GVN proposals, COMUSMACV took specific exception to the following points in the GVN discussion:[293]

1) The implication that military security should receive equal or less emphasis than the other aspects of the pacification program ignored experience which had shown that without security, economic and social progress would not go forward. The problem was one of timing. Initially, adequate security was paramount vis-a-vis the economic and social programs. In later stages of pacification, the latter programs would receive the bulk of the emphasis.

2) Moreover, COMUSMACV did not subscribe to the charge of poor liaison between the GVN and the US Mission, or the lack of coordination and cooperation among the Mission Council agencies. Liaison existed, and was generally effective at all levels as evidenced by US support of the following activities: a) the Joint US Mission Council/CRCC meetings, b) the Hop Tac organization with its Joint Council and Secretariat, c) the Provincial Rural Construction Committees, and, d) the Subsector Advisory Program.

3) COMUSMACV was opposed to the proposal to establish a new armed organization, subordinate to the Ministry of Rural Construction, and designed to protect the cadres. This was a completely unsatisfactory and inadequate approach to a major problem of security. No "new armed organization" would solve the problem of security, although improvements were always possible. COMUSMACV felt a more realistic approach in this regard was to develop, together with the JGS, a military campaign plan designed to accomplish, with both US and ARVN troops, the immediate policy objective, which was to convince the VC and NVN that they could not win. In order to do this US/GVN must halt the VC offensive and then, in selected areas, make visible progress in pacification plans, designed to take advantage of the increased security afforded by US troops. Such a campaign plan was being drawn up at year's end.

4) Finally, COMUSMACV was not in favor of the formation of coordination committees at the national, regional and provincial levels. Rural construction councils were already in existence at these levels, to carry out required coordination. Additional committees formed for coordination

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purposes would hinder rather than improve coordination.

(C) In view of the observations cited above, COMUSMACV recommended:[294]

1) That a review be made with the GVN, of the conceptual approach to pacification, in order to isolate the problem areas that had been associated with its execution and the taking of corrective actions as required.

2) That a military campaign plan be developed which would be in consonance with pacification doctrine, plans and priorities. USMACV and JGS had this underway.

3) That there be insistence upon the proper implementation of the campaign plan under development and adherence to the pacification principles set forth in previous pacification plans.

4) That the Mission Council oppose the establishment of a new armed organization to provide security for cadres.

5) That the Mission Council discourage the formation of pacification coordinating committees by requiring existing rural construction councils at the national, regional and provincial levels to carry out their assigned functions.[295]

(C) At the joint GVN-Mission Council meeting on 11 September, it was brought out that Hop Tac, during 1965, had not progressed as rapidly as anticipated, and if the then present rate continued, it appeared dubious that the 30 June 1965 goals would be met before the end of the year.

(C) COMUSMACV prepared a detailed analysis for the Ambassador, showing the fundamental problems that beset Hop Tac. From a preliminary survey, it appeared that many of the problems were rooted in areas outside the competence of the Hop Tac Council. Some of the more important were:

1) Political. The many changes of government caused changes in personnel and organization of ministries with ensuing delays in decisions. Serious turbulence in province and district chief assignments slowed pacification programs. The new GVN leaders generally were unfamiliar with the Hop Tac concept and, until the 11 September briefing, had received no progress report since

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11 June-a three-month hiatus.

2) Military. As a result of the deteriorating security situation, many ARVN units on securing missions pulled into defensive positions with the resultant lack of aggressiveness in saturation patrolling and the limiting of night activities to manning fixed positions. Effective clearing and securing operations were few with the most prominent deficiencies noted in the 25th Division area. The major VC strongholds in the northern, northwestern and western Hop Tac areas continued to preoccupy RVNAF leaders, diverting attention and effort from Hop Tac operations in Zones B and C. At the same time, the major effort of the general reserve had to be shifted to other corps areas.

3) Personnel. Within the Hop Tac organization, personnel turnover resulted from political changes. The former chairman of the Hop Tac Council, a senior RVNAF major general, was replaced in June by the CG, III Corps, who rarely attended meetings and who assigned his deputy, a sub-brigadier general, as the de facto chairman. As a result, the other principals did not attend. The former resident deputy chairman and the chief of the Secretariat, a sub-brigadier general, was relieved, leaving a lieutenant colonel as the senior staff member.

4) Collateral Programs.

a) The mobile action cadre program, which involved cadre teams moving among villages to help them consolidate their security and administrative organizations, continued to deteriorate. Cadres had never become fully effective as a result of inadequate training, a pay scale too low to attract competent personnel, and accelerating depletion by the military draft.

b) Continuing personnel shortages in the RF/PF contributed to the retention of ARVN units in Zone B securing operations, at the expense of the latter's commitment in Zone C. The prohibition against recruiting PF in the under 20 age bracket had a deleterious affect which would require some time to overcome.

5) Evaluation Criteria. Failure to match the rate of progress as projected in January 1965 was in part the result of some areas being declared secured or cleared, but not meeting the criteria as later defined, so that the program, in fact, had farther to go than was realized at the time. Also, a more stringent application of criteria led to

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more realistic evaluations.

(C) COMUSMACV felt that, while rural construction in the Hop Tac area had not progressed as rapidly as predicted, the primary objective, to secure the national complex, had been partially achieved. The problems which beset the program were to a large degree national in scope and outside the control of the Hop Tac organization. The Hop Tac organization was a coordinating body dealing with problems which cut across political and military boundaries and which, by its very nature, generally interacted on two or more ministries. However, such a body was essential if problems of rural construction in the capital complex were to be expeditiously isolated and solved. Had it not existed, something similar would have had to be invented. The organization of Hop Tac was in being and COMUSMACV believed the Hop Tac concept remained sound. It provided a channel of communication from province to national level, which given top-level attention, could expedite the solution of problems which otherwise would be lost in the administrative maze. It was not a question as to whether the Hop Tac council was needed. What was required was a revitalization of the program and top-level governmental attention.[296]

(S) On 22 September, the US Mission Council was briefed on COMUSMACV's recommendations to revitalize the Hop Tac program. In the ensuing discussion, COMUSMACV stated that while Hop Tac could be said only to have been about 50 percent successful, it had undoubtedly averted a VC siege of Saigon. The Ambassador reviewed the original reasons for the emphasis placed on the area surrounding Saigon and maintained that they were still valid, primarily because of the heavy density of population. He noted, however, the lack of a clear commitment to Hop Tac on the part of the GVN possibly owing to the fact that the VN considered the program a US scheme. The view was also expressed that the trouble might also lie in US/GVN differences over some fundamental concepts of Hop Tac. It was concluded that all interested US agencies should agree upon concepts and tactics before approaching the GVN. To this end, a committee was formed to discuss the Hop Tac program.[297]

(C) Sub-Brig Gen Nguyen Duc Thang succeeded Nguyen Tat Ung as Minister of Rural Construction when the latter died in a plane crash at Quang Ngai on 16 September. A four-month test of a Revolving Rural Construction Fund was implemented on 1 October. It provided subsector advisors with readily available funds to support high impact rural construction projects and civic action activities when normal GVN financial support was not immediately available.

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Each subsector advisor had access to 50,000 piasters which could be replenished as necessary. The fund provided immediate responsiveness and flexibility to the rural construction effort, and was intended to complement existing GVN programs and to enhance the prestige of local government officials. Toward the end of 1965, it became obvious that this method was highly successful. Consideration was given in late December to propose permanent establishment of the revolving fund.

(TS) In September, US authorities clearly recognized "the imperative need for a pacification program which would capitalize upon successes achieved by US/ARVN troops against main force VC units."[298] They saw that a realistic program would "require a buildup of ARVN forces commensurate with the buildup and capabilities of US forces because ARVN forces, of all categories, are critical to the success or failure in the pacification effort and the long term outcome of the war."[299] CINCPAC felt that the US should be more aggressive and set the lead, as ARVN did not have the capability. The US also appeared to have certain advantages over ARVN: inherent understanding of this type of undertaking, interest in the people and technical qualifications and special equipment. Nevertheless, there was a clear need for an "adequate number of RF/PF and police."[300] COMUSMACV expressed appreciation for recognition of the importance of the pacification program, but he also indicated that he had learned that US concepts and anxiety could not be forcibly imposed on GVN leaders. He recommended quiet persuasion as the most efficient method.[301]

(TS) This view was entirely congruent with the purpose of US military operations in SVN: "To allow the Vietnamese to continue with their pacification program within the shield established by US and Free World Military Assitance forces. Again, this must be done by the Vietnamese, it cannot be done by us."[302]

(S) In early October, there were indications that GVN leaders also recognized that emphasis and acceleration in the pacification program were necessary. GVN leaders revealed that plans were being considered to assign, for an extended period, specially-trained teams of 200 men at the district level, to ensure the development of lasting security and stability. They envisaged Minister of Rural Construction General Thang as directing the initial thrust in this effort (6-12 months) to be succeeded by a civilian director. Apart from the soundness of this concept,

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US officials found GVN enthusiasm for this program most refreshing. By the end of October, after considering US suggestions, the GVN had prepared a proposed pacification policy which defined phases and objectives, established criteria for each phase and described the roles and missions of the rural construction cadre group. 303

(S) At a Commanders' Conference at Nha Trang on 24 October, COMUSMACV reiterated the following guidelines concerning the pacification program:

> We must get involved in pacification around our base areas to enhance base security. However, when we are working with the people, it must be in the name of and in close coordination with the Vietnamese officials. The GVN is very concerned lest we take over the police function or in other ways over-shadow the GVN. We are not in competition with the GVN. We must be alert to their fears and handle them with finesse. Sub-Sector Advisors should be present in all districts where US troops are based.
>
> While the term Rural Construction or Pacification is meaningful to most of us, it is not fully understood by many NCO's and Junior Officers. It is very important that US troops understand what is meant . . . There are many facets to Rural Construction. Security is probably the most important . . . The end result sought is to get a favorable image of the government to the people and to bring them to the government side.
>
> The most critical problem in the Rural Construction effort is to recruit and train Popular Forces Units. The PF are local people. They have a vested interest in their local security. . . We must be alert and work with GVN officials to recruit for the PF . . . If there are US troops in the area, we should provide a few selected NCO's to work with the PF on a long term basis. If we can succeed in producing effective PF units we will be relieved of a great part of our security problem. We want to develop the PF into a force that can take over local security. However, we must not shove our assistance down the throat of the GVN. We can get them to ask for our help if we approach the matter with finesse.

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> [Commanders should] . . . build up the village and hamlet chiefs. When units go into new areas, the Commanders should meet and make a fuss over the local officials. Advisors should urge their counterparts to do likewise. 304

(TS) At the weekly US/GVN Council Meeting on 5 November, Minister of Rural Construction General Thang presented the GVN's concept of pacification as envisaged for the 1966 program. A Senior Rural Construction Council was established to be chaired by the Prime Minister; members would include Minister of Defense Lt Gen Co; CJGS, Lt Gen Vien; the corps commanders and the NP. At the corps councils, membership would consist of division commanders; at division councils, province chiefs; and at province councils, district chiefs. A new cadre concept was developed by 1 December; the Prime Minister had already decreed that the lowest cadre member would be paid at least 2,500 piasters per month. The 1966 program was to be in the hands of province chiefs by 1 January. The entire GVN would be involved in rural construction and would be guided by the following principles: the people's security would be of primary concern; the populace would be encouraged to participate; and democracy would be the guiding principle. The following policies also applied: the GVN would pacify, not the RVNAF. The mission of RVNAF was to support the GVN; the people's aspirations would be fully considered in the development of programs. The US Mission Council members stated that "this was the most intelligent and practical approach to the problem of pacification thus far."305

(S) The key features of the 1966 Pacification Plan (GVN Circular 3041 published on 11 November) included: continued use of the six-point evaluation criteria, construction of additional hamlets in priority areas, and organization of cadres into armed groups with propaganda, civil affairs and civil action functions. According to the Minister of Rural Construction, the Ministry of Defense had responsibility for the clearing phase; the Ministers of Interior and Rural Construction, the securing phase; and all Ministries, the development phase. Cadre teams were to be assigned to a village for 6 to 12 months, rather than just a few weeks. 306 In addition to cadre teams, formed of experienced personnel, teams were to be specially trained at the National Training Center at Vung Tau. Over 40,000 qualified personnel were expected to be available by the end of 1966, to meet the requirements for programs in the priority areas. These areas coincided with areas where military forces would concentrate their efforts to establish secure zones.307 The priority areas were Da Nang-Quang Nam Province (I Corps); Binh Dinh Province (II Corps); Saigon-Cholon-Gia Dinh Sector,

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eastern portion of Hau Nghia Sector, southern portion of Binh Duong Sector, western portion of Bien Hoa Sector, northern and central portions of Long An Sector and the northwestern portion of Rung Sat Special Zone (III Corps), and An Giang Province (IV Corps). Province chiefs presented their plans to division and corps commanders and to the Minister of Rural Construction for approval during the period 6-29 December. USMACV and USAID representatives from all levels participated in the review of these plans and related actions. Upon approval of the plans, the Minister of Rural Construction required RVNAF corps and division commanders and province chiefs to sign statements that at least 75 percent of the planned programs would be accomplished in 1966. Signatures of US advisors were also required, to signify mutual understanding of minimum goals of the 1966 program. The plans were finalized and funds were released so that the 1966 program could begin on 1 January 1966.

(C) The GVN military plan in support of the 1966 Rural Construction Plan was given in JGS Directive AB 140 dated 15 December 1965. It was developed in coordination with the Ministry of Rural Construction and USMACV and included eight annexes. The annexes delineated the roles and missions of the RVNAF and other GVN forces; the basic tasks of the FWMAF; and described the programs for resources control, civil affairs and psywar. They also showed the relationships among the forces in the three phases of rural construction. RVNAF/USMACV Directive AB 141 dated 31 December 1965 was the combined RVNAF/USMACV campaign plan. It established the basic missions of RVNAF and US/FWMAF, and outlined immediate goals to accomplish those missions during 1966. The campaign plan tasked the military commands to gain the objectives established in the 1966 Rural Construction Plan and AB 140. On 11 December 1965, the GVN published CRCC Directive 1535-UBHP-CT-M. It was an all-encompassing summation of rural construction policy and superseded Directive 2-64, which was dated 8 October 1964.

(S) In late November 1965, the special assistant to the U. S. Ambassador, Maj Gen E. Lansdale, (Ret) identified a problem occasioned by the appointment of a Director of Cadre in the Ministry of Rural Construction, and expressed in the question: "Who on the US side will have the executive role in dealing with the Rural Construction Cadre, their organization, their recruitment, their training and their employment?" He informed the Ambassador that:

[redacted] USAID desire establishing a joint office with the Rural Construction Ministry, to have daily working liaison with the GVN on these cadre matters. MACV desires a working subcommittee of Mission Liaison Group, in which MACV

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would have a strong role and perform this daily working liaison function on GVN cadre. The USAID project envisages MACV and JUSPAO as "observers" only . . . There is a need for a single US voice to reconcile policy differences and one focal point for US dealings on RC cadre. 308

(S) COMUSMACV believed that USMACV's role should not be limited to the degree envisaged by USAID because it had a direct and substantial interest in the cadre program. USMACV was the only structure for advising the GVN at all levels of its governmental operations and administrative organizations. At district level and below, the USMACV subsector advisory team was the sole US advisory element. Because of this, COMUSMACV shared the responsibility for failure if the cadre policies and programs developed in Saigon were ineffective in the provinces. The manpower required for the cadre teams would impact directly and seriously on COMUSMACV's efforts to maintain RVNAF strength levels. The supplying of arms, ammunition and other standard military items for the cadre and the maintenance and repair of such material would inevitably become the responsibility of RVNAF and hence of COMUSMACV. The Minister of Rural Construction, Major General Thang, was also the Director of Operations, JGS, and looked to USMACV for advice and assistance on the whole spectrum of pacification activities to include cadre problems. 309

(C) In a memorandum to Special Assistant Lansdale on 15 December, the Ambassador clarified the roles and missions of US agencies in SVN in these words:

> I consider the government of Vietnam's effort in this domain (apart from the military clearing phase) to be primarily civilian, economic, social and political in nature and in its aims. Consequently, on the American side, it is preferable that i.e., USAID be the operating support upon whom you should rely for the implementation of the necessary programs as they develop. Other sections of the Mission, including MACV, JUSPAO . . . should consider themselves associated with . . . USAID but not as agencies directly responsible for operations.
>
> The foregoing is intended to insure that the number of persons and agencies contacting the GVN and particularly the Ministry of Rural Construction, on the subject of pacification and development

is reduced, and in fact is limited to yourself or your representative, plus the representatives of the two operating agencies, USAID and CAS. 310

(TS) At year's end, COMUSMACV held these views on the pacification effort:

> From an administrative and a management viewpoint, I think we are getting pretty well organized to subsequently pursue a military campaign and to project a meaningful rural construction program. The only missing element now is a cadre concept and plan which should become an annex to a decree by the Prime Minister setting up a broad policy and the organization for rural construction. This is a matter to be worked out between General Thang and Mr. Lansdale. The biggest problem now in this whole complex is Lansdale's function, to include his relationship with other elements of the US Mission and agencies of the GVN. 311

(S) In evaluating the progress of pacification during 1965, many factors must be considered. In September 1963, there were 79 indicators which USMACV staff members had devised to measure developments in the then 27 objectives defined in the pacification program. By March 1964, the number of indicators accepted by J3, USMACV, had increased to 101. Although these indicators were formulated on reasonable bases, their large number made analysis and presentation cumbersome.

> Pacification reports from the beginning were in a constant state of flux, because of a continual search for a meaningful basis of comparison between past and present. Uncertainty as to what data were significant created a demand for more and more information, with the resultant introduction of statistical methods into pacification reporting. As the search for significant indicators for pacification progress continued throughout 1964, reports became more numerous and unwieldy. 312

(C) Thus when COMUSMACV proposed that a few basic yardsticks be used as primary indicators to measure pacification progress, they were readily accepted by the agencies involved, i.e., DIA (Defense Intelligence Agency), OSD, USAID. These yardsticks were: 1) population control, 2) area control, 3) communication control, 4) resources control, 5) VC strength and viability, 6) RVN strength and viability. Three reports which evolved during 1964 and served as the basic pacification progress report requirements during 1965 were: 1) USMACV Directive 335-10, Subject: Monthly Reporting of Pacification Progress and Population and Area Control, 15 July 1964 (revised

6 October 1965), (C); 2) Joint Directive 2-64, Subject: Criteria to Evaluate New Life Hamlets, 8 October 1964, (C), (superseded by GVN CRCC Directive 1535-UBHP-CT-M, 11 December 1965); and 3) Joint Directive 3-64, Subject: Province Pacification Reports, 26 October 1964, (C), (superseded by Joint Directive 1-65 dated 22 July 1965).

(S) Statistical data on gains and losses during 1965 can thus be calculated by analyzing the pertinent data of these reports. For example, the population in the secured areas increased from 4,278,600 to 7,724,200, for a gain of 3,445,600 during the period 25 January-25 December 1965. [313] A true appreciation of this gain should, however, be qualified by factors to include: 1) normal population growth, 2) continuing reevaluation of methods by which these figures are compiled, 3) periodic discovery of inaccurate data submitted by lower echelons, 4) movements of refugees, 5) deliberate VC infiltrations, etc., as well as GVN control over additional areas. The hazardous nature of statistical formulation in RVN can be summarized by unconfirmed report from the office of the Mayor of Saigon that "approximately 500,000 unregistered people were in the Saigon/Cholon area." [314]

(S) The qualified nature of statistical data can be illustrated by the analysis of selected data for December 1965. According to GVN Memorandum No. 0657, dated September 1964, an area can be considered secured only if it met the "six-point criteria." One of the conditions needed for fulfilment of Criterion No. 1 is the recognition of the ineffectiveness of VC harassment on the population. One of the indications by which this condition can be recognized is when the people "voluntarily provide effective intelligence to GVN, which will identify and neutralize the remaining VC infrastructures." In December, Gia Dinh Province, the province which had the second greatest percentage of its population in areas considered secured, had 97.7 percent of its population in this category. [315] During the first 11 months of 1965, an affirmative answer was given to the basic question posed in the Provincial Team Report: Is the population willingly giving intelligence to the government concerning the VC? Yet, in December, the answer was: "No. Information provided in only one district where there is security." [316] The change in attitude of the people, despite this statistic, can probably be attributed to the assassination of six government officials by the VC in Gia Dinh Province from September to November 1965 and the confirmed increase of six VC battalions [317] in the areas bordering the province. [318]

(C) The expectations for progress in terms of land area and population control were natural. But they were based on

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assumptions which were not necessarily valid during 1965: that there were effective and coordinated pacification plans and an efficient organization to pursue these goals. Some of the obstructions and inadequacies which hindered the program during 1965 were: 1) lack of local administrative capability to assimilate rural construction programs, 2) inadequate formation of RF/PF units to follow up military clearing operations, 3) administrative confusion associated with the attempted coup of 15 February 1965, 4) increased VC activity, particularly in the first half of the year, 5) uncertainties resulting from delays at the national level in approving the 1965 Pacification Program, 6) delays in the disbursement of funds budgeted for rural construction activities, 7) continued use of low-quality civilian cadres, 8) relatively low efficiency in search and destroy operations, 9) the drafting of many capable cadres, teachers and survey team members into the military service, and 10) the appointment of some incapable and obstinate officials at the district and province levels.

(C) In a larger sense it would be more appropriate to evaluate pacification progress during 1965 in terms of the changes and refinements in pacification concepts, planning and organization. If this is considered a valid criterion, the following developments would indicate that significant progress was made: 1) greater GVN initiative and better planning, 2) timely handling of the 1966 pacification budget, 3) clearer definitions, 4) more definitive policies, 5) better coordination of plans and views, 6) more accurate statistics, 7) a refinement in the methods of evaluation, 8) greater efficiency and flexibility at the lower levels, 9) recognition of the need for a better trained cadre, 10) more aggressive attitudes (such as the return of refugees to their own villages), and 11) greater appreciation of the nuances of pacification techniques.

(U) The process of pacification was usually slow and involved as much a change in attitude as it did the accomplishment of physical tasks. By an awareness of the political and psychological factors involved, by an attitude of helpfulness and understanding, coupled with firm and fair application of the necessary controls, and by conduct of an imaginative and aggressive civic action program, military forces could make the difference between success and failure in the pacification program. 319

ECONOMIC WARFARE

(S) In 1965 the US mission established an economic warfare program as an integral part of the joint US/GVN effort to defeat the VC/NVN forces. With the sharp increase of NVN military forces

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infiltrating into SVN, and their corresponding increasing requirements for food and medicines, an economic warfare program was essential to deny them these logistic resources and thus reduce their effectiveness. Such a program would force them to expand more effort just to subsist, leaving them less time and capability to fight. Emphasis was given to immediate action which would deny the enemy money, foodstuffs, salt and medicines, particularly in the critical areas of the II CTZ, where most of the VC buildup was taking place. 320

(S) The US Mission Council's Economic Warfare Committee, formed in August 1965, was chaired by the US Counselor for Economic Affairs. It consisted of representatives from J2, USMACV, USAID, CAS, and the US Embassy's Special Liaison Office. The committee considered the suggestions of various agencies, intelligence reports, and investigation results, to ensure that all possible measures would be employed to weaken the enemy. Specific programs were arranged with the appropriate implementing agencies and recommendations were submitted to the US Ambassador and Washington. The committee members also monitored various programs to determine their effectiveness and to assure proper execution. Close liaison was established, especially with the director of USAID, the Embassy political section and CAS. 321

(S) Initially, the committee focused its attention on two activities: 1) to deny the VC access to needed resources, and 2) to counter the VC program of economic warfare. Toward the last few months of the year the committee concentrated its efforts in programs to deny resources to the VC. 322

(S) Although there was a variety of commodities which the VC needed to maintain a satisfactory capability, the committee felt that programs should be formulated in terms of denying the enemy specific selected items which when limited would hurt the enemy most effectively. 323 The committee determined these items to be money, food, salt and medicines, in a descending order of priority. Money was of primary importance because of its negotiable nature both in-country and abroad. An appropriate program to deny the VC money would thus consist of measures which could counter their taxation, hijacking, blackmailing and strongarm activities. 324 During 1964, the VC reportedly collected more than two billion piasters in taxes. However, the committee believed that the VC were still operating with a considerable deficit. A reported CHICOM purchase of 300 million piasters in Hong Kong was apparently a measure to balance the VC budget. The VC's financial system was sophisticated and businesslike. Even low-level functionaries reportedly complained of the paper work involved. The magnitude of VC

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taxation can be illustrated in terms of the fact that two billion piasters in taxes is tantamount to an annual levy of 1,000 piasters from each family in the RVN. 325

(S) The VC had numerous ways of obtaining money while the GVN/US measures to counter their efforts were limited. The simplest immediate countermeasure was to neutralize VC tax and revenue collectors on the highways and riverways. The expansion of areas under GVN control would also shield an increasing number of people from VC taxation. 326 USAID pressed GVN authorities to establish a number of strong and efficient checkpoints on the major national highways leading into Saigon and those leading from the central lowlands into the highlands. Permanently manned by the NP, but to include RVNAF and US MP's, all vehicles could thus be stopped and searched. The committee believed that this measure would prevent the VC from using certain highways. 327

(S) A Resources Control Program, which was developed by the USAID Public Safety Division and implemented by the NP, concentrated on checking the flow of resources from the Delta to the highlands and to the central lowlands. It was difficult, if not impossible, to check VC efforts to obtain food within the food-producing Delta region but the VC in the highlands had only very limited food resources. 328

(S) To deny drugs to the VC, USAID and the Ministry of Health developed a plan which increased control over retail distribution of pharmaceuticals. Previously, any person with an ID card could purchase drugs freely. 329 The program required retail drug distributors to register all buyers of drugs. Hospital personnel were urged to strictly monitor their medical supplies to minimize leakage into the black market. COMUSMACV instructed all US and FWMAF medical teams to administer only daily dosages and not dosages for complete treatment. This would prevent the VC from collecting medicines from villages visited by Medical Civic Action Program (MEDCAP) teams. 330

(S) The program to deny salt to the VC, who required about one pound per month per man, consisted largely in controlling the movement of salt cargoes in the salt-producing areas along the coastal plains of SVN. Salt was transported largely by small junks and sampans. If successfully executed, this program would cut the VC's access to 85 percent of the salt produced in SVN. Plans were also made to institute checkpoints in the highlands to control the shipping of salt into that region. 331,332

(S) US and ARVN forces conducted a series of operations to secure the rice-producing areas, particularly in I CTZ and in the Delta region, to insure that the rice harvest would not fall into

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VC hands. Evacuation of rice supplies found in VC hideouts and supply points also contributed toward denial of this valuable commodity to the VC. When such supplies could not be evacuated, they were destroyed.

(S) Programs carried out strictly by the GVN were generally ineffective. This was due largely to shortage of trained supervisory personnel and a deterioration of the security situation. The Economic Warfare Committee recommended that USAID direct a concentration of effort into a few, properly staffed and supervised transportation route checkpoints, with the main effort in the II CTZ and the Saigon-Cholon complex. 334

(S) In response to the US Ambassador's request, the USMACV staff developed an economic warfare directive in December 1965, which was subsequently published and distributed by 14 January 1966. 335 The directive included data on previous USMACV studies on this subject and pointed out the two objectives of economic warfare: to deny to the VC/NVA those commodities which they must have to carry on insurgency, and to counter the VC economic warfare measures against the RVN. US/FWMA forces and/or RVNAF, through advisory channels, were thus required to:

1) deny rice harvests to the VC on a planned basis within manpower capabilities by securing the area concerned or by destroying rice fields in regions which could not be secured and by providing limited amounts of rice to the people in fringe areas through the cooperation of local provincial authorities.

2) secure the salt producing areas (solely an RVNAF mission) and cooperate with the NP who were to inspect and control commercial shipments of salt from these areas. 336

3) neutralize VC attempts to collect money by attacking VC tax collection points and personnel on roads and waterways and to provide sufficient security to the local population so that they would be encouraged to ignore VC tax and bond-selling efforts.

4) identify and neutralize local VC sources of medicine and to report all captured medicine stocks.

5) control all traffic on selected key roads and waterways by imposing a night curfew, by protecting all convoys which must move during the day and by inspecting each vehicle or watercraft traversing these areas.

6) cooperate with the NP in the operation of resources control checkpoints. 337

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(C) COMUSMACV's overall guidance in this new directive provided for US/FWMAF to assist and monitor RVNAF security efforts and furnish appropriate assistance to other US agencies engaged in this program. It was hoped that this fresh approach would lend new stimulus to this vital program as the new year began.

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

(U) The most significant development of USMACV psyops during 1965 was the introduction of USA psyops units as part of and in support of the buildup of US combat forces. There was a general consolidation and integration of US-GVN efforts, a corresponding clarification of functions among members of the psyops community in the RVN, and a marked interest throughout the US Mission in full exploitation of all psychological opportunities.

(U) The keystone of USMACV psyops policy relative to the support of combat operations was contained in USMACV Directive 525-3, Minimising Non-Combatant Battle Casualties, 7 September 1965. This directive, which emphasized discrimination in the application of firepower and the use of all available psyops resources during each operation, also noted that the circumstances of the war in SVN called for the exercise of restraint not normally required of soldiers on the battlefield. These circumstances were described as follows:

> The Government of Vietnam (GVN) is engaged in a fight for its survival against the communist Viet Cong (VC) supported and reinforced by the forces of the DRV. It is the objective of the VC to seize control of the hamlets, villages and towns by a combination of military action, terrorism, political action and subversion. It is the objective of the GVN to resist this process and where it has occurred, to reserve it. This means that the battle for Vietnam flows backward and forward across the homes and fields of the hapless rice farmer and the small town inhabitant. Whether, at any one time, he lives in a VC or a GVN controlled hamlet depends to a large extent upon factors and forces beyond his control. Eventually, of course, the GVN plans to regain control over all of the hamlets and all of the people.
>
> The use of unnecessary force leading to non-combatant casualties in areas temporarily controlled by the VC will embitter the population, drive them into the arms of the VC, and make the long range goal of pacification more difficult and more costly.

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Integration of US Psyops Activities

(U) Following his March 1965 SVN visit, USIA Director Carl Rowan recommended to the President that US psyops in the RVN be expanded and realigned. The President approved the recommended program, which called for the immediate creation of a Joint US Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO) through the combination of USIS, USMACV and USAID elements. 338

(U) The creation of JUSPAO was formally announced by US Embassy Instruction VN 186, of 14 May. A joint USMACV/JUSPAO message dated 18 May, Subject: Direction and Supervision of US Psychological Operations in Vietnam, clarified the relationship among USMACV, JUSPAO and GVN personnel and agencies. The Director, USIS in SVN, was designated Director, JUSPAO. (See Figure IV-4 for the organization of JUSPAO.)

(U) The Director, JUSPAO, as US Mission Coordinator for Psychological Operations, developed psyops guidance applicable to all US elements in SVN. The more significant elements of this guidance, such as the National Psychological Operations Plan, were submitted to the US Mission PsyOps Committee, on which the USMACV J3 was a member, and subsequently to the Mission Council for approval prior to dissemination to field agencies. JUSPAO field representatives accomplished at the local level, i.e., region and province, the same mission of coordination of the psyops activities of all agencies.

(U) The Political Warfare Advisory Directorate (POLWAR) was established by USMACV GO Nr. 931, dated 5 May 1965, to advise and support the General Political Warfare Department (GPWD) of the RVNAF, to advise COMUSMACV and the USMACV staff on and exercise staff supervision over psyops and civic action and the psychological implications of military operations, and to monitor and supervise the efforts of USMACV psywar and civic action field advisors and psywar units. 339 The Director functioned under the staff supervision of the ACofS, J3, with direct access to the CofS when required.

(U) The Director, POLWAR, sat as a member of the JUSPAO Executive Board, representing the ACofS, J3 (and USMACV) in the routine coordination of Mission psyops. Military members of the JUSPAO staff, and JUSPAO military field representatives were carried in the POLWAR portion of the USMACV JTD but were not under the operational control of the Director, POLWAR.

(U) In its advisory role, POLWAR was concerned not only with psyops and civic action but with the other activities charged to the GPWD as well. Because of the significance of

the GPWD's missions of motivation, propaganda, security and welfare of the RVNAF in support of RVNAF commander's primary missions, a separate treatment of this organization is provided in Annex L. To support the programmed expansion of the RVNAF political warfare structure and activities, an increase in the USMACV JTD was recommended in August 1965 to provide for an additional 57 psyops trained officer advisors, to be assigned primarily at schools and training centers but also including separate command, VNAF, VNN and VNMC elements not already staffed with psyops advisors.[340]

(U) In mid-December the JCS approved the deployment of the 6th USA Tactical PsyOps Battalion to the RVN.[341] This deployment was designed to culminate the gradual buildup of USA psyops detachments which had been introduced concurrently with US combat forces and to provide command, control, and support headquarters for all USA psyops units in the RVN. The introduction of USA psyops units was designed to provide a major stimulus to the whole US/GVN psyops program and to insure that US tactical units were provided adequate and timely psyops support.[342]

(U) The 5th Air Commando Squadron (PsyOps) was deployed to the RVN during the last quarter of 1965 and became operational in late December. The squadron, equipped with four C-47 aircraft mounting ALTEC speaker systems and 17 U-10's with an improved, LING-TEMPCO-VAUGHT univeraity speaker system, was exclusively committed to the support of psyops and functioned under the operational control of the Cdr, 2d AD.

(U) With the arrival of the remaining elements of the 6th PsyOps Bn, and including psyops advisors, staff personnel in combat units, and USA and USAF psyops units it was estimated that the total US military commitment to psyops in the RVN approached 500 full time personnel.

(U) Within the CTZ's, the US military psyops program was closely integrated with the RVNAF psyops effort. The USA detachments were placed under the operational control of senior CTZ advisors, who were engaged in advising and assisting ARVN units, with the hope of raising the level of commitment and professional competence of ARVN psyops units and to overcome the shortage of VN language qualification and area specialization in the US units. To maximize on the capabilities of ARVN and US units, propaganda support centers were established at locations within CTZ's where US and ARVN psyops units were collocated. The propaganda support centers were conceived as being jointly manned and supporting all US/RVNAF/FWMAF operations within the CTZ according to priorities mutually agreed to by the ARVN corps commanders and the Senior US Corps Advisor. By the end of 1965 US psyops units had assisted

materially with psyops support to the Plei Me-Ia Drang campaign in II CTZ, to Operation "New Life" in III CTZ, and to many other less publicized operations.

USMACV Troop Indoctrination in Civic Action

(C) The point of departure for the USMACV civic action operational concept was the attitude of courtesy and helpfulness displayed by the individual US/FWMAF soldier in his daily contacts with the VN people. Emphasis was placed on making personal friends among the VN soldiers and common people and helping them individually; using phrases from their language; honoring their customs and laws; making no special demands; and treating women with politeness and respect. Loud, rude or unusual behavior, and open display of wealth were discouraged, because they alienated the soldier from the people. COMUSMACV's guidance, summarized in terms of nine specific points of conduct, was printed on 3½ x 2½ inch cards and distributed to all US military personnel in SVN. Unit civic action complemented individual actions. Combined US and GVN civic actions were encouraged in situations where they were collocated or engaged in combined operations. Initiative for Civic Action was to originate at the lowest practicable echelon.[343] Civic action projects were considered successful if they encouraged a local VN attitude of self-help, and if the arrival or continued stationing of US units in an area was welcome for the positive and tangible benefits that would accrue to the common people.

(U) US military commanders were encouraged to participate in civic action to the extent that military operations permitted. Instructions called for the use of managerial and technical skills of the military as well as the equipment available to assist the people to accomplish their own improvement, rather than employ troop units to accomplish the improvement for the people as a primary mission.[344]

USMACV Civic Action Program

(U) The key to civic action in the provinces was the province chief. He had the administrative staff for determining requirements, establishing priorities, developing programs and projects, allocating resources of money, materials, managerial and technical skills, equipment and labor, in the furtherance of and coordination with reconstruction activities. After coordination with province/sector staffs, through US Advisory Teams, US commanders were urged to obtain the province chief's approval prior to implementing planned civic action projects. On 31 October 1965, USMACV Command Letter, Subject: Supplies

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for US/FWMAF Military Civic Action, Serial No. 4678, was issued, providing detailed information on the availability of supplies for this program.

(C) CINCPAC's guidance to COMUSMACV in November 1965 stipulated that the degree of implementation of civic action programs was dependent on various factors including: the imminence and nature of the insurgency threat, the magnitude of the in-country effort, the importance attached to this effort by the local government and senior military officials, the degree of internal coordination and centralization of civil affairs, functions within US military/host country military staff, and the degree of coordination and programming among all cognizant team agencies. 345

(U) From October to December 1965, USMACV Civic Action staff officers visited all major US/FWMAF units and USMACV groups in order to improve directing, monitoring, coordinating and evaluating the nationwide civic action program. The visits resulted in the publication and distribution of several letters of guidance including: 1) USMACV Letter, Subject: Sector PsyOps/CA Advisor Duties (U), Serial Nr. 4964, 8 November, (duty readjustments to enable sector advisors to concentrate on their primary responsibilities), 2) USMACV Letter, Subject: Disposition of Captured Rice Stocks (U), Serial Nr. 01536, 24 November.

(U) During 1965, US military personnel assisted in the distribution to the VN people of over 106,000 tons of foodstuffs and other commodities valued at more than $100,000 donated by International Voluntary Agencies, CARE and the Catholic Relief Services. Civic action construction projects numbered more than 2,400 and ranged from drainage control and road repair to school construction and bridge building. Monetary contributions by US units in support of orphanages, schools and dispensaries were often unreported and are not included in the above figures.

(U) See Annex L for the GVN Polwar Program, Chieu Hoi Program, Rand Corporation Research Projects, Leaflet Operations, and MEDCAP.

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CHAPTER V

THE OUTCOME

(U) The Year of Decision brought remarkable changes to the military situation in Vietnam, the most significant of which was the deployment of almost 200,000 US combat troops and the commencement of one of the largest construction programs ever undertaken by the US Armed Forces. It was a year in which the US faced challenges it had never before encountered. The degree of success with which these challenges were met could not always be measured--a perplexing and frustrating situation. The highest order of perseverance and judgment on the part of each serviceman was required. But his problems were recognized--the entire world became painfully aware of the vexing situation and the importance of events in Vietnam. This recognition was symbolized by Time magazine's choice of General Westmoreland as the "Man of the Year" for 1965.

BUILDUP

(U) The first US tactical units arrived in SVN early in the year. USMC air defense units arrived in Da Nang in February, followed by USMC infantry units at the same location on 8 March. The USA 173d Abn Bde arrived in the Saigon-Bien Hoa area on 5 May. By the end of the year there were 12 USMC battalions, two Army divisions, two separate USA airborne brigades and numerous USMC and USA aviation and support units deployed. Deployment of elements of the 25th Inf Div began toward the end of the year (see chronology).

(U) The purpose of the initial USMC buildup was to provide a security force for the Da Nang air base. This emphasis on security forces continued throughout the year. MP units were deployed to areas of high troop concentrations and, in May, USMACV corps advisory detachments were augmented to provide security for the various advisory elements.

(S) The year also saw the first overt employment of US air power in the war. Concentrated bombing of NVN began on 7 February with a raid by USN and VNAF aircraft in retaliation for the VC attacks on Pleiku on the same date. The first USAF strike of 1965 in NVN was conducted on 11 February when 150 USAF and USN aircraft struck in retaliation for the bombing of a BEQ in Qui Nhon. [1] (NVN had been bombed once on 5 August 1964 following an attack by NVN PT boats on two US destroyers in the Gulf of Tonkin.) US tactical jet aircraft commenced operations

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in SVN on 19 February and the first tactical employment of B-52 bombers occurred on 18 June. Aerial reconnaissance of Laos and the infiltration routes had been underway since May 1964 under the code name YANKEE TEAM. Some strikes had been made against air defense positions in Laos but the first US air strikes against VC/NVA infiltration routes occurred on 12 December 1964 under the code name BARREL ROLL (air strikes into the northern Laotian Panhandle).[2] BARREL ROLL, ARC LIGHT (B-52 strikes in RVN), STEEL TIGER (air strikes in the southern Laotian Panhandle), and ROLLING THUNDER (air strikes in NVN) operations were conducted throughout the year from bases in RVN, Thailand, Guam, and from 7th Flt carriers. Strikes in Laos and RVN continued throughout the year but there were two cessations of bombings in NVN (13-18 May; 25 December-unresumed in 1965) to provide opportunities for peace negotiations.

(C) There was a great increase in the USN role in the war. Aside from its support of the VNN through the NAVGP and its support of air operations from several CVA's, it provided extensive gunfire support and conducted MARKET TIME operations to maintain coastal surveillance against VC infiltration. Before May 1965 only five NGF ships supported counterinsurgency operations. At the end of the year 18 destroyers were providing this support. Occasionally as many as 25 ships participated in this role.[3] In addition, USCG elements arrived in RVN during the summer to participate in MARKET TIME.

(C) Changes in USA advisory effort included an increase of advisory teams at subsector level and a POLWAR Directorate on the USMACV staff as well as an expansion in the intelligence field. More naval advisors were assigned to RAG and to the Coastal Force. Additional USAF advisors were assigned to newly-activated VNAF squadrons. However, there were no significant changes in the USMC advisory role during 1965.

(S) The year saw the first tactical commitment of FWMAF with the arrival of the 1st Bn, RAR, on 8 June. It was followed by a battery of New Zealand artillery, the ROK Capital Infantry Division and a ROK Marine brigade (see chronology). About 22,400 FWMAF troops were deployed by 31 December and plans were being made for deployment of another ROK RCT and another ROK division.[4]

(C) Given the long lines of communication across the Pacific, the inadequate terminal facilities in the RVN and the dispersion of field elements coupled with the hazardous nature of inland routes, it was clearly imperative that a logistics base should be developed. Initially, Saigon was the only major port; it was considered inadequate because of its limited space, the vulnerability of ships to VC attacks on the river and its

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location as a transshipment point. A dual logistics support system was developed in which the NAVSUPPACT, Da Nang, would service the northern regions while the 1st USA Log Comd in Saigon would cover the southern area. This system called for the establishment of a major supply and support complex at Cam Ranh Bay and additional bases at Qui Nhon, Nha Trang, Bien Hoa and Vung Tau. The development of these facilities was particularly necessary if US/FWMAF elements were expected to mount sustained military operations.

(C) By the end of 1965, except for some logistics units and four USAF squadrons, the US personnel buildup under Phase I was completed. Of the 184,314 US military personnel in-country, 116,755 were USA; 8,749, USN and USCG; 38,190, USMC; and 20,620, USAF.[5] Although Phase II buildup had begun, it required augmentation (Phase IIA) to cope with the increased VC/NVA buildup.

(C) Except for the PF, RVNAF and other GVN forces managed to attain their respective MAP strength ceilings. However, RVNAF suffered from an extremely high desertion rate and heavy combat losses. These developments substantially decreased the RVN manpower resources to the degree that COMUSMACV was obliged to reduce the 1966 MAP supported force increases from a desired 326,725 for ARVN to 286,007.[6] Approximate year-end strengths attained by GVN forces were: ARVN, 267,900; VNN, 14,500; VNAF, 12,700; VNMC, 7,400; RF 132,200; PF, 136,400; NP 52,200; and CIDG, 28,400.[7]

REACTIONS

(C) The campaign of terrorist attacks against both US and GVN installations increased greatly in 1965. Undoubtedly many of the incidents may be attributed to the VC's reaction to the increasing signs of US determination in fulfilling its commitment to the RVN. In preparation for the anticipated step-up in VC hostile action the evacuation of dependents of US military personnel and other US government employees was ordered on 8 February. VC-initiated incidents continued to rise throughout the year; the highest weekly record of incidents was for the week ending 1 December, when it reached 1,038.[8]

(C) In early 1965 it was apparent that infiltration of supplies from the north was increasing. There were also indications that NVA regulars were being introduced into the RVN. Intelligence reports tended to show that the VC would launch a big campaign in the II CTZ during the summer monsoons with one goal of splitting the RVN in half. The enemy demonstrated his ability to coordinate the actions of multi-battalion forces

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effectively and displayed a willingness to engage the US/FWMAF elements in large conventional warfare battles. It appeared as though the insurgent activity was developing into Mao's third stage of revolution--that of open warfare.

(U) The first public confirmation of the presence of NVA units in the RVN was made by a USMACV announcement of 15 July which identified the 101st NVA Regiment as being in-country. [9] Late in the year the enemy infiltration rate was estimated to have increased to a monthly rate of 4,500. It was concluded that VC/NVA strength in RVN doubled during the year, with a strength of 229,759 [10] at the year's end (see Table I-2).

(U) The year also saw a wide diversity of US public and international reaction to the US involvement in the war. In the US there were student protest marches, teach-ins and a few attempts to halt or delay shipments to Vietnam. However, these actions appeared to be protests of small albeit, highly vocal, groups. The vast majority of the US public appeared to support the policy of the US Government. Private citizens and civic organizations indicated their support by sending tons of Christmas mail and gifts to US servicemen in SVN. A massive airlift of Christmas mail, nicknamed "Operation Christmas Star," was initiated. Incoming mail handled by USMACV postal facilities in November and December totaled 6,429,216 lbs. In all, more than 1,500,000 letters and 100,000 packages were received by US personnel in SVN. COMUSMACV said that although it posed "an additional burden on our internal logistics system, . . . it was exceptionally worthwhile."[11]

(C) The number of official visitors to RVN created a serious problem in 1965. This was first evident when 407 military and 45 civilian officials visited RVN between 1 February and 15 March. [12] COMUSMACV expressed his concern over the problem, pointing out that these visits caused a heavy drain on air transportation and billeting; required a great deal of support from USMACV personnel, and created a security problem. [13] He recognized that "visits by senior individuals play a constructive role in that they see the situation at first hand and can thus speak from experience upon their return to the states. Secondly, they can acquire expertise that can be brought to bear in helping us solve some of our problems". [14] He suggested to CINCPAC that visits be reduced to an absolute minimum. [15] CINCPAC and CJCS approved the following COMUSMACV-proposed criteria in alleviating the problems: Will the trip: Aid in eliminating a USMACV problem area? Aid in acquiring needed resources? Aid future operations of USMACV? Impart to USMACV significant information not otherwise available? Or involve personnel whose responsibilities require them to maintain periodic contact with field activities in the national interest? [16] In spite of these

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actions to discourage nonessential visits, the total for October reached an all-time high of 892. The CG, FFORCEV, noted in October that the volume of visitors to his HQ had begun to affect adversely his operational activities.[17] This same concern was expressed by the CG, 1st Cav Div (AM), in December.[18] (See Table V-1 for 1965 visitor statistics.)

(C) Concerned with the safety of VIP's who might desire to visit units engaged in combat, the Ambassador and COMUSMACV agreed that the decision as the whether such visits should be arranged or not should be made by the commanders (or if delegated, their immediate subordinates) of the respective major subordinate commands affected. In the IV CTZ, the Senior Advisor was to decide. The criterion governing these decisions was: to prevent unnecessary exposure to hostile action of key US/Free World officials whose injury or death would result in grave loss to the nation.[19]

ACCOMPLISHMENTS AND PROBLEMS

(S) The Phase I buildup was a particularly noteworthy accomplishment considering its rapidity and the lack of a logistical base and adequate communications in-country. Great progress was made in both logistical and communications areas but much improvement was still needed at the end of the year. While there were critical supply shortages during the year, no combat operations were delayed by lack of adequate logistics support. However, the capability for sustained combat was hampered. The major problem that remained unsolved at the end of the year was that of port congestion and cargo through-put. Land LOC's were also largely interdicted forcing heavy reliance on coastal shipping and airlift. At year's end negotiation for additional LST's, barges and other forms of lighterage were underway. The cost of all this effort, though, was high. In November the SECDEF stated that the war was costing the US approximately ten billion dollars annually.[20]

(S) In the field of communications, significant progress was made in planning and establishing systems to provide COMUSMACV with resources necessary for the exercise of responsive command and control. A secure voice net linking Saigon and Washington was completed. An in-country secure voice net was partially completed. Advisory communications were improved. A serious shortcoming of the year was the failure to complete construction of the IWCS to permit overall upgrading of the SEASIA long lines system. A serious message backlog developed causing COMUSMACV to place stringent controls on message traffic within his HQ. At the end of the year plans were underway for an expansion of the Armed Forces Radio Service (AFRS)

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and for the introduction of TV into RVN both as a morale booster and for use in the GVN psywar program.

(C) Early in the year COMUSMACV stressed the need for an improved command and control system for tactical air operations. After COMUSMACV approved a 2d AD plan on 24 March, releasing US tactical aircraft from previous restraints, a Joint Tactical Air Control Center (JTACC) was established at TSN air base. [21] On 1 December a COC was established to control ground force operations and coordinate this control with the JTACC.

(C) Significant military achievements by US forces during the year were the blunting of the monsoon offensive and the engagement of the VC within his traditional sanctuaries. The US forces took a tremendous toll of VC lives and acquitted themselves creditably on the battlefield. Many US units were, like RVNAF, tied to a local security role but at year's end, with the buildup continuing, an expansion of operations was planned.

(C) The III MAF encountered a greater problem than other US units owing to the lack of RF/PF elements for securing hamlets within their TAOR. As a result, III MAF was not able to conduct operations outside their TAOR to the extent desired because of the need to use their own units in the securing phase of pacification.

(U) RVNAF forces recorded some significant victories and some costly defeats. When VC units were forced to stand and fight they were soundly defeated but they were often victorious in battles of their own choosing. During the first half of the year the VC held the initiative in many areas, attacking under favorable conditions and avoiding or breaking contact when conditions were unfavorable. Many RVNAF units were committed to the defense of key installations which left large areas where the VC could move freely. The introduction of US units and increased air strikes tended to deprive the VC of these traditional sanctuaries and as the year progressed RVNAF gained strength and confidence. An improvement in the RVNAF ability to use new equipment effectively was noted. Some ARVN commanders, especially in IV Corps, demonstrated an excellent ability to conduct successful military operations. [22]

(C) The cost in lives, equipment and aircraft was higher than previous years but it was less than COMUSMACV's estimates. Personnel losses for US forces were 1,378 KIA; 6,148 WIA; 126 MIA and 17 known detained or captured. [23] RVNAF lost nearly 14,000 KIA [24] while the VC lost approximately 35,000 KIA and 6,000 captured. [25] On 20 January 1966 the Secretary of Defense announced that the US had lost 351 aircraft in SVN and NVN in 1965.

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Included were 76 helicopters and 275 fixed wing aircraft. Of these, approximately 160 (95 USAF; USN exact losses unknown) were tactical strike aircraft brought down over NVN.[27]

(S) Significant developments of material and techniques were noted during the year, particularly in the field of target acquisition. SLAR was used to locate river and road traffic at night; IR devices were used to locate hidden campsites; the heliborne illumination system called "Lightning Bug" was developed for use with a SLAR aircraft to provide target illumination for armed helicopters at night. A tactic known as "Snipe Hunt" was developed in which targets were located by a SLAR aircraft working with a FAC, a flare aircraft and tactical strike aircraft. Delta teams were organized and used as long range reconnaissance teams. New techniques in night photography were employed. By year's end antipersonnel radars were in use in the Command.

(S) Significant advances were made in the field of psywar. JUSPAO was organized and the USMACV POLWAR Directorate was established. Each sector was provided two specially equipped Tri-Lambretta vehicles for use in the psywar effort. U-10 aircraft and UH-1 loudspeaker and leaflet drop aircraft were used extensively. US units took full advantage of the psywar effects of MEDCAP and construction projects. One of the more successful psywar efforts appeared to be the leaflet drop program over NVN which reached a wide audience and seemingly affected the morale among some segments of the NVN citizenry. The number of returnees in the Chieu Hoi program doubled in 1965 (11,000) over that of 1964. But a true evaluation of this program should not be based on plain statistics.

(C) Achievements in the pacification effort fell short of the established goals but some progress was made. The Hop Tac program was accepted in the GVN national pacification plan for 1966. A pilot program was initiated to provide subsector advisors with a revolving fund to assist in rural construction. A trial program was initiated in three provinces to bring the US effort in the rural construction field under one US coordinator, known as the Province Team Chief. This effort met with some success as the program was continued in two provinces after the trial period ended. Progress in the 1965 pacification program was hindered by political instability during the first half of the year; inadequate initial planning and coordination at the national level; slow clarification of policies, and insufficient personnel resources to expand into the cleared areas. At year's end, the VC controlled about 56 percent of the land area and 23 percent of the population[28] but new directives and plans, AB 140 and AB 141, developed at that time offered promise for 1966.

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(U) After 20 months of political instability, the Thieu/Ky government gave promise of halting this debilitating situation. At the end of 1965 this government had been in office more than six months and had begun to consider a formula for future political development of the country. This included a proposal to form a national advisory council to take up the task of drafting a constitution and laws governing elections and political parties.[29]

(S) The year was marred by conflict between the Montagnard tribes and GVN. There were a series of incidents, the largest of which was the FULRO rebellion in Phu Bon in December. The rebellion was suppressed and four FULRO leaders were executed on 29 December.[30] At the end of 1965, as in 1964, the aspirations of the Montagnards were still largely unfulfilled and it appeared that 1966 would see the same tension which characterized GVN/Montagnard relationships up to that time.

(C) Both US and GVN authorities agreed that the inflation caused by increased US and GVN spending and the security of goods had to be checked. Inflation was one of the factors that prompted the US currency conversion to Military Payment Certificates in August. However, this and other measures were only temporarily effective and the situation appeared even more aggravated at the end of the year.

THE FUTURE

(C) The prospects for USMACV in 1966 were not entirely clear. The cessation of the bombing of NVN, already a week long, would probably continue for an extended period, to allow the President's peace efforts time for fruition. However, the enemy did not appear to be responsive or interested. In spite of the massive strength the US had assembled in SVN and the enemy's heavy personnel losses, VC/NVN leaders did not appear to be impressed. Increased enemy infiltration provided definite indications that the US/FWMA/RVN forces could only look forward to many battles ahead.

(C) The year 1965 was thus a year of decision, marked by the US buildup and the establishment of a huge logistics base in SVN. The firmness of the US position in SVN was amply demonstrated to the enemy and to the world. Phase I goals had been substantially achieved and Phase II and IIA deployment were assured of execution, thus providing adequate resources for the accomplishment of Phase II objectives. The one billion dollar base development program and the additional commitment of other resources were certainly formidable assets in support of the long and difficult process of regaining GVN control over the country. Unless the peace efforts were to succeed, it

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appeared inevitable that there would be increased fighting. The US goals continued to be: to defeat the enemy on the battlefield; to destroy his safe havens; to stop his infiltration; to neutralize his war-making capabilities in NVN, and to assist in creating those conditions conducive to the development of effective GVN control over the entire nation.

(C) In an address to the USMACV staff on the last day of the year, COMUSMACV envisaged 1966 as the Year of Opportunity. The enemy had lost the initiative; the GVN had stopped losing the war. Some progress had begun to show in the development of a mature and stable government which would, hopefully, begin to win the allegiance of the people. The opportunity was at hand for the US/FWMAF and RVNAF to begin the difficult march to victory and win for the Vietnamese people the peace they so long had sought. In all, 1966, the "Year of the Horse," held forth promise of being a "galloping" year. [31]

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TABLES

FIGURES

FOOTNOTES

ANNEXES

VIET CONG INCIDENTS, 1965-75

MONTH	ATK	ATK NRL HAM	AMBUSH	KIDNAP	OTHER TERR	OTHER ASSAS	SAB	PROP	TOTAL
JAN	64	2	16	125	1,428	31	272	190	2,287
FEB	78	7	25	86	1,239	35	251	81	1,855
MAR	83	11	24	134	1,347	48	248	93	2,080
APR	42	2	16	143	1,316	44	146	89	1,801
MAY	54	6	12	71	1,457	29	362	115	2,264
JUN	80	10	34	156	1,653	41	489	108	2,699
JUL	46	2	14	113	1,540	32	384	150	2,476
AUG	56	3	16	88	1,434	24	346	201	2,449
SEP	29	1	3	83	1,477	41	277	188	2,550
OCT	43	1	10	121	1,824	43	421	197	3,363
NOV	53	6	9	94	2,046	53	485	254	3,588
DEC	58	1	6	82	2,436	60	450	313	3,399
TOTAL	677	52	200	1,296	19,197	481	4,131	1,979	30,813

Table I-1

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VC/NVA PERSONNEL STRENGTH IN RVN[76]

MONTH	REGT	TOT BNS	SEP COS	SEP PLTS	COMBT STR	SUPT STR	MILITIA	POLITICAL CADRE	TOTAL STR
Dec 64	5	47	135	29	33,000	-	60,000-80,000	-	93,000-113,000
Jan 65	5	47	135	29	33,000	-	60,000-80,000	-	93,000-113,000
Feb 65	5	50	144	30	37,250	-	60,000-80,000-	-	97,250-117,250
Mar 65	5	53	142	35	38,460	-	80,000-100,000	-	118,460-138,460
Apr 65	9	61	188	114	47,000	17,860	80,000-100,000	-	144,860-164,860
May 65	9	64	188	114	47,000	17,860	80,000-100,000	-	144,860-164,860
Jun 65	9	65	188	114	47,750	16,869	80,000-100,000	-	144,619-164,619
Jul 65	10	71	189	101	50,050	16,869	100,000-120,000	-	166,919-186,919
Aug 65	10	71	189	101	50,050	16,869	103,573	39,175	209,667
Sep 65	10	73	189	101	53,550	16,869	103,573	39,175	213,167
Oct 65	14	89	189	101	61,911	16,911	103,573	39,175	221,159
Nov 65	18	100	185	101	68,000	16,911	103,573	39,175	227,659
Dec 65	19	107	185	101	70,100	16,911	103,573	39,175	229,759

Table I-2

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MONTH-END STRENGTHS - US FORCES - 1965 [689]

MONTH	ARMY	NAVY *	MARINES	AIR FORCE	TOTAL
JAN	14,752	1,103	891	7,112	23,858
FEB	15,201	1,131	1,447	7,158	24,937
MAR	15,592	1,271	4,721	7,527	29,111
APR	16,192	1,561	8,944	9,324	36,021
MAY	22,588	2,912	16,265	9,963	51,728
JUN	27,350	3,756	18,112	10,703	59,921
JUL	39,650	4,646	25,533	11,593	81,422
AUG	48,077	5,324	34,227	18,719	100,347
SEP	76,179	6,039	36,442	13,637	132,297
OCT	92,755	8,529	36,788	15,207	153,279
NOV	104,508	8,869	37,897	18,297	169,571
DEC	116,755	8,749	38,190	20,620	184,314

*Includes US Coast Guard

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RVNAF DESERTION - 1965 690

MONTH	ARVN	VNAF	VNN	VNMC	RF	PF
JAN	2,259	15	41	69	1,470	3,359
FEB	2,459	1	8	64	812	3,894
MAR	4,946	13	0	59	1,137	5,010
APR	3,370	15	66	160	1,242	5,402
MAY	4,157	10	42	1	2,141	3,245
JUN	2,578	20	47	410	2,440	4,838
JUL	3,087	13	40	269	1,346	5,178
AUG	3,659	20	17	105	1,530	5,308
SEP	3,845	16	28	122	1,464	3,214
OCT	5,122	14	38	105	1,026	3,982
NOV	4,345	25	45	206	936	3,380
DEC	5,161	7	69	125	1,401	2,414

Table II-2

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RVNAF LOSSES - 1965* 691

MONTH	ARVN	VNAF	VNMC	VNN	RF	PF
JAN	382	6	11	7	531	828
FEB	373	2	17	7	393	1,194
MAR	372	2	26	19	451	834
APR	352	4	7	19	463	903
MAY	500	2	38	31	576	524
JUN	841	3	0	0	1,400	1,070
JUL	734	4	46	4	1,130	1,324
AUG	437	5	15	11	509	987
SEP	399	6	20	8	531	538
OCT	666	3	7	6	714	475
NOV	698	2	10	3	811	386
DEC	537	4	125	3	676	737

*(KIA, OTHER DEAD, and MIA)

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RVN FORCES MONTH END STRENGTHS - 1965 692

MONTH	VNAF	ARVN	VNMC	VNN	RF	PF	CIDG	POL
DEC 64	10,521	220,360	7,209	8,194	96,049	168,317	21,454	31,205
JAN 65	10,847	218,278	7,336	8,276	98,877	165,026	19,700	33,599
FEB 65	11,258	218,545	7,251	8,399	99,143	161,566	19,150	33,624
MAR 65	11,546	217,593	7,116	8,806	100,018	156,619	19,070	34,751
APR 65	11,949	224,515	6,931	8,892	102,680	152,514	21,000	36,606
MAY 65	11,781	229,006	7,039	9,045	105,506	150,538	20,366	38,831
JUN 65	12,081	234,136	6,842	9,037	107,652	149,029	21,721	43,851
JUL 65	12,351	243,491	6,691	12,931	111,194	144,669	23,130	42,898
AUG 65	12,701	250,288	6,839	13,285	117,162	141,148	23,401	47,206
SEP 65	13,085	257,730	7,249	13,507	120,004	137,806	24,369	48,555
OCT 65	12,830	264,127	7,259	13,786	125,913	135,486	26,557	49,326
NOV 65	12,766	263,928	7,519	14,274	130,704	135,362	28,188	51,[illegible]
DEC 65	12,778	267,877	7,380	14,559	132,221	136,398	28,430	52,242

Table II-4

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Order [illegible]
841534

BUILDUP, FREE WORLD, 1965 693

MONTH	ROK	AUST	NZ	PHIL	ROC	THAI
JAN	140	162	24	32	14	16
FEB	609	162	25	28	14	16
MAR	2,127	160	25	31	16	16
APR	2,126	164	20	65	16	16
MAY	2,130	192	23	65	16	16
JUN	2,398	1,177	24	65	16	16
JUL	2,557	1,185	125	70	21	16
AUG	2,550	1,185	125	76	21	16
SEP	2,598	1,511	119	76	21	16
OCT	16,671	1,534	125	72	20	16
NOV	20,990	1,534	123	72	20	16
DEC	20,620	1,557	119	72	20	16

Table II-5

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Order Sec Army [illegible] DATE [illegible]

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MACV PERSONNEL STRENGTHS 694

MACV Hqs

	1 Jan 65		31 Dec 65	
	Auth	Asg	Auth	Asg
Cmd Gp	*	*	78	70
J1	35	46	91	97
J2	135	133	476	339
J3	130	153	318	243
J4	43	47	433	342
J5	30	35	49	42
J6	132	147	182	152
AG	136	147	248	260
CJA	7	9	34	23
IN	*	*	26	26
Chap	*	*	7	7
Hq Comdt	49	48	65	60
IG	*	*	6	4
Surg	21	23	33	28
CI	59	57	123	76
Compt	18	21	26	22
POL/AR[1]_2	---	---	49	42
Tng Dir	194	226	68	49
FWMAO	*	*	22	18
JRATA	12	13	16	20
MAP Dir	15	14	13	13
Flt Det	*	*	81	63
Hop Tac	*	*	20	16

SERVICE BREAKDOWN WITHIN MACV HQS

Table II-6

(As of 31 Dec 65)

Service	Auth	Asg
USA	1,665	1,673
USN	218	136
USMC	131	56
USAF	413	277
Totals:	2,427	2,142

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[redacted]

ADVISORY PERSONNEL - MACV

(As of 31 Dec 65)

Service	Auth	Asg[3]
USA	5,352	4,387
USN	1,516	633
USMC	89	98
USAF	499	398
Totals:	7,456	5,516

US UNIT STRENGTHS - MACV

(As of 31 Dec 65)

Service	Asg
USA	110,326
USN	6,460
USMC	38,017
USAF	19,820
USCG	303
Total:	174,926

TOTAL PERSONNEL STRENGTHS - MACV

(As of 31 Dec 65)

Service	Asg
USA	116,755
USN	8,446
USMC	38,190
USAF	20,620
USCG	303
Total:	184,314

NOTES: -- Data not available.
1. Established May 1965.
2. Listed as O&T in 1964 History. Strengths at beginning of year included tng advisory data.
3. Large discrepancy between assigned and authorized strengths due primarily to fact that personnel action incomplete on 15 Nov 65, JTD.

[redacted]

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KEY PERSONNEL LISTING - 31 DEC 65 695

HQS MACV

Name	Position	Date of Incumbency
Gen W. C. Westmoreland, USA	COMUSMACV	20 Jun 64
Lt Gen J. A. Heintges, USA	DEPCOMUSMACV	5 Nov 65
Vice Lt Gen J. L. Throckmorton, USA		
Lt Gen J. H. Moore, USAF	DEPCOMUSMACV for Air	14 May 65
Maj Gen J. B. Rosson, USA	CofS	8 Jul 65
Vice Maj Gen R. G. Stilwell, USA		
Maj Gen R. S. Abbey, USAF	DEP CofS	15 Jul 65
Brig Gen J. L. Collins, USA	Spec Asst to COMUSMACV	15 Apr 65
Maj Gen B. Sternberg, USA	ACofS, J1	20 Jan 64
Brig Gen J. A. McChristian, USA	ACofS, J2	13 Jul 65
Vice Maj Gen C. A. Youngdale, USMC		
Brig Gen J. E. DePuy, USA	ACofS, J3	9 May 64
Brig Gen J. D. Crowley, USA	ACofS, J4	14 Feb 65
Vice Maj Gen F. A. Osmanski, USA		
Maj Gen J. N. Ambank, Jr., USAF	ACofS, J5	9 Aug 65
Vice Maj Gen H. B. Adams, USAF		
Brig Gen W. E. Lotz, Jr., USA	ACofS, J6	18 Sep 65
Vice Col R. E. Kimball, USA		

Major Subordinate Commands

US Army

Gen W. C. Westmoreland, USA	CG, USARV/ACC	20 Jul 65

US Air Force

Lt Gen J. H. Moore, USAF	Cdr, 2d AD/AFCC	31 Jan 64

US Marine Corps

Maj Gen L. W. Walt, USMC	CG, III MAF/NCC	4 Jun 65
Vice Maj Gen W. R. Collins, USMC		

US Navy

RAdm N. G. Ward, USN	CHNAVGP/CTF 115/116	10 May 65
Vice Capt W. H. Hardcastle, Jr.		

MISSIONS OF RVNAF 29

MISSION	SUBTASKS		PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY	SECONDARY
Defense of bases & LOC's			RF	ARVN
Harassment of VC bases & LOC's			ARVN CIDG	RF
Border surveillance			ARVN CIDG	
Air support			VNAF	
Sea surveillance			VNN	
Pacification	Security Restoration Phase	Clearing Subphase	ARVN	RF
		Securing Subphase	RF PF National Police	ARVN
	Development Phase			

Table III-1

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CONTINGENCY PLANS - 1 JAN 65 [30]

Plan	Date	Changes
COMUSSEASIA OPLAN 1-64	20 Oct 63	C1, C2 pending
CCRSFF OPLAN 4-64	20 Oct 63	C1
COMUSMACV OPLAN 32-64 (Ph II RVN)	1 Jul 63	C3, C4 pending
COMUSSEASIA OPLAN 32-64 (Ph III & IV)	1 Dec 63	C4
COMUSMACV/THAI OPLAN 33-63	1 Jan 63	C1
COMUSMACV OPLAN 34-64	12 Jul 63	C19
COMUSMACV OPLAN 34A-64	15 Dec 63	C2
COMUSMACV OPLAN 37-64	15 Apr 64	C2
COMUSMACV OPLAN 38-65	15 Nov 64	---
COMUSMACV OPLAN 39-65	in preparation	---
COMUSMACV OPLAN 60-64	16 Mar 64	C3
COMUSMACV OPLAN 61-64	15 Sep 64	C1 pending
COMUSMACV OPLAN 98-64	10 Mar 64	C1
COMUSMACV OPLAN 98A-64	18 Dec 63	C1

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Order Sec Army, 24 Dec 74 per

Table II-2

CONTINGENCY PLANS - 1 Jan 66[31]

COMUSSEASIA OPLAN 1-64	20 Oct 63	C1, C2 pending
CORSFF OPLAN 4-64	30 Oct 63	C4
COMUSMACV/SEACIA OPLAN 22-66	pending	--
COMUSMACV OPLAN 32-64 (Ph II RVN)	1 Jul 63	C3
COMUSSEASIA OPLAN 32-64 (Ph III & IV)	1 Dec 63	C6
COMUSMACV OPLAN 37-65	4 Mar 65	C1
COMUSSEASIA OPLAN 38-65	15 Nov 64	--
COMUSSEASIA OPLAN 39-65	15 Jan 65	C1 pending
COMUSMACV OPLAN 60-66	22 Sep 65	--

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OFFICIAL VISITORS TO RVN PROCESSED BY MACV[32]

1965

MONTH	CATEGORY 1*	OTHER	TOTAL
JAN	25	158	183
FEB	87	181	268
MAR	121	178	299
APR	103	136	239
MAY	80	240	320
JUN	78	229	307
JUL	163	207	370
AUG	95	422	517
SEP	82	346	428
OCT	162	730	892
NOV	172	432	604
DEC	205	169	374

*Brigadier generals, equivalents and above.

Table V-1

Page 281 of 282 Pages

VC ATTACKS: BATTALION AND COMPANY SIZE[77]



Figure I-1

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[redacted]

VC AND RVN PERSONNEL KIA[78]



1964: RVN KIA - 7,064
VC KIA - 16,969

1965: RVN KIA - 11,3[illegible]
VC KIA - 36,925

Figure I-2

[redacted]

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Order Sec Army By OAHS per

[redacted]

VC ATTACKS BY CORPS AREA 79



Figure 1-3

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VC INCIDENTS OF TERRORISM BY CORPS AREA [80]



Figure I-4

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VC INCIDENTS OF SABOTAGE BY CORPS AREA [81]



Figure I-5

VC INCIDENTS OF PROPAGANDA BY CORPS AREA



Figure I-6

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VC ANTI-AIRCRAFT INCIDENTS BY CORPS AREA [83]



Figure I-7

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VC BASE AREAS



Figure I-8

BUILDUP OF US FORCES, 1965



Figure II-1

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
6252 Tac Ftr Wg
390 Tac Ftr Sq
12 Tac Ftr Wg
557 Tac Ftr Sq
558 Tac Ftr Sq
559 Tac Ftr Sq
366 Tac Ftr Wg
389 Tac Ftr Sq
391 Tac Ftr Sq
480 Tac Ftr Sq
3 Tac Ftr Wg
602 Tac Ftr Sq
4503 Tac Ftr Sq
531 Tac Ftr Sq
510 Tac Ftr Sq
308 Tac Ftr Sq
416 Tac Ftr Sq
2D Air Division
416 Tac Ftr Sq
619 Tac Recce Sq
16 Tac Recce Sq
509 Ftr Incpt Sq
315 Air Cmdo Gp
PHU BAI
-2d Bn, 1st Mar
DA NANG
HQ III MAF
3d Mar Div (-) (Rein)
1st MAW (-) (Rein)
CHU LAI
4th Mar Regt
7th Mar Regt
11th Mar Regt
MAG-12
MAG-36
PLEIKU
-3d Bde, 25th Div
-1st Cav Div (Ai)
AN KHE
QUI NHON
-1st ROK Div
NHA TRANG
-FFORCEV
CAM RANH BAY
PHAN RANG
-1st Bde, 101st Abn Div
BIEN HOA
161 FA Btry, RNZA
1st Bn, RAR
173d Abn Bde
TSN
DI AN
SAIGON
-1st Inf Div
-USAIRV
-MACV

Figure II-2

RVNAF REGULAR FORCE ORGANIZATION [698]



Figure II-3

699

RVNAF STRENGTH BUILDUP BY MONTH - 1965 REGULAR FORCES



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Figure II-4

RVNAF STRENGTH BUILDUP BY MONTH - 1965 REGIONAL FORCES 700



Figure II-5

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RVNAF STRENGTH BUILDUP BY MONTH - 1965 POPULAR FORCES[701]



Figure II-6

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RVNAF STRENGTH BUILDUP BY MONTH - 1965 CIDG 702



Figure II-7

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[redacted]

RVNAF STRENGTH BUILDUP BY MONTH - 1965 NATIONAL POLICE 703



Figure II-8

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USMACV ADVISORY STRUCTURE 704



Numbers in each box indicate 15 Nov 65 JTD paragraph numbers

Figure II-9

HEADQUARTERS MACV ORGANIZATION CHART 705

31 December 1965



NOTE:

1 Under Joint Staff Supervision Of AC of S J-1
2 Under Joint Staff Supervision Of AC of S J-3.
3 Under Joint Staff Supervision Of AC of S J-5.
4 Under Joint Staff Supervision Of AC of S J-4.
5 Under Joint Staff Supervision Of AC of S J-4 for Logistic Functions
6 Direct Access to COMUSMACV as required by Law

Figure IX-10
Page 299 of 8 2 Pages

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UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM 706

Command Relationships
(as of 31 Dec 65)



LEGEND: ——— Command and Control

xxxxxxxxxx Command Less Operational Control

- - - - - - Operational Control Only

NOTES:
1. 173d & 101st Abn Bdes under opcon MACV, PFV or 1stInfDiv as missions indicate.
2. 1st/4th MAB(+) and RZ btry normally attached to 173d Abn Bde.
3. ROK Div and ROK Marine Bde responds to PFV direction based on mutual agreement, CG, PFV and CG, ROK Div.

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[redacted]

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U. S. LOGISTICAL CONCEPT 707



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841534

Figure II-12



Figure II-13

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

Figure II-14

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MAJOR HIGHWAYS 709



Figure II-15

[redacted]

710

C-130 CAPABLE AIRFIELDS

● ADEQUATE

○ MARGINAL



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Figure II-16

[redacted]

IN-COUNTRY CARGO MOVEMENT - 1965[712]



Figure II-17

CONSTRUCTION LOCATIONS 713

$ 10 Million or More



CONSTRUCTION FORCES

CONTRACTOR 22,000 EMPLOYEES

15 ENGINEER BATTALIONS

TYPES OF FACILITIES

PORTS

PIERS
WHARFS
TRANSIT SHEDS
HARDSTANDS
LIGHTERAGE FAC.
LST RAMPS

DEPOTS

WAREHOUSES
OPEN STORAGE
AMMO STORAGE
FUEL STORAGE
SHOPS
ADMIN FACILITIES

CANTONMENTS
MEDICAL FACILITIES
ROADS
UTILITIES
AIRFIELDS
COMMUNICATION FAC.

Figure II-18

[redacted]

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● MAJOR PORT CONSTRUCTION

O MINOR PORT CONSTRUCTION

PORT CONSTRUCTION STATUS - 1965714



Figure II-19

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[redacted]

1965 - AIRCRAFT
MONTHLY LOSSES TO COMBAT 346



Figure IV-1.

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GVN-US ORGANIZATION FOR RURAL CONSTRUCTION 347



Figure IV-2



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Figure IV-3

JOINT US PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE (JUSPAO) 349



Figure IV-4

Footnotes - Chapter I

1. This portion of Chapter I summarizes data in the body of this history; footnotes have thus been omitted.
2. Fact Book, MACV, Dec 65 (S).
3. MONEVAL, MACV, Feb 65 (S).
4. Briefing, MACJ2, 28 Nov 65 (TS).
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8. MONEVAL, MACV, May 65 (S).
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12. MONEVAL, MACV, Jul 65 (S).
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14. Ibid.
15. MONEVAL, MACV, Aug 65 (S).
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid.
18. MONEVAL, MACV, Sep 65 (S).
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20. MONEVAL, MACV, Oct 65 (S).
21. MONEVAL, MACV, Sep 65 (S).
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24. Ibid.
25. Fact Book, MACV, 30 Dec 65, Subj: Viet Cong Activity (C).
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28. Critique of Counterinsurgency Airmobile Operations in Vietnam, MACV, 5 Jul 65 (C).
29. Fact Sheet, MACV, Dec 65 (C).
30. Monograph, VC Strategy and Tactics in 1964, no date, (C).
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52. USMWR, 1-31 Jan 65 (S).
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55. Msg, COMUSMACV 191252Z Feb 65 (S).
56. Msg, COMUSMACV, 191601Z Feb 65 (S).
57. Msg, COMUSMACV 200335Z Feb 65 (S).
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59. USMWR's, 1-31 May 65 (S).
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68. Memo for Record, MACV, 16 Nov 65, Subj: Commanders Conference (C).
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76. Chart, MACJ2, Subj: VC/NVA Personnel Strength in RVN 1965 (C).
77. SDS, MACJ2, 29 Jan 66, Subj: Frequency Battalion and Company Size Attacks, (C).
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79. Chart, MACJ2, Subj: VC Attacks by Corps Area (C).
80. Chart, MACJ2, Subj: VC Terrorism, Incidents by Corps Area (C).
81. Chart, MACJ2, Subj: VC Incidents, Sabotage by Corps Area (C).
82. Chart, MACJ2, Subj: VC Propaganda by Corps Area (C).
83. Chart, MACJ2, Subj: VC Incidents of Antiaircraft Fire by Corps Area (C).
84. Map, MACJ2, Subj: Base Areas Supply (C).

Footnotes - Chapter II

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2. Msg, COMUSMACV MAC 3237, 24 Jun 65 (TS).
3. COMUSMACV Concept of Operations, 1 Sep 65 (TS). See Chap III.
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5. Msg, JCS, No 0531065, 112246Z Feb 65 (TS)
6. Oplan, COMUSMACV, Oplan 32-64, 1 Jul 63 (TS).
7. Msg, JCS, No 1451, 1 Nov 64 (TS).
8. MFR, MACJ01, No 1462-65, 15 Feb 65 (TS).
9. Msg, JCS, 122140Z Feb (TS).
10. Msg, MACV, 200200Z Feb 65; Msg, JCS, No 0736-65, 272152Z Feb 65 (TS).
11. W. P. Bundy, STATE, 141840Z Feb 65 (Class Unk); Msg, JCS, 161610Z Feb 65 (TS); Msg, CINCPAC, 161937Z Feb 65 (TS).
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17. Msg, CINCPAC, 062235Z Mar 65 (TS).
18. Msg, JCS, No 0839, 081434Z Mar 65 (TS).
19. Booklet, Fleet Marine Force Pacific, Mar - Sep 65, Subj: History of III MAF in Vietnam, Mar - Sep 1965 (S).
20. Msg, CINCPAC, 292233Z Mar 65 (TS).
21. Msg, JCS, 032048Z Apr 65 (TS).
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23. Msg, DOD, 152239Z Apr 65 (TS).
24. Msg, CG, 9th MEB, 210722Z Apr 65 (S).
25. Msg, COMUSMACV, 261206Z Apr 65 (TS).
26. Msg, CINCPAC, 010808Z May 65 (TS).
27. SITREP, 9th MEB #146, 061405Z May 65 (S).
28. Msg, CG, III MAF, 080630Z May 65 (S).
29. Msg, CINCPAC, 162216Z May 65 (TS).
30. III MAF History, Mar - Sep 65 (S).
31. Msg, MACV, 070335Z Jun 65 (TS).
32. Msg, JCS, No 2323-65 (TS).
33. Msg, CINCPAC, 270959Z Jun 65 (TS).
34. Msg, COMUSMACV, MAC 3283, 27 Jun 65 (TS).
35. Msg, JCS, No 2400-65, Jun 65 (TS).
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37. Ibid.
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41. Msg, CINCPAC, 150419Z Dec 65 (TS).
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43. Msg, MACV, 270915Z Dec 65 (S).
44. Ltr, COMUSMACV, 9 Dec 65 (TS).
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56. Msg, COMUSMACV, 221143Z Jan 65 (S).
57. Msg, COMUSMACV, 210200Z Mar 65 (TS).
58. Commander's Estimate of the Situation in South Vietnam, 26 Mar 65 (TS).
59. Msg, COMUSMACV, MAC 1724, 301340Z Mar 65 (TS).
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61. Msg, Maj Gen Stilwell, No 0869, 102213Z Apr 65 (TS).
62. Msg, JCS, 140355Z Apr 65 (TS).
63. Msg, JCS, No 009012, 140051Z Apr 65 (TS).
64. Msg, COMUSMACV, 181314Z Apr 65 (TS).
65. Msg, COMUSMACV, 130202Z May 65 (TS).
66. Msg, COMUSMACV, 140825Z May 65 (TS).
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68. LOI, MACJ3, 5 May 65 Subj: Mission and Employment of 173d Abn Bde (S).
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70. Msg, CJCS, No 2323, 222338Z Jun 65 (TS).
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72. Msg, COMUSMACV, MAC 3275, 26 Jun 65 (TS).
73. Msg, CJCS, No 2400, 22 Jun 65 (TS).
74. Msg, COMUSMACV, MAC 3320, 24 Jun 65 (TS).
75. Msg, COMUSMACV, MAC 3283, 27 Jun 65 (TS).
76. Msg, COMUSMACV, No 12727, 020836Z Jul 65, (TS).
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81. Msg, DA, No 726278, 021449Z Aug 65 (S).
82. News Release, MACOI, No 213-65, 5 Aug 65 (U).
83. Msg, SECDEF, No 5319, 972352Z Jul 65 (TS-LIMDIS).
84. JCSM 515-65, 2 Jul 65 w/2d corrigendum, 9 Jul 65 (TS).
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92. Ltr, COMUSMACV, 18 Sep 65, Subj: MACV Phase II Force Requirements (TS).
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94. Ltr, CINCPAC, No 000347, 7 Oct 65, Subj: Program for Phase II (TS).
95. Mon Hist Sum MACJ1, Oct 65 (S).
96. COMUSMACV, 210122Z Nov 65 (TS).
97. Ibid.
98. SECDEF Briefing, COMUSMACV, MHB Files, 28 Nov 65 (TS).
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101. COMUSMACV, 901157Z Dec 65 (TS).
102. SECDEF, 112125Z Dec 65 (TS).
103. News Release, MACOI, No 363-65, 29 Dec 65 (U).
104. Strength Report, MACJ1, 13 Jan 66 (S).
105. Staff Action Memo, 2d AD, 21 Jan 65 (S); and 2d AD History Jan - Jun 65, Vol 1 (S).
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109. Msg, COMUSMACV, 141412Z Feb 65 (TS).
110. Ibid.
111. Ibid.
112. Ibid.
113. Historical Summary, Hist Br, 2d AD, Jan - Jul 65 (S).
114. Ibid.
115. Chronology, Proj CHECO, 2d AD (Hist Br), Jan - Jun 65 (U).
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118. Memo, JCS, 7 Apr 65, Subj: Teams of Reference for Honolulu Conference (9 Apr), (Revised) (TS).
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132. Msg, COMUSMACV, 27 Jun 65 (TS).
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140. Msg, JCS, 302148Z Sep 65 (C).
141. Msg, SECSTATE, No 977, 7 Oct 65 (TS).
142. Msg, CINCPAC, 290719Z Oct 65 (TS).
143. Fact Sheet, MACJ3, 10 Dec 65 (S).
144. Msg, CINCPAC, 030915Z Oct 65, Subj: Phase II Planning-Combat Acft Regmts (TS).
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146. Msg, COMUSMACV, 150620Z Nov 65 (TS).
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148. Msg, COMUSMACV, 010858Z Dec 65 (TS).
149. SDS No. 3A, AFGP, 8 Jan 66, Subj: Buildup of Operational Units (S).
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168. Msg, COMUSMACV, 241055Z Nov 64 (S).
169. Msg, SECDEF, 232116Z Jan 65 (S).
170. Hist Sum, MACJ3, 28 Apr 65 (TS).
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178. Briefing, 28 Nov 65, COMUSMACV to SECDEF (TS).
179. Briefing Notes, MACJ3, 10 Nov 65, Subj: The Requirement for RVNAF Forces Increases (S).
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184. Questions and Answers, 14 Jul 65, SECDEF Visit (TS).
185. Ibid.
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187. Memo, MACJ3, 4 Feb 65, Subj: RVNAF Counterinsurgency Roles and Missions (Kin).
188. Briefing, 16 Jul 65, COMUSMACV (TS).
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192. Memo, RVNAF JGS, No 1133, 18 May 65 (U).
193. Briefing Notes, MACJ1, 28 Dec 65 (S).
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195. Cmt 2, MACJ3, 19 Mar 66, Subj: Draft of USMACV Comd Hist (S).
196. Fact Sheet, MAC RF/PF, 6 Oct 65 (C).
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198. Briefing, 28 Nov 65, COMUSMACV (TS).
199. Report, RF/PF Adv Det, 20 Nov 65, Subj: Mon Hist Rpt (S).
200. Rpt, MACJ1, 24 Nov 65, Subj: Command Historical Program (S).
201. General Westmoreland's Historical Briefing, 4 Sep 65 (TS).
202. Memo, MACV, 4 Feb 65, Subj: RVNAF Counterinsurgency Roles and Missions (Kin).
203. Briefing, 28 Nov 65, COMUSMACV (TS).
204. Rpt, RF/PF Adv Det, 20 Nov 65, Subj: Mon Hist Rpt (S).
205. Ltr, CINCRVNAF, Subj: Conversion of CIDG to RF, 15 Sep 65 (Mat).

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215. Fact Sheet 3A, AFAG, 8 Jan 65 (S).
216. History, AFAG, 26 Jan 66, Subj: AFAG 1965 History (S).
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218. Rpt PACAF, Project CHECO, Subj: Escalation of the War in SEASIA, Jul - Dec 64 (TS).
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225. Ltr, AFAG, (with ind by CG, 2d AD and COMUSMACV, 6 Nov 65), 15 Oct 65, Subj: Modernization of VNAF (S).
226. Interview of Col J. R. Best, AFAG, by L/C J. C. Stokes, MHB, 30 Mar 66 (U).
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238. Historical Review, NAVGP, Subj: NAVGP Activities, Mar 65 (S).
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241. Ltr, CHNAVGP, Nr 3121, 25 May 65 (S).
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262. Memo for Record, Lt Col Rayburn L. Smith, 30 May 64 (U).
263. Military Working Arrangement between COMNZAFFE and COMUSMACV, 9 Jun 65 (C).
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265. Draft Financial Working Arrangement, US and New Zealand, Comptroller File.
266. FWMAO Mon Hist Sum, 20 Jan 66 (S).
267. Msg, COMUSMACV, 220705Z Dec 65 (TS).
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272. Military Working Arrangement between COMROKFV and COMUSMACV, 6 Sep 65 (C).
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274. Telecon, Maj R. S. Teel, 15 Jan 66 (U).
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683. Interview, Capt Cody, MACV Directorate of Construction, by Capt Greene, MHB, 2 Apr 66 (S).
684. MACJ4 Monthly Historical Summary, 18 Sep 65 (S).
685. Ibid., 19 Oct 65 (S).
686. Msg, JCS, 040020Z Dec 65 (S).
687. Memo, MACV, 6 Dec 65, Subj: Staff Conference Notes (S).
688. General Westmoreland's Historical Briefing, 28 Nov 65 (TS).
689. Ltr, MACV, 13 Jan 66, Subj: Strength Report-Vietnam (S).
690. Monthly Report, DPC, RVNAF High Command, Jan 65 - Dec 65, Subj: Gains and Losses, Regular Force (Kin); Monthly Report, DPC, RVNAF High Command Jan 65 - Dec 65, Subj: Gains and Losses, Regional Force, (Kin); Monthly Report, PF High Command, Jan 65 - Dec 65, Subj: PF Strengths (Kin).
691. Ibid.
692. Monthly Report, DPC, Dec 64 - Dec 65, Subj: Regular Forces Total Strength by Unit, (Kin); Monthly Report, DPC, Dec 64 - Dec 65, Subj: Regional Force Total Strength by Unit (Kin); Monthly Report, PF HQ, Dec 64 - Dec 65, Subj: PF Strength (Kin); Recurring Report, COMUSMACV Dec 64 - Dec 65, Subj: GVN Forces Strength Data (S).
693. FWMAO, Mon Hist Sum, Jan 65 - Dec 65 (C).
694. History, MACV, 15 Oct 65, Subj: USMACV Command History (TS).
695. Key Personnel Listings, MACJ1, 31 Dec 65 (U).
696. Ltr, MACV, 13 Jan 66, Subj: Strength Report-Vietnam (S).
697. Ibid.
698. Figure, MACJ1, Subj: RVNAF Regular Force Organization (U).
699. Briefing Chart, MACJ1, Dec 64 - Dec 65, Subj: RVNAF Strength Buildup by Month - 1965 (Regular Forces) (C).
700. Ibid., (Regional Forces).
701. Ibid., (Popular Forces).
702. Ibid., (CIDG).
703. Ibid., (National Police).
704. JTD, MACV, 15 Nov 65 (C).

705. Manual, MACV, 15 Dec 65, Subj: Organization & Function Manual (C).
706. Figure, MACV, Subj: Command Relationships (S).
707. This source of information is MACJ4.
708. Ibid.
709. Ibid.
710. Ibid.
711. Ibid.
712. Ibid.
713. Ibid.
714. Ibid.

Footnotes - Chapter III

1. Ltr, HQ USMACV, Ser. 0020, 13 Jan 65. Subj: RVNAF High Command Directive AB 139 25 Dec 65 (MAT-S) henceforth referred to as AB 139.
2. Ibid.
3. See later section on Contingency Plans for a discussion of this plan.
4. Ltr, HQ USMACJ322, 30 Aug 65. Subj: USMACV Concept of Operations in Vietnam (U) w/1 Incl, Subj: Concept of Operations, dated 1 Sep 65 (TS), henceforth referred to as USMACV Concept of Operations, 1 Sep 65 (TS).
5. All of the material in this section has been obtained from AB 139.
6. All of the material in this section has been obtained from USMACV Concept of Operations, 1 Sep 65 (TS), except where otherwise noted.
7. Ibid. Appendix 1 to Annex B.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
10. Historical Review, NAVGP Activities, Mar 65 (S).
11. USMACV Directive 10-11, 10 Nov 65. Subj: Command Relationships and Terms of Reference for USMACV (S).
12. The "Home Guard" is the Civil Defense force referred to in Annex E, AB 139. This is a civilian organization of hamlet and village residents not in the RVNAF to provide mutual self-help among the villagers and support the PF.
13. Table III-2 appears to list only 14 plans. However, COMUSMACV OPLAN 32-64 (Ph III & IV) is actually <u>two</u> plans, one for each phase.
14. COMUSSEASIA OPLAN 1-64, 20 Oct 63 (TS).
15. COMUSMACV OPLAN 32-64 (Ph II, RVN), 1 Jul 63 (TS).
16. J5 Assessment of USSEASIA/SEATO Contingency Plans, undated (65), (TS).
17. COMUSSEASIA OPLAN 32-64 (Ph III & IV), 1 Dec 63, w/C1 & C2, (TS).
18. COMUSMACV/THAI OPLAN 33-63, 1 Jan 63 (TS).
19. COMUSMACV OPLAN 34-64, 12 Jul 63 (TS).
20. COMUSMACV OPLAN 38-65, 15 Nov 65 (TS).
21. J5 Resume of Contingency and Counterinsurgency Plans, undated (65) (TS).
22. COMUSMACV OPLAN 39-65, 15 Jan 65 (TS).
23. COMUSMACV Fact Sheet, MACJ5-1, 25 Jan 65. Subj: Status of Contingency Plans, (TS).
24. Report, MACJ5, Jan 65, Mon Hist Sum (TS).
25. COMUSMACV OPLAN 61-64 as changed, 5 Jan 65 (C).
26. COMUSMACV/SEASIA OPLAN 22-66, draft, undated, (TS).

27. COMUSMACV OPLAN 37-65, 4 Mar 65 (TS).
28. COMUSMACV Ltr, Ser. 00794, 10 Sep 65. Subj: Unknown, (TS).
29. AB 139
30. Incl 1 to COMUSMACV Ltr, Ser. 05, 1 Jan 65. Subj: Status of COMUSMACV/SEASIA/SFF OPLAN's as of 1 Jan 65 (C).
31. Ltr, COMUSMACV, MACJ52, 10 Jan 66, Subj: Status of COMUSMACV/SEASIA/SFF OPLAN's as of 1 Jan 66 (C).

Footnotes - Chapter IV

1. Directive MACV No. 524-4, 17 Sep 65, Subj: Tactics and Techniques for Employment of US Forces in the RVN, (C).
2. History, III MAF, Subj: Vietnam, March-September 65, (S).
3. LOI, COMUSMACV, 21 Nov 65 No. 001032, (S).
4. Ibid and Operations Briefing 62 III MAF, Aug 65, (S).
5. Official USMC 35mm Film "Operation Piranha", 1965, (U).
6. Chronology CG III MAF, 19 Nov 65, Subj: Sept 65 Command Chronology, (S).
7. Msg, CTG 76.4, 292300Z Nov 65, (S).
8. Chronology, CG III MAF, 19 Nov 65, Subj: Sept 65 Command Chronology, (S).
9. Oplan, Commander Landing Force (CLF) Blue Marlin, 041930Z Nov 65, Subj: Oplan 1-65, (TS).
10. Historical Review, NAVGP, Nov 65, Subj: NAVGP Activities, Mar ADV Unit, (S).
11. Msg, CG III MAF, 081612Z Dec 65, (S).
12. Msg, CG III MAF, 240226Z Dec 65, (S).
13. Msg, CG III MAF, 240608Z Nov 65, (S).
14. History, III MAF, Subj: III MAF Operations-Vietnam, Mar-Sep 1965, (C).
15. Ibid.
16. Military Working Agreement between COMAAFV and COMUSMACV, 5 May 65, (C).
17. Report, 173d Airborne Brigade, 11 Jul 65, Subj: Command Report , (U).
18. SITREPS, MACV, No. 16 thru 44, US Ground Forces, 1965, (C).
19. Ltr, CO, 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div, 5 Dec 65, Subj: Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation Highland, (U).
20. Memo, CO, 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div, 21 Sep 65, Subj: Preliminary After Action Report Operation Gibralter, 18-21 Sep 65, (U).
21. Ltr, CO 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div, 5 Dec 65, Subj: Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation Highland, (U).
22. Msg, MACVCOC, 141503Z Nov 65, (TS).
23. SITREPS, MACV, No.'s 90-118, (US Ground Forces), 1965, (C).
24. Msg, COMUSMACV, 211050Z Nov 65, (U).
25. SITREPS, MACV, No's 323 thru 330, (US Ground Forces), 1965, (C).
26. Ltr, CG, 173d Abn Bde, 19 Dec 65, Subj: Combat Operations After Action Report, (C).
27. Ltr, CO, 3d Bde 1st Inf Div, 21 Dec 65, Subj: Combat Operations After Action Report (C).
28. MACV, Concept of Operations, 15 Apr 65, Subj: Tab A US Patrol Ships, to Appendix 7, Naval Support, to Annex B, Operations, (TS).
29. Ibid.
30. Msg, COMUSMACV, 251128Z Jan 65, (S).
31. Historical Review, NAVGP, Subj: NAVGP Activities, Apr 65, (S).
32. Historical Review, NAVGP, Subj: NAVGP Activities, Jul 65, (S).
33. Ibid., May 65.
34. Ibid., Jun 65.

35. Ltr, CHNAVGP, No. 3000N3/078, 29 Jun 65, (S).
36. Nov 65 SECDEF Conference, Saigon, Item 3f, (S).
37. Historical Review, NAVGP, Subj: NAVGP Activities, Nov 65, (S).
38. Ibid., Apr 65.
39. Ibid., May 65.
40. Ibid., Jun 65.
41. Msg, CINCPAC, 140140Z May 65, (S).
42. OPORDER, CTF 115, 10-65, (Und).
43. Msg, CINCPACFLT, 102331Z Dec 65, (C).
44. CINCPAC Msg, DTG 220424Z Dec 65, (S).
45. History, MACCOC, May 65, NGFS History, (C).
46. Ibid.
47. Ibid.
48. Ibid.
49. Ibid.
50. Ibid.
51. USMACV 1964 Command History, Chapter III, pgs 82-84 (TS).
52. Msg, MACV No. 732, 130756 Feb 65, (TS).
53. Msg, JCS, No. 0688, 23 Feb 65, (TS).
54. Msg, MACV, No. 1387, 14 Mar 65, (TS).
55. Press Release, Seventh Flt, No. 02-66 of 7 Jan 66, (U).
56. Ibid.
57. Ibid.
58. Ibid.
59. Interview with LCdr Calahan, 7th Fleet PIO, by Maj J. Duncan, MHB, 24 Jan 66, (S).
60. Rpt, Project CHECO, SEASIA, Subj: "Escalation of the War", Jul-Dec 64, (TS).
61. Memo, MACJ5, 18 Jan 65, Subj: "Increased Air Effort in Vietnam", (TS).
62. Ibid.
63. Rpt, Project CHECO, SEASIA, Subj: "Escalation of the War", Jul-Dec 64, (TS NOFORN).
64. Memo, USMACV MACJ 5, 18 Jan 65, Subj: "Increased Air Effort in Vietnam", (TS).
65. Rpt, Project CHECO, SEAISA, Subj: "Escalation of the War", Jul-Dec 64, (TS NOFORN).
66. Ltr, COMUSMACV, 13 Jan 65, Subj: Constraints Affecting MACV Opns, 21 Jan 65, (TS), Tab A (S) & Tab D, (TS).
67. Ibid. ("Farmgate" provided US aircraft having VNAF marking with US pilot and RVN observer.)
68. Ibid.
69. Ibid.
70. Msg, CSAF, No. 81338, 291614Z Jan 64, (TS).
71. Ltr, LtGen J. H. Moore, 28 Jan 65, Subj: Presentation, Air Capabilities in RVN, (TS).
(TS) 72. "Yankee Team" - reconnaissance of Pathet Lao in Laos by US 7th Fleet acft.

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73. Rpt, Project CHECO, SEAISA, Subj: "Escalation of the War", Jul-Dec 64 (TS).
74. Memo, USMACV MACJ5, 18 Jan 65, Subj: Increased Air Effort in Vietnam, (TS).
75. Munitions: LAZY DOG: Stand-off air-to-grd tactical missile (USN developed), (S), See Study: LtGen J. H. Moore, 17 Mar 65, Subj: Increased Air Effort in Vietnam, (TS).
76. Ibid. CBU: Cluster Bomb Unit. See: "New Weapons and Tactics", Annex K (S).
(S) 77. FC-47 "PUFF" equipped with 3 side-firing SUU-IVA gun pods, each capable of firing 6,000 rds per minute. See: JRATA Rpt 1 Jul - 31 Dec 65, (S); Also see memo, MACJ5, 18 Jan 65, Subj: Increased Air Effort in VN, (TS).
78. Memo, MACJ5, 18 Jan 65, Subj: Increased Air Effort in Vietnam, (TS).
79. Msg, COMUSMACV, MAC 2473, 260532Z Jan 65, (TS).
80. Msg, JCS, No. 004213, 272333Z Jan 65, (TS).
81. Ibid.
82. Ibid. (There were cases on record where the time required for a USAF FAC to explain his needs to a Vietnamese observer at his side and get the necessary response had proved too long. Also the language barrier was a problem.)
83. Ibid.
84. Ibid.
85. MONEVAL, MACV, Jan 65 (S).
86. History; 2d AD (PACAF) MACV, Jan-Jun 65 (S).
87. Ibid.
88. MONEVAL, MACV, Apr 65 (S). Ref: General Westmoreland's Historical Briefing, Subj: B-52 Strikes for SVN, 4 Sep 65 (TS).
89. History; 2d AD (PACAF) MACV, Jan-Jun 65 (S).
90. Ibid.
91. Ibid.
92. Ibid.
93. MONEVAL, MACV, Jun 65 (S).
94. History; 2d AD (PACAF) MACV, Jan-Jun 65 (S).
95. MONEVAL, MACV, Jun 65 (S).
96. Mil Hist Rec; 2d AD (PACAF) MACV, Jan-Jun 65 (S).
97. Ibid.
98. Ibid. Also MONEVAL, MACV, Jul 65 (S).
99. Ibid.
100. MONEVAL, MACV, Oct 65 (S); Ltr Hq Sp Tac Zone 24, 5 Dec 65, Subj: Combat Operation After Action Rpt (S).
101. Ibid.
102. Ibid. Also MONEVAL, MACV, Nov 65 (S).
103. Ibid.
104. News Release, Secretary of the Air Force, Office of Information (SAFOI), 3 Jan 66 (U); News Release, Dir IO, 2d AD, 3 Jan 66 (U).
105. Briefing, 2d AD, Subj: Command Brief, Jan 66 (S).
106. Mil Hist Records, 2d AD, (PACAF), Jul-Dec 65 (S).
107. Dir, MACV No. 525-43, 7 Sep 65 (C).

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108. Msg, JCS, No. 3041, 14 Aug 65, (S).
109. Msg, COMUSMACV, MAC 4171, 18 Aug 65, (S).
110. Msg, JCS, No. 3196, 26 Aug 65, (S).
111. Msg, COMUSMACV, MAC 4382, 28 Aug 65, (S).
112. Msg, JCS, No. 3382, 13 Sep 65 (TS).
113. General Westmoreland's Historical Briefing, 4 Sep 65, (TS).
114. Memo, MACJO3, No. 01182, 10 Sep 65, Subj: Joint Board to Study Tactical Air Firepower, (C).
115. MFR, MACV, No. 00884, 15 Sep 65, Subj: Joint Board to Study Tactical Air Firepower, (S).
116. Ltr, MACJO2, No. 00874, 20 Oct 65, Subj: USMACV Tactical Air Firepower Board Report, (S).
117. Msg, JCS, 041459Z, Mar 65, (TS).
118. Msg, CINCPAC, 050341Z, Mar 65, (TS).
119. Msg, CINCSAC, 041948Z, Mar 65, (TS).
120. Msg, CINCPAC, 050341Z, Mar 65, (TS).
121. Msg, COMUSMACV, MAC 1187, 5 Mar 65, (TS).
122. General Westmoreland's Historical Briefing, 4 Sep 65, (TS).
123. 1965 History, 2d AD Jan-Jun 65, (S).
124. Msg, COMUSMACV, MAC 3172, 20 Jun 65, (TS).
125. Msg, COMUSMACV, MAC 3239, 24 Jun 65, (TS).
126. Ibid.
127. Msg, COMUSMACV, MAC 3275, 26 Jun 65, (TS).
128. Msg, CINCPAC, 270257Z, Jun 65, (TS).
129. Msg, JCS, No. 2555, 13 Jul 65, (TS).
130. Mon Hist Sum; MACJ3, Jul 65, (S).
131. General Westmoreland's Historical Briefing, 4 Sep 65, (TS).
132. Msg, COMUSMACV, 171336Z, Sep 65, (S).
133. Msg, COMUSMACV, MAC 4679, 18 Sep 65, (S).
134. Ibid.
135. Msg, CINCPAC, 210435Z, Sep 65, (TS).
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137. Msg, CINCPAC, 030031Z, Oct 65, (TS).
138. Msg, JCS, 061825Z, Oct 65, (TS).
139. Msg, JCS, 051859Z, Oct 65, (TS).
140. Briefing, COMUSMACV, 28 Nov 65, (TS).
141. Msg, COMUSMACV, 310137Z, Oct 65, (TS).
142. Msg, COMUSMACV, 021150Z, Nov 65, (TS).
143. Msg, CINCPAC, 060140Z, Nov 65, (TS).
144. Msg, COMUSMACV, 160457Z, Nov 65, (TS); Msg, CINCPAC, 160555Z, Nov 65, (TS).
145. Msg, JCS, 161624Z, Nov 65, (TS); Msg, COMUSMACV, 160435Z, Nov 65, (TS); Msg, COMUSMACV, 160457Z, Nov 65, (TS); Msg, COMUSMACV, 160940Z, Nov 65, (TS); Msg, COMUSMACV, 161526Z, Nov 65, (TS); Msg, JCS, 161624Z, Nov 65, (TS).
146. Telcon, CINCPAC, 170010Z, Nov 65, (TS).
147. Ibid., Msg, SAC No. 07654, 161325Z, Nov 65, (TS); Msg, JCS No. 6459, 161624, Nov 65, (TS).
148. General Westmoreland's Historical Briefing, 21 Nov 65, (TS).

149. Briefing, COMUSMACV, 28 Nov 65, (TS).
150. Ibid.
151. General Westmoreland's Historical Briefing, 15 Nov 65, (TS).
152. Briefing, COMUSMACV, 28 Nov 65, (TS).
153. Ibid., Msg, CSAF, 162054Z, Nov 65, (TS).
154. Mon Hist Sum, MACJ3, Nov 65, (TS).
155. Msg, JCS, 011656Z, Dec 65, (TS).
156. Mon Hist Sum, MACJ3, Dec 65, (TS); Interview, Maj H. A. Morris, USAF, Proj Off, ARCH LIGHT by LtCol J. C. Stokes, MHB, (TS).
157. Msg, CG, III MAF, 131113Z, Dec 65, (U).
158. Msg, OASD/PA (DOD), 151600Z, 15 Jan 66, (S).
159. Ibid.
160. Ibid.
161. General Westmoreland's Historical Briefing, 30 Dec 65, (TS).
162. Msg, COMUSMACV, 270836Z, Dec 65, (TS).
163. Msg, JCS, 072322 Feb 65, (TS).
164. Mon Hist Sum, MACJ3, Feb 65, (TS).
165. Ibid., Msg, JCS, 102212 Feb 65, (TS).
166. Msg, JCS, No 0531, 11 Feb 65, (TS).
167. Msg, JCS, 122140Z Feb 65, (TS).
168. Msg, COMUSMACV, MAC 0732, 12 Feb 65, (TS).
169. Msg, COMUSMACV, MAC 0848, Feb 65, (TS).
170. Msg, CINCPAC, 130356Z Feb 65, (TS).
171. Msg, JCS, No 0553, 13 Feb 65, (S).
172. Msg, CINCPAC, 142200Z Feb 65, (S).
173. Msg, COMUSMACV, MAC 0792, 15 Feb 65, (S).
174. Msg, COMUSMACV, MAC 1061, 1 Mar 65, (TS).
175. Msg, CINCPAC, 020500Z Mar 65, (TS).
176. Msg, JCS, No 0739, Mar 65, (TS).
177. Mon Hist Sum, MACJ321, Mar 65, (TS).
178. Msg, COMUSMACV, MAC 1387, 14 Mar 65, (TS).
179. Msg, CINCPAC, 160216Z Mar 65, (TS).
180. Msg, COMUSMACV, MAC 1851, 3 Apr 65, (TS).
181. Msg, CINCPAC, 040240Z Apr 65, (TS).
182. Msg, CINCPAC, 040325Z Apr 65, (TS).
183. Msg, COMUSMACV, MAC 2027, 12 Apr 65, (TS).
184. Msg, CINCPAC, 022044Z Apr 65, (TS).
185. Msg, COMUSMACV, MAC 3052, 11 Jun 65.
186. Msg, COMUSMACV, MAC 3240, 24 Jun 65.
187. Mon Hist Sum, MACJ3, Aug 65, (S).
188. Msg, CINCPACAF, 282250Z Sep 65, Subj: Intel Summary, (S).
189. MFR, CINCPAC, 10 Sep 65, (TS). Msg, COMUSMACV, MAC 81683, 9 Sep 65, (TS).
190. Msg, COMUSMACV, MAC 4758, 23 Sep 65, Subj: Recent Air Strikes in the DMZ, (TS).
191. General Westmoreland's Historical Briefing, 4 Sep 65, (TS).
192. Ibid., 17 Oct 65, (TS).
193. Historical Summary, USMACV, MACJ321, Oct 65, (S).

194. Msg, CINCPAC, 061950Z Nov 65, (C).
195. See footnotes 27, 29, 30, 31.
196. Msg, CINCPAC, 061950Z Nov 65, (C).
197. General Westmoreland's Historical Briefing, 15 Nov 65, (TS).
198. Memo, MACJ02, 25 Nov 65, Subj: Extension of in-country Air Strike Control Criteria and Procedures, (S).
199. Msg, COMUSMACV, MAC 4712, 13 Nov 65, (S).
200. Mon Hist Sum, MACJ341, Dec 65, (S).
201. Historical Summary, 2d AD, Hist Br (PROJ CHECO) Jul-Dec 65, (S).
202. Msg, CINCPAC, 120610Z Jan 66, (TS).
203. Ibid.
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205. Ltr, HQ MACV, SN 0076A, 25 Feb 64, Subj: Report of Recommendations Pertaining to Infiltration into SVN of VC Personnel, Supporting Materials, Weapons and Ammunitions, (S).
206. Study, MACV, Supp't Group, NAVOPS, SN 0076, 15 Feb 64, Subj: Report of Recommendations Pertaining to Infiltration into SVN of VC Personnel, Supporting Materials, Weapons and Ammunitions, (S); Study, (Bucklew Report), ARPA, 23 Mar 64, Subj: Border Security in SVN, (S); Study, (Research Analysis Corporation), OSD/ARPA RDFU, Jun 63, Subj: The Border Control Problem in SVN, (S); Study, ATSWS-S, 24 Mar 64, Subj: Border Control, (S).
207. Msg, JCS, 251747Z, May 64, (TS).
208. Msg, CINCPAC, 260836Z May 64, (TS).
209. Study, 2d AD Hist Br, Proj CHECO, Jul-Dec 64, Subj: Escalation of the War, Jan 65, (TS).
210. Special Study, ARVN, Jan 65, Subj: VC Infiltration, RVN, (TS).
211. Ibid.
212. Briefing, COMUSMACV, 14 Jul 65, (TS).
213. Ibid.
214. Msg, NMCC, 090041Z Dec 65, (TS).
215. Mon Hist Sum, MACJ3 Jan-Jun 65, (S).
216. Briefing, COMUSMACV, 14 Jul 65, (TS).
217. Ibid.
218. Ibid.
219. Ibid.
220. Ibid.
221. General Westmoreland's Historical Briefing, 4 Sep 65, (TS) and Interview, L/Cdr J. H. Eckart, J3, by L/C Stokes, MHB, 23 Mar 66, (TS).
222. Msg, COMUSMACV, 250636Z, Sep 65, (TS).
223. Msg, CINCPAC, 052357Z Oct 65, (TS).
224. Msg, CINCPAC, 102142Z Oct 65, (TS).
225. Msg, Cdr, 2d AD, 241235Z Nov 65, (TS).
226. Msg, USAIRA, Vientiane, No 03936, 210330Z Dec 65, (TS), and Msg, AMEMB, Vientiane, Wash, D.C., 221319Z Nov 65, (TS).
227. Msg, AMEMB, Bangkok, 041150Z Oct 65, (TS).
228. Msg, Cdr, 2d AD, 080005Z Oct 65, (TS).
229. Ibid.

230. Msg, COMUSMACV, MAC5358, 27 Oct 65, (TS).
231. Msg, COMUSMACV, 222151Z, Nov 65, (S).
232. Msg, AMEMB, Vientiane, Wash, D. C., 240859Z, Nov 65, (TS).
233. Msg, AMEMB, Vientiane, 250130Z, Nov 65, (TS).
234. Mon Hist Sum, MACJ3, Nov 65, (TS).
235. General Westmoreland's Historical Briefing, 28 Nov 65, (TS).
236. Briefing, COMUSMACV, 28 Nov 65, (TS).
237. Msg, COMUSMACV, 100335Z, Dec 65, (TS).
238. Ibid.
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241. Msg, COMUSMACV, 091149Z, Dec 65, (TS).
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243. Msg, CINCPAC, 171213Z, Dec 65, (TS).
244. Msg, COMUSMACV, 210305Z, Dec 65, (TS).
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246. Briefing, COMUSMACV, 28 Nov 65, (TS).
247. Ibid.
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249. Records, USMACV CCC, Interview, LtCdr J. H. Eckart, J3, by LtCol J. C. Stokes, MIB, 23 Mar 66, (TS).
250. Briefing, COMUSMACV, 28 Nov 65, (TS).
251. Ibid.
252. Ltr, Hq Abn Bde Adv Det, 17 May 65, Subj: Combat After Action Report, (S).
253. MILREP, COMUSMACV 120600Z, Apr 65, (S).
254. Ibid.
255. MILREP, COMUSMACV, 040430Z, May 65, (S).
256. MILREP, COMUSMACV, 170430Z, May 65, (S).
257. MILREP, COMUSMACV, 070742Z, Jun 65, (S).
258. MILREP, COMUSMACV, 140737Z, Jun 65, (S).
259. MILREP, COMUSMACV, 270940Z, Sep 65, (S).
260. HONEVAL, MACV, Sep 65, (S).
261. Ltr, Hq Sp Tac Zone 24, 5 Dec 65, Subj: Combat Operation After Action Report, (S).
262. MFR, MACV Joint Operations Division (CCC), Subj: Operations XAY DUNG 12, 2 Dec 65, (U).
263. Interview, Capt W. Baxter, Former SA 3/7 Inf, by Capt. C. Larimer, MIB, 29 Jan 66, (U).
264. HONEVAL, MACV, Nov 65, (S).
265. Ltr, Hq 9th Inf Div, 32d DTA, 9 Jul 65, Subj: Ambush of 2d Bn 9th Regt, (S).
266. Ltr, USMACV, III Corps, 18 Dec 65, Subj: Ambush After Action Report, (S).
267. Ltr, Hq 49th Inf Regt, 20 Dec 65, Subj: Ambush, (S).
268. Table of Organization, VNMC Brigade, 1965, (U).
269. Historical Review, MAVGP, Subj: GP Activities, Marine Adv Sec May 65, (S).

270. Ibid., Feb 65, (S).
271. Ibid., Jun 65, (S).
272. Ibid.
273. Ibid.
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275. EMBTEL, Amemb, Saigon, No 11-396-A, (C).
276. Briefing, COMUSMACV, 28 Nov 65, (TS).
277. MONEVAL, MACV, Jan 65, (S).
278. MONEVAL, MACV, Feb 65, (S).
279. Memo, COMUSMACV, 14 Nov 64, Subj: Assumption by US of Operational Control of the Pacification Program in SVN, (S).
280. Ibid.
281. Ibid.
282. Ibid.
283. Memo, US Mission Council, 21 Jan 65, Subj: Agenda for US Mission Council Meeting for 25 Jan, (S).
284. Memo, US Mission Council, 2 Mar 65, Subj: US Mission Action Memo No 74, (S).
285. Ibid.
286. Ltr, MACV, No 0577, 23 Apr 65, Subj: The Concept of Rural Reconstruction and Certain Definitions and Procedures, (C).
287. Cmt 2, J3, 19 Mar 66, Subj: Draft of USMACV Command History, (S).
288. Fact Sheet, MACV, 23 May 65, (S).
289. MONEVAL, MACV, Jun 65, (S).
290. Briefing, COMUSMACV, Item 13, 14 Jul 65, (S), and Cmt 2, J33, 14 Mar 66, Subj: Draft of USMACV Command History, (C).
291. Ibid.
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ANNEX A - THE MONTAGNARD PROBLEM

(S) The largest minority group in the RVN is the Montagnards, who number about one million, inhabit 22 provinces and claim about 33 percent of the land area. They comprise approximately 12 percent of the country's population. Ethnically, they are made up of 35 distinctive tribal groups. The Montagnards seriously embarrassed the GVN by rebelling in 1964 and 1965.

(C) Under the French, the central and northern highlands were a Montagnard preserve. Therefore, Montagnard resented and resisted Diem's policy of assimilation, which tended to disrupt their tribal life without preparing them for adjustment to the laws of the new nation. The watershed in GVN/Montagnard relations was marked by a decree issued by Premier Khanh on 17 October 1964, which granted many concessions to the Montagnards. This decree was reaffirmed by each successive government. Some of these concessions were: reinstitution of tribal courts, a revised draft law, a practical system of land distribution, relaxation of school fees and entrance requirements, and authorization of use of tribal languages in elementary education. In 1965, the GVN planned the construction of five new Montagnard boarding schools and budgeted for five new Montagnard agricultural training centers. In addition, the National Military Academy began to accept Montagnards.

(S) The political movement, the FULRO, had a strong grip on the Montagnards and voiced their dissatisfaction with GVN treatment. Not too much was known of communist penetration into this organization but its leadership was located in Cambodia.[1] Most Montagnard tribes were represented in the FULRO movement but the Rhade tribesmen had the largest representation with reportedly 2,000 men under arms in the FULRO forces. COMUSMACV estimated that FULRO had the capability of rallying an additional two to ten thousand men. Although FULRO had indicated its anti-communist orientation, MACV felt that if GVN did not satisfy FULRO's proposals to improve treatment of the Montagnards, FULRO could create a division in the country which could only work to the advantage of the VC.[2]

(S) On 29 April 1965, the US Embassy reported that FULRO leader, Y Bham Enoul, had indicated readiness to return to SVN from his residence in Cambodia. He wanted to be a free agent and insisted on his previous demands for Montagnard autonomy.

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The US Embassy advised Y Bham to discuss the problem with the GVN and offered assistance in making such an arrangement. At a 20-21 July GVN-FULRO meeting at Ban Me Thuot (Darlac Province), GVN representatives found the FULRO proposals unacceptable but agreed to further discussions.3

(S) On 23 July, the CG, ARVN 23d Division, received information that FULRO was plotting to take over the CIDG camp at Buon Brieng in Darlac Province. On 29 July, the FULRO forces seized that camp and later threatened to take USASF personnel as hostages. On 2 August FULRO forces withdrew, taking about 176 CIDG personnel. On 7 September, the CG, 23d Division, was ordered to send troops to Buon Brieng to disarm all CIDG personnel because of the FULRO influence and penetration in their ranks. On 9 September, the CofS, 23d Division, inspected the disarmed camp and informed the CIDG personnel that they could choose to enlist in ARVN, RF/PF or return to their villages. On 10-11 September, elements of the 23d Division made contact with a FULRO force; appeals and negotiations resulted in the return of 454 individuals to GVN control. CG, II Corps, stated that they would be treated as ralliers. Premier Ky welcomed them in a formal ceremony on 15 September at Ban Me Thuot. Plans were afoot to relocate families of the ralliers on an emergency basis and to offer enlistment opportunities to the ralliers in the ARVN or RF. But the FULRO ralliers felt degraded at the ceremony and objected to the plan to form three new RF companies from their ranks of volunteers. They wanted to serve as a battalion and to be exempted from all or part of the planned training which would take them away from their homes. Their requests were denied and the ralliers reluctantly submitted to recruiting proposals.4

(S) On 17 December, CG, II ARVN Corps, informed the US Senior Advisor that the FULRO might be planning an uprising to coincide with the Prime Minister's visit to Pleiku. He stated that the official GVN attitude toward the FULRO had hardened and that the GVN would no longer be tolerant of radical actions.

(S) On 18 December at Gia Nghia (Quang Duc Province), at about 0630, FULRO personnel briefly seized control of the province headquarters. The ARVN 8th Abn Bn was flown to Gia Nghia and restored control in the afternoon; 154 FULRO members voluntarily surrended with 51 weapons. At Phu Thien, Phu Bon Province, on the same day, Montagnards killed 32 GVN troops, but ARVN control was reestablished in the afternoon. At Lac Thien, in the same province, FULRO elements seized some LLDB personnel as hostages.

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(S) Unsuccessful, however, in their attempts to persuade the VN Special Forces and CIDG troops to march to Ban Me Thuot for a demonstration, the FULRO forces left the area and the rebellion ended.5

(C) Of 92 suspected FULRO members arrested at Pleiku from 16-20 December, 19 were tried and sentenced on 28 December by an ARVN military court for "offenses against the security of the state." Three were sentenced to 20 years hard labor; 12 others received lighter sentences and four were acquitted. The remaining 73 suspects were not tried but received administrative punishments such as loss of pay and rank. Four members of FULRO who penetrated an RF company were sentenced to death on 27 December and executed on 29 December. Twenty others were tried and 86 were held for retraining. Of the 154 who surrended at Gia Nghia, 151 were sent to a Special Forces camp for retraining while three were held for trial.6

(C) The GVN then sent teams out to the Montagnards to explain the GVN policies and to expose the falsehoods of FULRO propaganda (which stated that the US, France, and Cambodia would support the 18 December uprising) and to persuade the Montagnards to rebuff any future approaches by FULRO.7

(S) In assessing the December FULRO rebellion, it appeared to COMUSMACV that the FULRO had greater military and political strength than either the GVN or the US had previously estimated. The GVN officials were impressed by the improved security and the coordination displayed by the FULRO in the rebellion. The motivation may have been the belief that armed action would stimulate an affirmative action on the part of the GVN toward FULRO demands and would impress world opinion with the Montagnard problem.8 The primary reason for increased sympathy and support for FULRO among the Montagnards probably stemmed from increasing disillusionment with the GVN. GVN promises had been only partially fulfilled, if at all. FULRO appeared to provide the Montagnards with a means for forcing the GVN to be more attentive to their problems. GVN services which benefited the people, such as schools and dispensaries, had been disrupted by the increasing tempo of war in the highlands and the Montagnards may have felt abandoned by the GVN, particularly in a time when they most needed help.9

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(S) The chance of RVNAF fighting the NVA and VC forces on one hand and armed groups of Montagnards on the other was a haunting possibility throughout 1965. COMUSMACV was also acutely aware of the possibility that the accession of large numbers of trained and armed Montagnards to the VC cause would have extreme military and political implications.[10]

(S) In July 1965, COMUSMACV voiced the concept that the US Government was in SVN to help RVN and since both the Montagnard and the ethnic VN were RVN citizens, the US should not intervene in the internal affairs of the nation.[11] The situation was complicated by the fact that the GVN entertained suspicions that US was sympathizing with, if not encouraging, the FULRO autonomy demands. GVN meetings on the Montagnard problem thus did not include any US participants or observers.[12]

(S) In August 1965, the US Mission Council considered the following alternatives in response to the question, "What role should the US Mission play in the Montagnard situation?"

1) Make a strong effort to regain entry in GVN councils concerned with Montagnard affairs in order to reassert US influence by one of the following approaches:

a) To prove that the US had always acted in the best interest of the GVN, the GVN authorities should be invited frankly to state their suspicions, after a complete review of US activities in the highlands had been presented. The disadvantage to this approach was that GVN officials may have had views of certain US actions which could not be dispelled by simple and clear explanations.

b) Indicate full US support for the GVN's position by expressing willingness to participate in military contingency planning with them in actions against FULRO units. The advantage of this approach was that once having been taken into confidence, there would be opportunities to dissuade GVN leaders from extreme actions and to withhold participation in actions considered contrary to US views. The main disadvantage was that it would signal to the GVN a change of US position (which had been the encouragement of a conciliatory attitude on the part of GVN and US opposition to use of armed forces against FULRO) and increase the likelihood of military actions against FULRO. If this possibility developed, the Montagnards would probably suffer severely. However, this alternative could become more attractive. It was also noted that since the GVN would probably make this known to the Montagnards it would discourage FULRO aggressiveness on one hand but also lead to a cooling of Montagnard attitudes toward the US.

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c) Reconsider and accept the earlier GVN proposal that the US take over major responsibility for the security of the highlands. This matter had already been considered and rejected by US authorities.

2) To keep open the channels of communication and to provide GVN with a further opportunity to discuss the matter with the US, the Ambassador or the Deputy Ambassador would approach Minister of War, then Maj Gen Nguyen Huu Co, the key authority on this subject, and indicate continuing US interest in the question of negotiations with FULRO. This would reaffirm the US position that although the FULRO demands were unacceptable, the policy of negotiation and conciliation would continue and that the FULRO group should be offered incentives to encourage and keep their allegiance to the GVN. The US would also consider supporting projects to provide such incentives.

3) Make a hard line approach to the GVN, indicating the importance the US attached to the finding of a nonviolent solution to the GVN-FULRO problem and the US opposition to the use of force initiated by the GVN. The US feared that an open clash with FULRO would lead to serious consequences in the highlands and might make a genuine and peaceful accommodation impossible for many years. This position could be emphasized by informing the GVN that US military units would not be employed against FULRO without prior approval of the US Mission in Saigon. The advantage of this approach was its application of the US presence at a critical point. The disadvantage was in the probability that it would lead to an even further estrangement of the US and GVN over the Montagnard question.[13]

(S) In discussions which ensued, it was noted that the GVN was aware of the US position and although this position had to be considered, the GVN nevertheless did not appear to want the US to be involved in the specifics of their negotiations with FULRO. Given the hostile GVN attitude, they were unlikely to respond positively to a US effort to regain entry into their councils; forceful US approaches would likely prove counterproductive. The Embassy representative recommended alternative 2; the USAID representative and the RAND Corporation advisor, who was a consultant on Montagnard problems, recommended alternative 2 in conjunction with 3; and the USMACV representative recommended alternative 1b.[14] At the US Mission Council meeting of 7 September, approach 2 was agreed upon and the Ambassador indicated that he would speak to Maj Gen Co.[15]

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(S) The US State Department recognized the gravity of the situation and wanted the GVN Prime Minister to be informed that the US was acutely concerned over the GVN's lack of progress with the Montagnard problem. As the US commitment of troops and US casualties grew, the US public would probably become more aware of the Montagnard problem and wonder how the GVN could allow their major efforts to be weakened by this problem.[16] Members of the US Mission in SVN endeavored to impress upon GVN leaders the necessity of preventing military clashes which would rally the Montagnards around FULRO, and of the GVN displaying a greater interest in the material well-being of the Montagnards. The US Mission felt that the GVN socio-economic reforms and assistance to the Montagnards should be increased. The long range question of the relationship between GVN and the Montagnards was one which only the GVN could solve and it did not directly concern the US. However, the immediate security of the highland area and the successful prosecution of the battle against the VC was a vital concern to the US. It was imperative that the Montagnard military forces and the GVN continue to cooperate in the joint US/GVN military effort in the highlands.

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ANNEX B - FREE WORLD MILITARY ASSISTANCE

Background

(U) In April, and again in December 1964, the President publicly requested that other nations of the Free World contribute toward the GVN's struggle against the VC insurgency.[1] Prior to that request, aside from the US, only Australia had provided military aid in the form of a training team of some 30 members, highly skilled in counterinsurgency, which arrived in 1962.[2]

(S) The GVN made formal requests for aid from specific nations, but much of the planning behind these requests was conducted by the US.[3] A shopping list of various types of assistance was prepared, and during July 1964, the GVN formally requested assistance from 36 nations of the Free World.

(S) By January 1965, at least 26 nations were providing assistance to GVN.[4] Some of these nations were:[5]

Australia, with 88 Army advisors, a RAAF detachment consisting of six Caribou aircraft with air and maintenance crews (74 men), an eight-man surgical team plus economic aid.

Canada, which donated $730,000 to be used in education and academic development.

Republic of China, with a political warfare detachment of 15 senior officers and also 86 agricultural experts.

France, which furnished medical assistance, academic assistance and loans.

Germany, which sent $5,000,000 to be used in development projects as well as teachers and equipment for technical schools.

Japan, which sent a six-man surgical team, 29 ambulances and 20,000 small radios.

Korea, with one MASH composed of 130 men, and ten Taekwondo (Karate) instructors.

Malaysia, which sent vehicles and police instructors.

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New Zealand, with one 25-man engineer team.

Philippines, with three medical teams totaling 16 doctors, nurses and medical technicians, plus 18 civil affairs and psywar advisors.

Thailand, with C-47 crews composed of seven pilots, one navigator, and nine maintenance personnel, and the furnishing of T-33 (jet) transition training for 24 SVN pilots.

United Kingdom, with six British policemen to work with the USAID Public Safety Division, plus some diesel engines and road-building equipment.

(U) The basic diplomatic accord that enabled other nations to be of assistance to GVN was the so-called pentalateral agreement. This agreement among the nations of Cambodia, France, Laos, SVN, and the US was signed on 23 December 1950. Under its terms the US Government agreed to provide certain unspecified aid to the then-called French Union. In return for this assistance the other signatories agreed to allow duty-free treatment and exemption from taxation upon importation, exportation, or movement within Indo-China of US-furnished material. They also agreed to receive such US personnel as might be required to administer the program. In effect, US personnel so provided were to be considered as members of the US Mission and, as a result, would receive the normal privileges granted under diplomatic immunity.[6] Relations between the GVN and FWMAF were based on extensions of this agreement. In 1965 there were no status of forces agreements between SVN and any of the nations furnishing military aid.

(U) As a result of increasing Free World assistance during 1964, and with the promise of more to come, COMUSMACV found it necessary to establish a special staff agency to deal with the international military assistance effort. On 22 December 1964, IMAO was established under the staff supervision of USMACV ACofS J5.[7] Initial manning for this section was provided from J5 resources. In August 1965 arrangements were completed with the GVN to provide the so-called Madame Nhu Building to house not only the IMAO but also the representatives of all Free World nations active in SVN. This building was dedicated on 16 December by raising the flags of all member nations.[8] On 6 October, the name of the IMAO was officially changed to FWMAO, the better to express the role of those countries involved in providing support for the RVN.[9]

(S) One of the first accomplishments of the FWMAO during 1965 was the preparation of a draft policy and procedures guide that was forwarded to CINCPAC in January. After staffing, this document was published and received distribution on 29 August as a CINCPAC manual.[10] This manual provided guidance to COMUSMACV

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in establishing, coordinating, and utilizing other Free World forces active in SVN. Key points of this document are summarized as follows:11

1) SECTION I, INTRODUCTION: The introduction to this manual described the general scope to the international military assistance program to include a guide to command relationships. RVNAF and COMUSMACV jointly determined the form of assistance desired. Assistance would be supportable by the US, the GVN, or the Free World nation involved. Agreements would be written between the US, the GVN and the pertinent nation, to cover in detail the relationships involved. Each country furnishing troops to assist the GVN would have its own commander. Operational control would be exercised by him, and might be exercised additionally by USMACV or GVN. A policy council would be established for each international military assistance force to establish command and control relations, based on the written agreements between the states involved. The following quote summarizes the aims of the program:

> Although many forms of assistance are urgently needed in the Republic of Vietnam the most sought-after are support units or individuals that will have major impact on favorable progress in the counterinsurgency effort by:
>
> 1) Dramatically demonstrating to the government and people of the Republic of Vietnam and to the rest of the world that other free countries are interested in helping the Vietnamese people maintain their freedom and achieve peace.
>
> 2) Providing assistance, short of direct combat actions, of a form that will have the most immediate and noticeable effect on the counterinsurgency effort in a particular locale.

2) SECTION II, PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION: This section of the manual covered normal personnel functions with relation to the Free World effort. It included such items as mail, morale and PX privileges.

3) SECTION III, INTELLIGENCE: This section of the manual covered procedures for the exchange of classified information and intelligence with the third country.

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4) SECTION IV, OPERATIONS AND TRAINING: This section of the manual covered normal operational relations, to include the recommendation that all FWMAF elements would receive pre-deployment training on operations in SVN. It was also stated that USMACV was willing to provide lesson plans and instructors to assist in this training.

5) SECTION V, LOGISTICS: This portion of the manual covered basic supply procedures for the FWMAF and stated that donor nations should provide full TOE authorization of equipment for all units deployed, in addition to a supply of repair parts. The donor was expected to supply logistical support for its own units below depot level. GVN would provide basic subsistence consisting of rice, salt, tea and shortening. The GVN would also furnish depot support as available. The US would provide any backup necessary.

6) SECTION VI, COMMUNICATIONS: FWMAF communications would be integrated into US and GVN facilities. The US would provide certain facilities as required, such as use of overseas equipment to contact the donor's home state.

7) SECTION VII, COMPTROLLER: The US might finance costs related to defense supplies, replacement items, and services in support of units, to the extent consistent with US laws and programming guidelines. Donor nations would be encouraged to bear as much of the cost as possible short of withdrawal of assistance. Methods to finance the FWMAF included the following: increased AID to the donor state, increased AID to the RVN, increased RVN MAP, and utilization of the services of the US military establishment without reimbursement. This section also included detailed information on funding procedures to be used.

8) SECTION VII, PUBLIC INFORMATION: Basically this portion of the manual stated that public information facilities, to include accreditation of war correspondents, would be made available to the donor states on a co-equal basis with the US.

9) SECTION IX, LEGAL: Although the US obviously could not establish the context of agreements between two other nations, there were three pages of recommendations as to what the agreements between the GVN and other Free World countries should contain.

(S) Early in the year GVN prepared draft regulations to serve as a guide to relations between the GVN and those nations providing assistance. So far as can be determined, these regulations were never formally published, although they were of

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historical value in that they indicated the feelings of the VN toward other nations helping their country.[12] Many of the provisions of these draft regulations were overcome by events arising out of the arrival of Free World combat elements. The general contents of this proposed document follow:[13]

1) International military assistance units of the Free World nations provided to assist the RVN would be according to the four basic principles below:

a) No direct participation in search and destroy operations.

b) Would be used in areas already secure or cleared.

c) If having the capability, would take charge of close-in self-defense activities.

d) Would be placed under the operational control of RVNAF and would be provided logistical support by RVNAF and the various US military and civilian agencies in SVN; would be self-supporting as regards personnel and pay, with the help and assistance of USMACV.

2) This proposal also described in great detail actions permitted when an international military assistance force was faced with civil disturbance and also what self-defense actions against VC attack would be authorized. In general the fact that these provisions were included in draft regulations indicates the fact that the GVN was concerned that members of assistance forces might tend to meddle in domestic politics. This was an attempt to preclude that possibility.

(C) Although the GVN thought that all FWMAF units should be under operational control of RVNAF, this did not take place. (Command and control arrangements will be discussed in connection with each nation providing aid to SVN, as appropriate.)

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(U) The most significant event, with relation to FWMA during 1965, was the arrival of combat elements, as opposed to units strictly involved in advisory and civic action functions. Once again Australia led the way, and thus became the first nation, aside from the US, to provide forces designed actually to engage the VC as a cohesive military unit.

(U) As stated earlier Australia was the first of the Free World nations (the US not included) to have given active military assistance to SVN. The initial contingent of 30 Australian army personnel had arrived in August 1962, and had been assigned duties as advisors working with US teams located in the I CTZ.

(S) Initially, the GVN made a strong effort to keep the Australian aid a "closed circuit" between the two governments. On learning of this, the then COMUSMACV, General P. D. Harkins, stated that the Australian contingent must be under his operational control. GVN agreed and a precedent was established for the operational control of other FWMAF.[14]

(S) The first military working arrangement between COMUSMACV and another country was signed with Australia on 27 July 1962. The arrangement stated that Australia would provide the 30-man element, that it was to be integrated into the US advisory structure, and that it would be under the direction of COMUSMACV. Under this arrangement, the US was to provide all administrative and logistical support for the Australians on a reimbursable basis; the GOA agreed to pay the United States $150 per month per officer, and $125 per month per enlisted man. In addition, a flat sum of $100 per month was to be paid to cover the cost of a sedan and driver provided to the Australian commander.[15] Thus, to all intents and purposes, the small Australian contingent was made part of the US advisory effort in the I CTZ and received exactly the same support as US personnel.

(S) In August 1964, an RAAF detachment arrived and was also employed under the operational control of COMUSMACV as part of the SEASIA airlift. This element brought six Caribous and consisted of 74 personnel. The arrival of this new detachment resulted in a slight change in the initial USG-GOA agreement. The revision served to broaden the terms of the references under which the Australians were operating. No longer were they restricted to "training of the ground forces of South Vietnam in that country in jungle fighting and village defense." They were able to give ". . . almost any type of assistance necessary in

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this type of operation."[16] The change was of significance in that it indicated a broadening of the conflict and a realization on the part of the GOA that perhaps greater efforts might be required in the future.

(C) This heightened awareness was to result in an offer by the GOA to take a more active part in the growing struggle. To implement this decision, made early in 1965, a task force was formed, composed of the following elements:[17]

1) Headquarters, Australian Army Far East.

2) First Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment (+).

3) 709th Signal Troop.

4) Logistical Support Company.

(C) At that time it was also determined that all Australian elements then in SVN, the advisors and the aviation detachment, would be placed under the control of the new HQ soon to be established. An employment restriction was placed on the Australian force in that it was not to be used to quell SVN civil disturbances.[18]

(C) During May 1965 a new working arrangement was drawn up between the US and Australia, and it was agreed that the Australian battalion would be attached to and under the operational control of a US brigade. Thus, the concept of having FWMAF under operational control of COMUSMACV was continued. Command, of course, was retained by the senior Australian officer in SVN. The CG, 173d Abn Bde, was selected to exercise operational control over the 1st Bn, RAR. In effect, the 1st Bn, RAR, became the third infantry battalion of the 173d Abn Bde. The precedent already established for operational control of the Australian forces thus continued in effect. In the arrangement it was also stated that the new force would receive essentially the same administrative and logistical support given equivalent US units.[19]

(C) On 26 May the reconnaissance party for the battalion arrived in SVN followed by the advance party on 29 May. Between 2 and 11 June, the major portion of the Australian contingent landed and was employed with the 173d Abn Bde, and supported by a New Zealand field artillery battery. This brigade was thus the only major international combat element operating in SVN at that time.[20]

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(S) The GOA continued to reimburse the US for all support received. Owing to the fact that there was no experience factor available in funding an FWMAF element of this size, it was decided to divide the initial operating period into three phases as indicated:[21]

1) Phase I - A six-month period of stabilization during which the force would substantially support itself in Class II and IV supplies and perform its own maintenance and repair functions.

2) Phase II - A six-month period immediately following Phase I during which logistical support would come from the USA 1st Log Comd, except for maintenance and repair of items unique to Australia.

3) Phase III - A period during which all Australian equipment would be made fully compatible with US equipment. All support would come from the 1st Log Comd. The Australian force would, at this point, be co-equal to an organic battalion of a US brigade.

(S) In the financial working arrangement between the US and Australia, signed during September, it was agreed that Australia would reimburse the US as follows:[22]

	OFF	EM
1) Rationed, not quartered:	$40	$40
2) Quartered, not rationed:	$50	$45
3) Rationed and quartered:	$ 0	$56

4) POL products: $20 per vehicle per month.

(S) Because it was difficult to make a good estimate of cost per man, it was decided to base the reimbursement on a functional cost factor. The average administrative and logistical cost of supporting one man for one month was determined. Within this agreement, separate schedules were also prepared for the Australian Army Training Team (AATT) and the RAAF detachment, which revised the average reimbursement contained in former working arrangements. All rates were only applicable during Phase I of the operation and were subject to renegotiation at the end of that phase.[23]

(U) On 30 September, an augmentation to the battalion arrived, consisting of a 105-mm howitzer battery, a field engineer troop, an APC troop, an air reconnaissance flight detachment, and filler personnel. A signal troop arrived on the same date to augment the Australian HQ in Saigon.[24]

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(TS) Initially, the battalion was to operate in defense of the Bien Hoa area; however, the GOA gradually relaxed this restriction and COMUSMACV was able to report, in October, that the battalion proper could operate anywhere in the III Corps area and that the artillery battery could be employed any place in SVN in support of US troops. The only remaining qualification was that Australian troops would not become involved in incidents on the Cambodian border.[25]

(TS) In November, COMUSMACV discussed with the Australian Ambassador the possibility of deployment of an additional battalion to SVN.[26] Higher HQ, however, later announced that this matter would be handled by the SECSTATE.[27] Toward the end of the year, COMUSMACV expressed his goals with regard to additional deployment of ANZAC forces. His short range objective was a second Australian battalion; his long range objective was a full ANZAC brigade capable of self-support, to be employed under the opcon of a US corps.[28] With the past history of Australian and New Zealand assistance to VN, it was almost certain that their forces in-country would be increased during 1966.

New Zealand

(FOUO) The Australian battalion received part of its fire support from a New Zealand artillery battery. The overall New Zealand support for operations in SVN had been small but most welcome, as it provided representation from still another country in the war against the VC.

(U) On 30 May 1964, in response to a request for increased Free World assistance, the charge d'affaires for the New Zealand Embassy called on Prime Minister Khanh of SVN and offered him the services of an engineer detachment. This offer was accepted and the engineer team consisting of some 25 personnel arrived on 29 June 1964. On 30 June this team was extended rights and privileges under the pentalateral agreement with the GVN. At the same time they were told that the GVN would supply building material necessary for their construction projects. They were assigned a variety of civic action programs, which continued until their departure on 20 July 1965.[29,30]

(S) The New Zealand detachment had numerous problems in obtaining supplies and equipment while in SVN. This was partly due to difficulty in establishing proper sources of supply prior to deployment of the team, i.e., MAAG, USAID,

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GVN or USMACV. The problems were later solved. The team had plans for full employment including a long list of worthwhile projects and were equipped with sufficient tools. However, GNZ decided to withdraw this team and replace it with the artillery battery, considered by US, GVN and GNZ to be of more value.[31]

(S) On 27 May 1965, concurrent with an announcement from the Prime Minister of New Zealand, his Ambassador talked with the GVN Minister of the Interior and offered a New Zealand 105-mm artillery battery to assist the RVN. In the announcement by the Prime Minister was the statement that the engineer team was to be withdrawn.[32] In spite of attempts on the part of USMACV and the State Department to keep the New Zealand engineer detachment in SVN, a final decision to withdraw the team was made in late June. It was stated at the time that the withdrawal was necessary politically in order to obtain permission to send the artillery element. Also to be taken into account, however, was the fact that the team was, on the average, less than 50 percent employed, which probably played a part in the decision.[33]

(C) It is interesting to note that no working arrangement was ever signed between New Zealand and USMACV during the stay of the engineer team. This also may have been one of the causes of the problems that arose.

(S) There were no command and control problems with the engineer team, as they worked directly under US sector advisors. Prior to the arrival of the artillery battery, a working arrangement was signed stating that this unit would be under the operational control of COMUSMACV, would be brigaded with an American element and would normally operate in support of the Australian battalion. To all intents and purposes the New Zealand battery, which arrived on 21 July, operated as part of the 173d Abn Bde. (Initially there was an operating restriction imposed on the New Zealand battery by its government which stated that it would be employed only in the Bien Hoa area unless prior governmental approval was granted for movement. This restriction was later removed.) In any event, there was sufficient US artillery available in-country to preclude the necessity for moving the New Zealand battery.[34,35]

(S) The financial problems that existed with some of the other FWMAF elements were not encountered with the New Zealand unit. New Zealand and Australia were the two Free World countries paying their own way in SVN. In return for administrative and logistical support, on the same basis as that provided US forces, New Zealand reimbursed the US with $56.50

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per man per month. New Zealand also paid $26,880 per month for ammunition and $20 per vehicle for POL. The financial working arrangement was in diplomatic channels and had not been signed at year's end, although it was being used in Saigon as a basis of operation. Agreement was expected shortly after the first of the new year.[36]

South Korea

(S) One of the Free World nations providing major assistance to RVN was the ROK. In August 1964, based on requests from the US and GVN, the ROK decided to send a MASH and Taekwondo instructors to RVN. As part of the implementation of this decision, the ROK JCS published an operations order on 28 August 1964, establishing the terms under which the ROK force would operate, to include the fact that these elements of ROK Military Assistance Group, Vietnam (ROKMAGV) would be under the operational control of COMUSMACV.[37]

(C) On 5 September 1964, a working arrangement was signed between the GVN and ROK to establish relations governing activities of the Korean MASH and Taekwondo instructors. This document covered such items as the location of the force, construction of facilities, supply procedures, security to be provided, and functions of the ROK contingent. Included was the key point that ROK forces would be subject to the provisions of the 1950 pentalateral agreement thus granting, in effect, diplomatic immunity for these personnel. The ROK element arrived during September 1964 and was stationed at Vung Tau and various training centers. On 31 October 1964, the rights under the pentalateral agreement were again confirmed by the passage of a diplomatic note between the two governments.[38,39,40]

(C) In early 1965, the GVN decided that additional assistance was needed to combat the growing VC pressure and, as a result, the ROK was requested to provide additional non-combatants. The reason for this request was that the GVN troops had been diverted to civic action projects related to the heavy flooding during the fall monsoon in 1964.[41] The Government of Korea (GOK) agreed that more support could be provided and agreed to furnish a task force composed as follows:[42]
HQ Commander Republic of Korea Military Assistance Group, Vietnam (COMROKMAGV), one army engineer battalion, one army transport company, one marine engineer company, one LST with crew, one security battalion, one service unit, a liaison group, and one MASH (already in-country).

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(C) On 10 January 1965, a planning group arrived from the ROK to discuss arrangements for deployment of the ROK engineer task force which was also known as the Dove Unit. Conferences were conducted by a group known as the International Military Assistance Policy Council (after 1 October 1965, FWMAPC). This council was charged with policy making pertaining to operational control of the ROKMAGV. Present during these meetings, the first of which took place on 24 January 1965, were senior officers from RVNAF, USMACV and the ROK advance party.[43]

(C) Arrangements for arrival of the Dove unit were completed by the FWMAPC on 6 February. On 7 February a military working arrangement was signed between ROKMAGV and RVNAF and on 8 February an arrangement between COMROKMAGV and COMUSMACV was signed.[44] The ROK-GVN arrangement included several unusual features: the ROK's were not to fire unless attacked, but in any event could not fire or pursue outside their delineated area of responsibility; in the event of a VC attack, the senior ARVN commander in the area would provide assistance; ROK's were not to act against civil demonstrations unless forced to by circumstances, and authorized by the VN liaison officer. Operational control was not mentioned in this arrangement, although it implied that in combat action the senior ARVN officer would exercise control.[45] The arrangements provided that both COMUSMACV and RVNAF would provide logistic support for the ROK force. TOE equipment would be furnished through the MAP and issued by ARVN. Maintenance services would be provided by the VN. Basic Class I supplies, to include rice, salt, tea, sugar and shortening would be provided by GVN with supplemental rations furnished by USMACV. Other necessary equipment not available through MAP would also be supplied by USMACV.[46,47]

(S) The question of command and control was a problem for the three nations involved. At one point, the VN stated that they desired full operational control by the appropriate corps commander over all FWMAF employed in SVN. In January 1965, Brig General Lee, senior ROK officer in SVN, stated that his government could not accept control under any international authority other than the US.[48] Using as a precedent the fact that the initial ROK element had been placed under operational control of COMUSMACV, and also to salve the Vietnamese national pride, a method was discovered to overcome this stumbling block. The basic solution was to utilize the FWMAPC as a combined staff to determine the general operational functions of the ROK force. This council was composed initially of the CofS, USMACV, the senior Korean officer in SVN, and the RVNAF CJCS. Subsequently COMUSMACV took the place of his CofS. Various subordinate staffs

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handled day to day operations. Evidently, the three nations involved found these arrangements to be satisfactory, since the military working arrangement between COMUSMACV and COMROKMAGV, already discussed, contained provisions that the FWMAPC would establish operating parameters for the Dove unit; that command would be retained by COMROKMAGV; that operational control would be under COMUSMACV; and that the force would be responsive to the senior commander in any given area of operations.[49]

(U) On 25 February the advance element of the Dove unit arrived, to be followed on 16 March by the main party. The group was located at a base camp in Bien Hoa and during 1965 constructed three bridges, four schools, two dispensaries and two hamlet offices, and accomplished numerous other minor projects. Medical elements of the Dove unit treated some 30,000 patients. Based on recommendations by COMUSMACV, the ROKMAGV was increased by 272 officers and men on 27 June and by two LSM's on 9 July.[50,51,52,53,54]

(U) During the summer and early fall of 1965, numerous discussions were conducted on the diplomatic level regarding ROK combat elements to assist the RVN. (As mentioned earlier, the Dove unit was restricted by working agreement to selfdefense only.) These discussions culminated on 12 August when the ROK approved deployment to SVN of a combat division composed of an HQ, one Marine regiment, two infantry regiments, and a field support command.[55]

(TS) Prior to the arrival of the ROK division, considerable study of possible locations for deployment took place. The initial thought was to employ the division in the I CTZ with major elements at Chu Lai, Tam Ky and Quang Ngai.[56] This concept envisaged the ROK troops joining with the III MAF, and perhaps other FWMAF elements, to form an international FWMAF. Subsequently, this idea was dropped for several reasons. First of all, it was decided that support of another full division in that area would be logistically difficult, since over-the-beach supply would be necessary. Employment in I CTZ would also necessitate offensive operations as the enclaves were already adequately secured by III MAF elements. This might, in turn, provoke problems of "face" between the two Asian nations of RVN and ROK, especially if the ROK forces turned out to be more successful during encounters with the VC than the VN.[57] For these reasons, and also because logistics bases in the II CTZ were in need of security forces, COMUSMACV made the decision to employ the ROK forces in the Qui Nhon area. This would provide necessary base security as well as supply a force to keep the vital land LOC of Route 19 open to traffic.[58] In the USMACV operations plan, the mission of the ROK division was stated as providing security for bases in the II CTZ.[59]

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(TS) One of the major problems in bringing ROK elements to SVN was the necessity for determining who was going to pay the cost. Since the ROK military forces were MAP supported, supply presented no great problems; however, pay for the individual soldier definitely did. After much discussion, the decision was made in Washington that, if necessary, the USG was willing to underwrite whatever was needed to have ROK combat forces take part in the war.[60] The eventual negotiated arrangement provided that each ROK soldier in SVN was to receive special overseas pay ranging from $1.00 per day for a private to $7.00 per day for a brigadier general. These funds were transferred from Washington to Seoul - to the ROK Embassy in Saigon—and, finally, to the troops.[61] Another financial problem was the ROK refusal to pay claims that might be brought against them because of their presence in SVN.[62] As of the end of the year, no arrangement had been signed, although it appeared that claims would be paid through the office of the USMACV SJA using US funds.[63] A limited financial working arrangement was signed in December, covering such items as subsistence allowance, TDY travel, and special activity costs.[64] Discussion of the financial arrangements between the US and ROK was expected to continue into 1966.

(C) The advance planning group for the Korean division arrived in Saigon on 19 August to make final deployment arrangements. After a series of conferences, new working arrangements were signed between RVNAF and Commander Republic of Korea Force, Vietnam (COMROKFV), on 5 September and between COMUSMACV and COMROKFV on 6 September.[65] This new arrangement contained several interesting features. In the first place, there was no reference to operational control. The only formally recognized control agency was the FWMAPC that continued in its policy-making role. Command, of course, remained with the senior ROK officer. In this agreement, COMUSMACV stated that ROK forces would receive the same logistical support given to similar US units. This was possible because of the formation of the 1st Log Comd in SVN. COMUSMACV also agreed to support the establishment of a ROK HQ in Saigon, not to exceed 230 personnel; however, GVN was to supply all real estate requirements. To all intents and purposes, COMUSMACV thus provided all combat service support for the ROK division.[66]

(U) On 15 September, the advance party for t[illegible] K Capital Infantry Division, to include staff personne[illegible] to fill out the ROKFV HQ, arrived in Saigon. The division itself began landing on 8 October and deployment was complete on 8 November.[68,69] The ROK Marine regiment was stationed at Cam Ranh Bay and the division (-) at Qui Nhon, in consonance with

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COMUSMACV's operations plan.[70]

(S) As already mentioned, there was no provision for command and control in the military working arrangement signed between COMUSMACV and COMROKFV on 6 September. As a result, this matter was discussed by the FWMAPC, and a paper was prepared for signature, indicating that COMUSMACV would exercise operational control over all ROK forces in SVN. This proposed arrangement was presented to the ROK representative on 23 October.[71] On 28 October COMUSMACV discussed with Maj Gen Chae Myung-Shin (COMROKFV) and Brig Gen Cao Van Vien (CJCS, RVNAF), the contents of this proposal. At the time COMROKFV stated that he could not sign the arrangement without first checking with his government; however, in the meantime, he would follow the outlined procedures.[72] The ROK's submitted a rewrite of command and control arrangements which, after study, was found by COMUSMACV to be too restrictive. On 20 November it was returned to ROKFV and he was reminded that the verbal agreement made on 28 October would continue to be followed.[73] After additional discussions, COMUSMACV reported to CINCPAC that a formal signed arrangement could be politically embarrassing to the ROK's as it might connote that they were subordinate to, and acting as mercenaries for, the US. COMUSMACV felt that a formal arrangement was no longer necessary since COMROKFV had agreed to de facto operational control by US commanders. COMFORCEV and COMROKFV understood that, although directives to ROK units would be in the form of requests, they would be honored as orders. It was also thought appropriate that ROK officers be assigned to the FFORCEV staff to assist in matters relating to ROK elements. This would not constitute a combined staff, as they would serve in the positions of liaison officers.[74] Thus, by the end of 1965, COMUSMACV had de facto operational control over all FWMF operating in SVN.

(TS) Shortly after arrival of the ROK Capital Infantry Division in SVN, COMUSMACV was notified that the ROK Minister of Defense was interested in sending two additional divisions to SVN in order to form a corps structure.[75] After study, COMUSMACV recommended deployment of one division, one regimental combat team, and sufficient capability to process 350 tons of supplies per day for their logistical support.[76] In mid-December the decision was made that SECSTATE would request this additional force. COMUSMACV was directed not to discuss the matter with ROK authorities until such time as State/Defense plans to tie in additional Free World elements with increased US forces were complete.[77] COMUSMACV's position was that the additional Korean forces would be used to provide security for developing base areas, with the RCT being deployed to Tuy Hoa and the division to Nha Trang,

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Duc My, Cam Ranh, and Phan Rang. In addition, if necessary, COMUSMACV would not oppose a ROK lieutenant general's slot in Saigon although it was not required as the ROK troops were already under operational control of FFORCEV.[78] COMUSMACV requested that the RCT be on hand in SVN by 15 April 1966 in order to provide security troops for the new Tuy Hoa airfield. If the ROK elements were not available he would be required to obtain these troops from other in-country sources.[79] Pending completion of diplomatic negotiations and approval by the GOK, it appeared reasonably certain that additional ROK troops would be dispatched to SVN during 1966.

Philippines

(U) One of the nations to provide early support for SVN was the ROP. The initial ROP contingent arrived in August 1964 and was composed of 12 medical personnel and 16 civic action/psywar advisors. These teams received support from both USAID and the GVN Department of Public Health. An augmentation to this team, actually a second team, consisting of 18 more medical personnel and 16 additional psywar/civil affairs advisors arrived on 17 April 1965. The medical personnel were located in Tay Ninh, Kontum, Binh Duong and Dinh Tuong; with the psywar/civil affairs advisors in the CMR and III CTZ.[80]

(S) These teams evidently had some problems in coordination of support between US and GVN agencies. On 14 August, FWMAO reported that the commander of the ROP contingent had rotated members of his medical teams without consulting other agencies. At the same time, it was stated that the commander of the ROP contingent felt that USAID was "pushing him around."[81] This situation may have been aggravated by the fact that there was no working arrangement in effect during this period. As in the case of the New Zealand engineer detachment, the question of command and control was not resolved. In addition, the Filipinos often expressed the desire to be given the responsibility for a specific sector in order to retain their national identity.[82] The lack of a unified effort may have been a point of friction that helped to intensify some of the other irritations.

(U) A new team arrived on 23 August to replace the first team that had, by now, completed a full year in SVN.[83]

(C) By 13 September a draft military working arrangement had been prepared and was forwarded to the ROP for study. The arrangement contained the normal provisions as recommended in

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the CINCPAC Policy and Procedures Guide.[84] As of 31 December, final action on the arrangement had not been taken, and the ROP contingent continued to function under informal arrangement with COMUSMACV and the GVN.

(S) Since 1964 there had been continued efforts on the part of the US to encourage the ROP to deploy additional troops to the RVN. These negotiations were centered around a CAG to be composed of engineer elements, an infantry selfdefense force, and support troops. By June, the Government of the Philippines (GOP) had agreed in principle to provide this force; however, it stated that all equipment for the CAG must be supplied by the US and be on hand in SVN before deployment. In addition, any equipment brought from the ROP by the CAG would have to be replaced by the US and be on hand or on the way before deployment, not merely promised.[85]

(S) In order to deploy this team, it was necessary for special legislation to be passed by the ROP Congress; however, although the House did approve the measure, Congress adjourned late in June 1965 without taking final action.[86] Early in July, the President of the Philippines called a special session of Congress to consider the national budget and also to consider the bill to provide the CAG for RVN. Once again, on 12 July, Congress adjourned without taking action on the bill. Since the Senate was not to convene again until January 1966, there was little chance that any additional support would be provided by the ROP before that time.[87,88] The problem in passage of the bill was due more to internal political difficulties than any continued firm opposition to the commitment of combat type troops to SVN.[89]

(S) After the national elections in the ROP on 9 November, President-elect Marcos publicly stated that he favored sending troops to assist in SVN.[90] This was further expanded in early December, when he said that he would recommend to Congress the dispatch of the 2,000-man CAG already discussed.[91] In the meantime, the US SECSTATE requested that the US Embassy Manila look into the possibility of forming a self-contained combat force in addition to the CAG.[92] After study, CINCUSMAGPHIL reported to CINCPAC that the ROP armed forces were in no condition to supply combat troops.[93] Provided President Marcos was able to overcome local political opposition, it appeared probable that the CAG would be approved and deployed to the RVN during 1966. Pending this approval, COMUSMACV took continuing actions to assure that necessary supplies and equipment would be available to the CAG if it were eventually committed.[94]

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Republic of China

(C) Another nation providing assistance to RVN was the ROC. In May 1964, a US-GVN team went to Taiwan in order to determine what type of assistance would be appropriate for the ROC to give to the RVN. As a result of this trip, it was reported to COMUSMACV that the Government of the Republic of China (GRC) could best support the GVN, at that time, by providing a political warfare training team. Consequently, COMUSMACV recommended to GVN that their Political Warfare Department be reorganized and that assistance in this field be accepted from the ROC.[95,96]

(U) Following COMUSMACV's tacit approval on 28 July 1965, the Minister of Defense, GVN, requested the GRC to provide assistance to RVN in the form of political warfare cadres. On 8 October, 14 officers from ROC arrived in Saigon and Military Assistance Group, Republic of China, Vietnam (MAG-ROCV) was formed. The team was assigned to work with RVNAF JGS Polwar Directorate.[97,98]

(S) By 1 December a draft military working arrangement had been prepared by the USMACV IMAO; however, Commander Military Assistance Group, Republic of China, Vietnam (COMMAGROCV) declined either to concur or non-concur in the draft and it was not signed at that time. The draft arrangement contained several provisions that were deleted from the final version, to include the clauses that the ROC would reimburse the US in the amount of $125 for each officer serving in SVN per month and that US MP's had the authority to apprehend members of the MAG-ROCV whose actions were prejudicial to good order and discipline.[99,100]

(C) In early 1965, the draft arrangement was reviewed, and several changes recommended by the USMACV staff were incorporated. On 6 May 1965, COMMAGROCV and the CofS, USMACV, signed the arrangement. This arrangement contained many of the standard clauses including:[101,102]

1) The ROC would establish a political warfare advisory team that would be under the command of the senior Chinese Nationalist (CHINAT) officer.

2) An International Military Assistance Policy Council (IMAPC) would be established, composed of CofS, USMACV; CJGS GVN; and COMMAGROCV, to formulate tasks and establish missions. COMUSMACV would coordinate control arrangements made by the IMAPC.

3) COMUSMACV would provide logistical and administrative support.

(C) The ROC political warfare team was scheduled to remain in SVN for a period of one year, to depart on or about 7 October 1965. Action was initiated by both COMUSMACV and the US Ambassador in an attempt to have the team remain for at least one more year. At the end of 1965, the CHINAT advisors were still present in SVN.[103]

(S) The major problem connected with the use of CHINAT personnel in SVN was the possibility that the CHICOM's would use the presence of the CHINAT's as an excuse for direct intervention. As early as December 1964, this problem was discussed in a message from the SECSTATE to the US Ambassador in Taipei. In this message, it was stated that great care must be used not to export the Chinese civil war to SVN and that the CHINAT's should not wear their military uniform. Even the use of noncombatant troops, such as engineers, was discouraged. It was recommended that the ROC continue to serve the RVN in economic and technical fields and that they be induced to send medical teams.[104]

(S) The problem again arose when, in May 1965, FWMAO reported that information had been received from a "reliable" source that the ROC was willing to send a 1000-man force of irregular troops to assist militant Catholic Father Hoa in An Xuyen Province. This possibility was not pursued in 1965. There were obvious political problems involved in bringing a CHINAT force to SVN. In September, Prime Minister Ky made an informal comment indicating the possibility that he might request the ROC to supply crews to assist in flying transport aircraft.[105,106]

(S) In early October, COMUSMACV informed the US Ambassador that six C-46 aircraft with crews could be used by the RVN for integration into the VNAF 33rd Support Wing at TSN. It was also stated that, if available, landing craft would be most welcome.[107] After discussion, it was determined that two C-46 aircraft could be furnished. These aircraft would be supplied under the name of "China Airlines" and crew wages would be paid by the GRC. Food and lodging for the crews, as well as fuel for the aircraft, would be provided by the GVN. Necessary aircraft maintenance would be performed by the CHINAT's. These aircraft were to be placed in SVN for a three-month trial period.[108] On 25 November 1965, the local press announced the transfer of two aircraft from the ROC to the RVN.[109]

(S) It was considered highly probable that the ROC would provide additional aircraft and some form of shallow-draft shipping during 1966. The latter was of particular interest to

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COMUSMACV owing to the prevalent port congestion problems. CINCPAC concurred with COMUSMACV in the request and final action was expected in early 1966.[110]

Thailand

(C) The RTG also provided a limited amount of military assistance to the RVN in the form of a small contingent of the Royal Thai Air Force (RTAF). These 16 men arrived in SVN on 29 September 1964, and were stationed at TSN airfield and assigned for duty with VNAF as transport crews. They received no support from USMACV except PX and commissary privileges.[111]

(S) COMUSMACV's position relative to the assistance provided by the RTG was that it should be brought into line with that from other nations. In October 1965, a USMACV FWMAO officer went to Thailand and presented four recommendations to the RTG: that the chief of the air force group in the RVN should be a lt colonel; that the status and mission of the Thai effort be unclassified; that a proposed military working arrangement be signed; and that Thailand request extensions of the 1950 pentalateral agreement to cover its unit. The RTG agreed to the first two recommendations and the other two were still under discussion at the end of the year.[112]

(S) During these discussions in Thailand, Lt Gen Kriangsak, Commander Supreme Command, stated that his country was interested in vastly increasing its aid to SVN.[113] This increase might be in the form of LST's and cargo aircraft to help solve the problem of port congestion.[114]

Spain

(C) Early in November 1965, the Government of Spain made an offer to send four ambulances with military crews to aid in the war against the VC. Following coordination with COMUSMACV, USAID, and the US Embassy, the GVN requested that a twelve man army medical team be provided instead. On 29 November, the Spanish Council of Ministers approved this request and the team, consisting of four doctors, four nurses, and four technicians was expected to arrive early in 1966. The team was earmarked for employment in the provincial hospital in Go Cong Province.[115]

Summary

(TS) By the end of 1965, SVN was receiving military assistance from seven nations, including the US. Four of these—

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the US, Korea, Australia, and New Zealand, were providing combat elements. In December, the SECSTATE again appealed for additional assistance, especially from Asian countries. These forces were necessary, not only for military purposes, but also because there was concern within the US that Free World nations were not doing their share.[116]

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ANNEX C-COMMUNICATIONS

Introduction

(S) By the end of 1964 it was evident that the in-country communications facilities did not have the "requisite capacity, quality or reliability required." [1] Much of the communications effort during 1965 was centered on improving existing systems to provide minimum communications necessary in support of the US troop buildup. The US-operated communications systems in SEASIA had been primarily designed to support the advisory program and were not capable of satisfying the requirements of US combat units which were to deploy in Vietnam during 1965.

(U) Counterinsurgency warfare, as conducted in SVN in 1965, was largely characterized by rapidly moving small units. The war was, for the most part, fought on the platoon, company and battalion levels. The US armed forces, therefore, were more dependent than ever on adequate, responsible methods of communication. To provide commanders at all echelons with information required for intelligent decisions, as well as to transmit their decisions to subordinates, communications systems were taxed as never before. Additional problems emerged in the technical areas of communications caused by the high noise level, the tropical climate, jungle terrain and the lack of long lines civilian systems in RVN.

(C) Even before the arrival of US combat forces various shortcomings were identified in the overall communications system in SEASIA and steps had been taken to begin renovation and improvement. COMUSMACV had no direct control over the development of US communication systems in SEASIA. So during the year, much effort was directed toward obtaining a unified communications command and control structure. The history of communications development during 1965 is one of constant expansion of available systems, and the establishment of necessary agencies to provide management and control of these systems.

(C) In early 1965, the following long line communications systems were available to COMUSMACV: [2]

1) Back Porch - a heavy troposcatter system using AN/MCR 85 equipment. Major terminals were located at Saigon, Pleiku, Da Nang, Qui Nhon, Vung Tau, Nha Trang in RVN, Ubon

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and Green Hill in Thailand.

2) Cross Bow - a light troposcatter system using AN/TRC 90 equipment. This system provided back-up for the Back Porch net and had terminals at Saigon, Gia Nghia, Ban Me Thuot and Pleiku.

3) Southern Toll - a microwave radio system built in 1964 under the AID program, providing voice and radio teletype channels from Saigon to My Tho, Vinh Long, Can Tho, Soc Trang, Long Xuyen and Rach Gia.

4) A Synchronous Communications Satellite (SYNCOM) satellite link to connect Saigon with Hawaii and CONUS.

(C) In-country communications to service the field advisors consisted of the following:3,4,5

1) The operations and intelligence nets consisting of AN/GRC 26 radio equipment, which provided radio teletype communications between corps and division advisory teams and Saigon.

2) The USMACV Single Sideband Radio Net consisting of Collins commercial single sideband equipment (32-RS-1) to provide voice communications for key advisors at corps and divisional level. This system was also linked with Saigon.

3) MAP supported AN/PRC 10 FM radios and the AN/GRC 87 family of AM radios that were used for field advisory communications at battalion and sector level and also provided an air-ground link for the use of advisory personnel on FM channels.

Integrated Wideband Communications System

(U) IWCS was the communications backbone for SEASIA and provided tactical as well as strategic communications facilities. A wideband communications system may generally be described as follows:6

> A communications system which provides numerous channels of communication on a highly reliable basis; included are multichannel telephone cable, troposcatter, and multi-channel line of sight radio systems such as microwave.

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(S) The SEASIA long lines system consisted of communications nets located in SVN, Laos, and Thailand. As early as mid-1964 it had become obvious that this system was no longer adequate, and a CINCPAC plan was developed to upgrade the facility in support of US SEASIA contingency plans.[7] On 13 November 1964 the JCS approved expansion of the SEASIA long lines communications system into the IWCS and tasked the Defense Communications Agency (DCA) to prepare an overall plan that would integrate and expand these facilities.[8]

(S) By 28 December, DCA had prepared the plan which was approved by the JCS and forwarded to SECDEF for consideration.[9] This plan provided for the integration of all long range communications systems in SEASIA.[10] Major provisions of the plan were:[11]

1) Establish a fixed Back Porch type system in Thailand using Philco troposcatter equipment originally provided by MAP for Indonesia.

2) Upgrade part of the RVN Back Porch system and provide minimum capability from Vung Tau to Hue, Phu Bai.

3) Establish a DCA center in Saigon and designate control and reporting stations in Thailand and RVN.

4) The system was to be operational by 1 December 1965.

(C) The first significant improvement in the long lines communications situation took place on 1 January 1965 when Wet Wash "/," an underwater cable between Clark AFB, Republic of the Philippines, and Nha Trang, RVN, became operational. This cable was the final link in the chain, providing adequate voice and teletype communication from Saigon to Hawaii and Washington. By the end of January, 13 voice and 30 teletype circuits over this cable were in use. [12]

(C) By early spring of 1965 a noticeable decrease in the reliability of the long lines system had been noted. This was attributable not only to technical problems but also to the lack of a single directive authority for the entire system.[13] COMUSMACV called this to the attention of CINCPAC and stated that restoration of circuits was dependent upon cooperation among several different agencies resulting in unnecessary delay. It was recommended that DCA be given management responsibility over all communications systems in SEASIA in order to solve this unity of command problem.[14] CINCUSARPAC did not concur in this proposal and stated that the new signal group, soon to be

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deployed to SVN, should be the overall system manager since the long lines systems were largely USA controlled. He also commented that DCA had no command authority and should not be involved in tactical communications.15

(C) At this point the CINCPAC staff reviewed the entire SEASIA communications picture and reached the following conclusions:16

1) The communications organization in SEASIA was not functioning with the desired degree of effectiveness to provide communications responsive to operational requirements.

2) In SVN the 39th Sig Bn, under USASCV, operated all USA in-country and joint trunking systems with the exception of the DCA station in Saigon, although the latter did, however, report thru USASCV.

3) In Thailand all USA communications functions, including the DCA stations in Bangkok and Udorn, were executed by the 379th Sig Bn under the 9th Log Comd in Korat. There was no coordination line between USASCV and the 9th Log Comd, even though both commands were subordinate to CG, USARYIS (US Army Ryukyus).

4) All USAF fixed-plant communications were under the 1964th Communications Group, under command of the 2d AD. As the Cdr, 2d AD was also COMUSMACV's AFCC, no real command problem existed.

5) DCA personnel in Bangkok and Udorn reported to US Army Strategic Communications Command (USASTRATCOM) Pacific in Hawaii.

6) The Philco troposcatter system, under construction from Thailand to SVN, was the responsibility of of the 279th Sig Bn.

7) Trunk systems in SVN were operated by USA. Trunk systems in Thailand were operated jointly by USA and USAF.

8) The IWCS plan, developed in November 1964 by DCA and subsequently approved by the JCS, provided for a DCA office in Saigon; however, no operational concept for this organization had been described and the relations between the DCA office, Saigon, and DCA office, SEASIA (Clark AFB), was not clear.

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This was complicated by DEPCOMUSMACTHAI's request that an additional DCA element be assigned to Thailand.

9) The DCA IWCS plan divided operating responsibility between USA and USAF.

10) The USA had been unable to decide who would operate their portion of the system:

a) COMUSMACV, DEPCOMUSMACTHAI, CG USASTRATCOM, CSAF all believed that the USASTRATCOM should be the systems operator.

b) CINCUSARPAC did not believe that the SEASIA long lines system should be designated as part of the Defense Communications System (DCS) as it provided tactical circuits, must be under the direct control of the on-the-scene commander, and should be operated by tactical units.

11) CINCUSARPAC thought that the USA Signal Group which was being deployed to SVN would solve the command problems. No account was given as to how the USA Signal Group would be related to DCA office, Saigon, or how civilian contractor assistance would be utilized.

12) The USASTRATCOM believed that its operations charter authorized it to operate all USA portions of the DCS, with joint military/civilian manning and maximum use of MAP-furnished systems. The MAP had failed to meet US military requirements because of the troop buildup.

13) Activation of DCA, Saigon branch, and designation of the IWCS as part of the DCS, would not solve the problem, since the DCA was not an operating element but rather a manager. The line of control between DCA and the operator of the system had to be clarified.

(C) As a result of these findings, the following conclusions were reached:[17]

1) Clear lines of operational control for communications and electronics elements in SEASIA did not exist; SEASIA must be treated as a single entity. This was not possible under the MAP concept.

2) The USASTRATCOM should form an element to operate the IWCS under the operational control of COMUSMACV.

3) The DCA element in SEASIA should provide overall management of the system under the operational control of COMUSMACV, with responsibility for operating procedures, technical

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standards and channel allocations.

(C) On 29 March 1965, CINCPAC recommended that a COMUSMACV-DEPCOMUSMACTHAI conference be held to resolve questions concerning operational communications responsibility.[18] CINCPAC stated that he considered the Back Porch system, the reconfigured Philco troposcatter system, and the Wet Wash cable, were at that time part of the IWCS. Therefore, they should be under single management.[19] This meeting was held in Saigon on 6 April and resulted in COMUSMACV recommending to CINCPAC that a SEASIA Communications Operations Center be established to provide a single manager for certain multi-channel systems.[20] A second, working level, conference was held in Saigon on 12-15 April to develop detailed operating procedures.

(C) The draft SEASIA Communications Operations Charter contained, inter alia, the following provisions:[21]

1) SEASIA Communications Operations Center should be established in Saigon with a branch in Bangkok composed of representatives from the USASCV, 379th Sig Bn, 2d AD and the USASTRATCOM. Initial staff support would be provided by USMACV J6 and USMACTHAI J6.

2) The DCA should establish a Saigon office with the chief of this organization also serving as the OIC of the SEASIA Communications Operations Center.

3) All equipment, tactical or strategic, connected to an IWCS main distribution frame should come under the SEASIA Communications Operations Center control and management.

4) The Back Porch system, reconfigured Philco troposcatter system, and Wet Wash cable system should be considered part of the IWCS and operated as a single entity.

5) Validated requirements for circuits utilizing IWCS routes should be provided the SEASIA Communications Operations Center by the appropriate J6.

6) A USA long lines signal company should be formed to operate the Back Porch and reconfigured Philco troposcatter systems.

(C) COMUSMACV accepted the recommendation that a SEASIA Communications Operations Center be formed and notified CINCPAC on 13 April that the target date for commencement of operations had been set for 1 May.[22] At the same time, CINCPAC was requested

to help arrange for DCA and USASTRATCOM representation. Shortly thereafter, COMUSMACV sent a message to the DCA and the USASTRATCOM requesting manning assistance in the creation of the Communications Operations Center.[23]

(C) Meanwhile SECDEF approved, in principle, the DCA's proposal to establish the IWCS and on 21 April directed DCA to staff a Saigon office to manage the system. The USASTRATCOM was designated as the system operator. Formal approval of the IWCS project was signed on 4 August.[24]

(C) Obviously, COMUSMACV's proposal for a SEASIA Communications Operations Center and the decision on the part of SECDEF to give long lines managerial responsibility to DCA were conflicting. DCA, upon receipt of the manning request for the SEASIA Communications Operations Center, requested that COMUSMACV withhold approval of this concept pending establishment of its office in Saigon.[25] COMUSMACV thereupon agreed to delay the date for establishment of the center until 10 May; but reemphasized the point that he could not accept indefinite delay, because the problem of system management was critical.[26] On 7 May the DCA office, Saigon, subsequently renamed DCA Southeast Asia Mainland was established as a field activity of the DCA-SEASIA located at Clark AFB.[27]

(C) With the designation of DCA as the IWCS manager, a statement of mission was required to establish the parameters of operation and appropriate command channels. Initially, DCA-SAM was given managerial responsibility over certain long lines systems located in SVN, Laos, and Thailand, and was directed to be responsive to the communications needs of COMUSMACV, DEPCOMUSMACTHAI and other authorized users of the system.[28] As DCA was charged with overall management of DCS, it was necessary to designate exactly what portions of the communications nets in SEASIA would form a part of this system. On 31 May, DA designated the following long lines facilities as part of the DCS:[29]

1) DCS station in Saigon and Bangkok (previously designated).

2) The Back Porch system of heavy troposcatter equipment (previously designated) with the following circuits:

a) Ubon to Pleiku.

b) Pleiku to Da Nang.

c) Nha Trang to Qui Nhon to Da Nang.

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d) Nha Trang to Saigon.

e) Bangkok to Green Mountain to Korat (microwave).

f) Korat to Ubon.

g) All facilities associated with the above.

(C) Effective 1 August, the USASTRATCOM assumed responsibility for the operation and maintenance of the USA portion of the DCS in SEASIA.[30] This resulted in still greater fragmentation of control, as the USASTRATCOM elements in SVN were under the command of USASTRATCOM, Pacific, located in Hawaii, and not operationally responsible to COMUSMACV.[31] Additional consolidation was achieved in September when the decision was made that the Southeast Asia Mainland office in SVN would exercise operational direction over control personnel operating the DCS in the event of trouble on circuits traversing both the system circuits and tactical tails.[32] In effect, DCA had thus become the central control office for all major communications systems in SEASIA, regardless of the operator or owner.

(C) Although there was now a single manager and operator for the long lines system, one of COMUSMACV's most critical communications problems was that of authority over systems required for command and control of US and FWMAF in SEASIA. By mid-October, COMUSMACV had decided that he could no longer tolerate a country-wide communications system over which he had no authority, and recommended to the CofSA that the USARV signal officer exercise operational control over all USA signal elements in-country.[33] These included two separate operating elements of the USASTRATCOM as well as units organic to USARV. The CofSA agreed that action was necessary to solve this problem, and sent a team headed by Brig Gen J.C.F. Tillson to Saigon during the first part of November.[34]

(S) COMUSMACV discussed in detail with Brig Gen Tillson the communications problems that were prevalent in SEASIA, to include specific reference to the elements that were not under his command but provided him with support. COMUSMACV requested that the USARV signal officer be assigned as CO, 2d Signal Group and that the designated representative of the USASTRATCOM be on the scene by 1 February 1966. He should be a general officer and all signal elements in SVN placed under his control.[35] As a result of this request, on 1 December, DA placed the USASTRATCOM element in SVN under the operational control of the CG, USARV.[36]

(C) Another significant event in November was the visit to Saigon of Lt Gen A.O. Starbird, Director of DCA. He had been

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sent to SVN by the JCS to survey communications difficulties and recommend corrective action. His findings included the following:[37]

1) The long lines system was still inadequate to handle current message traffic.

2) The Phu Lam (overseas relay facility) was overtaxed, a "quick fix" was required.

3) A coastal cable from Vung Tau to Da Nang was necessary.

(C) To insure that the DCA Southeast Asia Mainland facility was responsive to COMUSMACV, Lt Gen Starbird authorized the USMACV J6 to submit a letter of performance appraisal to accompany the Director, DCA Southeast Asia Mainland's efficiency report; thus, the DCA office in SVN was, in effect, under the operational control of COMUSMACV.

(S) Construction of the IWCS did not keep pace with the reorganization of communications command and management functions. Subsequent to the 4 August approval by SECDEF, contracts were let in September to Page Communications Engineering, Inc., for the work to be done in SVN, and to Philco Corporation for the work to be done in Thailand.[39] In these contracts, the completion date was delayed from 1 December 1965 to 3 March 1966. This date was further adjusted to 1 August 1966. Information available at the end of the year indicated that, owing to lack of equipment availability, transportation delays, lack of heavy machinery, excessive offloading time, and a local labor shortage, the 1 August date might not be met, and the RVN portion of the IWCS would not be operational until December 1966.[40,41] With the schedule "Phase II and Phase IIA" buildup expected during 1966, COMUSMACV believed that the existing IWCS plan, even when construction was completed, would be insufficient to support the expanded long lines requirements. For this reason, he requested that immediate action be taken to complete construction of the planned system and to prepare a new plan for further upgrading the facilities to meet the new requirements.[42,43]

(U) Figure C-1 shows the long lines system in December 1965.

(U) The following is a discussion of the expansion and planned expansion of the various components of the IWCS during 1965. These components were the Back Porch system and its augmenting Crossbow System; the Northern Toll system; the Southern Toll system, and the Wetwash Cable system. The Southern Toll and the Wetwash Cable systems were completed in 1964 and are discussed in the USMACV 1964 Command History.

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Back Porch and Crossbow

(C) Back Porch was the name given to the heavy troposcatter system that formed the backbone voice and teletype net for SVN. It was a major component of the IWCS. At the beginning of 1965, the Back Porch system consisted of troposcatter equipment at Saigon, Pleiku, Da Nang, Qui Nhon, Nha Trang, and Vung Tau in RVN, Ubon and Green Hill in Thailand.[44]

(S) During the first few months of 1965, numerous complaints were registered about the quality of the system; some of these were related to the lack of proper management, as already covered in this annex. However, the major difficulties were caused by atmospheric conditions and the lack of sufficient channels to carry the ever-increasing message load.[45,46]

(C) In response to COMUSMACV's request for assistance, a DCA military-civilian team arrived in RVN on 30 January, to visit the AN/MRC 85 sites and recommended improvements.[47] At the same time, representatives of Page Electronics, the prime civilian contractor on Back Porch, also made a technical survey of the sites. Based on these studies, several changes and additions were completed during 1965. Major changes in system configurations were:[48]

1) In July, AN/TRC 90B light troposcatter equipment was emplaced at Saigon, Lan Bian Mountain (Dalat) and Pleiku, adding 24 channels to the system. In September, this was expanded to 48 channels.

2) In September, AN/MRC 85 heavy troposcatter equipment was installed at Pleiku and Da Nang, adding 24 channels to the system. This would be expanded to 60 channels by March 1966.

3) In October, AN/TRC 90 light troposcatter equipment was installed at Da Nang and Chu Lai, providing 24 channels. This equipment had been part of the Cross Bow system, a back-up for Back Porch, which was found to be of too low a quality over the original distances and terrain involved.

4) In November, AN/MRC 98 heavy troposcatter equipment was emplaced at Cam Ranh Bay and Vung Tau, to provide 24 channels. This was to be expanded to 66 channels during 1966.

5) Da Nang to Ubon troposcatter link, using AN/MRC 98 heavy troposcatter equipment, had 24 channels, and was being expanded to 72 channels at the end of the year.

6) The Vung Tau to Green Hill (Thailand) troposcatter network, utilizing Philco equipment, would provide 24 channels

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with estimated completion by the end of 1965.

(C) Even though the Back Porch system greatly improved during the year, it failed to keep pace with the US troop buildup and in some cases reached a saturation. Plans were made to continue expansion; however, no major relief was expected until October 1966.[49]

Northern Toll

(C) Since 1957 there had been discussion on both US military and civilian levels as how to best improve civilian communication in RVN. One of the first major developments in this program was the construction of the Southern Toll microwave system that was completed in 1964 at the cost of some $4 million, and provided voice radio teletype circuits for both military and civilian use south of Saigon.[50,51]

(S) The Northern Toll project, as developed during 1964, had as a concept, the construction of a 600-channel capacity microwave system from Vung Tau to Quang Tri along the eastern coast of SVN, with drops at major cities along the way. The system would eventually interconnect with Southern Toll, Back Porch and other military nets. The system as proposed would cost some $13 million.[52] The DCA-SAM office favored the Northern Toll concept, provided it was combined with military requirements, and favored a cable installation as a primary system, with radio as backup.[53] COMUSMACV also felt that a cable system was the best long range device to upgrade the entire RVN communications situation, and in April 1965, recommended to CINCPAC that a study be made of possible submarine cable routes to link Da Nang, Qui Nhon, Nha Trang, Vung Tau and possibly Bangkok.[54] The DCA Southeast Asia Mainland office recommended an immediate feasibility study.[55]

(C) As a result of these recommendations, DCA, Washington, replied that a cable from Saigon to Nha Trang would be vulnerable because of shallow bottom configuration. However, the route from Nha Trang to Da Nang would present no great difficulty. Installment time was estimated at 15 months from the date of the contract.[56] CINCPAC believed that additional bottom study was necessary and that a cable system along the coast could fulfill both Northern Toll system and military requirements. He also cited the difficulty of obtaining adequate secure locations for the microwave relay sites that would be necessary under the initial concept.[57] During mid-August 1965, a meeting was held in Washington, attended by representatives from USMACV, JCS, CINCPAC, and the Office of Chief of Communications Electronics and the OSD ISA. A recommendation was submitted to SECDEF that a parallel Northern Toll communications system, consisting of both microwave and cable, be constructed as quickly as possible.[58]

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(S) COMUSMACV found it necessary to restate his position on the Northern Toll system as a matter of clarification. In October, he stated that the Northern Toll system should not be expected to replace any existing military system such as Back Porch, but rather would supplement the overall communications capability in SVN and help to relieve the ever-growing message congestion situation.[59]

(C) During a fact-finding trip to Saigon for JCS in November, the Director, DCA, stated that long lines systems were still inadequate and a coastal cable offered one solution.[60] This, of course, added additional weight to the recommendation for prompt approval of the Northern Toll concept.

(C) At a CINCPAC-COMUSMACV conference on 20 November, the following conclusions were made:[61]

1) The Northern Toll system was a joint USAID/MAP project.

2) Verbal agreement had been made with USAID that it be a joint project.

3) Funding was established at $7 million from MAP, and $5 million from USAID.

4) USAID had approved the project, pending military requirements from DOD, which had not yet been furnished.

5) Military requirements would be mostly RVNAF, with some low priority to US military traffic.

6) No action was expected from OSD until a joint project was submitted.

(C) It appeared likely that some type of Northern Toll microwave system in conjunction with an offshore cable would eventually be approved. With the ever-growing communications needs in RVN, these proposals represented the only existing long range solution to the problem of supplying adequate communications between Saigon and Quang Tri.

Advisory Communications

(C) During 1964 and early 1965 many field advisors complained about communications equipment, particularly the AN/PRC 10 FM radio and the AN/GRC 87 family of AM radios.[62]

(S) Problems encountered with the AN/PRC 10 in the field

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included the following:[63,64,65]

1) The AN/PRC 10 radio was not compatible with the AN/ARC 54 radio found in aircraft. As a result, reliable air/ground communications were not available to most field advisors.

2) The AN/PRC 10 did not have sufficient range for the purpose of which it was being used in SVN.

(C) In January 1965, a study was prepared in which the USMACV J6 cited the advantages of the AN/PRC 25 over the AN/PRC 10, and recommended procurement of the former.[66] It was found that the AN/PRC 25 had greater output power and range; operated over a greater frequency range; was transistorized, and was more reliable (the USAF and USASF had used 75 sets in-country with good results).

(C) The following disadvantages were listed:[67]

1) The AN/PRC 25 was not MAP supported. Bringing this equipment in-country would create a maintenance problem. Advisory radio equipment in use was receiving higher echelon maintenance through ARVN. A change in policy would be required if this equipment were to be introduced.

2) The AN/PRC 25 was considerably more expensive than the AN/PRC 10.

3) While the AN/PRC 25 would help correct the wideband-narrowband problems that existed in air/ground communications, it would not provide optimum results.

(C) The J6 recommendation to procure the AN/PRC 25 was approved by COMUSMACV on 11 June and an urgent request was submitted to CG USARYIS for over 1,000 sets for use by advisors; 501 for USARV; 200 for a maintenance float; and 311 of a vehicular mounted version for use throughout the Command.[68] The 1st Log Comd was tasked with providing maintenance support for this equipment.[69]

(C) Within a short time, DA agreed to fill this requirement and stated that 1,000 sets could be shipped immediately.[70] The only question asked was: out of the 1,000 sets, how many portable type radios (AN/PRC 25) were desired and how many vehicular mounted radios (AN/GRC 125) were desired?[71] A clarification was made, and immediate air shipment requested. The first sets arrived in SVN on 19 July.[72] By the end of the year most field advisory teams had received this new equipment.

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(C) The other radio system causing advisory complaints was the AN/GRC 87. This radio, developed between WW II and the Korean conflict, was the prime system for field advisors' long distance communication. The problems stemmed from the fact that the radio was frequently used at maximum range, requiring a continuous wave (CW) mode of operation, and that it was difficult to tune correctly. The trained operators needed for these requirements were in short supply. In general, the system was inadequate for advisory needs in SVN.[73]

(C) Another problem was the single sideband air request net used by USAF. When an Air Liaison Officer (ALO) or FAC was not available with his single sideband radio equipment, field advisors could not enter the USAF net to request air strikes. As a result, USMACV DAML investigated the possibility of providing single sideband equipment down to battalion advisory level.[74] A study was conducted to augment and update the existing advisory single sideband net utilizing the non-standard Collins 32RS commercial transceiver.[75] The AN/FRC 93 single sideband radio would satisfy all these requirements. The first supply request was for 173 AN/FRC 93 Collins single sideband radios (HC-162) to build up the existing single sideband net.[76] Soon after, an add-on request was made for 250 radios to provide communications for USASF and subsector advisors.[77]

(C) On 16 April, DA approved the requirement for 250 radios and directed immediate air shipment.[78] Unfortunately, the radios were not available, and COMUSMACV was informed that procurement would require four to seven months after the contract was let.[79] On 24 September, the first 17 AN/FRC 93 radios arrived and were distributed on the basis of a J6-established priority.[80] In October, a requirement for an additional 839 radios was established and they were requested from USARPAC.[81] By November, a total of 54 complete radio sets had arrived in SVN and, although this was still inadequate, each corps advisory team had a single sideband net and the country-wide net had been expanded.[82]

Project Talk Quick

(S) "Talk Quick" was a term applied to a project designed to obtain secure voice communications in RVN. In mid-1964, COMUSMACV expressed the desire for secure communications both within RVN and to higher HQ. At that time, the only secure method of communications was via radio-teletype. He recommended to CINCPAC that TSEC/KY-9 equipment be obtained for this purpose, and requested that a system be developed to permit attainment of truly secure voice capability.[83]

(S) This requirement was referred to JCS, who in turn tasked the DCA to do the engineering work required for systems

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development.[84] Unfortunately, the KY-9 system could not be procured and as a result HY-2/KG-13/MODEM equipment was recommended to provide the minimum essential service on a manual basis.[85] By February 1965 the National Security Agency (NSA) had obtained sufficient equipment to provide secure voice circuits from SVN to CONUS on a very austere basis; however, the remainder of the equipment necessary to complete the in-country requirement was not to be available for some time.[86,87]

(S) In late February 1965, the secure voice net linking COMUSMACV, CINCPAC, NMCC (National Military Command Center), JCS, Department of State and the White House was completed, using KG-13 equipment through the Wet Wash "A" cable that had been installed earlier in the year. This was the first secure voice network to be established in SEASIA.[88,89]

(S) During March a conference was held at HQ PACOM to review the entire secure voice network plan for SEASIA. Plans for its implementation by 1 August proved futile.[90] JCS again had to review the entire problem owing to the cost and magnitude of the effort. Since the desired equipment was unavailable, a quick fix solution appeared to be in order. It would provide COMUSMACV with the facility for secure communications within his area of responsibility as COMUSSEASIA (D), although it would not be as responsive as desired. Most of the work involved upgrading and expanding the existing facilities to accept the manual secure voice equipment that could be made available.[91,92,93]

(S) When completed, the overall PACOM secure voice net was to consist of 122 subscribers. COMUSMACV allocated his portion of the resources as follows:[94,95]

1) Twenty-four KY-3 wideband subscribers in the Saigon/TSN area.

2) Seven HY-2/KG-13 narrowband subscribers in other areas of SVN.

3) Six HY-2/KG-13 narrowband subscribers in Thailand.

4) One HY-2/KG-13 narrowband subscriber in Laos.

(S) Sufficient equipment was installed to enable the wideband portion of the system to open for local traffic on 15 November.[96] During December, the system was extended to permit direct calls from subscribers to Hawaii. The narrowband portion of the system was delayed because of late arrival of contractor-furnished equipment; however, it was under construction at year's end.[97]

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USMC secure voice requirements were met through the expansion of Talk Quick system. The USAF, on a unilateral basis, had installed its own additional secure voice equipment but it was not compatible with the Talk Quick net.[98]

(S) To provide an alternate secure out-of-country voice route, an AN/MCS-44 terminal was moved from Asmara, Ethiopia to SVN. This ground station provided the desired capability through the SYNCOM-III satellite. The equipment was operated by USASTRATCOM with the installation located at Ba Queo and became operational on 14 December.[99]

(U) Figure C-2 shows the Talk Quick system as of the end of 1965.

Message Backlog

(S) During the year, COMUSMACV became increasingly concerned with the near saturation of his communications system. With the massive US troop buildup, existing communications systems had been unable to keep pace with the demands for service. Owing to requirements at all levels, the preferred communications method had been over the secure teletype system. Delays were caused by the influx of messages to relay points. Normally, each message was transmitted to a teletype relay station which prepared additional tapes of the message, one for each addressee. Messages passed through several relay points before arriving at their final destination; the process of tape preparation was thus repeated many times. Messages with numerous action and information addressees thus required excessive handling time.[100]

(S) A second major problem was that of service traffic. When a message arrived at its final destination in an illegible condition a service was requested. This necessitated a repetition of the entire process from the originating point. With the prevalent equipment difficulties, service requests equaled or exceeded normal traffic.[101]

(S) During November, complete message saturation was reported from the USARV communications center and also at the Phu Lam relay, the major overseas relay point from SVN.[102]

(S) During the visit of the DCA Director, to SVN in November, COMUSMACV requested assistance in reducing out-of-country message traffic. There were two major recommendations:[103,104]

1) That routing procedures on messages from Washington be changed. CINCPAC was action addressee on many messages on

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which only COMUSMACV could act. By making COMUSMACV the action addressee, considerable reduction in workload could be effected at relay points.

2) Much message traffic relative to B-52 strikes and III MAF activity was not essential to operations. Reduced requirements for this information would provide significant reduction in overall traffic.

(S) COMUSMACV directed stringent controls over message traffic generated within his command:[105]

1) Send all routine precedence message by air mail or courier.

2) Send all messages to information addressees by air mail or courier except when ability to accomplish the mission would be degraded.

3) Limit length of messages.

4) Limit number of releasing officers and insure use of proper precedence.

5) Review requirements for recurring reports; use air mail or courier whenever possible.

6) Improve mail and courier systems.

7) Establish message screening boards to review at least two days' traffic per month; report violations of the above policies.

(U) COMUSMACV also initiated action to increase the message handling capability of selected relay points and communication centers. In addition a relay point was established at Nha Trang and became operational on 3 November. DCA Southeast Asia Mainland was requested to establish an advisory analysis working group with representatives from each of the components. This group visited selected relay points and assisted in improving communication practices and procedures. This assistance, in addition to increased message handling capability and management improvements, had significant results during November and December.

1) At the in-country relay points, the message volume increased from 26,000 messages daily on 1 November to a peak of 36,000 messages daily on 3 December. This message volume was reduced to 26,000 daily by 31 December.[106]

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2) During November the total traffic backlog at the in-country relays points averaged 3,000 messages daily with a peak on 6 November of 4,200 messages. On 30 November the daily backlog had been significantly decreased and averaged less than 500 messages daily. On 31 December the message backlog averaged less than 100 messages daily.

3) The service message traffic decreased from approximately 60 percent in the case of Phu Lam for November to approximately 15 percent on 31 December.

Armed Forces Radio Service

(U) The AFRS outlet in SVN provided information, entertainment and education services and a method of command-wide dissemination of urgent announcements.

(U) When the basic AFRS system was designed in 1962, most US personnel were situated in small compounds near nodes of the long lines communications system. It was therefore practical to adopt a concept of serving audiences with low power transmitters modulated by a programming signal delivered through the long lines system. Prior to the US troop buildup, this system occasionally reached as much as 94 percent of the advisory personnel, although covering less than 10 percent of the total land area of RVN.[107] With the large US troop increase in 1965, this system predictably became inadequate. On 17 April 1965, an AFRS CONUS team arrived in RVN to conduct a field survey and recommend improvements for the facilities.[108] In late May, the survey was complete; however, the USMACV J6 felt that the recommended improvements were inadequate to provide the desired audience coverage.[109]

(U) In August a USMACV staff study was completed outlining a recommended approach of system developments that would fully provide for all anticipated future needs.[110] This staff study recommended that planning based on population coverage should cease, and planning should concentrate on area coverage, since US forces were now located throughout SVN. Comparative area coverage by system was:

1) Existing systems - less than 10 percent of land area.

2) AFRS survey team's recommended improved system - 46 percent of land area.

3) Maximum feasible improvement of satellite system - 75 percent of land area.

4) A four-station net system - 99 percent of land area.

(U) Although there was some question as to actual land area coverage, it was recommended in this study that a four-station network be constructed with 50 KW transmitters in Saigon, Da Nang, Pleiku and Nha Trang. The staff study was approved by COMUSMACV and in late September was forwarded to the JCS for approval.[111]

(C) During 1965, the feasibility of bringing TV to RVN, both for the use of US personnel and as a psywar tool for GVN, was throughly considered. The SECDEF announced that, subject to agreement by the GVN, the propcsal to establish TV facilities for US forces had been approved. The development program would consist of three phases:[112]

1) Initial telecasting of two hours daily from airborne facilities, to commence within three months.

2) Telecasting from studio facilities in Saigon for about 40 hours per week, within three to nine months.

3) Developing a seven-station system, with one relay, for a 55-hour telecasting week, within nine to twelve months.

(C) The system would eventually have two channels and be a dual facility for use by both the US and the GVN. It would not be a true net where all stations would broadcast the same program at the same time because of limited military communications available. Program packages would be circulated from one station to another.[113]

Military Affiliate Radio System (MARS)

(U) MARS is a network of radio stations operated under the control of the military services. While it is operated by volunteers outside their normal duty assignments, it is not an amateur network. The system is operated with the objective of providing emergency back-up communications and giving side benefits in training of personnel and fulfilling morale requirements.

(U) Negotiations to obtain permission from the GVN to permit the establishment of a MARS Network had been pursued since December 1965.[114] In August COMUSMACV submitted a memorandum to the US Ambassador requesting his assistance to obtain authority to install and operate a MARS Network. The Deputy Ambassador informally discussed this matter with GVN officials and secured an informal approval.[115] The GVN Ministry of Foreign Affairs officially approved the request to operate MARS facilities in SVN on 25 November.[116]

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(U) COMUSMACV started immediate installation of stations. A goal was established to have as many stations as possible operational prior to Christmas so service personnel could send messages to their homes during the holiday season. All military services were prompt to respond and 13 stations were operational on 25 December. On Christmas a USMC MARS station was temporarily set up at the Da Nang Hospital. Wounded men were able to talk to their families in CONUS. This was a tremendous success in raising the morale of the patients.

(U) At the end of 1965 MARS stations were operational at the following locations:

1) USA Stations.

   a) Long Binh

   b) An Khe

   c) Qui Nhon

   d) Cam Ranh Bay

   e) Di An

   f) Soc Trang

   g) Nha Trang

2) USAF Stations.

   a) Tan Son Nhut

   b) Bien Hoa

   c) Nha Trang

   d) Da Nang

   e) Cam Ranh Bay

3) USN Station at Da Nang.

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5. Fact Sheet, MACV J6, 15 Sep 65, Subj: MACV Single Sideband Net, (C).
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7. Fact Sheet, MACV J6, 22 Jan 65, Subj: SEA Long Lines Systems, (S).
8. Msg, COMUSMACV 160207Z Dec 65, (S).
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79. Msg, JCS, 162120Z Apr 65, (C).
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81. Msg, CO USARV, 281200Z Oct 65.
82. Ltr, 39th Sig Bn to CO, 2d Sig Gp, 9 Nov 65, Subj: Status of Radio Set AN/FRC/93, (S).
83. Msg, COMUSMACV, 101111Z Jul 65, (S).

84. Msg, JCS-J6, 20 Jul 64, Subj: Secure Voice Requirements.
85. Msg, CINCPAC, 212006Z Nov 64, (S).
86. Msg, Director, NSA, 022115Z Feb 65 (S).
87. During the early part of 1965 numerous messages were passed among interested agencies explaining technical and administrative delays in obtaining the desired equipment. It is not considered within the scope of this annex to discuss the situation in such detail. Messages are available in the MACV J6 file.
88. Msg, COMUSMACV, Subj: MILREP, 22 Feb 65 (S).
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LONG LINES SYSTEM DECEMBER 1965

LEGEND

——— HEAVY TROPO
– – – LIGHT TROPO
. . . . . MICROWAVE
·–·–· AN/TRC-24
——·—— SUB CABLE
—12— No. of Available Channels



KEY

ALC - An Loc (Han Quan
ANK - An Khe
BLC - Bau Loc
BLU - Bac Lieu
BMT - Ban Me Thuot
BNH - Bien Hoa
CHL - Chu Lai
CRB - Cam Ranh Bay
CRO - Cheo Reo
CTO - Can Tho
DAN - Dian
DBT - Dong Ba Thin
DCH - Duc Hoa
DMY - Duc My
DLT - Dalat
DNG - Da Nang
GIA - Gia Nghai
GMT - Green Mountain
HUE - Hue
KTM - Kontum
LBM - Lang Bian Mounta
MYT - My Tho
NHA - Nha Trang
PHB - Phu Bai
PHIL - Philippine Islan
PKU - Pleiku
PLC - Phu Loi
PNT - Phan Thiet
PRG - Phan Rang
PVN - Phuoc Vinh
QLG - Quang Long
QNG - Quang Ngai
QNH - Qui Nhon
SCT - Soc Trang
SDC - Dadec
SGN - Saigon
TKY - Tam Ky
TLH - Tanh Linh
TYH - Tuy Hoa
UBON - Ubon
VNL - Vinh Long
VTU - Vung Tau
XNL - Xuan Loc

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Figure C-1

TALK QUICK SYSTEM 118



Figure C-2

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The Mission Council

(U) The US Mission Council in RVN was formed in July 1964. It was composed of six principal representatives: Chief of Mission (the Ambassador), Deputy Ambassador, the senior members of USMACV, USAID, JUSPAO (prior to the formation of JUSPAO in 1965, USIS was the representative on the Mission Council) and [redacted] and three special representatives (senior liaison officer, and the political and economic counselors). In addition, the Executive Secretary, US Embassy, served as the mission coordinator.

(U) As a general practice, the Mission Council met weekly at the Embassy to discuss subjects having over-all mission implications. Normally each council representative presented a brief review of significant activities and problems of his agency of the previous week and outlined a forecast of activities planned or scheduled for the future in a weekly summary. In addition, items tasked by the Ambassador to mission agencies were discussed.[1]

(U) At the end of 1965 there were only three members of the Mission Council who had been on the Council on 31 December 1964: Gen Westmoreland, Mr. Zorthian, and Mr. Wehrle. [redacted] and Ambassador M. D. Taylor, Deputy Ambassador V. A. Johnson, USAID Director Mr. Killen, Mission Coordinator J. Herfurt, and Political Counselor M. Manfill left during the summer of 1965. For the remainder of 1965, the Mission Council representatives were:

Chief of Mission	Ambassador H. C. Lodge
Embassy	Deputy Ambassador W. J. Porter
USMACV	General W. C. Westmoreland
USAID	Mr. C. A. Mann
JUSPAO	Mr. B. Zorthian
Mission Coordinator	Mr. P. H. Chadbourn
Special Representatives	Political Counselor - Mr. P. Habib Senior Laision Officer - Maj Gen (Ret'd) E. Lansdale Economic Counselor - Mr. R. Wehrle

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

Provincial Team Chief

(S) In late April 1965, the Ambassador requested that a plan be developed to introduce into three provinces carefully selected US teams designed as an experiment to provide coordinated civil and military initiative and advice. In each of the provinces, the US effort would be under one team chief.[9] It was decided that the three provinces would be Darlac, Dinh Tuong and Binh Thuan. A Foreign Service Officer (FSO) from the US Embassy would serve as team chief in Darlac; the USMACV Sector Advisor would be team chief in Dinh Tuong; the USAID representative would be team chief in Binh Thuan. The team chief would control and make full use of all US resources within the province but would not enter into the technical affairs that had been directly and jointly controlled by the province chief and his US counterparts.[10]

(S) In September, an evaluation of the "team chief" experiment was prepared, based upon three months of operation and was discussed at the Mission Council meetings.[11]

(C) USMACV's review of the evaluations submitted by the team chiefs and their principal team members indicated that the test was only partially successful. Where success was attained it came as a result of keen spirit of cooperation on the part of all team members. The test failed in Darlac because of political factors and the generally poor security in that province. The FSO, assigned as the team chief, was held suspect by local authorities because, unlike the USMACV and USAID representatives, he appeared to have no function other than being team chief. A major difficulty involved the question of whether the military or civilian representative should have dominant control. While this may have resulted from a personality clash, it nevertheless revealed problems which could have seriously hampered efforts at the province level.[12]

(C) Overall, COMUSMACV felt that the test did result in closer working relationships among representatives of US agencies operating at the province level. There were no positive





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indications that the tests had any material influence on the pacification or military situation in the provinces concerned except perhaps in Binh Thuan. There, the team members felt that their coordinated efforts resulted in the province chief adopting a more aggressive attitude toward the VC. The tests also continued to show the importance of security, its effects on the country team efforts, and the predominant role of the military at this stage.[13]

(C) In view of the inconclusive results of this test, COMUSMACV concluded that the team chief concept should not be implemented at that time particularly in view of the military situation. He felt the concept was incompatible with the security situation, the in-country deployment of large US forces and the influence on the military advisory effort of the senior US tactical commanders.[14]

(C) Although the experiment was officially terminated, the team chiefs of Binh Thuan and Dinh Tuong were retained and were redesignated as team coordinators.[15] At year's end there was evidence of renewed interest in this project by the Mission Council but it appeared that the specific terms of reference for the team chief coordinator project would differ from that of the past.[16]

Inter-US Agency Orientation Program

(U) In July 1965, COMUSMACV informed the Ambassador that key military personnel (O-6 and above) arriving in SVN did not receive adequate orientation briefings on the missions of the US civilian agencies in RVN. Accordingly, he suggested that an Inter-US Agency Orientation Program for both civilian and military personnel be established. He believed that there would be big dividends in added understanding of the roles of the different agencies.[17] On 12 July the Mission Council approved the orientation program submitted by COMUSMACV. The first orientation program was conducted on 13-14 October.[18]

Role of USAID and JUSPAO

(S) In August 1965, with various command elements within USMACV being reorganized, there was no accompanying clarification of the USAID and JUSPAO role vis-a-vis COMUSMACV advisory and tactical roles. The Ambassador desired that a working group be established, consisting of USMACV and USAID/JUSPAO representatives, to make recommendations with respect to the effect of the reorganization of USMACV on the role of provincial advisors.[19]

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(S) By the end of August, the Mission Council received and reviewed the committee's report, and approved the following recommendations:[20]

1) That no changes be made in the inter-agency working arrangements at province level. The USAID and JUSPAO province representatives would support forces within their provinces as directed by their respective division or regional supervisors.

2) That the USAID and JUSPAO field representatives at all levels would assist, advise and support US tactical units as appropriate and as directed by their respective division or regional supervisors.

3) That USAID and JUSPAO would assign field representatives to each US division deployed in-country.

4) That at corps/regional level, the USAID/JUSPAO regional supervisors, in addition to other responsibilities, would work as civilian advisors to the senior US tactical commander and participate with him in coordinated planning of future military deployments and operations.

5) That the US Consul at Hue - Da Nang, would, in addition to his other duties, act as a political advisor to CG, III MAF.

6) [redacted] 1.3(a)(4)

Mission Policy on RVN Draft

(U) In mid-1965, the Mission Council requested COMUSMACV's comments on a revision of the US Mission policy on RVN draft deferments. This policy had been established in August 1964 and restated in Embassy Administrative Instruction #181, 16 April 1965. The policy was transmitted to the then Prime Minister Khanh in a letter from the US Ambassador. The revised draft deferment recommendations were initiated by the civilian agencies, because during the year the US civilian effort had been hampered by an inability to recruit and retain sufficient VN nationals who possessed talents required by components of the US Mission. The contention was that almost all local employees eligible for the draft possessed experience or skills which could not be replaced through local recruitment.

Interpreters, field representatives, accountants, etc., were extremely difficult to find.[21]

(S) COMUSMACV took exception to the recommendation, stating that it asked for preferential treatment for a small segment of the work-force of the nation. The 1964 policy concerning draft deferments was intended to encourage the GVN to pursue forcefully its mobilization program. It appeared that the new proposal expressed a parochial viewpoint in stipulating that VN working for US agencies could better serve their country by continuing in their present positions.[22]

(S) COMUSMACV stated that two actions were in progress that should help to relieve many of the uncertainties regarding the status of those personnel eligible for induction.[23]

1) The USMACV J2 was preparing a request that US agencies review the essential nature of their draft-eligible personnel and submit requests for deferment by the end of November. The Ministry of Defense would review these requests beginning 1 December. USMACV directives provided that only those personnel absolutely necessary to operations would be considered.

2) A study was being prepared by the Mobilization Directorate, Ministry of Defense, to consider long-term deferment of cadre employed by US agencies.

(S) COMUSMACV concluded that the US must continue to provide unqualified support of the GVN mobilization effort. Thus, in view of the existing manpower situation within RVN, he believed that the GVN would have cause for questioning US integrity if a proposal which specifically asked for preferential consideration of Vietnamese employees of US agencies were received.[24] The 1964/65 policy of the US Mission was to voluntarily abide by the GVN Military Service Regulation.

Footnotes

1. Draft Memo, MACV, Dec 65, Subj: Mission Council (U). [redacted]
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

9. Memo, J3, 28 Apr 64, Subj: Mission Council Action, (S).
10. Ltr, MACV, 11 Jun 65, Subj: Team Chief Experiment, (U).
11. Memo 7, 7 Sep 65, Subj: Mission Council Action, (S).
12. Talking Paper, COMUSMACV, Sep 65, Subj: Mission Council Meeting Files, (C).
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
15. Msg, COMUSMACV 111513Z, Dec 65, (C).
16. Interview, Maj King, J33, with Capt Collier, Mil Hist Br, 3 Feb 66, (C).
17. Memo, COMUSMACV, no date, (Jul 65) (U).
18. Memo 115, 15 Jul 65, Subj: Mission Council Action, (S).
19. Memo 121, 2 Aug 65, Subj: Mission Council Action, (S).
20. Memo 125, 17 Aug 65, Subj: Mission Council Action (S).
21. Topic of Discussion for the Mission Council Meeting, undated, Subj: US Mission Policy, (C).
22. Talking Paper, COMUSMACV, undated, (Sep), (C).
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid.

ANNEX E-PORT STATUS[1,2,3]
(December 1965)

Da Nang

(S) Facilities available.

1) Museum landing: One LST and Landing Craft Utility (LCU) ramp. No storage facility as landing site was in the middle of a main thoroughfare.

2) Commercial pier: One LST landing that shared the end of the commercial pier for an offloading area and 200 feet of frontage.

3) Tien Sha landing: Two LST and two LCU landings that were shared with ARVN.

4) Seabee materials ramp: A very shallow landing area.

5) LARC's: Several of these USA amphibious vehicles were on loan to the USN and were used to move USAF ammunition from offshore vessels directly to Da Nang airfield.

(S) Factors limiting timely discharge of vessels:

1) Inadequate port facilities.

a) No deep draft piers.

b) Insufficient stevedoring personnel and cargo handling gear.

c) Insufficient open and covered transit, staging and storage areas because of inability to acquire real estate.

d) Insufficient shallow draft lighterage facilities.

e) Insufficient port clearance capability.

f) Non-availability of harbor control communications.

2) Chu Lai backloading requirement superimposed on Da Nang.

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(S) Facilities construction required.

1) Bridge cargo facility: Build two LST ramps, two LCU ramps, an LST pier, and 1,600 ft of wharf for lighterage.

2) Expand the museum ramp to add facilities for an additional LST.

3) Add a sheet pile bulkhead to construction materials wharf.

4) Build two deep draft piers at Observation Point in conjunction with a sheet pile bulkhead and transit area.

5) Increase capacity of cross harbor bridge to 50 tons.

(S) Port capacity approximately 1,800 S/T per day. Estimated capacity at end of 1966 in excess of 4,000 S/T per day.

Qui Nhon

(S) Facilities available: Two LST ramps were located on the Qui Nhon peninsula and a floating causeway/finger pier northwest of the ramps. Primary unloading facilities: the beaches themselves.

(S) Factors limiting timely discharge of vessels:

1) Bad weather (monsoons).

2) Insufficient all-weather LST facilities.

3) No alongside lighterage facility.

4) No anchorage for floating crane.

5) No in-transit open and covered storage facilities.

6) No alongside berthing for refrigerated cargo barges.

7) Lack of dependable civilian stevedore work force.

(S) Facilities construction required.

1) Long wharf of sheet pile face from the end of

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the breakwater to the peninsula to handle coastal vessels, LST's, and lighters up to a 20-ft draft.

2) Study underway as to feasibility of three deep-draft piers and four buoy berths.

3) Possible installation of a 60 x 600 foot De Long pier.

(S) Port capacity was 2,294 S/T per day. Estimated capacity at the end of 1966: 4,000 S/T per day.

Nha Trang

(S) Facilities available: Over the beach operation only. Support via rail and road from Cam Ranh Bay available.

(S) Factors limiting timely discharge of vessels:

1) Insufficient lighterage and cargo handling personnel.

2) No deep draft pier facilities.

(S) Facilities construction required: One De Long pier was tentatively scheduled; sheet pile wharfs to provide all-weather lighterage capability.

(S) Port capacity was 1,039 S/T per day. Total planned capacity at the end of 1966: 2,752 S/T per day.

Cam Ranh Bay

(S) Facilities available.

1) Old deep-draft pier.

2) New De Long pier.

3) Two permanent and two temporary LST ramps.

(S) Factors limiting timely discharge of vessels:

1) Old deep-draft pier was too narrow for rapid discharge of even one ship.

2) No ammunition pier.

3) Insufficient LST sites.

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4) Insufficient number of lighters.

5) No lighterage berths.

6) Limited stevedoring and beach clearance capability.

7) Heavy outloading workload compounded by congestion. of inadequate port facilities.

(S) Facilities construction required.

1) Additional De Long pier.

2) Widen and lengthen concrete wharf.

3) Construct additional LST wharfs and ammunition piers.

4) Construct additional sheet steel pile wharfs.

(S) Current port capacity was 2,995 S/T per day. Estimated capacity at the end of 1966: 6,000 S/T per day.

Vung Tau

(S) Facilities available: LST ramps.

(S) Facilities construction required: Two LST ramps and one T-pier. A De Long pier was tentatively programmed. Vung Tau was not designed to be a major port but rather to take part of load off Saigon; serve as transshipment port to the Delta region; to be used as unloading point for Bien Hoa, reducing congestion at Saigon.

(S) Factors limiting timely discharge of vessels: None.

(S) Current capacity was approximately 300 M/T per day. Estimated capacity at the end of 1966: in excess of 2,000 M/T per day.

Saigon

(S) Facilities available.

1) Ten berths alongside.

2) Seven large berths at mooring buoys.

3) Four small berths at mooring buoys.

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4) Two LST berths.

5) Three T-piers for coasters.

6) Six to ten miles of canals to warehouses alongside.

(S) Factors limiting timely discharge of cargo:

1) Insufficient deep draft pier berths.

2) Insufficient barges to accomplish discharge in Saigon River.

3) Insufficient open and covered transit storage.

4) Insufficient and improperly located LST discharge and loading facilities.

5) Obsolete lighters incapable of handling palletized cargo, preventing effective utilization of MHE.

6) Inadequate facilities for offloading lighterage.

7) Port not operated by military personnel (under GVN control); two or three berths normally assigned military operations; three to four berths assigned to USAID cargo; remaining berths assigned to civilian commercial vessels.

(S) Facilities construction required:

1) One LST slip at the Messageries et Maritimes facility.

2) A concrete and floating quay in the fishmarket area.

3) A lighter and landing craft facility in the Newport area with mooring buoys on the opposite shore.

(S) Port capability: was approximately 13,000 S/T per day, less ammunition, POL, and construction materials. Estimated capacity at the end of 1966: 24,000 S/T per day.

All Ports

(S) The following general problem areas prevailed at all ports:

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1) Improper containerization; lack of unitization; broken stowage of loose and domestic pack cargos.

2) Non-availability of short-mast forklifts for shipboard operations essential for expeditious handling of unitized cargo.

3) Slippage of deliveries of MHE and spare parts to support and maintain required equipment availability rate.

4) Vessel outloading by CONUS ports for multiple port discharge frequently limits discharge to only one hatch.

5) Failure of CONUS terminals to segregate block-stow. cargo by consignee.

6) Receipt of non-sustaining vessels without notice.

7) Vessels loaded full and down without regard to POD capability to expeditiously offload between deck and wing-stowed items with ship's gear.

8) Project shipments to improper POD causing delays by requiring multiport diversions and discharge in-country after arrival of vessels.

9) No programmed tonnage forecast by POD and commodity, to enable accurate operational planning.

10) Vessels arrived RVN waters with depleted bunkers often necessitating ship removal for replenishment during discharge of critical cargo.

Footnotes

1. Msg, COMUSMACV 091350Z, Nov 65, (S).
2. Mon Hist Sum, MACJ4, 15 Jan 66, (S).
3. Ltr, MACJOO, 9 Dec 65, Subj: MACV Phase IIA Force Requirements (TS).

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ANNEX F- BASE DEVELOPMENT[1,2,3]

Da Nang

(S) Da Nang had a 10,000-foot permanent runway with a second, parallel, runway under construction. The new runway was between 20 - 30 percent complete. Construction would enable the relocation of the 1st MAW and ease aircraft congestion. A small airfield for use of USA and USMC light aircraft had been completed east of the Da Nang River in the vicinity of Marble Mountain. A 100-bed hospital had been completed near the Marble Mountain airfield. The port of Da Nang was scheduled to undergo renovation to include two 600-foot piers, eight LST ramps, and additional landing facilities for lighters. Construction cantonments, warehouses, fuel storage tanks and ammunition facilities were either underway or planned.

Chu Lai

(S) Chu Lai was the site of the first expeditionary airfield to be constructed using AM-2. The 8,000-foot runway was completed in July 1965 although the first aircraft actually landed on 27 May, using a USMC developed special arresting gear.[4] A second runway parallel to the expeditionary strip was being constructed and would be 10,000 feet long and of permanent construction. Depot facilities and cantonment areas were also under construction or planned.

An Khe

(S) An Khe was the base complex for the 1st Cav Div (AM). Initial work, before the arrival of the division main party on 12 September, consisted of preparing a 3,000-foot by 4,000-foot heliport for the 432 assigned helicopters. The heliport was known as the "Golf Course," so named because when the ADC, Brig Gen John M Wright, pointed out the heliport area to the members of the advance party, he declared that he wanted it cleared and made level enough to play golf on. He and the members of the advance party, officers and men, commenced the clearing of the land by hand until sufficient indigenous labor could be obtained. End-of-year construction effort centered on the building of "strong back tents" for troop housing to replace "pup" tents. Over 50 percent of the division was living in squad tents. A small airstrip was being enlarged to accept up to C-130 aircraft. This complex included a parallel taxiway, control tower and administrative buildings. Other

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projects included construction of two supply depot areas, a quartermaster field bakery, a 140-bed hospital, power, water and communications facilities.

Qui Nhon

(S) The Qui Nhon support area was the primary logistical complex for the northern part of the USA's area of responsibility and as such was the site of a major construction project. Over 40,000 US troops were supported from this facility. Construction was currently in progress for all portions of the complex.

1) POL facility: compacted bases had been completed for five 10,000 bbl tanks. A three-acre drum storage facility had been completed and was in use. An interim under water tanker-discharge pipeline had been installed.

2) Ammunition storage facility: temporary storage pads and berms were complete. A 10,000-ton capacity permanent ammunition dump was under construction.

3) Hospital: a mobile USA surgical hospital was under construction. Some air-conditioned quonset huts had been completed. The facility would eventually be built to Standard Six and was designed for 400 beds.

4) Cantonments: facilities for over 12,000 men were underway or planned. Actual construction had started on a 1,900-man cantonment in the main depot area.

5) Port facilities: the beach had been stabilized and a USN floating pier is in use. A 2,100-foot sheet pile wharf was planned.

6) Aviation facilities: a new parking apron had already been completed. Two additional parking aprons, a hangar and a cantonment area were in progress. Future planned construction consisted of a taxiway and of repaving part of the main runway.

Tuy Hoa

(S) In late 1965 COMUSMACV had approved construction of a jet-capable expeditionary airfield at Tuy Hoa. The project would also include harbor improvements. Work was scheduled to begin on or about 1 February, 1966.[5]

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Nha Trang

(S) Nha Trang was also being developed as a major logistical support area and, in addition, was the hqs location for FFORCEV.

1) Construction of the FFORCEV HQ started in late August with work continuing through the end of the year.

2) Depot facilities: the land area for the planned depot had been stabilized. Construction of the complex itself was scheduled to get underway upon completion of a design study in progress at year's end. The depot would include shop space, warehouses, refrigerated storage and open storage facilities. A 10,000-ton ammunition storage area would be complete by 15 January, 1966.

3) Design work on expanding the 8th Field Hospital from 200 to 400 beds was over 70 percent complete and construction had started.

4) Airfield facility: work was being undertaken to fulfill both USA and USAF requirements. An aircraft apron, started in early spring, had been completed. Cantonment, maintenance, and operations facilities were over 85 percent complete and the majority were occupied by 31 December. Repaving of the runway and additional cantonments and operations facilities were either in the design phase or under construction.

5) POL storage: A storage facility for 100,000 bbls was scheduled to be finished by 15 January, 1966. This tank farm would be serviced by offshore tankers. A 10,000-bbl POL storage facility was planned for the airfield proper.

Cam Ranh Bay[6,7,8]

(S) Cam Ranh Bay was selected by COMUSMACV to be a major logistical base and would eventually rival Saigon in throughput capability. When the decision was made in May 1965 to build a major facility at this undeveloped natural harbor, the only items there were a small pier and a minor POL installation. Cam Ranh was the largest complex then under construction in SVN and the estimated total cost was approximately $64,000,000.

1) Airbase complex: Construction began on 1 August to provide an expeditionary airfield. The strip was completed on 16 October and the first strike mission flown on 2 November.

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Interim cantonment and maintenance facilities were in operation. Construction of the second runway, a permanent strip, had started and would be completed in 1966. Permanent support facilities would be constructed and eventually the AM-2 expeditionary strip would be converted to permanent operations through resurfacing.

2) Port complex: the port area consisted of two facilities: a harbor area for deep draft vessels and a LST ramp area for transshipment of supplies within SVN. A Delong pier that could be used to work two ships simultaneously arrived on 30 October and was placed in operation late in December. A U-shaped permanent pier would be constructed for additional deep draft capability. A feasibility study was underway to determine the best location for separate ammunition berths. Land-fill area would provide open transient storage. Guidance received from COMUSMACV had established an eventual 4,000 tons per day discharge capability, exclusive of POL. Transshipment capability was planned at 3,500 tons per day with five LST's working simultaneously.

3) POL facilities: a temporary pipeline for JP-4 had been constructed from the harbor area to the airfield. Bulk storage facilities would eventually have the capability of storing 1,250,000 bbls. Surveys were being undertaken before the initiation of construction.

4) Depot facilities: planned storage areas consisted of warehouses, refrigerated, open, and shed storage facilities. Eight warehouses had been completed and material supplied by USAID for 18 others was on hand. Over 3,000,000 cubic yards of sand had been moved to develop the site.

5) Cantonment areas for 15,000 troops had been planned with initial work being done to reach a Standard Four status.

6) Ammunition storage: temporary ammunition storage areas had been completed and were in use. The eventual facility would consist of approximately 7.5 square miles of permanent construction.

7) Additional facilities then in the planning stage consisted of a joint USN/VNN complex to include a marine railway, repair shops, a pier and other support facilities.

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Phan Rang

(S) In October 1965, construction on an AM-2 expeditionary airfield was started. A second, permanent, 10,000-foot runway was planned with additional support facilities.

Saigon

(S) Saigon remained the major logistical area for support of US and other FWMAF in SVN. Several major projects were in process or had been planned:

1) A supply complex in the fishmarket area, consisting of open and covered storaged areas, was over 40 percent complete.

2) Design work for a logistics area, also in the fishmarket section, was over 30 percent complete.

3) A new quay for the fishmarket area was being designed, and was scheduled to be completed during 1966. Upon completion, a second quay was to be planned.

4) Project Newport would consist of LST ramps, lighterage facilities, three or four deep draft berths, storage and operational facilities. Some field survey work had been accomplished on the west side of the Saigon River. Design work was pending.

5) A new POL facility to include pipelines and a 50,000-bbl storage complex would be built near the RVN POL tank farm on the Saigon River.

6) A new USMACV HQ would be built at Camp Petrus Ky during 1966. Construction started on 5 December. A new headquarters for USARV was also planned.

Vung Tau

(S) Vung Tau would be developed as a logistical support area for the southern part of SVN.

1) Thon currently under construction was a complex consisting of maintenance shops, a warehouse, administrative facilities and airfield improvements. This project was over 20 percent complete and was expected to be finished by February 1966..

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2) A depot facility for shops, refrigerated storage, open and shed storage was in the design phase.

3) An open ammunition storage area for 13,000 tons of ammunition was under construction. The completed portion provided storage for in excess of 7,000 tons.

4) A port facility consisting of three LST ramps, two amphibious vehicle ramps, a shallow draft pier and a storage area was planned. Construction had started on the storage area. Projected completion date was estimated as the spring of 1966.

5) Design of a 50,000-bbl storage area with a sea terminal line was in progress. Estimated completion date was April 1966. Helicopter facilities were also to be consturcted and a deep water pier study was being made.

Bien Hoa

(S) Bien Hoa was one of the three large jet-capable airfields in SVN and was undergoing a considerable facelifting to improve its capacity.

1) Construction of additional parking aprons had just begun. These would provide parking for 80 tactical fighters. Additional hardstands, taxiways and overruns were 15 percent complete. Construction of three USA helicopter pads was 50 percent complete. Eight new prefabricated maintenance shelters had been finished.

2) Planning for the future included a 10,000-foot parallel runway, ammunition storage and maintenance facilities, maintenance shops and cantonments. Significant MAP construction was also underway and planned.

Footnotes

1. DF, Ch MACJ4 Engr Div, Nov 1965, Subj: Background Briefing for the Press, (C).
2. Talking paper, MACOI, 21 Dec 65, Subj: End of Year Press Conference, (S).
3. Ltr, MACJOO, 9 Dec 65, Subj: MACV Phase IIA Force Requirements, (TS).
4. Msg, CINCPAC, 162210Z, May 65, (TS).
5. Msg, COMUSMACV, 151810Z Dec 65, (S).
6. Memo, MACJ4, 15 May 65, Subj: Support Areas Feasibility Briefing, (TS).
7. Fact Sheet, MACJ4, 26 May 65, Subj: Concept of Cam Ranh Bay, (S).
8. Msg, COMUSMACV, 14 Jun 65, Subj: MILREP, (S).

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794. THE TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW. Order and Army by [illegible] DOD

ANNEX G - J5 STUDIES

(U) In addition to contingency planning, the ACofS J5, USMACV, was also tasked with the preparation of numerous studies during 1965. The highlights of some of the more important studies are treated in this annex.

RVNAF Ability to Cope with NVN/CHICOM Threat

(S) In early January 1965, a study of the status of RVNAF and the tasks attendant upon US/VNAF air strikes against NVN was completed. The study envisioned a three-phase operation involving preparatory deployments, the conduct of massive air strikes against military and industrial targets in NVN and, if required, the introduction of additional US ground forces to assist in the defense of RVN. The conclusions of the study, which were approved by COMUSMACV on 9 January, were that RVNAF, by itself, would be incapable of successfully opposing a large-scale NVN or NVN/CHICOM ground attack and any relocation of RVNAF units for defense against overt aggression would detract from the pacification effort. No decision to redeploy ARVN units was made as a result of the study, and the study was retained for possible use in the future.[1]

Disruption of Major VC Bases

(S) COMUSMACV also approved a study on the feasibility of conducting disruptive pressures of major VC base areas. The concept developed included operations against Do Xa base, War Zones C and D, Plain of Reeds, U Minh Forest and Seven Mountains. COMUSMACV directed that RVNAF be urged to mount ground and air operations against Zone C and based on the results, conduct operations against Zone D. He also directed the study of the use of Eagle Flights to maintain pressure against the Plain of Reeds and the possible methods of destroying food supplies in the U Minh Forest. The operation would culminate in small-scale attacks on enemy installations and units in the base areas, the destruction of facilities and food supplies and the employment of all available weapons, to include CN and CS riot control agents.[2]

Enclaves

(TS) In early March, the feasibility of establishing enclaves within RVN was studied. US troops would provide security for important base areas which would thus release RVNAF troops for employment elsewhere. The study concluded that:

1) Replacement of ARVN troops at the 14 locations studied would require 21 battalion equivalents of US forces. This

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would release 13,438 ARVN personnel for employment elsewhere.

2). If the 14 areas were established as enclaves, artillery support should be provided and a battalion-size reaction force should be located at three of the enclaves. This would require an increase of US forces to an estimated 25-26 battalion equivalents.

3). The establishment of enclaves should be accomplished on a phased basis; additional enclaves should be developed only after successful experience with this initial trial.

4). Areas selected for initial development should be those which had the best potential for maintaining the US presence in RVN against the VC efforts to drive the US out. This made the selection of areas along the coast, with port and airfield facilities, highly desirable, if not necessary.

(S). The study recommended that action be taken to develop one secure enclave in RVN with subsequent enclaves to be established based on the following order of precedence; Da Nang, Vung Tau, Nha Trang, Qui Nhon, Bien Hoa, Hue, Can Tho, Cam Ranh-Phan Rang, Quang Ngai, Tuy Hoa, Phan Thiet, Soc Trang, Vinh Long and Rach Gia.[3]

HQ USSEASIA

(TS) In conjunction with other actions to ready the facilities at Korat, Thailand, for use of COMUSSEASIA HQ in the event of implementation of contingency plans, a study was made concerning the establishment of a COMUSSEASIA staff in Saigon. The staff would be ready for immediate deployment to Korat and, additionally, would handle the planning and operational functions which dealt with military matters outside of RVN for which COMUSMACV was assigned responsibility.

(TS) As a result of the study, COMUSMACV recommended to CINCPAC that appropriate USMACV staff agencies be compartmentalized to provide a branch/section which would be concerned only with SEASIA matters, requiring an augmentation of 83 personnel. CINCPAC did not concur but did recommend to the JCS that they examine the proposed increases recommended for possible implementation in the future.[4]

PACOM Ground Forces Reserve

(TS) Directed by COMUSMACV, a study was prepared concerning the rapid-reaction ground force theater reserve of

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PACOM. The major conclusions reached in the study were:

1) Under the NVN/CHICOM threat to SEASIA, there was a need for a PACOM ground reserve of USA infantry and airborne and USMC units to provide the operational flexibility required by COMUSMACV.

2) The then-current PACOM reserve of the 25th Inf Div and the III MAF (-) provided the additional forces to conduct sustained ground and amphibious operations. The lack of uncommitted airborne units was serious, however.

3) The two airborne brigades in or enroute to RVN (173d Abn Bde and 1st Bde of the 101st Abn Div) would be fully committed. Withdrawal of either of these units to reconstitute a PACOM reserve should not be considered.

(TS) The study recommended that the JCS, through CINCPAC, be requested to deploy a USA airborne brigade (minimum of three infantry battalions) from CONUS to Okinawa as soon as possible. The study was approved and taken by COMUSMACV to the 3-5 August Honolulu conference.5

Operations in Thailand and Laos

(TS) During December, US/Thai bilateral planning for operations in Thailand and Laos neared completion. Portions of the plan were forwarded for review by the JCS, RTG, CINCPAC, and CINCPAC component commanders. The plan envisaged operations in Thailand and Laos, with or without the consent of the RLG.

Footnotes

1. Mon Hist Sum, MACJ5, Jan 65, (TS).
2. Ibid.
3. Mon Hist Sum, MACJ5, Mar 65, (TS).
4. Mon Hist Sum, MACJ5, Apr 65, (TS).
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ANNEX H - PHYSICAL SECURITY OF US PERSONNEL AND INSTALLATIONS

(U) The VC attacks at the Bien Hoa air base (November 1965); at Pleiku (7 February 1965); the terrorist bombings of the Brink BOQ (24 December 1964) and the BEQ at Qui Nhon (10 February 1965), generated a storm of public protest in the US against the inadequate security apparently being given US forces by the VN. In one letter to the President, the Ranger Battalion Association of the US claimed that more positive measures could be taken to protect Americans. The letter concluded that if ARVN could not provide Americans with proper security, then US infantry units should be assigned.[1]

(U) DEPCOMUSMACV stated:

> We in the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, are operating under the policy that defense of these key installations is a Vietnamese responsibility. Of course, we are providing a certain amount of internal security of our own, but defense of the outer perimeter is definitely the job of the Vietnamese. We are providing advisors to assist them in carrying out that responsibility, and will help them in every way we can to provide the maximum feasible security at every American installation.[2]

Certain calculated risks had to be taken, COMUSMACV felt, otherwise the US would have troops tied down to static security tasks and they would be unable to move against the VC.

(U) USMACV representatives, on 22 January 1965, briefed the US Ambassador on the subject of security for US personnel and facilities. Civilian agencies were also represented. The Ambassador was informed that the civilian agencies intended to hire more civilian guards, to which he agreed, and stipulated that it should be done as soon as possible. He was further informed of the utilization of the limited military personnel resources for security, and a recommendation was made that a tailored MP battalion be assigned to SVN. Both COMUSMACV and the Ambassador agreed on the recommendation.[3]

(U) Since USMACV consisted primarily of advisory personnel, it was vital to the posture of adequate physical security to bring US troops to SVN. The US MP's that were in-country were insufficient in numbers to give any permanent security or even to satisfy the requirements on a temporary basis. Reliance had to be placed upon SVN for the security of US personnel and facilities.[4]

(C) In Saigon, the NP, under the sponsorship of USAID, took the position that physical security of fixed installations was poor utilization of the NP, in that they did not have sufficient personnel.[5]

(U) In the field, US installations were guarded by ARVN troops. Here, too, there was differing of opinion on just how many guards were needed for any specific facility.[6]

(TS) In January 1965, CINCPAC believed that the situation had deteriorated in SVN to the extent that the question of evacuation of US Government sponsored dependents could no longer be treated primarily from the political view, but must be decided on the basis of actual and growing danger to US lives. CINCPAC believed, therefore, that there should be an orderly withdrawal commencing as soon as possible, but recognized that it might be necessary to shift to emergency evacuation measures at anytime.[7]

(TS) COMUSMACV did not agree with CINCPAC, and strongly recommended against the proposed action because of the profound, perhaps disastrous, impact that it might have in SVN. COMUSMACV felt that the conditions did not exacerbate, but for the moment, in fact, reduced the danger for Americans.[8]

(C) On 8 February, the President directed the orderly withdrawal of US government sponsored dependents from SVN. A joint US Embassy-USMACV planning conference convened to process and control the evacuation, and a decision was made to base the evacuation on a modified version of an evacuation plan (USMACV OPLAN 60-64). The evacuation began on 9 February, using commercial aircraft as the primary mode of transportation, and by 19 February, with minor exceptions, was completed. Approximately 1,710 dependents were evacuated to the CONUS and locations in SEASIA.[9]

(S) DOD approved COMUSMACV's previous recommendation for an MP battalion to be assigned to SVN as a security force, and by 19 March, the first element of the 716th MP Bn arrived in Saigon.[10]

(S) In spite of the rapid buildup of security forces for both close internal security and protection of large US installations, on 30 March, VC terrorists exploded a bomb, placed in a car in front of the US Embassy in Saigon.[11] On 16 June, a terrorist explosion occurred in the civilian air terminal at TSN. This highlighted the need to clear up the security problem at TSN airport. Two Claymore mines exploded on 25 June at the My Canh restaurant causing casualties to both VN and US personnel.[12] On 4 December, a panel truck carrying explosives was set off at the Metropole BEQ in Saigon, killing eight persons and injuring 137. Again a terrorist action generated US reaction in additional studies on effective countermeasures. Additional physical security barriers were provided;

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there was more intensive screening of VN civilian buildings adjacent to US occupied buildings; a new reward program for information on VC terrorist activities was initiated by the US Embassy, working with the NP; and an additional US MP company was assigned to the Saigon/Cholon area. Motorized patrols were increased 40 percent, and 15 percent additional static posts were manned. For the critical period of the VC December campaign, curfew was tightened.[13]

(S) The VC made numerous attempts to neutralize US/FWMAF airpower by a series of night attacks on airfields. Mortar fire was directed on Da Nang, Nha Trang, Cheo Reo, Boc Tranh, Boc Xieu, and Can Tho airfields in late June and early July. In the Da Nang attack the VC, supported by 81-mm mortar fire, penetrated the base defenses and destroyed four aircraft with satchel charges and 57-mm RR fire.[14]

(S) COMUSMACV improved security and control of weapons. A Presidential inquiry regarding this policy stemmed from a complaint by a soldier in SVN that he was not permitted to have a weapon or ammunition except in the case of an actual attack. COMUSMACV explained that control of weapons was a command responsibility. Command action was predicated upon the situation, troop location, mission and duty status of the individual soldier. The weapons and ammunition control of these personnel changed as the security situation changed, to insure timely responses.[15]

(U) With a view to highlighting need for improving security, COMUSMACV dispatched a message bringing this problem to the attention of all US military personnel. In essence, it charged such personnel to perform guard duty, watch, and security functions, with the highest standards of alertness and vigilance. Laxity during guard duty the message said, endangered US lives and property. It pointed out that misbehavior of a sentinel, by sleeping or leaving his post, was punishable by a general court martial.[16]

(U) As it was, US military personnel were so few in some areas that they worked as advisors or on other primary jobs during the day and stood guard duty at night. In Saigon, the US MP's were pulling eight hour shifts on static posts because of the shortage of personnel.[17]

Port Security

(S) Shipping and port security in SVN was a continually difficult task. With congested ports and long waterways, the security of ship traffic posed problems.

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(S) At a US Mission Council meeting in May, it was noted that there was a dispersion of authority for security around the Saigon harbor. The Ambassador convened an ad hoc committee, composed of USMACV/USAID representatives, to study this problem.[18]

(S) By 10 July the report of the security program was completed. It restricted itself to listing necessary improvements in the internal physical barriers, stressing the construction of additional physical barriers, and establishing more stringent personnel control procedures. The Embassy offered to assist in the project by obtaining the required funds of $200,000.[19]

(S) With respect to the Saigon port, the Ambassador suggested to the Prime Minister that as a decision had been made on both sides, the responsibility for security should be given to the commander of the CMR and this decision should be put into effect immediately.[20]

(S) Late in December COMUSMACV was disturbed by a report that the VC were training frogmen. He directed the NAVGP to develop an overall port security plan and the USARV to take interim port security measures at ports under USA control.[21] Increased security measures were put into effect to the maximum possible extent.

(S) MP escorts were traveling on MSTS-controlled ships transiting the Saigon River between Vung Tau and Saigon; air cover was being flown, and ARVN forces alerted when designated critical ships were in the waterways.[22] In Da Nang and Hue, CG III MAF was charged with security of US shipping. Comprehensive security measures were taken to include USCG patrols at night, 7th Flt destroyer patrols at harbor entrances, picket boats in the harbor, and guards on key vessels.[23]

(U) The VC had all the advantages of surprise in their terrorist attacks. The best that US forces could hope for was that the commitment of additional personnel in 1965, and the comprehensive physical security measures taken to improve the defense of US areas, would make the VC realize the risk in attacking or terrorizing would be too high. Certainly the security measures were returning some value, for at Qui Nhon, Pleiku, the Embassy, and the Metropole bombings in Saigon, some VC terrorists were killed and captured. The buildup of MP strength to group level was adding to the cost of killing Americans at the end of 1965.

Footnotes.

1. Army Times February 65, (U).
2. Saigon Post, 11 Feb 65, (U).

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3. MFR, MACPM, 23 Jan 65, Subj: Amb Conference on Physical Security, (U).
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. Msg, CINCPAC, 270313Z Jan 65, (S).
8. Msg, COMUSMACV, MAC 2603, 270715Z Jan 65, (TS).
9. Fact Sheet, MACJ5, 20 Aug 65, Subj: MACV OPLAN 60-64E Emergency Care, Protection, and Evacuation of US Non-Combatants, (S).
10. Study, MACPM, Nov 1965, Subj: MP and Security Force Requirements, (S).
11. Agent Report, 704th INTC Det, 30 Mar 65, (C).
12. Ltr, 2d AD, 20 Jan 65, (S); MFR, MACV, 10 Jul 65, Subj: Security of Tan Son Nhut and Saigon Port, (S).
13. DF, MACPM, 14 Dec 65, Subj: Physical Security Measures, (S).
14. MACV MONEVAL, Jul 65, (S).
15. Msg, COMUSMACV, 150942Z Dec 65, (S).
16. Msg, COMUSMACV, 060925Z Jul 65, (U).
17. Msg, CGFFORCEV, 300800 Dec 65, (U).
18. Memo, US Mission Council, 28 May 65, Subj: US Mission Council Action Memo #101, (S).
19. Memo, MACV, 10 Jul 65, Subj: Security of Tan Son Nhut and Saigon Port, (S).
20. Memo, US Mission Council, 13 Jul 65, Subj: US Mission Council Action Memo #115, (S).
21. Command Conference, COMUSMACV, 22 Dec 65, (S).
22. Msg, CGUSARV, 010925Z Jan 66, (S).
23. Msg, COMUSMACV, 020049Z Jan 66, (S).

ANNEX I - PRISONERS OF WAR

(U) The acceleration of the war in SVN and NVN and the increasing role of US troops in combat against the enemy made it inevitable that more VC personnel would be captured. The problem this would cause was well described in an editorial in the 6 December 1965 Washington Post entitled, "Humanity to Prisoners."

> Humane treatment of prisoners of war is an especially difficult problem when the enemy makes a practice of torturing and slaughtering captives. Nevertheless, a country which places a high value on human life and which seeks to uphold international standards in the treatment of prisoners of war must strive to avoid brutalizing and self-defeating reprisals. General Westmoreland has wisely reminded the American troops in Vietnam that it is both dishonorable and foolish to mistreat a captive.

(U) In harmony with COMUSMACV's approach, the governments of the US and the RVN notified the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) that their armed forces were abiding and would continue to abide by the Geneva Conventions of 1949. These formal announcements in August 1965 indicated that both governments would increase their programs of instruction to armed forces personnel on the requirements of the Geneva Convention. COMUSMACV directed that the educational program for all US military personnel in SVN include issuance of a pocket-size card containing the basic requirements of the Geneva Conventions on humane treatment of PW's.[1]

US PW's

(S) However, the VC execution of US captives in so-called retaliations against the GVN shooting of convicted terrorists showed a complete disregard by the VC for the humanitarian principles and provisions of the 1949 Geneva Prisoners of War Convention (GPW). For example, the so-called VC liberation radio announced on 26 September 1965 that the VC had executed two more American PW's, a captain and a sergeant, in reprisal for the SVN execution of three VC terrorists in Da Nang on 22 September.[2]

(S) These actions of the VC caused considerable concern to the US Mission Council. At a meeting on 28 September it discussed the question of possible means to deter further execution of US PW's. In summary, the steps under consideration were: 1) branding the NVN and Front leaders as war criminals and threatening them with a Nuvemberg-like trial; 2) putting a bounty on the heads of various NVN and VC leaders; 3) harassment of communist VN while

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traveling abroad; 4) bombing of new targets such as the Haiphong docks, the bridge in Hanoi, and the dikes up-country. While there was a general feeling in the Council that none of these measures was likely to deter further executions of US PW's, there was agreement that something should be done to demonstrate to US soldiers that an effort was being made to stop further executions and possibly punish the communists if executions continued. The Ambassador stated that probably the single most effective deterrent would be to kidnap a number of top VC leaders. He expressed some doubt as to the usefulness of making empty threats. He suggested that some military operations should be conducted as specific reprisals for the execution of US PW's, and asked COMUSMACV to keep the Mission informed of upcoming military operations that would lend themselves to this reprisal technique.[3]

(S) The concern for the welfare of US PW's was further deepened by reliable indications in December that the NVN intended to try some US PW's for alleged war crimes. This immediately prompted the US State Department to instruct the US Mission in Geneva to make its policies known to representatives of the ICRC. The US hoped that the ICRC would inform the government of NVN of US views concerning such trials and punishments and the effect they would have on US public opinion and the peaceful resolution of the VN problem.[4]

(S) Desiring reciprocal treatment for US PW's held by the Communists and favorable public opinion the US Embassy requested that GVN cooperate with the ICRC in promptly providing PW lists and in completing arrangements for ICRC visits to PW's.[5]

(S) The State Department felt that the impact on the ICRC and international opinion would be strongly favorable to GVN releasing some NVN PW's. The ICRC was inclined to commend the VC for release of two US PW's in December 1965, McClure and Smith. State felt that international opinion in general, which was inclined to praise the propaganda aspects of the release of McClure and Smith, would also regard the GVN release of NVN's as a reasonable and humanitarian gesture.[6]

(TS) USMACV, in coordination with the US Embassy and CAS, initiated an aggressive program to determine the location of US PW's held by the VC/NVN forces. As of November 1965 the following US personnel were known captives of the enemy:[7]

POSSIBLE LOCATION	MILITARY	CIVILIANS
RVN	24	4
NVN	50	0
Laos	2	2 (4 military missing)

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(TS) A US Mission Council agency, Committee of Prisoners and Detainees, was established to formulate policy recommendations and to coordinate actions concerning PW's. The 704th Intelligence Corps (INTC) Det was given responsibility under the supervision of the J2 USMACV, to recover detained US military personnel in RVN. Prior to November, efforts to recover US detainees by ARVN operations, and by rewards through VN intermediaries, were unsuccessful. Plans to recover PW's in NVN and Laos were hampered by the lack of information as to their place of detention but a continuing effort was being made at the end of the year to determine the whereabouts of US detainees in these countries.[8]

Detention of VC and VC Suspects

(S) Some VC were captured by US units. To fully clarify the role of US troops in relation to captured VC and VC suspects, COMUSMACV announced his policy in a USMACV directive (381-11) to all US forces (FWMAF would also follow this policy). Basically, the US capturing unit was responsible for enemy personnel captured in the course of operations. Enemy captives and suspects were to be interrogated and detained by US forces only for the time required to complete tactical exploitation, after which the captives were to be turned over to the appropriate GVN authorities.[9]

(S) The US forces had no legal authority in SVN to detain captives whom the GVN regarded as citizens violating GVN law. The responsibility for the detention of captives rested with the GVN. Under Article 12, GPW, the US retained responsibility for ensuring that treatment was in accord with the GPW even after the transfer of the captives to GVN. COMUSMACV had given consideration to the operation of PW camps but rejected the idea, based primarily on the lack of legality for such action.[10]

(S) Both the GVN and the US forces applied the humanitarian provisions of the GPW in the treatment of VC captives and had issued appropriate instructions to all forces. The GVN policy had been to consider the VC as criminal offenders against state security laws. As a result, consideration was given by GVN authorities to the trial of the VC by military tribunals. Suspected VC, not caught flagrante delicto, were generally brought before a province chief, magistrate, military and police representatives, and a representative of the military security service. The US did not participate in any of these procedures beyond delivering a captive to the GVN. Both the US forces and the GVN excluded terrorists, spies, and saboteurs from consideration as PW's. These persons would be expected to be tried and punished for their crimes.[11]

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(S) COMUSMACV made an all-out effort to make the GVN aware of the rules of the GPW conventions. In regard to the procedures between the US forces and GVN concerning detention responsibility and adequate control and treatment of prisoners, the following was effected:

1) The policy agreed upon by ARVN and US Joint Military Committee was to apply all provisions of GPW to all VC captives. This joint US-GVN Military Committee was appointed in September 1965 to work out the details on the application of the GPW in RVN. By October, the Joint Military Committee had issued photo-size cards and other training aids, concerning the obligations regarding PW treatment which coincided with those of the 1949 Conventions. This would give adequate instructions on convention obligation to all GVN personnel.

2) All US and RVN military units were advised of the basic rules to be applied in handling of prisoners.[12]

(S) The rules were disseminated in a newsletter to all advisory personnel, as well as by individual cards to the troops. The senior advisors and US units were instructed to identify and record all captives taken and turned over to GVN. The record was to include a notation as to whom captives were transferred. A separate record was kept of civilians apprehended and turned over to GVN. In early October, all RVNAF legal advisors were briefed by USMACV SJA on the legal aspects concerning the application of the Conventions.[13]

(S) COMUSMACV also established policy concerning the interrogation procedures, which called for all VC captives to be treated initially as PW's and to be taken to a combined US/RVN military interrogation center. From the interrogation center the captive was to be sent to the VC/NVN PW camp and the suspected VC was to be sent to the Province Security Committee.[14]

(S) A facilities plan was developed by GVN to establish five permanent stockades, one in each CTZ and one in the CMR, each having a capacity of 1,000 prisoners. US MP PW processing teams, acting in the advisory role, would be stationed at these stockades.[15]

(S) VC captives taken prisoner in combat did not come within the Chieu Hoi program, which pertained to returnees or defectors. However, COMUSMACV though it possible in the future that the Chieu Hoi program would be available to VC captives subsequent to some detention in a PW camp and the establishment of a desire by the VC captive to become a returnee. The initial distinction between a captive and returnee was the voluntary action of the individual in returning to the GVN control.[16]

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(S) COMUSMACV believed that RVNAF was gradually becoming more enthusiastic about according humanitarian treatment to prisoners as specified by Article III, Geneva Conventions of 1949, because RVNAF throught it would help induce the VC to surrender and improve intelligence. Also, they knew the Americans needed this for support at home to save US personnel already detained by VC/NVN.[17]

(S) The GVN did have an interministerial group working on the whole problem in parallel with the US/GVN Joint Military Committee. Because of VC acts of outrage over the years, COMUSMACV believed that the highest RVN military and political figures were not yet quite ready to fully accept the Geneva Conventions. COMUSMACV thought that the practical application of the GPW would in any case be difficult. The VC had been utterly ruthless with the ARVN soldiers. Civilians, if anything, fared even worse. It was anticipated that many killings would continue on the battlefield and that relatively few PW's would be taken by ARVN.[18]

(S) To insure that the Interministerial Committee, studying the GPW problem on the political side, was kept fully informed of the progress made by the Joint Military Committee, they were given a general briefing by USMACV representatives in November.[19] At this briefing, considerable discussion centered on whether the ICRC should be allowed to visit the VC PW's in RVN. One of the ministerial representatives noted that camps provided for captives would be suitable for ICRC visits. The representative also agreed on the necessity for abiding by the GPW.[20]

(S) But the political aspects of the problem were not intended to be solved at this briefing. The practical problems, and deep-seated emotions of the VN in this area, after two decades of harsh, ruthless treatment and violence, made progress by USMACV difficult.

(C) On 27 November, a joint committee proposed a workable plan for application of the Geneva Conventions by US, RVN, and FWMAF. This completed plan was approved for implementation in December. A joint committee meeting was held on 2 December to review the progress of the sub-committees relative to the implementation of the approved plan.[21] It was agreed that a temporary PW camp be established in the vicinity of Bien Hoa in early January 1966. Upon completion of the set-up of one PW camp, four others were to be established in the I, II and IV CTZ's and the CMR.[22] As the year ended, USMACV Directive 381-11, concerning PW handling by US forces, was being staffed.[23]

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Footnotes

1. Mon Hist Sum, MACSJA, Oct/Nov 65, (U).
2. Msg, State, No. 92657B, 27 Sep 65 (S).
3. Memo, 29 65, Subj: Action Memo #13, US Mission Council, (S).
4. Msg, SECSTATE, 160417Z Dec 65, (S).
5. Msg, SECSTATE, 151029Z Dec 65, (S).
6. Ibid.
7. Msg, COMUSMACV, MAC 4055, 151136Z Nov 65, (TS).
8. Ibid.
9. Msg, COMUSMACV, MAC 3835, 200210Z Oct 65, (S).
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid.
19. DF, MACJ1, 5 Nov 65, Subj: Application of the Geneva Convention in RVN, (S).
20. Ibid.
21. Fact Sheet, MACJ1, 7 Jan 66, Subj: Implementation of Geneva Convention to RVNAF, (C).
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid.

(U) Free mailing privileges, increased pay, expanded exchange facilities, a consistent tour policy, swift medical evacuation for wounded US personnel, a liberal decorations and awards policy, opportunity for rest and recuperation (R&R), and recreational facilities and programs provided by Special Services, HEDSUPPACT, the American Red Cross (ARC), and the United Service Organization (USO), served to bolster morale and increase troop welfare in SVN during 1965.

(U) Mail service was a major problem in 1965. Median transit times for airmal letters from CONUS to APO patrons varied from four days in Saigon to ten days or more at some up-country locations. Service on airmail parcels and boat mail was even more erratic. The Executive Order providing airmal service on packages of five pounds or less helped speed delivery of packages.[1] Saigon received mail on a daily basis but up-country delivery was less frequent. Even by the end of the year some isolated posts were receiving mail only twice weekly.[2] The establishment of free mailing privileges on 1 September[3] for those serving in SVN eliminated the dificulty in getting postage stamps from the limited and scattered postal facilities available. It also removed the inconvenience of preserving stamps in the field, which had a tendency to lose mucilage, or stick together when subjected to the heat and humidity of the rainy season.

(U) Hostile fire pay, and partial or total exemption from federal income taxes increased the monthly pay of all personnel. Warrant officers and enlisted personnel received a total exemption on all pay and allowances while offiers received an exemption of $200 monthly.[4] Hostile fire pay was extended on 1 June to include everyone serving in SVN.[5] Prior to this time, this pay was granted on the basis of a certificate signed by the senior advisor or commander stating that the individual had been exposed to or in an area subject to hostile fire for six days out of the month. The old system was discarded because there were no areas in SVN not subject to attack and because of inequities of the system. Some personnel were receiving hostile fire pay in relatively safe areas while others in areas like Saigon were being killed or injured by terrorist attacks and were not receiving hostile fire pay.

(C) The disparity between the official dollar-piaster rate of exchange (72.765 per dollar) and the fluctuating black market price (sometimes as high as 140 piasters per

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dollar) created a dilemma for many personnel. If they utilized the official rate they felt cheated; if they exchanged on the black market they were subject to prosecution if apprehended. This disparity was reduced on 31 August with the establishment of a new exchange rate of 118 piasters per dollar for authorized personnel.[6] For the purpose of this agreement, authorized personnel were defined as those US and FWMAF military personnel plus US government sponsored civilians authorized PX and commissary privileges in SVN. Concurrent with this adjusted exchange rate, dollars were replaced by Military Payment Certificates. It was hoped that these measures would strengthen the economy by increasing GVN control over foreign exchange transactions and also help curb the flow of dollars to countries outside SVN.

(S) The out-of-country R&R program expanded throughout the year. During January 1965, 625 personnel went to Hong Kong or Bangkok. In December 1965, 3,353 personnel went to Hong Kong, Bangkok, Taipei, or Tokyo. The impact of the large influx of US forces in SVN, most of whom arrived in mid-1965, would not be felt until February or March 1966. In keeping with the policy of providing the opportunity for R&R at some time during their tour to all US personnel serving in SVN, and to help curb inflation by channeling money out of SVN, plans were made to increase the monthly total to 13,500 by March 1966 and add Manila to the R&R locations. Major problems facing this expansion were insufficient aircraft and political problems in some of the R&R areas.[7]

(C) The R&R program to Taipei, which began on 25 November, was threatened almost immediately with suspension or cancellation over the question of legal jurisdiction. The State Department attempted to use this as a wedge to extend Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) immunity to all US personnel stationed, visiting, or passing through Taiwan. This problem had not been resolved at year's end. It was more political than military, since there was no SOFA agreement with Thailand or Hong Kong.[8]

(S) The Hong Kong R&R program ran into difficulty because of Red China's sensitivity to the presence of large numbers of US personnel there. CHICOM diplomatic pressure on the government of Hong Kong resulted in limitations on the number of US personnel who could use the R&R facilities at any one time. US fleet visitors and repair of military aircraft in Hong Kong were also affected.[9] Cancellation of this program was not expected, although only limited expansion was foreseen. In-country R&R opportunities were

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increased with the opening of the Vung Tau R&R center on 1 September.

(U) Branch exchanges grew from six in January to thirteen in December. During this period, field exchanges increased from 51 to 134 and monthly sales rose from $1.46 to $12.3 million. Responsibility for the exchange system passed from USN to USA and USAF Exchange Service on 26 December. With this change, the manner of allocating the recreation and welfare funds in SVN also changed. The funds guaranteed a prescribed amount per man per month and were not affected by any fluctuations in the monthly profits.[10]

(U) During the year a total of 42,103 decorations and awards were approved throughout the entire command. They included 3,557 Purple Hearts; 3,949 Army Commendation Medals; 510 Army Commendation Medals with "V" device; 28,480 Air Medals; 864 Air Medals with "V" device; 3,122 Bronze Star Medals, 879 Bronze Star Medals with "V" device; 105 Soldiers Medals; 292 Distinguished Flying Crosses; 171 Legion of Merits, and 174 Silver Stars. In addition, there were 1,030 recommendations forwarded to other headquarters, including recommendations for 4 Medals of Honor.[11]

(U) MEDSUPPACT operated several recreational installations in the Saigon area such as the library, bowling alley, boating facility, craft shop, photo lab and equipment loan service. It also operated the 16-mm movie account until 26 December, (when the Army Special Services took over the account) at which time the separate accounts totaled over 500.[12] The ARC had mobile recreation centers in Da Nang, Nha Trang, and Bien Hoa, with plans to construct permanent facilities at these and other sites during 1966. The ARC handled almost 10,000 individual cases and loaned or granted $84,539 during the year.[13] USO centers were located in Saigon, TSN, Da Nang, and Nha Trang. Plans were made to open nine additional branches in 1966. The USO introduced many professional and amateur shows into the country and, among its many other services, provided facilities for telephone calls to CONUS. Approximately 1,715,000 visits were made by servicemen of all branches to the four USO facilities during 1965.[14]

(U) Several other factors increased the fighting man's morale. A consistent tour policy of 12 months assured him a target rotation date. Inexpensive term life insurance for all US military personnel, guaranteeing his beneficiary $10,000 in the event of his death, freed many servicemen

from personal worries. The knowledge that every effort would be made to evacuate him by the most rapid means to the best available medical facilities greatly cheered him and helped him face the hazards of combat. No serviceman in SVN was more than thirty minutes away from a well-equipped medical facility;[15] and if necessary, evacuation out-of-country was proportionately swift.

Footnotes

1. Msg, DA, 042107Z Nov 65, Subj: Instructions for Implementing the Airlift of 5 pound Personal Parcels, (U).
2. Interview, Col E. D. Bryson, AG, by Capt C. L. Larimer, MHB, 22 Mar 66, (U).
3. PL 89-132, Mil Pay Act of 1965 approved by President, 21 Aug 65, (U).
4. Executive Order 11216, 26 Apr 65, Subj: Designation of Vietnam and Waters adjacent thereto as a Combat Zone for the Purpose of Section 112 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.
5. DOD Instr 1340.6, 2 Jun 65, Implemented by MACV Dir 37-2, 29 Jul 65, (U).
6. Memo of Understanding, DEPAMB Johnson, 24 Aug 65, Subj: Establishing of a Special Currency Fund, (C).
7. EMBTEL, AMEMB Saigon, No. 01-203-A, 5 Jan 66, (S).
8. Memo, MACJ1, 29 Nov 65, Subj: Juridical Status of R&R in Taiwan, (C).
9. Msg, SECSTATE, HK, 201835Z Nov 65, (S).
10. Interview, Lt Col Corsentino, J1, by Capt C. L. Larimer, MHB, 8 Jan 66, (U).
11. DF, Ch Dec and Awds (MACJ), Subj: Workload Data, Decorations and Awards for months January to 31 December 1965.
12. Interview, Lt Col Barker, Ch, Ex and Spl Svc Br, by Capt C. L. Larimer, MHB, 24 Jan 66, (U).
13. Conference ARC, Saigon, H. McCullohs, Sr., ARC; G.T. Harmon, ARC; E. McDougall, ARC, and Capt C. L. Larimer, MHB, 10 Jan 66, (U).
14. Interview, USO Director, Saigon, by Capt C. L. Larimer, MHB, 12 Jan 66, (U).
15. Briefing, CONUSMACV, 31 Dec 65, Subj: Press Briefing, (U).

ANNEX K - NEW WEAPONS AND TACTICS

(U) In February 1964, the JCS directed that all research and test agencies in RVN be organized into a single command. As a result, the Joint Research and Test Activity (JRATA) was established 23 April 1964 by COMUSMACV. This agency was composed of the Army Concept Team in Vietnam (ACTIV), the Air Force Test Unit-Vietnam (AFTU-V) and the OSD Advanced Research Projects Agency, Research and Development Field Unit, (OSD/ARPA RDFU). Provision was made for inclusion of a naval test unit when activated. The commander of JRATA was the principal staff advisor to COMUSMACV on research, development, testing and evaluation and combat developments, and he advised and assisted the Vietnamese in their research and development effort, through the Combat Development Test Center Vietnam (CDTCV).[1]

(U) The Navy Research and Development Unit (NRDU) became operational 26 August 1965.[2]

(U) The objectives of JRATA were:[3]

1) To enhance the counterinsurgency capabilities of both US and GVN forces.

2) To provide research and development, testing and evaluation and combat development support to RVNAF.

3) To assist RVNAF to develop their own RDT&E and combat developments capabilities.

4) To provide access to data and test environment for the development of new and improved weapons, equipment, concepts and techniques applicable to countersubversion and counterinsurgency.

5) Provide sound and fully objective military evaluations of new or improved operational or organizational concepts, doctrine, tactics, techniques and material in the combat environment of SVN.

(U) Projects to be conducted in RVN were to be proposed by JCS, the military services, OSD/ARPA, CINCPAC, COMUSMACV or JRATA. CINCPAC was the approving authority for all projects. JRATA monitored projects, reviewed their status periodically and evaluated selected completed projects. Follow up was conducted to insure that actions indicated in the reports received proper attention and emphasis.[4]

(U) There were many new concepts, new weapons, and new techniques for employing older equipment tested during the year. JRATA published a semi-annual progress report in July 1965 and January 1966 which gave a resume of all projects completed, in progress, or programmed. Only the more salient projects of each test agency will be discussed below.

(U) Tests conducted by ACTIV included:

1) An evaluation of the employment of a CV-2B Caribou aviation company in providing forward area transportation support of counterinsurgency operations. The evaluation was favorable and indicated that the CV-2B provided invaluable support to the CTZ's Special Forces and USAID.[5]

2) An evaluation of the heliborne command post to determine concepts for its employment by US and RVNAF commanders. The report indicated the heliborne CP was invaluable for providing battlefield control in both counterinsurgency and conventional warfare. A total of 30 heliborne CP consoles were requested for use in RVN.[6]

3) A study to determine the capability of ARVN artillery to support operations and area defense. Conclusions were that while the artillery was capable of support, much of its effectiveness was lost due to stringent control, lack of observers, lack of tubes and failure to use Controlled Variable Time fuzes. RF/PF personnel were reported to be inadequately trained in techniques of fire adjustment and control.[7]

4) A study of clothing and equipment used by US personnel in RVN. The report indicated US personnel were not issued all items needed, such as knives, flashlights, plastic bags, pistols, watches and other items. Hence, many of these articles were purchased on the local market.[8]

5) Testing of the heliborne illumination system (HIS) to determine its operational suitability and to develop concepts for its employment. This was a highly successful project, completed 11 November. USARV was charged with the mission of procuring sufficient HIS to meet needs. This system was nicknamed "Lightning Bug" and tactics utilized consisted of one UH-1 observer helicopter operating at 300 feet without lights. This system was used successfully in conjunction with SLAR to locate and engage VC river and road traffic at night.[9]

6) An evaluation of the USA Aviation Company (Aerial Surveillance) in counterinsurgency operations. The 73d Aviation Company was used to determine the tactical employment of this type unit, and to determine the effectiveness of SLAR, IR and night photography to detect VC LOC's and base camp areas. The final report on this project was not available at year's end.[10]

7) An evaluation of the 40-mm grenade launcher for the UH-1 helicopter. This system was evaluated to determine its operational suitability in the counterinsurgency environment and to develop concepts for its employment. The system consisted of an M-75 grenade launcher in a nose-mounted flexible turret, which could be fired independently of the helicopter altitude or fired as a fixed piece. The rate of fire was 220 rounds per minute and range was 1,200 meters. The weapon fully loaded carried 150 rounds of ammunition. The final report on this project was not published at year's end, but tentative recommendations included authorizing six of these sub-systems to each airmobile company in RVN, modifying UH-1D helicopters to accept the kit, and further study to improve range and ammunition capability.[11]

8) Testing of a bar armor kit for M-113 to determine the suitability of the kit for use in RVN and to recommend a basis for issue. This kit was designed to reduce the effect of shaped charges by causing them to detonate prematurely. This project was in progress at year's end.[12]

9) A project to determine the feasibility of employing a jungle canopy platform to permit the landing of helicopters and the discharge of cargo on top of forests and to evaluate its use in support of US combat operations. This project was in progress at year's end. The first platform arrived in RVN in December 1965, and five more were expected in March 1966. The first one was being tested by 1st Cav Div (AM).[13,14]

10) A study to determine if the use of airboats would increase the capability of ARVN to intercept insurgent forces operating in inundated areas containing aquatic grasses. This project was complete at year's end but the report had not been distributed. Tentative conclusions were that the boat could be of significant value and should be procured for use by ARVN prior to the 1966 rainy season.[15]

(S) Projects completed or in progress by AFTUV included:

1) A study to assess the capability of the C-47 to deliver effective fire against area targets, from guns mounted in the side door. This project was considered highly successful and immediate action was taken by HQ USAF to organize and train a FC-47 squadron which was deployed to RVN in November. This aircraft had the ability to carry extra ammunition, carry its own flares and had a high on-station endurance time. The FC-47 aircraft were nicknamed "Puff the Magic Dragon."[16]

2) An evaluation of the "Red Chief" beacon system to determine its suitability as a close-in, high-accuracy navigational device, to be used in aerial resupply of isolated units. Results were favorable and permitted accurate airdrops under adverse weather conditions and at night. The system was also used to locate ground units, to direct level, dlevel bombing missions by using offset, to locate drop zones for flares and to provide terminal navigation.[17]

3) A study to evaluate the employment and effects of CBU munitions. This study was complete but the report had not been forwarded by year's end. Tentative conclusions were that CBU did not penetrate the jungle canopy as effectively as iron bombs, but that they were still more effective against exposed personnel than other conventional ordnance of comparable weight.[18]

4) A comparative evaluation of the F-5, F-4 and F-100 aircraft. This evaluation was under control of a Tactical Air Command Team, and monitored by AFTU. The project was classed "Skoshi Tiger" and its purpose was to provide a data base which could be used to refine requirements for future fighter aircraft. F-5A aircraft were deployed to RVN especially for this evaluation.[19]

(U) There were numerous OSD/ARPA-RDFU projects. Included were tests of reversible uniforms for ARVN[20] black on the inside, camouflaged on the outside; a magnetic concealed intrusion alarm;[21] a convoy protection unit consisting of a vehicle mounting grenade launchers and .50 caliber machine guns;[22] and a test to determine if specially trained dogs could detect personnel contaminated with squalene, a highly malodorous substance.[23]

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(U) OSD/ARPA RDFU also conducted several military data and analysis studies during the year.[24,25]

(U) The NRDUV had no formal projects during 1965, but conducted informal evaluations of a stabilized binocular for MARKET TIME aircraft, an infrared weapon sight for river craft, UDT personnel and coastal craft and of LCP(L) armament.[26]

(C) Several unprogrammed tests and studies were conducted during the year, including a study of the destruction of tunnels through the use of a mixture of acetylene and air, and evaluation of Beehive (canister) ammunition, a study of an acoustic airborne ground-fire detector (bullet detector), and a study of the adequacy of counter-mortar radar in defense of airfields, forts, and other installations.[27,28]

(U) There were other new tactics and concepts used which did not fall under the auspices of JRATA. Some of these included the tactical use of riot control agents (RCA), the introduction of the B-52 in a conventional bombing role, the use of the M-16 rifle, the "Snipe Hunt" and the use of scout and sentry dogs.

(S) One of the most controversial new tactics was the employment of RCA. The agents were first used on 25 December 1964 in Tay Ninh Province, and were subsequently used by ARVN in combat three times prior to March 1965.[29,30] The hue and cry began on 21 March, when the Associated Press (AP) released an article based upon the observations of an AP photographer, Horst Faas. He reported the story to Peter Arnett, an AP reporter, and together they wrote the article entitled, "Gas Warfare" without checking with USMACV officials. It caused rather extensive unfavorable public reaction.[31] As a result, COMUSMACV was requested to refrain from using RCA, pending analysis of its application in counterinsurgency. He restricted its use by US units[32] and requested JCS to prohibit use by RVNAF units.[33]

(S) On 5 September, the 2d Bn, 7th USMC Regiment, used RCA with considerable success to clear tunnels on a search and destroy mission. The commander was unaware of any restriction on the use of RCA.[34] Following this incident, and the more favorable press reaction that accompanied it, COMUSMACV was permitted to employ RCA on a case-by-case basis, each requiring approval from JCS.[35,36] On 10 October, COMUSMACV informed CJCS that the increasing pace of operations made the individual request for authority to use RCA cumbersome and requested authority to employ CN and CS at his discretion.[37] This

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authority ultimately was granted on 3 November.[38]

(S) On 15 November, COMUSMACV delegated authority to the CG, III MAF; the CG, FFORCEV; and the CG, 1st Inf Div, to employ CN and CS in tunnels or caves and where the VC had intermingled themselves with civilian populace.[39] He modified these instructions on 26 December to permit unrestricted use of CS and CN at the discretion of the senior commander concerned.[40] Authority was never granted for use of DM.

(U) As mentioned above the use of RCA in SVN was almost universally condemned by the press after the disclosure in late March. Howard Margolis summed up the dispute in the Washington Post of 4 April:

> Those favoring the use of the gases see them as a substitute for bullets and bombs and napalm and hence a step toward more humane means of warfare. Those opposed doubt that use of such gases would make warfare much more humane. More important, they fear it would have the contrary effect by eroding inhibitions on the use of poison gases.

A typical editorial comment appeared in the 27 March Providence Journal:

> The peasant whose horizons are defined by his village or a rice paddy will grasp instantly the chance that he stands to be gassed. The fact that the gas is non-lethal will be lost in his revulsion and fears. That the weapon is new, that it could lead to the horrors of genuine gas warfare, and that America is the likely supplier will be played to the full by skilled Viet Cong propagandists.

The editorial uproar died down after President Johnson's lengthy statement on gas at his 1 April press conference. When the Marine unit used tear gas in September there was very little press criticism and many commentators strongly advocated its use. On 9 September the Los Angeles Times editorialized: "It is ridiculous for the United States to be apologetic about using tear gas in Vietnam, when it can really believe the villagers prefer bombs and napalm to tear gas?" The New York Times said on 11 September: "If the Government prohibits the use of tear gas, it will thereby condemn to certain death or injury many more Americans and Vietnamese than the absolute necessities of war demand." And widely printed was the quip by British Conservative MP Julian Amery in the House of Commons 1 April: "While most of us, I think, disagree with the slogan 'Better Red than Dead,' I think we would all agree that 'It's better to cry than die.'"

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(U) The M-16 rifle proved to be a significant weapon in 1965. While it had been used by USASF and USAF in prior years, 1965 marked its first use by full tactical units. The 1st Cav Div (AM), the 173d Abn Bde, and the 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div were equipped with M-16. The III MAF and the 1st Inf Div were equipped with M-14 rifles. RVNAF and ROK forces were equipped with M-1 rifles and M-1 and M-2 carbines.

(S) On 6 December following a study of the comparative effectiveness of various weapons in repulsing VC assaults, COMUSMACV concluded the need for additional M-16's in all friendly units in RVN. The study showed that units not equipped with the M-16 had experienced situations where the VC surpassed them in automatic weapon firepower. COMUSMACV recommended that some M-16's be integrated into all units. He requested 170,000 be made available for the Phase IIA buildup.[41]

(S) On 8 December, the SECDEF confirmed that 100,000 M-16's had been ordered.[42] Other commitments would not permit higher production. A reappraisal of requirements indicated a requirement for 179,614 M-16's to equip all ground combat units, but a plan was submitted for the distribution of the 100,000 which were to be made available between May and December 1966.[43,44]

(C) A significant type of night aerial armed reconnaissance mission, nicknamed "Snipe Hunt," was initiated by 2d AD. This operation provided night surveillance of rivers, [illegible] and roads by USA SLAR-equipped Mohawk aircraft, working with FAC's in O-1 aircraft and C-123 or AC-47 flare ships. Strike aircraft were called in against targets when confirmed.[45] COMUSMACV was pleased with the performance of the Snipe Hunt and similar projects such as Lightning Bug (discussed earlier in this chapter under ACTIV projects). He expressed his desire that these night reconnaissance means be fully exploited.[46]

(TS) Scout dogs with ARVN handlers were used by US units to search rice paddies, caves, tunnels and villages and in guarding perimeters at night.[47] The CG, III MAF felt that sentry and scout dogs with US handlers would greatly increase their effectiveness, since the language barrier with ARVN handlers tended to reduce their effectiveness.[48] It was estimated that the ARVN scout dog program would lead to depletion of available indigenous dogs in 1 or 2 years due to attrition. However, the success of III MAF, 1st Inf Div and 1st Brigade, 101st Abn Div in using these dogs was sufficient to warrant the continuation of the ARVN program and the institution of a US program.[49] COMUSMACV requested 15½ platoons of tactical war dogs; he desired 9 platoons before the end of 1965 and 6½ additional platoons for deployment in 1966. He recommended that consideration be given to training US procured dogs in VN. He expressed a need

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for scout dogs, sentry (attack) dogs, arms recovery dogs and demolition detection dogs. Also, he recommended reconfiguring the US scout dog platoon to include one squad of attack dogs per platoon.[50] JCS concurred and approved the deployment but no trained platoons were available for 1965 deployment and at years' end, US forces were still dependent upon dogs provided from ARVN resources.[51] Plans were made to deploy US platoons as soon as they could be trained at Lackland AFB, Texas and Fort Benning, Georgia.

Footnotes

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2. Report, JRATA 20 Oct 65, Subj: Historical Summary (FOUO).
3. Memo for AGILE Personnel, ARPA Symposium, 20-25 Jul 64 (U).
4. Ibid.
5. Report, JRATA Project IC-204.1, JRATA 3d Semi-Annual Progress Report, 15 Jul 65 (S).
6. Report, JRATA Project 1A-102.0, JRATA 3d Semi-Annual Progress Report, 15 Jul 65 (S).
7. Report, JRATA Project 1B-153.0, JRATA 3d Semi-Annual Progress Report, 15 Jul 65 (S).
8. Report, JRATA Project 1B-162.0, JRATA 3d Semi-Annual Progress Report, 15 Jul 65 (S).
9. Report, JRATA Project 2L-506.0, JRATA 4th Semi-Annual Progress Report, 15 Jan 66 (S).
10. Report, JRATA Project IC-200.2, JRATA 4th Semi-Annual Progress Report, 15 Jan 66 (S).
11. Report, JRATA Project IC-200.4, JRATA 4th Semi-Annual Progress Report, 15 Jan 66 (S).
12. Report, JRATA Project 1B-172.0, JRATA 4th Semi-Annual Progress Report, 15 Jan 66 (S).
13. Report, JRATA Project 1C-208.0, JRATA 4th Semi-Annual Progress Report, 15 Jan 66 (S).
14. Msg, JRATA, No. 42337, 0103342 Dec 65 (C).
15. Report, JRATA Project 1B-159.0, JRATA 4th Semi-Annual Progress Report, 15 Jan 66 (S).
16. Report, JRATA Project 3T-753.0, JRATA 4th Semi-Annual Progress Report, 16 Jan 66 (S).
17. Report, JRATA, Project 3T-754.0, JRATA 4th Semi-Annual Progress Report, 15 Jan 66 (S).
18. Report JRATA Project 3T-755.0, JRATA 4th Semi-Annual Progress Report, 15 Jan 66 (S).
19. Report, JRATA Project 3T-756.0, JRATA 4th Semi-Annual Progress Report, 15 Jan 66 (S).
20. Report, JRATA Project 2K-453.0, JRATA 3d Semi-Annual Progress Report, 15 Jul 65 (S).
21. Report, JRATA Project 2G-301.0, JRATA 4th Semi-Annual Progress Report, 15 Jan 66 (S).

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22. Report, JRATA Project 2J-403.0, JRATA 4th Semi-Annual Progress Report, 15 Jan 66 (S).
23. Report, JRATA Project 2J-403.0, JRATA 4th Semi-Annual Progress Report, 15 Jan 66 (S).
24. Report, JRATA 3d Semi-Annual Progress Report, 15 Jul 65 (S).
25. Report, JRATA 4th Semi-Annual Progress Report, 15 Jan 66 (S).
26. Report, JRATA 4th Semi-Annual Progress Report, 15 Jan 66 (S).
27. Report, JRATA 3d Semi-Annual Progress Report, 15 Jul 65 (S).
28. Report, JRATA 4th Semi-Annual Progress Report, 15 Jan 66 (S).
29. History CINCPAC, Subj: CINCPAC 1964 History, 23 Apr 65 (TS).
30. Msg ,COMUSMACV MAC 4755, 231025Z, Sep 65 (S).
31. Msg, General Westmoreland, No 1687, 290100Z Mar 65 (S).
32. Msg, COMUSMACV MAC 4755, 231025Z Sep 65 (S).
33. Msg, COMUSMACV MAC 4548, 100155Z Sep 65 (S).
34. Msg, COMUSMACV MAC 4755, 231025Z Sep 65 (S).
35. Msg, CJCS, No 3548-65, 232221Z Sep 65 (S).
36. Msg, COMUSMACV, 050143Z Oct 65 (S).
37. Msg, COMUSMACV, MAC 5056, 10 Oct 65 (S).
38. Msg, CJCS No 420, 3 Nov 65 (S).
39. Msg, COMUSMACV MAC 40502, 150621Z Nov 65 (S).
40. Msg, COMUSMACV MAC 45191, 261030Z Dec 65 (S).
41. Msg, COMUSMACV MAC 42787, 060148Z Dec 65 (S).
42. Msg, SECDEF No 4773, 8 Dec 65 (S).
43. Msg, COMUSMACV MAC 43529, 120954Z Dec 65 (S).
44. Msg, DA No 744316, 171918Z Dec 65 (S).
45. Report, JRATA, 4th Semi-Annual Progress Report 16 Jan 66 (S).
46. Memo MACV, Subj: Notes of Staff Briefing, 23 Aug, 27 Aug, 8 Oct 65 (TS).
47. SITREP CG III MAF 180044Z Sep 65 (S).
48. Msg, CG III MAF, 081326Z Nov 65, (C).
49. Ltr, COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 11 Nov 65, (TS).
50. Msg, COMUSMACV MAC 15768, 11 Nov 65 (TS).
51. Msg JCS, No 9315, 241125Z, Dec 65 (TS).

(C) In May 1964, when the GVN IG of the Civil Guard, Maj Gen Nguyen Ngoc Le returned from a study of Taipei's political warfare program, he recommended that a "Special Commissariat for Psywar" be established, which would combine the following GVN departments: Psywar, Military Security Service, Social Service, Veteran Affairs and Chaplains. COMUSMACV, on 4 June 1964, commented favorably on the joint psywar delegation's trip report, and indicated advance approval of plans to reorganize those RVNAF agencies concerned with psywar, troop morale, civic affairs and social services.

(C) In accordance with an October 1964 agreement with GVN, the GRC established the Military Assistance Group Republic of China Vietnam (MAGROCV) consisting primarily of officers from the GRC polwar program and Polwar Staff College. Its mission was to aid the GVN to organize and inaugurate the General Political Warfare Department (which was founded on 24 October 1964). However, preparatory organizational work and the changes in the GVN hampered implementation of the programs. The RVNAF JGS, in its Memorandum of 19 March 1965 specified that the GPWD be organized along the lines recomended by COMUSMACV, and prescribed a 5-phased schedule for implemehting polwar throughout RVNAF during period March 1965 - March 1966. Soon after MACV POLWAR Directorate was established in May 1965, POLWAR and MAGROCV members began to sketch out an indoctrination program and new instruction program for the RVNAF POLWAR school. An RVNAF-wide organisational structure was also formulated. RVNAF, letter Nr. 1397, 16 June 1965, requested USMACV approval for a proposed polwar organisation totaling 12,168 spaces: 5,463 ARVN, 396 VNAF, 555 VNN, 128 VNMC and 5,626 RF. On 24 July 1965, Prime Minister Ky, by decree No. 152, confirmed the GPWD as an integral part of RVNAF. The decree rescinded a variety of previous orders concerning the GPWD and legally placed the political indoctrination, psywar, social services and security, departments and chaplain directorates subordinate to the GPWD.

(C) The mission of the GPWD was to study, prepare and direct the plans of its component departments as described below. The Chief of the GPWD, who was also the Deputy Chief of the JGS for POLWAR, assisted the CJGS on all polwar matters within the RVNAF. The GPWD HQ was authorized 301 spaces. Its assigned strength in December 1965 was 167, including 86 officers. [1]

(C) The Political Indoctrination Department, in conjunction with Republic of China (ROC) and the US Mission, had been formulating a program to motivate and indoctrinate RVNAF. The program was aimed at bolstering the fighting spirit and morale, and

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sustaining the loyalty of RVNAF. The initial stage of the program 1 July 1965-February 1966, called training staff officers and school instructors at the Polwar School to ensure their competence in the implementation of troop indoctrination. Although authorized 136 spaces, only 49 personnel, including 30 officers, were assigned by December 1965. [2]

(C) The Psywar Department provided general and strategic psychological and civic action support. Its mission was to plan and control psywar/civil affairs activities and to provide policy guidance and support to corps, division and sector psywar sections, the psywar battalions and the civil affairs companies. It had the capability of printing leaflets, posters and wall newspapers. This department prepared data for a weekly troop newspaper, a monthly troop pictorial magazine and a monthly magazine for officers. Published by contract, the troop publications were printed in 200,000copies each and the officer's magazine in 20,000 copies. A Pictorical Center distributed commercial entertainment films and newsreels made by psywar personnel. This center also produced ARVN training films and dubbed-in Vietnamese sound on US training films. The Psywar Department produced the "Voice of the Army" program for broadcasting over ARVN radio. Authorized 444 spaces, the Psywar Department had an assigned strength of 455 in December 1965.

(C) The Social Services Department managed the RVNAF social and welfare assistance program, the RVNAF department housing program and the RVNAF PX-Commissary system, which became a separate department by late 1966. The Security Department was charged with counter-intelligence and counter-espionage functions. On 11 August 1965, this department and the J-2, RVNAF, issued Instruction No. 1931, which clearly defined their respective missions and responsibilities.

(C) The ARVN 1st, 2nd, 3d and 4th Psywar Battalions were under the operational control of the Commanders of the III, II, I and IV Corps, respectively. Their mission was to conduct psywar operations in their respective areas, to conduct civic action and morale programs for military personnel, and to support the consolidation and internal security phases in rural construction operations. Each battalion was authorized 367 spaces, including 29 officers and 120 NCO positions. Except for the 1st Battalion, which had 381 assigned, the other battalions were only about 80 percent filled at year's end.

(C) The ARVN 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th Civil Affairs Companies were under the operational control of the Commanders of the I, III, IV and II Corps respectively. Their mission was to support the consolidation and internal security phases of rural construction operations and to provide and administer aid to civilians affected

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by operations. CA companies were each authorized 140 spaces, including 40 officers and 82 NCO positions. In December 1965, they were each only about 75 percent filled.

(C) The Regional Forces (RF) Psywar/CA Composite Teams, which were allocated one per sector (province), conducted psywar/CA operations in support of rural construction within its sector. RF Headquarters provided general policies and guidance, while the province chief exercised operational control over the team in his sector. In December 1965, assigned strength of these teams very closely approximated the authorized strength of 2 officers, 6 NCO's and 4 EM each.

(C) The RVNAF Psychological Warfare Training Center increased its resident student capacity from 80 to 150 when it was moved to Camp Le Van Duyet in Saigon in October 1964. Its name was changed to Political Warfare School (PWS) in April 1965, and it was subordinated to the indoctrination directorate of the GPWD.[3] During 1965, 433 personnel were graduated: four enlisted classes (four weeks each); one basic officers psywar class (six weeks); and one Polwar instructors class (12 weeks).[4] In late 1965, two additional orientation courses were also conducted, which were to end in 1966.

(C) The PWS was scheduled for relocation to the Gendarmerie Training Center at Dalat, where its resident student capacity was expected to increase to 350. The original estimates that renovation would cost nine million piasters, and would be completed by 1 January 1966, were revised at the end of 1965 to 19 million piasters, and the expected completion date to April 1966.

Objectives

(C) The basic GVN psychological objectives were to create, build, and maintain confidence in the government; establish a climate of unity behind the war effort, expose the true nature of VC objectives and destroy the VC will to fight. The GVN visualized its psywar program in terms of, 1) troop action: to strengthen and maintain the fighting spirit and loyalty of its own forces; 2) enemy action: to destroy the VC spirit and will to fight, and 3) civic action: to gain and maintain the support of the citizenry.

Troop Action

(C) Troop action involved everything that affected the morale, welfare, loyalty, and fighting spirit of the RVNAF. Programs conducted toward this end were: 1) Indoctrination: similar to the US military information program, it used media

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as military radio programs, unit newspapers, pamphlets, unit classes and motion pictures. Centered on the ideas of responsibility, honor and country, the program was designed to instill in the soldier a sense of responsibility toward and love for country, government, family and fellow citizens, and to develop a code of honor. 2) Dependents quarters: the program illustrated in a material way the government's concern for the military dependents' welfare. In late 1965, 57,130 of 149,614 projected family quarters were completed. These quarters consisted of 10-family units made of wood frame, metal roof, cement floor, with a total space of 30 x 8 meters. The social services directorate of GPWD administered the RVNAF regular forces dependent housing program. 3) PX-Commissary program: to provide military families with food and basic supplies below market prices at 22 outlets. In late 1965, 11 items were being sold, and plans called for establishing one outlet in each provincial capital and major post. 4) Social welfare program: provided assistance to needy families, medical care, maternity service, kindergarten and elementary schooling for 60,000 children of military families and education in sanitation. Specially-trained, 375 social workers were assigned to military housing areas throughout SVN in late 1965. The social services directorate, GPWD, opened the first day-time high school for 600 RVNAF dependents on 20 September in Saigon. 5 5) Recognition: medals and awards for distinguished service in combat or in duty performance. The RVNAF's "Feats in Arms Contest" gave monetary rewards to individuals and units which captured the most weapons, took the most VC captives and inflicted heaviest losses to enemy. 6) Entertainment: cultural platoons organic to ARVN psywar battalions and the RF Headquarters entertained personnel at military posts and training centers.

Enemy Action: Chieu Hoi

(U) The second RVNAF psywar program was called enemy action, aimed at destroying the VC spirit and will to fight. The program drew heavily on the GVN's Chieu Hoi "Open Arms" Program (CHP), which provided for safe conduct, reorientation, vocational training and resettlement assistance for VC and their supporters who defected. In conjunction with this program an award was offered for weapons according to a standard price scale. 6

(U) The CHP, as originally conceived, was a sincere offer to insurgents to change their attitude and join in the effort to build the nation. Its primary purpose was to provide opportunities for the insurgents to make this change; it also had the strategic aim of destroying the belief that there was a normal obligation for one to support friends or relatives among the insurgents. The CHP attempted to dispel the traditional strong family ties

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which influenced individual behavior and to develop loyalty ties to the nation. The rallier (a VC or VC supporter who responded to the CHP appeal) was treated for sickness or injuries and kept at the reception center for one or two weeks. Sometimes mentioned, but not stressed, was the fact that ralliers were free to leave the center at any time and return to the VC.

(C) The CHP was carried out primarily through civilian channels under the advice and assistance of USAID and with the support of the RVNAF at all levels. That the number of ralliers doubled in 1965 (11,123) over 1964, may be attributable to a number of factors in addition to the Chieu Hoi policy itself and the supporting psywar effort, for example 1) increasing hardships of VC life, 2) friends or relatives who had been aided by civic actions, 3) his immediate need for food, rest and medical treatment, 4) deliberate VC attempts to send some of their personnel on rest and recuperation leave, 5) his intent to deceive GVN officials and take advantage of the provision that a rallier was exempt from military draft for a specified period, 6) deliberate VC attempts to gain information regarding the Chieu Hoi program and identify those who have rallied. (See Table L-1, Monthly Chieu Hoi Returnees, 1965.)

(U) The problem of leadership continuity had been serious in the CHP since its inception in 1963. Mr. Tran Van An, who was appointed as minister for Chieu Hoi operations on 16 February, was the 10th director of the CHP. His tenure in this elevated position was also short lived. On 24 June, the new government under Prime Minister Ky dissolved the ministry and placed the CHP under the Secretariat of State for Psychological Warfare. [7] This resulted in the appointment of a director whose rank was equivalent only to an army captain. [8]

(C) Subsequently, the US Mission Council formed an interagency ad hoc task force to investigate the CHP and recommend measures which might improve the program. On 10 August, the task force recommended that more US support be provided the CHP, regional CHP centers be formed in each corps, and some changes be made in operational procedures. [9] The Mission Council's approval on 17 August, was followed by a plan to assign six USAID advisory, and the authorization of four US military liaison teams in support of the program. By the end of 1965, three USAID advisors were in the job. The GVN was constructing a National Chieu Hoi Center, scheduled for completion in early 1966. The construction of four regional centers had been delayed owing to lack of qualified contracting bidders. A new reporting procedure was established, which promised to provide more reliable and precise statistics. In contrast to the delay in the approval of funds for the CHP in 1965, action was taken to ensure prompt

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implementation of CHP plans in 1966. Although the problem of inadequate CHP facilities was gradually being corrected, the problem of insufficient trained cadre would probably be solved only partially during 1966. Of 1,800 positions authorized, only 1,400 were filled at the end of 1965. Many of the cadres were improperly trained and some were incompetent. [11] Toward the end of 1965, a massive campaign, to encourage the VC and their supporters to defect was planned with maximum emphasis timed for the Tet holiday period (21-24 January 1966).[12] The outcome of this drive would probably serve to chart the course of the CHP during 1966.

Bounty Program

(S) During 1964 and 1965, discussions were held between representatives of USMACV, the US Embassy, and other interested agencies, relative to the advisability of establishing a bounty system of rewards for VC leaders on a dead-or-alive basis in SVN. Based on recommendations from SECSTATE, the Mission Council in Saigon appointed an ad hoc committee at the end of 1964 to study the proposal and make suggestions on possible implementation. This committee consisted of representatives of USIS, USAID, the Embassy, USMACV, [redacted] [13] 1.3(a)(4)

(S) By mid-January 1965, the committee had completed its study and recommended that a pilot bounty program be established. It was suggested that the program be implemented in four areas: Quang Ngai Province, Tay Ninh Province, Long An/Hau Nghia Provinces, and Quang Tri Province. Two of these areas were considered to be under heavy VC influence, and the two others were, for the most part under government control. The test program would be conducted over a six-month period, with rewards from 200,000 piasters to 500,000 piasters being paid for a select number of VC leaders dead or alive. Under this plan the USMACV J2 would be responsible for cataloging and identifying VC personnel in order to prepare a want list. [14]

(S) After staffing, USMACV J2 did not concur with his assigned role, as the identification function would provide, in effect, undesirable overt US participation. [15] Other agencies were also given tasks, to include the GVN Minister of Interior, through the NP, for [redacted] overall coordination; [redacted] and psywar agencies for program publicity. [16] On 20 March 1965, COMUSMACV concurred with this version of the plan. [17] In April, the entire Mission Council approved the plan; however, implementation was delayed owing to a "political vaccum" within the GVN. [18]

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Civic Action [redacted]

(C) The third major RVNAF psywar program concerned civic action, which aimed at gaining the loyalty, and maintaining the support of the citizenry. The VN connotation of "civic action" was far more comprehensive than the normal usage: It included not only tangible projects, but also the spoken or written word which contributed to the strength and welfare of the nation (see also RVNAF MILCAP below).

RVNAF Military Civic Action Program

(C) Most of the then government leaders in the Diem government seemed to fail to recognize the true nature of psywar. This resulted in a lack of guidance to RVNAF personnel concerning development of wholesome relations between military personnel and the local population. Although subsequent governments increasingly appreciated this aspect of the counterinsurgency effort, they nevertheless only gradually translated these beliefs into direct actions. Limited funds and resources also hampered their actions. Although the office of the prime minister had accepted on 12 March 1965, a US draft proposal of an integrated RVNAF MILCAP decree for study, it had not been finalized at the end of the year.

(U) The RVNAF MILCAP was administered at the JGS level by the Psywar Directorate of the GPWD. The program included information and education, entertainment, gifts, repair and construction, and indemnification for damages and losses due to combat operations. For the VN, the "civic action" concept connoted not only tangible projects, which benefited the local populace, but also the spoken word and leaflet, which was intended to gain the people's respect for the GVN.

(C) In CY 64 the RVNAF MILCAP was supported by 100 million piasters; in CY 65 by 70 million piasters. The 1965 RVNAF MILCAP, which was approved by the Chief, JGS, on 2 March, included provisions for an indemnification program to compensate for deaths, injuries, and loss or damage to property caused by RVNAF activities. COMUSMACV, in a letter dated 7 July, recommended that the memorandum be changed to include US and other FWMAF. This change was effected by RVNAF JGS Memo 2415 dated 17 August. Indemnification funds were allocated from the MILCAP program of the RVN defense budget; money for the program came from AID-generated funds.

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(U) According to GPWD Memorandum No. 263, Subject: Use of 1965 MILCAP Funds, civic actions were to be planned and executed in terms of timeliness, real usefulness (avoiding luxury items) and direct benefit to intended recipients (avoiding intermediaries). The RF/PF were the primary agencies for undertaking MILCAP within the provinces. As the military situation permitted, the regular armed forces would also be used in civic action programs. Emphasis would be placed on the use of military managerial/technical skills and equipment. When selection was possible, the regular forces would undertake civic action programs in areas where VC activities were greater.

(U) The contribution of civic action accomplishments to the overall counterinsurgency effort was officially recognized by ranking RVNAF authorities on 2 September. Following discussions with COMUSMACV, CJGS issued an order of the day in which he noted that the recent victories throughout the RVN might be attributed basically to the awareness of the military forces of their mission to destroy the enemy, and the fact that the people had voluntarily helped the armed forces in its operations. He further stated that these wholesome developments could be enhanced by ensuring the close solidarity between the armed forces and the people, by respecting the spirit of discipline in the armed forces and by eliminating tendencies toward arrogance and irresponsibility.[20]

Medical Civic Action Program

(C) US field advisors indicated that among civic action projects, none had a more immediate and dramatic effect than the MEDCAP. Apart from the purely medical aspects of the program, the appearance of military medical personnel in rural areas vividly portrayed the government's concern for the welfare of the people and created a favorable image of the military forces. Medical teams effectively induced interest among villagers and provided a ready audience for GVN messages and appeals. In early 1965, RVNAF medical personnel were performing about 75 percent of all treatments under the supervision of US medical personnel. Consideration was being given to a phase-out of the US MEDCAP activities, whereupon VN personnel would take over. MEDCAP program supplies were funded and provided by USAID and distributed through RVNAF medical depots. The US MEDCAP was under the supervision of the USMACV Surgeon.[21]

(C) VNN authorities converted an LSM to an austere hospital ship in February 1965. Staffed with a medical/dental team and preventive medicine respresentatives, the LSM (H) made possible the novel extension of the RVNAF MEDCAP among junk divisions and islands in the Gulf of Thailand and along the coast. During the year the LSM (H) medically treated thousands of civilians and

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military and paramilitary personnel and their dependents. In March 1965, a US medical mobile training team arrived in-country and boarded the LSM (H) for a six-month training and assistance program with their VNN counterparts. A psywar team was often on board and gave cultural shows and other types of entertainment. Soap, food and clothing were also distributed. [22]

(U) A US-ARVN MEDCAP using the railroad to distribute food, clothing and medical assistance on a scheduled basis, (called "Operation Rail Aid"), was held along the railway line between Saigon and Xuan Loc in October 1965. About 1,500 patients were treated. [23] Toward the end of 1965, this program had to be curtailed because of non-availability of rolling stock.

(C) In April 1965, the USA Surgeon General's office considered a plan to expand MEDCAP activities by deploying a mobile dispensary team to each RVN province, each team to consist of three doctors and 15-20 enlisted men. However, smaller teams operating in fixed locations were subsequently considered to be more practical. USAID USMACV Joint Directive 4-65 concerning the Military Provincial Hospital Assistance Program (MILPHAP), was published on 20 December. This program emphasized the use of US military medical personnel to treat VN civilians in civilian medical institutions. In addition to providing immediate medical aid to the VN and support in raising the standards of training of VN medical personnel, this program augmented the MEDCAP by improving the GVN medical referral system. [24] At the end of 1965, there were six US teams, consisting of 16 men each, two teams each operating in I and IV CTZ's, and one team each in II and III Corps. Programmed for deployment in 1966 were 18 additional teams, nine US and nine from Free World nations.

(U) USMACV Directive 40-9, dated 29 September 1965, concerning MEDCAP was superseded by a revised issue dated 28 December 1965. This revision provided substantially different guidance for the participation of an increasing number of US and FWMAF units of battalion and larger size. The treatment of VN civilians by US military personnel through RVNAF counterparts was defined as MEDCAP I and when conducted directly, was known as MEDCAP II.

(C) MEDCAP I was conducted by medical service personnel assigned as advisors or by personnel of Special Forces detachments or other small units, primarily in insecure areas, to foster mutual respect and cooperation among RVNAF personnel, GVN civilian health representatives and the people. US personnel were to encourage RVNAF medical personnel to undertake MEDCAP activities without US personnel support and to persuade RVNAF personnel that they would eventually be expected to assume

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complete responsibility for the program. MEDCAP II projects required approval by the pertinent provincial government, the USAID provincial representative, the USMACV sector advisor and, finally, by the USMACV Surgeon. 25

(C) VN medically treated by US military personnel during 1965 (excluding those treated in the MILPHAP) totaled 5,993,214. Total cost was $924,549.44. (In 1964, 2,705,898 had been treated at a cost of $583,091.) The average cost for the entire MEDCAP at the end of year was 19 cents per patient.

RAND Corporation Research Projects

(C) Local attempts to expand USMACV's capability in propaganda research analysis in early 1965 were unsuccessful, since the program lacked depth, system and expertise. In February 1965, COMUSMACV sought the support of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, (International Security Affairs) (OASD/ISA) in conducting a research project on VC vulnerabilities. The Rand (Research and Development) Corporation, a non-profit organization providing DOD with technical and scientific research services, agreed to undertake the proposed project. In March 1965, COMUSMACV felt that the Rand plan for conducting the study appeared to be responsive to MACV requirements. It was expected that the results of these studies would be helpful in formulating plans to exploit VC vulnerabilities through psychological operations (psyops).

(C) In December 1965, the Rand staff in SVN consisted of 13 US research workers (eight on long-term projects), two secretaries, and 12 Vietnamese interrogators and clerk-typists. Rand publications during 1965 for ARPA and OASD/ISA which were useful references for USMACV's propaganda and operations research efforts included: 1) RM-4482-ARPA, G. C. Hickey: The American Military Advisory and his Foreign Counterpart: The Case of Vietnam, March 1965, (C); 2) RM-4517-ISA, Leon Goure: Some Impressions of the Effects of Military Operations on Viet Cong Behavior, March 1965, (C); 3) RM-4552-ARPA, R. Michael Pearce: Evolution of a Vietnamese Village - Part I: The Present, After Eight Months of Pacification, April 1965, (C); 4) RM-4402-ARPA, C. V. Sturdevant: Additional Insight on the Military Situation in South Vietnam Relative to Prior Years, July 1965 (C); and 5) RM-4699-ISA, Leon Goure and CAH Thompson: Some Impressions of Viet Cong Vulnerabilities: An Interim Report, (Advance Copy) August 1965, (C).

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Leaflet Operations

(C) In early April 1965, the Vietnam Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee headed by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs and composed of representatives from the Department of State, DOD, JCS, USIA, USAID, DIA and CIA approved in principle the US Ambassador's proposal for regular but random psyops against NVN. These operations were to be conducted by CINCPAC, using the resources of both RVN and US forces. A US Mission Psyops Committee was formed chaired by the JUSPAO Director. Initially, JUSPAO was primarily concerned with coordination of media content with the GVN and leaflet development, the US Embassy political section with policy considerations, and POLWAR with targeting, delivery means and other technical aspects of the program.

(C) Leaflet drops up until early July were made primarily in the heavily populated cities and towns along the NVN coast from the 17th parallel to the edge of the Red River delta. The leaflets explained why certain targets were being struck and warned the people to move away from potential targets. In mid-1965, two other types of leaflet operations were authorized: Those which reinforced ROLLING THUNDER strikes, and those designed to achieve other psychological objectives. An NVN Leaflet Targeting Group was formed with US Embassy, JUSPAO and POLWAR participation to coordinate the more fully expanded overt psyops against NVN.

(U) The US Mission Council, on 12 July, approved a JUSPAO-prepared 3-month (15 July - 15 October) leaflet drop program designed to warn NVN citizenry to stay away from probable target areas, to explain the necessity of such bombings, to place the blame for them on the NVN government, and to agitate the NVN citizenry against their government and its policies. Leaflet themes were designed to invoke the appropriate sentiments of the people on specific national and religious holidays. For example, the theme of Leaflet 21 cited national hero Tran Binh Tong's willingness to "be a Vietnamese ghost rather than King of China," and that when the CHICOM-influenced Lao Dong Party cease its aggression in the south, all would live in peace. The target areas were mostly in the Red River delta, to include populated areas, the major routes to Hanoi and Haiphong and the outskirts of those two cities.

(S) The psyops campaign for the six months ending 15 October, which involved dropping about 44,268,000 leaflets and 10,000 small gift packages over 90 target areas, was considered

to be a success by the US Inter-Agency Committee. This evaluation was based on the following facts: 1) air-dropped data and radio broadcasts had reached a wide audience in NVN, 2) NVN officials admitted that some "backward elements" had been enticed by the gifts and duped by the broadcasts, 3) some inquisitive people had become propaganda disseminators, 4) morale among NVN citizenry had apparently been adversely affected, and 5) NVN officials expressed serious concern over the "deceitful propaganda arguments" and the need for countering such efforts. The most significant factors involved in the apparent lowering of the morale appeared to be the continued selective bombing of military and economic targets, the hardships and dislocations caused by such bombings, and the factual data contained in the leaflets.

(TS) In addition to the general success of leaflet operations in NVN, the program also provided valuable experience in terms of coordinating the complex mechanical aspects involving printing in Okinawa, centralized storage and bomb loading in Saigon and Bien Hoa, delivery of bombs to Korat and Da Nang, procedures for use of various dissemination techniques, joint targeting, fragging (ordering) leaflet missions, debriefing missions, etc. During 1965, 77 million leaflets, 340,000 newspapers, and 20,000 gift packages were dropped over NVN. [27]

(TS) Toward the end of 1965, plans were jointly prepared by the US Embassy and JUSPAO for a systematic three-month psyops campaign against NVA infiltrators in NVN staging areas, along various points of infiltration routes in the eastern Panhandle of Laos and staging areas within the RVN. [28] These plans were complicated by restrictions based on political considerations.

Community Relations and the Refugee Problem

(U) In view of the buildup of US and FWMAF in the RVN, and the attendant increased possibilities for untoward incidents to occur, COMUSMACV instituted a Community Relations Program [29] to encourage good relations between the VN people and their foreign guests, and to establish means by which VC efforts to exploit unfortunate incidents might be negated. In early June 1965, the US Ambassador requested GVN's assistance in organizing a Community Relations Committee in each major city to include US, RVNAF and FWMAF representatives, plus GVN officials and local civic and business leaders. [30] In addition to the cities of Saigon, Hue, Vung Tau, Bien Hoa, Da Nang and Qui Nhon, these committees were also formed in the provinces of Quang Tin and Quang Ngai in I CTZ and Ban Me Thuot, Kontum and Pleiku in II CTZ. The committees were primarily concerned with maintenance of discipline, prevention of incidents, amicable solutions to

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disputes, the reception and resettlement of refugees and enhancement of public relations.

(C) USAID had the primary responsibility for advising, assisting and supporting GVN non-military governmental organs and thus had the primary US civil affairs responsibility in RVN. Programmed USMACV/CA operations were limited to base areas and were restricted in scope to those government functions which had a direct bearing on the welfare of US/FWMAF efforts, e.g., public safety. In areas adjacent to or away from base areas, US tactical unit CA requirements were met by working with the existing GVN and local officials through the sector and subsector advisory detachments. The Community Relations Committee, or Friendship Council, served as the primary forum for discussions with local government officials. Although US commanders were not responsible for the civilian population during operations, a refugee relief team (six officers, two EM) was attached to each brigade or regiment during operations to manage refugees in situations when GVN agencies were not effective. 31

(U) With increased VC terrorism, a series of natural disasters and the intensification of military activities in SVN, the number of refugees rose to 735,858 as of 5 December 1965, which constituted nearly five percent of the total RVN population. At the national level USAID had primary responsibility for refugee relief. Every effort was made to turn those refugees into a natural asset and to resettle them in their original hamlets if possible. Coordination of refugee relief activities at the provincial level was the responsibility of the Provincial Committee, augmented by social welfare and rural construction representatives.

(U) USMACV sector advisors assisted the USAID provincial representatives in coordination of US refugee relief assistance, through use of subsector advisory teams to assist and support GVN refugee relief operations, and by using USMACV refugee relief teams to supplement GVN operations when necessary. 32

(U) The refugee program was conceived not only in terms of providing the material and medical needs of refugees, but, more essentially, their needs for confidence in themselves and the GVN, for security for self and family and for hope of a better life. Refugees were returned to their home village or relocated only after 1) they received adequate training and equipment, 2) adequate security had been established and refugees were prepared to defend themselves, 3) the provincial structure in the area of resettlement was capable and willing to administer the needs of such hamlets and villages, and 4) they were informed of various GVN socio-economic services available to them.

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(C) The 41st USA CA Company, composed of 16 refugee teams, specifically tailored for operation in RVN, was placed under the operational control of FFORCEV to provide FWMAF tactical units with a capability to manage refugees from military actions. Four teams were attached to III MAF and three teams were attached to the 1st Inf Div. Logistic support for refugee operations were normally drawn from GVN/USAID stocks. 33 As of 5 December, 282,191 refugees had been resettled while 453,667 were in temporary shelters.

Rural Surface Water Supply Program

(U) In April 1964, a Joint US/GVN task force was organized by USAID to manage the RVN Rural Water Supply Program, primarily in surface water purification projects. USA engineers and USAID advisors were providing equipment, logistic support and essential direction to this program. The GVN would take over full operation of the program when it developed the capability.

(C) The 539th Engineer Battalion, Okinawa, provided USA Engineer Control Advisory Detachments (ECAD) on a 6-month TDY basis to support this operation. Four three-man ECAD's were working with USAID Public Works Department in advising and assisting the GVN. Local labor was used on all projects, and local personnel were trained in the operation and maintenance of equipment. As of 31 December 1965, 12 projects in IV CTZ and one in II CTZ had been completed, four were in progress and 18 scheduled to start through May 1966. Capacity of systems varied from 25-50 gallons per minute. 34

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Monthy Chieu Hoi Returnees, 1965

Month	Returnees
January	406
February	467
March	489
April	532
May	1,015
June	1,089
July	687
August	1,571*
September	1,068
October	1,211
November	1,482
December	1,106
TOTAL	11,123

*898 of these 1,571 returnees were the KKK (Khmer Kampuchea Korm) of Cambodian origin, known as the "Foulard Blancs" (White Scarves).

Table L-1

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1. Fact Sheet, US Adv to RVNAF Polwar School, 20 Jan 66, Subj: UW and Psychological Operations Forces and Resources, (C) (Data on GPWD in this section basically from this Fact Sheet.)
2. Ibid.
3. Memo, GPWD, 16 Apr 65, Subj: Polwar School, (C).
4. Fact Sheet, MACV, 25 Sept 65, Subj: RVNAF Polwar School, (C).
5. MILREP, MACV, 18-25 Sep 65, (S).
6. Fact Sheet, MACV, 22 Apr 65, Subj: Chieu Hoi Program, (U).
7. Report, USAID, Subj: Support of Office of Provincial Operations, 430-11-999-288, (U).
8. Interview, with Mr. John Perry, USOM, by Capt E. S. Gregory, MHB, on 11 Oct 65, (C).
9. Task Force Report, US Mission Council, 10 Aug 65, Subj: Chieu Hoi Program, (C).
10. Interview, with Mr. Robert J. Burnes, USOM, by Capt E. S. Gregory, MHB, 11 Jan 66, (C).
11. Ibid.
12. Msg, COMUSMACV, 180135Z Dec 65, (C).
13. Office Memo, Jack A. Herbert, USEMB, 29 Dec 64, (C).
14. Report, US Mission Council, 6 Feb 65, Subj: A Pilot Bounty Program for Vietnam, (S).
15. Ibid.
16. Memo, MACJ2, 6 Feb 65, Subj: Recommended Actions Plans for Pilot Bounty Program, (S).
17. Memo, COMUSMACV, 30 Mar 65, (S).
18. Msg, COMUSMACV, 15 Apr 65, (S), Memo, E. H. Adkins, 29 Jun 65, (S).
19. [redacted]
20. MACJ3 Mon Hist Rep, Sep 65, (S).
21. Fact Sheet, MACV, Subj: Polwar Relationship to Voluntary Agencies, 4 Aug 65, (C).
22. Historical Review, NAVGP, Subj: US NAVGP Activities, CY 1965, (S).
23. MACV Surgeon Mon Hist Rep, Oct 65, (U).
24. Ibid, Dec 65, (U).
25. Ibid.
26. Msg, COMUSMACV, 271315Z Oct 65, (S).
27. MACJ3 Mon Hist Rep, Dec 65, (S).
28. Operations Memo, JUSPAO, 22 Dec 65, Subj: Three-Month Plan for Psychological Operations for DRV Infiltrators, (TS).
29. Directive, MACV, No. 551-3, 5 Jun 65, Subj: Foreign Nationals Community Relations: Community Relations Committee Friendship Councils, (U).
30. Fact Sheet, MACV, MACJ1, Subj: Community Relations, 30 Sep 65, (U).
31. Ltr, COMUSMACV, No. 01046, 26 Oct 65, Subj: Concept for Military Civic Action and Military Civil Affairs in RVN, (C).

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32. Directive, USOM/MACV/JUSPAO, No. 3-65, 30 Oct 65, Subj: Refugees, (U).
33. Ltr, COMUSMACV, No. 01487, 16 Nov 65, Subj: Refugee Relief Teams for FWMAF Tactical Units, (U).
34. Fact Sheet, MACJ3, 30 Jan 66, Subj: Military Participation in USAID/GVN Rural Surface Water Supply Program, (U).
35. Figure, MACPO, Jan 66, Subj: Returnees, (U).

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(C) Until the decisions were made to employ US and FWMAF in offensive combat operations, USMACV's primary means of influencing the conduct and outcome of the war in Vietnam was through MAP and the advisory effort. Because of the limited US participation in combat operations, the scope of J2 activities was also limited. In essence, the J2 mission at that time was to support and improve the Vietnamese intelligence effort and to keep COMUSMACV, CINCPAC, and the US national agencies informed of the intelligence situation. The bulk of the intelligence acquired was funneled into J2 through the advisory system, [redacted] and from the 5th SFG. Unilateral US collection resources were limited to special intelligence activities, photo and visual reconnaissance, Radio Direction Finding and IR and SLAR reconnaissance. These resources were provided on a very austere basis.

(S) At the time of the SECDEF visit to USMACV in mid-July, it became apparent that the rapid increase in US forces approved by the SECDEF would require additional intelligence support in all areas and phases of the intelligence cycle.

(C) The J2 mission mushroomed to include providing combat intelligence for US units and support for an intensive B-52 bombing program. At the same time, it became necessary to intensify the intelligence effort in the other areas of USMACV intelligence interest: NVN, Laos, Cambodia, and South China.

(TS) In the area of air targeting, not only were the ARC LIGHT targets validated (see Chapter IV) by the J2, but the out-of-country air programs in Laos and NVN were supported by in-country targeting. [redacted]

During the month of December 1965 the personnel requirements of the Reconnaissance Branch of J2 were expanded to provide support for TIGER HOUND strike/reconnaissance operations. Reconnaissance Branch was responsible for providing personnel support in order to establish an intelligence collection base for the TIGER HOUND program, and certain assigned personnel functioned directly in the immediate TIGER HOUND operations area. The J2 also provided targeting support of US/FWMAF ground operations. Such unilateral operations as STARLIGHT, UTAH, and SILVER BAYONET were based on intelligence processed by the US intelligence community. [redacted]

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[redacted]

(C) In order to cope with the expanded J2 mission of support of US/FWMAF offensive operations and unilateral activities, it was necessary to reorganize the J2 staff to provide better supervision of joint and combined intelligence activities and to divorce the J2 from the administration of intelligence organizational activities.

(U) The Management Division performed managerial functions for the J2, USMACV, and provided the focal point for the intelligence programs, budgets, procedures and resources. This division developed policy and exercised general staff supervision of intelligence ADP applications and equipment. This division also included the Office of RVNAF Intelligence Affairs, which concentrated on relationships with the Vietnamese intelligence organization.

(C) The Intelligence Division was responsible for all intelligence production activities. It also exercised staff supervision over the intelligence center which was the US element of a combined USMACV/RVNAF intelligence production facility. This facility, known as the Combined Intelligence Center, Vietnam (CICV), brought together in teams all of the tools, skills and special talents of both US and RVNAF intelligence specialists -- order of battle, area analysis, imagery interpretation and technical intelligence. The establishment of this center reversed the trend toward isolation of targeting activities by concentrating all available resources for the solution of intelligence problems across the board. Most of the personnel manning the CICV were provided by the 519th MI Battalion, assigned to USARV. The director and key supervisory personnel however were assigned to the Intelligence Division.

(U) The Plans and Training Division prepared, developed, coordinated, and maintained policies and requirements relating to the intelligence portion of contingency plans. It also had staff responsibility for mapping, charting, geodesy, and intelligence training. This division advised J2, JGS on the RVNAF mapping program, and on matters pertaining to RVNAF intelligence training and schools.

(C) The Intelligence Operations Division planned, coordinated, supervised and evaluated the USMACV intelligence collection effort and represented the J2 on all interagency committees concerned with collection or exploitation activities.

[redacted]

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(U) The Counterintelligence Division was responsible for the supervision of offensive and defensive counterintelligence matters.

(U) The Meteorological Officer compiled and presented meteorological briefings, reports, estimates and other natural environmental information of intelligence and operational interest in Southeast Asia.

(U) The Foreign Liaison Office was created to perform intelligence liaison with foreign military attaches.

(C) The Special Assistant for RVNAF Affairs was the principal representative of J2, USMACV to the J2 of the JGS, and served as the primary advisor to J2, USMACV on all matters affecting US/GVN relations.

(C) US/RVNAF intelligence relationships can be illustrated by two examples: 1) the Special Military Intelligence Activities Team (SMIAT) which collected information of intelligence value by clandestine means. SMIAT also had the mission of advising the direction of clandestine collection activities of the RVNAF 924th Support Group. 2) The 704th INTC Det which had a counter intelligence mission and also advised the Vietnamese Military Security Service (MSS).

(C) The US combat intelligence flow was similar to the RVNAF effort and was, in effect, a parallel system of reporting. In the fields of processing and production, the CICV was a joint US/RVNAF effort and interrogations were conducted on a bilateral basis.

Footnotes

1. Material contained in Annex M is derived principally from the MACVJ2 Briefing given to Maj Gen Davis, ACSI, DA, 10 Dec 65.

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ANNEX N
(Published Separately)

[redacted]

GLOSSARY

	AATT	Australian Army Training Team
	Abn	Airborne
	ACC	Army Component Command (er)
	ACofS	Assistant Chief of Staff
	ACTIV	Army Concept Team in Vietnam
	ACY	Armed Combat Youth
	AD	Air Division
	AF	Air Force
	AFAG	Air Force Advisory Group
	AFB	Air Force Base
	AFC	Armed Forces Council
	AFCC	Air Force Component Command (er)
	AFLC	Air Force Logistics Command
	AFRS	Armed Forces Radio Service
	AFSC	Air Force Systems Command
	AFTU-V	Air Force Test Unit, Vietnam
	AIK	Assistance-in-kind
	ALO	Air Liaison Officer
	AM	Alluminum Matting
	AMB	Ambassador
	AMEMB	American Embassy
	ANGLICO	Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company
	ANZAC	Australian New Zealand Army Corps
	AOC	Air Operations Center
	AP	Associated Press
	APC	Armored Personnel Carrier
	ARC	American Red Cross
	ARPA	Advanced Research Projects Agency
	ARVN	Army Republic of Vietnam
	ASOC	Air Support Operations Center
	ATCO	Air Transport Coordinating Office
	Bde	Brigade
	BEQ	Bachelor Enlisted Quarters
	BLT	Battalion Landing Team
	BOQ	Bachelor Officers Quarters
	Brig Gen	Brigadier General
	BRJ	Brown-Root-Jones
	CA	Civil Affairs
	CAG	Civic Action Group
	CAD	Corps Advisory Detachment
(C)	CAS	Controlled American Source
	CBU	Cluster Bomb Unit
	CCRSFF (D)	Commander, Central Region SEATO Field Forces, (Designate)
	CDTCV	Combat Development Test Center, Vietnam
	CG	Commanding General
	CH	Chief

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[redacted]

CHAFAG	Chief Air Force Advisory Group
CHICOM	Chinese Communist
CHINAT	Chinese Nationalist
CHJUSMAGPHIL	Chief, Joint United States Military Advisory Group, Philippines
CHJUSMAGTHAI	Chief, Joint US Military Advisory Group Thailand
CHNAVGP	Chief, Naval Advisory Group
CHP	Chieu Hoi Program
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CICV	Combined Intelligence Center - Vietnam
CIDG	Civilian Irregular Defense Group
CINCPAC	Commander in Chief Pacific
CINCPACFLT	Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet
CINCRVNAF	Commander in Chief Vietnamese Armed Forces
CINCSAC	Commander in Chief Strategic Air Command
CINCSTRIKE	Commander in Chief Strike Command
CINCVNN	Commander in Chief Vietnamese Navy
CJCS	Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
CJGS	Chief Joint General Staff
CLASSES OF SUPPLY	
Class I	Rations
Class II	Clothing and Equipment
Class III	POL
Class IV	Organizational Equipment and Fortification Material
Class V	Ammunition
CMR	Capital Military Region
CN	Riot Control Agent
CNO	Chief of Naval Operations
CO	Commanding Officer
COC	Combat Operations Center
CofSA	Chief of Staff, US Army
COMAAFV	Commander, Australian Army Forces, Vietnam
COMNEWZEDV	Commander, New Zealand Assistance Detachment, Vietnam
COMNZAFFE	Commander, New Zealand Army Forces Far East
COMPHILMAGV	Commander, Philippine Military Assistance Group Vietnam
COMMAGROCV	Commander, Military Assistance Group, Republic of China, Vietnam
COMROKFV	Commander, Republic of Korea Forces, Vietnam
COMROKMAGV	Commander, Republic of Korea Military Assistance Group, Vietnam
COMSEVENTHFLT	Commander, Seventh Fleet

COMSTSFE	Commander, Military Sea Transport Service Far East
COMUSKOREA	Commander, United States Forces, Korea
COMUSMACTHAI	Commander, United States Military Assistance Command, Thailand
COMUSMACV	Commander, United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
COMUSSEASIA	Commander, US Forces, Southeast Asia
CONUS	Continental United States
COSURVFOR	Coastal Surveillance Force
COSVN	Central Office for South Vietnam
CRRC	Central Rural Reconstruction Council
CS	Riot Control Agent
CSAF	Chief of Staff, US Air Force
CTF	Commander Task Force
CTF-77	Commander Task Force 77
CTOC	Corps Tactical Operations Center
CTZ	Corps Tactical Zone
CVA	Aircraft Carrier, Large Attack
CW	Continuous Wave
CY	Calendar Year
DA	Department of the Army
DAML	Directorate, Army MAP Logistics
DCA	Defense Communications Agency
DCNO	Deputy Chief of Naval Operations
DCS	Defense Communications System
DCSLOG	Deputy Chief of Staff, Logistics
DCSOPS	Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations
DEPCOMUSMACTHAI	Deputy Commander United States Military Assistance Command, Thailand
DEPCOMUSMACV	Deputy Commander United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
DGRR	Directorate General for Rural Reconstruction
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
DMZ	Demilitarized Zone
DOD	Department of Defense
ECAD	Engineer Control Advisory Detachment
ECM	Electronic Counter Measures
EMBTEL	Embassy Telegram
FAC	Forward Air Controller
FAR	Force Armee Royaume
FATOC	Field Army Tactical Operations Center
FFORCEV	Field Force, Vietnam
FMFPAC	US Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
FOM	French Patrol Boat
FSCC	Fire Support Coordination Center
FSO	Foreign Service Officer
FULRO	United Front for the Struggle of Oppressed Races

FWMAF	Free World Military Assistance Forces
FWMAO	Free World Military Assistance Office
FWMAPC	Free World Military Assistance Policy Council
GLO	Gun Liaison Officer
GNZ	Government of New Zealand
GO	General Order
GOA	Government of Australia
GOK	Government of Korea
GOP	Government of the Philippines
GOS	Government of Spain
GPW	Geneva Prisoners of War Convention
GPWD	General Political Warfare Department
GRC	Government of the Republic of China
GVN	Government of Vietnam
HEDSUPPACT	Headquarters, Support Activity, Saigon (HSAS)
HIS	Heliborne Illumination System
HMM	Medium Helicopter
HNC	High National Council
HQ	Headquarters
HQ COMDT	Headquarters Commandant
HSAS	Headquarters, Support Activity, Saigon, (HEDSUPPACT)
ICC	International Control Commission
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IMAO	International Military Assistance Office
INTC	Intelligence Corps
IR	Infrared
ISA	International Security Agency
IWCS	Integrated Wideband Communications System
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JGS	Joint General Staff (RVNAF)
JRATA	Joint Research and Test Agency
JSOP	Joint Strategic Objectives Plan
JTACC	Joint Tactical Air Control Center
JTD	Joint Table of Distribution
JTOC	Joint Tactical Operations Center
JUSMACTHAI	Joint US Military Assistance Advisory Group, Thailand
JUSPAO	Joint US Public Affairs Office
KIA	Killed in Action
LAAM	Light Anti-aircraft Missile
LARC	Lighter, Amphibious Resupply Cargo
LCM	Landing Ship Mechanized
LCP	Landing Craft, Personnel
LCPL	Landing Craft Personnel Light
LCU	Landing Craft Utility
LCVP	Landing Craft Vehicle, Personnel
LLDB	Vietnamese Special Forces
LO	Liaison Officer

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LOI	Letter of Instruction
LOC	Line(s) of Communication
Log Comd	Logistical Command
LSD	Landing Ship Dock
LSIL	Landing Ship Infantry Large
LSM	Landing Ship Medium
LSM(H)	Landing Ship Medium, Hospital
LSSL	Landing Ship Support Large
LST	Landing Ship Tank
LTR	Letter
LZ	Landing Zone
MAAG	Military Assistance Advisory Group
MAC	Marine Amphibious Corps
MACPD	Military Assistance Command Political Warfare Advisory Directorate
MACSOG	Military Assistance Command Studies and Observation Group
MACV	Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
MAF	Marine Amphibious Force
MAG	Marine Air Group
MAGROCV	Military Advisory Group, Government of the Republic of China
Maj Gen	Major General
MAP	Military Assistance Program
MARADVU	Marine Advisory Unit
MASH	Mobile Army Surgical Hospital
MATS	Military Air Transport Service
MAW	Marine Air Wing
MCB	Mobile Construction Battalion
MEB	Marine Expeditionary Brigade
MEDCAP	Medical Civic Action Program
MEF	Marine Expeditionary Force
MEMO	Memorandum
MHB	Military History Branch
MHE	Materials Handling Equipment
MIA	Missing in Action
MIG	Communist Jet Fighter
MILCAP	Military Civic Action Program
MILCON	Military Construction
MILPHAP	Military Provincial Hospital Assistance Program
MONEVAL	Monthly Evaluation Report
MP	Military Police
MSG	Message
MSS	Military Security Service
MSTS	Military Sea Transport Service
MSTSPE	Military Sea Transport Service, Far East.
M/T	Measurement Ton
NAVGP	Naval Advisory Group

NAVPHIBASE	Naval Amphibious Base
NAVSUPPACT	Naval Support Activity
NCC	Naval Component Command (er)
NGF	Naval Gunfire
NGFS	Naval Gunfire Support
NGLO	Naval Gunfire Liaison Officer
NLC	National Legislative Council
NLF	National Liberation Front
NMCC	National Military Command Center
NP	National Police
NPFF	National Police Field Force
NRDU	Naval Research & Development Unit
NRDUV	Naval Research & Development Unit, Vietnam
NSA	National Security Agency
NTC	National Training Center
NVA	North Vietnam Army
NVN	North Vietnam (ese)
OASD	Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
OICC	Officer in Charge of Construction
OPLAN	Operations Plan
OSA	Office of Special Assistant
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
OSD/ARPARDFUV	Projects Agency, Research and Development Forward Unit, Vietnam
OSI	Office of Special Investigations (USAF)
O&T	Organization and Training
PACAF	US Air Forces, Pacific
PACFLT	Pacific Fleet
PACOM	Pacific Command
PACV	Patrol Air-Cushion Boats
PBR	River Patrol Boat
PCF	Patrol Craft Fast
PCS	Permanent Changes of Station
PF	Popular Force
PL	Pathet Lao
POL	Petroleum, Oil and Lubricants
POLWAR	Political Warfare
POLWARADDIR	Political Warfare Advisory Directorate
PW	Prisoner of War
PRC	Pathfinder, Reconnaissance and Combat
PSYOPS	Psychological Operations
PSYWAR	Psychological Warfare
PTT	Postes, Telegraphes, Telephones
PWS	Political Warfare School

[redacted]

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RAAF	Royal Australian Air Force
RAG	River Assault Group
RAR	Royal Australian Regiment
RDFU	Research and Development Field Unit
REGT	Regiment
RF	Regional Force
RLAF	Royal Laotian Air Force
RLF	Royal Laotian Forces
RLG	Royal Laotian Government
RLT	Regimental Landing Team
RMK	Raymond-Morrison-Knudsen
ROC	Republic of China
ROCMAGV	Republic of China, Military Assistance Group, Vietnam
ROK	Republic of Korea
ROKFV	Republic of Korea Forces, Vietnam
ROKMACV	Republic of Korea, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
ROP	Republic of the Philippines
RPC	River Patrol Craft
RR	Recoilless Rifle
R&R	Rest and Recuperation
RSSZ	Rung Sat Special Zone
RTAF	Royal Thai Air Force
RTF	Reconnaissance Task Force
RTG	Royal Thai Government
RVN	Republic of Vietnam
RVNAF	Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces
SAC	Strategic Air Command
SAFOI	Secretary of the Air Force, Office of Information
SAM	Surface to Air Missile
SAPOV	Sub-Area Petroleum Office, Vietnam
SAR	Search and Rescue
SATS	Short Airfield Tactical Strip
SDS	Supplemental Data Sheet(s)
SEACOORD	Southeast Asia Coordinating Council
SEAL	Sea, Air, Land
SEASIA	Southeast Asia
SEATO	Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
SECDEF	Secretary of Defense
SECSTATE	Secretary of State
SFCP	Shore Fire Control Party
SFG	Special Forces Group
SLAR	Side Looking Airborne Radar
SLF	Special Landing Force
SLO	Senior Liaison Officer
SMIA[redacted]	Special Military Intelligence Activities Team

[redacted]

[redacted]

SOFA	Status of Forces Agreement
STAR	Speed Thru Air Supply
STATEDEPT	Department of State
SVN	South Vietnam
SWIFT	A 50-foot, 32 knot, radar equipped, aluminum boat.
SYNCOM	Synchronous Communications Satellite
TAC	Tactical Air Command
TACC	Tactical Air Control Center
TACS	Tactical Air Control System
TAOR	Tactical Area of Responsibility
TD	Table of Distribution
TDY	Temporary Duty
TF	Task Force
TMA	Traffic Management Agency
TOC	Tactical Operations Center
TRAC	Target Research and Analysis Center
TSN	Tan Son Nhut
TU	Task Unit
TUCR	Troop Unit Change Request
UBA	United Buddhist Association
UBI	United Buddhist Institute
UDT	Under Water Demolition Team
USAID	US Agency for International Development (United States Operations Mission, USOM- prior to 1966)
USARPAC	US Army Pacific
USARV	US Army, Vietnam
USARYIS	US Army Ryukyus
USATFA	US Army, Task Force Alpha
USASCV	US Army Support Command, Vietnam
USASF	US Army Special Forces
USASTRATCOM	US Army Strategic Communication Command
USASWS	US Army Special Warfare School
USCG	US Coast Guard
USEMB	US Embassy
USIA	US Information Agency
USIS	US Information Service
USMACTHAI	US Military Assistance Command, Thailand
USMACV	US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
USMWR	US Mission Weekly Report(s)
USO	United Service Organization
USOM	United States Operations Mission (preceding January 66)
USPAO	US Public Affairs Office
VC	Viet Cong

VCC	Viet Cong Captive
VCS	Viet Cong Suspects
VFR	Visual Flight Rules
VM	Viet Minh
VMFA	Marine Fighter Attack
VN	Vietnam or Vietnamese
VNAF	Vietnamese Air Force
VNMC	Vietnamese Marine Corps
VNN	Vietnamese Navy
WESTPAC	Western Pacific
WIA	Wounded in Action
WPB	Coast Guard Patrol Boat

1965 CHRONOLOGY

JANUARY

1 US military strength in Vietnam is approximately 23,000.
22 Buddhists demonstrate against RVN Government at US Embassy Saigon.
25 Martial law imposed in Hue after serious disturbances.
27 Lt Gen Nguyen Khanh takes over SVN government from Premier Tran Van Huong in bloodless coup.

FEBRUARY

7 VC attack US compound at Pleiku. First 1965 US air strike against NVN hits Dong Hoi Barracks.
8 President Johnson orders evacuation of US government sponsored dependents from SVN. President Johnson orders Hawk air defense missiles to SVN.
9 First elements of USMC 1st L/AM Bn operational at Da Nang. Gen Khanh names Nguyen Xuan Oanh acting premier.
10 VC blow up US BEQ at Qui Nhon.
15 Dr. Phan Huy Quat named premier, replacing Oanh.
16 Largest VC weapons cache of war to date seized at Vung Ro Bay.
19 Jets used for first time in SVN as USAF B-57's attack VC in Binh Dinh sector. Last US government sponsored dependents flown out of SVN.
22 Maj Gen Tran Van Minh replaces Khanh as CINCRVNAF.
25 600 ROK troops arrive in SVN.
27 US White Paper accuses NVN of deliberate campaign of aggression in SVN.

MARCH

8 First USMC unit (3d Bn, 9th Marines) lands at Da Nang.
15 Highway 19 from Qui Nhon to Pleiku reopened after almost two months without traffic.
19 716th MP Bn arrives in SVN to provide security for US installations.
21 USMACV publicly confirms riot-control agents have been used in SVN.
22 US aircraft hit first NVN radar site.
27 About 30 Claymore type mines accidentally detonated at Plei-Do-Lim Special Forces Camp with heavy casualties.
28 7th Bde undertakes SVN coastal surveillance.
30 US Embassy in Saigon damaged by VC explosives. USAF aircraft strike Dong Hoi airfield, first NVN airfield hit.

APRIL

1 US 1st Log Comd is established.
4 First US planes are shot down by MIG's over NVN.
5 Pacification program renamed Rural Reconstruction under new GVN Central Rural Reconstruction Council.
9 USN jet shoots down MIG over South China Sea southwest of Hainan Island with Sidewinder missile; one USN jet downed by MIG in same dogfight.
14 VNAF planes fly first night attack mission over NVN.
16 First NVN SAM site reported under construction near Hanoi.
19 SECDEF, CINCPAC, CJCS, COMUSMACV at Honolulu conference.

MAY

3 Initial elements of 173d Abn Bde arrive in SVN.
4 US begins 2-day halt of ROLLING THUNDER aerial armed reconnaissance and strike missions over NVN while conducting intensive aerial photo reconnaissance missions.
5 POLWAR Advisory Directorate established within the USMACV staff.
6 SVN Armed Forces Council dissolves itself, votes confidence in Premier Quat.
7 US Marines and Seabees land and begin construction at Chu Lai. III MAF activated under command of Maj Gen W. R. Collins, USMC.
11 VC attack provincial capital of Song Be.
13 US begins 5-day peace move and standdown of ROLLING THUNDER aerial armed reconnaissance and air strike missions over NVN.
14 1st ANGLICO units deployed in SVN. US Embassy announces creation of Joint US Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO).
16 Bien Hoa airbase rocked by series of accidental explosions.
18 US resumes NVN air raids.
20 USS Hamner fires Navy's first NGF mission in SVN.

JUNE

2 Advance party of 1st Bn RAR arrives in SVN.
4. Brig Gen L. W. Walt assumes command of III MAF replacing Maj Gen W. R. Collins.
9 USA combat engineers begin construction of base at Cam Ranh Bay.
10 Battle of Dong Xoai begins with heavy casualties on both sides.
11 Premier Quat resigns.
14 Generals form National Leadership Committee under Maj Gen Nguyen Van Thieu.
16 Explosive charge damages TSN civilian passenger terminal.
17 First MIG's shot down by USN aircraft over NVN.

18 First B-52 bomber raid in SVN.
19 Air Vice Marshall Nguyen Cao Ky assumes premiership.
25 VC mines blast My Canh floating restaurant in Saigon.
27 173d Abn brigade-sized operation in Zone D with ARVN and RAR is first major US ground combat offensive of war.

JULY

1 VC attack Da Nang and Soc Trang air bases.
7 8,000 additional Marines land at Da Nang and Qui Nhon.
8 Gen Taylor resigns as Ambassador to SVN; Henry Cabot Lodge named as successor.
9 SFC Isaac Camacho escapes after 20 months as VC prisoner.
12 2d Bde, 1st Inf Div, begins landing in SVN.
15 USMACV confirms presence of NVA 101st Regiment in SVN.
16 B-52's used in support of ground operation for first time.
SECDEF and Ambassador-designate Lodge arrive in Saigon.
20 US Army Support Command, Vietnam redesignated US Army, Vietnam, with General Westmoreland as commander and Gen Norton as Deputy CG.
SECDEF departs for Washington.
First USCG vessels to see action in combat zone since WW II arrive in RVN
21 New Zealand Field Artillery Btry arrives in SVN.
24 First US aircraft downed by SAM over NVN.
27 US aircraft hit SAM sites in NVN for first time.
28 President Johnson announces US troop strength in Vietnam will rise to 125,000.
USMC and RVNAF forces begin Operation Hac Bo 4, the first combined land operation in the war.
29 1st Bde, 1st Abn Div, lands at Cam Ranh Bay.
30 Ambassador Taylor leaves RVN at end of his tour of duty.
Rural Reconstruction renamed Rural Construction under new GVN Ministry of Rural Construction.
Operational control of USN coastal surveillance (MARKET TIME) shifted from COMNAVFORV PAC to COMUSMACV.

AUGUST

1 USA Task Force Alpha activated as the first USA field force HQ in SVN.
Battle at Du Co Special Forces Camp begins.
2 COMUSMACV and CINCPAC at Honolulu conference.
7 CG III MAF designated Senior Advisor, I Corps, and assumes opcon over I Corps Advisory Group.
9 VNAF receives first USAF B-57's.
14 7th Marine Regt (Rein) begins landing at Da Nang and Chu Lai.
18 III MAF begins Operation STARLIGHT.
20 Ambassador Lodge arrives in Saigon to begin his second tour.

24 VC mortar attack hits Bien Hoa air base.
31 Military Payment Certificates introduced to replace US currency in SVN.

SEPTEMBER

7 US and SVN Marines begin five-day Operation PIRANHA.
11 Group of Montagnard tribesmen disarmed in Darlac Province in GVN move against FULRO.
12 First elements of the USA 1st Cav Div (AM) land at Qui Nhon.
15 Group of Montagnards reaffirms loyalty to GVN at Ban Me Thuot ceremony.
18 101st Abn, 1st Cav Div (AM), and ARVN units begin four-day Operation GIBRALTAR.
25 Task Force Alpha redesignated Field Force Vietnam and assumes opcon over II Corps Advisory Group and all USA units in II CTZ.
28 CINCPAC and COMUSMACV at Honolulu conference.
30 VC suffer heavy losses in week-long battle at Phu Cu Pass.

OCTOBER

7 Elements of the USA 1st Inf Div arrive at Vung Tau.
8 Initial elements of the ROK Capital Division land at Cam Ranh Bay.
17 USN jets destroy first SAM mobile site in NVN.
19 Battle of Plei Me begins.
21 CG, FFORCEV, designated Senior Advisor, II Corps.
27 VC attack USMC air installations at Da Nang and Chu Lai.

NOVEMBER

1 1st Cav Div (AM) in its first offensive combat mission, SILVER BAYONET, near Plei Me.
CG, 1st Inf Div, assumes opcon over all USA units and Free World attachments in III CTZ.
2 Air base at Cam Ranh Bay operational for tactical jet aircraft.
Lt Gen J. L. Throckmorton, DEPCOMUSMACV, leaves Vietnam.
6 Lt Gen J. A. Heintges, USA, replaces Lt Gen Throckmorton as DEPCOMUSMACV.
7 USMACV publicly confirms presence of five NVA regiments in SVN.
9 173d Abn Bde concludes five-day Operation HUMP.
10 US and SVN Marines join in Operation BLUE MARLIN, first combined amphibious landing in RVN.
14 Battle of Ia Drang Valley begins.
22 VC mortar Soc Trang airfield.
27 VC overrun ARVN 7th Regt at Michelin plantation. VC release USA PW's Smith and McClure in Cambodia.
28 Defense Secretary McNamara arrives in Saigon for two day visit.

DECEMBER

1 CG, 1st Inf Div, designated Senior Advisor, III Corps, and assumes opcon over III Corps Advisory Group.
2 USS Enterprise enters combat, sending sorties against VC targets in SVN.
4 VC terrorists bomb Metropole BEQ in Saigon.
8 US Marine and ARVN elements begin 11-day Operation HARVEST MOON.
10 CINCPAC and COMUSMACV at Honolulu conference.
15 USAF hits Uong Bi thermal power plant near Haiphong.
18 FULRO briefly seizes control of Quang Duc provincial headquarters at Gia Nghia.
24 US FWMAF and RVN forces begin 30-hour Christmas cease-fire; bombing of NVN ceases.
29 3d Bde, USA 25th Inf Div, begins arriving in SVN.
31 US military strength in SVN is approximately 184,000.