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
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R-940-ARPA

January 1972

Can and Should the United States Preserve A Military Capability for Revolutionary Conflict?

H. Heymann, Jr. and W. W. Whitson



A Report prepared for
ADVANCED RESEARCH PROJECTS AGENCY

Rand
SANTA MONICA, CA. 90406

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PREFACE

U.S. military "counterinsurgency" -- using American forces and resources to help third-country governments defeat violent challenges to their authority -- has become an unpopular concept, and public as well as high-level governmental support for continuing any U.S. participation in insurgent or revolutionary conflict abroad has virtually disappeared. Unless this trend is reversed, the mid-seventies may see the United States with no institutional capability in this sphere.

Moved by a concern that the lack of such a capability may, at some future stage, pose a serious security problem for the United States, the Advanced Research Projects Agency of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD/ARPA) asked The Rand Corporation to examine what a minimal counterinsurgency capability might look like and whether such a capability can be sustained in the U.S. armed forces. The present study is the result of that examination. Specifically, it considers (1) the nature and dimensions of the revolutionary conflict threat in the seventies; (2) the performance of the U.S. military in past revolutionary conflict situations; (3) the possibility and desirability of reconstituting and preserving such a capability in the future; and (4) the institutional reforms that this would require.

In the course of the study, extensive interviews were held with representatives of five groups: (1) decisionmakers in the OSD, the Joint Staff, and the headquarters of the three services; (2) the war colleges, the command and staff colleges, and such specialized institutions as the Military Assistance Institute at Ft. Bragg, the Civil Affairs School at Ft. Gordon, and the USAF Special Operations School at Eglin AFB; (3) two major U.S. theater commands (SOUTHCOM and PACOM); (4) specialized field units (including Army Special Forces groups and Air Force Special Operations forces); and (5) talented individuals experienced in the advisory role, including such renowned personalities as General Edward G. Lansdale as well as a much larger number of less celebrated but equally successful officers with valuable insight into counterinsurgency problems.

This study will be of interest to all those concerned with limited conflict issues in the groups mentioned above. Within OSD and the Department of State, it should be of special value to personnel responsible for policy guidance and execution of the Security Assistance Program. At various stages, results of this research were discussed with the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Security Assistance (OSD/ISA), with the Director of the Security Assistance Planning and Analysis Staff of the Department of State, and with a large number of people in the doctrine, planning, and operations communities of the three services, all of whom provided valuable insights and cooperation. The findings, however, are solely the responsibility of the authors.

SUMMARY

THE PROBLEM

Revolutionary Conflict in the Seventies. -- What is likely to be the nature of revolutionary conflict in the nineteen-seventies, and will it pose a significant threat to U.S. interests? Of the several kinds of rebellion that have marked the years since World War II, those likely to recur in the 1970s are the ethnic-separatist and the radical-nationalist. In these two categories, only two rebellions -- Cuba and Vietnam -- have been "successful" in recent history in the sense of having brought about a national upheaval. Both grew out of exceptionally vulnerable situations, which are not likely soon to be replicated. But many more revolutionary conflicts have been "successful" in the sense of making the defending governments pay heavily in resource diversion, political erosion, and loss of public confidence. Successes of this kind will continue to be recorded in the future.

U.S. Interests. -- A revolutionary conflict in the third world need not, of itself, threaten U.S. interests. Indeed, some rebellions may actually be congenial to U.S. interests. A revolutionary conflict becomes unambiguously injurious to U.S. interests, however, if it lends itself to being exploited by Soviet or Chinese military power in a way that may provoke a political confrontation of the superpowers or pose a direct military threat. The United States has a strong interest in forestalling any transformation of internal revolts into issues of strategic concern. Where the danger of such escalation can be identified, it may call for a limited U.S. response to deter it.

U.S. Response. -- The choice of whether to support, oppose, or ignore a revolutionary conflict thus is neither obvious nor invariable. The likelihood of any U.S. response, however, is now very low, given the prevailing national sentiment against all involvement in third-country conflicts -- lest even modest kinds of internal security assistance (training and advice) draw the United States relentlessly into direct and costly military intervention (deployment of U.S. combat forces). To minimize the possibility of escalation, these

two kinds of response -- "security assistance" and "direct intervention" -- should be sharply distinguished, and the capabilities they require should be clearly separated, both conceptually and administratively. Moreover, inasmuch as the United States has found a direct combat role in third-country revolutionary conflict unrewarding, any specialized capability it preserves for such conflict should be only in the realm of "internal security assistance."

LESSONS FROM EXPERIENCE

Insurgency Experience of U.S. Forces. -- The exposure of U.S. forces to revolutionary conflict since World War II (principally in the Philippines, Laos, Vietnam, and Thailand) has had only a miniscule impact on the perceptions and modes of operation of the military establishment. Like all large organizations, the U.S. military has become fixed in routines and patterns of behavior that are highly resistant to change. Moreover, its ability to adapt itself to novel situations has been inhibited by certain functional characteristics of our regular forces in the spheres of doctrine, assessment, planning, and execution.

As regards *doctrine*, the traditional military concept of the primacy of violent line combat against an armed enemy persisted long after President Kennedy in 1961 undertook to turn the military's attention to counterinsurgency and "low-intensity" conflict. As doctrine lags behind experience, it was not until 1965-1966, after the Vietnam war had shifted to a more conventional mode, that U.S. military doctrine began to reflect the special nature of revolutionary conflict. By then, however, the U.S. military establishment was no longer receptive to the fact that this kind of conflict demanded novel responses. Thus, the valid doctrinal conclusions drawn from the Asian experience, which reversed the old orientation on firepower, came too late to affect institutional perceptions or performance.

In the sphere of *assessment*, the U.S. military is severely constrained by the peculiar limitations of military intelligence, whose prime focus is on the host country's military capabilities, not on its political condition, and whose traditional concern is with

collection rather than with analysis. Military intelligence is further hampered by its low status on the career ladder, the clutter of information, a cumbersome organizational structure, and its dependence on the meager and unreliable data that flow to it from host governments. These handicaps often render it difficult to distinguish fact from illusion and noisy dissidence from real threats of violence.

In the sphere of *planning*, lack of receptivity to new doctrine and the persistence of tactical concepts derived from World War II and Korea have led military planners to foster a "mirror-imaged" U.S. force structure in third countries regardless of its relevance to local situations. This JSOP-sanctioned "mirror-imaging" has pervaded every aspect of the U.S. military relationship with many of the host countries. It is reflected in the repeated failure of that relationship to yield agreed force goals that would be appropriate to the low-intensity conflict situations in those countries.

In the sphere of *execution*, we distinguish among four categories of participants in revolutionary conflict: regular forces, MAAGs, specialized forces, and key individuals. Of these, regular forces are the least desirable for rebellions in foreign countries. Their military standards and goals, and their lack of experience in meshing force with low-level political objectives, render them unadaptable to this type of conflict. MAAGs are similarly ineffectual. They seem unable to escape from the hardware orientation of the Military Assistance Program and remain insensitive to local political processes and their consequences. Specialized forces and Mobile Training Teams -- partly because they are not concerned with massive arms transfers -- have been far more successful in imparting their skills to local counterparts. Talented individuals are the best means of interacting with and strengthening local leadership, for they perform well as executors or guardians of a limited American military commitment. But they are anathema to the regular military establishment, and their freedom of action quickly shrinks when the protagonists of conventional conflict arrive on the scene.

Revolutionary Versus Conventional Conflict. -- In concept and in purpose, revolutionary conflict differs fundamentally from

conventional conflict: It does not pit forces against forces, nor does it seek the conquest of territory; it is a contest between rival authority structures. It aims at the liquidation of the existing power structure, not its preservation. It stresses conservatism and "staying power," not military victory. It glorifies disengagement, stealth, and evasion, not the aggressive, persistent offense. Revolutionary conflict differs also in methods and tactics: It begins, not with the deployment of military forces, but with the creation of a disciplined political organization that can generate such forces. It proceeds in phases, rather than seek the immediate development of full military power. It uses force selectively, more for its political and psychological than for its massive lethal effects. For popular support, it depends heavily on coercion, and resorts to terrorism as an integral technique of disruption and enforcement.

Countering Rebellion. -- Several imperatives flow from these differences: (1) The most important task for the threatened government is to "harden" its authority structure, i.e., to improve its own political and administrative effectiveness; (2) counteraction must be targeted primarily against the insurgent movement's organization, not its forces; (3) identifying and penetrating this organization is the task of a sophisticated police-intelligence system; (4) eradicating the organization requires interdiction of its resource flow -- a combined effort of intelligence, police, and military elements. Effective counterrebellion thus calls primarily for nonmilitary skills, and the military skills it does demand are not those typically possessed or acquired by conventional armies. What counts most are people and organization, not weapons and equipment.

Constraints on U.S. Assistance. -- Several factors limit the ability of the United States to render assistance to governments faced with rebellion: (1) Because rebellions in their embryonic phase are virtually undetectable, the threatened governments rarely become aware of them until they reach a virulent stage. Thus, by the time U.S. assistance is requested, the rebellion will be solidly entrenched. (2) The qualities most needed by the government that is fighting a rebellion are the least susceptible to being provided

by external assistance. Techniques and tactics can be taught; administrative competence and integrity may be more difficult to impart; but political "legitimacy" -- the most vital ingredient -- cannot be bestowed by an outside force. (3) The potential of even the more feasible kinds of assistance is limited by the blunt and ill-focused multiagency mechanism on which the U.S. Government has to rely.

RECOMMENDATIONS

A New Focus. -- Given these constraints, the role of U.S. military assistance in revolutionary conflict in the seventies should be (1) *small* -- stressing high-quality rather than high-quantity inputs; (2) *coordinate* -- in the sense of being deployed in conjunction with an equally specialized civilian effort; (3) *distinct* -- aimed solely at "internal security assistance" and decoupled from "direct intervention" and from the massive arms transfers that are designed to develop conventional forces; and, most important, (4) oriented toward *authority-building* -- focused on those aspects of the host country's military establishment that most enhance its counterrebellion performance. Such assistance would draw on U.S. military expertise in the area of combat service support rather than in that of combat techniques. It would include such fields as intelligence, communications, personnel management, military justice, and others with high relevance to the competence, integrity, and morale of the host country's military service.

Institutional Reform. -- Three levels of reform are proposed that would make the organizational environment for those engaged in internal security assistance more hospitable, permitting any skills that now exist within the military establishment to be preserved, and new skills to be developed among coming generations of officers. The three levels are arranged in ascending order of resource concentration, with each level a prerequisite to the next.

Level 1 reforms seek to minimize organizational disturbance and focus instead on altering *perspectives and procedures*. Their aim is to enhance individual organizational performance and thereby improve

doctrine, assessment, planning, and execution. Proposed reforms include: designation of the new Defense Security Assistance Agency as the focal point for specialized revolutionary conflict functions; development of a unified doctrine; adoption of a special assessment process to identify "internal security priority" areas; utilization of the talents of specialized service schools to improve host country military establishments; creation of an "institutional memory" on critical countries; improvement of selection, training, and rewards for individuals and teams dedicated to the internal security assistance task. This level of reform would yield some improvement in performance, but expectations for its effectiveness should not be too high.

Level 2 reforms build upon the changes of Level 1, but move substantially toward resource concentration. The concentration, however, is limited to *military* resources; civil resources are left essentially untouched. The principal reform proposed is the concentration of all revolutionary conflict resources under a single Security Assistance Command, headed by its own three-star commander and reporting to the Director of the Defense Security Assistance Agency. This reform could be expected to yield major improvements in planning and execution, but would fall far short of achieving an integrated *civil-military* capability.

Level 3 reforms include all or most of the *first two* levels of change, but add the much more painful step of concentrating civil as well as military resources, placing all those that are relevant under a single, civilian line of authority. Proposed changes include: organizational reforms within the non-Defense agencies comparable to the Defense reforms outlined under Levels 1 and 2; creation in Washington of interagency integration *machinery* comparable to the "country team" concept in many U.S. diplomatic missions abroad; designation of a single agency to assume full responsibility for assistance *implementation* (as distinct from policy formulation); and designation of a single office in the field to assume full responsibility for the entire assistance effort in-country. Level 3 reforms are revolutionary in scope but could be highly effective. They would clearly entail high bureaucratic and political costs.

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I. INTRODUCTION: THE RISE AND FALL
OF "COUNTERINSURGENCY"

"The return home the other day of the last Green Beret unit from Vietnam came as a reminder that the concept of counterinsurgency, though it died long ago, has finally been buried -- without very much honor. And this suggests that the U.S. military establishment, whatever its other attitudes, at least acknowledges that the idea of Americans playing at revolution in exotic lands has been sheer romanticism."

This judgment by an experienced American journalist* sums up the view, widely held within the U.S. military establishment and in the country at large, that the U.S. military involvement in revolutionary conflicts in the third world was presumptuous and ill-fated. Counterinsurgency, it is now argued, has been discredited as a concept, as a war-fighting strategy, and as a military art form, and should be quietly laid to rest.

That counterinsurgency has gone out of fashion, few will deny. It was born in the euphoria of the "cult of development" at the beginning of the sixties, and nurtured by the spectre of Communist powers fomenting and abetting "wars of national liberation" throughout the third world. The concept of American military forces helping third-country governments prevent and defeat subversive challenges to their authority quickly rose to its peak of popularity in the mid-sixties. As escalation set in and disillusionment grew in Vietnam, the concept fell out of favor almost as quickly as it had risen. By the end of the decade, its champions and practitioners had been reduced to a small band of activists in each of the services, struggling for bare survival. Today, high-level support, even within the defense establishment, for a continued U.S. military role in "counterinsurgency" has almost disappeared, and such forces and talents as have been

* Stanley Karnow in his *Washington Post* column of March 22, 1971.

developed to this end are, for the most part, being phased out or allowed to wither away. Whether by design or by inadvertence, the U.S. military will find itself with no significant institutional capability in this sphere by the mid-seventies, if the present trend continues.

Finding the explanation for this loss of support is relatively easy. The post-Vietnam syndrome, doubts about the validity of the "counterinsurgency" concept and about the seriousness of the threat, distaste for prolonged, inconclusive "low-intensity conflicts," the need to cope with entirely new and baffling problems within the services (the all-volunteer army, racial tension, crime, drug abuse, and dissent) have no doubt contributed to the military establishment's disenchantment with "counterinsurgency."

Much more difficult, however, is the task of assessing the consequences of this disenchantment and, ultimately, of the loss of capability. What would be the implications for its own security if, by the mid-seventies, the United States were to be left without a military capability for dealing with revolutionary conflict? Should the United States be willing to pay a substantial price -- in organizational effort and resources -- to preserve or reconstitute such a capability, and if so, what needs to be done to accomplish this task?

In an attempt to answer these questions, this study considers first (in Section II) the kinds of revolutionary conflict that are likely to occur in the seventies, the threat that such conflicts would pose for U.S. interests, and the likelihood that the United States would respond should such a threat be severe. A sharp distinction is made between two kinds of U.S. response: (1) "internal security assistance" in the form of training and advice, with limited provision of equipment, and (2) "direct military intervention" in the form of commitment of combat forces. This study focuses exclusively on the former mode, inasmuch as the authors regard a direct U.S. combat role in such conflicts as unpromising and, therefore, undesirable. Thus, they believe that any specialized U.S. capability in the revolutionary conflict sphere should be geared to "internal security assistance" only.

and should be clearly separated conceptually and administratively from capabilities for "direct military intervention."

The study then turns (in Section III) to a review of the U.S. military experience and performance in revolutionary conflict since World War II. It seeks to examine the military organizations that have had a role in revolutionary conflict situations, to describe their organizational repertoires and procedures as they have evolved in the fifties and sixties, and thereby to reveal their expected performance in comparable situations in the seventies. This approach derives from the major premise that large organizations develop fixed routines and patterns of behavior which tend to remain unchanged for long periods of time, and that these stable characteristics operate as constraints on, and determinants of, the organizations' future behavior or "capability." This review of past organizational experience thus is intended to be predictive rather than merely historic: It aims at identifying those military elements whose institutional characteristics can be expected to be compatible with the special characteristics and demands of revolutionary conflict.

The analysis turns next (in Section IV) to the nature of these special characteristics and demands. It describes the differences between revolutionary and conventional conflict and attempts to distill from these differences a set of imperatives for countering rebellion. It goes on to propose a set of guiding principles for U.S. military assistance in this sphere: the deployment of very small quantities but very high qualities of U.S. assistance resources; maximum reliance on host government initiatives and self-support; a low-visibility American presence; and emphasis on the military's noncombat role. These principles call for a major departure from what comes naturally and what has traditionally been done, their focus being on improving the military administrative system rather than on supplying weapons or equipment.

Finally, the study explores (in Section V) the kinds of institutional reforms that would be required to transform these principles into actualities. It distinguishes three levels of reform, in ascending

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order of difficulty and cost, their likelihood of success increasing with the difficulty and cost of their implementation.

II. REVOLUTIONARY CONFLICT AND U.S. INTERESTS

How significant is the threat of third-world revolutionary conflict that the United States confronts in the seventies?

Let us begin by examining some basic issues bearing on the seriousness with which the United States ought to view possible efforts to modify third-country social structures, and on the desirability and likelihood of U.S. intervention should such modifications be attempted by revolutionary means. Specifically, what types of revolutionary conflict should we be concerned about? How likely is it that such conflicts will occur, will succeed in their objectives, will constitute a serious threat to U.S. interests, and, in the last case, will evoke a purposeful U.S. response?

TYPES OF REVOLUTIONARY CONFLICT

Judging by the experience of the last twenty-five years, one may predict that revolutionary conflict or rebellion^{*} -- in the sense of politically organized, armed assault upon established authority -- is a widespread condition in the developing countries that is likely to occur with disturbing regularity in the future as in the past.^{**} Indeed, virtually every year since World War II has seen at least one revolutionary conflict underway in the third world.^{***} These conflicts

^{*} These two terms are employed interchangeably throughout this Report. The authors consider them more accurate and less emotional than the more popular but ambiguous term "insurgency." In this as in several other conceptual points, the authors subscribe to the views set forth by their Rand colleagues Nathan Leites and Charles Wolf, Jr., in *Rebellion and Authority: An Analytic Essay on Insurgency Conflict*, R-462-ARPA, The Rand Corporation, February 1970.

^{**} The phenomenon is not confined to the developing countries; advanced Western countries, including the United States, have also experienced an upsurge in radical violence in recent years.

^{***} Among the more notable: Yugoslavia, Greece, Burma, Malaya, the Philippines, Vietnam, Kenya, Laos, the Congo, Algeria, Indonesia, Cyprus, Cuba, Yemen, Thailand, Ethiopia, the Portuguese African colonies, the Palestinian guerrillas, Cambodia, East Pakistan (in approximate chronological order of appearance).

have, however, differed widely in origin, form, intensity, and duration. To put this confusing mass of experience into a semblance of order, it may be useful to distinguish among four types of rebellion. The distinctions are drawn with regard to causation and are, to be sure, not clear-cut, since more than one stimulus is usually at work. Moreover, the force of nationalism runs through all of them as a powerful motivational thread. Nevertheless, distinguishing among these may help us place future probabilities in better perspective.

Type 1: Rebellions growing out of anti-invasion or partisan movements (examples: Greece, Malaya, Yugoslavia, and China from 1937 on). In these situations, the partisan forces, having achieved liberation from the invader, turn into civil-war forces and, often under Communist control, move on to destroy the enfeebled *aliens* régimes.

Type 2: Anticolonial rebellions (examples: Kenya, Algeria, Indonesia, Vietnam I, the Congo, Portuguese Africa). In these cases, the armed rebellion derives its impetus from the refusal of colonial powers to relinquish their rule, and often owes its political strength to the impaired legitimacy of the colonial regimes. In only one of the examples cited -- Vietnam -- was the anticolonial rebellion Communist-organized, but the political-military tactics and techniques, though less sophisticated in the non-Communist cases, were roughly the same: guerrilla warfare and terrorism to discredit and incapacitate the colonial regime, and a mix of inducement and coercion to mobilize popular support for the insurgents.

Type 3: Ethnic or religious separatist rebellions (examples: Burma [Kachins], Iraq [Kurds], Ethiopia [Eritreans], Palestinian guerrillas, Northern Ireland [IRA], East Pakistan [Bengalis]). In these cases, the rebellion does not seek to destroy and supplant the attacked government but strives for more limited sectional political objectives. It aims at compelling the regime to accede to a redistribution of power, to a change in policies, or to the cession of some portion of its authority or territory to the rebellious group. Such "separatist" rebellions often have an anticolonial ingredient: The Eritrean Liberation Front looks upon Haile Selassie and Ethiopian

central authority as representing a colonial oppressor; the East Pakistanis had a similar view of Yahya Khan in the West; the IRA of Whitehall, and so forth. These separatist rebellions typically are not Communist-organized or -controlled but may benefit from Communist support.

Type 4: Radical nationalist-populist rebellions (examples: the Philippines, Laos, Vietnam II, Cuba, Thailand, Uruguay). These cases exhibit a considerable diversity of insurrectionary experience. While they can often be traced back to anti-invasion movements or to anticolonial rebellions, their impetus combines nationalism ("national liberation" in radical parlance) with social-revolutionary or reformist ideologies. Popular grievances, glaring social inequities, and unresponsive or repressive rule by an illegitimate regime often work together to radicalize elements of the population and to provide the underpinnings for an insurgent movement.

A disciplined Communist leadership or a radical populist leadership can build a movement upon such foundations, relying on increasingly well-known concepts of revolutionary-organizational mobilization as the engineering technique and on nationalism as the binding cement. The movement can be purely rural-based, as in Vietnam, or urban, as in Uruguay; it can be largely externally fostered, as in Laos, or essentially home-grown, as in Algeria (although some external support is almost always required^{*}); and it may be Communist-organized and -controlled, as in Thailand, or radical-populist-led, as in Cuba.

There is considerable flexibility in these matters, and neither the probability of their success nor the threat they pose for the United States can be assessed exclusively in the above terms. But two ingredients appear to be essential if revolutionary progress is to be made: (i) A "revolutionary situation" must exist, i.e., the authority structure of a country must exhibit a combination of political and administrative weaknesses that render it vulnerable to subversion,

^{*}The strategic importance of external support is discussed more fully below (pp. 16-17).

and (ii) there must be a revolutionary vanguard capable of exploiting these weaknesses. Unless both of these phenomena are present and well developed, the rebellion is unlikely to get far off the ground.

Looking more specifically at what the future may hold, it is appropriate now to turn to the four questions previously posed: How likely are rebellions (1) to occur, (2) to succeed, (3) to affect U.S. interests, and (4) to evoke a purposeful U.S. response?

HOW LIKELY TO OCCUR?

Of the four types of rebellion just described, types 1 and 2 -- anti-invasion partisan, and anticolonial -- have largely run their course. True, colonial and racial-minority rule still survives in subequatorial Africa, and anticolonial rebellions have been smoldering in the Portuguese colonies for a decade, but in these cases the relative strengths of insurgent groups versus those of incumbent regimes are such as to pose no serious challenge to the latter in the foreseeable future.

The two types of rebellion that are currently most in evidence and are likely to continue to proliferate in the course of the seventies are types 3 and 4: ethnic-separatist and radical-nationalist.

Ethnic-separatist rebellions, such as the Eritrean independence movement in Ethiopia, can be expected to flare up, especially, in black Africa, where the artificiality of national borders and the tribal nature of the society are highly conducive to such conflicts. Ethnic separatism is also endemic to South Asia and parts of the Middle East (as illustrated by the Pathan tribes along the Pakistan-Afghan border and the Kurds in Iraq, among others), and scattered insurgent activity will undoubtedly continue to occur there. In addition, there are the seething religious and ethnic animosities of historic dimensions that pose an ever-present danger of eruption: Bengali versus Punjabi in Pakistan, Catholic versus Protestant in Ulster, Turk versus Greek in Cyprus. Here, accumulated grievances and hatreds have become too heavy a burden for the normal conciliatory processes of domestic politics, and insecure, stubborn, or inept governments are unwilling to reform the basic political rules so as to protect the minority from

the majority, the disadvantaged from the privileged, the lowly from the dominant. Unlike the ethnic or tribal rebellions of Africa, these explosive conflicts almost inevitably engage or encroach upon religious or ethnic affinities of outside powers, and their potential international ramifications, therefore, are far more significant.

Radical-nationalist rebellions, the last of our four types, will undoubtedly continue to develop in various parts of the world throughout the seventies. This applies particularly to Latin America, where political instability is chronic, and where a growing trend of turbulence and intolerance of the *status quo* is apparent among populations that are rapidly being urbanized. While the traditional pattern of largely rural-based, desultory guerrilla activity seems to be on the wane, revolutionary violence in Latin America has been migrating to the cities.

Whether urban terrorists can succeed remains to be seen. Their impact to date has been essentially one of enfeebling established authority and of promoting *coups d'état*, rather than one of building new authority or organizing civil war.

In Southeast Asia, the prospects for the growth and proliferation of radical-nationalist insurgencies are also uncertain. Their future will depend in large part upon the kind of strategic environment that will emerge in the aftermath of the Indochina war. If that environment were to achieve some stability, i.e., if the reduction of U.S. power in the region should be accompanied by a measure of *détente* with Peking, the Chinese Communists would have less incentive for expanding their as yet very limited insurgency assets in the area than they would have if the environment remained dangerously unstable.

The pivotal country in the area -- in terms of its potential vulnerability and its importance to U.S. interests -- is Thailand, where a Communist-led revolutionary conflict has been building up over the past ten years with the help of quite modest amounts of

external assistance.* Thailand is the only Southeast Asian country (excluding Indochina) that is protected by a U.S. defense commitment and immediately vulnerable to Chinese pressures. The military ingredient of the Thai insurgency has been in "Phase II" (open guerrilla warfare)** since 1965, but is still essentially contained in remote areas and confined to disaffected minority groups (Lao-speaking peoples in the northeast, Meo tribes in the north). The mainstream Thai on the central plain have so far been remarkably resistant to its expansion. But given the limited organizational capabilities and demonstrated reluctance of the Thai government to attack the problem energetically, it should not be too difficult for the Chinese, should they choose to do so, to increase their resource inputs substantially, break through the present containment barrier, and thus pose a far more serious challenge to the regime at the center than they do now. There is considerable room for skepticism as to whether revolutionary conflict could succeed in Thailand even with such outside support. The shortage of indigenous Thai cadres would certainly be a major impediment. On the other hand, there is also much uncertainty as to whether the Thai government could or would rise to any such challenge. And that leads to our second question.

HOW LIKELY TO SUCCEED?

If by success we mean the achievement of the revolutionaries' ultimate goal, whether it be secession, sectional independence, or "national liberation," the record of past rebellions -- particularly those of types 3 and 4 that are most likely to occur in the future -- is far from impressive. In fact, only two of that variety, Cuba and Vietnam, have succeeded in engendering a national upheaval. And these were very special situations. In the Cuban case, the Batista regime

* An up-to-date treatment of this conflict and an analysis of the U.S. assistance role in it is contained in a separate Rand study still in preparation.

** For a discussion of the significance of "phases" of rebellion, see Section IV, pp. 58-61.

had so thoroughly forfeited its legitimacy by malfeasance and corruption that a small band of middle-class insurrectionists, at the head of a rebel army of fewer than two thousand armed men, were able to march down from the Sierra Maestra to gather the fruits of an already existing, climactic revolutionary situation. In the Vietnam case, the cause of a non-Communist regime in the South was cumulatively undermined and thwarted, first, by an aloof mandarin patriarchy that terminated in a regicide, and then by a succession of feeble military regimes unable to control the maneuverings of self-seeking cliques and factions. Into this cauldron of internal dissension and weakness, the Communists, bearing the torch of national liberation and holding out the prospect of national unification, were able to toss massive organizational and military strength and thus pose a well-nigh unmanageable challenge. But such a dismal set of circumstances, such a lopsided juxtaposition of forces as existed in Vietnam is likely to remain unique. In the rest of the world, the prospects for revolutionary success are considerably less glowing: Most governments, it appears, are not so impotent and devoid of legitimacy; nor are most revolutionary movements so historically favored or amply endowed.

True, popular tolerance for government and for the rules of the established order seems to be on the decline throughout the world. There is much greater readiness everywhere now than there was, say, ten years ago to question the legitimacy of the *status quo* and to attack it. But sporadic acts of revolt and dissidence, however widespread, do not add up to sustained revolutionary conflict. To mount the latter is an infinitely more arduous task, as would-be revolutionary warriors have discovered to their chagrin in many countries. Almost all Latin American regimes are now able to suppress rural insurrections of self-styled "revolutionary armed forces." None is as vulnerable as the Batista government was in the 1950s. Partly as a result of U.S. "public safety" programs and military aid, police forces are better trained and armies better equipped. Some lessons of Vietnam and of Latin America's own revolutionary conflict experience also have been learned: Peasant cooperation is

studiously enlisted (and essential intelligence thus acquired) through "civil action" and monetary inducements; political measures are taken to establish the authority of the central government in the affected areas; and guerrillas are isolated before they are attacked. In Venezuela, Colombia, Peru, Bolivia, and Guatemala, rebel bands, including Che Guevara's guerrilleros, have been eliminated or reduced to impotence.* In Latin America at least, revolution in the countryside now appears as something of a will-o'-the-wisp, and the focus there has been shifting from rural to urban guerrilla warfare.

However, if rural rebellion is difficult to carry forward, the obstacles to a seizure of power through urban rebellion are even greater. The city is the government's bastion and the home base of its forces. In fact, these forces are densely deployed there precisely to prevent its overthrow. The organization, technology, and resources that governments can bring to bear in the cities are formidable. While they often cannot prevent acts of terrorism, kidnappings, and hit-and-run attacks by dedicated conspiratorial groups, most governments -- unless hopelessly divided and enfeebled -- should find it easy enough to suppress attempts to develop anything like an urban-based revolutionary mass movement. Urban revolutionaries can certainly develop significant political strength, as the Uruguayan Tupamaros have demonstrated, but taking over a government by military means or through a popular urban uprising does not seem to be within their grasp.

Still, a rebellion, whether rural or urban, may be as successful in a quite different sense, i.e., by imposing very heavy costs on a government: not merely in forcing it to divert its resources from development to security, but also by humiliating it, and thereby causing it to lose legitimacy and self-confidence at home and status abroad. It can inspire an erosion of consensus, undermine popular faith in peaceful solutions, or cause a backlash that strikes back too harshly and too indiscriminately. Uruguay and Brazil are examples.

* For a more detailed discussion of governmental actions and political conditions that led to the defeat or collapse of various Latin American peasant rebellions, see David F. Ronfeldt and Luigi R. Einaudi, *Internal Security and Military Assistance to Latin America in the 1970s*, R-924-ISA, The Rand Corporation, November 1971.

In Uruguay, the Tupamaros have succeeded in undermining popular confidence in the Pacheco regime, capitalizing on its failure to cope with the economic distress that has shaken the country's political structure. Infiltrating its police and prison system and thus reducing its internal security to a sham, they have made the government look ludicrously impotent. While the Tupamaros are not able to translate their successes into a seizure of power, they have managed to create a virtual dual-power situation in Montevideo: their writ, as much as the government's, is law. The Tupamaros have become a force with which any Uruguayan government will eventually have to come to terms, lest it run the risk of depending for its survival on a counter-revolutionary "peace-keeping operation" by a neighboring power, such as Argentina or Brazil.

Brazil represents another, though somewhat different case. There, growing terrorism has impelled a hard-pressed military junta to tolerate abandonment of legality and reliance on counterterror. Unable to hold terrorists in its jails in the face of their successful kidnap-diplomats-to-free-prisoners gambit, and fearful of sliding into an Uruguayan kind of defeat, some elements of the Brazilian police and armed forces have resorted to assassination and torture to combat the rebellion. Whatever may be the effectiveness of this mode (and it seems to have been effective in Brazil), it exacts a toll in loss of governmental legitimacy. Successes of rebellions in exacting such tolls have been considerable, and there is no reason to assume that they will not be emulated in other places.

HOW LIKELY TO AFFECT U.S. INTERESTS?

Nothing that has been said so far is intended to imply that revolutionary conflict in the third world is inimical to U.S. interests. Whether it affects these interests at all depends as much on its relationship to external forces as on the nature of the conflict itself. Both will determine whether and to what extent a revolutionary conflict impinges on U.S. interests. Several points may be worth making here.

First, there is a tendency in the Executive and Legislative branches of the U.S. Government to view national interests as being either vital or nonexistent, that is, to acknowledge no values in between. In fact, of course, many U.S. interests are of intermediate value -- some worth only a very limited and yet not negligible effort to protect them; others important enough to justify paying a high cost for their defense. U.S. actions to preserve an interest should be commensurate with its value.

Second, discerning and assessing U.S. interests is an elusive task. In third countries as elsewhere, U.S. interests range over the entire spectrum of military, economic, political, cultural, and psychological concerns. They are often intangible, sometimes in conflict with one another, and perceived differently by different groups. Whether, in the long run, U.S. interests will be better served by the preservation of an existing government or by its demise is not always obvious. Moreover, U.S. interests are affected by the actions we take to defend them. A decision to intervene will, of itself, tend to deepen U.S. interests, or create interests where none existed before. Consensus on these questions can often be established only through intragovernmental bargaining or through the national political process.

Third, U.S. interests are rarely threatened by the mere fact of revolution. That a government in some country is beset by a rebellion should not in itself be disquieting to the United States. As has been pointed out, a great many different rebellions are either underway or in prospect in the third world. Only a few are likely to succeed. Some of these will be hostile, some neutral, and some congenial to U.S. interests. There is no reason for the United States to assume a counterrevolutionary posture everywhere.

On the contrary, there might be occasions in the future in which U.S. interests would be served by *assisting* an insurgency rather than countering it, though plausible examples are not easy to conceive.

True, other things being equal, the United States prefers "open" and "stable" societies. But the properties of "openness" and "stability" are frequently in sharp conflict, and the first property is all-too-easily sacrificed for the sake of preserving the second.* For example, we provide substantial military aid to a number of third-country governments with "political stability" as our explicit objective. But "preserving stability" then sometimes means underwriting an unresponsive regime that prefers repression to reform. Helping to preserve such a regime can be unrewarding, even self-defeating. In the long run, U.S. interests may be poorly served by such underwritings.

Belief in the importance of political stability, however, nevertheless remains firmly rooted in U.S. aid programs, which are often justified in terms of assumed linkages between violence, stability, and development. A major rationale for U.S. security assistance to many developing countries, particularly in Latin America, is that revolutionary violence engenders political instability, which, in turn, thwarts or retards national development. The linkages, however, are by no means clear, and there is considerable evidence to the contrary, namely, that domestic violence is an unavoidable adjunct of development, and indeed indispensable to its success. Preoccupation with suppression of violence tends to divert governments from coping with the problems that may be the source of the violence.**

Fourth, even where a revolutionary conflict is Communist-led or appears headed for a Communist takeover, the implications for U.S.

* Thus, while Uruguay has remained relatively "open" at the cost of "stability," Brazil has remained relatively "stable" at the cost of "openness."

** Detailed consideration of this topic would take us far afield; for a thoughtful discussion of the political role of violence in Latin America, see Ronfeldt and Einaudi, *op. cit.*; see also L. Einaudi, *Revolution from within? Military Rule in Peru Since 1968*, P-4676, The Rand Corporation, July 1971.

interests are not necessarily clear. To be sure, during the fifties and early sixties, when we assumed -- and then not unreasonably -- that we were faced with a monolithic Communist thrust in the third world, any accretion of Communist influence seemed worth resisting even at much cost. Particularly in Latin America, the mere possibility of Communist advance could precipitate U.S. intervention -- as it did in Guatemala, Cuba, and the Dominican Republic.

But in the seventies, the Communist world has been revealed as fundamentally divided, rent by both ideological and great-power rivalries. Also, former "satellites" have evolved into national communisms with which the United States can peacefully coexist. Soviet and Chinese efforts to gain influence in third countries through trade, aid, and other instruments, though relatively cost-effective, have achieved only tenuous results. They have encountered the same obdurate circumstances that have frustrated similar U.S. efforts. Communist parties and movements in third countries are divided by ideological schisms and impeded by their various affiliations with rival external revolutionary power centers (Moscow, Peking, Havana). They find themselves in competition not only with one another but with a wide spectrum of non-Communist, radical-nationalist opposition movements that can outperform them in anti-imperialist and anti-American vehemence. Given all these limitations, it is difficult to see why a successful Communist political upheaval in a third country today should be any more injurious to U.S. interests than a radical-nationalist one, recognizing, of course, that inherent in each are political liabilities -- in terms of a diminution of U.S. influence, or an accretion of Soviet or Chinese influence, or both.

Finally, U.S. interests would be unequivocally and gravely affected if internal instability in a third country were exploited by Soviet or Chinese military power in such a way as either to provoke a confrontation between the superpowers or to bring Soviet or Chinese military power closer to U.S. territory. The employment of Soviet tanks by Iraq in its intervention in the Jordan-Fedayeen confrontation came close to becoming an example of the former; the implantation of Soviet missiles in Cuba was an actual example of the latter. While

the United States should not aim at safeguarding foreign governments against internal rebellions as such, it does have an interest in forestalling, limiting, or defeating the kinds of rebellions that contain the seeds of superpower confrontation and those that pose a military threat to the United States or to one of its allies.

Unfortunately, it is not always easy to identify the rebellions that hold such escalating dangers, nor to specify in advance what forms and levels of external intervention would transform an internal rebellion into an issue of strategic concern. For example, what degree of Chinese involvement in the revolutionary conflict in Thailand would make substantial counterintervention necessary or worthwhile? Increased training and material assistance to the terrorists? Covert provision of Chinese advisers and cadres? Infiltration of Chinese military "volunteers"? Outright use of Chinese regular units to support or spearhead the terrorists' attacks (in the manner of the North Vietnamese Army supporting the Pathet Lao)? At some point along this spectrum, we might choose or feel compelled to confront China, but without knowing more about both the local and the global context at that future moment, it is not possible to say at what point.

In any event, such a confrontation would present the United States with the painful choice of either committing U.S. forces to contest the outcome with the Chinese, accepting all the costs and risks of that course, or remaining uninvolved and suffering decay in the credibility of U.S. commitments. Obviously, the United States would prefer not to be confronted with these alternatives. Reducing the likelihood of being faced with such a choice would be an objective of an early U.S. response -- which, by virtue of being early, could be kept well beneath the level of direct military intervention; a response, in other words, designed to forestall a confrontation. And that leads to our final question.

HOW LIKELY TO EVOKE A U.S. RESPONSE?

As indicated in the Introduction, we are distinguishing sharply between two kinds of responses: (1) "internal security assistance"

(training and advice plus selected equipment), and (2) "direct military intervention" (commitment of U.S. combat forces). Our concern in this study is only with the former response, "internal security assistance." For reasons to be discussed below, we believe that any specialized U.S. capability for revolutionary conflict should be of that kind only, and should be clearly separated from capabilities for "direct military intervention." The reasons strike at the heart of the question of whether the United States will, in the future, be able to respond even to a revolutionary conflict situation that seriously threatens U.S. interests.

The fact is that U.S. attitudes on military intervention have shifted dramatically in recent years, particularly in reaction to Vietnam. They have taken the wide pendulum swing from the *Eisenhower Doctrine* of the fifties, with its pledge to use American forces "to secure and protect the territorial integrity and political independence" of nations threatened by "international communism," through the *Kennedy era* of the sixties, with its penchant for resisting the extension of Soviet influence into the third world through "counter-insurgency, a wholly new kind of strategy, a wholly different kind of force and, therefore, a new and wholly different kind of military training," to the *Nixon Doctrine* of the seventies -- a doctrine that reflects our present concern to *avoid* future involvement of American combat forces in the defense of third countries and that looks "to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility... for its defense."

Yet the Nixon Doctrine is but a restrained expression of the country's new temper, inasmuch as it does reaffirm existing U.S. commitments and a willingness to provide assistance to "allies and friends." The mood of the Congress and of the American public, by and large, is far more negative, questioning the value of the commitments themselves. The slogan "No More Vietnams" seems to reflect a widespread feeling that almost *no* commitment is worth the cost of armed intervention -- a cost that, in the case of Vietnam, is now considered to have been totally out of proportion to any benefits derived. The reaction to Vietnam has been such that there is a real question whether

any administration henceforth will be able to command sufficient public support for *any* kind of intervention, even if it felt that vital U.S. interests were threatened. The trend is not imaginary, to judge by the *Time*-Harris poll of mid-1969, which suggested that only one-quarter of all Americans were in favor of using U.S. troops to resist overt Communist aggression even in such areas as Berlin, long considered vital to U.S. interests.*

The negative public sentiment is not confined to direct intervention with U.S. troops. It extends also to much more circumscribed forms of American involvement, such as the provision of military training and advice. The concern is that even the most limited forms and levels of U.S. support imply a degree of commitment that will draw the United States relentlessly into more costly interventions. This concern ignores the fact that the United States has for many years been providing a modest level of security assistance to many countries of Latin America without being drawn into any larger interventions. Moreover, avoiding such interventions was and is an objective very much shared by the recipient countries. The fact remains, however, that the present gun-shy public reaction against any kind of U.S. involvement augurs badly for any future U.S. military role in assisting governments that are beset by rebellion.

Still, the prevailing mood is no reliable harbinger of future moods or future judgments regarding America's vital interests and appropriate responses. Also, past examples of unexpected interventions (Korea, Cambodia) and the inherent uncertainties of international relations render dubious any firm prediction that no president in the seventies will again risk public displeasure by injecting American military power into a situation that he perceives as seriously threatening to American interests.

It does seem clear, however, that a future president and his Joint Chiefs, if confronted with such a situation, are more likely

**Time*, Vol. 93, June 6, 1969, pp. 26-27.

either to abstain at high cost or to commit power both excessive and ineffective if their predecessors have failed to preserve a less costly, less risky, and less visible alternative by ignoring or discarding the modest institutional and individual capabilities that have painfully and unevenly emerged from two decades of American experience in third-world conflicts.

To sum up briefly: (1) A rebellion in a third country may, in particular circumstances, pose a serious threat to U.S. interests; (2) the United States should thus wish to preserve a capability for responding in such circumstances; (3) failure to preserve such a capability may leave future presidents with undesirable alternatives; (4) the public mood is now highly negative toward the use of any capability, out of fear that it might lead to larger and more costly involvements; (5) to minimize the risk of such involvements, capabilities for responding to rebellion should be "security assistance," not "direct intervention," capabilities.

Neither kind of capability, however, is now held in high regard. Indeed, U.S. reluctance to contemplate any future involvement is partly attributable to the widespread belief that American performance in the past has been unskillful. It is appropriate then to ask, "How badly have we really done, and why?"

III. U.S. MILITARY EXPERIENCE WITH REVOLUTIONARY CONFLICT

INSTITUTIONAL EXPOSURE

Between 1948 and 1971, American military resources were committed, through a variety of methods, to the containment of four major revolutionary threats: the Huk movement in the Philippines, 1949-1952; the Pathet Lao movement in Laos, 1959-1968; the Viet Cong insurgency in South Vietnam, 1956-1965; and the Communist insurgency in Thailand, 1963-1971. The United States was, of course, "involved" in other revolutionary conflict situations as well -- the civil war in Greece (1947), rear-area security in the Korean War (1950-1953), and the variety of rural and urban rebellions in such Latin American countries as Bolivia, Columbia, Guatemala, and Venezuela (throughout the 1960s). While there are some resemblances among all of these cases, the important feature which distinguishes the four major cases from the rest -- apart from their military character -- was the much greater U.S. role during their early, formative phases, when the political weighed more heavily than the military dimension. Our evaluation of likely future performance will, therefore, be based largely on American past achievement in those four cases.*

It goes without saying that no American military organization in the early seventies failed to be deeply influenced by the experience of American involvement in Southeast Asia. On the other hand, for the reasons recalled above, remarkably few U.S. military organizations were still committed to revolutionary conflict as a focus for capability. It is the purpose of this section to identify those organizations, to describe them briefly as they had evolved by 1971, and thereby to portray existing U.S. military capabilities for revolutionary conflict situations during the 1970s.

* No attempt is made in this study to develop these cases in any detail. A parallel Rand effort, under the direction of Robert W. Komer, is devoted to case studies of U.S. experience in Vietnam, Thailand, and Laos. These studies are expected to be completed in 1972.

As already indicated, we proceed in this way because of what seems to us to be an often neglected fact: An organization is apt to acquire a fixed personality; that is, to develop patterns of behavior that remain stable over long periods of time. A principal determinant of the capabilities that American military organizations possess for revolutionary conflict operations has been -- and is likely to remain -- the modes of operation in which they have been trained, which they have practiced, and to which they have become committed almost beyond escape, however disappointing the record or however novel the situation.

EVOLUTION OF CAPABILITIES

This section traces the evolution of revolutionary conflict routines within the U.S. military in (1) doctrine, (2) assessment, (3) planning, and (4) execution. While these four spheres are obviously related, separate agencies have generally operated with relative independence in the performance of each. Indeed, it is precisely the apportionment of these responsibilities among different levels of the military bureaucracy and their physical separation in different geographic locations that have posed one of the most troublesome problems for the military professional: how to translate a coherent doctrine -- through consistent assessment and planning -- into uniform execution. In this and succeeding sections, we will show that the process of translation from idea to action has virtually precluded the achievement of desired outcomes. Specifically, we will pose three broad questions:

(1) *How and by whom is doctrine produced?* In the field of insurgency doctrine, while conceptual issues have been vigorously debated at all levels of the American military bureaucracy, only a few agencies have been directly involved in the articulation and dissemination of concepts concerning the application of military power to revolutionary conflicts. Among them, the more important contributions have been those of the war colleges, the staff colleges, some specialized schools, certain service commands, and staff elements

responsible for the production of field manuals and other doctrinal literature. These agencies contain the "institutional memory" now available to military planners. We will examine what is stored in this memory, appraise its aptness, and explore the ability of the pertinent institutions to modify it in response to new events or insights.

(2) *How and by whom are situations assessed and plans made?*

In the four cases of revolutionary conflict mentioned earlier, staff agencies at all levels of the Department of Defense were responsible for making assessments and devising plans for the allocation of American military resources. However, we will focus on three key agencies in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, on relevant staff agencies in each of the services, and on the two Unified Command headquarters and the several MAAGs or Milgroups involved in the cases concerned.

(3) *How and by whom are plans and programs executed?* The actual application of military advice and resources to revolutionary situations has been the responsibility of a small number of regular and special units of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. These are the organizations which have had a direct role in translating doctrine, assessments, and planning into action.

In examining each of the foregoing functions (doctrine, assessment, planning, and execution) and the organizational routines for performing them, we will concentrate on the role of the U.S. Army. Historically, the Army has occupied a position of primacy among the four services in the evolution of doctrine and in the development of capabilities for coping with revolutionary conflicts. It has pioneered many of the ideas and techniques now taught throughout the U.S. military school system. Its normal functions, as contrasted with the sea- and airborne functions of the Navy and Air Force, seem more closely related to the problems raised by rebellion. Hence the focus of the discussion below will be primarily on the Army as an instrument for third-country counterrebellion operations.

DOCTRINE

American military doctrine for "counterinsurgency" has generally followed and reflected, rather than preceded and guided, prevailing practice. An examination of war college and staff college curricula since World War II reveals that a preoccupation with problems of a possible European war in the 1950s focused the attention of war and staff college faculties on nuclear and conventional strategy and tactics in Europe and the Northern Hemisphere to the neglect of "low-intensity conflict" or guerrilla warfare in Southern Hemisphere countries of Asia and Latin America. Thus, there was no fund of analysis or experience on which the Defense Department, or the MAAG in the Philippines, could draw when the Huk movement demanded American assistance for the Quirino regime in 1949. This is not to say that nothing had been published on the subject of guerrilla warfare. The point is that none of the major agencies normally concerned with the development of doctrine had emerged from World War II with a charter that accented or even recognized the potential salience of this mode of conflict. Indeed, the energies of thoughtful professional military men were being devoted either to sorting out lessons of World War II or to the problem of allocating resources for the deterrence of a Soviet strategic threat.

At best, the focus of relevant doctrine in Army manuals was on the armed guerrilla, who was presumed to be helpless without continuing support from nearby regular forces. Perceived as a sideshow of the main event of armored, airborne, and infantry-artillery warfare on the North European plain, guerrilla warfare was understood in terms of rear-area security: the problem of guarding lines of communication, logistical installations, and other base facilities in the rear of a front line, where the main forces must continue to consume most of the available energy, planning, and resources. The bulk of American military doctrine was devoted to understanding and managing the problems of that front-line force, especially the problem of delivering a high volume of fire from all available naval, air, and ground power. This was the way World War II had been fought and won,

and this was the way any future conflict in Europe would be managed, the nuclear component remaining the only major unknown in the doctrinal equation.

Although a number of outstanding individuals, such as Major General (then Colonel) Edward Lansdale, played a major role in the anti-Huk campaigns of 1949-1953 in the Philippines and in the early anti-Viet Minh campaigns of 1954-1958 in South Vietnam, these experiences had not, by 1960, had any significant impact on published doctrine or on the thrust of war- and staff-college instruction. True, in the latter half of the fifties interest in this type of conflict had begun to grow. Stimulated by studies carried out in a few academic and research organizations, some officials in the Pentagon and in other parts of the Executive branch began to recognize that there were linkages between the problems of development and those of security -- that violence and rebellion were often associated with rapid economic and political change.

However, the war in Korea, and even the war in Greece, had fostered the traditional notions of conventional (General Purpose) forces mutually committed to FEBA (line) warfare; and the creation of NATO had spawned the new scenario (and vocabulary) of Strategic Forces concerned with "massive retaliation" and "deterrence." It became an article of faith, which was to have a profound impact on American military assessment and planning agencies, that any forces that could handle the "worst case" scenarios -- those with the highest level of conventional firepower exchanged -- would also be able to handle "lesser" scenarios, such as guerrilla warfare. Reflecting the predominant allocation of military budgets to strategic bombers, strategic bases, nuclear hardware, and nuclear delivery systems, instruction at staff colleges continued to focus on what were perceived to be the key problems, i.e., those relating to the application of military power in the industrialized countries of the Northern Hemisphere rather than to its involvement in the underdeveloped Southern Hemisphere.

By 1958, a host of events conspired to generate a slow but insistent shift in the focus of agencies concerned with military doctrine. A decade of military and economic assistance, particularly to less developed countries, had provided evidence that the problems of social, political, and economic change, whether evolutionary or revolutionary, could not be neatly categorized into independent spheres. It had become clear that the various forms of assistance were interrelated, and that, collectively, they had a significant impact on the authority structure of the recipient country. It was much less clear in what ways this assistance helped deter or combat the insidious forms of political-military struggle, often under external sponsorship, that seemed to be so much a part of the development process in the third world. The problem of "insurgency" began to receive scrutiny from analysts not only in the academic community but also in government. Men like General Maxwell Taylor were calling for a new concept of "graduated deterrence" and "crisis management" in opposition to what was increasingly viewed as the bankrupt notion of "massive retaliation." That notion had failed to deter a variety of small wars, both Communist and non-Communist, including the Soviet invasion of Hungary in 1956 and the Israeli-French-British invasion of the Sinai in the same year.

More to the point of this study, the situation in South Vietnam, temporarily pacified by the 1954 partition, had once more deteriorated as the Viet Cong surfaced an increasingly threatening military force, with an infrastructure provided by the Communist Party. Taken in conjunction with the insurgency in Malaya, the revival of North Vietnamese-sponsored civil war in Laos, the growth of Chinese and Soviet influence in Indonesia, and revolutionary turmoil in Latin America, especially in Cuba, indirect aggression by internal upheaval in the third world seemed to demand a new look at the security problems of the Southern Hemisphere. By late 1960, the subject had become a matter of great concern to President-elect John F. Kennedy. In the spring of 1961, the new President, increasingly conscious of an imbalance in American military emphasis, began to give the subject

his personal attention with the issuance of a directive that no military officer would be promoted to the rank of general unless he had received instruction in the problems of insurgency.

It was Kennedy's personal interest as well as the Army's responsibilities that soon generated a host of committees, special schools, and studies aimed at clarifying doctrine and action in this sphere. At the time, however, the only models worthy of study were the cases of the Philippines, Algeria, and Malaya, on which data existed but in which American participation had been limited; there was very little experience that might have guided the U.S. MAAG in South Vietnam to recognize what unbiased observation would have easily shown, namely, that the conflict there was a revolutionary war. The problem was diagnosed instead as a threat of conventional invasion from North Vietnam.

In this context of Presidential interest on the one hand, opposed by traditional military perceptions and routines on the other, the Special Warfare Center at Ft. Bragg, North Carolina, began to assemble materials, lecturers, and case studies to breathe new life and purpose into the Army's Special Forces. These had, up to then, been dedicated to "insurgency" (understood as military action behind the enemy's lines) rather than "counterinsurgency" (understood as assisting a friendly government to combat the activities of insurgents). Reluctantly trailing behind the Special Warfare Center and its concentrated curricular focus on problems of revolutionary conflict, the war colleges slowly combined fragments of their regular curricula, particularly those concerned with problems of underdevelopment, and began to teach short "sensitivity courses" of about two weeks' duration to conform to the letter of the President's new promotion criterion.

As we will see later, these educational efforts had no discernible impact on U.S. military performance in Vietnam.* As always, the

* Laos is another matter: there, the U.S. organized a highly creditable friendly insurgent movement in the early 1960s -- but the operation was not carried out under U.S. military auspices.

evolution of U.S. military doctrine -- at best a painfully slow process, which makes the production of a Papal encyclical look like a knee-jerk reaction -- lagged far behind relevant debate over current problems, especially at the highest levels of the bureaucracy.

At the time that President Kennedy was forming his new administration, the Army's Combat Developments Command (CDC) had just taken over formal responsibility for the development of Army doctrine ("the Book"). This process, rooted in tradition, had previously been the principal responsibility of the military school system, where faculty members could test new ideas against the fresh experience of students just returned from "hands-on" field exposure. CDC relegated the formal responsibility for doctrinal analysis to a separate corps of military intellectuals, teams of which were stationed at the military schools so that they might coordinate with, but be independent of, the school faculties.

In the Army, which, of the four services, probably had the most highly developed bureaucratic process for generating, articulating, and disseminating "low-intensity conflict" doctrine, the takeoff point for further study was the counter guerrilla focus already mentioned. That is, the new problem was perceived as a variation of the traditional problem for military action: how to find, fix, and destroy the armed enemy soonest and with optimum (ostensibly minimum, really maximum) firepower. This focus is not only embodied in a vast library of Army field manuals but is also reflected in the notion, dear to the hearts of professionals through the ages, that the battle is the payoff and that resources must be conserved for that purpose. In the late 1950s, for example, any suggestion that engineer equipment given to the Korean army under our Military Assistance Program (MAP) be used for "civic action" was heretical, for it would have meant the "diversion" of scarce military resources from the main goal, preparation for line combat.

This doctrine of the primacy of violent line combat against an armed enemy is of critical importance in understanding how American military capabilities -- ideas, organizational routines and equipment --

have evolved so that they are ill-suited to cope with conditions of rebellion. The doctrine has rank-ordered the roles of various services (at least within the Army) into combat combat-support, and combat-service-support categories, the latter two being designed for the overriding purpose of facilitating the progress of combat forces. Hence the doctrines and functions of supporting administrative organizations have been no more readily applicable to revolutionary conflict problems than are those of the regular combat forces. For the orientation that governs the combat forces has obviously also informed the perspectives, values, standards, and goals of the supporting organizations.

It was Kennedy's purpose to shake the military establishment out of its rigid adherence to time-honored war-fighting techniques and to turn the attention of its senior leaders to "low-intensity conflict." Between 1961 and late 1964, i.e., in the years prior to the deployment of U.S. regular ground forces to Vietnam, the low-level involvement of American military personnel in Vietnam and, to a lesser extent, in Laos provided an abundance of case material against which to test old and new precepts. Yet, despite the sometimes brilliant performance of talented individuals and specialized units, the feedback process of translating this experience into doctrine remained woefully slow and inadequate. For example, as late as 1963, instructors at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College could seriously set their students (who already knew better) a hypothetical "counterinsurgency" problem involving, in a country approximately the size of Ghana, some 15,000 armed insurgents backed by 100,000 civilian supporters. The approved solution: Two U.S. Army divisions with standard combat service support would be able to defeat such an insurgency! Despite outraged objections from British officers who had had first-hand experience in the Malayan insurgency, the C&GSC faculty could not be budged from its considered judgment, derived from the approved concept of relative firepower effectiveness.

This example is cited, not to criticize the great school at Ft. Leavenworth, but to underscore the gulf which has existed between practice and theory in this field. Military theoreticians have tended,

with rare exception, to see the fight against a rebellion as a traditional combat merely scaled down to small-unit operations (and often, with great and unfavorable effect, not even greatly scaled down).*

Ironically, it was not until about 1965-1966, when the war in Vietnam quite suddenly shifted to a conventional mode involving American and North Vietnamese main forces, that the special nature of rebellion began to be appreciated. From then on, the case materials examined by the military educational community -- including war and staff colleges, the Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency and Special Activities (SACSA), specialized schools like those at Ft. Bragg, Eglin Air Force Base, and the National Interdepartmental Seminar (now renamed the Foreign Affairs Executive Seminar) -- and by the military research community -- including the research efforts under the guidance of the Advanced Research Projects Agency and those of other government research sponsors -- began to reveal many of the shortcomings of the previously dominant military concepts. The irony is that by that time the U.S. military establishment was turning away from the revolutionary conflict mode, and the increasingly perceptive studies of the insurgency problem therefore could only marginally influence military perceptions.

It is equally ironic that the more nearly correct doctrinal conclusions that were eventually drawn both from the pre- and from the post-1965 experience of the American military and that reversed the old orientation on firepower came too late. By the time the new precepts for low-intensity conflict in the Southern Hemisphere had

* At the other end of the spectrum of violence, nuclear warfare in its tactical mode has often been perceived as conventional war scaled up, that is, marginally complicated by more devastating ordnance. For most of the past two decades, the few people who regarded such weapons as primarily useful for their impact on terrain and on enemy morale have also been voices in the wilderness.

become embodied in field manuals and training curricula, a disenchanted public, a changed perception of risks and priorities, and a new set of problems confronting the political and military leadership called for a reorientation of U.S. military resources away from the Southern and back to the Northern Hemisphere. The main focus of U.S. military concern had turned once again toward Europe and, to a lesser extent, toward Northeast Asia.

The new doctrine now reflects greater sensitivity to the non-military dimensions of rebellion. It recognizes that the guerrilla depends for combat effectiveness on support systems, which, in turn, depend to a large extent upon being able to organize support from within the population. Thus, the new Army manuals disdain the term "counterinsurgency" and speak of broader concepts of "nationbuilding" and "stability operations." These reflect an awareness of the importance of political action and of mobilizing the population or at least making it more difficult for the rebels to do so. Instead of military operations aimed at the destruction of the armed enemy, the new focus is on nonviolent operations aimed at winning the support of "the people" (it being understood that this would lead to an enfeebling of the enemy, which would allow neglecting or destroying him). The new doctrine is often vague on the division of responsibilities between the United States and the country being assisted; it is even more vague as to the line that should separate military from civilian functions or the manner in which violent and nonviolent activities should be mixed without their reducing each other's effectiveness. The new doctrine does, however, imply a greatly enlarged advisory role for the U.S. military, extending far beyond security and encompassing, in some variants, virtually every facet of life in the rebellion-beset country, even such purely civilian efforts as assistance in the conduct of the country's economic and fiscal affairs. By the beginning of the 1970s, many thoughtful Army officers believed that, in view of the difficulty that U.S. nonmilitary agencies had in deploying well-trained civilian advisers for these functions, the Army itself should be prepared to provide such assistance, even though it had only very limited competence in these areas.

As already indicated, however, this new and vastly expanded conception of the U.S. military role in revolutionary conflicts coincided with a sharp shift of public and Executive branch interest away from such an involvement -- a shift reflected in significant cutbacks in the budgets and manpower allocated to that purpose. By 1971, the time devoted to insurgency in the curricula of the various war and staff colleges had been sharply reduced, and further diminutions were clearly in the offing. In Combat Developments Command, although its Institute of Strategic and Stability Operations (ISSO) was attempting to monitor all relevant field manuals for consistency, there was a contraction of staff at the Ft. Belvoir headquarters. The reduction in the resources available to the "counterinsurgency" doctrinal community reflected both a shift of interest of the military leadership and budget cuts throughout the armed forces. But it came at a time when high-level defense planners admittedly still lacked a conceptual basis for coping with insurgent threats. As revealed in our interviews, in late 1971 senior Defense Department planners readily acknowledged their inability to design special force structures to meet revolutionary conflict contingencies. *Thus, all the years of experience had still had no discernible positive impact on the military agencies responsible for assessment and planning.*

ASSESSMENT

In contrast with the doctrinal community, which has demonstrated at least a considerable capacity to learn, the military organizations responsible for assessing crisis and threat situations are burdened with long-standing characteristics that critically limit their ability to analyze revolutionary situations and to assess the degree to which they affect U.S. security.

(1) *Nonmilitary dimension:* First, the military are not responsible for making political assessments; within the intelligence community, such assessments are the responsibility primarily of the State Department and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), while the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) focuses primarily on military assessments. This separation of political from military assessments

within the Executive branch tends to complicate the problem of producing an integrated evaluation of any political-military situation.

(2) *Disinclination toward political-military analysis:* The organizational routines and career rewards of military assessment agencies tend to encourage collection rather than analysis, and a focus on order of battle, hardware performance, and foreign military biography rather than matters of military-political concern. Indeed, field agencies of the DIA have been specifically asked to concentrate on collecting data, not on analyzing them. Even military attachés serving in embassies have found themselves constrained not only by DIA directives but also by foreign service officers, who tend to usurp the prerogatives of political analysis even where it is focused on the indigenous military. It is the rare military attaché who ventures to unravel the mysteries of the host country's "military sociology": the effects of differences between the generations within the officer corps; the relationship between the armed forces and the civil polity; the ideal versus the actual role of the military in society; the criteria for selecting and promoting future military leaders; the political-cultural reasons for the prevailing organization of military power; the preferred options for both the strategic and the tactical deployment of military power.

(3) *Concern with operational situations:* Intelligence agencies, with the exception of a few very small groups dealing with long-range threat assessment, devote their energies and resources to *immediate* field situations under the rubric of national security policy. Thus, while doctrinal organizations reflect on the implications of *past* success and failure, these agencies hardly attempt to anticipate the *future* military behavior of adversaries. Their focus is on the near term. Military intelligence agencies are most concerned with *immediate* or midterm threat assessment; they operate within a short time horizon. In principle, it extends five years into the future, as in the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan (JSOP). In fact, their perspective is much shorter, being limited to the current and the coming fiscal year.

(4) *Multileveled bureaucracy:* Unlike the doctrine producers, the assessment agencies of the Department of Defense are scattered among at least four major layers of bureaucracy: the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD); the four service staffs; the Unified Commands (primarily the Pacific Command [PACOM] in Hawaii and the Southern Command [SOUTHCOM] in Panama) and the Military Assistance Advisory Groups (MAAGs) and their Milgroup counterparts in Latin America. The very size of that bureaucracy induces inertia, caution, suspicion of innovation, and the tyranny of "standard operating procedures" (SOPs) -- all of which are less evident among doctrinal agencies.

(5) *Orientation to the needs of the military "establishment":* Given these characteristics, the military intelligence agencies are much more attuned to the internal politics of military management than are doctrine-oriented agencies. Thus, the latter tend to be looked upon as "intellectuals" suffering from varying degrees of isolation from "the real world," while intelligence staffs think of themselves as "realists" and "operators" because they seek to exert an immediate influence over men and resources rather than deal "merely" in ideas.

(6) *Information clutter:* Unlike doctrinal organizations, military assessment agencies are deployed across the globe in a profusion of activities and reporting responsibilities. Thus, their high noise level from local environmental factors (not necessarily related to American interests and their protection) contrasts with the relative isolation of doctrine-oriented agencies from the distractions of diverse cultures. Many consequences flow from this geographic fragmentation of attention. Not the least is an illusion of useful production derived from the sheer volume of message traffic and information flow. Another is the time and energy consumed by the management of such a far-flung information network.

(7) *Unpromising career status:* Within the American military establishment, a career in military intelligence is hardly the chosen path to rapid promotion. Although a military intelligence career

field has finally emerged in the Army, the intelligence function has remained suspect, in part because the quality of manpower traditionally attracted to intelligence has been wanting. As in all low-prestige fields, there have been brilliant individual exceptions, but the function and the organization of military intelligence -- because of rapid turnover of personnel, because of stifling organizational routines, because of traditionally inferior standing among various military staff functions, and because of poor performance in some widely publicized crisis situations -- have not attracted men with a strong interest or background in political-military analysis. Instead, such people tend to gravitate toward planning and command.

(8) *Reliance on host government sources:* Intelligence collection focused on hardware can rely on a variety of sophisticated technologies and devices; but intelligence assessments of political-military matters of necessity depend heavily on host government sources. Thus, the perceptions and evaluations of military assessors regarding internal security problems tend to be deeply influenced by the peculiar perspectives of these sources.

Now governments in the third world typically suffer from a grossly inadequate and unreliable flow of information. This was certainly the case in the four countries from which this study has drawn much of its observations of American experience. In each, the government lacked even the most rudimentary intelligence about the evolving revolutionary conflict. And yet, particularly in the early stages of American involvement, there was little alternative to relying on host government intelligence for U.S. assessments. The phenomenon is general, inasmuch as less-developed countries seem to exhibit this deficiency in direct relationship to their degree of underdevelopment.* In future revolutionary conflict, therefore, U.S. assessments will no doubt be similarly constrained.

* For a detailed discussion of the cost and availability of information in less-developed versus more-developed countries, see Leites and Wolf, *op. cit.*, pp. 133ff.

Not only is the information flow deficient, but there are incentives for the host government to preserve its own ignorance if not to be deliberately misleading. Thus, host government officials may find it politic to ignore the existence of rebellion or to claim that it is due entirely to an external power. Key members of the power structure will be tempted to ignore a threat until it begins to interfere with their own financial or political prerogatives, which are more likely to be centered in the capital city than in precisely those rural areas where the revolutionary infrastructure might be developing. It can be politically awkward to admit that the dissidence has its roots in glaring social injustices or is fueled by a corrupt, incompetent power structure.

Forced to rely largely on host government intelligence, Americans will find it exceedingly difficult to sort out fact from illusion, and self-deception from falsehood. In short, American assessment is always confronted by the problem of distinguishing innocuous dissidence from threatening levels of violence.

PLANNING

As we have suggested earlier, one of the major causes of myopia among planners concerned with revolutionary conflict has been their relative indifference to or unfamiliarity with doctrine. In great part, this has reflected four broad conditions:

(1) *Doctrine not relevant:* Given the orientation of doctrine, during post-World War II years, toward a European conventional or nuclear war, it is doubtful if planners would have benefited from the "counterinsurgency" doctrine that was available, had they devoted much time to its study.

(2) *Doctrine not read:* Even if a more satisfactory doctrine had been available to MAAG and DoD planners, say, during the 1948-1951 Huk campaigns, it is very unlikely that they would have read it. "Operators" are inclined to think that doctrine lags so far behind real problems or is so widely understood that it is not worth much study. In part, the military planners' tendency to avoid doctrinal exegesis may have reflected their disapproval of the turgid style of

field manuals and similar doctrinal texts. Only the leisure of a war- or staff-college assignment, whether in faculty or student status, with its required reading assignments in dry-as-dust manuals, or issue-sheets extracted from the manuals for easier student consumption, would have exposed planners of the 1950s to available doctrine.

(3) *Doctrine not influential*: What Peter Drucker once observed with respect to ideology applies equally to doctrine: "If there is one dependable finding from a century's study of the political process, it is that action decisions are rarely made on the basis of ideology." Doctrine, like ideology, is more likely to be *shaped* by action than to guide it.

(4) *Awareness of resource constraints*: The perspectives of planning agencies are closely linked to available technology and, particularly, to available resources. Plans are developed in the context of known resource limitations. Doctrine, on the other hand, is rarely so constrained; instead, it draws on experience to postulate idealized solutions to general, rather than specific, political-military problems.

Career-oriented officers generally would rather be assigned to assessment and planning duties than to doctrinal agencies. (An Army War College faculty assignment is a possible exception, offering as it does a vantage point on the sidelines from which an observer may occasionally express dismay or approbation without bearing responsibility.) The "line" assignments are regarded as strenuous tests of individual imagination and judgment.

As has been pointed out, "counterinsurgency" doctrine did steadily advance in the sixties. But even as late as 1966, most American unit commanders and division staff officers arriving in South Vietnam were not familiar with the standard doctrinal literature contained in Army field manuals. One informant who had been struck by this knowledge gap explained that, in the view of these officers, the focal division staff problem was not that of understanding the nature of the conflict, but one of managing a division's resources according to prevailing practice. In short, what counted for those planners was the continuance of established SOPs, not their adaptation to a new situation.

(5) *MAAGs and the JSOP*: Regular unit commanders as well as intelligence and operations staff officers were not the only ones so oriented. MAAGs, at least in Asia, were similarly predisposed. The experience and behavior of the MAAG in the Philippines in the early 1950s, and of the MAAG in South Vietnam in 1954-1964, seem to bear this out. The officers of JUSMAG (Philippines) were simply unable to comprehend Lansdale's tactics for combatting the Huk movement, and insisted that counter-Huk strategic and tactical planning be based on the experience of World War II and the map exercises of Ft. Leavenworth. Similar views characterized the MAAG that was established by American officers in South Vietnam in the mid-1950s. The North Vietnamese regular army was perceived as the real enemy, and the salient scenario was a replay of the Korean War, but this time across the 17th parallel and down the Indochina coast. The same general perspectives dominated U.S. military planning in Thailand in the fifties and early sixties, and they continue to be the determining factor in Cambodia even in the seventies. While the current conflict between the Lon Nol regime and the North Vietnamese Army is more an invasion than a revolutionary conflict, it has important revolutionary ingredients which, though still at an early organizational stage, pose the real threat to the regime in the long run. And yet, U.S. force-structure planning is supporting the expansion of the fledgling Cambodian Army to a more than 200,000-man conventional force, unsuited in both size and composition to the "people's defense" and territorial security requirements of that conflict.* The fact is that, in spite of all the experience and weight of evidence against it, U.S. military assistance planners continue to foster, in the most inappropriate places, allied force structures which reflect not only the American professional concept of conventional military power but also the strategic trade-off

* For an apt critique of the present thrust of U.S. military assistance to Cambodia, see the Rowland Evans and Robert Novak column in the *Washington Post*, October 14, 1971.

A persuasive case for a "people's army" versus a conventional force is made by B. M. Jenkins in a forthcoming study, *A People's Army for South Vietnam: A Vietnamese Solution*, R-897-ARPA, The Rand Corporation, October 1971.

concept, applied regardless of its relevance to the local situation, of substituting a less costly local force for an American force to do approximately the same job. In treating third countries, the JSOP simply comes out in favor of the development of U.S.-preferred local forces to replace American forces; and it does so without regard to the availability of MAP funds to support such development. While the JSOP's influence on the Military Assistance Program has greatly diminished, past MAAG and Unified Command efforts to attain its unrealistic force goals have meant that host government needs and preferences for force development were disregarded, and local doctrine and tradition essentially ignored, while American values were imposed. This kind of JSOP-sanctioned "mirror-imaging" has often pervaded every aspect of the United States' military relationship with the host country, whether the U.S. contribution took the form of foreign officers trained in the United States, equipment provided through MAP, techniques adopted for training, administrative systems recommended, or unit performance evaluated. It continues to be reflected in a lack of innovative initiative at all U.S. military staff levels toward developing modes of force-structure assessment and planning more appropriate to third countries.

An example drawn from the experience of PACOM headquarters in 1971 illustrates the point. One office in that headquarters is charged with evaluating the unit readiness of MAP-supported forces in the PACOM area. Its evaluation procedures employ American maneuver elements and tests drawn from conventional combat scenarios as criteria for measuring the effectiveness of MAP-supported units. The office is well aware that such criteria would be essentially invalid if a different combat scenario were considered, such as revolutionary conflict or the deployment of a "people's defense" force against a foreign invader, yet PACOM has developed no alternative procedures for evaluation.

Another example, encountered at the JCS level, similarly supports the point. By early summer 1971, it was certainly clear that American strategies in Southeast Asia would have to anticipate a spectrum of "low-intensity conflicts" in the future. In a discussion of the subject with planners from OSD and JCS, one of the authors of this Report advanced

several plausible revolutionary conflict scenarios for their consideration. After devoting some effort to designing and costing alternative U.S. and allied force structures appropriate to such scenarios, the planners concluded that they had no models or procedures to draw on that would permit them to develop unconventional responses to such unconventional situations. A survey of earlier Joint War Games Agency bibliographies bears out their conclusion. Indeed, although efforts have been made in the Department of Defense to develop models and computer programs that might deal with the salient elements of a revolutionary conflict, none of these proved sufficiently persuasive to the JCS planners to command serious attention. Thus, today as in the past, planning at the JCS, Unified Command, and MAAG levels is based on the preferred or traditional scenarios of conventional armies locked in line combat.

This is not to overlook the special planning staffs that still retain some responsibility explicitly for the problem of "counterinsurgency." However, the status, confidence, and morale of these staffs have suffered erosion in recent years,* a development that reflects the determination of conventional planners and senior leaders to turn the attention of the military establishment back to the main arena of U.S. military experience: the European war.

This is also evident in the changed views of the U.S. Army headquarters staff element that has been most closely identified with the concepts of "nationbuilding" and "stability operations." This staff now has second thoughts about the validity of these concepts. It recently completed and forwarded to the Combat Developments Command's Institute for Strategic and Stability Operations a study which offers "guidance for the development of doctrine." The study gives explicit recognition to the inappropriateness of "nationbuilding" as a U.S. Army function.

*SACSA, for example, has been downgraded from a full-fledged special assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs to an inconspicuous deputy within the J-3 structure, recently renamed DOCSA (Deputy Director for Operations, Counterinsurgency, and Special Activities).

Interviews with "counterinsurgency" planners at various echelons reveal a new concern that their planning activities may have become too narrowly identified with that out-of-fashion style. They insist that planning for civil action, psychological warfare, and unconventional warfare is applicable to the entire spectrum of warfare.

This eagerness of unconventional warriors to get back into the "main stream" has also found expression at Ft. Bragg, North Carolina, which is the home of training programs for Special Forces, Civil Affairs, Psychological Warfare, and Military Assistance officers. Even the most innovative of these training efforts, the Military Assistance Officer Program (MAOP), has encountered difficulty in attracting the highly qualified midcareer officers it seeks for specialization in the political-military problems of low-intensity conflict.

In the Air Force, similarly, specialists and planners at Florida's Eglin Air Force Base that provide the home for the Air Force Special Operations Force have suffered a succession of cutbacks in budgets and personnel to the point where some of the most highly qualified officers are now determined to return to the "real" Air Force before it is too late.

Only in the Navy have special operations retained some allure, principally because they were never so sharply separated from the central thrust of naval operations. Instead of according special operations a "special" status, naval planners attempted to keep its role properly attuned to the historic functions of a deep-ocean navy. Naval Special Warfare consisted largely of skills that were integral to Navy concerns: underwater demolition, undersea swimmer defense, over-the-beach landing operations, and limited riverine and small-boat operations. Thus, only the Army and, to a lesser degree, the Air Force are finding it painful to reorder the priorities and resource claims of the specialized planning and operations staffs that were given considerable status during the Kennedy-Johnson era.

It remains now to examine the impact of these U.S. military experiences and trends upon the "executors," i.e., the institutions charged with applying doctrine, assessments, and plans to actual situations.

EXECUTION

Since 1945, direct application of American counterinsurgency doctrine by field military agencies has been the responsibility of four categories of participants: regular forces; MAAGs; specialized forces; and key individuals. This section describes broad characteristics of these participants' organizational behavior and discusses their relevance to problems of revolutionary conflict.

Regular Forces

American regular forces have participated in only three of the four cases from which data for this study have been taken: Laos, Vietnam, and Thailand. American regulars were not involved in the Philippines, nor in the considerable number of other countries, especially in Latin America, where the United States provided some counterinsurgency assistance. In Laos and Thailand, only the U.S. Air Force took a direct role in the counterinsurgency operation (and in Thailand to only a very limited extent). In Vietnam, all four services were involved; however, only a small proportion of their activities had any "counterinsurgency" significance, which diminished as the war became conventionalized. That is, almost from the instant that American regulars entered the conflict, they were engrossed in what was essentially a conventional war, its insurgent characteristics less and less discernible as the war progressed. Even counter guerrilla operations were the exception, not the rule. From 1965 to the present, American ground forces in Vietnam have had relatively little opportunity to engage in such operations, since they have been primarily concerned with the defeat of North Vietnamese main forces.

But this is not to say that, during this time, they were totally unaware of the fact that the conflict had an internal revolutionary component. Despite their organizational propensity to focus their resources on combat and the defeat of an armed enemy, some of these regular forces experimented with operations aimed at developing popular support through village security and civic action, in the hope that their own operations might thereby be facilitated. There was certainly

some recognition of the salience in insurgency of political rather than military factors. On the other hand, the mobility of a regular American ground force in Vietnam, which next to firepower is its greatest military asset, naturally led to a militarily sensible emphasis on search and destroy (by military action) rather than to a politically sensible emphasis on area defense (and "stability operations"). Moreover, a regular army division is not designed for a political authority-defending or authority-building role; its commanders are not prepared by training or experience to divert significant valuable combat resources to low-level political tactics, nor do they have the assistance of an institution like the Communist political commissar system (which seeks to ensure the primacy of the political over the military objective) in their operations.

As a consequence of the collective training and experience of the American regular units of 1965, the latter's participation in the Vietnam conflict tended to be focused almost exclusively on the armed and organized enemy. Having had very little opportunity to become familiar with the complex political character of the conflict in Vietnam, these units proceeded on the assumption that conventional military action promised the greatest return in wearing down the North Vietnamese and defeating the Viet Cong (VC). As mentioned in Section I, increasing American military resources were soon being applied to the most visible, but perhaps least important, dimension of the conflict, the main force war, which was sustained on each side by the large-scale external intervention and support of Communist and non-Communist states, respectively. Simultaneously, the most important dimension of the conflict, the reestablishment and extension of control over a contested population by a systematically enfeebled military-political authority structure, was largely beyond the understanding or interest of these regular units. Until the establishment in 1967 of the unique civil-military organization known as CORDS,*

* Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support was established under the Military Assistance Command Vietnam in early 1967. Its organizational characteristics and experience are described in R. W. Komer's forthcoming Rand study on *The Impact of Institutional Constraints on U. S./GVN Performance in the Vietnam War*.

that dimension had been almost wholly left to the Vietnamese, with varying degrees of understanding and support from the MAAG, specialized units, and talented individuals.

It is tempting to explain the performance of American regular forces in Vietnam in terms of special circumstances. In fact, we have concluded that these forces did precisely what should have been expected of them, given their standard operating procedures, their institutional unfamiliarity with the true nature of the conflict, and their faith in mobility and firepower. Furthermore, we would argue that, in the absence of a determined civil and military leadership thrust in the opposite direction, an American regular-force unit should be expected to behave in precisely the same way in the future, even if sophisticated briefings were to precede its entry into such a conflict. For, despite the fact that since 1945 Americans have gained extensive experience in several revolutionary conflicts, if only as observers, and despite our interest in training regular forces in counter guerrilla techniques, American regular forces have received almost no operational experience in the calculated meshing of American military power with low-level political objectives. Indeed, even in Nationalist China, where it is a matter of doctrine that the political commissar in the army serves precisely the purpose of employing military power for local political ends, the U.S. "conventional" influence over the Chinese Nationalist Armed Forces since 1951 has so steadily diluted that philosophy that the commissars have long since ceased practicing their doctrine in maneuvers. Thus, the disdain of the American professional military for psychological operations and similar techniques has found expression, not only in Vietnam, but also in other countries where the local military tradition might have pointed in different directions but for the doctrinal rigidity and stereotyped routines of the American military ethic and style.*

* This is not to argue that stereotyping is the only constraint on the political sensitivity of U.S. forces. The American public's deep-rooted suspicion of any American military "meddling in local politics" has been an equally powerful disincentive to developing such sensitivity.

We would argue that stereotyping has been most pronounced in regular units. And this should be expected. For the management of large American ground, air, or naval force units poses such an array of complex issues that no one should demand of their commanders a performance that calls for adaptation to an entirely different mode and focus of warfare. Within the sphere of conventional war, these commanders may improvise and innovate brilliantly, but only within the standard framework of imaginative and efficient delivery of firepower against a visible enemy. To expect them to turn their commands into efficient instruments of political warfare, aimed at authority-building, would fly in the face of everything that we have learned about organizational behavior, American and foreign military doctrine, and the thrust of American military style.

Indeed, the evidence seems to suggest that American regular forces are the least propitious form of military power to apply to a rebellion in a foreign country. Not only are they likely to fight the wrong kind of war; they are also likely to discourage other American participants from fighting the war properly. That is to say, the presence of large American units, staffs, and bases tends to overwhelm small MAAGs, special forces, and key individuals with the sheer complexity of their administrative functions and routines. In order to survive, the smaller agencies and staffs must attempt to adjust their behavior to that of the larger organizations; in the process, these smaller and possibly more innovative agencies lose their ability to influence both the larger American organization and their host government counterparts.

MAAGs

A MAAG was involved, at least during their early stages, in three of the insurgencies from which we have drawn evidence of American military performance in revolutionary conflict (Laos was the exception). In the earliest case, the Philippines, the attitudes of the MAAG differed little from those of the regular forces described above. Colonel Lansdale's success in helping Magsaysay revive popular support for the Philippine authority structure owed very little to MAAG assistance.

Indeed, many MAAG officers felt that Lansdale's techniques violated the military managerial and tactical principles that had won World War II in the forties and were surely applicable to revolutionary conflicts in the fifties. Filipino officers considered these MAAG views so inappropriate and unacceptable that many of them refused to associate with their MAAG counterparts or communicate to them the true conditions in the countryside or in the Philippine Armed Forces.

It is easy to understand why American officers of the fifties might have assumed that conventional Ft. Leavenworth tactics should have swept the Huks from the field. The Military Assistance Program was still a novelty, short on experience and long on hopes. But by the time a MAAG was sent to Vietnam, the Philippine and the French experience in Vietnam should have warned American planners that revolutionary conflict could seriously challenge the precepts of World War II conventional combat and even the standard focus of American "unconventional warfare." Yet the MAAG which entered Vietnam and took over training and advisory functions from the French proceeded once again to mirror American professional military values, standards, and goals. For nearly a decade before American regular forces entered Vietnam, in 1965, that orientation focused American and even Vietnamese attention on the threat from North Vietnam rather than the threat from within. Despite the efforts of a small number of officers experienced in revolutionary conflict, and despite the studies produced in Washington after President Kennedy assumed office, the MAAG in Vietnam proved unable to escape from the hardware orientation of the Military Assistance Program -- an orientation that still remained the dominant *raison d'être* of the worldwide program in 1971.

Overriding concern for military hardware is apt to be accompanied by insensitivity to indigenous political consequences and processes. Through the years since the Military Assistance Program was first conceived, MAAGs considered themselves constrained from involvement in or even concern with local politics and harbored the illusion that they could play a purely technical advisory role. In forward-defense

countries, where U.S. military assistance is usually designed to develop technical military capabilities and standards of performance comparable and complementary to those of U.S. forces, an apolitical, "technical" role for MAAGs could perhaps be sustained. But in countries where internal security is the focus, and where economic weakness sets a ceiling on the country's capacity to absorb modern weapons, such an "innocent" role for MAAGs is inappropriate. Unfortunately, in the cases under study there was no clear *organizational* alternative to such a role.

As indicated above, once American regular forces entered on the scene, any latent inclination in the MAAG to analyze the situation through the lenses of the local military authority and its traditions (what one Rand colleague has called "military anthropology") was overwhelmed by conventional American preferences and perceptions. Thus, in Thailand after 1965, the MAAG could not (even if it had wanted to) have developed an assistance program tailored to Thai security needs and to the inherent limitations of its military forces, since the demands of the Indochina war dominated MAP decisions and dictated a level and mix of military assistance that tended to perpetuate a force structure largely inappropriate to the growing internal conflict in Thailand.

In sum, MAAGs have been severely constrained in their task of "modernizing" host government military forces by their inability to depart from the precepts of the military establishment. MAAG officers have deluded themselves into believing that they are strictly military advisers and trainers, ignoring the fact that their gift-bearing role more often than not involves them in the local political scene. They have also tended to ignore the often adverse consequences of their "purely technical" assistance on the military as well as the larger political authority structure of the host country. Specialized forces and Mobile Training Teams (MTTs), on the other hand -- partly because they are not concerned with massive arms transfers -- have provided a much more effective instrument for focusing host government attention on appropriate force structures and organizational routines.

Specialized Forces

The evolution, since 1945, of specialized forces tailored to the special needs of less-developed countries have reflected a rising tide of U.S. interest in a military contribution to nationbuilding and internal security. The U.S. Army Special Forces, at least in Latin America and Southeast Asia, have gradually shifted from the role of a stay-behind "unconventional warfare" force to that of a counterinsurgent training force. In the early sixties, they played an important part in the creation of "irregular" forces in Vietnam and Laos. Indeed, in Laos, Special Forces personnel -- as individuals, not as units -- helped create a very effective guerrilla force that has withstood North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao conventional attacks for several years. In a few countries of Latin America, Special Forces Mobile Training Teams assisted materially in the establishment of local military units, which became capable of applying the Special Forces' operating principles to their own cultural environment and terrain. During the 1960s, MTTs were employed in many locales in Latin America with minimal political friction and some positive military-political returns particularly in the "civic action" sphere. Special Forces training assistance to the Bolivian military has been widely credited with being at least partly responsible for the dramatic capture of "Che" Guevara in 1967. More generally, the Special Forces seem to have had some success in adjusting to the standards and attitudes of local military units and in avoiding mirror-imaging of traditional American patterns.

Air Force Special Action Forces and Navy riverine forces, as employed in Vietnam, seem to have had a much more limited impact on host country forces. This is not to say that specialized Navy and Air Force assistance was not *militarily* effective. Its effectiveness owed more to direct participation in military operations than to indirect influence through the training of local counterpart organizations. In 1963, for example, the arrival in Vietnam of the first units of the Air Commandos (now Air Force Special Operations Forces) did not herald a new emphasis on the training of a Vietnamese air force for the kinds of "counterinsurgency" operations for which the

Air Commandos had been created. Instead, these units were used almost immediately as a vehicle for injecting the U.S. Air Force directly into the Vietnam war. Air Commando pilots began to fly close-support combat missions. In due course, the U.S. Air Force developed special logistics missions that were appropriate to the peculiar requirements of that war, but by then the war had become conventionalized. The Navy, as already indicated, never allowed the counterinsurgency "fad" to disrupt its traditional perceptions and prescriptions. Sea-Air-Land (SEAL) teams, "Beach Jumpers," and so forth were developed to perform missions that could support and supplement regular naval operations in almost any combat environment.* But no special naval career programs were devised that compared with either the Army Special Forces or the Air Force Special Operations Forces.

Why were Special Forces and Mobile Training Teams more effective than either MAAGs or regular forces in their approach to the internal security problems of less-developed countries? At least three factors seem to have distinguished their behavior from that of both MAAGs and regular forces.

(1) Special Forces teams and MTTs had as their explicit mission the task of training counterparts to adapt U.S. technology and techniques to the political and military culture of the host country. That is, the trainers aimed at having the bulk of the effort performed by host-country officers, and not by foreign "advisers," who characteristically seek only to get the job done, without regard for the retarding effect of such impatient efficiency on the development of local self-reliance.

(2) For the most part, Special Forces and MIT trainers remained in-country only briefly -- long enough to train indigenous cadres

* The riverine forces (often dubbed "the brown-water navy") were probably the only exception; but they were originally a U.S. Army creation, and the U.S. Navy never really accepted them as its own. They have by now been fully "Vietnamized," i.e., from the U.S. Navy's point of view, phased out.

capable of training their own forces. It appeared that, when the trainees understood that the advisers would not remain to provide a crutch but were bent on turning responsibility over to them, their relationship to the advisory team became more productive than the often parasitic relationship of the local military hierarchy to a permanent MAAG.

(3) Those Special Forces officers and men who did remain in-country longer than the larger MTT usually had had previous training or experience that made them sensitive to local political realities. They could serve as a bridge between the host government and the transient trainers.

In addition to the foregoing factors, which have facilitated the transfer of specialized knowledge from American trainers to local military authority structures, the specialized nature of these small units (Special Forces and MTTs) and their focus on unconventional warfare created perspectives more appropriate to the demands of a revolutionary situation (such as the insight that large gains can be achieved with small but high-quality investments of men and resources). These small teams were often able to take on responsibilities, both political and military, that could not have been carried out by large regular military staffs.

Special Forces, by mission definition and personal predisposition, tend to disdain large military establishments as of low cost-effectiveness. Relying as they do on unorthodox approaches, they do not endear themselves to these establishments. They are anathema to MAAGs and regular forces, and their scope for operation quickly shrinks once these conventional entities arrive on the scene.

Key Individuals

A striking fact that emerged from the extensive interviews conducted in connection with this study is the number of highly talented U.S. military officers who have demonstrated a capacity, in many different countries and situations, to interact productively with high-ranking local leaders. Such men as Brigadier General

Robert Rowland in Vietnam, Colonel Robert Shaeffer in Venezuela, Colonel William Law in Laos, and, currently, Colonel Jonathan Ladd in Cambodia and Colonel George Benson in Indonesia have shown that American officers can perform highly effectively in complex local political situations.

One of the most illustrious examples of such success is that of Major General (then Colonel) Edward Lansdale in the Philippines in the early 1950s, to which we have previously referred. By patient analysis and collaboration with key local leaders, especially Philippine Defense Minister Ramon Magsaysay, Lansdale was able to encourage and support these leaders as they carried out a drastic reform of the entire Philippine military authority structure. This reform began in the field with the promotion of competent junior leaders, and the removal of men whom fatigue, disillusionment, or corruption had turned into a liability. Lansdale, of course, was fortunate in having backing from the highest national security levels in Washington and a broad charter from the American Ambassador. Thus, although Lansdale's relationship with the local MAAG was always correct, he was not under their control, a fact which sometimes frustrated senior MAAG officers, who regarded Lansdale's methods as inefficient and too political. The focus of Lansdale's operation was precisely the improvement of the local military establishment in both its internal procedures and its relationship with the population. Magsaysay was quickly attracted to Lansdale's ideas, which he amplified with concepts of his own, drawn from his wealth of experience in insurgency operations against the Japanese during World War II.

When Lansdale began his first tour in Vietnam, in 1954, under similarly favorable auspices, his efforts to employ the same approach with President Diem, though at first promising, were progressively diluted by the increasing size and complexity, and the bureaucratic momentum, of the MAAG and other elements of the U.S. Mission. As has been recalled, U.S. military assistance in Vietnam was dominated by the spectre of a conventional North Vietnamese invasion across the DMZ, and the MAAG was bent on developing the South Vietnamese armed forces in the American image. No matter how persuasive, Lansdale's

unconventional advice could hardly be expected to have prevailed in the presence of a conventional military mission which, by the time he left Vietnam, in 1956, numbered almost nine hundred.*

In such a context, talented individuals like Lansdale have discovered that they can exert an influence on a host government bureaucracy only by finding channels through the labyrinth of the American bureaucracy, whether civil or military. Unfortunately, the successes of individual American officers in their relations with influential local leaders have not been studied in a way that might provide a basis for identifying and training such officers in the future. It is indeed difficult to identify personalities with the political sensitivity, the area and language skills, and the motivations necessary to undertake these challenging but often unrewarding assignments. It is even more difficult to grant them adequate scope for making the desired impact. Lansdale himself was always baffled by the problem of establishing criteria for selecting appropriate individuals. After considerable research and discussion with sociologists and psychologists, he concluded that good advisers are made only by exposure to situations; they must have no real-world experience that will bring out their creativeness *in a particular milieu*. However, through personal acquaintance and word-of-mouth recommendations, Lansdale collected a unique -- and surprisingly large -- file of names of such officers. Needless to say, such a list was bound to include many people whose qualifications would seem exotic, if not questionable, to our conventional military professionals.

Familiar as they are with the way the military establishment reacts to them, officers with these unique qualities are not necessarily eager to be so identified. The label of a "special forces" qualification more often than not evokes an unfavorable reaction

* For a detailed critique of the early U.S. assistance performance, see Dennis J. Duncanson, *Government and Revolution in Vietnam*, Oxford University Press, London, 1968, pp. 272ff.

from the military professional. Indeed, there are officers in the Army and Air Force who would argue that such a label is a distinct liability for advancement. Thus, many officers who could serve well in complex political-military situations have avoided such assignments.

The evidence nevertheless suggests that, in revolutionary conflict situations, the competent individual and small specialized team will be a better executor or guardian of a limited American military commitment than either a MAAC or the regular establishment. And the evidence is unequivocal as to the fate of these individuals and small teams when a MAAG or the regular establishment arrives on the scene: The innovative, unconventional political-military officer is frustrated; the specialized teams are suffocated in heavy-handed organizational routines.

IV. U.S. ASSISTANCE: IMPERATIVES AND CONSTRAINTS

A contrast has emerged from the discussion in the preceding section between the lack of an *institutional* capacity for revolutionary conflict and the existence of highly creditable *individual* capacities for such conflict. To harness such individual talents, we shall argue, an institutional capability will have to be created that is aimed specifically at revolutionary warfare, and clearly differentiated from the military establishment's other tasks.

But before we can turn to this subject, it is necessary to throw into sharper relief the differences between the problems of revolutionary and conventional conflict, and to consider some of the implications of these differences for a U.S. assistance role.

REVOLUTIONARY VERSUS CONVENTIONAL CONFLICT

Perhaps the most important differences are those of *concept* and *goals*:

(1) Conventional war pits forces against forces -- revolutionary war is a contest between rival authority structures.

(2) Conventional war is fought over the conquest of territory -- revolutionary war is indifferent to territory; the insurgents seek to "conquer" (discredit, destroy, and replace) the authority structure, wherever it is deployed.

(3) Conventional war glorifies the offense (aggressiveness, audacity, persistence, and forward momentum) -- the rebellion is "strategically" (politically) offensive but tactically defensive, i.e., it is elusive, evasive, conservative, and "plays it safe" by disengaging and withdrawing when confronted by superior force.

(4) Conventional war pursues victory -- the rebellion stresses "staying power," accepts setbacks, seeks to wear down rather than defeat its opponents; its aim is to frustrate them and undermine their confidence.

(5) Conventional war rarely challenges the political system; even "unconventional" partisan war usually seeks the preservation of

that system or restoration of the *status quo ante* -- revolutionary war aims at the liquidation of the existing power structure and at a transformation in the structure of society.

There are also striking differences in *methods* and *tactics*:

(1) Conventional war begins with the deployment and employment of military power - revolutionary conflict begins with the creation of a disciplined political organization that can mobilize popular energies and produce and reproduce insurgent manpower and resources.

(2) Conventional war seeks immediate, maximum development of military power -- revolutionary conflict proceeds in phases, i.e., it embraces a concept of "stages of growth," each stage being a prerequisite to, and coexisting with, the next.

(3) Conventional war relies primarily on the lethal effects of massive military force, such as heavy firepower, armor, aerial bombardment, and centralized operations by large units -- rebellion relies primarily on stealth, agility, and evasiveness, and on the political-psychological effects of selective, carefully targeted employment of force.

(4) Conventional war usually requires sustained voluntary popular support for its pursuit, and continued sympathy for its cause -- the rebellion can rely in larger measure on coerced popular support; thus it places less emphasis on "HAM" (appealing to the "Hearts and Minds" of the population to win their loyalty and support) than it does on "CAS" (mobilizing the baser instincts of "Greed, Ambition, and Spite" to create a tyrannical order). Revolutionary conflict is to a much greater extent a contest in the effective management of coercion.

(5) Conventional forces may resort to terrorism, but they do so, more often than not, coincidentally and out of frustration -- the rebellion employs terrorism as a central technique, either for demonstration and provocation (to advertise and build prestige for the movement, to discredit authority and provoke its overreaction) or for compulsion and enforcement (to intimidate and coerce the population so as to ensure its compliance).

These differences in concepts and methods between conventional and revolutionary conflict have important implications for what is required to combat rebellion as distinct from coping with conventional attack.

IMPERATIVES FOR COUNTERING REBELLION

Unlike conventional armies, which aim at annihilating a government's forces or at acquiring its territory, rebellion aims its attack at the government's authority structure. It seeks to undermine, destroy, and supplant it. Also, unlike conventional armies, whose strength resides primarily in their forces and firepower in being, the rebellion's strength resides in its political organization -- the apparatus that produces and regenerates forces. Some distinctive imperatives for countering rebellion flow from these differences:

(1) *"Hardening" the authority structure:* The overriding and enduring requirement for a government seeking to deter or meet a revolutionary threat is to "harden the target," i.e., improve its own political and administrative effectiveness. This means, in the first instance, rectifying its most glaring weaknesses, such as reducing the incidence of illegal and undisciplined conduct within its own agencies and forces, both civil and military, raising their integrity and morale, and fostering observance of the rule of law. It also means demonstrating administrative competence, and a capacity to govern, by taking measures that will enhance the authority's ability to protect the population, enforce law and order, and carry out essential programs. Finally, it means heightening the political appeal of the government at the macro level, through a display of effective leadership, a capacity for institutional accommodation, and a willingness to undertake some social or economic reforms that gain the public's allegiance or compliance.

(2) *Targeting the rebellion's organization:* Force is, of course, also important in combatting a rebellion, but its application must be discriminating and properly targeted. Its object is not so much to destroy the rebellion's forces, but to incapacitate the organization that produces these forces and provides their supplies. The real

core and growing points of a revolutionary movement are not its armed units but its political organization. As long as this organization remains intact, the rebellion can regenerate its forces almost at will. Without the organization, its armed units become ineffective. Eradicating a revolutionary organization is a function much better suited to the capabilities of police and paramilitary forces than to those of conventional armies.

(3) *Accentuating the role of intelligence:* Targeting the rebellion's organization places extraordinary requirements upon a government's intelligence system. In the fighting of a conventional war, military intelligence is focused almost entirely on the enemy's order of battle and his impending plans. In a revolutionary conflict, virtually every measure the government directs against the rebellion is critically dependent on accurate, timely information, specifically about the inner workings of the revolutionaries' administrative network. Intercepting its communications, infiltrating its ranks, and ultimately eradicating it from the countryside calls for procedures that again resemble those of police criminal investigation much more than those of tactical military intelligence. Developing a sophisticated police intelligence system is difficult and takes time. It is, however, one of the best investments a rebellion-threatened government can make.

(4) *Restricting the symbiotic resource flow:* One of the important and elusive targets of the government's intelligence must be the rebellion's resource flow, its sources and its disposition of manpower, money, and materiel. Unlike conventional armies, whose lines of logistic support are physically visible and can be militarily interdicted, revolutionary forces support themselves and grow by gaining control of part of the government's and the community's resources. The revolutionary organization enmeshes itself in the economic and political fabric of the society it seeks to take over, and thus sustains itself through symbiosis.* The symbiotic flow is

*Duncanson, *op. cit.*, p. 296.

of central importance to the rebellion, occupying a large part of its submerged organization. Therefore, untangling this web with a view to interdicting the flow is essential to effective counteraction. It is once again a combined task for intelligence, police, and military skills.

Several points emerge from this brief and incomplete listing of "imperatives."

First, measures designed to deter or combat revolutionary conflicts go far beyond the application of purely military skills. They call for administrative competence and integrity in all elements of government that come into contact with the population. They also call for specialized skills in nonmilitary spheres such as civil intelligence and police pursuits, and for political effectiveness in areas beyond that of administration.

Second, to the extent that military skills are called for, they are different from those residing in conventional armies, whose standard doctrines and routines are not suited to the task. If military force is to be used effectively in revolutionary conflicts, it will have to be specially adapted and structured to that purpose.

Third, assistance to rebellion-beset governments must stress people and organization, not weapons and equipment. The arms-transfer orientation that dominates the U.S. Security Assistance Program is inappropriate to the internal security sphere.

Fourth, preventing a rebellion or coping with it in its embryonic stages is far easier than trying to defeat it once it has taken hold or approached maturity. The hope, however, that American involvement will occur early enough to nip a revolutionary conflict in the bud is not likely to be realized. This point needs some elaboration.

PHASES OF REBELLION AND THE LIMITS OF PREVENTION

A rebellion develops in progressive stages, like a living organism, its embryonic stage virtually undetectable. The literature on revolutionary warfare is filled with discussions of this phenomenon. Whether one accepts Mao's three-phase or Giap's five-phase classification, or favors the more recent propositions of "Che" Guevara and

Regis Debray or even the urban-guerrilla exegesis of Carlos Marighela, all these theorists share a recognition of the necessity for painstaking organizational beginnings that are carefully concealed and that emerge into visibility only as the movement gains strength and confidence. Leites and Wolf^{*} liken the progression to the "stages of economic growth" that Walt Rostow observed in the evolution of the less-developed countries.

For the sake of illustration, we show in Table 1 a phased development of a rural rebellion. It is purely notional; rebellions are likely to diverge from this or any other pattern, particularly in their later phases.^{**} But the illustration is useful in showing the great differences in the nature and the severity of the problems that will be encountered, and therefore at the countermeasures that will be required at the different stages. It should be easiest to suppress a rebellion while it is still in its formative stages -- when the organization is being built, training and indoctrination are underway, and acts of violence are only occasional. But governments are likely not to be aware of rebellions at such early stages; or, if they are, not to take them more seriously than traditional banditry. As was pointed out in the preceding section, their information flows and assessment systems are not good enough to provide such early warning. Even if they were aware or suspected that a revolutionary challenge was being mounted, they might be reluctant to acknowledge such a dismaying fact. When a rebellion begins in areas remote from the seat of government or appears connected with a distant population group,

^{*} Leites and Wolf, *op. cit.*, p. 49.

^{**} For example, it was long believed that there was a preordained sequence of guerrilla warfare leading into mobile warfare and thence into positional warfare, and that attacks on government outposts or villages must start out from hidden jungle bases. The second Indochina war has dispelled both these beliefs.

CLASSIC PHASES OF A RURAL REBELLION

	PHASE I (Organizational Buildup)	PHASE II (Active Guerrilla Warfare)	PHASE III	PHASE IV	PHASE V
		(Main-Force Warfare)			
GOALS	Develop political cadre and support base among population; build "production" or organization: intelligence and propaganda sections, terrorist-sabotage sections; acquire recruits, materiel, intelligence	Gain control over villages in inaccessible areas; build rural guerrilla forces, village platoons, village authority structure	Begin destruction of government's prestige and authority; build territorial forces, district companies, district authority structure	Create LOC, provincial, and main-force maneuver battalions; build province authority structure; demonstrate irresistible power and inevitable victory	Prepare all forces for general offensive and general uprising to topple central authority
METHODS	Armed propaganda; recruitment by enticement and entrapment; training and indoctrination by face-to-face communication	Attacks on and coercion of village leadership; widespread proselytizing efforts; disruptive-provocational terrorism	Attacks on district government structure; coercion terrorism; large scale weapons capture	Attacks on province government main forces; mobile warfare in large units	Expand LOC; intensify attacks with help of large-scale external main-force increments

it may be lightly dismissed as the inconsequential action of a misguided minority that needs merely to be brought back into the fold.* Least of all, at such an early stage, will a government be inclined to invite external assistance, since to do so would be to admit and advertise its own inadequacy. Thus the opportunity for aborting an insurgency in its embryonic and most vulnerable stage is almost invariably missed.

This means that, by the time the United States is asked to assist, the rebellion most probably has evolved to the stage where it constitutes the kind of challenge to the established order that the host government can no longer ignore and with which it is demonstrably unable to cope. That point is likeliest to be somewhere between Phases II and III on our synthetic table, a stage that poses much more difficult problems for the host government and for U.S. assistance than does Phase I.

CONSTRAINTS ON U.S. ASSISTANCE

What kinds of assistance can the United States be expected to render when called into such a situation?

Too much should not be expected of technical assistance given by one government to another. Transferring physical objects and capital equipment is rather simple. A dam can be constructed rapidly, an industrial plant built, a squadron of F-4 Phantoms provided. But transferring the human skills required to permit these physical objects to function and to be maintained is a much slower and more difficult task. The difficulties are multiplied when the skill transfer is in the internal security sphere, because it involves authority structures and because criteria of what constitutes "effective" authority are

* In the Thai government, for example, this view is widely held even now to explain the phenomenon of the "Communist Terrorists" in Thailand's remote northeast.

far vaguer and more deeply affected by social-cultural divergences than, say, matters of technical engineering. For example, improving the internal security performance of one element of the civil administration, such as the district or village authorities, may cut into the traditional prerogatives of another, such as the national police, thus affecting their relative power positions. This can cause ripples of consequences for the effective functioning of the authority structure as a whole that were neither foreseen nor intended.

Some kinds of skills are more easily transferred than others, and some cannot be transferred at all -- and this is particularly true in the internal security sphere. Here, it is important to distinguish among three kinds of governmental functions: (1) techniques and tactics, (2) administrative competence and integrity, and (3) political "legitimacy."

There is no question that U.S. assistance can be of some help in the first category. For example, in such areas as law enforcement, intelligence, resource control, and small-unit patrolling there are specific technical proficiencies, mechanical skills, and organizational techniques that can be fairly readily imparted. They tend to be only minimally affected by cultural values.

American assistance can also be of help in the second category, though this is considerably more problematic. The measures required to improve the administrative functioning and integrity of a government strike closer to the heart of established bureaucratic and political equities. They are painful and tend to be resisted. And yet these are precisely the measures that can have the greatest impact on the government's ability to frustrate the rebellion: reform of the system of career incentives and sanctions in the civil and military services, improvements in financial management and logistic control procedures, and so forth. Such measures are also much more culture-constrained. Unenlightened U.S. "mirror-imaging" could result in an undermining of local values, thereby weakening rather than bolstering governmental effectiveness. Thus, this category of assistance calls for advisers and trainers who understand the art and politics of government and who also are sensitive to alien cultural and social values. Developing this expertise and attracting

it to such assignments is not easy.

Finally, U.S. assistance can *not* be effectively rendered in the third category. Strengthening a government's legitimacy (not legitimacy in the formal, constitutional sense, but legitimacy in the sense in which it matters: the psychological relationship between a government and its people that permits rulers to rule) is not a task for an outside force. It involves issues of far-reaching internal political change that affect the entire society and the distribution of power within it. Transforming illegitimate into legitimate rule belongs in the domain of the host government. Where effective leadership and clear political direction exist, external assistance can support them; where they do not, no machinery operating from the outside can create them. On the basis of recent experience, it is probably fair to say that U.S. pretensions to the contrary in Vietnam have proved illusory.

But even the more feasible kinds of U.S. assistance, such as those in the first and second categories, are limited in their potential by the blunt and ill-focused mechanisms available to the U.S. Government for providing assistance. Of the many agencies involved in the process, none is charged with improving the political effectiveness, or strengthening the authority structures, of third-country governments.* Each agency has its own repertoires and parochial concerns: AID pursues "economic development," State stresses "political reporting," CIA fosters "intelligence assets," Defense seeks "mutual security," and so forth. Needless to say, each agency would claim that its assistance contributes to the political strengthening of the host government, and in an incidental way each may be right. But there is not integrated focus toward this end, and in the aggregate

*The mildly encouraging language of Title IX of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1967, admonishing AID to support "political development" in aid-receiving countries, hardly constitutes such a charge.

the political effects of the separate programs are often trivial and sometimes negative.

Much more could and should be said about the larger institutional limitations of U.S. assistance: the professional motivations, perspectives, and biases of the assistance personnel; the policies that govern their selection and rotation; the experience profiles and career interests of those who tend to be assigned to less-developed countries as ambassadors and heads of mission. But this would carry us well beyond the scope of this study.

The point to be made here is simply that, no matter what is done within the military sphere alone, and no matter what changes are made within the Department of Defense, the assistance effort will still suffer from the constraints of a poorly coordinated, unfocused, multiagency mechanism.

A NEW "INTERNAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE" FOCUS

Given the imperatives and constraints described so far -- the multifunctional, staged-growth character of revolutionary challenges; the inability or reluctance of governments to meet rebellions in their early and vulnerable phases; the difficulties of transferring political skills; and the inadequacies of our assistance mechanism -- what might be the appropriate role for U.S. military resources in revolutionary conflict of the 1970s?

First, it can only be a *small* role, not only because of the inherent limitations and the fact that the problems of rebellion call for high-quality rather than high-quantity inputs, but also because, in the current political context and in the face of competing budgetary demands on behalf of more pressing defense needs, we can hardly expect to garner significant new resource support for a role in revolutionary conflict, or to muster enthusiasm for radical organizational departures.

Second, it can only be a *coordinate* role, in the sense that the military effort, to be effective, must be deployed in conjunction with an equally specialized civilian effort. Although our study focuses on the military dimension, this is thought of throughout as complementary to a predominantly civilian venture.

Third, it must be a *distinct* role, in the sense of having a separate identity within the military establishment and being clearly aimed at "internal security assistance," as distinguished from conventionally oriented military combat capabilities. This is particularly important, because, if it is not so separated, the dominant traditional U.S. military perceptions and routines will ultimately suffocate it. Thus, if the role is to survive, the resources, organizations, and decision processes that it encompasses will have to be formally decoupled from those concerned with "direct military intervention" and from the massive arms transfers that are designed to develop conventional forces in "forward-defense countries." Such a decoupling is also significant in signaling a break in any escalatory linkage that is believed to exist between "internal security assistance" and "direct military intervention." Separating the two capabilities would make it more difficult for modest assistance to "grow imperceptibly" into large military involvements.

Finally, it should be an *authority-building* role, i.e., assistance should be focused on those aspects of the host country's military establishment where it will do the most to enhance the latter's counterrebellion performance -- its technical competence, its administrative effectiveness, and its integrity -- thus strengthening the contribution of the military element to the host government's effective authority. Such assistance would draw on U.S. military expertise in the area of combat service support rather than that of combat techniques. It would include intelligence, communications, personnel management, military justice, and other fields that make high demands on the competence, integrity, and morale of the military service.

These are difficult fields in which to work improvements, and progress will be slow. But progress on the side of the rebellion will also be slow -- revolutionary organizations are not built overnight. Progress in authority-building, like progress in rebellion-building, must be measured in years, not months. Assistance, therefore, would have to be sustained over lengthy time spans. But if so sustained, even modest efforts could achieve significant results.

How could such a military "internal security assistance" role be developed within the present U.S. military establishment? What organizing framework might preserve and develop the necessary talents? The following, final section of this Report addresses itself to these questions.

V. POSSIBILITIES FOR INSTITUTIONAL REFORM

The purpose of this section is to explore a range of measures that might be taken, primarily within the Department of Defense, to ensure that the internal security assistance skills that have been developed within the U.S. military establishment over the past fifteen years are preserved and that new and, one would hope, more appropriate skills are developed by a new generation of military officers.* Such skills cannot simply be taught in a classroom, they must be acquired through many years of exposure and experience. The key to the problem is the *individual* and his professional environment -- and this is not simply a matter of personnel selection and assignment. Even the most carefully selected individual cannot be expected to sustain his professional enthusiasm and ability if he must fight to survive in an unsympathetic organizational environment. Hence this section examines a range of institutional reforms -- at different levels of difficulty and cost -- that would tend to make the organizational environment more propitious, so that young officers will be tempted to invest the years of effort required to develop expertise in this sphere.

As we showed earlier, one of the most discouraging aspects of the American "counterinsurgency" effort in the past has been the dispersion of functions and resources among different agencies and geographic areas. For this reason, we have made the degree of *resource concentration* the principal criterion for distinguishing among three possible levels of reform (arranged in ascending order of resource concentration), with each level a prerequisite to the next.

* Again, we have reference here only to *internal security* assistance, as distinct from security assistance geared to arms transfer and combat capability, which accounts for the bulk of the program.

We have adopted this approach because we recognize that organizational change involving the shifting of resources exacts a toll in political effects, organizational struggle, and disruption, and that administrations are reluctant to incur such costs except for commensurately important objectives. Our Level 1 reforms, therefore, seek to keep such resource shifts to a minimum and focus instead on altering *perspectives and procedures*, their aim being to enhance individual and organizational performance and thereby improve doctrine, assessment, planning, and execution. But our expectations for their effectiveness are not high. Our Level 2 reforms build upon the changes of Level 1, but move substantially toward resource concentration. The concentration, however, is limited to *military* resources; civil resources are left essentially untouched. This level of reform should yield significant improvements in the revolutionary conflict capabilities of the U.S. military establishment, but would fall short of achieving an integrated civil-military capability. Our Level 3 reforms include all or most of the first two levels of change, but add the much more painful step of concentrating civil resources as well as military, and placing all relevant resources under a single, civilian line of authority.

It is an unfortunate paradox that the level of reform most likely to be effective (Level 3) has the lowest expectation of being instituted. Conversely, the level of reform most likely to be instituted (Level 1) has the lowest expectation of being effective. Because, in the current political context, support for drastic reforms is extremely weak, our analysis has concentrated on the Level 1 and 2 reforms, which have at least some chance of being attempted.

LEVEL 1 REFORMS: DOD ONLY -- MINIMAL ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE

As already suggested, these reforms aim at achieving least-cost improvements in the perspectives and procedures governing revolutionary conflict skills within the Department of Defense, with costs being measured in terms of both bureaucratic conflict and budgetary constraints. To that end, the guiding principle in Level 1 reforms is an emphasis

on improving and unifying the doctrine and assessment functions, while planning and execution assets are left largely unchanged.

Doctrine: The prevailing state of confusion about revolutionary conflict doctrine within the Department of Defense calls for a major review of doctrinal and instructional materials guided by a unifying philosophy about the origins, evolution, and techniques of this type of conflict. In some measure, Section IV of this study has attempted to outline the key elements of such a philosophy. Aspects that need to be stressed include:

- a. concepts of cumulative phases of rebellion and the kinds of countermeasures appropriate to them;
- b. the vital importance of integrating a military contribution with the civil effort both on the American and on the host government's side;
- c. the focal importance of the host government's military authority structure, rather than either the armed enemy or "the people";
- d. the consequent significance of American advice and expertise in combat service support techniques rather than combat techniques, with particular emphasis on intelligence, ~~communications~~, personnel management procedures (pay, promotion, assignment, rewards, etc.), military jurisprudence, family welfare, and military logistics; and, above all,
- e. the need for adapting American expertise in those administrative fields to the particular environment of the country beset by revolutionary conflict.

The development of such a unified doctrinal vision will require high-level guidance and supervision. To get this review underway, a task force might be set up at OSD level. Where should this activity be lodged? Within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, cognizance of the security assistance effort has, until recently, rested with the Office of International Security Affairs (ISA). At the beginning of 1972, however, operational responsibility for security assistance was moved out of ISA and set up under a new small Defense Security Assistance Agency (SAA) reporting directly to the Secretary of Defense. ISA now retains only the policy and program formulation responsibility for

security assistance. While the new SAA is concerned with *all* security assistance, it is the logical focal point within OSD for the specialized revolutionary conflict responsibility as well. The limited manpower resources of this agency could be supplemented by drawing on other organizations within the Department of Defense. But since the SAA, under our concept, would have a key role in guiding the doctrine and assessment efforts, some thought should be given to its position within the DoD establishment.

Who would be the Director of the Security Assistance Agency? While he would clearly have to be a distinguished senior military officer, there would be some disadvantages to appointing an *active* officer to that role. In the past, the Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency and Special Activities (SACSA) was an active duty officer with a measure of independence. In 1970, however, his office was subordinated to the direct control of J-3 in the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) -- an organizational context that assures the dominance of the traditionalists over those who know something about rebellion. Certainly, it is imperative that the Secretary of Defense have the advice and support of a well-qualified military officer with experience in revolutionary conflict as well as conventional operations. His past career must command the respect of senior officers responsible for allocating military resources among competing strategic concepts and missions. On the other hand, the Director of Security Assistance must not be allowed to feel that his future career depends upon the sympathies and good offices of the Joint Chiefs.

A *retired* officer, therefore, with extensive experience in counterinsurgency at both policy and field levels, would seem to be the best choice. Moreover, it would not be difficult to find among the ranks of retired officers some highly qualified candidates, with the right motivation and necessary depth of experience in the substantive as well as the bureaucratic aspects of third-country security assistance.

What would be the relationship among the Director of the SAA, the JCS, and the Secretary of Defense? For the purpose of translating doctrine into improved methods of assessment, planning, and execution, we would argue in favor of concentrating the now-scattered revolutionary

conflict functions in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, this concentration to include the shifting of many SACSA (now DOCSA) functions from the JCS to the Security Assistance Agency. The objective of such a shift would be to give to the Director of the SAA enough responsibilities to enable him to play an adversary role vis-à-vis the JCS.

This adversary role is vitally important. The past and present status of unconventional and special operations planners on conventional staffs -- whether at MAAG, Mission, Unified Command, Service Staff, or OSD levels -- indicates that they are natural adversaries of conventional planners. Members of the first group must believe in a philosophy of limited military power applied for limited political ends; they must disdain massive arms transfers and military "modernization," preferring limited arms transfers tailored to the low absorptive capacity of host governments. The other group is committed to the belief in firepower massed through conventional American military force structure models, a goal whose achievement in a host government requires high-pressure modernization in accord with JSOP time schedules and priorities. Between the two groups, an adversary relationship has evolved at all staff levels. This phenomenon is widely recognized in the Defense Department.

Our contemplated reform would deliberately institutionalize that adversary relationship in such a way as to provide the Secretary of Defense with clear alternative strategies reflected in alternative budgets, base structures, security assistance goals, and force postures in or near countries where internal revolutionary conflict was threatening U.S. interests. In order for the Director of Security Assistance to debate alternative strategies with the JCS with the necessary independence and clout, his office has to be separated from the JCS.

Within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, then, the least radical change in the bureaucracy would assign all revolutionary conflict functions to the new Defense Security Assistance Agency, including those of policy and program formulation. Or, to go one step further, the Director of Security Assistance might be elevated to Assistant Secretary level, at the time that the new internal security responsibilities are assigned to him. Such a step would have several consequences:

- o It would give him enhanced prestige and equal status with the Assistant Secretary, ISA, a status required to enable him to respond directly to the needs of the Secretary of Defense without involving ISA as an intermediary.

- o It would clearly separate his security assistance functions from ISA's more conventional security policy functions.

- o It would give the office greater negotiating power, both within the Defense Department and with other agencies of the Executive branch.

- o It would be a signal to all military and nonmilitary participants that the Secretary of Defense (and the President) considered the preservation of an American revolutionary conflict capability an important element in the implementation of the Nixon Doctrine. This would be especially true if the person appointed to the post were widely known for his competence in the field of internal defense.

ISA would most probably oppose such a shift of resources and functions to a coequal agency. Yet the field of security assistance has recently been given even greater, independent recognition by the Department of State, which has moved to create a new post of coordinator with the rank of Under Secretary of State, for the purpose of supervising all aspects of security assistance for the Executive branch as a whole. Hence a rank of Assistant Secretary of Defense would certainly not be out of proportion to that move.

Among the functions of the Director of the SAA, a review of doctrine, as suggested earlier, would be a priority task aimed at resolving interservice confusion over terminology and roles. Besides articulating a unifying set of guidelines, the Director could prepare a directive for the signature of the Secretary of Defense requiring all service schools to review their curricula to ensure that they reflected these guidelines. At the same time, certain service schools (Finance, Military Police, Judge Advocate, Transportation, and others) could be directed to form task groups to examine how their expertise might be adapted to the problems of revolutionary

conflict. The progress of this review would be monitored by the Security Assistance Agency for consistency with the guidelines.

In addition to those initiatives, the Security Assistance Agency could sponsor a study within the Department of Defense to assess the relative effectiveness of a tailored security or "people's army" force structure^{*} versus a conventional army in defense against either an externally assisted internal rebellion or a conventional invasion by a foreign enemy. There is increasing evidence to support the thesis that an army on the American model is not only inappropriate for revolutionary conflict but may be inefficient even in a conventional conflict involving a less-developed country defending its territory against a more powerful foreign adversary. The lack of any analyses of this subject has hampered assessment and planning in the Department of Defense for too many years; it is a fault that could easily be corrected.

The revised set of concepts, an agreed terminology, modified instructional curricula, and improved evidence on the effectiveness of a "people's war" force structure might reorient conventional wisdom. They could not, however, work any significant changes in performance. To achieve the latter would require much more far-reaching measures involving personnel selection, training, and assignment. But the changes in personnel assignment policies, incentives, and rewards that would make this an attractive career field would be revolutionary departure from the current practices of the Department of Defense. There is no prospect of such revolutionary changes taking place in the present environment; reform in this basic career sense is not feasible.

What is feasible is an improvement in the ability of the services to *locate* the talent that now exists. Such a modest program, carried

^{*} A force structure in which police, local, and national defense forces are integrated and management, combat, and support structures highly decentralized. For a classic example, see A. Ross Johnson, *Total National Defense in Yugoslavia*, The Rand Corporation, p. 4746, December, 1971.

out or monitored by the Security Assistance Agency, would seek to identify those individuals whose experience in past revolutionary conflicts testified to a knowledge of either a particular country or a particular function. This file of specialists also would be basic to the implementation of other recommendations, discussed below. Looking further ahead, the curricula of service schools could be gradually modified to conform to the revised concepts of revolutionary conflict and their implications for the military component of U.S. assistance, so that officers attending these service schools in the future might be appropriately trained. To this end, the Security Assistance Agency could be tasked to monitor instruction at service schools and to recommend curriculum changes to the Secretary of Defense for implementation by the services.

Assessment: Perhaps more than any other single function, the assessment process is critical in determining the success of a U.S. assistance venture. Not only because our past record has been so poor, but also because the consequences of a misassessment can be so costly, this area deserves the most meticulous attention and highest talent.

Here again, the inadequacy of limiting the discussion to the military element of a revolutionary conflict capability becomes apparent. Rebellion is so largely a political phenomenon that the assessment of a revolutionary challenge and of the measures required to meet it cannot be primarily a military function; and, in fact, institutionally it never is. Assessing an internal security situation is a (primarily ambassadorial) responsibility of the U.S. missions in the field, and primarily a State Department-CIA responsibility in Washington. Improvements in the U.S. military contribution to these assessments would be significant only to the extent that they were matched by comparable improvements in the other elements in the Mission and in Washington. Although changes within Defense alone would thus have only a marginal impact on the total assessment of a situation, they ought nevertheless to be considered, since even in a comprehensive reform throughout the Executive branch (our Level 3), the Defense Department's participation in the assessment process would require it to make these changes in its own structure.

In the field of assessment, it is possible to institute effective changes in Defense Department procedures without seriously altering prevailing organizational equities or resource commitments. Under the aegis of the new Security Assistance Agency, a low-key "early warning" alert procedure could be introduced by which to monitor intelligence reports and evaluations from MAAGs and missions as well as from individuals with a view to identifying internal security situations that contain the seeds of a threat to U.S. interests. Some considerations in making a judgment of this kind have been discussed in Section II of this study. A country in which such a situation was identified would become subject to a special assessment process designed to determine whether it should be "Internal Security Priority" (ISP) status. The initial identification, however, would be tentative. That is, before applying the ISP label and invoking the special planning procedures suggested below, much further evidence would be required. It is at the collection and evaluation of such evidence that our contemplated assessment process in the Department of Defense is aimed.

The first step in such a process would be for the Security Assistance Agency to assemble a special assessment team of experts, to undertake a deeper analysis of the situation in the particular country. The team would include not only military personnel with outstanding experience both in the particular country and in revolutionary conflict in general, but also civilian political and economic analytic talent borrowed from other agencies or brought in as consultants from outside the government. Though the assessment process would be strictly a DoD effort, it ought to have the broadest possible intellectual base. It would be tasked to concern itself not only with the nature of the rebellion but, more important, with ways of improving the host country's authority structure, particularly its military component. All findings would be reported directly to the SAA instead of being funneled through the normal channels (MAAG to Unified Command/Service Staff to JCS/DIA). This would ensure that the Secretary of Defense received an independent analysis of a situation well before it had reached a crisis stage.

In-country American officials would be asked to participate in, but would not control, the analysis. As we indicated earlier, the perceptions of Embassy and MAAG personnel, regardless of their professional qualifications, are influenced by their interests and career obligations -- as would be those of the Security Assistance Agency -- which makes an adversary procedure advisable as long as no consensus on basic points has been reached.

Such an early assessment process would forestall any hasty allocations of assistance resources, which would be all too likely to be inappropriate in quantity, quality, or timing. The assessment team report, along with the comments of the country team, would provide the Secretary of Defense with a wide range of views and judgments on which to base his decisions.

The assessment process would be even more productive if it were made clear to the team at the outset that, if their recommendations were accepted in whole or in part, they would be asked to assist in developing an assistance program under the direction of the Security Assistance Agency. In a sense, this would bestow upon the assessment team the potential additional utility of being an *ad hoc* planning staff under SAA sponsorship. In this way, the value of the team's experience prior to and after its field investigation would not be lost after the team returned to the United States. Instead, continuity between assessment and planning would be assured.

Clearly, without further changes these measures would not go far in preserving or improving the revolutionary conflict capability of the United States, inasmuch as they would not stimulate career interest in this field. In fact, as we pointed out previously, any system that identified talented officers who would be on call to serve on assessment teams might act as a disincentive to some, who would fear being branded "unconventional warriors." But short of the kinds of changes in personnel procedures embodied in our Level 2 reforms, the measures described above would at least offer some modest returns, in the form of better assessments and more effective decisions, at very limited costs in interference with organization and careers.

Planning: As suggested earlier, the greatest improvements in planning would derive from changes in doctrine and approach. One of the proposed changes in approach is that of deciding which, at any given time, are ISP countries, and of according them special treatment that would set aside the normal military assistance processes and what is left of their traditional linkage with the JSOP. This is essential if assistance to ISP countries is not to be informed by the traditional military conceptions, which, as we argued in Section III, are so inappropriate to revolutionary conflict situations. The normal military assistance processes would, at least initially, continue in effect for countries receiving more conventional arms transfer aid under the Military Assistance Program, particularly the forward-defense countries, which account for the overwhelming bulk of the MAP budget. Thus, important organizational equities would not be endangered by the initial decoupling of ISP countries.

In addition, the talents of specialized service schools should be tapped to improve the combat service support functions in the host government military establishment. To this end, the Director of the Security Assistance Agency could direct each appropriate service school to prepare a "type" plan for the application of its specialized competence to typical revolutionary conflict environments. Such a plan might provide a first cut or "model" of training assistance that could later be adapted to specific situations. Also, the requirement to produce such plans would give a more concrete focus to the curriculum reviews described above as part of a doctrinal reform.

Further, in order to create an "institutional memory," the Security Assistance Agency could sponsor studies on all countries that have received or are likely to receive internal security assistance from the United States. Especially for countries that have a history of significant military relationships with the United States, the study should focus on several topics that would be useful to future planners:

- a. The historic role of the military in the host-country society.

b. The "sociology" of the local military establishment, with emphasis on its social origins, its internal politics, and its perceptions of internal and external threats; the military's behavior toward the population, especially at the village level; its concepts of discipline and rewards to the common soldier; the professional quality of the officer corps; promotion criteria; the legal status of the soldier and his dependents.

c. The impact of past MAAGs on the foregoing perspectives; that is, the extent to which MAAG influence has altered the political status of military establishments in their own society and the way in which local military leaders have employed MAAG resources to manipulate their own political allies and adversaries.

The lack of such knowledge, systematically committed to an institutional memory, has seriously limited the effectiveness of U.S. assistance efforts in the past. Those engaged in assessment and planning in the future would find such analyses invaluable in gauging the host country's "absorptive capacity" for assistance and judging whether particular levels and forms of aid would have the desired effects.

Execution: The basic principles that guide our conception of U.S. internal security assistance involve the deployment of very small quantities but very high qualities of U.S. resources, maximum reliance on host government initiatives and self-support, a low-visibility American presence, and a focus on improving the military administrative system rather than on supplying weapons or equipment.

To apply these principles at minimal cost to the existing system, the Security Assistance Agency would do well to rely to the greatest extent possible on mobile training teams (MTTs) in implementing plans. MTTs have been employed for technical training with great effectiveness throughout Latin America. In part they have been used extensively there because the U.S. Southern Command has encouraged Milgroups to promote them and to stress their availability. The Pacific Command has employed MTTs much less frequently. Unlike resident MAAGs and

Milgroups, MTTs remain in-country only briefly, thus minimizing the chances of friction with host governments. Such chances would be further reduced if MTTs were area-oriented; that is, if they were composed of men whose functional expertise was matched by familiarity with and sensitivity to the host government's political problems. In part, the resident officers of MAAGs and Milgroups could contribute to that sensitivity by supervising the work of the MTTs.

The discussion thus returns to the problem of training both individuals and teams. The Military Assistance Officer Program (MAOP) at Ft. Bragg is an example of the kind of training that will enhance the sensitivity of MAAG personnel to local political and cultural conditions. The Army's Foreign Area Specialist Training program (FAST) is even likelier to foster the desired depth of knowledge and awareness, but it is very costly in the time it takes out of an officer's career. Certainly, it would be desirable to assign only MAOP or FAST graduates to resident MAAGs and Milgroups in internal security priority countries. But the present shortage of such graduates limits this possibility to the short-run demands. In the long run, particularly if ISP countries became much more numerous, both programs would have to be expanded.

Given the emphasis of this study on a combat service support focus for American assistance, it might be well to consider drawing more of the FAST and MAOP trainees from the service rather than the combat arms. Majors and lieutenant colonels already familiar with the complexities of military finance, transportation, law, quartermaster, signal, intelligence, medical, and engineering would probably be more effective than combat-arms officers when applying area and language skills to an internal security situation.

These training programs have only long-range value, however. In the short run, the selection of senior MAAG chiefs is clearly crucial. Even well-trained subordinates, experienced in revolutionary conflict and sympathetic to the principles outlined in this study, cannot hope to generate perceptive assessments and plans if their immediate superiors cherish totally divergent doctrinal and operational beliefs. Just as the Director of the Security Assistance Agency should

be carefully selected from among the small group of retired senior officers experienced in this sphere, so MAAG and Milgroup chiefs assigned to ISP countries should be selected from among active officers with a similar bent. That requirement cannot be satisfied by a cursory look at an officer's service record to ascertain that he spent time in Vietnam. For most senior officers, Vietnam was not an experience in revolutionary conflict. The need for an appropriate senior officer on the country team is important enough to warrant giving the Director of the Security Assistance Agency a major voice in (and certainly a veto over) the selection of such officers.

Once selected, senior officers should be given much more instruction than at present in their assigned country's military politics, and be made thoroughly familiar with whatever new doctrines were developed at Ft. Bragg and in the Security Assistance Agency.

LEVEL 2 REFORMS: DOD ONLY -- MAJOR ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE

The major difference between Level 1 and Level 2 reforms is in the degree of concentration of military resources. Our Level 1 reforms were limited to modifying perspectives and procedures, without significantly disturbing existing organizational arrangements. Those reforms would be relatively easy to accomplish, as they would entail minimal shifts in resources and organizational equities. Level 2 reforms, however, would go much further. Building upon the doctrinal and assessment changes of Level 1, they would concentrate military resources under a single command so as to achieve major improvements in planning and execution. Needless to say, the bureaucratic costs of such reforms would be far more likely than those entailed in Level 1 to deter Defense officials from undertaking them, lest other, more important programs suffer in the process.

The principal change under Level 2 would be the creation of an agency, or a command, that would have the same global operational control over U.S. military resources for low-intensity conflict as the Strategic Air Command has over Air Force resources for strategic

conflict. The unique difference between them would be that the proposed Security Assistance Agency (through its field command described below) would have control over *all* Department of Defense resources related to its domain, that of revolutionary conflict doctrine, assessment, planning, and execution.

One way of providing such a unified headquarters would be to designate Ft. Bragg, North Carolina, as the principal base for housing headquarters, staff, students, and major operational units, some mobile training teams, and administrative and service support organizations. This could be the field command of the Security Assistance Agency (SAA) in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The legal and command relationship between the SAA and its field organizations would approximate that which now exists between the Defense Intelligence Agency headquarters in Washington on the one hand and the service intelligence and Defense Attaché field agencies on the other. Under this concept, the SAA would have direct operational control over a small headquarters staff at Ft. Bragg, which in turn would have direct control over all MAAGs and Milgroups. Units assigned to the Security Assistance Command, both at Ft. Bragg and in the field, would retain their service affiliation, just as units under a Unified Command report to a component commander. However, service components on MAAGs and Milgroups would report to the service component of the Security Assistance Command, not to the service component of one of the Unified Commands.

Within the United States, the principal effect of the effort to concentrate revolutionary conflict resources in a unified headquarters would be the transfer of some Air Force and Navy resources from such places as Eglin Air Force Base and Little Creek, Virginia, to Ft. Bragg to facilitate achievement of the Level 1 reforms outlined above. Identifying those specialized units and schools that have been created primarily for revolutionary conflict situations would require interservice agreement on selection criteria, worked out under the supervision of the SAA.

All services can be expected to resist any new agency threatening to steal budgetary and manpower resources, and thus influence.

Indeed, in the context of continued professional distrust of unconventional warfare, even the specialized units and planning staffs in each service are ready to disavow their specialization. Special Forces now lay claim to skills in domestic nationbuilding and internal development; frogmen see themselves as *primarily* engaged in regular underwater demolition; Air Force Special Operations Forces emphasize their *multipurpose* airlift capabilities; and so forth.

In part, this tendency of special units, which were designed or modified by their respective services to ride the crest of John F. Kennedy's enthusiasm for counterinsurgency, is a tactic of survival in the hostile environment of the seventies. In part, it reflects the frustrating search for truly general-purpose forces. Our research suggests that *neither strategic nor general-purpose forces are appropriate for revolutionary conflict*. But clearly, revolutionary conflict forces as a military claimant face powerful competition from strategic forces and general-purpose forces, both of which enjoy line-item status in the military budget. Perhaps revolutionary conflict forces should similarly be given line-item status and their own, unified organizational identity as a way of providing them with some budgetary clout and demonstrating to the U.S. Congress and public their very modest overall cost.

Doctrine: The availability of a new field command under the cognizance of the SAA would reinforce the need for a review of doctrine and the establishment of a prestigious Director of the SAA as suggested under Level 1. If the Level 2 reforms were instituted, such a field command would provide the Director with an operating agency that could be employed to carry out many of the programs proposed under Level 1. Indeed, there is already in being at Ft. Bragg a staff which has been engaged for several months in a review of the Army's counterinsurgency doctrine and practice. That staff could be made responsible for reviewing *all* service school and Defense Department doctrinal and instructional materials to assure their consistency and adherence to the new, unified conception of revolutionary conflict.

While the staff of the SAA should retain the primary responsibility for developing such a unified philosophy, the specialists already assembled at Ft. Bragg, together with experts drawn from the Navy and the Air Force, could facilitate the work of reconciling the four services' current differences in terminology and perception.

Through its Security Assistance Command, and with the support of the 82d Airborne Division at Ft. Bragg, the SAA could test the effectiveness of a "people's army" force structure against a conventional force. Experimental exercises which the Special Warfare Center at Ft. Bragg has conducted in Anson County, North Carolina, and which are described more fully below might be modified and expanded so as to include the 82d Airborne Division, deployed as a conventional invading force and fighting against a "people's army" deployed in a variety of ways, the exercises to be tailored by the Security Assistance Command to conform to different phases of a hypothetical revolutionary conflict. Such a maneuver, along with war games conducted by the Joint Staff, would help challenge any preconceptions about the ineffectiveness of irregular against regular forces.

The existence of a Security Assistance Command would make it easier to get doctrine adopted in training. The Command could assure that its Mobile Training Teams and military advisers were schooled in the new doctrine and that the doctrine was clearly conveyed to MAAGs, Milgroups, and special missions. It would also have a stake in attracting career-oriented specialists to service in revolutionary conflict. Thus the Command could help the SAA compile the list of officers and men with outstanding experience in revolutionary conflict, and might also help develop a career program aimed at producing senior officers of star rank for future MAAGs and Milgroups as well as for major commands with an important security assistance function. The complexity of this question defies detailed analysis here. However, the existence of a major headquarters, bases, schools, and operating entities would provide at least some institutional incentive for career planning.

Centralizing the selection and assignment of security assistance personnel at Ft. Bragg would be another desirable change. It would constitute a sharp departure from current personnel assignment practices in the Army, where the "general officer" is the goal to be attained through many varied (and often unrelated) assignments, all monitored by branch career assignment officers and by the Office of Personnel Operations (OPO). At present, the schools at Ft. Bragg have minimal influence over the selection of their students and no say at all in postgraduate assignments. Yet sound judgments as to the suitability of an officer for assignment to a complex foreign environment are more likely to be made in the context of the security assistance orientation and academic and operational expertise that exist at Ft. Bragg than in the framework of the OPO's standard career orientation. In the latter, the focus has been on "Army needs," which are expressed in manpower matched against a shifting array of "slots." If selection and assignment were made at a center such as Ft. Bragg, the focus would be on specialized function, which would mean greater reliance on cumulative experience than the traditional Army personnel system could sustain, and adherence to different criteria of selection.

To put it another way, the future needs of the Defense Department for senior officers in security assistance roles might well justify combining many career specialists in one broad category (possibly designated "political-military officer"). Some of these officers might ultimately fill roles other than in security assistance, and it would therefore be unreasonable for assignment officers in the Security Assistance Command at Ft. Bragg to retain permanent control over their careers merely because these had started with the specialized training (and low-level assignments) of the security assistance function. Nevertheless, establishing a single personnel assignments office within the Security Assistance Command would seem justified as a way of motivating, evaluating, selecting, assigning, and rewarding those officers and men who are embarked on an "advisory" career.

Specifically, such an office would have the power, under the guidance of the Director of the Security Assistance Agency and the Commander of the Security Assistance Command, to review the qualifications of all officers whom their parent services have selected for security assistance training and assignment. For example, an officer so selected should be interviewed and examined by officers already experienced in the politics of the country to which he is to be assigned and familiar with the personalities of his counterparts there. Once accepted for assignment to a particular country, the officer should expect successive assignments to the same country or to other foreign areas with similar political situations. At home, his jobs might range from staff functions in the Security Assistance Command, through faculty duties in the Command's schools, to assignments in the Army, the Joint Staff, or the Security Assistance Agency, with perhaps occasional detachment to either the State Department or the CIA. The personnel office would also have cognizance over the customary personnel activities, including efficiency reports, rewards, and pay. It would thus administer, through its service components, all personnel aspects of the Command.

Assessment: The assessment function would remain the focus of most of the training and personnel selection effort of the Security Assistance Agency, as suggested in our Level 1 reforms. Under Level 2, the process of creating and manning a Security Assistance Command would bring together a large number of officers and men whose names had been high on the proposed list of area and language experts. Concentrated in one Command, these would become participants in an active dialogue that could speed many of the reforms considered in this study toward implementation. Particularly in the review and reformulation of doctrine, these men could create a new awareness of the constraints on the role of the American military in this peculiar sphere of conflict. They could provide the core manpower for assessment teams, on which they would be joined by similarly experienced personnel from State and CIA.

Under Level 2 reforms, primary responsibility for assessment would be lodged in the Intelligence Division of the Security Assistance

Command, which would select the military members of the assessment team. Their selection would, of course, be reviewed both by the Security Assistance Commander and by the Director of the Security Assistance Agency. As a matter of routine, the Intelligence Division would also perform three other functions:

a. Prepare studies on the history and experience of MAAGs and Milgroups in selected countries, and on the overall military and political relationship between the United States and host countries. These studies would be updated periodically for assessment, planning and briefing purposes.

b. Brief officers and men before they enter upon their assignments to MAAGs, Milgroups, MTs, and Special Assessment Teams.

c. Debrief MAAG, Milgroup, and MTT members upon completion of these tours.

These functions of the Intelligence Division are obviously related. In addition, the Division, in coordination with DIA and other intelligence agencies, would maintain the "early warning" alert system referred to earlier, by which it would monitor the situation in countries where revolutionary conflict appeared to threaten U.S. interests. With that task as its continuing responsibility, the Security Assistance Command would be well prepared to serve the needs of the Secretary of Defense whenever foreign governments or U.S. missions abroad made requests for assistance or for an assessment team.

Needless to say, the military orientation of the Security Assistance Command would have to be leavened by nonmilitary expertise in all of the functions listed above under Level 2 reforms. At a minimum, representatives or contingents from the State Department, AID, CIA, and other concerned agencies would have to be attached to the Command. More properly, there ought to be a conscious effort to incorporate nonmilitary skills into the Command and thus make it into an integrated military-civil assistance organization. But such a step would take us beyond the ground rules of Level 2 reforms, since it would require major organizational changes outside the Department of Defense.

Planning: As suggested earlier, the major benefits of the Security Assistance Command would lie in the fields of planning and execution. Headed by its own three-star commander and reporting to a civilian OSD director (possibly at the Assistant Secretary level), the Command could play a significant adversary role vis-à-vis the JCS through which to enrich the dialogue over strategy and budgets and provide provocative alternatives to JSOP perceptions and prescriptions. This is not to say that, in such a dialogue, the proponents of the revolutionary conflict view would or should prevail over proponents of the nuclear and "mid-intensity" conflict views. But they would bring to the debate a possibly realistic estimate of the costs entailed by conventional intervention, one that has been lacking in the past decade. On balance, as we said earlier, Presidential decisions concerning U.S. involvement in a third-country situation might not be significantly influenced by either expert *military* assessments or criteria of cost-effectiveness. But an adversary position by advocates of low-key assistance and a "people's war" approach would at least expose the President and his cabinet to that option, spelled out in terms different from the basing, force structure, and tactical models that now occupy an uncontested field.*

In an intellectual and bureaucratic context of antitraditional perceptions of the role of military power, planners at all levels of the security assistance organization, but especially in MAAGs and Milgroups, could freely examine the military traditions of host governments and attempt to adapt American combat service support to the particular situation overseas. Their premise would be a great reluctance to commit American combat forces to any revolutionary conflict; they would be inclined to search for every feasible alternative to such commitment.

* In our view it would make a noticeable difference to current U.S.-Cambodian military assistance decisions if the President had a non-JCS option available to him.

In the search for such alternatives, the planning staff of the Security Assistance Command would be primarily responsible for monitoring the program, recommended under Level 1, of generating "type" plans in service schools. Under Level 2 reforms, however, they would have the benefit of a large number of people knowing what to look for and motivated to obtain it, and they would be better able than under Level 1 to guide the service schools in the development of such plans. Armed with "type" plans and with Intelligence Division assessments, Command planners would then be prepared to work out specific plans in actual future situations.

In addition, the planning staff would be responsible for the training function of the Security Assistance Command. In this capacity, the Command would have at least policy (if not operational) control over all schools, both in the United States and abroad, that are engaged in teaching American officers to advise foreign armies and those that teach foreign officers to employ American equipment and concepts in their own armies. While our training of foreign officers is, by and large, highly effective from a *technical* viewpoint, it often imparts American military doctrines which are deleterious when thus implanted and applied in the third country. For this reason, the Security Assistance Command might usefully review the curricula of the Air Training Command and other service schools that train foreign officers, so as to determine how to adapt the training more nearly to conditions in the various host countries. The studies and debriefings prepared by the Intelligence Division could then make a distinct contribution to the large and expensive foreign-officer training program.

In addition, a number of schools would be placed under the Command: The School of the Americas at SOUTHCON, for example, would fall under its operational control, while such schools at Ft. Bragg as the Institute of Military Assistance, the Civil Affairs School, and the Psychological Warfare Schools would fall under its direct command. A concentration under the new Command of these and other schools oriented toward foreign assistance would be desirable as a way of

underlining the Command's essential function of advising and training (as contrasted with a combat function). Indeed, it would be wise to have only a minimum of operational troop units under the new Command (a subject to be discussed below under "Execution").

A separate Training Branch might be created within the Planning Division to supervise the schools devoted to security assistance training and to assume staff responsibility for the training of all Mobile Training Teams. Because the training of foreign armies (in ISP countries) would be the principal function of the Command, the training of trainers would become one of the most important staff functions and might require the greatest number of people. Needless to say, language and area studies would be of special interest to the Training Branch, which should have a budget for graduate training generous enough to attract career officers and to meet field requirements. Also, the Defense Language Institute might be among the schools to be incorporated in the Security Assistance Command. Without pursuing further the question of what particular service schools ought to be included, it seems clear that the SAA could be tasked to determine the schools that would be appropriate for the language, area, and functional requirements of security assistance. A large number of these schools probably would most suitably be brought under the Security Assistance Command. Any school, however, the majority of whose students were likely not to enter the security assistance system after graduation should no doubt remain outside that system.

Execution: As a further step toward the separation of internal security assistance from the conventional military establishment, it would be desirable to withdraw from existing Unified Commands the responsibility for administering *internal* security assistance, leaving under their control only the arms-transfer (forward-defense country) programs. MAAGs, Milgroups, and MTTs could then be supervised in the field by new subcommands under the Security Assistance Command. The advantages of regional subcommands over the concentration of all units at a single headquarters such as Ft. Bragg are apparent from the example of the U.S. Southern Command in the Canal Zone.

In addition to the obvious benefits of its geographic location within the theater of its activity, SOUTHCOM is steeped in the atmosphere of the Southern Hemisphere. Milgroup and MTT members who are repeatedly rotated through or are garrisoned there have the opportunity to become and remain acclimated, to use their language skills regularly, and to exchange experiences obtained from similar assignments. Having the specialized schools at SOUTHCOM teach all their courses in Spanish further underlines its regional character.

Turning these responsibilities over to a new regional subcommand of the Security Assistance Command would involve a painful change in the existing Unified Command structure -- one that would be vehemently opposed at least by SOUTHCOM, as it would remove the very resources and activities from its control that are its principal *raison d'être*. Similar opposition, though with less reason, would be encountered at PACOM if internal security assistance resources were co-opted by a new regional subcommand there. In PACOM's case, however, such a change would be much less of a shock than at SOUTHCOM, as internal security is a trivial part of its responsibilities compared to the massive arms transfer programs that are its principal concern. Still, an established Unified Command structure, with its complex, carefully balanced internal and mutual relationships, could be disturbed only at great cost -- likely to be incurred only if the Secretary of Defense places a high value on preserving an internal security capability within the Department of Defense.

In keeping with our principle of low American visibility, Level 2 reforms would also include an effort to reduce the size of MAAGs. This would mean concentrating as many as possible of the professional personnel and their dependents at the regional subcommands, and reducing MAAG personnel to the few officers best equipped for long in-country assignment. Whenever an MTT or an assessment team was called in, these few officers could help and guide the transient team. No matter how well qualified the short-term team members, they would still benefit from the assistance of colleagues permanently on station.

One of the more puzzling problems in our Level 2 reforms is that of the U.S. Army Special Forces and their counterparts in the U.S. Air Force. The specialized forces in the U.S. Navy, as has been pointed out, are well integrated with other Navy programs. Those of the Army and Air Force, however, are very much unsettled as regards their future roles and missions. Within the past few years, for example, the Army Special Forces, seizing upon the Army's concept of "nationbuilding," have experimented with an ambitious application of their medical, engineering, and communications skills -- their noncombat expertise -- to U.S. domestic community relations. To compensate for the lack of opportunities overseas in which to apply their combat, administrative, and language skills, as well as for a public image that has accented their combat role in insurgency, Special Forces officers and men have engaged in a series of unusual exercises in civic action and community development in Anson County, North Carolina, in which they were able to put some of their extensive training to work. In general, the feeling in the Army is that the Special Forces are overtrained for the assignments available to them.

In light of the dominance of training and advisory functions in our concept of internal security assistance, Special Forces are indeed overtrained in their combat qualifications. But as a superb repository of trainers, particularly in their noncommissioned officer ranks, they would seem well suited, under our Level 2 reforms, to becoming the permanent mass-training arm of the Security Assistance Command. Some Special Forces Groups stationed abroad could be placed under the purview of the regional Security Assistance subcommand; those at Ft. Bragg, under the Command itself. They would provide the principal source of trainers in combat and support skills for third-country military forces that required a "people's army" capability. In addition, they would provide excellent raw material for staffing the personnel, intelligence, and planning divisions of the Security Assistance Command. In many cases, they would be appropriate for MIT and even for MAAG (Milgroup) assignments. And finally, some could be tasked as a contingency reserve for employment by EUCOM, PACOM, and SOUTHCOM.

The Special Forces themselves are apt to regard such a redefinition of their missions as one that does not do justice to their unique combat potential. The élan of the Green Berets of the early sixties will hardly be restored in the seventies.

LEVEL 3 REFORMS -- INTERAGENCY INTEGRATION

The aim of our Level 3 reforms is the much-discussed *desideratum* of achieving an integrated civil-military assistance effort that would put an end to the institutional fragmentation characteristic of the present U.S. assistance approach described (see Section IV, pp. 61-64). To accomplish such an integration, at least four major changes would be required:

- (1) Organizational reforms within the non-Defense agencies concerned with internal security assistance (State, CIA, AID, USIA, etc.) comparable to the Defense Department reforms described under our Levels 1 and 2;

- (2) Creation in Washington of new instrumentalities of interagency coordination and integration comparable to the "country teams" in many U.S. diplomatic missions abroad;

- (3) Designation of a single agency (State? Defense?) to assume full responsibility for the *implementation* (as distinct from policy formulation) of assistance; and,

- (4) Designation of a single office in the field (the ambassador? a political-military deputy ambassador?) to assume full responsibility for the entire assistance effort in the particular country.

A detailed discussion of the reasons for such changes, and of alternative ways of bringing them about, would take us beyond the scope of this study.* A few comments on each of the four areas of reform, however, may be in order.

* A parallel study, under the direction of our Rand colleague Robert W. Komer, will be devoted to this subject.

Reform in the non-Defense agencies: Many of the characteristics of organizational behavior that we described with respect to the military services also apply to the nonmilitary agencies. The unconventional young foreign service officer who is attracted to and excels in assignments as province senior adviser in Vietnam or as head of the Peace Corps in Morocco is not a hero to his own, tradition-bound establishment; the career of a CIA officer who achieves success as an organizer of guerrilla forces in Laos or as an unconventional program manager in Timbuktu will not progress as fast or as far as that of his more conventional, intelligence-oriented colleague. If the skills demanded by "internal security assistance" are to be encouraged and if the function as such is to receive adequate recognition, the civilian agencies will have to institute reforms comparable to those described under our Levels 1 and 2. As already indicated, the State Department has made a modest start in that direction by establishing the new post of Coordinator of Security Assistance, with the proposed rank of Under Secretary and reporting directly to the new (proposed) Deputy Secretary of State. This coordinator is to be responsible for the coordination of all foreign assistance. Although he will be primarily concerned with conventional security assistance, he will also serve as a focal point in the State Department for high-level attention to *internal* security assistance.

Interagency integration: Since the gradual demise of the "Special Group-CI" that existed at the level of Under Secretary during the Kennedy administration, there has been no high-level coordinating body in Washington specifically concerned with internal security issues abroad. Policy guidance, too, is almost totally lacking. The Foreign Internal Defense Policy (FIDP) paper that evolved laboriously from many earlier iterations, though formally approved by the National Security Council is in fact in limbo. If internal security assistance is to be revived as a serious U.S. effort, it will require the re-creation, under the cognizance of the NSC, of an interagency integrating mechanism -- more specialized than the present Interdepartmental Groups -- to develop policy, guide doctrine, and monitor execution.

Responsibility for implementation at the "Center": The monitoring of execution, unfortunately, could not be done other than imperfectly by such an integrating committee, especially one established at the highest levels. If there is to be consistency in execution -- if indeed there is to be a *resemblance* between policy and execution -- the responsibility for implementation will have to be lodged in a single agency. For practical purposes, the choice lies between the Departments of State and Defense: State, because it is legislatively and Presidentially charged with policy responsibility for all foreign assistance; Defense, because it has under its domain the largest share of the resources and organizations that can be readily fielded for assistance abroad, and because, unlike State, it is experienced in operations and in the management of programs. On balance, we would tend to favor Defense as the locus of responsibility, particularly if our Level 2 reforms were adopted, including creation of an unconventional Security Assistance Agency (and Command). This agency could develop a close policy link to State, even to the point of having the Security Assistance Commander, with three-star rank, serve concurrently as deputy to State's new Coordinator of Security Assistance. The subject, however, is complex, involving as it does not merely interservice and interagency equities but also Washington's relations with the field and, most important, relations between the Executive branch and Congress. The shifting of responsibilities (as between State and Defense in the sphere of foreign aid) is, of course, severely constrained by the existing Congressional committee structure and by a conflict of views within the Congress.

Responsibility for implementation in the field: Perhaps the most serious impediment to the effective conduct of U.S. security assistance has been the lack of a single management, an undivided authority, over the assistance activities of the separate elements of U.S. missions abroad. This has, of course, been more true in some countries than in others, but in spite of the ambassador's often reiterated titular authority as "leader, coordinator, and supervisor" of all U.S. activities abroad, the fact remains that component elements report to and are budgetarily dependent upon their own agencies in Washington. So long as this situation obtains,

a unified assistance approach will remain more a hope than a reality. If, on the other hand, the SAA in the Department of Defense were made responsible at least for all *internal* security assistance programs and all resources associated with these programs were transferred to it, this would put an end to the multiagency hold on such assistance, making it possible to vest authority in a single official in the mission, presumably the ambassador.

Clearly, the kinds of reforms we have sketched under Level 3 are little short of revolutionary and would exact very high bureaucratic and political costs. Such costs are not likely to be incurred for the preservation of a very modest, albeit potentially important, capability.