The United States Army in the Phillippine Insurrection, 1899-1902
Abstract
The U.S. Army's current approach to counterinsurgency is through internal defense and development campaigns intended to maintain or restore order while concurrently removing those social and economic conditions that contribute to the insurgency and provide the basis of its support. The study evaluates American experience in the Philippine Insurrection in light of these principles. The methods by which the insurgency was suppressed are isolated and analyzed to determine whether or not they support current counterinsurgency policy guidelines. These experiences confirm the validity of today's counterinsurgency doctrine. Every present-day guideline that was thoroughly and carefully implemented by the American administration was successful, while some of the slowness in the pacification effort may have been caused by failure to adequately and promptly adopt others. The insurrection could not have been suppressed exclusively by force of arms--the Americans had to create the conditions under which the basis of insurgent support was removed and the Filipinos became willing to accept United States sovereignty. The United States was fortunate to have had wise and progressive military governors in the Philippines who grasped the essence of this problem and eliminated the insurgency using policies that are entirely consistent with contemporary counterinsurgency doctrine.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jun 06, 1975
- Accession Number
- ADB006712
Entities
People
- Gerald H. Early
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College