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U.S. MARITIME INTERESTS
IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC,

Volume I,

October 1, 1977

Final report submitted in fulfillment
of contract No. N00014-76-C-1160

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Subj: U.S. Maritime Interests in the South Atlantic Study
Report; promulgation of

Encl: (1) U.S. Maritime Interests in the South Atlantic
Study Report

1. The purpose of the study was threefold. First, it examined and delineated the major strategic, political and economic trends in the South Atlantic region and projected changes in the regional environment. Second, it identified major issues which could generate conflict in the region. Third, it evaluated the implications of these potential changes upon U.S. policy, with special emphasis on naval policy.

2. The study reached the following major conclusions:

- The strategic importance of the South Atlantic is largely indirect, deriving primarily from its proximity to other regions--the North Atlantic and Persian Gulf/Indian Ocean--and the linkage it provides among those theaters.
- In the next five to ten years, conflict in Latin America will either be the direct result of competition for scarce resources or over political issues exacerbated by rivalry over resources.
- In contrast to the economic rivalries of Latin America, potential conflict issues in Africa revolve more around political issues. Although Rhodesia is currently the focal point of active conflict in southern Africa, the future of South Africa remains the pivotal question along the South Atlantic's African littoral.
- The principal U.S. naval tasks in the South Atlantic will be ensuring the freedom of maritime passage through the region and the support of national political and military interests during a crisis in the littoral areas.



- The near-term scenario for the South Atlantic suggests that there is unlikely to be a crisis which will jeopardize the security of its important sea lanes. Moreover, it suggests that the South American littoral of the South Atlantic will be relatively quiescent if not stable, and that the focus of conflict and crisis will continue to be southern Africa.
- Although the South Atlantic may assume greater strategic significance over the next two decades, the region will be important rather than vital to the United States. In terms of naval operations, this conclusion implies that no drastic initiatives are necessary at present. Thus:
 - deployments to the region need not be increased, although periodic deployment of a carrier task group into the South Atlantic would make sense;
 - the impact on naval procurement policies is not great although the contingency of the shrinking availability of friendly ports enhances the importance of durable afloat capabilities and possibly British islands such as Ascension.

3. This study is meant to provide Navy planners with a structure for understanding the forces at work within the South Atlantic region. As with any study of the future, this effort has examined trends in order to highlight key issues and estimate the course of regional developments. It is not, however, intended as a prediction of the future, and has included appropriate caveats and qualifications to indicate possible alternative outcomes and their consequences.

4. Enclosure (1) is forwarded.

C. A. H. Trost

C.A.H. TROST
Director, Systems Analysis Division

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U.S. Maritime Interests in the South Atlantic

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PREFACE

This study is submitted under the terms of Contract No. NO0014-F6-C-1160. This document was produced solely by the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis. The material contained herein does not necessarily represent the views of any government agency.

The purpose of this study is threefold: 1) to delineate the major geostrategic, political and economic trends in the South Atlantic region and to project changes in that region's environment; 2) to identify major issues that could generate or exacerbate conflict in the region; and, 3) to evaluate the implications of potential changes and potential conflicts in the South Atlantic for U.S. policy, with special emphasis on naval policy.

This study is guided by several major premises. The first is that the South Atlantic region is becoming an increasingly important locus of salient security and economic interests of the United States and its allies. The industrialized nations of the West are ever more heavily dependent on raw materials within the region as well as the natural resources from other areas, prominently Persian Gulf oil, that must transit South Atlantic sea-lanes. Clearly, the economic requirements of the West

make unimpeded passage through the South Atlantic and free access to the resources within it a primary strategic objective.

Second, against the background of these rising economic interests, the expanding presence of the Soviet Union in the region and in the adjacent Indian Ocean/Mediterranean basins, augurs a growing potential for rivalry and confrontation between the superpowers.

Third, the unfolding scenario in the South Atlantic is complicated by the emergence (or potential emergence) of regional powers such as Brazil, Argentina, Nigeria and South Africa. These regional actors not only are progressively in a position to impinge directly upon U.S. economic, political and to some extent strategic interests, but their rivalry also enhances the potential of regional conflict.

Finally, the potential for conflict inheres in destabilizing trends in the region, notably the harbingers of racial strife in southern Africa and the competition for resources in Latin America. An ominous background for these trends is the possible proliferation of nuclear weapons, notably with respect to Brazil, Argentina and South Africa.

These and other developments will define the growing significance of the South Atlantic region during the next two decades. Clearly it is important for U.S. policymakers

to identify and understand the forces at work in the region and their implications. It is the goal of this study to contribute to that understanding and help provide guidelines for U.S. naval planning.

The study is presented in two parts with two sets of appendices. Volume I, the focus of the study, concentrates on the potential sources of conflict in the South Atlantic region, the role of naval forces in the area, and the implications of present trends in the South Atlantic for U.S. policy. Volume II is a more detailed analysis of the South Atlantic's present and projected political and economic environment. It has been prepared as supportive companion to Volume I, providing background for and elaboration of the issues raised in the initial volume. Appendix I is a collection of papers prepared for the seven seminar sessions organized as part of the project. Appendix II is a collection of summaries of the discussions during those seminars.

This study reflects a two-pronged research effort by the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Inc. First, independent research was conducted by staff members of the Institute. Second, a series of seminars were convened, the purposes of which were: 1) to consider papers prepared by experts on various aspects of the South Atlantic environment, and, 2) to bring to the attention of the professional-academic community

some of the significant problems concerning the emerging maritime environment. This analysis attempts to draw together the findings of both of these efforts.

It should be pointed out, however, that the authors of the various seminar papers neither necessarily share all of the judgments nor support all of the conclusions presented in the report. Their papers were used by the members of the IFPA staff who prepared the study primarily as a source of data and as a guide to conceptualizing some of the problems confronting U.S. policymakers in the South Atlantic region.

Many people contributed to this study. Participants in the meetings convened in Cambridge and Washington provided innumerable insights into the issues under consideration. Each of our meetings created an opportunity for an exchange of ideas among papergivers, discussants and others in attendance. They are too numerous to acknowledge individually here. Nevertheless we must give special thanks to Dr. Geoffrey Kemp who served as co-principal investigator during the project.

Several members of the staff of the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis were responsible for the report prepared as part of the project. Victoria Van Dyke contributed considerably in preparing drafts of several sections of the study particularly those on economic and resource issues as well as conflict in Latin America. Dr. Charles Perry made contributions to many parts of the study, especially the section on the role

of naval forces in the region. Walter Hahn, Deputy Director of the IFPA must be thanked not only for his substantive inputs but also for his editorial skills. Special thanks are owed to the administrative staff of the Institute, particularly Anne Torgersen, Karol Kelliher, and Mimi Becker for assistance in the typing and production of the report. Jo Ellen Milkovits who supervised the financial and administrative details was of invaluable assistance. Last but not least, the major tasks of project coordinator on a day-to-day basis as well as the drafting of much of the study fell to Michael Moodie, whose combination of time and talent were indispensable in completion of this report.

Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr.
Institute for Foreign Policy
Analysis, Inc.

Executive Summary

The purpose of this study is threefold:

- 1) To delineate the major geostrategic, political and economic trends in the South Atlantic region and to project changes in the region;
- 2) To identify major issues that could generate or exacerbate conflict in the region; and
- 3) To evaluate the implications of potential changes and potential conflict in the South Atlantic for U.S. policy, with special emphasis on naval policy.

The South Atlantic Theater

The current strategic importance of the South Atlantic region for the United States is largely indirect. It is derived from the area's geographic proximity to other regions that are vital to U.S. interests -- i.e., the Persian Gulf/Indian Ocean and the North Atlantic -- and from the linkage it provides among those theaters. Moreover, direct U.S. political and economic interests in the South Atlantic region are comparatively modest relative to other regions of the world, and those interests that are present have remained, to date, relatively unthreatened by either local states or actors external to the area. There are thus no compelling reasons why, in the short-run, the United States should contemplate greater use of military responses to developments within the South Atlantic region.

Two sets of factors promise to invest the South Atlantic theater with a growing importance:

- 1) the nature of superpower interests in the South Atlantic; and
- 2) international trends that are creating a new strategic map generally and infusing the South Atlantic particularly with greater significance.

United States interests in the South Atlantic region include the following:

1) security of the region's sea lines of communication with the Persian Gulf/Indian Ocean and the North Atlantic

-- At present, it is estimated that the trade route around the Cape of Good Hope carries some 70 per cent and 20 per cent of West European and U.S. fuel imports respectively.

-- By the 1980s, according to some estimates, 60 per cent of all U.S. oil imports will be shipped around the Cape.

-- The South Atlantic SLOCs also include the trade routes between the South Atlantic and northern ports carrying important materials indigenous to the region.

-- Analysis of the importance of these SLOCs and potential threats to their security involves a number of factors including:

a) the direction of traffic;

b) its origin and destination;

c) alternative routes; and

d) differences between a peacetime and wartime scenario.

-- In military terms the Cape Route is important but not essential since it is one of four routes of entry and exit to and from the Indian Ocean and the approaches to the Gulf.

2) continued access to natural resources within the South Atlantic region

-- e.g., Nigeria is one of the United State's primary oil suppliers.

-- e.g., South Africa is an important source of minerals such as platinum, chrome and vanadium.

-- e.g., Conservative estimates suggest that at least 50 million tons of the protein-rich krill can be harvested annually in the waters off the extreme southeast coast of South America (the total fish catch in 1974 was only about 60 million tons).

- 3) access to military and logistic facilities in war-time and the denial of access to those facilities by adversaries
- 4) peaceful evolution within both the South Atlantic's African and South American littorals so as to protect U.S. and West European investments and to avert superpower confrontation (the Angolan civil war demonstrated how an essentially regional issue can quickly assume an East-West dimension).

Soviet interests in the South Atlantic region, centered almost exclusively in West Africa, include:

- 1) in military terms, the potential application of pressure to North Atlantic SLOCs (especially between North America and the Mediterranean) and, according to some observers, the creation of a counter to possible SSBN deployment in the South Atlantic.
- 2) the expansion of political influence
 - The strength of any Soviet presence in the South Atlantic and the direction that Moscow's influence will take will be a function of local evolution and opportunities as much as of the application of power. While the Soviet Union will likely encounter setbacks in the South Atlantic, therefore, the past record of Soviet activity abroad (e.g., the Middle East) suggests that Moscow will try to adapt and retain its power and influence in the region.
- 3) the safety of the Soviet Union's fishing fleet and the shipping routes from Soviet Europe to Soviet Asia
 - The Soviet fishing fleet is now the second largest in the world and frequently operates in and transits both the South Atlantic and the Indian Ocean.
 - Indian Ocean trade routes (whether around the Cape of Good Hope or through the Suez Canal) represent the major alternative to the vulnerable Trans-Siberian Railroad as the link between the Western and Eastern Soviet Union.

- 4) the counterbalancing of Chinese influence in the Third World and in Africa particularly
- 5) the relationship between southern Africa and Soviet minerals
 - Together, Pretoria and Moscow control over half of the world's known reserves in platinum group metals, vanadium, manganese ore, chrome, gold and fluorspar. Reduction in Western trade with South Africa could possibly force the West into greater reliance on Soviet sources, making their supply potentially more vulnerable to greater political manipulation.
- 6) the exploitation of South Atlantic fisheries as a source of protein for the Soviet diet

These U.S. and Soviet interests must be viewed in the context of present trends creating a new strategic configuration in the international environment and the manifestation of those trends in the South Atlantic region. These trends include:

- 1) a diffusion of political, military and economic power on a global scale -- not only in terms of the number of states in the international system, but also in the redistribution of wealth and the spread of military power, both nuclear and non-nuclear;
 - Brazil has become the key to eastern South America's evolution and South Africa has assumed a similar role in southern Africa. In western Africa, Nigeria may emerge as the central actor. The importance of these countries derives from their relative economic and technological strength as well as resources, strategic location and political dynamics.
 - The current lack of military prowess characterizing many states in the area appears to be changing in light of the rates of growth in defense expenditures. Although many states are expanding their defense budgets from quite small bases, their growth rates are among some of the highest in the world.

- Brazil, Argentina and South Africa currently possess the basic infrastructure for the development of nuclear weapons. A nuclear race between Brazil and Argentina or an increasingly isolated South Africa opting for a nuclear weapon would give South Atlantic politics particularly ominous overtones especially if latent conflicts in the region erupt.
- 2) the changing pattern of superpower access to overseas facilities
 - In the South Atlantic, the West has lost access to facilities in Portugal's former African colonies, while the Soviet Union has acquired use of air and port facilities in Guinea and is seeking similar arrangements in Angola and Mozambique. A major Soviet military presence in southern Africa -- particularly in South Africa -- would pose serious psychological and military problems for the United States and its allies in undertaking operations either in wartime or in a crisis short of war in the South Atlantic and Indian Ocean.
- 3) the growing economic interdependence of the West the Soviet bloc and the non-industrial states
 - A triangular series of economic and resource dependencies is developing based on the West's need for oil and other resources, the Soviet Union's food and technology requirements and the Third World's dependence on technology and aid. In the South Atlantic this relationship is reflected in superpower interests in the region's SLOCs, minerals and fish.
- 4) the steady emergence of a new maritime regime
 - The extension of territorial seas by many maritime states to distances between 12 and 200 miles, the creation of 200-mile exclusive economic zones (EEZs) and other developments will have serious implications for Western and Soviet access to transportation routes and sea resources. Moreover, they have generated

disputes over ownership of near-forgotten islands as well as over land boundary lines that form the basis for determining offshore jurisdiction. The new maritime regime will likely lead to the growth of constabulary forces to police and monitor offshore regions, requiring in turn the United States and others to adapt to these new conditions and adjust their maritime policies.

The interaction of U.S. and Soviet interests and the geostrategic trends currently at work in the South Atlantic will ensure that the region will be a focus of international attention in the next two decades. Given the nature of U.S. and Soviet interests in the South Atlantic region the question can be raised, however, to what extent either superpower will intensify its activity in the area. Should such heightened involvement occur it is not likely to be the result of a direct military threat to those interests. Rather, superpower interests are likely to be affected more by disruption and chaos created by conflicts among and within South Atlantic littoral states.

Potential Sources of Conflict in the South Atlantic

Latin America

In the next five to ten years, conflict in Latin America will either be the direct result of competition for scarce resources or over political issues exacerbated by the rivalry over resources. These issues include:

- 1) disposition of resources in the Rio de la Plata basin:
 - In its effort to expand the availability of important hydro-electric power, Brazilian-initiated economic penetration of bordering countries, especially Paraguay, will increase in the coming years and fuel Argentine fears of Brazilian expansionism. Paraguay has agreed to the construction by Brazil of a \$7 billion hydro-electric complex (Itaipu) on the Parana River. Argentina -- which has concluded an argument with Asunción for construction of a dam further down the river -- has expressed serious objections to Brazil's plans. Argentina's concerns are based on a number of factors.
 - a) the country controlling the Paraná River is in a position to dominate the economy of the region

b) Brazilian domination of the Paraná would provide Brasilia with unparalleled influence within South America when combined with its penetration of the Amazon which has already been initiated. Buenos Aires which has lost considerable ground to its traditional rival for influence in South America in the last several years would find it very difficult to re-establish any form of power balance.

-- It is unlikely for several reasons that the use of armed force will decide the issue. However, a growing disparity between Brazil and Argentina may force the Argentine leadership to the conclusion that nuclear weapons provide the best means for redressing the balance, thereby initiating a destabilizing nuclear race between the two.

2) the status of the Beagle Channel between Argentina and Chile

-- A recent court decision has awarded jurisdiction of the Beagle Channel and three disputed islands at the southern tip of South America to Chile rather than Argentina. The issue reflected concern with not only valuable fish resources but also the littoral states' concern with protecting their territorial waters as the new maritime regime emerges.

-- The major impact of the dispute will be on Argentina's security perceptions. Buenos Aires argues that the decision gives Chile an entry as an Atlantic state and jurisdiction in the Argentine Sea (in contravention of treaties signed in the 19th century). In light of military sales by Brazil to Chile, Argentina could perceive it is being out-flanked, thereby creating the potential for further destabilization.

3) the Anglo-Argentinian dispute over sovereignty of the Falkland/Malvinas Islands

-- The Falkland/Malvinas archipelago still offers a good strategic position in the South Atlantic although it is not as important as in earlier years because of the advent of nuclear-powered ships and long-range logistic support. British-Argentine differences over the Islands, therefore, are based on their economic potential:

- a) the waters surrounding the Islands are rich in krill, blue whiting and other fish, and a substantial fisheries industry could be developed there if other trends in the world-market coalesced; the potential catches in this region are of particular interest to the Soviet Union and Japan
- b) oil reserves around the Island have been estimated at more than three times the size of North Sea reserves (although given a paucity of seismic data, this estimate may be high); given Brazil's need for energy, Brasilia might make an effort to bargain for inclusion in exploration and exploitation of this oil, thus raising prospects for cooperation as well as conflict in the area;
- c) a high potential for the production of alginates from seaweed that could generate considerable foreign exchange also exists.

-- Argentina is also concerned that with continued British sovereignty, Brazil might successfully bargain for use of the Falklands/Malvinas to project its presence more forcefully into the South Atlantic and even into the Antarctic

4) the future of the Antarctic

It has been suggested that the Antarctic could become the object of international rivalry because of its potential resources or its strategic location. While there are coveted resources -- oil, other minerals, fish -- on the Antarctic land mass and in the surrounding seas, several factors suggest that they will not be the source of conflict for some time. These include insufficient evidence of substantial reserves, extremely difficult problems of extraction, uncompetitive costs of production with current market prices and alternative unexplored areas with potentially better yields.

-- Similarly, with respect to its strategic value the importance of the area is questionable:

- a) it is highly unlikely that military bases will be established given treaty provisions for the continent's demilitarization
- b) Antarctica is too remote from the Cape of Good Hope to be of significance to the Cape Route (although this is not the case with respect to Cape Horn and the Drake Passage, major shipping does not transit this route)
- c) given its remoteness from strategic targets it is unlikely that the Antarctic would become a useful platform for long-range missiles

The potential for internal strife in South America also exists, most importantly in Brazil and Argentina. Disaffected segments of Brazil's population include at least a substantial portion of:

- 1) the lower socio-economic class (found primarily in the northeast) that is excluded essentially from the economic life of the country;
- 2) the business sector unhappy with Brazil's now-prolonged economic slump;
- 3) the students opposing the regime's repressive measures; and
- 4) the upper/middle class increasingly disenchanted with the economic stagnation (although opposition here is still limited).

In Argentina, internal divisions are primarily of a political/ideological character. Opposition to the regime exists in the Peronist faction ousted in the coup, students, the labor unions and terrorist organizations (although their activity has been substantially reduced). Argentina's ruling military leadership also faces opposition from the right who argue that a tougher line should be taken, and who have responded to continued leftist terrorism with their own violence.

It is unlikely, however, that internal unrest in either country will be of sufficient magnitude to allow the intervention of external actors, for several reasons:

- 1) diverse pockets of dissent making coordination extremely difficult;
- 2) internal fragmentation of opposition groups; and
- 3) effective use of internal security forces by the present governments.

In the longer term the potential for conflict in Latin America will be heightened. A growing squeeze on resources and increased economic competition will coincide with enhanced military capabilities, in the hands of regional states, both on land and sea. A nuclear race between Brazil and Argentina -- a distinct possibility by the 1980s -- would give South American politics global implications, with particularly ominous consequences for U.S. hemispheric interests.

Africa

Whereas in Latin America many conflict issues are generated largely by economic rivalries, potential conflict issues in Africa tend more to revolve around political issues. External interest in conflict in Africa, however, does tend to be stimulated in part by economic considerations, e.g., continued access to important resources. Although many of the African conflicts will be between rival groups contending for power, they are likely to spill more broadly into regional politics.

In the short-term Rhodesia is the focal point of conflict in southern Africa. The Smith regime is under intense pressure to reach an agreement with black nationalists. At the same time there is a trend toward increasing violence by the guerrillas and intensified counterinsurgency operations by government forces. Pressure on the Smith government to negotiate a settlement has taken many forms:

- 1) record levels of emigration among the white population that operates Rhodesia's farms, shops and factories;
- 2) the serious strain on the Rhodesian economy created by the war with 26% of the total national budget allocated to financing counter-guerrilla operations;
- 3) pressure from the South African government; and
- 4) the widening scope of guerrilla operations which now include episodes of urban terrorism.

Against this background, Prime Minister Smith received a resounding mandate from the white electorate to pursue a solution, whether on the basis of recent Anglo-American proposals on Smith's own plan of an "internal" settlement. While there are moderate black leaders within Rhodesia with whom Smith might negotiate (e.g., Bishop Muzorewa, Rev. Sithole or Chief Chirau), the complexities of black nationalist politics in Rhodesia does not allow any of these possible negotiators to conclude an agreement acceptable and binding for all segments of the black population. Given opposition to an "internal" settlement from most black nationalists, the front-line states, the British and Americans and, most importantly, the South Africans, Smith has shelved this idea for the moment. While the Anglo-American proposal has not been totally rejected by either the black nationalists or the Smith government, securing agreement will be extremely difficult given the differences over the security forces during the transition, the role of the UN and the nature of elections. At the present time, therefore, while a negotiated settlement is possible, the prospects are just as likely that the scenario will be one of continuing and increasing violence.

If a settlement can be achieved through negotiations, the evolution will be substantially different than if a new black government emerges after further violence. The differences would manifest themselves in the structure of Rhodesia's society and economy, the number of whites leaving the country and the prospects for multiracial coexistence, the nature of internal disputes, and Zimbabwe's regional role and relations with the superpowers. Irrespective of the nature of the regime that resumes power in post-independence Zimbabwe, it will face serious problems:

- 1) a major urban influx generating serious housing problems and other social dysfunctions;
- 2) increasing unemployment further destabilizing the society; and
- 3) ethnic problems between the Shona-speakers and Ndebele, and others.

In the longer term, the future of South Africa is the pivotal question in the South Atlantic's African littoral. Two features in the present situation point to the likelihood of increased instability and possible conflict:

- 1) the inadequacy of the government's homeland policy, particularly with respect to the status of South Africa's urban blacks; and
- 2) an emerging instability marked by violence in black townships and a possible increase in organized urban terrorism
 - The government's problems would be seriously exacerbated if increased violence were to be coordinated with work stoppages by such segments of South Africa's organized black labor as the mineworkers or longshoremen.

Growing violence in South Africa demonstrates that an increasing proportion of blacks is no longer prepared to look to peaceful methods to achieve its goals. In responding to their demands the government has two choices: to return to the "laager" and try to hold its privileged position by force or to accept the permanence of blacks in the cities as indispensable, thereby undercutting the theory of separate development.

Violence within South Africa is likely to increase for several reasons:

- 1) spiralling unemployment within the black townships
 - Among blacks in urban areas an estimated 20,000 are out of work
- 2) an emerging new generation of black leadership spearheaded by the students in Soweto and the leaders of the "black consciousness" movement.
- 3) the forging of a closer link between student militants within South Africa and the exiled liberation movements
- 4) increased emphasis on urban terrorism

While violence within South Africa is likely to increase, it is unlikely to assume the proportions of a civil war, at least in the short-term, given the physical separation of black urban areas (facilitating their containment) and the high quality of South African troops. If violence in South Africa did escalate into a protracted conflict the situation would be seriously complicated by the country's demographic complexity. Both black and white populations would suffer divisions, as would the South African Coloreds with the more militant probably joining black liberation efforts. Consequently, the outcome of a protracted conflict would be far from clear.

Facing a protracted conflict, a beleaguered South African government might choose to demonstrate a nuclear weapons capability, for which it already has the necessary infrastructure. The utility of this option, however, would be more external than internal. Rather than using a nuclear weapon against black guerrillas within the country, the South African government could explode a nuclear device in an attempt to forestall intervention by outside powers.

South Africa's black neighbors would face a serious dilemma in the event of protracted conflict in South Africa.

- On one hand, they would be compelled to support the nationalists for reasons of national ideologies and African and regional politics.
- On the other hand, their economic dependence on South Africa would make them extremely vulnerable to South African countermeasures.
- e.g., Mozambique's economy relies heavily on the export of labor to South African mines, foreign exchange supplied by South African use of Mozambican port and rail facilities and South African purchases of power generated by the Cabora Bossa dam.
- e.g., Zaire exports much of its copper through South African ports and for Botswana South Africa is not only its principal market but also its largest single source of investment.

Even if black nationalists forced the capitulation of the present white regime, there is no assurance that a civil conflict would not ensue given traditional rivalries between the exiled liberation movements, generational differences, tribal animosities, contending ideologies and personal disputes among the black nationalist leaders.

If a radically socialist or Marxist regime came to power in South Africa, the United States would face:

- 1) enhanced prospects for cartelization of additional minerals;
- 2) potential nationalization of major industries;
- 3) possible denial of access to South African naval facilities even in wartime; and
- 4) a more palpable threat to Western shipping, particularly if such a regime allowed the Soviet Union to use the facilities.

At this time the probability of such a scenario is very low. Pretoria has been restrained in the use of its physical power and its ability to survive serious challenges for the foreseeable future is substantial.

Compared to the Rhodesian crisis the situation in Namibia is not as volatile. Nor is it as potentially significant for dramatic change as conflict in South Africa. Nevertheless, conflict in Namibia has important strategic implications, given that country's resource wealth and strategic location.

- Namibia, Africa's fourth largest mineral producer with an annual output of \$300 million, exports significant quantities of lead, zinc, diamonds, vanadium and lithium. It also has the potential to become the third largest uranium producer in the world, which would make it an important trading partner of those countries who are or will be dependent on imported uranium. Fishing areas off Namibia's coast are some of the richest in the South Atlantic, and a strong attraction to the Soviet fishing fleet.
- The port of Walvis Bay, which is presently the only harbor of significance between Lobito and Cape Town, dominates the western approaches to the Cape of Good Hope. Although Walvis Bay is legally a part of South Africa, its status will complicate present negotiations for Namibian independence. South Africa is sensitive to its strategic importance and the implications of Soviet access to its facilities.

Namibia's future role will be determined in large part by the dynamics of its internal politics, particularly in its black population:

- SWAPO, the leading liberation organization which is supported primarily by the Ovambos, has been severely criticized by some leaders of the Herero -- the Ovambos traditional rivals -- as procommunist and an agent for Ovambo hegemony
- SWAPO has divisions within its own ranks as well as differences exist between the party hierarchy and young recruits, between pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese factions and between the party's external wing and its active guerrilla forces.

Nevertheless SWAPO remains the key to Namibia's future as well as Namibia's relations with its neighbors. SWAPO has, for example, clashed with UNITA forces in southern Angola who are challenging the government in Luanda and is seeking to establish an independent state in southern Angola.

Another source of potential conflict in Africa is disputes between black nationalist groupings. In almost every independent black country in southern Africa there are challenges to the regime. In those countries still ruled by white governments traditional animosities continue among rival liberation organizations. Among the most important black nationalist rivalries are:

1) Angola

The present MPLA regime in Angola faces three serious challengers:

- in the north, remnants of the FNLA are mounting an effort to bring Angola's important coffee crop under its control;
- in the oil-rich enclave of Cabinda, FLEC is continually harassing MPLA and Cuban forces in an area whose dense vegetation makes counterinsurgency operations extremely difficult;
- in the south, the most serious challenge is being mounted by UNITA whose forces now control a number of key cities in the south and who are seeking the creation of a new state in the southern half of Angola.

2) Rhodesia

A settlement in Rhodesia has been complicated by rivalry between four black nationalists contending for leadership:

- Joshua Nkomo of ZAPU and Robert Mugabe of ZANU, allied in the Patriotic Front, control the guerrilla forces. Their alliance appears to be one of convenience since the two organizations with which they are associated have been traditional rivals. With Mugabe's position in ZANU presently unclear, Nkomo has recently emerged with apparently a stronger position in the guerrilla movement.

- Bishop Abel Muzorewa and Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole are contesting leadership of the blacks within Zimbabwe. While the Bishop apparently enjoys the support of the majority of the population, Sithole has made substantial gains since he returned to the country in August.
- While Nkomo and Mugabe maintain the closest ties with the guerrillas, the extent of their popular support is questionable, and they would probably lose to Muzorewa (and possibly Sithole) in an election. This is probably why they insist that Smith turn power over to them during any transition period.

3) South Africa

The most serious division exists between the ANC -- committed to a multiracial society and occasionally linked to the pro-Soviet South African Communist Party -- and the PAC, an organization with a stronger Pan-African dimension and a more pro-Peking policy. This division is complicated by the emergence of new organizations such as the Soweto Students Representative Council, reflecting the generational and ethnic factors also dividing South Africa's black nationalists.

4) Zambia

Although there is no military threat to the Kaunda government at present, shortages and inflation have sparked a climate of discontent that could lead to a resurgence of tribal and ideological divisions that have to date been dormant. Kaunda faces a number of rebellious elements -- such as the 114 recently expelled members of his own party -- seeking a change to the government's economic and social policies. Another challenger is Adamson Mushala whose forces operate from Zaire's Shaba province to attack villages in northern Zambia.

In the immediate time frame, few issues in the South Atlantic's African littoral are likely to generate interstate conflict. Most states are still too preoccupied with their own economic and political problems of nation-building. These restraints, however, will ease in the longer run -- especially if and when a transition to black power in Rhodesia and South Africa removes the unifying force of the racial issue. Conflicts between black states could flare from ethnic spillovers, ideological disputes, and rivalry over resources. Particularly in the case of conflict over the latter two issues, external involvement could exacerbate hostilities, or local arms races.

The Role of Naval Forces in the South Atlantic

In comparison with the North Atlantic or the Eastern Mediterranean, the South Atlantic contains relatively low levels of naval deployment. The superpowers maintain only an irregular presence, and the naval forces of the South Atlantic states are generally small and primarily configured for coastal defense. However, several political, economic and military trends are at work which, in the near-term future, could alter significantly this description of the South Atlantic. These trends include:

- 1) the emergence of a new, more clearly defined maritime regime;
- 2) the growth of commercial traffic within and through the South Atlantic;
- 3) the rise of regional powers with broad maritime ambitions (such as Brazil);
- 4) the increasing dissemination of new naval technologies to South Atlantic states; and
- 5) the prospect that U.S.-Soviet naval competition (perhaps spurred by conflict in southern Africa) may spread to the South Atlantic seas.

The principal functions of naval force in the South Atlantic are sea control (primarily the province of the superpowers) and coastal defense (essentially the concern of the littoral states). Since American and Soviet interests in the South Atlantic are focussed primarily on its utility as a strategic waterway linking the North Atlantic and the Indian Ocean-Persian Gulf, U.S. and Soviet naval forces will continue to concentrate on monitoring and if need be, controlling interoceanic navigation through the South Atlantic. From the U.S. perspective, in the short-run, a serious threat to the principal sea lines of communication in the South Atlantic (including the vital oil SLOCs around southern Africa) is unlikely for a number of reasons:

- 1) the largest and most effective naval inventories among the littoral states belong to South Africa, Argentina and Brazil whose maritime interests in the South Atlantic are not dissimilar to those of the United States
- 2) the Soviet Union is unlikely to take action against the South Atlantic SLOCs short of a total war scenario since it is seriously constrained by:

- logistical difficulties and geographic constraints;
- vulnerability to Western counteractions elsewhere;
- the political symbolism of such an action and its gravity.

Another function of the superpowers' naval forces in the South Atlantic is the support of political and military interests during a crisis in the littoral areas. Should armed conflict break out within or among littoral states naval units could be used for a number of purposes:

- 1) combat against coastal navies or the bombardment of land targets;
- 2) evacuation of civilian and military personnel;
- 3) protection of property located within coastal waters or on land;
- 4) resupply by sea of allied or friendly governments; and
- 5) interpositioning operations to prevent intervention by other external powers.

In situations short of conflict, naval forces could be used to promote economic and political interests through showing-the-flag operations or displays of force.

In contrast to superpower forces, the naval units of Latin American and African coastal states will play a limited role in the South Atlantic. They will continue to focus on their traditional roles in coastal defense, aimed at protecting offshore resources and prohibiting the projection of force ashore.

The extent to which regional navies will play a broader role in the South Atlantic will depend on the build-up of their forces and the overall naval balance in the South Atlantic. At present there is a relatively low-level of naval force in the South Atlantic (both in terms of quality and quantity) for several reasons:

- 1) relatively poor economies of the littoral incapable of sustaining high defense expenditures;

- 2) perceptions of land-based threats to security rather than any serious threats from the sea;
- 3) an emphasis on the army, given the army background of most Latin American leaders;
- 4) the unavailability of skilled manpower.

What naval force there is in the South Atlantic remains unevenly distributed, concentrated primarily in South Africa, Argentina, and Brazil with Venezuela making a serious effort to improve substantially. The naval forces of the major Latin American states are considerably larger and more sophisticated, if somewhat older, than those of South Africa which have concentrated on maritime patrol and in-shore surveillance duties. Although Argentina has been traditionally more South Atlantic oriented, both Brazil and Argentina now claim responsibility for South America's Atlantic coast. Brazil's growing concern for the security of the sea lanes running through and across the Brazil-West Africa corridor has stimulated Argentine fears that Brazil would like to make the South Atlantic a "Brazilian sea."

The probability of regional nations having to perform "sea-denial" missions against external powers in the immediate future is low (the only possible exception being southern Africa) for two reasons:

- 1) those European powers who once patrolled in the South Atlantic have withdrawn their units;
and
- 2) as there has been little to draw their interest to the region until recently, neither superpower sustains naval deployments in the South Atlantic.

-- In order to achieve a significant naval presence in the South Atlantic both the United States and the Soviet Union would have to re-deploy naval units from adjacent fleet areas (the North Atlantic, the Mediterranean, the Caribbean or the Indian Ocean).

Comparing relative capabilities for military operations in the South Atlantic, the United States appears to hold some advantages:

- 1) a superior quick reaction capability resulting from:
 - the comparative geographic proximity of the South Atlantic to U.S. home bases, and
 - the "surge capacity" of U.S. naval forces.
- 2) the good operating environment for carriers provided by the South Atlantic
- 3) the difficulty for the Soviet Union of stretching an additional South Atlantic-oriented mission from its distant water surface force
 - Soviet acquisition of a forward operating base in the region, however, would clearly help to alleviate this constraint.

In the long run, threats to maritime passage within and through the South Atlantic and to other U.S. interests in the region could well increase, particularly with the proliferation of new naval technologies. The Soviet Union has been developing new technologies that could alter significantly the use and utility of current naval forces including:

- 1) advanced satellites for ocean surveillance and communication;
- 2) anti-ship missiles;
- 3) anti-submarine warfare; and
- 4) improved force projection and fleet support capabilities

U.S. efforts are concentrated on upgrading precision-guided munitions, aircraft carrier forces, and ASW operations. Present trends in naval technology, therefore, will have considerable implications for the U.S. and Soviet forces in the South Atlantic:

- 1) while they will not necessarily alter the principal missions of the superpower navies, new technologies will affect the effective execution of these missions;
- 2) the conduct of naval warfare will be rendered less dependent on geography than in the past given increasing reliance on satellites for surveillance and communication; and
- 3) command and control are likely to be more centralized

In general neither superpower will soon command an overwhelming advantage in naval combat. However, technological developments are clearly extending traditional naval capabilities, making the South Atlantic a more feasible environment for U.S.-Soviet naval deployment, even without access to large-scale base facilities.

New naval technologies will not create new missions for local navies, but they will benefit from new technologies in submarines, anti-ship missiles, tactical land-based aircraft and mines. The conclusion must be drawn, however, that the diffusion of these new technologies will be limited given their cost and sophistication. In the near future, then, the most advanced naval technologies will remain largely unexploited in the South Atlantic.

Implications for U.S. Policy

The South Atlantic has commanded low priority in U.S. policy in part because of the comparative modesty of U.S. interests in the region and in part because those interests have not been threatened since World War II. This study indicates, however, that the South Atlantic will become of greater geostrategic significance in the years ahead with implications for U.S. policy, especially for naval force and contingency planning.

In the near term, the United States does not face any serious challenge to its naval position in the South Atlantic although it must contemplate widening gaps in the naval infrastructure needed to project power around the Cape and Indian Ocean/Persian Gulf region as well as continued Soviet attempts to expand its own maritime access along the west coast of Africa. The success of this endeavor, however, will depend largely upon local politics and targets of opportunity.

The near-term scenario for the South Atlantic suggests that there is unlikely to be a crisis that will jeopardize the security of its important sea lines. Moreover, it suggests that the South American littoral of the South Atlantic will be relatively quiescent if not stable, and that the focus of conflict and crisis will continue to be southern Africa. The U.S. Navy will not be required to engage in large-scale military operations on the high seas; rather it is more likely that there will be contingencies entailing the limited use of naval force, including:

- rescue or intimidation missions on behalf of or threatened U.S. nationals;
- crisis-dampening displays of force;
- escort missions in the event of small scale actions against Western shipping;
- interpositioning missions to prevent possible external intervention in a regional crisis or counteroperations in the event of Soviet interpositioning; and
- flag-showing missions.

The longer term regional projections of this study suggest some potential conflict in the South Atlantic as a result of:

- intensified rivalry among regional and external powers over resources;
- continued strife within South Africa as well as contending ideologies, ethnic spill-overs and factional struggles in black Africa;
- Brazilian-Argentine rivalry that could lead to a nuclear race between them;
- increased and more sophisticated naval capabilities of littoral states; and
- intensified U.S. and Soviet naval activities.

In general, the long-term significance of the South Atlantic will be upgraded not only by these trends and projections, but also by potential developments in other regions (e.g., another war in the Middle East), since, in strategic terms, the South Atlantic cannot be decoupled from the North Atlantic and the Indian Ocean/Persian Gulf theaters.

Although the South Atlantic may assume greater strategic significance over the next two decades (not only for external powers but especially for major regional states), the region will be important rather than vital to the United States. In terms of U.S. naval operations, this conclusion implies that no drastic policy initiatives are necessary at present:

- e.g., deployments to the region need not be increased although it would make sense for a carrier task force operating in the western Indian Ocean to exercise for a few days in the South Atlantic
- e.g., the impact on naval procurement policies is not great although the contingency of the shrinking availability of friendly ports enhances the importance of durable afloat capabilities and possibly British islands such as Ascension.

Durrent trends within the South Atlantic, however, do have implications for U.S. naval planning, especially in three areas:

-- knowledge

U.S. strategic interests in the South Atlantic are sufficiently uncertain to warrant careful evaluation of developments within the region and the reciprocal impact of those developments and events and trends in vital contiguous areas. U.S. policymakers require a clear understanding of the overall stakes that are involved, so as to define appropriate responses to the evolving situation

-- administration

the close linkage of the South Atlantic with the North Atlantic and the Indian Ocean/Persian Gulf suggests that these regions be administered as a single entity. What might be involved is eliminating the artificial administrative distinction between these regions and giving responsibility for the South Atlantic, Caribbean, Persian Gulf and western Indian Ocean to CINCLANT

-- capabilities

the naval capabilities required in the South Atlantic will be those necessary for rapid deployment to remote focal points of crisis. To be effective, experience in "surge" operations of this kind are essential and additional emphasis could be placed on these types of capabilities in current U.S. naval planning

I. Introduction: The South Atlantic Theater

One of the most important issues confronting U.S. policymakers in the coming decade relates to the questions posed by trends in the maritime environment. These include political and economic developments in the littoral states bordering the world's oceans, commercial developments on the high seas and the exploitation of the sea-bed and sea-based resources. These trends pose profound implications for U.S. policy, with emphasis on the requirements of naval strategy.

The South Atlantic is a potentially important maritime area. Although there has been growing concern over events in southern Africa, little analysis has been devoted to the South Atlantic as a comprehensive region -- one that encompasses much of the continent of Africa, especially West and southern Africa, as well as a major portion of South America, notably Brazil and Argentina.


Broadly defined, the South Atlantic region stretches southward from the latitude band 10° North to the Antarctic Sea, drawing together well over 14 million square miles of ocean, some two dozen islands and approximately twenty-six littoral states.¹ To the west, it is flanked by the eastern

¹The South Atlantic proper stretches from the equator to the Antarctic Sea. However, for the purposes of this study, a broader definition has been used to include all those states who are likely to have some direct impact on future events in the South Atlantic area.

seaboard of South America from the northeast coast of Venezuela to the southern tip of Argentina. To the east, it is bordered by the coastlines of West and southern Africa from Senegal to the Cape of Good Hope. The northern and southern flanks are, of course, open sea (although the Antarctic is considered in this study at least peripherally, as a potential for rivalry among South Atlantic nations).

Though studded with a number of isolated islands, the South Atlantic includes no major archipelagic formations; consequently, maritime passage within the South Atlantic, and between it and adjacent seas (the North Atlantic, South Pacific and Indian Ocean), proceeds with relative ease. In this regard, there are two main axes of movement, both of which funnel through the "Atlantic Corridor" (at its narrowest point approximately 1900 miles wide) which divides Brazil from West Africa. The major one, running northwest-southeast, serves the African coast and links the North Atlantic with the Indian Ocean. The minor axis extends along the South American coast to Cape Horn, and thence to the South Pacific. The principal avenues of entrance and egress along these axes, then, would include the Panama Canal-Caribbean Sea route on the northwest, the North Atlantic approaches in the north and northeast, the Cape Route around Africa in the southeast and the route traversing the Magellan Straits-Drake Passage in the southwest.

THE SOUTH ATLANTIC THEATER



Azimuthal Equidistant Projection centred on Recife, Brazil. All distances from the centre of the projection are correct.

In spatial terms, the South Atlantic, the Indian Ocean and the North Atlantic are all segments of the same body of water. It is the geographic linkage that the South Atlantic constitutes between the Indian Ocean and the North Atlantic -- regions that remain of vital importance to the United States and its allies -- that currently draws attention to the region. It is the South Atlantic sea lanes, and the access which they provide between the non-industrial and industrial regions of the world, which give strategic coherence to the extended South Atlantic region. Their security alone demands that the United States and its West European allies pay close attention to politico-military events within and around the South Atlantic.

The importance of the South Atlantic as a link between other vital theaters was amply demonstrated during World War II, when Allied and Axis powers vied for control of maritime lines of communication from the Indian Ocean-Middle East region to Europe and North America. The primary mission of Allied navies in the region was to prevent Germany and Japan from establishing logistical support facilities on South Atlantic coastlines and islands from which they could threaten vital military and commercial maritime traffic through the area.¹

¹For a more detailed discussion of the South Atlantic during World War II, see Robert Albion, Sea Lanes in Wartime (New York: W.W. Norton, 1942) and L.C. Turner, H.R. Gordon-Cumming and J.E. Betzler, War in the Southern Oceans (New York: Oxford University Press, 1966).

Increasing dependence of the West, especially Western Europe, on imported oil in the post-war years only heightened the importance of South Atlantic SLOCS, and while the South Atlantic trade routes received less attention between 1945 and the mid-1960s, the closure of the Suez Canal and the growth of supertanker oil transportation thrust them again into prominence. Although the Suez Canal is functional today, the continued volatility of the region in which it is located poses the constant danger of repeated closure. Therefore, the security of the South Atlantic area, especially the Cape Route that brings Middle Eastern oil to the West, remains an important issue in Western policy.

The current importance of the South Atlantic area, then, is indirect. It derives from the region's geographic proximity to areas that are vital to Western interests and from the linkage it provides between those other theaters. The direct importance of the South Atlantic, while considerable, cannot be compared to that of either the Persian Gulf-Indian Ocean area or the North Atlantic.

However, there now are two sets of factors at work which soon may invest the entire South Atlantic area -- sea lanes, access routes, ocean bed, islands and littoral states -- with greater geostrategic importance, and which certainly will require careful assessment by U.S. policymakers in the next ten to

fifteen years. This first set of factors is the confluence of recent trends in the international environment that are creating a "new strategic map." The second set is the changing nature of superpower interests in the South Atlantic region.

A. The "New Strategic Map"

Four major trends are contributing to the evolution of a new strategic map.¹ First, the world is witnessing a diffusion of political, military and economic power, not only in terms of the number of states in the international system, but also in the redistribution of wealth among states and the unprecedented spread of military power, both nuclear and non-nuclear. With respect to the South Atlantic region, a proliferation of political and economic power has already occurred and can be expected to continue. Brazil, Nigeria and South Africa are well on their way to becoming major regional actors in the politico-economic realm. Moreover, while the area remains somewhat of a vacuum militarily (with the exception of Brazil, Argentina and South Africa), there are strong indications that the current lack of military prowess characterizing many states in the region is changing: the growth

¹See Geoffrey Kemp, "The New Strategic Map," Survival, Vol. XIX, No. 2 (March/April 1977), pp. 50-59.

rates of defense budgets are some of the largest in the world (though many states are expanding from rather miniscule foundations); defense funds are increasingly being earmarked for maritime expansion; and there is a growing potential for nuclear proliferation, with Brazil, Argentina and South Africa currently possessing the basic infrastructure for possible nuclear weapons production. Furthermore, after many years of relative neglect in that regard, the South Atlantic is again witnessing the influx of external power, as was demonstrated in Angola.

Second, the pattern of U.S. base rights overseas is changing radically. Over the past decade, the trend has been one of a decline in Western access to overseas bases, particularly in the Middle East and Southeast Asia. Simultaneously, Soviet forward deployment has been increasing, to the point where the Soviet Union now has considerable presence in regions previously remote from Soviet power and influence (e.g., the eastern Mediterranean and the northwest quadrant of the Indian Ocean). In the South Atlantic, the West has lost access to facilities in Portugal's former African colonies, while the Soviet Union has acquired use of port and air facilities in Guinea (the "Guinea Patrol"), and is seeking similar arrangements in Angola and Mozambique. Under these circumstances, should a pro-Soviet regime assume power in South Africa, the U.S. ability (relative

to the Soviet Union) to project naval force from the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean theater could be compromised considerably. Therefore, future relations with key regional states such as Brazil and Nigeria, as well as potential access to several strategic islands (principally British-owned) scattered throughout the South Atlantic may need to be reassessed.

Third, there is a growing interdependence among the West, the Soviet bloc, and the non-industrial states for scarce commodities such as oil, minerals and agricultural raw materials. This point is reflected in the West's need for secure access to oil supplies, and in the emerging linkage between this need and Western arms sales to key producer countries. With respect to the South Atlantic, then, U.S.-European resource concerns are focussed primarily on assuring the security of the oil flow cycle (originating in the Persian Gulf), which carries some 70 per cent of Western Europe's fuel imports and some 20 per cent of U.S. fuel imports.

Added to this, the future availability of scarce resources located in, and transshipped from, the South Atlantic region itself is a question of growing importance, and one which may elevate further the geostrategic significance of the South Atlantic. For the United States, Western Europe and Japan, the continued availability of South African minerals (such as manganese, chrome, diamonds, gold) will remain a key issue.

In the long run, supplies of adequate "substitutes" for these minerals may be found elsewhere. In the near-and mid-term future (ten to fifteen years), however, the economic well-being of the West will continue to depend on access to these resources. Off-shore oil and gas deposits in the South Atlantic region, also, could become important in the 1980s. Exploratory drilling already is widespread off the west coast of Africa from Senegal to Angola, the east coast of South America (especially off Brazil), and in the very southern tip of South America, including the portion of the Magellan Strait closest to the Falkland Islands. To date, however, no major strikes have been discovered.

For the Soviet bloc, South Atlantic fish steadily assumed economic significance in the 1960s, as fishing rights in the Pacific increasingly were denied, and as Soviet and East European consumption of additional fish protein continued to rise. Though Soviet fishing fleets no longer work the waters off the Brazilian-Argentine coasts, they have been very active off the African coast, and eventually are likely to expand their activities into the waters off the extreme southeast coast of South America, an area which has the potential to supply as much as 100 million tons of protein-rich krill per year. Their incentives for increasing this activity have been spurred by the extension of fishing zones in the northern Atlantic, especially of the U.S. eastern seaboard and the North Sea.

The fourth, and final, trend contributing to a new geostrategic environment in the South Atlantic is the emergence of a new maritime regime, a part of which is the extension of territorial waters. In order to protect and preserve their off-shore resources, most South Atlantic coastal states are adopting the concept of 200-mile territorial seas though some, e.g., South Africa, have limited themselves to a 200 mile extension of exclusive economic zones (EEZs) and 12 miles for the territorial sea. As a result, the larger, more affluent states are attempting to upgrade their maritime patrol capabilities to assert tighter control over their "coastal" waters.

Together, these four trends will probably enhance and extend the traditional geostrategic importance of the South Atlantic sea lanes, as well as the role of the Southern Seas in general. In order to appreciate fully the potential importance of the South Atlantic region, however, it is also necessary to consider the nature of superpower interests in the region.

B. U.S. and Soviet Interests in the South Atlantic Region

1. The United States

Regarding U.S. strategic interests in the South Atlantic region, the area is significant because of the access it could provide to U.S. air and naval power in times of war. Argentina, Brazil and South African facilities would be particularly important in a protracted war since they are among the best in

the southern hemisphere. The role that the South Atlantic played in U.S. and Allied strategy during World War II, although vitiated by time and technological advances for the first twenty years of the post-war era, is on the verge of a renaissance as the possibility for more protracted non-nuclear conflict becomes realistic once more. Indeed, the potential requirements of a future conflict in the Persian Gulf which required the rapid deployment of naval and air power point to an even greater significance of the region as a transit theater in wartime operations.

However, in situations short of war or major crisis, where it is perceived to be in the U.S. interest to deploy forces and/or assert a military presence in the South Atlantic region, the loss of access to the former Portuguese facilities in Angola and Mozambique has substantially circumscribed U.S. naval maneuverability in the eastern part of the basin. The United States could probably use South African ports for repair and resupply, but the price in terms of U.S. relations with black Africa and other countries would be extremely high. Depending upon the crisis scenario, the United States could face similar restrictions upon its strategic mobility with respect to Latin America. These adverse trends notwithstanding, the United States continues to have a stake in the maintenance of a strategic infrastructure in the region that will permit

the rapid and effective deployment of military power in a crisis situation. Moreover, the United States also has a preemptive interest, i.e., preventing the existing infrastructure, particularly in Argentina, Brazil and South Africa, from falling into potentially hostile hands.

Another important U.S. strategic interest in the South Atlantic is access to the region's natural resources and protection of the sea lines of communication that funnel those resources. Nigeria is one of the primary U.S. oil suppliers, and minerals from southern Africa are important, although not vital, to the health of the U.S. economy. It must be pointed out that there is considerable disagreement at present on the question of the South Atlantic's strategic materials and their role in the U.S. economy in the years ahead. The issue is one of extreme complexity: there are unique problems of extraction and marketability for each item on the South Atlantic's varied roster of minerals; questions relating to infrastructure and logistics must be considered; substitutability and stockpiling are important factors; the scenario in which disruption occurs is a significant determinant of the impact of that disruption.¹ While there appears to be great confusion about the relevance of minerals over the next ten

¹For a more detailed discussion of these factors, see Kemp, Appendix I, pp. I-12-14.

years, one can probably conclude that the United States, with its own considerable mineral wealth, could adjust (albeit at the cost of some temporary dislocations) to a severance of supply of most of these minerals by casting for substitutes and alternative sources. Yet, the United States would not be spared the secondary effects of a withholding of these supplies from more dependent consumers (particularly in Western Europe) in the form of higher world prices and a more intense competition for alternative sources.

A third major strategic interest of the United States in the South Atlantic derives from the area's position with respect to U.S. interests elsewhere in the world. The region is important in this regard in two ways. First, given the progressively interlocked nature of the world in both economic and political terms, events in the region -- and U.S. reaction to these events -- are likely to impact on U.S. interests in other areas. Second, the South Atlantic links two areas of vital importance -- namely, the Indian Ocean/Persian Gulf and the North Atlantic.

The political and economic interconnections do not need much elaboration here. For example, should conflict flare over Rhodesia or Namibia involving major Soviet interference, the willingness of the United States to assert leadership in resolving the crisis would be watched carefully by the nations

of the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean, thus calling into account the credibility of the U.S. role in that vital region. Similarly, a conflict in southern Africa, if it threatened the flow of mineral resources from the region, could impact debilitatingly upon the economies of the industrialized nations and put possibly severe strains upon U.S. economic ties with Western Europe.

As noted earlier, the Persian Gulf/Indian Ocean, South Atlantic and North Atlantic are linked by more than the repercussions of crisis and the demonstration effect of the American will to exercise a leadership role. The security of the sea lines of communication linking these areas is today perhaps the United States' primary strategic concern, exemplified most notably by the question of threats to the security of the "Cape Route."

With the closure of the Suez Canal in 1967, the sea lines of communication around the Cape of Good Hope assumed a pre-eminence in the transportation of oil from the Middle East that has not been reversed by the reopening of the Canal.¹

¹The diversion of oil traffic around the Cape in the wake of the 1967 Middle East War only intensified a trend that had begun in the early 1960s as a consequence of the change in the technology of oil transportation. Michael Burrell has argued that the "move to supertankers was under way by 1967 and in that year nearly $\frac{1}{2}$ m barrels per day of oil were passing the Cape in ships too large to pass through the Canal." By 1975 ships of 205,000 DWT or over constituted 50 per cent of the world tanker fleet and 76 per cent of the tonnage built between 1971 and 1975. See Michael Burrell, "The Cape Route and the Oil Trade," The Round Table No. 251 (July 1973), p. 355 and Melvin A. Conant and Fern R. Gold, Geopolitics of Energy, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, United States Senate (January 1977), p. 50.

Today, oil tankers account for one-quarter of the vessels and 70 per cent of the total tonnage passing the Cape of Good Hope.¹ Eighteen million barrels of oil per day are carried via the Cape, compared to 800,000 barrels in 1965.² Even with an enlargement of the Suez Canal, the Cape Route will remain a vital economic artery to the United States and Western Europe for many years to come (although it should be pointed out that there are alternative routes for the oil and other products even if the Suez Canal is closed).³ Thus, while it has been estimated that by the 1980s, 60 per cent of all U.S. oil imports will be shipped around the Cape,⁴ there is nothing inevitable about this figure; it merely represents an extrapolation based upon current trends. Some estimates indicate that more than 30 per cent of Western Europe's "essential bulk imports" including oil, liquid natural gas, coal and iron ore will follow the Cape Route in the year 2000.⁵

¹James E. Dornan, "The Strategic Importance of South Africa," in South Africa -- The Vital Link, Robert L. Schenttinger, ed. (Washington: Council on American Affairs, 1976), p. 32.

²Geoffrey Kemp, "The New Strategic Map," p. 51.

³See Kemp, Appendix I, p: I-7.

⁴Patrick Wall, "The Vulnerability of the West in the Southern Hemisphere," Strategic Review (Winter 1976), p. 45.

⁵Arthur D. Little, Dependence of Western Europe and Japan on Essential Imported Materials, Year 2000, p. III-4.

While the most important component of the "Cape Route" is this sea line of communication carrying Persian Gulf oil to the United States and Western Europe, it must be pointed out that, in fact, there is no single Cape Route. Rather, there are a number of trade routes linking East and West that share the characteristic of traversing the Cape of Good Hope. Moreover, while oil is undoubtedly the most important product carried around the Cape, one should consider the importance of other cargoes for both the regional suppliers and recipients. Consequently, assessing the Cape Route and threats to its security is a complex task involving analysis of such factors as the direction of traffic, its origin and destination, alternative routes, the distinction between those ships that require systematic use of the route's port facilities and those that do not, and the differences between a peacetime and wartime scenario. It has been argued that too much attention has been paid to the simple wartime scenario focusing on one factor -- oil -- and that more emphasis should be placed on peacetime crisis scenarios and the overall sensitivity of commercial traffic around the Cape to changes in the strategic environment.¹

To what extent is the Cape Route a convenience as distinct from a necessity? As mentioned earlier, there are alternative ways in which oil and other commodities can be

¹See Kemp, Appendix I, p. I-6.

moved from the Persian Gulf to North America. These include the Suez Canal and, even if that is closed, the eastern route through the Indonesian Straits (or around Australia) and through the Panama Canal, or, in the longer range, the Su-Med Pipeline. For commercial purposes, therefore, while the Cape Route is important, to argue that it is essential is to overstate the case.¹

Similarly, the Cape Route retains a military value, but not one that is essential. The Cape Route's military importance inheres in its geographic position as a way of entry into the Indian Ocean from the South Atlantic and vice versa. If a crisis occurred in the Persian Gulf -- the scenario of most concern to U.S. policymakers -- the Cape Route would be one of four sea lines of communication the U.S. Navy could use to reach the approaches to the Gulf, each of which has advantages and disadvantages in terms of the trade-offs between time, cost, operational flexibility and security.²

As a result of its growing importance in the oil trade and its military value, the Cape Route would have been a focus of U.S. attention irrespective of other developments. Yet,

¹For more detail on the commercial importance of the Cape Route, see Ibid., pp. I-6-9.

²For a more detailed analysis of these four alternatives, see Ibid., p. I-10-12.

the focus has been sharpened by the growth of Soviet naval power, particularly in the Indian Ocean region, which has called into question that route's future security. Under present and foreseeable circumstances, however, it is difficult to envision direct Soviet military actions against Western shipping around the Cape.¹ According to one analyst, the vulnerability of the South Atlantic's sea lines of communication would seem to be more pronounced in the context of a political-economic threat than in a direct military scenario, with the exception of a Soviet presence in South Africa.²

The political interests of the United States in the South Atlantic region are integrally linked with its economic and strategic concerns. Conflict in either South America or Africa puts at risk U.S. investment in both areas as well as (particularly in southern Africa) some vital stakes of America's allies. Conflict in the region, whether between states or between contending factions within a state, also raises the possibility of superpower confrontation. The Angolan civil

¹For a more detailed analysis of the potential threats to the Cape Route, See Kemp, Appendix I, pp. I-15-17.

²Ibid. One possible contingency that should be noted is a Soviet blockade of South Africa on behalf of the United Nations following a UN vote to impose sanctions on South Africa for its current social policies.

war demonstrated how an essentially regional issue can quickly assume an East-West dimension.¹ The belief that the Soviet Union was in some way involved in the invasion of Zaire's Shaba province by Katangan secessionists created some pressures for U.S. involvement in that dispute as well.²

U.S. interests in the South Atlantic, therefore, are closely tied to broader American foreign policy goals, and in this regard the U.S. is experiencing some problems. The human rights issue has impinged particularly upon U.S. policy toward Latin America. U.S. arms sales and development aid are two aspects of policy, for example, that are closely tied to this issue. The Congress is demanding more justification for appropriating funds and withholding military aid to repressive regimes. Consequently, President Carter's pending requests for close to \$3 billion in foreign aid for Latin America and other areas reportedly is in difficulty.³ The initial reaction of Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay (as well as other Latin American states) to U.S. censure of their internal policies has been

¹See John A. Marcum, "Lessons of Angola," Foreign Affairs (April 1976), pp. 407-426, Colin Legum, "The Soviet Union, China and the West in Southern Africa," Foreign Affairs (July 1976), pp. 745-763, and Charles Ebinger, "The Angolan Civil War," ORBIS (Fall 1976), pp. 669-699.

²See, for example, The Baltimore Sun, March 23, 1977.

³New York Times, June 5, 1977.

rejection of U.S. military aid that probably would have been cut off eventually in any event.¹

Trade has been a constant source of friction between the U.S. and South American states. Trade problems between Brasilia and Washington, for example, have ranged from the question of Brazil's nuclear development program (See Volume II, pp.) to disputes over non-rubber foot-wear. President Carter has blocked protectionist restrictions on shoe and sugar exports from Latin America, but pressure for restrictions continues from U.S. producers.

Concern has been expressed that the United States has ignored the Western Hemisphere -- and that the present administration has no Latin American policy beyond concern for human rights, renegotiation of the Panama Canal and rapprochement with Cuba.² In contrast, the collapse of the Portuguese empire in southern Africa and subsequent events in the area brought sub-Saharan Africa more squarely into U.S. policy concerns. Shortly after the victory of the MPLA in Angola in early 1976, Secretary of State Kissinger made his first venture into Africa, and the region has been a constant focus

¹Other Latin American states rejecting U.S. military aid were Chile, Nicaragua, Guatemala, and El Salvador.

²See, for example, Arthur Schlesinger, "The Continent Americans Forget," Wall Street Journal, May 2, 1977, p. 12.

of U.S. policy ever since. The United States has become actively involved in the transitions in Namibia and Rhodesia, and more recently, the U.S. position on domestic developments in South Africa has noticeably stiffened. In the Congress, some members have taken major steps to reorient U.S. policies toward Africa in general.

The Kissinger visit to Africa in April 1976 set in motion the Anglo-American initiative for the resolution of the Rhodesian transition that culminated in the abortive negotiations between Rhodesian Prime Minister Smith and black Rhodesian nationalists in Geneva at the end of the year. Speaking in Lusaka, Kissinger promised that the white regime in Rhodesia would face "unrelenting opposition" from Washington until a negotiated settlement was achieved.¹ Although the Geneva conference was a failure and a new administration came to power in Washington, the American position has remained essentially the same. The U.S. participation in the preparation of the initiatives of British Foreign Secretary David Owen reflects the orientation of the Carter Administration.

Since the collapse of the Geneva conference, however, the United States has been content to let Britain take the diplomatic lead in devising some new basis for negotiations.

¹The text of the Kissinger speech is reprinted in Survival, Vol. XVIII, No. 4 (July/August 1976), pp. 171-174.

At the same time, it has sent clear signals to southern Africa that its opposition to the minority regimes remains steadfast. In March, for example, the Byrd amendment allowing for the import of Rhodesian chrome in violation of UN sanctions was repealed. In Congress, the African Sub-committee of the House International Relations Committee indicated that it wanted the \$100-million fund the Administration seeks to commit to the development of a biracial Zimbabwe to be used instead to compensate the front-line states for war-related economic losses and refugee relief.¹

The United States has also used its influence to effect the transition of power in Namibia. The United States was one of five Western countries that, acting in concert, impressed on Prime Minister Vorster that the Turnhalle arrangements were unacceptable. (For details of the Turnhalle plan and the Western reaction, see Volume II, pp.77-80).² After negotiations with the representatives of these countries, South Africa decided to scrap the Turnhalle constitution and replace it with arrangements for an administrator-general and national

¹Washington Post, May 3, 1977.

²International Herald Tribune, June 16, 1977. The draft constitution prepared by the constitutional convention assembled by South Africa (Turnhalle talks) called for an interim government of eleven Ministers -- one for each ethnic group represented at the meeting -- with all decisions to be made by consensus. It also declared that only people who had lived in Namibia for at least five years should be allowed to vote, thereby effectively excluding SWAPO -- the major liberation organization in the territory.

elections that could possibly include the Southwest Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) -- the group leading Namibia's quest for independence.

Both Rhodesia and Namibia were the subject of the Vorster-Mondale discussions in Vienna in May 1977. Of perhaps ultimately greater importance, however, was the tough U.S. line regarding South Africa itself. Vice President Mondale warned Vorster that unless South Africa moved toward a "progressive transformation" of its internal situation, the United States would be forced to take diplomatic steps against the Republic.¹ While he left the nature of these steps unspecified, it was speculated that an early one would be U.S. support for economic sanctions, though whether this extreme measure would find approval in the U.S. Congress is debatable.²

Recent developments have thus evoked a more active U.S. role in the major questions of southern Africa that is likely to be continued. Questions abide, however, over the future direction of that role, particularly with respect to the investments that the United States is willing to make (including military ones) in pursuit of these interests. Domestic debate on the issue is intensifying. The fact that the race issue lies at the heart of the debate makes it emotionally charged and potentially divisive. A substantial factor in the evaluation of any U.S. policy toward southern Africa will be,

¹International Herald Tribune, June 16, 1977.

²New York Times, May 21, 1977.

therefore, the risk of polarizing American society inherent in that policy.

2. The Soviet Union

At the outset, it must be noted that Moscow has focused its attention in the South Atlantic region almost entirely on the African littoral. To date, beyond the derivative interests implicit in Moscow's alliance with Cuba, South America has held relatively little interest for Soviet policymakers, although that situation might be changing, as the increasing Soviet-Brazilian trade would seem to indicate.¹

Soviet motivations for its interest in southern Africa, for its acquisition of naval facilities in both eastern and western Africa and for its concern with the Indian Ocean and the South Atlantic are subjects of continuing controversy in the West. There are those who argue that the Soviet Union is seeking influence in Africa in order to achieve eventual domination of Africa's mineral wealth and the sea lanes around the continent, both of which are of high importance to the West.² Other analysts deprecate both Soviet designs and the implications of growing Soviet activity in Africa.

¹See Schneider, Appendix I, p. I-B-27, 28.

²See, for example, "Turmoil in Africa -- How Moscow Capitalizes on Strife," U.S. News and World Report, April 4, 1977.

Soviet activity in Africa and in the South Atlantic in general must be viewed in the context of overall Soviet policy toward the Third World. A recent Congressional study outlined the general Soviet conception:

For the Soviets, the Third World is an integral part of their ideological design of the world as they now perceive it and as they theoretically expect it to be with the unfolding of history; it is a vital component in the correlation of forces that in the Soviet view implies a shift in the balance of world power in their favor. The Third World presents them, moreover, with political opportunities to achieve the goals of this design and to fulfill their historical expectations; for it has become the instrumentality for expanding and globalizing Soviet influence and power, and for reducing or denying that of the United States, the West and Communist China. . .

The pursuit of a globalist policy imposes on the Soviets the imperative need to control strategic areas in the Third World. Accordingly, Soviet aid and political energies have been directed toward expanding Soviet influence and power in the "national liberation zone" of Asia and Africa.¹

Soviet policy in Africa in the 1950s and early 1960s suffered some severe setbacks. By learning from its early errors, however, and by adapting its policies accordingly, Moscow has subsequently acquired influence among some African countries such as Guinea-Bissau and Angola (although it may again be in the process of suffering reverses in both the Sudan and Somalia).

Several major points regarding Soviet interests and activities in the South Atlantic region should be noted.

¹House of Representatives, Committee on International Relations, The Soviet Union and the Third World: A Watershed in Great Power Policy? (Washington: GPO, 1977), pp. 3-4.

First, the Soviet naval expansion and forward deployment that saw the movement into the northwest quadrant of the Indian Ocean, the Caribbean and West African waters in the late 1960s and early 1970s is seen by some observers to relate in part to the strategic objective of countering the U.S. submarine-based nuclear deterrent. This interpretation, offered by Professor MccGwire,¹ is made plausible by the 10 to 15 year lead-time in modern naval systems -- and therefore the likelihood that present Soviet naval vessels and deployments reflect decisions made in the early 1960s, when the development of a naval counter-deterrent had priority in Soviet naval planning.

Second, it is clear that the Soviet Union has recognized in Africa opportunities for the expansion of its political influence and seeks marginal advantages wherever they may exist. Moscow has demonstrated a strong proclivity to support almost any cause in Africa that has had no other champion. The Amin regime in Uganda, the Polisario Front fighting for the independence of Western Sahara and the Marxist regime in Ethiopia are only current examples of groups that are receiving substantial aid from Moscow and very little from elsewhere. Active liberation movements in Rhodesia and an increasingly

¹MccGwire, Appendix I-D, pp. I-D-12-13.

volatile situation in South Africa would seem to present ample opportunities for the Soviet Union to pursue its interests in southern Africa in the coming years. The Soviet experience in the Horn of Africa, however, demonstrates the pitfalls of political opportunism. While trying to exploit the opportunity opened by Ethiopia when the new regime severed its ties with the United States, Moscow jeopardized its long-standing relationship with Somalia. Although political opportunism yields marginal gains in some cases, therefore, it also leaves Moscow open to serious setbacks. Consequently, its policy is one of constant adaptation.

Moscow's continuing interest in southern Africa was recently underscored by the visit in early 1977 of then-President Podgorny to Tanzania, Mozambique and Zambia -- the first to sub-Saharan Africa by a Soviet leader. There seemed to be basically two purposes for the trip: to show the flag and conclude substantive agreements. If one assumes that the advance of Soviet interests in southern Africa had been threatened by the Kissinger/Carter diplomacy, then the Podgorny visit represented an effort to give Soviet policy a fresh momentum. The visit also signaled the Soviet leadership's intention to consolidate its position with the nationalist leaders in Rhodesia.¹

¹Moscow has obviously been concerned that some liberation leaders like Robert Mugabe of ZANU and important elements of ZAPU favor Peking over Moscow. See "An African Tour-De-Force," To the Point International, April 4, 1977, p. 18.

While in Maputo, Podgorny also signed a Treaty of Friendship with Mozambique calling for unspecified military cooperation.¹

Although the Podgorny visit was widely interpreted as a striking success, the Soviet position in southern Africa is not assured. Recent events in Angola, for example, raise questions regarding the status of Soviet influence in that country. In late May an attempted coup by the pro-Soviet faction of the MPLA was quickly crushed, reportedly with the help of Cuban troops.² Following the restoration of order, President Neto reaffirmed his alliance with the Soviet Union (and Cuba) but the entire incident raises speculation about the extent of Soviet influence in Luanda.³

The Soviets may encounter further set-backs in Africa, as they have in the past. Yet, it must be kept in mind that in all their political-military intrusions abroad (e.g., in the Middle East) the Soviets have demonstrated tenacity and adaptability -- the ability to adjust to set-backs, to shift from one client state to another, and the determination to remain a regional force. Thus, irrespective of the original motives that propelled the Soviet Union into Africa, Soviet military pressure and political influence will remain a fact

¹New York Times, April 5, 1977.

²Washington Post, May 28, 1977.

³"Angola: The Manhunt is On," To the Point International, June 13, 1977, p. 46.

of life in the South Atlantic region in the years ahead. The strength of that presence and the direction that influence will take, however, will be a function of local evolution and opportunities as much as of the application of power itself.

While political opportunism is the primary generator of Soviet activity in the South Atlantic in general and Africa in particular, there are other secondary motives. Moscow, for example, is also concerned with safety of its fishing fleet and the shipping route from Soviet Europe to Soviet Asia. The Soviet fishing fleet is now the second largest in the world, and it frequently plies the waters of both the South Atlantic and the Indian Ocean. The Soviets also use the Indian Ocean trade routes -- either through the Suez Canal or around the Cape -- for non-fishing commercial purposes (although not nearly to the same extent as the West), as a major link between the two halves of the Soviet Union. This route assumes significant importance to Soviet planners in light of a possible Sino-Soviet conflict in which the Trans-Siberian railroad might be disrupted.¹

Soviet interest in the South Atlantic's African littoral was also sparked not in small part by its competition

¹To alleviate this heavy dependence on the Trans-Siberian Railroad and to offset its vulnerability, another railroad is being built further north.

with the People's Republic of China. During the past decade, China has given substantial economic aid to the states of black Africa and was an early supporter of black liberation movements in southern Africa (See Volume II, pp. 113-6). Given its rivalry with the PRC for leadership of the socialist world and influence in the Third World, it is not surprising that the Soviet Union would grow increasingly active in this area as well.

Moreover, the Soviet Union has an obvious interest in developments related to Western access to southern African resources, particularly minerals. The table on the following page lists the combined South African and Soviet percentage of the world's reserves of selected mineral commodities. Pretoria and Moscow control more than half of the world's reserves in platinum group metals, vanadium, manganese ore, chrome, gold and fluorspar. While data on "known reserves" cannot definitely establish conclusions about import dependence or price, reduction in Western trade with South Africa in these commodities could possibly force the West into greater dependence on Soviet sources, making their supply potentially more vulnerable to greater political manipulation. Moreover, the appearance of anti-Western regimes in southern Africa -- especially the advent of such a regime in the Republic of South Africa itself -- enhances the trends toward cartelization.

**COMBINED SOUTH AFRICAN AND U.S.S.R. PERCENTAGES
OF WORLD'S RESERVES OF SELECTED MINERAL COMMODITIES**

<i>Commodity</i>	<i>South Africa's Percentage of World's Reserves</i>	<i>U.S.S.R.'s Percentage of World's Reserves</i>	<i>Combined South African and U.S.S.R. Percentage</i>
1. Platinum Group Metals	86	13	99
2. Vanadium	64	33	97
3. Manganese Ore	48	45	93 ¹
4. Chrome Ore	83	1	84 ²
5. Gold	49	19	68
6. Fluorspar	46	4	50
7. Iron Ore	4	42	46
8. Asbestos	10	25	35
9. Uranium	17	13	30
10. Titanium	5	16	21
11. Nickel	10	7	17 ³
12. Zinc	9	8	17
13. Lead	4	13	17
14. Phosphate Rock	8	4	12
15. Coal	2	10	12
16. Copper	2	9	11
17. Industrial Diamonds	7	4	11
18. Antimony	4	5	9 ⁴
19. Tin	1	6	7

NOTES:

1. Apart from Australia, negligible reserves in Western World
2. Most of the remaining reserves are in Rhodesia
3. Conservative estimate
4. A large proportion of the remaining reserves are in China and Bolivia

Source: W.C.J. van Rensburg and D.A. Pretorius, South Africa's Strategic Minerals: Pieces on a Continental Chessboard (Johannesburg: Valiant, 1977), p. 133.

Finally, domestic considerations assert themselves in Soviet strategies. The inability of the Soviet Union to solve its problem of internal agricultural deficits -- particularly in land-provided protein -- will insure Soviet interest in South Atlantic fish. The Soviet Union remains heavily dependent on grain-oriented farming methods, and the oceans thus represent a principal dietary source of protein. During the last decade the Atlantic as a whole has maintained the lead in Soviet fishery catches, providing over half of the total fish supply of the Soviet Union, although most of this was taken in the North Atlantic.

The South Atlantic has remained relatively stable in its contribution to the total Soviet fish harvest, providing between 15 and 20 per cent of the yearly total catch. The southwest Atlantic provided about 6 per cent of the total Soviet catch at its peak. As a result of unilateral extensions by Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay of their economic zones to 200 miles (partly in response to Soviet behavior), the area now provides only about 0.1 per cent of the total Soviet catch. With the decrease in Soviet activity in the southwest Atlantic came an upsurge of Soviet fishing off the African coast. West African littoral waters now contribute more than 10 per cent of the total Soviet catch, with southern African waters providing an additional ten percent.¹

¹Uri Ra'anani, "The Soviet Union and the South Atlantic: Political and Economic Considerations," Appendix I-F, pp. I-F-2-3.

The Soviet Union might be able to add to this total, however, when Namibia becomes independent since the waters off its shores are some of the richest fishing grounds in the South Atlantic.

The political problems encountered by the Soviet Union off the Latin American coast in the late 1960s and early 1970s, have been recently replicated off the shores of New England and Canada. Consequently, as the North Atlantic catches encounter obstacles and provide less of the total Soviet catch, the South Atlantic could well grow in importance.¹

Given the nature of U.S. and Soviet interests in the South Atlantic region, the question arises whether either or both superpowers will become more actively involved in the area. Should such heightened involvement occur, however, it is not likely to be the result of a direct military threat to superpower interests.² Rather, those interests are likely to be affected more by the disruption and chaos created by conflicts within and among South Atlantic littoral states. It is important, therefore, that U.S. policymakers develop a keen understanding of the issues that could lead to conflict within the South Atlantic area. That is the focus of the next section.

¹See Ra'anan, Appendix I-F, p. I-F-3.

²See Kemp, Appendix I, pp. I-15-18.

II. Potential Sources of Conflict in the South Atlantic Region

A. The South American Littoral

1. External Sources of Conflict

All the evidence points to the projection that, during the time frame of this study, the conflicts that may arise in Latin America will either be related directly to competition for access to scarce resources or to political issues exacerbated by the rivalry over resources. Potential Latin American conflicts with resource implications in the coming years include controversy between Argentina and Brazil over the Itaipu hydroelectric project and nuclear development policy, Argentine-British differences over the potentially abundant oil and fish resources off the Falkland/Malvinas Islands, the dispute between Chile and Argentina over the Beagle Channel, and exploration and development of the Antarctic.

a. The River Plate Basin

Hydroelectric power is Brazil's most important substitute for fossil fuels, in which it is deficient. Yet its exploitation requires skillful diplomacy as the rivers of greatest potential are located on its southwestern, southern and western borders. The giant Itaipu dam complex on the Paraguayan frontier represents a joint Brazilian-Paraguayan effort that will make electricity Paraguay's most important export. The national security implications for Brazil of having such a

major power source across an international frontier are obvious. Actions to safeguard the Itaipu complex might embroil Brazil in a conflict in Paraguay. The danger of such a conflict is enhanced by the potential for internal instability in Paraguay -- perhaps following Stroessner's demise. Moreover, both Brazil and Argentina keep a wary eye on Asunción, and Brazil may feel called upon to block an extension of Argentine influence in Paraguay.

The search for energy has also led Brazil to pursue successful negotiations for oil and natural gas concessions in Bolivia. Unconfirmed but plausible reports point to Brazilian complicity in the coup which brought General Hugo Banzer to power in 1971. Bolivian internal politics will grow more important to Brazil as the level of its energy exports to Brazil increases, and intensified Brazilian involvement in Bolivia might spark a reaction elsewhere in the continent.

Most importantly, Brazilian-initiated economic penetration of bordering countries in the Rio de la Plata region, especially when combined with Brazilian development efforts in the Amazon, will undoubtedly fuel Argentine fears of Brazilian expansionism. Given Buenos Aires traditionally important role in the affairs of the smaller states of the Rio de la Plata Basin, it is not surprising that Argentinians are offended and alarmed by the emergence of Brazil as a

continental power and a virtual patron of the border states, which historically have been the targets of Brazilian-Argentine competition.¹ For the present, however, there appears to be little that Argentina -- in the throes of internal political confusion and conflict and a chronically sluggish economy -- can do. The complaints from Buenos Aires regarding the Itaipu dam project have fallen on deaf ears, and feeble attempts to counter the expanding Brazilian influence in other states have met with a similar lack of success.

It is in the areas of technology and standing military capabilities that Argentina has been able to keep pace with Brazil to some degree. In the last few years, however, economic and defense spending trends indicate that there is a growing disparity between the military strength of the two countries.² If present defense spending plans in Argentina and Brazil are implemented, by the 1980s Argentina's military will be substantially overmatched by that of Brazil.

It is not surprising, therefore, that many observers foresee Argentina harnessing its considerable technological capabilities to the acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability as a means of restoring the country's battered prestige and

¹For a more detailed discussion of Argentine perceptions of Brazil's regional intentions, see Ronald Schneider's paper in Appendix IB , pp. I-B-4-13.

²See Schneider, Appendix IB , pp. I-B-18-24.

providing an effective counter to Brazil's burgeoning hegemony. Argentina is currently well ahead of Brazil in nuclear technology, and some analysts suspect that the Argentine initiative has been directed toward nuclear weapons production for some time. Argentine nuclear facilities are relatively free from external control and Buenos Aires has refused to subscribe to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

From the Brazilian perspective it would be extremely unsettling if Argentina were to acquire a nuclear arms capability. Brazil could develop such a capability itself without substantial outside help. Given that it is starting well behind Argentina in the nuclear race, however, Brazil has sought such assistance. The heightened attention that the Brazilian leadership has recently devoted to its nuclear program, including the deal with the Federal Republic of Germany, is related to the country's pressing need for new energy sources.¹ Simultaneously, however, it addresses one of Brazil's most important security concerns.

The potential of a nuclear arms race between Brazil and Argentina is alarming enough but the acquisition of nuclear technology by Brazil is also likely to exacerbate that country's chronic problems in conveying its intentions to other Hispanic neighbors. Regardless of Brazilian policy statements denying

¹For more detail on the Brazilian-West German nuclear agreement, see Volume II, pp

expansionist desires, Brazilian nuclear capabilities would surely heighten security concerns among all the Spanish-speaking Latin American states.

Although the prospects of a "nuclearized" South America cannot be dismissed, it is unlikely to occur until at least the 1980s. Moreover, given the generally low intensity of the conflict issues between Brazil and its neighbors, the resort to nuclear weapons by Brazil once it has acquired them is highly improbable.

Similarly, it is unlikely for several reasons that the Brazilian military would take the initiative in the use of conventional armed force against any of its neighbors for at least the coming five to ten years. First, the Brazilian army does not currently stock enough ammunition to engage in large-scale combat for a prolonged period of time. Beyond the ten year time frame, however, Brazil will no longer find this an inhibiting factor. Plans for the creation of an expanded Brazilian munitions industry were announced in 1975. As plans become operational within the next five years, Brazil will progressively reduce its dependence upon foreign sources of military supply and hence will become a more independent and formidable Latin American power.

Second, logistical constraints limit Brazil's capacity to supply combat forces on any of its vast borders, except in the Plata basin. A sustained incursion into Bolivia, Peru, Colombia, Venezuela, or the three northern neighbors of Guyana, Surinam, and French Guiana would face substantial logistical obstacles.

Third, even if Brazil did possess the logistical capability to invade its neighbors, the Brazilian army is essentially unprepared for such an operation. At present, the troops have not been trained to be a mobile national fighting force.

Lastly, there are the implications of a Brazilian invasion for domestic "tranquillity" and security within Brazil itself, given the considerable import of this factor to the ruling military regime (See Volume II, pp. 18-32). The undertaking of a major military action on the country's borders would render the government much more vulnerable to opposition at home, if for no other reason than that a majority of the security forces that ordinarily maintain social order would be diverted from internal functions.

The same logistical constraints on Brazil's ability to attack its neighbors will also inhibit Venezuela, Peru, Colombia, or Bolivia in considering a military option in any confrontation with Brazil. It must be remembered that the arms capabilities and industries of these states are minimal relative to those of Brazil and none are likely to represent a significant threat for some time to come.

In the case of Uruguay, that country is governed by an authoritarian regime that is ideologically compatible with that of Brazil. Indeed, the security forces of the two countries already cooperate closely. As long as this common denominator obtains, there is little likelihood of a conflict between the

two states. In any event, Uruguay clearly lacks the capacity to challenge the larger Brazilian forces across the frontier.

The question of conflict in the South Atlantic's South American littoral, then, turns in large part on the power balance between Brasilia and Buenos Aires. A resuscitated Argentina would very likely take a more positive policy aimed at redressing the present imbalance in Brazil's favor. Such a policy would probably entail a more rapid expansion of conventional military capabilities, and a diplomatic offensive aimed at securing improved relations with the more substantial states of Spanish-speaking Latin America and re-establishing a strong Argentine position in the states along Brazil's periphery. Such a course would obviously lead to Brazilian countermeasures and the result could be a more flammable regional situation. On the other hand, if Buenos Aires perceives itself to be falling further behind Brazil, it may see the nuclear option as its only recourse, thereby initiating a South American nuclear arms race.

b. The Beagle Channel

Although there has been a tentative legal resolution of the dispute between Argentina and Chile over the Beagle Channel, activities around Tierra del Fuego (oil exploration, fishing, 200-mile EEZs, territorial ownership, naval deployment, etc.) will be of increasing concern to all parties in the South

Atlantic. Aware not only of the valuable resources of the Argentine sea, including fish and oil, policymakers in Buenos Aires are also concerned with protecting their territorial waters.

Argentina suffered a setback in its dispute with Chile over the Beagle Channel and three adjoining islands when a court of arbitration decided in favor of Chile. Argentina was less concerned about the award to Chile of the sparsely inhabited islands themselves than by the fact that the extension of the 200-mile territorial waters limit from their coasts would give Chile an entry into the South Atlantic, as well as create the possibility of Chilean maritime jurisdiction in an important sector of the Argentine sea. Argentina argues that this would contravene the bilateral treaties signed in this regard in the 19th and 20th centuries. There have been reports that some Argentinian officials have suggested "acts of occupation" to safeguard Argentine sovereignty in the area.¹

At first blush this would appear to have been solely a bilateral issue between Chile and Argentina. According to reports, however, Brazil may soon sign a contract to supply

¹These "acts of occupation" would not necessarily be military. One suggestion has been a repetition of Argentine action on Barnevelt Island where the navy installed a buoy as a navigation aid. See FBIS, "Advisors Urge 'Acts of Occupation' in Disputed Beagle Area," Latin America (Buenos Aires, Clarín in Spanish, 6 August 1977), August 9, 1977, p. B1.

arms to Chile (and other countries) including armored vehicles, planes, light armaments and coastal vessels.¹ Especially against the background of the award to Chile of the three islands in the Beagle Channel dispute, these arms assume inordinate significance in Argentina's maritime security perceptions.

c. The Antarctic

Some recent analyses and reports suggest that the Antarctic, a continent previously free from political dispute, may progressively become the object of international rivalry. While it is true that coveted resources are to be found both on land and in the surrounding seas, several characteristics of the land mass itself, as well as of the market for these resources, suggest that their exploitation will neither be easy nor near-term. Despite the Antarctic's proximity to the tip of Africa and Latin America, and to the shipping lanes around the two southern capes, it is difficult to project any compelling strategic value for the continent in the near-term. The southern hemisphere nations have long been concerned that the great powers, especially the Soviet Union, might establish bases in Antarctica for local military operations. To date, there are no indications of any such move or ambition.

¹As mentioned in Dr. Schneider's paper, Brazil has already sold Bandeirante planes and missiles to Chile. See Schneider, Appendix IB, p. I-B-23.

With regard to the argument that the Antarctic might be important to world shipping as a result of its geographical location, two points must be noted. First, the continent is too remote from the Cape of Good Hope to be of significance to the sea route around southern Africa. While South America is much closer to Antarctica, major shipping does not pass through the Drake Passage. Whereas the Antarctic and the Falkland Islands played a limited role in World Wars I and II, it is doubtful whether they would be important in the event of a future war, as naval technology renders local supply and refueling bases less imperative. Finally, it is unlikely that the Antarctic would become a useful platform for long-range missiles because of its remoteness from northern hemisphere powers and its inhospitable terrain.

The Antarctic is reported to possess vast reserves of oil and other minerals. Notwithstanding the new attention given to these potential resources, their exploitation is doubtful for some time to come. There is no concrete evidence that deposits of oil and natural gas exist. Even if their presence were scientifically validated, the geologic configuration of Antarctica and its continental shelf pose significant technological problems that have never before been encountered in such combination. In any case, many other unexplored areas of the world hold an equivalent, if not better, petroleum potential

and do not present the barriers that the Antarctic does. Similarly, mining on the continent will be profitable only if the costs of extraction, refining, and transportation to markets are competitive with current market prices.

The krill swarms found in the Antarctic seas carry perhaps the greatest significance and are the only polar resource currently being exploited. Conservative estimates suggest that at least 50 million tons of krill can be harvested annually without dangerously depleting the stock, and a British government report estimated that up to 100 million tons of krill could be extracted -- almost double the total catch of fish in the world in 1974 (about 60 million tons).¹

British, Argentine, and Chilean claims to the Antarctic do overlap to a large extent, and would seem an obvious source of possible future conflict. However, it is likely that any dispute would take the form of symbolic assertions of national sovereignty. Since the three actors involved possess neither the funds to finance the required exploration and exploitation, nor the capital and technological sophistication to draw upon, it is unlikely that any debate over territoriality would result in the use of armed force, at least in the foreseeable future.

¹Geoffrey Kemp, "The New Strategic Map," Survival Volume XIX, Number 2 (March/April 1977), p. 54, fn. 4.

d. The Falkland/Malvinas Islands

In the case of the dispute between Great Britain and Argentina over the Falkland/Malvinas Islands, the pervasiveness of two themes that will characterize conflict in the South Atlantic is again manifest: first, the emerging awareness on the part of both regional and extraregional powers of the enormous resource wealth of the South Atlantic, and second, the fact that essentially bilateral disputes rarely remain so in South America. In this instance, although Brazil is not a primary actor in the territorial controversy over the Falkland/Malvinas Islands, Argentine paranoia vis-à-vis alleged Brazilian hegemonic aspirations results in the conjuring up of scenarios in which Brazil might attempt to assert dominance in the South Atlantic if Britain were to maintain control over the Islands. If Argentina's fears regarding Brazilian domination of the Rio de la Plata basin were realized, and Brasilia was also able to gain a foothold in the Falkland/Malvinas (through some agreement with Britain), Argentina would find itself increasingly isolated from areas in which it has traditionally been a major actor. The dispute over the Islands, then, could exacerbate political problems generated by other issues as well as raise contentious issues, particularly with respect to resources, on its own.

FALKLAND/MALVINAS ISLANDS



From a naval point of view, the archipelago offers a good strategic position in the South Atlantic. It does not hold as much importance as in earlier years for the traditional naval power like the United States, however, because of the advent of nuclear-powered ships as well as long-range logistic support. Regarding the monitoring of passage through the area, modern long-range detection systems and processes involving satellites lower the importance of the Islands' position in this respect as well.

However, it is widely recognized that the Islands' surrounding waters are richly endowed with resources that are of interest not only to the littoral South American nations, given their intensified maritime orientation, but also are attractive to extraregional actors. Britain recently commissioned a study to investigate the natural resources of the Falkland/Malvinas and to suggest economic improvements to enhance the viability of the Islands.¹ The resulting document, Lord Shackleton's economic survey, indicates that the waters surrounding the islands are rich in blue whiting as well as krill and other fish. Developing that potential, however, is quite another question. To date, the Falkland/Malvinas home market

¹It should be pointed out that historically British taxpayers have been financial beneficiaries rather than supporters of the Islands. Over the last 25 years roughly £10-12m (in 1974 prices) have flowed to the U.K., while British aid to the Islands between 1950 and 1974 totaled £1.7 million. Richard Johnson, "The Future of the Falkland Islands," The World Today, Volume 33, Number 6 (June 1977), p. 226.

has not been of sufficient size to facilitate a well-developed fisheries industry. The large krill swarms around the Islands, however, are particularly attractive to outside fishing interests, especially Japan and the Soviet Union. Both countries are working to develop technology for processing the delicate crustaceans at the site in large enough quantities to be commercially successful. In the past, the southwestern Atlantic has been the scene of incidents stimulated by aggressive fishing practices by external fleets, and should Japan and the Soviet Union make a concerted effort to exploit the krill around the Falkland/Malvinas, further incidents could result.

Another potential resource in the waters around the Falkland/Malvinas Islands is oil. Although some reports have estimated oil reserves in the region as three times greater than the reserves of the North Sea now being exploited by Great Britain, a more cautious assessment was offered in the Shackleton report, given a paucity of seismic data. The point was made that it would not be sufficient merely to discover oil, but that it would have to be discovered in large accumulations for commercial development to be successful. Further exploration of the area has been limited, however, by the dispute over the sovereignty of the Islands. One can assume that the presence of oil in the area will complicate those negotiations.

If Argentina secured access to the Falkland/Malvinas

oil reserves, the prospects would be created for potential cooperation between Buenos Aires and Brasilia in their exploration and exploitation. Brazil's lack of an indigenous source of low-cost energy supplies is the country's most serious economic constraint, and it is constantly trying to identify secure sources of oil (See Volume II, pp. 4-10). If Brazil perceived participation in oil production in the Falkland/Malvinas region as a means of alleviating some of its dependency problems, it might be willing to take steps to ensure that participation through cooperating with Argentina, which, in turn, could dampen Argentina's fears of Brazilian expansion.

An unusual potential resource in the Falkland/Malvinas region is seaweed. The British have been considering a plan for the conversion of Falkland seaweed into chemicals on such a scale that, it is claimed, a single year's production would bring Great Britain considerable foreign exchange earnings. The earnings would exceed the cost of a major British concern in the Islands, i.e., the expansion of the Islands' airport whose runway is currently too short for aircraft capable of flying farther than southern Argentina. At present, passengers depend on the weekly flights to (and operated by) Argentina, which makes them apply for special permits to go to or from "Las Malvinas." The British dilemma, however, is that the full development of the Falklands requires Argentina's cooperation,

which cannot be obtained without impinging on the question of sovereignty.

Fears have also been expressed in Argentina that Brazil might use the airport facilities in the Malvinas to project its presence into the Antarctic. From Argentina's perspective, if airfield facilities were expanded in the Malvinas, the Porto Alegre, Port Stanley and Antarctic could, in the future, become a Brazilian air route. In order to install and maintain an Antarctic base, airlift is necessary during the most rigorous part of the polar winter. If Great Britain were to retain possession of the Islands, Brazil would thus be in a position to offer its cooperation to the Island government for the transport of cargo and passengers in exchange for permission to use the airport -- which is being built for year-round operations -- as a stepping stone for Antarctic expeditions. The British government could agree to such a request in an effort to open the Antarctic to another non-communist country, like Brazil, so that the increasing Soviet naval influence and the activities of other socialist-bloc countries in the region might be countered.

2. Internal Sources of Conflict

The potential for internal unrest exists in both Brazil and Argentina. Disaffected segments of the Brazilian population include the lower socio-economic class (found

primarily in the Northeast) that is excluded, essentially, from the economic life of the country; the business sector that is beginning overtly to express its dissatisfaction with the now-prolonged economic slump in Brazil and is voicing criticism of the policy tools chosen by the military regime to meet the recession; the students that oppose the repressive measures utilized by the government to enforce domestic "tranquillity;" and, perhaps most significant, the upper/middle classes that are increasingly disenchanted with economic stagnation and whose potential withdrawal of support poses a serious threat to the government, should the economy not take a turn for the better. In Argentina, there does not exist a recognizable economic "fringe" group, as in Brazil, but internal divisions are primarily of an ideological/political character. Disaffected elements include the Peronist factions ousted in the coup, students whose university degrees are essentially worthless, the labor unions that are pressuring for a return to civilian government, and others.

It is unlikely, however, that internal unrest in either Brazil or Argentina would reach sufficient magnitude to allow the intervention of external actors. Pockets of dissent within each country are so diverse, whether it be in terms of socio-economic class or ideological persuasion, so as to render the likelihood of a coordinated effort among them practically non-existent. Further, contributing to the impotence of

opposition elements is the internal fragmentation within groups themselves. Moreover, the military regimes of both Argentina and Brazil have developed efficient and competent security forces to quell dissent. In Argentina in particular the present scene stands in contrast to the situation that obtained in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The Videla regime has been ruthless in counterattacking leftist terrorism, and of the two major guerrilla groups of the 1960s, one has been almost totally destroyed and the other is on the defensive. Nevertheless, leftist terrorism in Argentina continues, and it has stimulated a violent response from the right. The problem of the action-reaction pattern of violence by the left and right will be one of the more serious issues facing the government in Argentina -- whether civilian or military -- for some time to come.

In general, during the coming decade Latin America is not likely to be the scene of conflict of such magnitude that external actors might perceive an entree for intervention. Limited military arsenals and embryonic arms industries, abiding economic constraints and domestic tensions in both Brazil and Argentina would seem to militate against a serious armed confrontation.

Yet, such constraints may not persist over time. A change in regime in either country, for example, could alter

the regional scenario. Though it seems unlikely at present, the assumption of power by a radical Peronist-like leadership in Argentina could mean the resurrection of an aggressive Argentine foreign policy -- especially to the extent that such a policy would be deemed an instrument for domestic consolidation.

Moreover, by the mid-1980s, if current procurement plans are fulfilled, both Brazil and Argentina will have improved their respective military forces, both on land and at sea. Arms and logistical constraints will no longer impede momentum toward armed conflict. Military force could become a more tempting instrument to gain access to new-found and increasingly important resources and to protect existing infrastructure. The situation would be compounded if domestic unrest in one country spurred another regime to promote foreign aggression.

In such a scenario, conflict could erupt both on the South American land mass (over hydroelectric power in Paraguay or oil from Bolivia, for example) or in the regional seas. During the next twenty years, Latin America could also become a region in which two adversaries possess nuclear weapons manufacturing capabilities, and the possibility of an "irrational" act cannot be excluded. In any event, the very "nuclearization" of South American politics would endow developments there with global implications, with particularly ominous consequences for U.S. hemispheric interests.


B. The African Littoral

There are significant differences between the sources of conflict in Latin America and southern and western Africa. Whereas in Latin America many conflict issues are generated by the economic concerns of and competition between the more developed Latin American states, the issues in Africa -- while having economic resource components -- tend to be more politically related and frequently focus on the question of who is to hold power within a particular country.

Since many of the conflicts in Africa will be among rival groups contending for power within a specific country, they might be characterized as "internal." Yet, these disputes usually cannot be insulated from regional politics. Traditional tribal hostilities are intertwined with ideological disputes, political disputes and regional politics. Given the spillover of ethnic groups across national borders, as well as the broader relevance of questions of race and ideology, "internal" issues tend quickly to take on a regional content.

This section seeks to delineate the conflict issues in southern Africa that are most important in terms of their effect on the evolution of the South Atlantic environment and their impact on U.S. interests in the area. Given the nature of the issues and the volatility of the environment, it is difficult to construct time-frames for potential conflict;

SOUTHERN AFRICA



SOURCE: IISS, Strategic Survey, 1975

nevertheless, when feasible, such rough time-frames are suggested. The major considerations that have to be addressed in evaluating potential conflicts in Africa include the following:

- 1) the transition of power in those countries presently ruled by white governments;
- 2) the potential for conflict between black nationalists in liberation groups or for control of a particular state;
- 3) potential for state-to-state conflict;
- 4) the contribution of resource questions to conflict potential.

1. The transition in white governed states

- a. Rhodesia

In the short term, Rhodesia is the focal point of potential conflict in southern Africa. From the perspective of the United States the process of transition to black rule is the key element in the problem's evolution. The Smith regime is under intense pressure, both internally and externally, to reach an agreement with the black nationalists.

At the same time, however, there is also a trend toward increasing violence by the guerrillas and an intensification of the counterinsurgency operations by government forces. While the possibility of successful negotiations cannot be totally discounted, the likelihood of a violent resolution has also been

enhanced. Militarily, government forces have stepped up their operations. In part, this action has been necessitated by intensified guerrilla activity. The rising level of recently reported casualties indicate a growing incidence of major clashes.¹ The violations of the borders of both Zambia and Mozambique by Rhodesian security forces in "hot pursuit" of guerrillas is stiffening the resistance of the "front-line" states and escalating the warfare to a level where a negotiated settlement could become increasingly elusive.

Pressure on the Smith regime to negotiate a settlement has taken many forms:

1) In recent months Rhodesia has experienced white emigration at a record level. In the first five months of 1977 almost 5,000 people left the country.² The extension of the military call-up has been cited as the primary reason. Coming at a time when increased guerrilla activity has succeeded in tying down a growing proportion of the white population needed to run the country's farms, shops and factories, continued emigration on this scale will seriously erode the base of support of the Smith government as well as undermine the economy of the country (since white production amounts to over 55 per cent of the GDP).³

¹New York Times, June 28, 1977.

²Ibid.

³Patrick O'Meara, "Rhodesia: From White Rule to Independent Zimbabwe" in Southern Africa in Crisis, edited by Gwendolen Carter and Patrick O'Meara (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1977), p. 46.


2) Economically, the war against the guerrillas represents a serious strain on the Rhodesian economy. It was recently announced in Salisbury that defense expenditure for FY 1977-1978 would be increased by 44 per cent to R185 million to account for about 17 per cent of Rhodesia's public spending. When combined with counterinsurgency financing from other ministries, the total cost of the war to Rhodesia is almost R265 million, or about 26 per cent of the total budget. Expenditures in ministries which are not involved in the war effort have either increased only marginally or have been reduced.¹

3) The pressure applied by South Africa has, at times, been considerable (see Volume II, pp.). While the South Africans cannot dictate to the Smith regime, their influence has been instrumental in pushing Smith to the degree of accommodation he has exhibited to date. It is unlikely that such pressure will be stopped.


4) The scope of guerrilla operations has widened considerably in the last several months. The guerrillas now control a few of the tribal trust lands such as Chesa in the north-east and Sabi in the east, and government authority is challenged in other rural areas.² If the war continues, the whites could

¹FBIS, "Defense Expenditure to Increase Nearly 44 Per Cent," Sub-Saharan Africa (Johannesburg International Service, 30 June 1977), July 1, 1977, p. E4.

²The Times (London), April 23, 1977.



SOURCE: The Times (London), April 23, 1977



Rhodesia has established four operational areas (names in panels) for its fight against insurgents. Stars mark headquarters towns.

SOURCE: New York Times, February 25, 1977

eventually find themselves limited to control of a few major cities, with guerrilla forces dominating the countryside (as was the case when the Portuguese were trying to retain control in Angola and Mozambique).

While government control of the countryside is being challenged by the black guerrillas, the number of incidents of urban terrorism in Rhodesia is also increasing. Shortly before the recent election, for example, Joshua Nkomo, one of the two leaders of the Patriotic Front, claimed that two bombings in Salisbury were at his instruction (although he denied any nationalist responsibility for the blast that killed eleven and wounded 76 at a Salisbury store.¹) Nkomo told a news conference at the anti-apartheid conference in Lagos, Nigeria, that he was prepared to "destroy" Salisbury if such destruction would "win the war."²

Increased guerrilla activity reflects a trend of increasing capabilities and coordination within the guerrilla forces. Reports have indicated that Mozambique has received shipments of Soviet tanks, MIG aircraft, SA-7 missiles, howitzers and assault rifles.³ Some of the nationalists' leaders have expressed a desire to transform their guerrilla operations into

¹To the Point International, September 5, 1977, p. 29.

²Ibid.

³New York Times, April 24, 1977.

conventional warfare,¹ and continued supplies of this kind could give them this capability. Signs are emerging of closer coordination between the guerrillas operating from Zambia (largely associated with Nkomo's Zimbabwe Peoples Union (ZAPU) and those from Mozambique (primarily from Mugabe's Zimbabwe National Union (ZANU), which until now have functioned separately. The recent shelling of Kariba on Rhodesia's border with Zambia, for example, was believed to have been in retaliation for a five-day Rhodesian incursion into Mozambique.²

If the war continues, it will become increasingly difficult for Rhodesian security forces to cope with the situation. They will have to control a border of more than 1500 miles against forces whose arms, training and coordination will continue to improve. In such a situation, the prospects for the conflict spilling into Rhodesia's neighbors and the possible intrusion of other external actors are enhanced substantially.

South African support of Rhodesia plays an important part in the Smith government's ability to prosecute the war. If South Africa keeps open the pipelines to Salisbury so that its basic needs are met and its military capability is

¹See, for example, the interview with Robert Mugabe in To the Point International, June 27, 1977, p. 37.

²Washington Post, June 7, 1977.

maintained, the Smith government will be able to hold out much longer than many people estimate -- assuming, of course, that white morale remains high and that the loyalty of the blacks in the government's forces is retained. If South Africa closes those pipelines, however, Salisbury will find it difficult to resist nationalist pressure in the long run. The limitations at present to South African pressure on Rhodesia are detailed elsewhere (see Volume II, pp 83-4). If domestic unrest increases in South Africa (see below, pp 66-75), the Vorster government would probably find it increasingly unattractive to bolster the white Rhodesian government.

The possibility of Cuban involvement in a scenario of escalating conflict in Rhodesia cannot be discounted. Cuban advisors are already training Rhodesian nationalists in Mozambique. Whether Cuban troops would actually be used in combat, however, is open to question. Reports indicate that whenever Cuban troops confronted South African forces during the Angolan crisis, the Cubans were soundly defeated. Most analysts argue that there would be a similar result in a Cuban-Rhodesian confrontation. Cuban troops, however, could be used to fill in the black nationalists' rear, providing logistic support and perhaps even maintaining Mozambique's defenses, thereby freeing its forces for the war. Moreover, if the war proceeded to the point where Rhodesian security forces were severely

worn down and exhausted and the nationalist forces perceived a definite possibility of a military victory with Cuban assistance, they might ask for such help in order to deliver a knockout blow.

It is against this background that the election in Rhodesia in the summer of 1977 must be considered and prospects for a settlement must be addressed. In beating back the challenge from both right and left through his sweeping electoral victory, Prime Minister Smith has a mandate as the spokesman for Rhodesia's white population. It is unclear, however, what direction he will choose in pursuit of a political settlement. On the one hand, Mr. Smith has reiterated his pledge to seek an "internal" solution with moderate black leaders within Rhodesia excluding the Patriotic Front. On the other hand, he has not totally rejected the recent Anglo-American initiative that called for the retirement of Mr. Smith, elections based on universal suffrage, a U.N. presence during the transition to black rule and the creation of a Zimbabwe national army based on the liberation forces but containing some elements of Rhodesia's defense forces as well. Perhaps Mr. Smith believes he can incorporate some elements of the Anglo-American plan into his own solution.

Prime Minister Smith's goal of an "internal" settlement is a challenging task. To be sure, there are moderate

leaders within Rhodesia with whom Mr. Smith might negotiate. Given the complex nature of Rhodesian nationalist politics, however, it is questionable whether any single black Rhodesian leader speaks for the majority of the black population and could agree to a settlement with Smith in their name. The present rivalry between Bishop Muzorewa and Rev. Sithole is only one example (see below, pp 87-8). The fact that Rhodesia's black leaders must worry about being outflanked by rivals leaves them all little room for maneuver. Those who have been mentioned as candidates for concluding a possible agreement with Smith -- whether it is Muzorewa, Sithole or Chief Chirau -- have all indicated that a one-man, one-vote formula must be part of a final package or no agreement is possible.

The Patriotic Front's total opposition to an internal settlement is another factor that complicates the equation. Since the leaders of the Front control the guerrillas and demand to take the lead in any resolution of the Zimbabwe issue, the accession to power of a moderate black leader inside Rhodesia (and there is some skepticism that Smith would even agree to this), would not necessarily terminate the guerrilla attacks. The consequence could then be a transitional civil war of the kind fought in Angola after the departure of the Portuguese. The fact that the Patriotic Front has the support

of the five front-line presidents and has been singled out by the Organization of African Unity as its favorite gives the Front a strong position for influencing the success of any internal initiative Smith might pursue.

Several factors, therefore, must be considered in evaluating the feasibility of an internal settlement. The specific provisions of the government's proposals, for example, must secure the transition of power from white to black hands. The settlement must also be convincing to the front-line presidents since they not only support the activities of the Patriotic Front's guerrillas but also give a lead to much of the rest of the world in determining international opinion regarding the Rhodesian issue.

An internal settlement in Rhodesia cannot be totally discounted and a coalition of black moderates stands a chance of building a viable, black-ruled nation. The obstacles confronting an internal agreement, however, are formidable. If Prime Minister Smith insists on following this route to the exclusion of all others, the prospects -- at least in the foreseeable future -- point to continuing and likely increasing violence.

If a settlement can be achieved through negotiations -- particularly if they were based on the Anglo-American proposals --

and it led to the installation of a moderate black government in Rhodesia, it would likely be "reformist" in nature:¹

1) It would propose some form of Africanization of the government establishment and economy, but probably retain the concept of private ownership.

2) A situation would be created as in Kenya in which the white minority would lose political power but remain in the country. Some whites, particularly farmers, doctors and engineers would not necessarily leave the country and thereby continue to contribute their expertise.

3) Differences between various political factions now vying for power would probably continue, although the degree to which such differences would lead to violence cannot be accurately predicted. (See below pp. 84-88).

4) A policy of non-alignment would probably be pursued in Rhodesia's foreign policy. No Rhodesian government

¹For a more detailed discussion, see Patrick O'Meara, "Rhodesia: From White Rule to Independent Zimbabwe," pp. 44-47.

could ignore the contributions that the Soviet Union and China made to the liberation movements. At the same time, a more moderate government in Zimbabwe would not pursue a client relationship to either state if it could be avoided. Moreover, conscious of the need to develop the economy, a moderate Zimbabwe regime would likely encourage financial and technological investment from the West, particularly the United States.

5) Any black Rhodesian government is likely to take a hard-line policy toward South Africa. Having engaged in a liberation struggle itself, a new black government in Salisbury -- composed at least initially of politicians involved in the liberation effort, exiles and former prisoners -- would undoubtedly be committed to the black majority in South Africa.

In contrast a radical government in Rhodesia that had achieved power through violence would pursue policies designed to achieve more far-reaching and rapid change:

1) In addition to Africanization of the establishment, nationalization of industry, land and business would be likely. Private ownership might be limited or curtailed.

2) It would feature a higher probability of white exodus from the country, creating severe problems especially in the economic sector. For example, the medical, technical and engineering skills possessed by the white community would be lost.

Rhodesian agriculture would be severely debilitated if the whites left in large numbers. In 1975, for example, 6200 white farmers produced \$576 million worth of commodities, primarily for commercial purposes. In contrast, 660,000 black farmers produced only \$165 million worth of output, 70 per cent of which was for subsistence.¹

3) Jockeying for position among the various factions of the liberation movement would occur in the immediate post-independence period. While some alliances might be struck for convenience, with the passing of time traditional rivalries could well reassert themselves and a military challenge to the government could be forthcoming.

4) In Zimbabwe's relations with external powers, much depends on which faction of the liberation movement was in ascendance. In any case, relations with the United States are likely to be strained, particularly if the United States is blamed for a collapse in negotiations that leads to the escalation of violence.

5) Zimbabwe could become a base of operations for guerrillas operating against South Africa, particularly if the government was dominated by the guerrilla leaders of the Third Force rather than politicians like Nkomo. The identification with a liberation struggle in South Africa would be strong, and former guerrilla leaders might be willing to provide support to South African nationalists. In this case it is merely a

¹Ibid., p. 46.

question of degree between the two scenarios.

Irrespective of the nature of the regime that assumes power in post-independence Zimbabwe, that government will face some serious problems:

1) The urban influx that would probably result, without an injection of new capital and aid, would cause serious dysfunctions in the society due to inadequate housing and facilities.

2) Unemployment is likely to increase which, when combined with inadequate urban development, could create an alienated segment of the population, with negative repercussions for the country's political stability.

3) Ethnic problems are likely to arise. The Ndebele and the Shona-speakers are traditional rivals. Within the clans of the Shona there are sharp animosities as well. Ethnic differences could, therefore, easily reassert themselves once the common goal -- the elimination of white rule -- is achieved. Ethnic differences could also be used to mask disputes that really relate to politics or personalities.

Two basic questions must be asked concerning the strategic implications of change in Rhodesia: 1) Will the transition of power be bloody or peaceful? and 2) What sort of black regime will assume power? How these questions are

answered will seriously influence the strategic environment in southern Africa.

An example of the potential strategic consequences of change in Rhodesia is its impact on the availability and transportation of southern Africa's important raw materials. Rhodesia maintains a significant position in the region's mineral picture not only because of its indigenous resources but also because its rail system serves as a key element in southern Africa's transportation infrastructure. The interdependence of the transportation system forces each state in southern Africa to consider its transportation requirements when formulating a position on major regional issues. In part, that position is a function of what routes are available for the export of raw materials. President Machel of Mozambique, for example, was reluctant to close his country's borders with Rhodesia after Mozambican independence because it would result in the loss of an estimated 5,000 jobs and over \$40 million in annual revenues.¹ Rhodesia was also used to transship Zambian copper until President Kaunda decided Angola's Benuila Railway was an acceptable alternate route. Rhodesia, therefore, and its new government, will be in a good

¹John Marcum, "Southern Africa After the Collapse of Portuguese Rule," in Africa: From Mystery to Maze, edited by Helen Kitchen (Lexington: D.C. Heath, Critical Choices for Americans, Volume XI, 1976), p. 83.

position to regulate the flow of raw materials from southern Africa and/or the cost at which it will be done.

b. South Africa

A pivotal variable in the evolution of the South Atlantic region generally and southern Africa particularly is the future of South Africa. Two features in the present situation in South Africa point to the likelihood of increased instability and possible conflict. First, the government's homeland policy has proven to be inadequate, particularly with respect to the status of urban blacks. Second, there is emerging in South Africa a new instability marked by violence in the black townships. This violence has demonstrated that a growing proportion of South Africa's blacks is no longer prepared to look to peaceful methods for achieving its goals. In responding to their demands the present government has two basic choices: to return to the "laager" and try to hold its privileged position by force or to accept pragmatically the permanence of the blacks in the cities as an indispensable part of the labor force, thereby undercutting the theory of separate development.

Any conflict situation in South Africa will be complicated by the country's complex demography (see Volume II, pp. 61-7). Both the black and white communities will undoubtedly be split. It is likely that the colored population will divide

as well, with the more militant members joining black dissidents; a majority of the Asians, however, will remain hesitant to support black liberation efforts. It is likely, however, that any conflict in South Africa will be sparked by black opposition to the present ruling white regime, and it is on this conflict that the analysis places emphasis.

If one assumes white dominance will end in South Africa, then the consequent evolution could be varied, ranging from democratic majority rule or confederation to partition. A loose federation is probably the most viable alternative as it would allow the whites to retain the benefits of their labors. However, considerable difficulties would be encountered in achieving any effective confederation. In particular, given existing economic and political realities, a dramatic change of attitude would be required of the white South Africans before they would consider relinquishing any land or resources now under their jurisdiction, especially since the area with the most blacks is the Transvaal, the home of Afrikanerdom.

The greatest weakness and, therefore, vulnerability of the white regime is its dependence on cheap black labor to sustain its industrial productivity. To this extent a critical factor within the country is the relative strength of the urban blacks and the ability of the regime to control this group in the event of growing insurrection. In addressing the problems

of the urban blacks, however, the South African government is faced with a serious dilemma, because the permanent presence of blacks in "white" areas undermines the whole structure of apartheid. Through their demands for freehold rights to land, adequate housing, expanded trading rights, better transport facilities, better police protection and, most importantly, self-government, urban blacks are, in effect, demanding their integration into the economic and political mainstream of the country.¹

The South African government could meet many of these demands such as granting freehold tenure of land, improving housing and transportation and overhauling the educational system. These kinds of reforms, however, do not address the central question, i.e., the black's demand for political rights and thus shared power. Economic and financial concessions may temporarily assuage some of the discontent of the urban black population, but precisely to the extent that such concessions will inevitably fuel the drive for political rights as well, they will not cope with black discontent in the longer run.

In the short-term, therefore, while there will not be a race war in South Africa, violence within the country is likely to escalate for a number of reasons:

¹For a more detailed explanation, see Gwendolen Carter, "South Africa: Battleground of Rival Nationalisms," in Southern Africa in Crisis, pp. 120-25.

1) The events in Soweto in 1976 provided a new and possibly permanent impetus to the black nationalist struggle.

2) Unemployment within the black townships like Soweto is spiralling. Among blacks in urban areas an estimated 20,000 people are out of work,¹ providing an enlarging recruiting pool for black militants.

3) A new generation of black leadership is emerging in the form of the politically conscious, militant youth who organized the Soweto demonstrations. The political importance of the student activists was recently underlined when they forced most of the members of the urban Bantu Council -- the government-sponsored advisory body of black residents of Soweto -- to resign.

4) A closer link is being forged between the student militants inside the country and the exiled liberation movements, the African National Congress (ANC) and the Pan-African Congress (PAC). The students allegedly have been actively recruiting cadres, with some reports indicating that as many as 4,000 young men and women have fled Soweto through Botswana, Mozambique and Swaziland to join the ANC and PAC.² For their part the liberation movements are reported to be providing

¹The Times (London), April 29, 1977.

the internal assistance with organizational and political expertise.¹

5) Assistance to the ANC and PAC from other black African states has been stepped up.²

6) Recent incidents indicate that black nationalist leaders have decided to place greater emphasis on urban terrorism. The ANC, for example, took responsibility for a recent terrorist attack in a Johannesburg garage.³

If increased violence in South Africa were to be coordinated with work stoppages, the government's problems would be seriously exacerbated. Although illegal, sporadic strikes by black workers since 1973 have stimulated a new awareness of the latent power in the hands of African labor. Given the differences between many of the migrant workers and the Soweto student political leadership (see Volume II, pp 65-6), the barriers to effective coordination between them should not be underrated. Nevertheless, if a more militant course parallel to heightened political protest and increased violence were pursued by even limited segments of South Africa's organized black labor -- such as the mineworkers or long-

¹Ibid.

²Ibid., p. 53.

³New York Times, June 29, 1977.

shoremen's unions -- the economic impact could be severe.

In the short-term, even if increasing violence in South Africa took the form of an insurrection of the country's urban blacks, it could probably be contained fairly easily, if somewhat bloodily, by the regime. The physical separation of the black urban areas would facilitate such containment, and, if army troops were used, the blacks would be facing the most effective military forces in Africa. The Republic can and probably will smash any serious resistance by the Soweto youth leadership or others, and the checks of a "democratic" system would not stand in the way.

In the long-term, while one cannot conclude that the probability of such a scenario is very high, if violence in South Africa escalated into a protracted conflict, the government would have the advantages of its military capabilities, indigenous arms industry, the geography and terrain of the country and the determined "laager" mentality of some segments of the Afrikaner population. On the side of the black nationalists, the achievement of independence by Zimbabwe and Namibia could provide additional bases from which to launch operations. The ANC and PAC or other black nationalist guerrilla groups would be supported financially by black states like Nigeria and would probably receive military assistance from the Soviet Union and China. Greater coordination would undoubtedly be forthcoming

between internal dissidents and guerrillas operating from bases outside the country.

In this situation the conflict would be bloody and the outcome far from clear. Even if the black nationalists forced the capitulation of the present white regime, there is no assurance that civil conflict would not ensue, given the traditional rivalries between the ANC and the PAC, generational differences, contending ideologies, traditional tribal animosities and personal differences among the black nationalist leaders. The more protracted the conflict, the more complex it would become and the greater the temptations and opportunities for external actors to become involved.

Faced with such a possibility, a beleaguered South African government might choose to demonstrate a nuclear weapons capability. The utility of a nuclear weapons option to South Africa, however, is more external than internal. It is highly unlikely that a nuclear weapon would be used by the government within the country against black guerrillas; rather, if the South Africans demonstrated a nuclear capability it would do so in the hope of forestalling external intervention. South Africa currently has the necessary infrastructure to initiate the development of nuclear weapons. The international uproar that developed in August 1977 over claims that South Africa was preparing to test a nuclear device demonstrated the salience of the issue.

South Africa's black neighbors would be faced with a dilemma in the event of protracted conflict in South Africa. On one hand, they would be compelled to support black South African nationalists. Given their national ideologies, their identification with the liberation struggle and the pressures of domestic and regional politics, these states would find it very difficult to refuse aid to black nationalists, perhaps by allowing them to operate from bases within their territory near the South African border, and/or by financial assistance and international representation.

On the other hand, the economic dependence of these states on South Africa would serve to restrain these actions in support of the nationalists. Mozambique, for example, needs to maintain friendly relations with South Africa because of the income it receives from South African recruitment of mine laborers, South African use of Mozambican rail and port facilities which provides important foreign exchange, and the market South Africa represents for the power generated by the Cabora Bassa dam. One might speculate, however, that as conflict continued in South Africa, these restraints would become less important.

The impact of a protracted conflict in South Africa on U.S. interests would depend on the nature of the regime that emerged victorious. As one observer points out, "Alternatives to the existing regime are not more -- and perhaps less --

likely to provide a political climate conducive to the pursuit of Western interests."¹ If, for example, a radically socialist or Marxist regime with a militant Third World orientation were to come to power, the United States could face problems in the form of:

1) enhanced prospects for cartelization of additional minerals on political and economic grounds;²

2) possible nationalization of major industries, land and businesses;

3) denial to the U.S. of access to South African naval facilities even in wartime;

4) more palpable threats to Western shipping, given the relatively sophisticated maritime forces such a regime would have at its disposal.

A scenario that cannot be ignored is the assumption of power in South Africa by a regime that invites the Soviet Union to establish a presence in the country in reward for Soviet support to the winning faction and/or Soviet promises of continued military and economic assistance to the regime. Through the use of South Africa's excellent facilities the Soviet Union could thus dominate the Cape and pose a major threat for any vessel -- naval or commercial -- not only transitting the Cape

¹See Crocker, Appendix I-C, p. I-C-28.

²Ibid.

but steaming anywhere in the entire southern oceanic region. The Soviets would obtain a major naval capability in the South Atlantic in any general or limited war scenario. The psychological importance of the Soviet presence would be immense and, perhaps, inhibit the United States and other western nations from responding in a major way to any crisis in the region. Obviously, an active Soviet military presence in South Africa would represent a drastic change in the balance of power in the South Atlantic. At this time, however, the probability of the evolution of such a scenario is very low.

c. Namibia

Compared to the Rhodesian crisis, the situation in Namibia is not as volatile. Nor is it as potentially significant for dramatic change as conflict in South Africa. Nevertheless, conflict in Namibia and the future of that country have important strategic implications for the South Atlantic. The potential importance of Namibia rests on two factors: its resource wealth and its strategic location. In terms of current mining output Namibia is Africa's fourth largest mineral producer with an annual output valued at over \$300 million.¹ Already a significant international exporter of diamonds, vanadium, lead, zinc and lithium, it is expected to become a major producer of uranium within the next few years.²

¹"Namibia: The Economics of Liberation," Africa, Number 73 (September 1977), p. 53.

²U.S. Department of Interior, Bureau of Mines, Mineral Industries of Africa (Washington: U.S. Bureau of Mines, 1976).

The Rossing uranium mine -- the world's largest open-pit uranium operation -- is scheduled to have an annual output of 5,000 tons of uranium oxide by 1978.¹ In fact, Namibian uranium reserves actually exceed those of South Africa (although they are considered to be of a lower grade), giving Namibia the potential to become the third largest uranium producer in the world behind the United States and Canada. Given the important role uranium will play in energy developments over the next two decades as nuclear power plants proliferate, Namibia will become an important trading partner of those countries dependent on uranium imports.

As previously mentioned another resource that will draw attention following Namibia's independence is fish. The rich fishing areas of the Namibian coast are a strong attraction to the Soviet Union and the desire to exploit those resources could lead to incidents should Moscow attempt to take advantage of a new black regime in Windhoek and enter those areas on a large scale. On the other hand, it could also stimulate Moscow into actively courting the new government.

Namibia's strategic location will also make it the focus of attention in the South Atlantic region. The port at Walvis Bay is the only harbor of any significance between

¹"The Economics of Liberation," p. 53.

Lobito and Cape Town and, as such, it dominates the western approaches of the Cape of Good Hope. The South African government has been sensitive to Walvis Bay's strategic importance and the government in Pretoria is particularly determined that the Soviet Union will not be able to use its facilities. It recently announced that administration of the port would revert to South Africa's Cape Province.¹ Namibian leaders recognize that failure to include Walvis Bay as part of an independent Namibia would be a serious blow to the newly independent state economically and politically.² The status of Walvis Bay, therefore, stands as one of the more difficult issues to be resolved in the determination of Namibia's future.

Namibia's future role will be determined in large part by the dynamics of its internal politics. As in South Africa, the black and white segments of the population cannot be considered monolithic units. Within the white community, for example, many of Namibia's German-speakers, who constitute 25 per cent of the white population, have expressed their dissatisfaction with being treated like "second-class citizens."³

¹New York Times, September 1, 1977. Legally the port and the surrounding 425 square miles are part of South Africa. The enclave was annexed by the British in 1787, handed over to the Cape Colony in 1884 and incorporated with South Africa after the Act of Union in 1910.

²See The Times (London), May 13, 1977.

³The Times (London), May 16, 1977.

The German community has never formed a cohesive political body in Namibia and its influence has been far more social and cultural. Consequently, many German-speakers perceive that they now have little input into determining the future of their country.

Of greater importance are the differences within Namibia's black population. Chief Clemens Kapuuo of the Hereros, for example, has criticized SWAPO -- supported primarily by northern Namibia's Ovambos -- as a communist (or Marxist) organization and an agent for Ovambo hegemony within an independent Namibia.¹ Kapuuo has been portrayed by some as a potential President of Namibia and he obviously finds SWAPO a major political rival.²

Despite SWAPO's designation by the UN as the sole representative of the Namibian people, Kapuuo's remarks reflect the fact that the extent of SWAPO's popular support can be questioned. It should be noted that the Ovambo and the Herero, the primary supporters of SWAPO's rival SWANU (Southwest Africa National Union), are traditional enemies that have, since April 1974, fought each other occasionally along the Angolan-Namibian frontier.³

¹Elizabeth S. Landis, "Namibia: Impending Independence," in South Africa in Crisis, p. 193.

²"Namibia: A Western Demarche," p. 51. Kapuuo himself, however, represents only one faction vying for leadership of the Hereros.

³Ebinger, "The Angolan Civil War," p. 684.

Divisions within SWAPO itself could seriously impact on Namibia's political evolution as well. Differences have existed between the party hierarchy and the young recruits, as well as between rival pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese factions.¹ Disagreements between the external wing under Sam Nujoma and SWAPO's active forces led by Andreas Shipanga have also been manifest. The implications of these rifts lie in the potential instability they portend once Namibia becomes independent, even if SWAPO was involved in the government.

SWAPO is a key to Namibia's future. Several SWAPO officials have rejected the latest plan offered by Prime Minister Vorster for an administrator-general to oversee developments in the country during its elections and transition to independence. While this rejection cannot be considered SWAPO's final position, its failure to participate in the subsequent elections would have serious implications, not the least of which is the military challenge it could mount against any new government.

SWAPO's status in an independent Namibia will also affect that country's relations with its neighbors. The politics of SWAPO's external relations are extremely complicated, related to ethnic, ideological, geographical and internal

¹Ibid., p. 694.

political factors.¹ Suffice to say that while continued support of SWAPO from Angola is likely as long as the Neto regime remains in power, the situation could change drastically if UNITA successfully challenges Angola's MPLA leadership in the southern third of the country (see below, pp.81-3).

It has been reported that UNITA and MPLA-SWAPO forces have clashed in southern Angola on numerous occasions. Needless to say, if SWAPO assumes a pre-eminent leadership position in an independent Namibia, the logistic support that UNITA has received from Namibia while South Africa has administered the territory would be discontinued, thereby creating serious obstacles for UNITA in southern Angola.

2. Black nationalist conflicts

Within the time frame of this study, the potential conflicts with important repercussions for the evolution of southern Africa, and consequently for U.S. interests in the South Atlantic, extend well beyond those related to continued white rule. Of particular importance are those conflicts related to the struggle for power within a specific country between rival black nationalist groupings. In almost every independent black country in southern Africa there are challenges to the regime, and a potential coup d'etat or the

¹Ibid., pp. 694-695.

resort to arms by those discontented elements is a constant worry to existing governments. In those that remain under white rule, traditional animosities among rival liberation organizations exist. These differences are related to ethnic and ideological factors, personalities, regional politics and superpower competition.

a. Angola

The present regime in Angola faces serious challenges from a number of quarters. In the north, remnants of the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA), have mounted a serious effort to bring Angola's important coffee crop under its control. In Cabinda, Angola's oil-rich northern enclave, the Front for the Liberation of Cabina (FLEC) claims that it is ready to march on the capital city with an army of 12,000, although these claims are a matter for conjecture.¹

The most serious challenge to the Neto government, however, comes from the south and east, where Jonas Savimbi's UNITA forces have been successfully sabotaging the Benguela Railroad, communications and other facilities. Since the beginning of 1977 UNITA has also launched a series of attacks on MPLA positions along Angola's border with Namibia and has claimed the capture of a number of frontier towns including Caounda, Cuangar and

¹Godwin Matatu, "The Fight Continues," Africa, No. 71, (July 1977), p. 16.

Monte-Belo.¹ At an annual congress in March, the UNITA leadership also abandoned its previous policy of trying to force President Neto to concede a government of national unity, and instead announced its intention of establishing a separate state in the southern half of Angola running from Novo Redondo on the coast to Texeria de Sousa in the east.²

The splits within the nationalist movement in Angola reflect the ethnic variety in the country. The MPLA leadership is largely of mixed race. UNITA draws its major support from the Ovimbundu living in the south. (As previously mentioned, however, the degree of success UNITA ultimately enjoys is not unrelated to developments in both Namibia and Rhodesia). The FNLA shares an ethnic identity with elements outside Angola's borders as it draws its support largely from the Bakongo that spill over into Zaire and the Congo. One could speculate that this ethnic division will make it extremely difficult for any single element to maintain control of the entire country.

If either UNITA or the FNLA, or their combination, successfully challenged the Neto regime, major changes would occur in Angola with profound repercussions for all of southern Africa. Both are committed to the removal of both Soviet and

¹Africa Confidential, Volume 18, Number 7, August 19, 1977.

²Ibid.

Cuban influence from Angola. In terms of their domestic ideology, UNITA and the FNLA shy away from the Marxism of the MPLA and emphasize a more pan-African orientation.

b. Zambia

Although there is no military challenge to the Kaunda regime at present, shortages and inflation have engendered a climate of discontent in Zambia that has proven ideal for the resurgence of tribal and ideological divisions that had long remained dormant. Kaunda is now facing a number of rebellious elements -- both within his own party and outside -- who are seeking to change the government's economic and social policy, if not the government itself. For example, the so-called "114 Group" -- members of Kaunda's United National Independence Party (UNIP) who were recently expelled -- argues that the UNIP commitment to socialism and the policies that result are unnecessarily restrictive.¹

More immediately troublesome is the "Mushala Gang" operating out of northwest Zambia. Adamson Mushala is a Lunda tribesman with a personal grievance against Kaunda, and his forces often attack Zambian villages and then retreat into Zaire's Shaba province. Although Lusaka deplores Rhodesia's "hot pursuit" raids into neighboring countries, Zambian forces

¹To the Point International, June 27, 1977, p. 29.

in pursuit of Mushala have been known to penetrate the Zairois frontier, thus enhancing the chance of a clash with Mobutu's troops.

Although there are no real prospects for the ouster of President Kaunda at the present time, in the longer term they could be enhanced. If war erupted again in Angola it could cause severe damage to the Zambian economy, thereby exacerbating the serious economic problems now facing the country. As the situation in Rhodesia develops, a white regime might find it necessary to move against Zambia to limit its support of Rhodesian nationalists. Continuing problems in Zaire could have military and economic repercussions across the border, all of which could further stimulate domestic discontent in Zambia and provide the opening needed by Kaunda's opposition to take action.

The Kaunda regime is one of the more moderate governments in southern Africa and has always been willing to work with the United States and other Western countries. One could not be certain that a regime with a similar orientation would replace Kaunda.

c. Rhodesia

A negotiated settlement in Rhodesia has been complicated immensely by the rivalries between the black nationalists contending for leadership of the country once it achieved independence. Those leaders that are most important are:

- 1) Joshua Nkomo, President of ZAPU
- 2) Robert Mugabe, President of ZANU
- 3) Bishop Abel Muzorewa, President of Rhodesia's
United African National Council (UANC)
- 4) Ndabaningi Sithole, founding President of ZANU, who
left (or was expelled from) the organization in
1976, and who now heads the ANC-Sithole.

Nkomo and Mugabe, allied for the moment in the Patriotic Front, have been recognized by the front-line states¹ as the sole representative of the Rhodesian nationalists. Together, they control the guerrilla forces. Mugabe's status in ZANU is particularly important, since he has had the best relations with the field commanders of ZANU, who lead the largest and most efficient guerrilla force. There are indications, however, that Mugabe's credibility is increasingly being questioned within ZANU. According to reports, Rex Nhonga and Josiah Tongagara, ZANU's powerful military strategists, have told Mugabe that the organization must become more effective in prosecuting its armed struggle.² ZANU's recent central committee reorganization -- emphasizing the organization's military dimension - is seen as an attempt to revive the nationalists' guerrilla efforts.³

¹The five so-called front-line states are Angola, Zambia, Mozambique, Botswana and Tanzania.

²The Daily Telegraph (London), August 16, 1977.

³Ibid.

With Mugabe's position in ZANU unclear, Joshua Nkomo has emerged with a stronger position in the guerrilla movement and reportedly is exploiting Mugabe's weakness by making greater demands for ZAPU. Moreover, Nkomo has concentrated in recent months on building his ZAPU forces in Zambia to provide a counterweight to the ZANU guerrillas.

ZAPU and ZANU have been traditional rivals since the latter organization splintered from ZAPU in 1963.¹ Their present alliance, therefore, must be considered tactical and remains tenuous. There is some speculation that once Nkomo feels his forces in Zambia are sufficiently developed, he will break his ZANU link. If these two groups were recognized as the elements from which a black Zimbabwe government would be constituted, a situation like that in Angola could develop, with a civil war erupting between these rival guerrilla forces.

While Nkomo and Mugabe maintain the closest ties with the guerrillas, the extent of their general popular support is questionable. Bishop Muzorewa has demonstrated his wide popularity, deriving largely from his image as a symbol of national unity that emerged after the ANC mobilized black

¹This split subsequently assumed a Sino-Soviet dimension that still exists. The Soviet Union has been a long-time backer of ZAPU and Nkomo. ZANU, on the other hand, has a substantial pro-Chinese faction although it too is receiving hardware and training from Moscow.

opposition to the unsuccessful Smith-Home proposals in 1971. If one were to speculate about the results of a general election in Rhodesia, it is likely that the Bishop would win. Such a prospect must be unsettling to Nkomo and Mugabe. It is questionable, therefore, whether they would ever agree to a settlement, at least in the near future, that included provisions for such an election.

Bishop Muzorewa himself is not unchallenged within Rhodesia. In the summer of 1977 seven executive members of his UANC resigned and joined Rev. Sithole, who claims that at the grass roots level there have been "many more" defections from Bishop Muzorewa.¹ The Bishop's loss of support appears to be partly related to the fact he has spent so much time outside Rhodesia and partly to his refusal to implement a UANC executive resolution calling for discussion aimed at uniting the UANC with Rev. Sithole's organization.²

Once regarded by white Rhodesians as the most extreme and unacceptable of the nationalist leaders, Mr. Sithole is now seen increasingly as the man who could enter into negotiations with Prime Minister Smith aimed at securing an internal settlement. Apparently he is trying to mobilize black

¹The Times (London), August 23, 1977.

²Christian Science Monitor, August 24, 1977.

politicians, business and professional men to negotiate with the present government regarding a universal franchise constitution.

d. South Africa

In South Africa, the most serious division among black nationalists exists between the ANC and the PAC. Although their formal split occurred in 1959, a divergence had existed for several years prior to that time. The ANC -- which dates back to 1912 -- since its inception has been committed to a multi-racial society and has, at times, enjoyed close relations with the South African Communist Party (SACP), which is faithfully pro-Soviet. A number of elements in the ANC, however, feared Communist domination of the organization. Moreover, there were those who identified more with the Pan-African movement sweeping the continent in the late 1950s, as one black country after another moved toward independence.

The Sino-Soviet split permeates the ANC-PAC rivalry. The Soviet Union has frequently used the SACP as its mouth-piece for commenting on South African politics, and the SACP-ANC link has demonstrated Soviet preference for the older organization. This is not to say that the members of the ANC are merely Soviet agents; it does suggest that if violence by black nationalists intensifies, the ANC will probably receive Soviet assistance. The PAC, on the other hand, has taken a

pro-Peking position since it split from the older group, and the Chinese have reciprocated.

In projecting potential black nationalist conflict in South Africa, it is not possible to define a simple struggle between the Soviet-backed ANC and the Chinese-supported PAC. The politics within each group, the linkage of the groups to what are, or were, other liberation organizations, and the vagaries of regional politics are too complex to enable that kind of prediction. The advent of new organizations like the Soweto Student Representative Council, which has growing links with both organizations yet which is emerging as a major nationalist group in its own right, further complicates any predictions and reflects the generation factor in many of the significant rivalries in South Africa. Moreover, the ethnic factor asserts itself as strongly in South Africa as in its black-ruled neighbors. Many of the homeland's leaders are strongly nationalistic, e.g. Zulu Chief Gatsha Buthelezi, and could become the generators of additional rivalries in the black political milieu of South Africa.

3. Potential state-to-state conflict

With the exception of the volatile question of power in the white-ruled states, there are few issues in the South Atlantic's African littoral that are likely to generate interstate conflict -- at least in the immediate time frame. Most states in

the region are still too preoccupied with their own internal political and economic problems of nation-building to become deeply involved in disputes with their neighbors. Most of these states have not yet reached a level of economic and political development that would stimulate them to cast their ambitions beyond their own borders. The limited incursion of Kantangan irregulars into Zaire in 1977 probably suggests the kind as well as the scope of conflict across national borders in the near term.

This might not be the case in the longer run, however, as black nations progress beyond their immediate economic and political problems -- and especially if some resolution of the racial issue in southern Africa removes one of the major unifying bonds among diverse regimes. It would be futile to project all of the various scenarios for such state-to-state conflict. There are some issues, however, that loom as potential conflict generators.

a. Ethnic spillovers

Since present boundaries of African states reflect the administrative divisions of the colonial period, many ethnic groups find themselves split by international borders and under different political authorities. This ethnic spillover has particular ramifications for potential conflict between two states in Africa if in one state the ethnic group is an element of the political opposition while other members of that group

living in a neighboring state are part of the political establishment of that state.

There have been a number of times in the past where this circumstance has exacerbated tension between two states. The presence of the Bakongo people in southeastern Zaire and northern Angola, for example, was one reason for Zairois support of the largely Bakongo FNLA. Obviously this support helped to strain relations between President Mobutu and Angola's MPLA leadership. To be sure, President Mobutu had other motivations for supporting the FNLA (e.g., designs on Cabinda and the incompatibility of the MPLA's ideology with his own), but the ethnic factor in his policies cannot be underestimated.

Ethnic fragmentation is widespread throughout southern Africa and it could become a source of friction between almost any two neighboring states. In most cases, such conflict would be limited and the repercussions would not be far-reaching. Yet, in some instances -- for example, a possible conflict between Angola and Namibia stemming from the activities of the Ovambo that straddle their borders -- the resultant destabilization could reach regional dimensions.

b. The resource question

Unlike Latin America, few conflicts in the South Atlantic's African littoral will stem directly from competition for access to resources. As in the Latin American case, however, resource

questions will exacerbate tensions related to other sources, complicate the resolution of disputes, and influence the behavior of states in a possible confrontation.

The question of who will control Namibia's uranium is a good example of the problems that resource questions might generate in an African context. The estimated uranium reserves in Namibia are so substantial that the party controlling them will enjoy substantial economic and political leverage, particularly in light of the projected rise in nuclear energy on a global scale, not to speak of the possible proliferation of military nuclear power. Given South Africa's dwindling uranium reserves, Pretoria must certainly be reluctant to lose its sovereignty over this valuable asset. Consequently, the issue could very well complicate the negotiations underway for the transition of power. The resources are not themselves the focus of the dispute but they have become inextricably bound up in its resolution.

Resource-related problems will impact on potential conflicts in southern Africa in another way as well. Many southern African states are obviously dependent on the export of their resources for financing development. At the same time, given the high degree of interdependence in southern Africa's transportation infrastructure, those states, like Zambia, must rely on neighbors to assist in moving those goods to market.

Others, like Angola and Mozambique, benefit substantially from the foreign exchange derived from the use of their railroads and ports. The closure of the Benguela Railroad during and after the Angolan civil war, for example, constitutes a serious problem for Zambia, Zaire and Angola. Its continued closure to Zaire as a consequence of its feud with Angola exemplifies how resource questions and conflict in the region are inter-related. Each state must include as an input into its major policy decisions the cost and benefits of alternative policies in terms of resources and the transportation of resources. Resources are not necessarily, then, prominent causes for potential conflict in the area, but they will influence the patterns of relations in the region. Moreover, resources are a factor that could stimulate external involvement in ongoing hostilities or exacerbate latent tensions.

III. The Role of Naval Forces in the South Atlantic

In comparison with the North Atlantic or the Eastern Mediterranean, there is a relatively low level of naval deployment in the South Atlantic. The superpowers maintain only an irregular presence, and the naval forces of the South Atlantic states are generally small and primarily configured for coastal defense. Moreover, with few exceptions, present sources of conflict in the South Atlantic have little to do with maritime affairs per se; consequently, land and air forces remain far more important than naval forces.

However, there are now several political, economic and military trends at work which, in the near-term future, could alter this description of the South Atlantic. These trends include the gradual emergence of a new, more clearly defined maritime regime, the steady growth of commercial traffic within and through the South Atlantic, the rise of regional powers with broad maritime ambitions (such as Brazil), the increasing dissemination of new naval technologies to South Atlantic littoral states and the prospect that U.S.-Soviet naval competition (perhaps spurred by conflict in southern Africa) soon may spread to the South Atlantic seas. Together, these trends could enhance considerably both the use and utility of naval force. In anticipation of such

developments, it makes sense to gain a clearer picture of the actual and potential functions of naval force in the South Atlantic, the present and projected naval balance in the region, and the probable impact of new naval technologies on the use of naval force in general.

A. The Function of Naval Force in the South Atlantic

The basic function of naval force, in oceanic as well as in coastal waters, is to secure or prevent the use of the sea. Therefore, in assessing the role of naval forces in the South Atlantic, one must first examine the principal uses of the South Atlantic seas, and the relative interests of key regional and extra-regional powers in securing and/or preventing such use. The naval balance in the South Atlantic, and the potential effect of technological developments upon that balance, then can be gauged more accurately.

According to Professor Michael McGwire, the sea as a whole has importance in two ways: (1) "as a means of access to non-adjacent areas; and (2) as a source of natural resources."¹ He labels these two kinds of use as "navigation" and "exploitation," and suggests that it is the former which invests the sea with "strategic quality." While the exploitation of marine

¹See Michael McGwire, "Soviet Interests and Capabilities in the South Atlantic Region: 1977-1990," Appendix I, p. I-D-2.

resources occasionally may involve the threat or use of naval force, it is not in and of itself a strategic activity. Moreover, this particular use of the sea is best considered as a seaward extension of domestic commercial activities carried on ashore. Naval strategy, then, is concerned primarily with securing the navigational use of the sea for one's own purposes and preventing such use to one's disadvantage, both in peacetime and wartime.

Navigational use can be broken down further into sub-categories which bring the role of naval forces into sharper focus. First, there is the conveyance of goods and people, including seaborne trade and the movement of military cargoes in merchant ships -- in strategic terms, maritime communications. Second, there is the projection of military force against targets ashore. Today, this sub-category of navigational use has two variants: "the traditional one of bringing force (actual or latent) to bear on coastal states; and the deterrent form of targetting distant land areas with nuclear weapons."¹ Needless to say, whatever the variant, the ease with which navigational use can be secured (or prevented) depends upon maritime geography (narrow waters, open seas) and the type of naval forces involved (submarines, carriers).

¹MccGwire, "Soviet Interests and Capabilities . . .," Appendix I, p. I-D-3.

If this conceptual framework is applied to the South Atlantic, one point stands out above all others: given its expanse, configuration and location, the South Atlantic invites heavy navigational use, particularly for the purpose of seaborne trade. Stretching from the equator to the Antarctic Sea, it encompasses some 14 million square miles of ocean; and, as there are no major offshore archipelagic formations or physical choke-points, maritime passage may proceed with relative ease.¹ Together these factors serve to enhance the South Atlantic's natural position as a waterway link between the industrial regions of North America and Europe and key resource regions in the Near and Far East. Indeed, the most important and frequented route, which runs between the Indian Ocean and the North Atlantic, is wholly oceanic and currently serves as the principal oil sea line of communication between the Persian Gulf and the West.

Aside from their commercial utility, the South Atlantic sea lanes also could prove valuable to the global logistics and strategic mobility of major power -- particularly superpower -- naval forces, providing open (if somewhat indirect) pathways for

¹It should be noted, nevertheless, that turbulent waters and poor weather conditions often force maritime traffic around the Cape of Good Hope to pass relatively close to the coast. Moreover, in streaming to or from the South Atlantic along south-east Africa, ships usually pass through the Mozambique Channel.

the movement of cargo and combat ships between non-adjacent fleet areas (e.g., the North Atlantic and the Indian Ocean). Moreover, in the event of a major politico-military crisis (affecting U.S.-Soviet interests) along the Latin American or African littoral, the South Atlantic itself might assume more direct importance as a local theater for the projection of superpower naval force. Finally, it at least should be noted that, as the range and accuracy of advanced seaborne and submarine-launched missiles steadily increase, the South Atlantic seas conceivably could offer alternative deployment zones for strategic delivery systems generally confined to the northern seas.

This is not to suggest that the exploitation of marine resources in the South Atlantic is, or will be, of little consequence. In the recent past, the presence of European fishing fleets in the shrimp and lobster grounds off the Argentine and Brazilian coasts has led to several naval incidents, contributing (particularly in the case of Brazil) to local naval build-ups. Fishing fleets from afar (including those of the Soviet Union and Cuba) also are active off the southwest African coast; and, as the African states (including South Africa) move to press their claims of resource sovereignty, the prospects for conflict over offshore resources (and the local requirement for enhanced naval capabilities) well may

increase. While deep-sea deposits of manganese nodules and off-shore reserves of oil and gas are more limited and less commercially useful in the South Atlantic than elsewhere, these resources may prove increasingly valuable (and their ownership more controversial) by the 1990s. However, for the timeframe of this study, the navigational use of the South Atlantic, rather than its resource potential, will draw the most attention.

From this overview of the actual and potential uses of the South Atlantic, the function of naval force throughout the area becomes more apparent. As implied earlier, with respect to Soviet-American naval interests the projection of military force in its deterrent form -- that is, the targeting of distant lands with nuclear weapons -- may become more prominent in the South Atlantic. With the full-scale deployment the Soviet SS-N-8 and the American Trident I long-range systems, U.S. and Soviet ballistic missile submarine patrols theoretically could be expanded to include portions of the South Atlantic. In their wake, anti-submarine warfare activities would increase concurrently. There are, of course, less distant waters, such as the North and Eastern Atlantic, which would be far more suitable to the cost-effective operation of advanced ballistic missile submarines, particularly in terms of "time on station" advantages and overall target coverage.

Therefore, the deployment of such weapon systems in the South Atlantic at best will remain a low probability.

In contrast, the projection of conventional super-power force against coastal states within the South Atlantic region carries a much higher probability. For example, should armed conflict break out within or among littoral states considered central to the politico-economic interests of one or both superpowers, U.S. and Soviet naval units could become involved in a range of local military operations.¹ Aside from combat action against coastal navies and the bombardment of land targets, these operations might include the evacuation of civilian and military personnel stationed ashore, the protection of real property and other material assets located within coastal waters as well as on the mainland, and the resupply by sea of allied or friendly governments. Moreover, in crisis situations, the use of naval force as a political, rather than strictly military, instrument should not be overlooked. In this regard, the superpowers may wish to conduct naval presence operations in order to signal approval (or disapproval) of a particular state or sub-state actor, to intimidate hostile parties,

¹Indeed, under the terms of the Rio Defense Treaty of 1947 the United States well-might be called upon to deploy naval forces to the South Atlantic in the event of an armed attack upon a Latin American ally. The treaty obligates each signatory to assist in meeting an attack on any other, although no state can be required to use armed force without its consent.

to pre-empt provocative actions by local combattants, and to influence political trends in general.

Nevertheless, Soviet and American interests in the South Atlantic still are focussed primarily upon its utility as a year-round strategic waterway linking the North Atlantic basin with the Indian Ocean and the principal sea lines of communication to the Far East. Therefore, notwithstanding potential missions against coastal states, U.S. and Soviet naval forces will continue to concentrate on missions aimed at monitoring and, if need be, controlling interoceanic navigation through the South Atlantic. While neither the Soviet Union nor the United States now have a permanently deployed naval contingent in the South Atlantic, both superpowers wish to secure use of the North Atlantic-Indian Ocean route (preventing its use to their disadvantage) and well may consider increasing their naval deployment in the South Atlantic in support of this mission. Indeed, in recent years, Soviet naval units (primarily submarines) operating in the latitude band 10°N-20°N on the South Atlantic's northern edge, as well as Soviet maritime reconnaissance aircraft flying out of Conakry (part of the "Guinea patrol"), have increased their surveillance over sea-borne traffic moving both east-west and north-south, thereby reinforcing Soviet sea-denial capabilities. Moreover, the location of these activities along NATO's southern flank suggests

that in wartime the Soviet South Atlantic forces may assume a North Atlantic role, interrupting maritime supply lines between the United States and Western Europe, as well as the Indian Ocean-South Atlantic oil SLOCs.¹ (It should be understood that, as the force required to contain such operations may be significantly larger than that required for their initiation, interdiction of Western supply routes by Soviet naval units could have the additional effect of diverting, at least temporarily, a sizeable portion of NATO units from their primary North Atlantic role).

In contrast to superpower forces, the naval units of Latin American and African coastal states have played, and will continue to play, a far more limited role in securing and/or preventing maritime communications in the South Atlantic. For the most part, Latin American and African navies have focussed on coastal defense, aimed at protecting offshore resources from undue foreign exploitation and inhibiting the projection of force ashore. Needless to say, the importance of both missions has been enhanced with the extension of territorial seas and the declaration of exclusive economic zones; and, in recent years, the larger states (Venezuela, Brazil, Argentina, Nigeria, South Africa) have been upgrading their coastal patrol

¹See McGwire, "Soviet Interests and Capabilities...", Appendix I, p. I-D-46.

and sea denial capabilities (i.e., torpedo-firing submarines, fast patrol boats with anti-ship missiles). The older Brazilian and Argentinian navies (with one carrier apiece) also have a somewhat "longer reach" than the younger South Atlantic navies; and, in defending their coastlines, both Argentina and South Africa could play a supportive role in insuring maritime passage around their respective cape routes. However, at present, it is not possible for any state along the South Atlantic littorals to secure (or obstruct) independently oceanic routes by force.

This is not to suggest that emergent regional powers, such as Brazil, Nigeria and South Africa, do not aspire to a larger sea control mission. As the easternmost state in Latin America, Brazil has a special concern for the "Atlantic Corridor" (some 1600 nautical miles wide) between Brazil and West Africa; and, within Brazilian defense circles, there has been some suggestion that Brazil should fill the "strategic vacuum" in the corridor created by the absence of U.S. naval forces.¹ So too, following the termination of the Simonstown

¹Both Brazil and Nigeria have a common interest in securing the oil route which runs between them. For more detailed analysis, on the geo-strategic perspectives of Brazil, see Ronald Schneider, "Geostrategic Perspectives and Capabilities of Brazil and Argentina . . .," Appendix I, pp. I-B-2-5.

Agreement in 1975,¹ Pretoria has advocated the idea of a broader role for the South African navy (in association with U.S.-West European forces) in protecting both the eastern and western flanks of the Cape of Good Hope.² Whether or not these states can acquire adequate forces to perform such missions even in the face of Soviet opposition remains to be seen.

The principal functions of naval force in the South Atlantic, then, are sea control (primarily the province of the superpowers) and coastal defense (essentially the concern of the littoral states). Still, the extent to which these functions can be executed successfully will depend, of course, upon the actual naval balance; and, it is with respect to this factor that current constraints on the regional and extra-regional employment of naval force are most evident.

¹The Simonstown Agreement grew out of a 1955 exchange of letters between London and Pretoria which called for the British Government to relinquish control of the Simonstown naval base and dockyards to the then Union of South Africa. In return, the Union promised to allow the naval forces of Britain and her allies continued access to the Simonstown base and other facilities, even during a war in which South African forces would not participate. The Royal Navy, also, was allowed to maintain a naval headquarters and communications center in Simonstown, and to store pre-positioned ammunition and spare parts in shore facilities on the South African mainland.

²In this regard, it should be noted that long-range maritime patrol to assure the security of the sea lanes remains more a Western, than South African interest, and that the South African navy (SAN) will assume such duties only to the extent that Western assistance -- particularly in terms of equipment -- is forthcoming. Otherwise, the SAN will continue to focus on coastal defense and mine warfare duties, aimed at setting up a shield against hostile landings, infiltration and the like.

B. The Naval Balance in the South Atlantic: Available Forces and Current Capabilities

At present, there is a relatively low level of naval force in the South Atlantic region, both in terms of quantity and quality. Moreover, what force there is remains unevenly distributed, concentrated primarily in the naval inventories of South Africa, Argentina, Brazil and Venezuela.

The reasons for such limited naval development are not difficult to discern. Most South Atlantic coastal states (especially along the African littoral) are extremely poor, incapable of sustaining heavy military expenditures. Navies, on the other hand, are capital-intensive forces, requiring a rather large initial investment; and over their life-time combat ships of any description are expensive to maintain in good operating order. As manpower is generally cheap and plentiful in the Third World, most developing states will opt for building up adequate land forces, which are in any case more suitable to the types of combat -- guerrilla war and frontier disputes -- most common in Third World environments. Last, but not least, up to this point there has been relatively little superpower competition in the South Atlantic: consequently, the volume and variety of arms available to Soviet-American clients in such areas as the Middle East and the Persian Gulf have remained beyond the grasp of South Atlantic states.

The constraints on local naval development have been most acute among the African coastal states, where the typical navy presently consists of a handful of coastal patrol boats and small landing craft oriented entirely towards simple defensive tasks (coastal defense, shore surveillance, coast guard duties). Three states alone -- Ghana, Nigeria and South Africa -- maintain over two-thirds of the total naval manpower, as well as the only major surface ships. Of the black African states, Nigeria has the single ocean-going warship -- an ASW/AAW frigate built in the mid-1960s.¹

Unquestionably, the one regional naval power on the African flank of the South Atlantic is South Africa. As South Africa sits at the southern tip of the continent, drawing together some 2000 miles of coastline and abutting the strategic Cape Route, the South African Navy (SAN) has concentrated on a maritime patrol (counter-embargo) mission, as well as in-shore surveillance duties. In support of this mission, the SAN currently is seeking to augment both its underwater and surface ship inventories, placing an order for two "Agosta"-class attack submarines, two Type-A69 frigates

¹According to recent press releases, Nigeria may have commissioned two more warships in May 1977. FBIS Daily Report, Nigeria to Commission Warships, "Sub-Saharan Africa (Lagos International News Service in English, 26 April 1977), May 3, 1977, p. D2.

and six "Reshef"-class corvettes, plus several fast patrol boats, armed with Israel's "Gabriel II" SSM.¹ Together with the SAN's present inventory (three "Daphne"-class diesel submarines, seven ASW frigates and destroyers, eleven mine-sweepers and a score of older patrol craft), these new additions should upgrade substantially South Africa's sea-denial capabilities (even against extra-regional powers), and should more than counter-balance any foreseeable naval threat from potential local adversaries. Note also must be made of South Africa's maritime air capabilities, including the fourteen "Buccaneer" Mk 50s (assigned to the South African air force) used in a maritime strike role, as well as the "Piaggio" P-166s and aging "Shackletons" (both assigned to the SAN) which perform maritime reconnaissance duties. For the time being, however, South Africa's naval forces remain too small to provide much protection against an interruption of commercial traffic along the Cape Route. This particular mission still would require supportive assistance from external powers.²

¹South Africa also would like to enhance her maritime reconnaissance capabilities with new, longer-range shore-based aircraft, but has not yet found a supplier. As stated earlier, the SAN will be reluctant to assume broader reconnaissance duties without military assistance from the West. See Col. Norman L. Dodd, "The South African Navy: Guardian of the Ocean Crossroads," USNI Proceedings, Vol. 102, No. 9 (September 1976), pp. 94-97.

²Toward that eventuality, South Africa has gone to considerable effort to enlarge the Simonstown port facilities to handle larger numbers of ships, including the more advanced vessels now in Western navies. The Joint Maritime Communications Centre at Silvermine also has been enlarged so as to accomodate representatives of friendly navies and air forces. See Dodd, "The South African Navy," p. 97.

On the other side of the South Atlantic, the naval forces of the major Latin American states are considerably larger and more sophisticated, if somewhat older. Indeed, the navies of Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay and Venezuela hold over 90 per cent of the total naval manpower, most of the major surface ships and (except for South Africa) the only submarines in the South Atlantic region. There are basically two major regional naval powers -- Argentina and Brazil -- but if she can substantially improve both her force planning and personnel training standards, Venezuela may provide some competition in the north-west quadrant of the South Atlantic within ten to fifteen years.

While Brazil holds a quantitative edge in overall manpower and ships, and Argentina a qualitative edge in modern surface vessels and naval air, the Argentine and Brazilian navies share common characteristics in terms of capabilities and missions. Both now operate 30-year-old, 20,000-ton aircraft carriers, configured mainly for an ASW (anti-submarine) role.¹ In addition, each maintains just over a dozen cruiser or destroyer warships, about seventeen oceangoing patrol craft, and six coastal minesweepers, though Argentina's two new Type-42 destroyers (armed with "Sea Dart" SAM and one "Lynx" helicopter) and two fast patrol boats (armed with Israeli

¹While the Brazilian carrier carries almost solely helicopters, the Argentine carrier has a contingent of A-4Q fighter-bombers, giving it more offensive power. There are some suggestions that Brazil looks forward to the acquisition of a new helicopter carrier to provide greater surveillance over Brazilian oil import routes, especially between Brazil and Nigeria.

"Gabriel" SSMS) are more advanced and versatile than any in the Brazilian inventory. With respect to submarines, Brazil most probably holds the overall advantage with eight operating subs (one "Oberon" - and seven "Guppy"-class) versus four (two Type-209 and two "Guppy"-class) for Argentina. Finally, both states have placed orders for two more submarines ("Oberon"-class for Brazil, Type-209 for Argentina) and six modern ASW frigates ("Niteroi"-class for Brazil with one "Lynx" helicopter, "Ikara" ASW and "Sea Cat" SAM; Type-21 for Argentina with "Exocet" SSM and "Sea Wolf" SAM). Together with a variety of smaller support ships, these forces should give Argentina and Brazil the strongest regional coastal defense and anti-submarine warfare fleets in the South Atlantic.

Whether or not, given their similarities, the Argentine and Brazilian fleets will become involved in direct naval competition (perhaps conflict) remains an open question, although, judging from past experience, such competition is not unlikely. Both claim large responsibilities for the defense of the Latin American South Atlantic coast, and just where responsibilities may overlap still is undetermined. Traditionally, Argentina has been more sea-oriented, but Brazil's growing concern for the security of the sea lanes running through and across the "Brazil-West Africa corridor" (and recent suggestions that Brazil sees a role for her navy in the defense of Cape Horn)

raise Argentine fears that Brazil would like to make the South Atlantic a "Brazilian sea."¹ These fears are exacerbated by the fact that Brazil's economic growth in recent years, in contrast to Argentina's economic stagnation, well may give her the long-range defense potential to assume a naval posture far superior to Argentina's. For example, while both states are engaged in the licensed production of warships (Argentina with the Type-42 destroyers and Type-21 frigates, Brazil with the "Niteroi"-class frigates), Brazil has a substantial head-start in the area of indigenous design and production (including submarines and naval aircraft).

The only real potential third competitor in the region is Venezuela. Indeed, while still numerically inferior, the quality of Venezuela's naval force structure is steadily improving. At last count, Venezuela maintained three submarines (one "Balboa", two "Guppy"-class), five destroyers (one armed with "Sea Cat" SAM), six old destroyer escorts, almost thirty patrol craft (including a few modern fast patrol boats with anti-ship missiles), plus modest maritime surveillance and marine contingents. More important, Venezuela has on order

¹For more on this point, see Ronald M. Schneider, "Geo-strategic Perspectives and Capabilities of Brazil and Argentina . . .," Appendix I, pp. I-B-8-12. It should be noted, however, that the present leadership in Brazil, drawn primarily from the Brazilian army, may not be prepared to oversee a major expansion of the Brazilian navy.

two Type-209 submarines, six "Lupo"-class frigates (with "Albatros" SAM and one ASW helicopter) and some twenty-one fast-attack corvettes armed with "Otomat" SSM. Most of the missile-equipped corvettes will be produced under license, and, given both her growing economic strength and seaborne trade interests, Venezuela now is laying plans for a substantial ship-building industry. Admittedly, platform quality does not translate directly into operational quality; and, as previously stressed, both the management and training of Venezuelan naval units must be upgraded dramatically, if they are to prove competitive with Brazilian and Argentine naval units. However, given the naval potential outlined above, the Venezuelan navy could assume, in some 10 to 15 years, a broader role in patrolling the South Atlantic's northwestern flank, which may, in turn, conflict with Brazilian naval interests.

Of course, should the Beagle Channel dispute between Argentina and Chile finally be resolved in Santiago's favor, the Chilean navy well may assume an Atlantic, as well as Pacific, posture, thereby posing some additional challenge to Argentine and/or Brazilian naval predominance along the South Atlantic's southwestern flank. Though considerably smaller and less potent than its Argentine and Brazilian counterparts, Chile's navy (similar to Venezuela's) has undergone significant force struc-

ture improvement in recent years, acquiring a modern "Oberon" submarine (with one more on order), two advanced "Leander"-class frigates (armed with "Short Seacat" SAMs), and a number of sophisticated "Exocet" SSMs (mounted on "Almirante" destroyers, as well as the "Leanders"). Moreover, unlike Venezuela, Chile already enjoys a relatively strong naval air patrol capability (with twelve maritime reconnaissance aircraft), and maintains rather high naval planning and training standards. Thus, although Chile's main strategic problem at the present time is Peru, the prospect cannot be dismissed of a Chilean naval presence in the South Atlantic within the next decade, which well might compete and eventually conflict with Argentine and Brazilian interests.

On balance, then, in the next ten to fifteen years, South Africa, Argentina, Brazil, Venezuela and possibly Chile will field the only sizeable regional forces in the South Atlantic. If present political and economic trends remain stable, Nigeria also may join this group, albeit at a lower level of naval capability. The prospects for South Atlantic naval collaboration among these states are slim. Argentina apparently has floated the concept of an Argentine-Brazilian-South African security pact, aimed at providing some regional defense for the sea lanes. However, Brazil's dependence on Nigerian oil and general aversion to an explicit relationship with South Africa, as well as force

structure constraints shared by all, will make such a pact unlikely.¹ If any naval collaboration develops, it probably will remain at the bilateral level (i.e., Brazil-Nigeria, Argentina-South Africa). For the most part, South Atlantic regional navies will concentrate on the defense of coastal shipping and defense against the projection of force ashore, especially by extra-regional powers.

However, the probability of regional nations having to perform "sea-denial" missions against external powers in the immediate future is low, the only possible exception being in southern Africa.² In the first place, those European powers (essentially France and Great Britain) who once patrolled the waters along the western and southern coasts of Africa steadily have withdrawn their units. While France maintains defense collaboration agreements with several West African states, and Britain retains possession of some islands in the South Atlantic, neither power currently stations naval units in the area.³ In the second place, as there has been little

¹Of course, there are also considerable local inhibitions to increased Brazilian-Argentine naval collaboration. Outstanding disagreements over such issues as the Itaipu dam, the Rio Grande port, and river navigation work against a commonality of interests in the South Atlantic.

²For example, it is not inconceivable that South Africa soon might be confronted with the problem of breaking an embargo on trade with South African ports.

³France currently maintains agreements for defense and/or military cooperation with Gabon, Ivory Coast, Upper Volta, Senegal, Cameroon, Benin and Togo; however, the exact nature of these agreements (particularly with respect to potential operations by the French Navy) is unclear. See The Military Balance 1976-1977, p. 41.

to draw their interest until recently, neither superpower maintains sustained naval deployments in the South Atlantic. The U.S. South Atlantic Command (Comsolant) is basically a "shadow command" with no permanently attached naval forces: during joint U.S.-Latin American naval exercises (conducted annually for some nineteen years), combat ships from the Atlantic Fleet are temporarily assigned to Comsolant. At least at the present time, the few Soviet ships which frequent the coastal waters of Guinea and Angola, and occasionally patrol around the Cape Verde Islands (the Atlantic fleet's south-western flank), remain isolated from the four major Soviet fleets and play little or no role in large-scale Soviet naval exercises and demonstrations (such as "OKEAN-75"). Port visits by Soviet naval combattants have concentrated in westernmost Africa (Morocco, Senegal, Guinea and Sierra Leone), virtually ignoring Latin America; and, aside from the "Guinea Patrol" (generally composed of one landing ship), these port visits have no local military implications. Moreover, in the wake of the Portuguese withdrawal, the "Guinea Patrol" itself performs primarily a political, "flag-showing" function. In short, although Soviet and American naval units cruising through the South Atlantic manifest latent force and underscore respective superpower interests in the area, they perform no regular military function of any consequence.

Therefore, in order to achieve a significant naval presence within the South Atlantic, or along its shores, both the United States and the Soviet Union would have to rely on the rapid re-deployment of naval units from adjacent fleet areas, such as the North and Eastern Atlantic, the Caribbean and the Indian Ocean. It is in this context that Soviet shore facilities in Somalia in the northwest quadrant of the Indian Ocean, and future U.S. facilities on Diego Garcia, could assume strategic importance with respect to the South Atlantic region. Of course, in the event of a crisis along the Latin American littoral, or the northern and central portions of the African littoral, the Indian Ocean would remain an unlikely avenue of naval re-deployment. However, depending on the location and availability of forces elsewhere, it is not inconceivable that, in the event of a crisis in southern Africa, superpower units patrolling off Berbera or Diego Garcia could steam toward the Cape area more quickly than units from the Atlantic or Mediterranean fleets.

This is not to suggest that such an option now is, or soon will be, viable. For the time being, re-deployment toward southern Africa from the North and Eastern Atlantic, or even from the Mediterranean, retains a higher probability, especially for the United States. Those U.S. naval forces presently deployed in the Indian Ocean region are generally quite limited in quantity and quality, and usually are positioned well to the north along the Arabian Sea/Persian

Gulf axis, a considerable distance from the tip of Africa. Even the Soviet naval contingent in the Indian Ocean, which tends to be more substantial than its American counterpart, currently is focussed toward the north in mission orientation, and well may prove incapable (for reasons of size, composition, prior commitment, etc.) of contributing to a Soviet task force off southern Africa. However, the prospect that at least a few major U.S. surface ships eventually may be stationed at Diego Garcia, together with the likely expansion of Soviet naval activity emanating from Berbera (including patrols along the sea lanes south of Somalia), renders future deployment from the Indian Ocean to the South Atlantic more probable.

On the whole, comparing relative capabilities for military operations in the South Atlantic, the United States now appears to hold some striking advantages thanks largely to its attack carriers. First, given the comparative geographic proximity of the South Atlantic to U.S. home bases, coupled with the "surge capacity" of U.S. carrier task forces, the United States enjoys a superior quick reaction capability. Second, and related to the first point, the South Atlantic (with its relatively calm seas and wide expanses) provides a very good operating environment for aircraft carriers, which suggests that U.S. carrier-based aircraft might gain air superiority over the seas, thereby reinforcing U.S. staying power.

In contrast, so long as it lacks substantial shore-based air facilities, the Soviet Union would find it difficult to secure adequate air cover, and barring any revolution in Soviet VTOL aircraft, "Kiev"-type ships will not solve this problem. Third, given the current Soviet military shipbuilding rate, Moscow will be hard pressed in the near future to stretch an additional South Atlantic-oriented mission from the Soviet distant water surface force.¹ This is not to suggest that a small South Atlantic task force could not be formed, but rather that this task force inevitably would diminish the capability of an already established forward deployment commitment. Of course, the final outcome of any Soviet-American confrontation would depend upon the forces and weapon systems involved, and should a South Atlantic crisis quickly escalate, a major engagement, involving some of the most sophisticated non-nuclear technologies now available, could not be ruled out. Under these circumstances, the final outcome would be as difficult to predict as it is to gauge the present-day, world-wide Soviet-American naval balance.

Clearly, the Soviet acquisition of a forward operating base in the South Atlantic region would serve to relax some of the constraints, particularly the geographic one. If Soviet naval units enjoyed facilities in Guinea, Angola or even Mozambique similar to those in Somalia, their ability to bring

¹See MccGwire analysis, in "Soviet Interests and Capabilities," Appendix I, p. I-D-49.

force to bear quickly off the coasts of southern Africa, and to provide timely assistance (especially in the form of military supplies) to local allies could be enhanced considerably. This is true particularly when it is noted that, with access to only a few ports and airstrips along the African littoral (together with more extensive facilities in Cuba), the Soviet Union still was able to launch rather impressive "lift operations" during the Angolan civil war. With the benefit of additional coastal facilities in Angola and/or Mozambique (open to use on a more continuing basis), the Soviet Union would have little difficulty projecting military power into the South Atlantic (particularly along the African littoral) in an equally telling manner. Moreover, in addition to facilitating logistical support operations, the availability of friendly coasts would allow the Soviet Union to expand, in general, its naval role in the South Atlantic. For example, in crisis situations, Soviet units also could take up "blocking positions" and conduct "picket fence" operations in order to inhibit U.S. naval activity; in non-crisis situations, a Soviet regional naval presence could perform a range of peacetime functions, such as building Soviet influence, reassuring pro-Moscow political factions and helping to secure Soviet economic interests (e.g., fishing rights).¹

¹See Uri Ra'anan "The Soviet Union and the South Atlantic: Political and Economic Considerations," Appendix I-F, pp.

Unquestionably, the strategic prize in the South Atlantic region is South Africa. Should a radical black regime come to power in South Africa and give Soviet naval forces access to Simonstown (as well as the Silvermine maritime tracking facilities), or deny Simonstown and other facilities to the United States and its allies in crisis conditions, the Soviet Union could pose a major threat to Western shipping along the Cape sea lanes. Given the overall Soviet interest in maintaining open access to the sea, and in avoiding U.S.-Western interference with key Soviet shipping lanes, the circumstances under which such a threat would emerge appear to be extremely limited. However, the prospect of a sustained Soviet presence in Simonstown, in peacetime or in wartime, is one which the United States could not easily accept. At the very least, it would usher in an era of intense superpower competition in the South Atlantic, with the Soviets holding a geostrategic (and perhaps technological) edge.

Still, before carrying such scenarios too far, note must be made of the political, as well as economic, costs to the Soviet Union of securing distant overseas bases. As both superpowers have discovered in recent years, such facilities rarely can be considered permanent, depending as they often do on the maintenance of a friendly political climate within the host country. Recent suggestions that an attempted pro-

Moscow coup in Angola may lead to a deterioration in Soviet-Angolan relations underscore just how tenuous Moscow's political position in southern Africa may be, now and in the immediate future. Moreover, the skilled manpower/infrastructure base in most African countries (particularly in southern black African states) is extremely limited; consequently, the construction and maintenance of adequate naval facilities almost certainly would require a major Soviet financial and personnel investment. Presumably, given the access to the Indian Ocean provided by the Berbera facilities, these costs are acceptable to Moscow with respect to Somalia and the Horn of Africa. However, at the present time, there are few solid indications that the Soviet Union -- even if allowed to do so -- would be willing to risk similar large-scale investments in western or southern Africa.

In conclusion, while the growing concern in U.S.-Western defense circles over the security of the Cape route and the oil SLOCs is entirely reasonable, there is no immediate danger of a serious local or Soviet threat to the sea lanes. The naval force currently available to regional powers is oriented almost entirely towards coastal defense, and is concentrated in the naval inventories of African and Latin American states (South Africa, Argentina, Brazil, Venezuela) whose maritime interests in the South Atlantic are not dissimilar from those of the

LOCAL NAVAL BALANCE IN SOUTH ATLANTIC (1976-1977):
AFRICAN AND LATIN AMERICAN STATES

A. South Atlantic: African States (manpower)	Submarines	Major Surface Ships	Minesweepers.. Corvettes and Patrol Boats	Other Forces
Angola				c. 5 Landing craft
Cameroon (300)			1 SFCN P-48 type large patrol boat 3 Coastal patrol boat	5 Small landing craft
Congo (200)			14 Coastal patrol boat (2 "Shanghai"- class)	9 Riverboats
Ghana (1200)			2 Minesweepers (1 coastal, 1 in-shore) 2 ASW Corvettes 2 Fast Patrol boats 2 Patrol craft (ex UK Ford-class)	1 Training vessel
Guinea (350)			4 P-6 Motor Torpedo boats (MTB) 6 Motor gunboats, (MGB), 4 "Shanghai"-and 2 "Poluchat"-class	5 Small landing craft
Ivory Coast (200)			1 Coastal patrol boat (with SS-12 SSM) 1 80-ton patrol boat 4 Small patrol boat	2 Small landing craft
Liberia (200)			1 MGB 2 Patrol boats	

South Atlantic: African States (manpower)	Submarines	Major Surface Ships	Minesweepers, Corvettes and Patrol Boats	Other Forces
Sierra Leone			2 "Shanghai"-class MGB (1 P-48 type patrol boat with SS 12-SSM on order from France)	(1 "Francis Garnier"-type transport ship on order)
Nigeria (3500, plus 2000 reserves)		1 ASW/AA Frigate (2 new warships commissioned May '77; plans for more advanced ships, helicop- ters, and equipment announced)	2 Corvettes 8 Patrol craft (4 large, 4 ex-UK "Ford"-class) (1 "Brook-Marine" 33 type PB on order)	1 Landing craft
Senegal (240)			3 Patrol vessels 17 Small patrol vessels (1 SFCN P-48 type large patrol boat on order; 12 "Vosper Thornycroft" 45-ft. patrol boats under construction)	2 Landing craft
South Africa (5000, plus 10,500 reserves in Citizen Force with 1 Frigate and 7 Mineswee- pers)	3 "Daphne"-class (2 "Agosta"-class on order)	2 Destroyers (with 2 "Wasp" ASW heli) 5 ASW Frigates (3 with 1 "Wasp" heli.)	11 Minesweepers (1 escort, 10 coastal) 5 Patrol craft (ex-uk "Ford"-class) 3 FPBG and 6 corvettes with "Gabriel" II SSM on order; plan licensed production of "Ramta"-class (Is.) patrol boats with "Gabriel" SSM).	2 Maritime re- connaissance squadrons (7 "Shakleton", 20 Piaggio P16GS "Albatross") 1 Replenishment ship

South Atlantic: African States (manpower)	Submarines	Major Surface Ships	Minesweepers, Corvettes and Patrol Boats	Other Forces
Togo			4 Patrol boats 2 32-type coastal patrol boat	1 River gunboat
Zaire (400)			1 70-ton Coastal patrol boat 11 Patrol boats (6 ex-US "Stewart"- type)	
B. South Atlantic: Latin American States				
Argentina (32,300, incl. naval air and marines)	4 Subs (2 type- 209, 2 ex-US "Guppy"-class) (2 small subs under construc- tion in FRG)	1 A/C Carrier (with 21 S-2A, A-4Q, SH-3D heli.) 2 Cruisers (1 with "Seacat" SAM, 2 helicopters) 9 Destroyers (1 with "Sea Dart" SAM; 5 "Fletcher"- class, 3 ex-US) 2 Type-42 Destroyers (with "Sea Dart" SAM, 1 "Lynx" helicopter, and A/A guns; 1 licensed produced) (6 Type-21 Frigates with "Exocet" SSM and "Sea Wolf" SAM under construction; some to be licensed pro- duced)	6 Coastal Mine- sweepers 11 Patrol vessels (2 training, 1 coast guard) 5 Large patrol craft (3 in coast guard) 2 FPBG (with "Gab- riel" SSM; licensed product- ion completed or near completion) 2 FPB (with Bofors and Oto Melera guns)	5 Landing ships 20 Landing craft (1 LCT) <u>Naval Air:</u> 1 FB Sqn. A-4 Q (15) 1 FB Sqn. MB-326 GB (8) 1 MR Sqn--6S-2A, 6 P-2H, PBY-SA "Catalina" 1 SAR Sqn--3 HU- 16B "Albatross" Transport A/C, incl. C-45, 8 C-47 3 C-54, 3 "Electra", DC-4, 2 "Super King Air" 200, 1 "Guarani"-II, 1 HS- 125, 3 "Beaver", 1 DAC-6 Helicopters incl. 9 "Alouette" III, 4 "Sea King,"

South Atlantic: Latin American States	Submarines	Major Surface Ships	Other Forces
			5 S-55 & Bell 47G. 40 trainer A/C <u>Marines:</u> 5 Battalions, plus 1 field artil. bn. and 1 airdefense bn.
Brazil (45,800)	8 Subs (1 "Oberon"; 7 "Guppy" II/ III) (2 "Oberon" on order; in plan- ning stages for indigenous de- sign and produc- tion of subs)	1 A/C Carrier 1 Cruiser (with helicopters) 14 Destroyers (6 "Niteroi"-ASW frigates on order; carry 1 "Lynx" heli., "Ikara" ASM, "Sea- cat" SAM; 2 to be built in Brazil on lic. produc- tion)	2 LST, 35 small landing craft <u>Naval Air:</u> 1 ASW Sqn. with 6 SH-30 "Sea King" 1 Utility Sqn. with 3 Whirl- wind, 3 Wasp, & 8 ell 206B 1 Trng. Sqd., with 10 bell 206B (9 "Lynx", 30 "Gazelle" heli. on order; indi- genous production of EMB-111 mari- time surveillance (MR) A/C)
Guyana			3 "Vosper-Thornycroft" FPB's
Venezuela (8000, incl. 2500 marines)	3 subs (1 "Balboa" 2 "Guppy" II) (2 Type 209 subs on order)	5 Destroyers (1 with "Sea- cat" SAM) 6 Destroyer Escorts	2 LST, 4 medium landing ships <u>Naval Air:</u> 3 S-2E "Tracker"

South Atlantic: Latin American States	Submarines	Major Surface Ships	Minesweepers, Corvettes and Patrol Boats	Other Forces
		(6 "Lupo"-class frigates with "Albatros" SAM and 1 ASW heli. on order; substantial shipbuilding industry being planned)	3 FPB's (Oto Melera guns) 10 Patrol craft 16 Coastal patrol craft (21 corvettes with "Otomat" SSM on order, same to be lic. prod.)	4 HU-16 SAR A/C, 2 C-47 tpts. <u>Marines:</u> 3 Battalions
Uruguay (4000, incl. naval air and naval inf., coast guard)		4 Destroyer Escorts (1 trg.) 2 Escorts (ex-US minesweepers)	1 Coastal minesweeper 5 Patrol craft	<u>Naval Air:</u> 3 S-2A MR A/C; 3 SNB-5 tpts., 4 T-6, T-34B, SNJ-4, 2 Bell 47G helicopters
Chile * (23,800, incl. naval air and marines)	3 Subs (1 "Oberon," 2 ex-U.S. "Fleet"-class) (1 "Oberon" on order)	3 Cruisers (2 ex-US "Brooklyn" - class, 1 ex-Swedish "Trekroner"-class) 6 Destroyers (2 ex-US "Sumner" - class, 2 "Fletcher"-class, and 2 "Almirante" armed with four launchers for "Exocet" SSM) 2 Frigates (both "Leander"-class, armed with "Exocet" SSM and "Short Seacat" SAM) 3 Destroyer Escorts (ex-US fast transport ships)	7 Large patrol craft 4 Motor torpedo boats	6 Landing ships/craft (incl 4 ex-US LST, 2 medium size craft) <u>Naval Air:</u> 12 MR A/C (incl 5 HU-16B, 3 PBY-6A "Catalina," and 4SP-2E "Neptune") 1 Transport Sqd. (incl. 5C-45, 5C-47 and "Beechcraft" D18S) 24 Helicopters (incl 4 Bell "Jet Ranger"
	SOURCE: Military Balance 1976-1977, SIPRI Yearbook 1976, FBIS Daily Reports 4 UH-19, 20H-1D, and 14 Bell 47G			
	NOTE: *Chile's inclusion, of course, ultimately would require a resolution of the Beagle Channel dispute favorable to Santiago.			<u>Marines:</u> 1 Brigade

United States and its European allies -- namely, keeping the sea lanes open to use. Moreover, the ability of the Soviet Union to exploit naval force effectively in the South Atlantic, for military purposes, is now quite limited, and considerably less potent than that of the United States. This is not to suggest that this situation will remain constant, particularly if advanced naval technologies are widely distributed throughout the South Atlantic region. It is to this question, then, that we now turn.

C. Implications of New Naval Technologies in the South Atlantic

For obvious reasons, any discussion of the future applications of sophisticated naval technologies in the South Atlantic region must begin with a review of current U.S.-Soviet technological developments. First, those technologies which may be acquired by South Atlantic African and Latin American states most probably will be those now, or soon to be, deployed by the superpowers. Second, the emerging technological balance between the Soviet Union and the United States holds important implications for the South Atlantic politico-military environment in general and for the regional naval balance in particular. Significant technological advantages of one superpower over the other could affect both the likelihood (and extent) of a major superpower naval presence in the South Atlantic, and the resultant requirement of local

states to defend against regional superpower operations.

In recent years, the Soviet Union has been devoting considerable time and effort toward the development of new military technologies which could alter significantly the use and utility of current Soviet-American naval forces. Those technologies receiving particularly heavy attention include advanced satellites for ocean surveillance and communications (as well as anti-satellite systems), anti-ship missiles, anti-submarine warfare (ASW), and improved force projection and fleet support capabilities. The success of Soviet strides with respect to the last category of force projection/fleet support, a traditional weak spot in the Soviet naval inventory, is indicated by the appearance of the Kiev in July 1976. While primarily configured for an ASW role, the Kiev (carrying Yak-36 "Forger" VSTOL) well could prove effective in projecting force ashore, especially in Third World environments. If produced in sufficient numbers, "Kiev"-type ships, in tandem with Soviet sea-denial forces, could provide effective opposition to U.S. intervention forces.

Not surprisingly, U.S. efforts are concentrated on the development and deployment of superior sea control capabilities. Particular emphasis has been placed on upgrading U.S. precision-guided munitions (both air and sea-launched), aircraft carrier forces, and ASW operations

(especially in regard to more sensitive sonar technology); and with the possible exception of deployed PGMs, the United States enjoys a commanding technological lead over the Soviet Union in each of these three categories. In addition, the United States is investing heavily in its own anti-ship cruise missiles (the Harpoon and Tomahawk), as well as an anti-missile defense program.

However, it seems safe to say that, quantitatively at least, the U.S. anti-ship missile program still lags several years behind that of the Soviet Union, which has some nine different varieties in its inventory.

Whatever the current state of the U.S.-Soviet technological balance, present trends indicate that developments in naval technology will have considerable implications for a potential U.S.-Soviet maritime conflict in the South Atlantic or elsewhere. First, while new technologies will not necessarily alter the principal missions of the superpower navies, they well might affect the application of these missions in the South Atlantic area. For example, as implied earlier, with the construction of additional "Kiev"-type ships the Soviet Union probably will be able to intervene in a littoral state, whereas ten years ago it had had little capability to do so. Second, there will be an increasing reliance on sophisticated satellite systems for maritime surveillance and

communications, thereby rendering the conduct of naval warfare less dependent on geography than in the past.

Third, and related to the second point, command and control are likely to become more centralized, making it almost as easy to control navy operations in the South Atlantic as in home waters. Most Western defense analysts agree that these technological developments will help to diminish some of the current constraints -- particularly those of a logistical nature -- on the Soviet use of force in distant waters.

However, the outcome of U.S.-Soviet naval combat will depend to a large extent on the survivability of U.S. carrier forces; and, at present, there is far less agreement within defense circles as to whether new technologies will render large surface vessels so vulnerable as to render them insignificant in a major superpower sea battle. With respect to potential combat in the North Sea or the Mediterranean, some analysts argue that, given advances in anti-ship missile technology, together with projected improvements in submarine technology, large surface ships (carriers, destroyers, cruisers) are unlikely to survive a war in large numbers, and both sides would lose their major surface forces. Others argue that the vulnerability of surface ships has been greatly exaggerated. The extent to which either contention would pertain to potential U.S.-Soviet combat in less sophisticated naval environments such

as the South Atlantic, where the type and number of superpower forces available for duty is likely to be more limited, remains an open question. Still, there is general agreement on one critical point which could apply with equal logic (and affect naval strategy) in the South, as well as in the North or Eastern, Atlantic: if, in fact, large surface ships do become (or are perceived to become) increasingly vulnerable, then a premium will be placed on pre-emption, and the force striking first could acquire a distinct military advantage. As a result, the value of force structures and force postures which facilitate deception and surprise at sea, rapid re-deployment/reinforcement and target acquisition over longer distances would increase generally. (In this case, the strategic importance of the South Atlantic as an avenue of indirect approach towards the central NATO theater, and as a path of timely communication between the North Atlantic and the Indian Ocean and/or Pacific Oceans, could be heightened).

Yet, this is not to suggest that the impact and utility of new naval technologies will be equivalent in all theaters of naval operation. Technology and the maritime environment can (and will) interact in determining the types of vessels that could be operationally effective in a particular area. From the U.S. perspective, for example, the capabilities of most of its high performance ships currently being designed¹

¹High performance ships currently under development by the U.S. Navy are the SWATH, hydrofoil, surface effect ship, air cushion vessel, and WIG (wing in ground) vessel. All but SWATH would have difficulty operating effectively in very rough seas.

are severely degraded in rough seas. Calmer areas like the South Atlantic expand the parameters of their effective performance. Consequently, for operations in the South Atlantic region, the United States may have a wider range of vessel types from which it will be able to choose. Moreover, such factors as maritime geography and weather conditions may raise or lower the incentives for pre-emption in differing environments, whatever the local constellation of forces.

In general, barring any revolutionary innovations in anti-submarine warfare, neither superpower soon will command an overwhelming advantage in naval combat. However, technological developments are clearly extending traditional naval capabilities, making the South Atlantic a more feasible environment for U.S.-Soviet naval deployment, even without access to large-scale base facilities. As a result, the next decade may usher in an increasing drive by regional navies to acquire advanced naval technologies for their own defense. Two aspects of the potential spread of new maritime technologies to the littoral states of the South Atlantic area will then become important: 1) the probable impact of new technologies on the capabilities of the littoral states; and 2) the affordability of those technologies.

As with superpower navies, new naval technologies will not create new missions for local navies; their tasks will

remain coastal defense, surveillance, anti-submarine operations and, in some cases, the protection of off-shore resources. New technologies will, however, enhance small navies' capabilities to perform those missions, even in operations against superpower naval units. The ability of coastal states to inflict damage on superpower forces engaged in presence, crisis management or limited intervention operations will be increased. Even with new technologies, small navies will be in no way able to destroy superpower forces and, in the long run, could not prevent the projection of forces by a superpower into a specific region. Exploitation of those technologies, however, will allow smaller navies to limit the marginal return to the superpower in using force by inflicting a potentially unacceptable level of damage when evaluated against possible political gains. At the very least the use of new maritime technologies by small navies will prevent the superpowers from taking a "free ride" in areas like the South Atlantic, and will inhibit the casual use of superpower force.

Littoral states will benefit most from new technologies in four areas: submarines, anti-ship missiles, tactical land-based aircraft and mines. From the perspective of littoral states whose primary concern is coastal defense, the advantages of submarines derive not from their ability to carry out a protracted campaign (as might be the case with a larger navy),

but from their threat of inflicting significant damage in a short time frame. For example, operating in relatively shallow coastal waters, diesel submarines pose a serious threat to amphibious forces committed to movement of troops ashore during a crisis. Difficulty in detection further enhances the sea-denial capabilities of submarines in littoral sea areas, and the anonymity inherent in a submarine attack creates difficult problems in identifying an attacker against which to retaliate.

Anti-ship missiles also offer littoral states a number of benefits. They are relatively cheap, can be adapted to a wide range of launch platforms, and are reasonably reliable. In addition, threats of their use are credible.¹ Mines, too, could be useful to littoral states in a crisis situation against either the superpower navies or some other potential challenger. Generally considered "a poor man's weapon," mines share the submarine's anonymity and are extremely simple to use. Finally, land-based tactical aircraft, even without precision-guided weapons, should not be underestimated as a useful instrument in a naval confrontation in littoral areas. To be sure, most littoral states have limited tactical air inventories.

¹The sinking of the Israeli Eilat during the 1967 Middle East War, the successful use of SSM by the Indians against Pakistan in 1971 and the successful firings of the Israeli-made Gabriel in the 1973 Yom Kippur War are all used as evidence to underscore the credibility of SSMS by littoral states.

Nevertheless, if naval forces are not ready for them, they are difficult to defend against. Together, torpedo-firing submarines, fast patrol boats armed with anti-ship missiles, mines and tactical aircraft would possess considerable potential against naval craft, especially in narrow waterways.

In looking at the weapons inventories of South Atlantic littoral states, the conclusion must be drawn that the diffusion of these new technologies so far has been limited. With the exception of Venezuela, Brazil, Argentina and South Africa, no countries in the region have submarines, although it is likely that Nigeria could provide enough funds to buy them. States with sophisticated anti-ship missiles are almost as limited in number, including only Argentina, Brazil, Venezuela, South Africa, Sierra Leone and the Ivory Coast. While only South Africa and Argentina have shore-based or carrier-based tactical aircraft in numbers worthy of note, it should be pointed out that Angola, Nigeria, Brazil and other South Atlantic littoral states are, or will be, concentrating on developing this capability.

The limited introduction of new technologies by South Atlantic littoral states raises the question of the affordability of these systems which, in turn, is related to the issue of national priorities. Brazil, Argentina and South Africa are the only South Atlantic states with shipbuilding and weapons

assembly capabilities; all the others are totally reliant on weapons imports. Given other national goals such as economic development, these import requirements impose a serious constraint on the degree to which South Atlantic littoral states can introduce new maritime technologies. Even within the defense sector, naval forces have been given a secondary importance. As pointed out earlier, most South Atlantic states perceive the primary threat to their national security, not in maritime terms, but as either internal in nature, or as stemming from a bordering state. Consequently, land forces have received the bulk of their defense expenditures.

Since funds allocated to naval forces in the South Atlantic are limited, the price of many new maritime technologies -- such as nuclear submarines, satellites and sophisticated ASW equipment -- puts them well beyond the reach of any South Atlantic littoral state. Most states will also have difficulty acquiring even relatively cheap technologies in sufficient numbers to exploit fully the advantages they offer. Those countries that can -- such as Brazil, Argentina, South Africa and possibly Nigeria -- are already technologically well in advance of the other states in the region. The technological imbalance that results will serve to reinforce political and economic trends leading to the emergence of a few key regional actors.

In the near future, then, the most advanced naval technologies will remain largely unexploited by the South Atlantic states. Those technologies which probably will receive the most attention may be non-military systems aimed at the exploitation of off-shore resources along the continental shelf. This is not to downplay potential threats to maritime passage posed by the less complex technologies -- such as sophisticated anti-ship missiles mounted on fast patrol boats -- which now are available to several littoral states, and may in the future become available to additional states via superpower military assistance (e.g., Soviet arms transfers to Mozambique). While these weapon systems may pose a real danger to shipping only in the more narrow waterways (such as the Mozambique Channel), nevertheless they portend a possible "nuisance value" even against commercial ships passing through the more open waters of the South Atlantic. Moreover, in highly volatile situations, small state inhibitions against high-risk actions such as firing anti-ship missiles at oil tankers (or even superpower forces) may be considerably reduced. It is not inconceivable, for example, that in a sudden flare-up of racial conflict in southern Africa, in which the West supported (or is perceived to support) Pretoria, a black African naval unit armed with a few SSMs might target U.S. or European vessels trapped in coastal waters. While such provocative actions are apt to be limited, they nevertheless could prove very effective in terms of damage imposed.

Still, it is with respect to the U.S.-Soviet naval balance that advances in naval technology will register their strongest impact on the strategic environment in the South Atlantic. Indeed, if security conditions demand a more explicit and sustained superpower naval presence in the South Atlantic, the Soviet Union and the United States almost certainly will take advantage of the operational flexibility and mobility afforded by new maritime technologies on the horizon. Of course, reliance on high technology will not necessarily make it less expensive to deploy in the South Atlantic; however, superpower interests in retaining a capacity for quick reaction within, and rapid transit through, the South Atlantic seas could take precedence over any opposition to increased deployment costs. Unless deployment limitations such as those proposed for the Indian Ocean become applicable to the South Atlantic (and there is no reason to believe that they ever would), U.S.-Soviet exploitation of advanced naval technologies well may spread into the South Atlantic region, thereby enhancing the role now played by naval forces.

IV. Implications for U.S. Policy

General Observations

The South Atlantic region has commanded low priority in U.S. policy in part because of the comparative modesty of intrinsic U.S. economic and political interests in the region, particularly in comparison with other regions of the world (e.g., the North Atlantic, the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean-Persian Gulf). The South Atlantic's resources (e.g., oil from Nigeria) have been important but not vital to U.S. economic well-being. Similarly, while the U.S. has maintained a broad interest in the stability and security of the South American hemisphere, its specific political "commitments" in the region (which have been eroded by dwindling U.S. influence and greater independence on the part of hemispheric neighbors) do not compare in intensity with U.S. ties in Europe or Eastern Asia.

In terms of U.S. strategic interests, the South Atlantic cannot be decoupled from the North Atlantic and the Indian Ocean. The strategic significance of the region inheres primarily in the sea lines of communication that define (a) the vital trade routes that traverse the region linking the industrialized nations of the North Atlantic with key developing countries in the Indian Ocean area and beyond, (b) the sinews of access to the littoral resources of the region itself, and (c) from a naval vantage point, the links in a chain

of U.S. global mobility stretching westward from the eastern seaboard of the United to the Pacific.

Not only have the U.S. stakes in the South Atlantic been modest, but until recently they have never been meaningfully threatened. Western naval power has been unchallenged in the South Atlantic since World War II. The United States exercised what some have called hegemonic power in Latin America while Britain and France had primary influence in Africa.

A major reason for the change in this postwar scenario has been the incipient expansion of Soviet naval power into the region -- an intrusion that represents in effect an elongation of growing Soviet naval activities in the Indian Ocean-Persian Gulf area. This development is unfolding against the background of other trends -- both emergent and potential -- that point to a progressive rise in the geostrategic significance of the South Atlantic region. The more prominent among these trends include:

- a. The continued importance of the Cape Route as a funnel for raw materials destined for Western Europe and the United States, particularly oil from the Persian Gulf, and minerals from southern Africa. This importance is enhanced at present by technological innovations in oil transportation such as the supertanker. In some contingencies, such as another war in the Middle East that closed the Suez Canal, the Cape Route's importance would become even greater.

b. The potentially greater significance of the indigenous resources of the littoral states, fish and minerals from the seas and in the sea-bed, and the intensified competition for these resources (possibly affecting eventually the Antarctic area as well).

c. The emergence of the race issue in southern Africa as an important adjunct of U.S. domestic policies.

d. The emergence of regional actors with growing military and naval capabilities of their own, acquired either through indigenous development or arms transfers from powers external to the region.

e. In the broader realm of strategic mobility, the shrinking U.S. overseas network of facilities, which places greater emphasis on proximate bases for projecting power.

f. In the strategic-nuclear realm, technological advances (particularly in SLBM range and accuracy) that may make the South Atlantic more attractive to both U.S. and Soviet naval activities.

g. For all of these and other reasons, the rising potential for conflict in various parts of the region.

These trends have important implications for U.S. policy especially for naval force and contingency planning. From the perspective of U.S. naval planning, these implications can be placed into near-term (five to ten years) and long-term (10 to 20 years) time frames.

Near Term Implications

The U.S. does not face any serious challenge to its naval position in the South Atlantic in the near term, although it must contemplate widening gaps in the naval infrastructure required to project power quickly and effectively around the Cape into the Indian Ocean/Persian Gulf region. These gaps may assert themselves at a time when even the limited U.S. naval assets within the Indian Ocean may dwindle (e.g., if Diego Garcia were abandoned either unilaterally or as a consequence of an arms limitations agreement with the Soviet Union) and when losses of (or constraints upon) U.S. facilities in the Pacific (e.g., Subic Bay) may make timely contingency access from the east increasingly uncertain as well.

The Soviet Union will probably continue to expand its own naval-air access along the west coast of Africa, endeavoring to consolidate its position in such states as Guinea and Angola and seeking possible other client states, such as Senegal or the Cape Verde Islands. The success of this endeavor will depend largely upon local politics and targets of opportunity; moreover, the Soviet drive for political influence and military position in southern Africa may encounter new setbacks. Nevertheless the past record of Soviet activity in other countries suggest that it will not easily relinquish its play for power and influence in southern Africa, certainly

so long as the West remains equivocal as to its response to the dilemmas of southern Africa. The Soviet activity, which is also sustained by rivalry with the Chinese, is not likely to translate into a serious regional challenge in the near term, but could impact significantly upon political evolution and the tides of crisis in Southern Africa.

The near-term scenario for the South Atlantic focuses on the likelihood of intensified and possibly expanding conflict around the issue of black power in Rhodesia. In South Africa, internal tensions and violence are not likely to flare into full-scale civil conflict -- although, depending upon evolution in Rhodesia and Namibia, the possibility of external military harassments against South Africa cannot be discounted. By contrast, the near-term projection suggests relative quiescence (if not stability) on the South American littoral in light of the continuing preoccupation by the major actors (Brazil and Argentina) with social and economic problems.

Given the lack of vital economic interests at stake on the subcontinent and the opposition from many diverse factions in the United States to military intervention, the United States is not likely to become directly embroiled in a conflict in southern Africa. Moreover, military conflict in the near term is not likely to impinge seriously upon the security of the sea lanes. Nevertheless, it is possible to envisage some possible contingencies entailing the limited use

of U.S. naval force, among them:

a. flag-showing missions to counter Soviet political-military consolidation and expansion.

b. rescue or "intimidation" missions (e.g., similar to the deployment with respect to Uganda in 1977) on behalf of trapped or threatened U.S. nationals.

c. "crisis-dampening" displays of force, particularly under pressures from NATO allies, whose own economic interests would be much more at stake on the subcontinent.

d. escort missions in the event of possible small-scale actions against Western shipping by national or terrorist naval units in an inflamed conflict environment.

e. counter-interpositioning missions should the Soviet Union establish a maritime "picket fence" during a southern African crisis to prevent possible U.S. intervention.

Long-Term Implications

The longer-term regional projections of this study suggest some potential conflict in the South Atlantic theater as a result of:

a. intensified U.S. and Soviet naval activities.

b. increased and more sophisticated naval capabilities by littoral states (e.g., Brazil, Argentina, South Africa, and Nigeria).

c. intensified rivalry among regional as well as external powers for maritime resources.

d. the possible competition for claims in the Antarctic region.

In southern Africa, depending upon the interim evolution, the longer-term scenario is likely to feature the intensified beleaguerment of and strife within South Africa, as well as increased conflict within and between black African states arising from contending ideologies, ethnic spill-overs, competition for resources, and factional struggle. The surge in ideological rivalries would tend to open doors wider to the involvement of external powers. The most ominous long-term contingency is the ensconcement of Soviet naval and airpower in South Africa at the behest of an ideologically friendly and grateful black successor government to the white regime in Pretoria. Such a contingency would spell a drastic shift in the naval balance in the southern waters, by giving the Soviets a commanding presence at the key "check-point" of the Cape Route and a formidable base for operations in both the South Atlantic and Indian Oceans.

Projections about U.S. policy constraints are admittedly treacherous. Yet, one can at least speculate that current constraints on U.S. naval actions with respect to southern Africa could ease in the longer term to the extent that:

- a. the racial issue of conflict recedes with the advent of majority rule in southern Africa
- b. Soviet military activity becomes more blatant
- c. the economic and strategic stakes of the United

States and kindred industrial states become commensurately more visible

d. SLOCs are directly endangered

e. pressures for action are generated in NATO

To be sure, there will be other constraints, principally those relating to the risks of U.S.-Soviet confrontation and the generally compounded complexity of the political-military environment.

The study's long-term projection for the South American littoral indicates a heightened potential for conflict there as well -- one revolving primarily around Brazilian-Argentine rivalry. On the one hand, such conflict could directly threaten U.S. economic and security interests, especially if it spills into the maritime environment. On the other hand, any U.S. predilection for intervention or even interpositioning would be constrained by historical sensitivities which promise to become even more pronounced in the light of current trends.

The latter constraints would be qualified in the event of a "nuclearization" of the Brazilian-Argentine rivalry, let alone a nuclear confrontation between them. Such a contingency could mean an inexorable internationalization of the conflict in which the United States, acting alone or in concert with other powers, might be compelled to mount some crisis-dampening actions, including projection of military pressure.

In general, the long-term significance of the South Atlantic as a theater of naval operations is upgraded not only by the above trends and projections, but also by potential developments in other regions. A worse-case projection for the late 1980s and 1990s could feature a global scenario in which the United States and its remaining allies in Western Europe are increasingly dependent upon the resources of the South Atlantic and maintenance of their security.

It is not the mandate of this study to adduce detailed U.S. naval force structures and deployments compatible with these projections. Clearly, however, the long-term requirements would call for, in addition to the strategic-nuclear systems and counter-systems already under development:

- a. capabilities for routine patrol of major SLOCs.
- b. capabilities for rapid and effective deployment to remote focal points of crisis.
- c. durable afloat capabilities against the contingency of shrinking availability of friendly ports.

