Corps Command Post Architecture for the 1986-1990 Integrated Battlefield--A Vulnerability Analysis
Abstract
This study estimates that the 1986-1990 European battlefield will be integrated (characterized by nuclear and conventional weapons). Current doctrine is reviewed, vulnerabilities to nuclear weapons are identified, and solutions to reduce vulnerabilities are proposed. Investigation reveals primary causes of vulnerabilities are lack of dispersion and of true redundancy. Proposed solutions are to disperse Main CP into cells and separate them by two lethal radii of 100 kiloton weapon, using 'Minimum Safety Distance' rather than 'Latent Lethality' tables. Calculations consider cumulative rather than single dose of nuclear radiation. Recommended cell dispersion is 20 kilometers. The TAC CP, lacking communications and appropriate staff, is not a true alternate to the Main CP. An Alternate CP, a mirror image of the Main CP and dispersed into cells, is recommended for continuity of command and control. Intelligence communications and nuclear release systems terminate at TAC CP, corps and division artillery for redundancy and timely targeting. Spread spectrum techniques used by DARPA's packet radio system provide complex communications required by widely dispersed, redundant, and highly mobile cells. Variation of Josephson junction switches might reduce electromagnetic pulse effects. (Author)
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jun 06, 1980
- Accession Number
- ADB052274
Entities
People
- John R. Bondanella
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College