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By showing the relationship of the concept of correlation of forces to Soviet Marxist-Leninist ideology, this investigation reveals that 1) the concept of correlation of forces is fundamentally different from the Western concept of "Balance of Power"; 2) the correlation of forces is not a simple formula for duplicating Soviet analysis and determining probable courses of action; 3) the concept of correlation of forces is a logical extension of that ideology which can enable the Western observer to approach an international problem using what might be called a "cognitive map" fundamentally different from the mind set from which we in the West habitually interpret the nature of historical change; 4) by comprehending the concept of correlation of forces and approaching a foreign policy question from that point of view, a Western analyst is more likely to assess accurately Soviet goals and objectives than would be the case by applying Western modes of analysis to the question. (author)

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THE WORLD CORRELATION OF FORCES

A thesis presented to the faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements
for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

DANIEL F. VAN GUNDY, MAJ, USA
B.A., University of Arizona, 1975

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
1980

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ABSTRACT

This study proceeds from the assumption that ideology is an important factor in the shaping of Soviet foreign policy. It attempts to demonstrate that the Soviet concept of the correlation of forces is useful in gaining an understanding of the wholly different way a Soviet decision-maker approaches a foreign policy question, how he perceives the problem, what he sees as the issues, and what he thinks are desirable options for solving the problem.

By showing the relationship of the concept of correlation of forces to Soviet Marxist-Leninist ideology, this investigation reveals that 1) the concept of correlation of forces is fundamentally different from the Western concept of "Balance of Power"; 2) the correlation of forces is not a simple formula for duplicating Soviet analysis and determining probable short-range courses of action; 3) the concept of correlation of forces is a logical extension of that ideology which can enable the Western observer to approach an international problem using what might be called a "cognitive map" fundamentally different from the mind set from which we in the West habitually interpret the nature of historical change; 4) by comprehending the concept of correlation of forces and approaching a foreign policy question from that point of view, a Western analyst is more likely to assess accurately Soviet goals and objectives than would be the case by applying Western modes of analysis to the question.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Russia is a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma.

Winston Churchill

"In its distant objectives," writes Edward Crankshaw, "the foreign policy of the Soviet Union is less obscure and more coherent than that of any other country," yet its immediate intentions and the motivations behind day-to-day diplomacy often appear incoherent, capricious, and almost enigmatic.

Vernon V. Aspaturian

Western scholarship has produced no consensually accepted model of Soviet behavior that would identify key variables or causative factors in the formation of Soviet foreign policy doctrine.

R. Judson Mitchell

What motivates Soviet foreign policy? This question and possible answers to it are the subject of countless books and articles produced by Western¹ scholarship. Yet, as the citations above suggest,² we are unable to arrive at an answer or answers which fully explain Soviet motivations.

Western assessments of Soviet goals and objectives in the international arena are quite often expressed in terms of interstate power competition. Frequently, little attention is paid to the ideological aspects of Soviet international goals and objectives. Quite often the ideological

side of Soviet foreign policy pronouncements is received as disingenuous rhetoric which masks the true reasons for Soviet behavior in the world. On the other hand, it is commonplace to hear Soviet actions explained as being motivated by traditional Russian goals. Even so eminent a Sovietologist as George F. Kennan, who in 1947 ably showed the importance of the ideological aspect in shaping the Soviet-Russian view of the world, could comment in 1980 that the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan was primarily an expression of a desire for security.³ Likewise, the Soviet occupation of Central Europe is often looked upon as a means of establishing a buffer between the Soviet Union and the Western European powers who historically have taken advantage of the absence of natural borders to invade the Russian heartland. In describing the motivations of the Bolsheviks following Brest-Litovsk, and of Stalin both before World War II and following it, Louis J. Halle wrote, "The old strategic imperatives now bore upon them as upon the czars before them, and they saw the need of territory beyond the Russian land proper if the Russian land proper was to be made secure."⁴ Halle seemingly concluded that ideology had ceased to be a primary factor in Soviet foreign policy, and stated, "This is the history of every revolutionary ideology that has ever come to power."⁵

This tendency to depreciate or dismiss the ideological element in Soviet foreign policy is understandable.

Richard Pipes, the noted authority on Russia and the Soviet Union, has said:

All people tend to some extent to base their understanding of foreign civilizations on personal experience and self-image and to assume that underneath the cloak of even the most exotic exterior there thinks the same mind and beats the same heart. But no one is more prone to work on this assumption than a person whose occupation is commerce and whose political creed is liberalism.⁶

Pipes suggests that the liberal, capitalist West is compelled on the basis of its set of values to believe that all the countries of the world have an interest in peace and stability.⁷ There is a belief that only under stable, peaceful conditions can societies develop progressively toward the goals of economic prosperity and individual liberty. This belief leads Western observers to assume that Soviet actions which appear to be supportive of these values are evidence of Soviet subscription to them. Thus we see, for example, that in adopting the policy of detente, ". . . the proponents of detente justify it with offhand allusions to the 'web of interests' that allegedly enmeshes the Soviet Union with the rest of the world and gradually forces it to behave like any other responsible member of the international community. . . ." ⁸

This tendency to assume the universality of its basic values often leads the West to react with shocked surprise when Soviet actions diverge from the patterns of expected behavior, as for example, when the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan prompted widespread consternation in Western

societies. Western debate regarding the motivations for recent Soviet behavior in the Horn of Africa reflects the difficulty in explaining convincingly why the Soviet Union has pursued a particular course of action.

There is little consensus concerning why the Soviet Union came to the decision in 1977 to withdraw support from its client, Somalia, and to begin providing military and economic support to Ethiopia. Some analysts believe that the Soviets hoped to gain future strategic advantage in the Red Sea-Gulf of Aden region by providing support to Ethiopia's Provisional Military Administrative Council (PMAC), or derg, which, in the aftermath of Haile Selassie's downfall, had assumed control of the state and had launched Ethiopia on a path of socialist development;⁹ however, no explanation is given in this scenario for why the Soviets would risk the loss of access to important military facilities in Somalia. These facilities were important to the Soviet Union's growing Indian Ocean naval presence because of their weakness in carrier-based air support, their reliance on shore-basing of air assets, and their severe lack of an extensive under-way ship replenishment capability. Explaining the Soviet switch is even more difficult considering the superiority of the existing facilities in Somalia and the lack of certainty that the Soviet Union would obtain replacement facilities in Ethiopia, especially in view of the tenuous ability of the derg to hold the country together.

Others felt that the Soviets had simply blundered badly in an attempt to establish a military balance between the two neighboring states which Moscow presumably could control by dint of its influence as an arms supplier to both, while at the same time eliminating United States influence in the region entirely.¹⁰ In this scenario, the Soviets are seen as having severely underestimated both the nationalistic fervor of the Somalis, and the centrifugal forces of religious and ethnic separatism throughout Ethiopia in general, and in Eritrea in particular.¹¹

Neither of these explanations can be fully discounted or refuted; in fact, both of them may contain important elements of truth. Something is missing from both of them, however, and its importance to Soviet calculations may have been as great as the traditional "power" aspects so clearly distinguishable in the first two explanations.

To the Western observer, the Soviets seem compelled to phrase consistently foreign policy questions in Marxist-Leninist terms. Could it be that the dilemma of the Horn also was evaluated in an ideological framework in addition to, or instead of, the the frameworks of various non-Marxist modes of analysis? How such an evaluation may have been made will be examined later; for now, suffice it to say that an analysis of the "correlation of forces" in this instance could quite likely have resulted in or at least supported the decision to back Ethiopia and abandon Somalia.

Before suggesting how a position stressing the importance of ideological considerations in influencing Soviet policy in the Horn is supportable, it is first necessary to make explicit the arguments this inquiry will develop. The first of these is the assumption that Marxist-Leninist ideology is important to Soviet decision makers in arriving at foreign policy courses of action. This hypothesis is not provable by the presentation of direct evidence, since we do not know - we cannot know - exactly what the Soviet leadership thought or is thinking about a specific foreign policy question. At best we can only state, based upon the absence of any evidence to the contrary, that the Soviet Union's own public explanations of policy positions are invariably and firmly based upon ideological considerations.

Without actual evidence that ideology is an important factor in shaping foreign policy, this stated hypothesis may not be proven; however, evidence is not available to prove the opposite, either.¹² On the other hand, there is ample evidence that the Soviets consider the concept of correlation of forces important enough to write a great deal about it. An American scholar has noted that the concept of correlation of forces appears to be taken more seriously by the Soviets than Westerners give credit for, based upon the attention the concept has received in more scholarly Soviet journals.¹³ There is emphasis on the need to analyze accurately the present correlation of

forces in order for the Soviet leadership to decide upon the adoption of the most advantageous policies for advancing Soviet interests. Because correlation of forces is an ideological concept, one may infer at least that ideological considerations are indeed important to Soviet policy makers. It follows that if correlation of forces is a concept useful to the Soviet leadership in making policy choices which advance the world situation toward the attainment of their goals, then an understanding of the concept of correlation of forces may be useful, even essential, to the Western observer in discerning what the Soviet position is likely to be in a given situation.

This leads directly to the thesis of this study, i.e., that the correlation of forces may be a valid vehicle for understanding the different way a Soviet Marxist-Leninist policy maker approaches a problem, how he perceives the situation, what he sees as the issues, and what he is likely to think are attractive or logical options for solving the problem.

Before turning to a discussion of this thesis, an explanation first must be offered for why correlation of forces has not yet been advanced or accepted by Western scholarship as a means for better understanding Soviet foreign policy motivations. One reason for this reluctance to accept correlation of forces as a useful aid in understanding is the tendency to ascribe Western, non-Marxist values to Soviet Marxist-Leninists. This point has already

been discussed in this chapter. Western observers are reluctant to accept the sincerity of a Soviet ideological position. Rather, the tendency is to believe that, deep down, the Soviets must look at things ultimately in the same way that is done in the West (i.e., "realistically"), or at least in the same way that Russians historically have done.¹⁴ This tendency to "mirror-image" leads to the view that Soviet leaders are cynical in their subscription to their ideology and merely mask conventional Western-style power goals in Marxist-Leninist jargon. A logical outgrowth of this prejudice may be the assumption that correlation of forces is simply a jargonistic mirror image of balance of power. For their part, Soviet theoreticians have made clear the differences between the concepts of the correlation of forces and the traditional Western framework, balance of power, as will be shown in Chapter II.

Another reason for the seeming misunderstanding of correlation of forces is that translations of Soviet materials, both those translated by the Soviets for export and those translated in the West, often blur the distinction between correlation of forces and traditional non-Marxist concepts such as balance of power. Michael J. Deane makes this clear when he writes:

. . .the Russian term. . .sootnosheniye sil is variously translated by U.S. translators as "correlation of forces," "alignment of forces," "ratio of forces," "relationship of forces," or "balance of power." Likewise, Soviet translators of original Russian-language publications generally fluctuate between "correlation

of forces," "alignment of forces," "ratio of forces," and less frequently "relationship of forces."¹⁵

Before beginning an examination of the correlation of forces, a word of caution is appropriate. Because this inquiry focuses on a feature of Soviet ideology and to a large degree ignores other elements affecting Soviet decision-making, there is a real risk that a nearly exclusive concentration on correlation of forces will appear to be an appeal to a single cause. There is even the tendency in discussing a single factor like correlation of forces to belittle other explanations of Soviet behavior or to subordinate them to the aspect being examined here. If this is a danger, it is not wholly intended; however, since a failure to grasp the importance of ideology to the mind-set of a Soviet decision maker may likely result in inaccurate assessments of Soviet policy, this study has concentrated on ideology, or rather one manifestation of it, in an effort to prompt greater consideration of it by observers of Soviet affairs.

It would be presumptuous on the part of a Western analyst to claim that the Marxist-Leninist ideology of the Soviet Union is the exclusive guide for Soviet foreign policy, just as it would be to claim that Marxism-Leninism plays no part in establishing that policy. By stressing the ideological aspect, the intention is to encourage the viewing of international situations in ways other than

those with which we are accustomed, to view Soviet interests from the Soviet (not necessarily Russian) perspective.

Correlation of forces may be useful in this regard because it reflects the wholly different belief system regarding the nature of man and society that is modern Soviet Marxism-Leninism. It brings into focus precisely the values which are profoundly at odds with values which are generally accepted as basic truths by the non-Marxist.

CHAPTER II

IDEOLOGY AND THE CORRELATION OF FORCES

The Soviet World View

Soviet foreign policy is necessarily and invariably framed in Marxist-Leninist terminology. Essential to understanding any concept which portrays some feature of that foreign policy, such as the rationale for decision making or policy formulation, is a grasp of Marxist¹⁶ ideological underpinnings. As we shall see, the concept of correlation of forces is a basic feature of a Soviet Weltanschauung, which colors any Soviet discussion of world affairs. By briefly examining some of the precepts of Marxism, the essence of that world view will become apparent. While this overview of Marxist philosophy is necessarily oversimplified (and perhaps even vulgar), for the purpose of this study I have focused on only those terms and ideas which are essential as a backdrop for the concept of correlation of forces.

Marxism is, among other things, a philosophy of history; it purports to explain the progress of man and society. Unlike some philosophies of history, Marxism also describes the future and offers a means of arriving at that

future. Because Marxism is supposed to be based upon certain objective laws which govern man's historical development, Marxism can be a political program and a guide for action; by assuring that policy is in synchronization with these laws, the Marxist can assist the unfolding of history.

Basic to Marx's interpretation of history is dialectical materialism. As regards the latter half of this term, materialism meant to Marx a belief that matter was the only reality.¹⁷ George H. Sabine, an historian of political philosophy, states that Marx closely associated the word materialism with "scientific," since he believed that social studies based on the theory of dialectical materialism ". . . could be made [as] equally precise and certain [as the study of physics]."¹⁸

The first word in the term, dialectical materialism, is the qualifier which made Marxism so different from other mechanistic, cause-and-effect theories of history, and was also what gave it its appeal as a revolutionary guide for action. The dialectic, which Marx adapted from Hegel, was believed by him to have been ". . . a powerful logical method uniquely capable of demonstrating a law of social development. . . ."¹⁹ Dialectics explain change in terms of conflict resolution. The application of the dialectic to the history of the development of societies is called historical materialism. At each stage of society (which in the terminology of Hegelian logic would be called in this example the thesis), there arises from contradictions with-

in the society an antithesis, a force diametrically opposed to the thesis. The antithesis eventually negates the thesis. Out of this conflict of opposites emerges a qualitatively higher stage of societal development, the synthesis, or the negation of the negation. Although Hegel applied the dialectic to the resolution of conflicts in the realm of ideas, the application of the system to history and societies by Marx permitted him to demonstrate the inevitability, the necessity, of capitalism's demise.

R. N. Carew Hunt, in a passage which may shed some light on the discussion of correlation of forces, had this to say about dialectics:

As a revolutionary, Marx was naturally attracted to the dialectic because it represented everything as being in the state of becoming something else, and to this day Communists are taught that it constitutes a mode of reasoning which is somehow superior to that of formal logic, which is represented as conceiving of everything in fixed and unchangeable terms and as thus providing a convenient intellectual instrument for reactionaries. Thus Engels says that the dialectic transcends the narrow horizon of formal logic and contains the germ of a more comprehensive view of the world. . . .²⁰

A second major description of Marxism with which we must deal is economic determinism. It is in an explanation of this characterization of Marxism that the reason for Marx's desire to see capitalism replaced will become apparent. For Marx, man was different from other living animals by his "consciousness and purposiveness."²¹ Man was conscious of the potential hostility of his environment

and purposive in his "plans . . . to master his environment and turn it from a hostile into a useful force."²²

Marxism refers to the application of consciousness and purpose (intelligence) as labor. The purpose of labor is to obtain from the environment the means to preserve the life of the individual and the species; hence, the entire struggle of man with his environment is a struggle for the appropriation of nature, and this appropriation of nature is what Marxism calls production.²³

Hunt points out, ". . . there are two factors in production, the productive forces, and the productive relations which derive from them."²⁴ The productive forces include "production, commerce, and consumption."²⁵ The productive relations are the manner in which a society is organized to produce and distribute the results of labor, i.e., the division of labor. Thus, as A. G. Meyer observes, "the definition of man as an animal which produces implies that the struggle with the natural environment is the basic activity of man, of which the struggle with the social environment is only a derivative, a by-product."²⁶ This is a key point in the Marxist interpretation of history, since it makes all other aspects of society dependent upon this basic economic principle.

It is in the concept of productive relations that another factor of critical importance to Marxism manifests itself; that factor is the class struggle. As mentioned above, various societal arrangements have existed which

organize the society's productive forces in ways which result in fulfillment of the primary purpose of man. "Production is always a social, not an individual, activity,"²⁷ and as a result, social class is a key feature of productive relations. Because man's societal arrangements for production have resulted historically in a division of labor in which one group or class has come to control the means of production, while exploiting another class, conflict has always arisen between the exploiting and exploited classes. This conflict between classes gives rise to class struggle and is resolved dialectically. The resulting synthesis, over time, is always a higher form of social organization for production. Yet, this higher form of organization has always led to a renewed class struggle within society due to control of the means of production by an element (class) in the society and exploitation of another element. For Marx, the class struggle will be resolved ultimately only when there ceases to be a division of labor, when the means of production are controlled by society as a whole. When this occurs, as Marx said it inevitably and necessarily must because of the dialectical process of progress, classes will disappear. The end to exploitation of one class by another will result in a classless, i.e., non-exploitative, society.

This society is a socialist one, and it will come about through a revolutionary resolution of the class struggle in capitalist society. The exploited laboring

class will expropriate the capitalist class by means of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Under this dictatorship, the state, i.e., the governmental institutions and mechanisms of class control, oppression, and coercion will be turned on the capitalists in the interests of the working class. The destruction of the old exploiting class will cause the eventual disappearance of all class distinctions and the withering away of the means of class control, the state. This utopian society in which, as Marx said, each contributes his labor according to his abilities, and takes from the production of society according to his needs, will be the highest and final stage of productive development, and is called communism.

Communism can only come about when exploitation is eliminated world-wide. Additionally, it will only come about when the world's toiling classes recognize their class interests and unite to bring about the destruction of class oppression. Hence, today's communists are committed to strengthening the international proletarian forces and weakening international capitalism's oppressive hold in the interest of world progress toward achieving socialism. To speak of foreign policy in these terms is to address the class content of that policy.

Ideology and World Politics

The leaders of the Soviet Union are interested in knowing their position in the world relative to that of

other powers. To that end they have devised means of measuring their relative position. Due to Soviet Marxist-Leninist ideology, however, they reject as an anachronism the framework which states have used in the past to assess their relative position and to effect either a maintenance of that position or to alter it favorably. By this framework is meant the balance of power concept prominent in Western diplomatic circles since the nineteenth century.

Traditional models of international politics assume the basic actors to be sovereign states, and most typically, nation-states. Each state is concerned with protecting its territorial integrity, furthering its economic well-being, advancing its national goals; these interests may be pursued in concert with other nations in a way which is mutually beneficial, or they may be advanced at the expense of other states in cases where achievement of one state's goals can only be accomplished at the expense of one or several other states. Such roles have been attributed to states in times of both peace and war for centuries. In this conceptualization of international relations, the geographic location and configuration, the level and extent of economic development, the natural and human resources endowment, the political and social organization and supporting institutions, and the national will of each state have determined its power in relation to other states.

In the Marxist view, the relations between states were in actuality the relations between competing capitalist groupings. These capitalist states were (and are) competing for markets and materials. In its most advanced stage, having achieved a level of internal development in each state which prevented further growth, capitalism turned to the undeveloped areas of the world. Here, establishing a colonial system, the capitalist nations temporarily overcame economic crisis at home by building new markets for their industries while exploiting new raw materials with which to produce the product of those home industries. This imperialism was the stage that capitalism had reached by the beginning of World War I, during which the first socialist state was born.

This new Soviet state posed a grave threat to the rest of the capitalist-dominated states because it marked the beginning of the world-wide movement to free the exploited classes by overthrowing the exploiting capitalist class in each country. A significant change in international relations had occurred. These relations were now between the capitalist states and the one state which represented the class interests of all the world's proletariat. What had been the intra-class competition for markets and resources had become inter-class conflict. As one Soviet commentator has written, "The countries began to embody in the world arena not only a national but a social

quality; . . .the axis of conflict in the world moved ever more definitely in the class sphere."²⁸

Inherent in this conceptualization of interstate relations is its class nature, in a Marxist-Leninist sense. World politics had come to manifest the basic antagonisms of social classes and was locked in deadly dialectical conflict. No longer meaningful, at least to them, was the classical balance of power because the balance between capitalist states had been replaced by a more fundamental balance, the balance between capitalist-imperialist states and the first socialist state.

In the Soviet view, the attainment of power and the establishment of a state by the Bolsheviks on behalf of international socialism marked what has been called a "fundamental restructuring of international relations."²⁹ In essence the world was now composed of two opposing parties, the remaining capitalist states on the one hand and a single proletarian state on the other. Hence, the bipolar concept, from a class view, was operant from the Soviet state's inception.

Only since the Second World War has bipolarity in the balance of power been accepted in the West as a status quo, brought about by the relatively overwhelming strength of the Soviet Union and the United States. In the Soviet conception, however, bipolarity has been the status quo since the emergence of the Soviet state. For, to the Soviet

theoretician, the overthrow of the bourgeois regime in Russia heralded a qualitative change in the relationship between nations in that no longer were the relations between states only those between bourgeois states.

That the world had become bipolar is important because it contains the essence of the concept of correlation of forces. It simply is not possible to substitute correlation of forces for balance of power and grasp the full meaning of the former; while there are a number of similar ties between the two, especially in the way elements of the balance are measured, the similarity breaks down on this single point: correlation of forces is first and foremost a class concept.

Correlation of Forces and Balance of Power

As noted above, Soviet ideologists make a distinction between correlation of world forces and balance of power. Correlation of forces is the relative position of world capitalism vis-a-vis world socialism. Balance of power is, at once, a discredited means of maintaining peace between capitalist nations, especially prior to the emergence of the first Soviet state, and, particularly since then, a cynical system by which the capitalist powers attempt to preserve and justify the status quo and prevent the revolutionary transformation of the world from capitalism to socialism.³⁰

On a number of points, balance of power is criticized as an incomplete doctrine. The principal charge against it

is that "it ignores the class nature of foreign policy."³¹ The tendency of Western theorists is to conceive of the conflict in the world as competition between countries, ". . .to reduce practically the entire essence of foreign policy to playing on contradictions between states, blocs and groups of states."³² As a result, balance of power is almost entirely a matter of the relative military and economic power of the states considered in the equation.

The most important feature of the concept of correlation of forces and an aspect which cannot be ignored if an understanding of the concept is to be gained is its class nature. This feature, which reflects the status of the class struggle between socialism and capitalism at a given time, is precisely that which differentiates "correlation of forces" from "balance of power." Correlation of forces, as a result, transcends national and territorial boundaries and homes in on what, for the Marxist, is the only significant division among men--their relationship to the means of production. This frame of reference is for them the only acceptable one; this is exemplified in Lenin's words: "The only choice is--either bourgeois or socialist ideology. There is no middle course. . . ."³³

Correlation of forces is, in fact, explicitly defined as a class concept. "Speaking of the correlation of forces in the world, we refer, above all, to the correlation of the class forces and the struggle of classes both in individual countries and on [sic] the international

arena. . . ."34 This common denominator in world politics, the class struggle, is seen as the only legitimate distinction between competing entities. In the words of Marx: "Any historical struggle--whether it takes place in the political, religious, philosophical, or any other ideological sphere--in reality is only a more or less clear expression of the struggle of social classes. . . ."35

Another major criticism of balance of power conceptions rests on what the Soviets refer to as its military basis. Because Western concepts of international affairs are essentially "governmental," i.e., between sovereign states, in their approach, rather than based on concepts of class, the primary aim of Western states is their territorial security.³⁶ This security rests on military power as its most basic element, and military strength is viewed as the principal measure of a state's strength. One Soviet writer has added economic strength as a second major factor in bourgeois balance of power conceptions, stating that ". . . economic potential and military strength play a tremendous role in international relations," and concluding that "they make up the material basis of the policy of states, including the foreign sphere."³⁷ But he also was quick to add that as "Lenin pointed out . . . domestic and foreign policies are determined by the economic interests, the economic positions of the ruling classes of a state."³⁸

In historical eras when the only states were capitalist or pre-capitalist states, "the decisive criterion in assessing the ratio of forces in the international arena remained military power."³⁹ With military strength as the main factor in evaluating a state's power, and given the hostile internal contradictions characteristic of non-socialist societies, aggressive wars were the frequent result of imbalances in this chiefly military calculus.

Since the advent of the first socialist state, and especially since the emergence of the socialist community of states, states which by Marxist-Leninist definition lack the class contradictions which lead to aggressive wars, ". . . the axis of conflict in the world moved ever more definitely into the class sphere."⁴⁰ The growing ". . . industrial, scientific and technical, and military potential . . ." of states ". . . rejecting war as a means for achieving political objectives . . . (excluding just wars for independence and national liberation)" has proved the importance of the "class sphere" element in the correlation or balance of forces, the Soviet theoretician would maintain.⁴¹ Thus, balance of power, based on military might, and framed in obsolescent "governmental" concepts is thought to be outmoded, useless, and even dangerous as a means of accurately assessing the current balance in the world.

Main Features of the Concept of Correlation of Forces

Several aspects of the ideological content of correlation of forces are present here and deserve expansion. The first of these is bipolarity, and its constancy in Soviet interpretations of world politics. One American political scientist has stated that ". . . the concept of polarization, one of the the cardinal tenets of Marxism, is the most essential analytical tool in the Soviet theoretical approach to the restructuring of international politics."⁴² Polarization, in the sense of a world polarized between competing class forces, is indeed a constant theme in the ideological conceptualization of the world order since the earliest days of the Soviet state. In its attitude toward the belligerents in the First World War, irrespective of their various alliance postures; in its grouping into a single enemy the various forces which opposed it during its civil war; and in its view of the principal capitalist states following the war, the Soviet leadership invariably ignored obvious differences and divergent interests while it emphasized the only similarity among those groups--their class identity.⁴³

It is clear in the concept of "capitalist encirclement" that the Soviet view is one of polarity and consequent antagonism based solely on class differences; that the relations among the post-World War I nations of the West were conflict-ridden is not significant. It is not significant because the differences and antagonisms among

those countries are seen as being symptomatic of the contradictions inherent in capitalism, and are seen merely as intra-class competition. The more basic conflict is that which exists between "states with different social systems," between capitalist and socialist states. By comparison, there is no substantive difference between the various capitalist-imperialist states when it comes to the class conflict which exists between them and the Soviet Union.

In more recent times, the basically bipolar world of the post-World War II era has given way to a multipolar one, at least according to most Western observers.⁴⁴ The phenomenal economic recovery and growth of Europe and Japan, the emergence of the Third World (its very name epitomizing polar changes), the schism in what seemingly had been the monolithic socialist community, the recent growth of a split between the richer and poorer countries of the less developed world, all have led to the creation of a polycentric world community. These differences are manifested in a growing number of political, economic, and social alignments and associations.

This weakening of the bipolar nature of the world is rejected by Soviet Marxists on basic ideological grounds. Their position is clearly one that maintains and nurtures the bipolar description of the world balance. Writing in the New Times, Georgi Shakhnazarov, a Soviet historian, criticizes "Bourgeois commentators [who] talk a great deal

about the two-pole world becoming a world with five or more poles," and stresses that ". . . changes in the position of states, their relative strength, and their alliances are secondary as compared with the main factor--the struggle between the two diametrically opposed social systems."⁴⁵

This bipolar interpretation of the world condition is fundamental to a Marxist, dialectical-materialistic explanation of human history. It is also essential to the Soviet claim as the leader of the international proletarian movement. By focusing attention on economic class distinctions between the industrialized nations, especially the United States and the countries of the socialist community, i.e., between the countries which are (by Soviet-Marxist definition) exploiters of the laboring masses and the non-exploitative socialist states, the Soviet Union detracts attention from those features of its own relationship with many countries which by some standards would also be classed as exploitative.

This concentration on the bipolarity of the world has been and is an effective tactic in creating or maintaining distrust on the part of the non- or less-industrialized countries toward the Western industrialized states. On the other hand, it has not been totally effective in automatically winning unbridled support from those same "exploited" countries. In fact, the appeal of the Peking "Three Worlds" doctrine may rest on the feeling among many of the non-aligned countries that the Soviet Union is as

exploitative in its relations with them as are the "traditional" imperialist states. "Hegemonism" has enough truth in it as a characterization of Soviet relations with smaller states to cause increasing distrust of Soviet overtures; the recent intervention in Afghanistan should do little to dispel this distrust. Partly because the Chinese have touched a tender spot, the Soviets reserve considerable space in various publications for articles (and also within articles not written directly about China) which fulminate against the Chinese ideological heresy which serves the imperialist states and retards a more rapid shifting in the correlation of forces to the socialist side.⁴⁶

A second aspect of ideological content inherent in the correlation of forces, as it is conceptualized by Soviet ideologues, is the dynamism of the concept. This aspect is also a key feature which causes the rejection of balance of power as a viable interpretation of the relations between states. This aspect reflects clearly the value attached to the Marxist dialectic to explain the resolution of conflict.

In the Soviet view, by the very fact that at its most basic level the world is divided between the forces of capitalist-imperialism and socialism, there exists between the two forces a diametrical opposition which is actively seeking ultimate resolution. Doctrinally, this opposition will be resolved inevitably by the triumph of socialism and

the transformation at some point in the future to a communist world. Because the correlation of forces reflects the relative positions of strength and weakness of the opposing world class forces, it is an ever-changing, ever-shifting, i.e., dynamic, concept. It rejects the idea that there is a status quo; except when taken as a "snapshot" of the dynamics of change, the correlation of forces is constantly shifting.

Toward a Definition of Correlation of Forces

As mentioned previously, correlation of forces is a means of determining the current strengths and weaknesses of world class forces, reflecting the reciprocally related positions of imperialism and international socialism. But there are other class forces which affect the correlation of the protagonists, and which must be considered in any analysis. In addition to the world socialist community and imperialist centers, there is the force of the international laboring class itself in all countries (invariably led by communist and workers' parties in capitalist states), national liberation movements, groupings of nonaligned nations and pacifist-oriented movements, the social democratic movement, and various forces of reaction: racism, Zionism, and Trotskyism, among others.⁴⁷ All of these forces interact in the international arena and determine the correlation of forces in the world.

The strengths and weaknesses of these various forces are expressed in terms of political, economic, scientific-technological, military, and ideological development. The correlative or reciprocal strength of the chief class forces in each of these areas determines the rate at which the dialectical progress will occur.

As the forces of international socialism achieve strength in these various areas of development, the socialist position relative to the forces of world capitalism improves and the conflict between these two forces sharpens. This sharpening of the class conflict on an international level results in an acceleration of dialectical change in a progressive fashion. This is so because the achievement of correlative strength by international socialism in one of these areas constitutes a negation of the strength of world capitalism in that area.

In elaboration of this feature, the evolution of U.S. strategy since World War II may be viewed as the result of the growing military strength of proletarian internationalism and consequent dialectical change. If the policies of "containment" and "massive retaliation" may be viewed as being derived from a U.S. nuclear monopoly, and later from a significant nuclear superiority, then the growth of the Soviet Union's nuclear strength to a level of essential equivalence may be seen as the antithesis to that U.S. strength, and eventually the resulting synthesis described as the era of peaceful coexistence and detente. Thus, a

shift in the correlation of military forces made possible detente (and its outward manifestations, SALT, MBFR, CESC). This shift neutralized military power as a logical means of resolving disputes; the struggle did not end, but instead was shifted to other areas of competition and conflict (economic, political, ideological). Whether or not such a formulation is true or not, it nonetheless has validity as a Marxist explanation of the change.

The dialectical changes summarized above are precisely those given by the Soviets for the current correlation of forces and for the resultant status of relations between the socialist and imperialist states, i.e., peaceful co-existence and detente. For example, one Soviet author has written:

It is of paramount importance that precisely during . . . [the late 1960's to early 1970's] the West had to admit the untenability of all its illusions concerning military primacy. This had rather far-reaching consequences, for it has mostly been by force of arms that imperialism has traditionally exercised its influence on world development. It has also given top priority to armed strength in opposing socialism. The economic, scientific and technological capacities of the Soviet Union have, however, expanded sufficiently for it to oppose the imperialist countries with an equivalent military potential in every respect. That meant putting an end to the chimera of Western military superiority underpinning the 'position-of-strength' policy.⁴⁸

Soviet ideologists are adamant in their insistence on their (i.e. Marxist-Leninist) interpretation of detente and its causes in the face of Western, non-Marxist objections to placing detente in a Marxist ideological, as opposed to

a diplomatic, context. One such ideologist states:

To date, all the concepts of detente advanced by bourgeois scientists are no more than a search for an explanation of the changes in world politics that would suit imperialism and for approaches that would put detente in the service of imperialist foreign policy. This search is naturally doomed to failure. 'Re-targeting' detente to suit the imperialists is no more possible than 'undoing' the chief objective factor that has brought forth detente, i.e., the steady change of the world balance of forces in favor of socialism.⁴⁹

Explicit in the foregoing discussion of strengths and weaknesses of various world forces and in the example of changing US-Soviet military strength is the concept of dialectical conflict. The class forces referred to are engaged in continuous struggle. For the Marxist, the conflict or struggle must eventually be resolved in accordance with the laws of historical materialism. History is for him a zero-sum game with a predictable outcome. The only uncertainty is the speed or rate at which the game proceeds. But the Marxist is not content to let history take its own meandering, if inevitable, course; history can be assisted in its progress if the strengths and weaknesses of the world class forces can be determined. If the stage of historical development is revealed in terms of the relative strengths and weaknesses of the forces in the world, then policies can be developed which will accelerate historical development. Obviously, benefits will accrue to the nation acting in concert with such objective laws.

It is one thing to believe the world is developing socially according to objective laws. It is another thing to know with certainty the stage of development the world has reached at any given point in time, and to know that stage in terms of the military, political, economic, scientific-technological, and ideological strengths and weaknesses of the class forces active in the world. Because traditional concepts of gauging relative power positions do not measure class forces, they are incomplete and necessarily obsolete for Soviet purposes. As a result the concept which replaces the outmoded balance of power is the world correlation of forces.

To understand the relationship of the concept of correlation of forces to the Soviet world view, a simple analogy is helpful. In this analogy the objective reality of the world condition at a given time may be seen as a source emitting light. Because it enables one to interpret correctly the objective laws governing historical development, Marxism-Leninism may be seen as the lens which brings into focus the objective reality of the present world condition or stage of development. The role of the concept of the correlation of forces is that of a prism, which refracts this focused beam of light and reveals in the spectrum it produces the relative strengths and weaknesses of world class forces.

Summary

Correlation of forces is rooted in the Marxist view of the world. It is not possible simply to equate the concept with balance of power and other non-Marxist concepts for measuring relative international power positions. Instead, the Western analyst needs to understand that the essence of correlation of forces is the Marxist idea of class; the assessment of the correlation of forces is a gauging of class forces, which are seen as constantly changing.

Correlation of forces is intended to provide a glimpse of the relative class strengths of the two opposing social systems, international socialism and international imperialism, at a given point in time. As such, it aims at assessing the state of the dialectical progress of history towards a known future, but a future whose time of arrival is not known. The following chapter describes how the correlation of forces is (or may be) applied to arrive at an evaluation, and how it might have been used to analyze policy choices in a given situation.

CHAPTER III

ANALYZING THE CORRELATION OF FORCES

Problems of Measurement

At first glance it may appear that by applying the concept of correlation of forces to specific situations it might be possible to replicate the Soviet analyst's evaluation of what courses of action would be of greatest value in advancing Soviet interests. It is to this task and to the difficulties likely to be encountered that we now turn our attention. Thus far, this examination has dealt only with what the correlation of forces is and is not. It is now necessary to attempt to describe how and upon what basis the analysis of the correlation is made.

In perhaps the most detailed treatment of correlation of forces by a Soviet author, Georgi Shakhnazarov listed a large number of criteria which may be used to conduct an analysis of the correlation.

In economics, usually we compare the gross national product on a per capita basis, labor productivity, dynamics of economic growth [growth rate?], level of industrial output, particularly in the leading sectors, labor technology, resources and manpower skills, number of specialists, and level of development of theoretical and applied science. In the military aspect, comparisons are being made of the quantity and quality of arms, fire power of the armed forces, combat and moral qualities of the soldiers, training of the command personnel, forms of organization of the troops and

their experience in combat, nature of the military doctrine, and methods followed in strategic, operative, and tactical thinking. In terms of politics, we take into consideration the breadth of the social base of the governmental system, its method of organization, constitutional procedures governing relations between the government and the legislative organs, possibility to make operative decisions, and extent and nature of population support of domestic and foreign policy. Finally, if it is a question of assessing the strength of one or another international movement, we take into consideration its quantitative composition, influence among the masses, position in the political life of the individual countries, principles and norms governing relations among its constituent units, and the extent of their unity.⁵⁰

Some of these criteria easily lend themselves to quantification, while others are only measurable after defining and weighting them in ways which must be considered as prejudicial toward the Marxist-Leninist view. Further, this listing merely provides a sampling of economic, military, and political variables which might be of use in an analysis, but gives no indication of the relative importance of one major category over another, of one categorical discriminator over a second, etc. Given these omissions, how is it possible to make an assessment in any way similar to a Soviet assessment of the correlation of forces?

In a sense, it is not. Even in the Soviet analysis the variables do not have a fixed importance; Shakhnazarov makes this clear when he writes, "Some of them vary in significance and could adopt an unpredictable behavior."⁵¹ As has already been mentioned, these are not

even all the possible variables of significance which may bear upon an assessment of the overall correlation of forces. He writes that "the number of factors which participate in its formation is hard to estimate."⁵² Indeed it must be; even in a regional analysis, which will only allow the Soviet analyst a ". . . short-term forecast . . .," these criteria only permit the determination of the correlation of forces ". . . with greater or lesser accuracy" ⁵³

Deane points out in examining this same article that by so caveating the utility of an analysis, Shakhnazarov. ". . .[stops] just short of saying that an overall assessment of the correlation of forces is impossible. . . ." ⁵⁴

The conclusion may be drawn from the foregoing that as a model or formula capable of adaptation by an analyst in the West for predicting specific Soviet courses of action, the correlation of forces has little value. If the Soviet analyst can assess the correlation only with "greater or lesser accuracy," then we in the West have little chance of arriving at his conclusions when attempting to duplicate his analysis.

An Analytical Framework

As stated above, since a sure formula for computing the correlation of forces is not given nor possible to construct considering the changing values which may be assigned to the various variables examined in an analysis,

its use as a model is limited. In the sense of permitting a determination of Soviet short-term intentions with neat precision, correlation of forces is of almost no value. It does have some usefulness, however, in framing any particular policy question in roughly the same way that it would be done in Moscow; it forces the Western analyst to look at a problem from a Marxist viewpoint.

To show how this might be helpful, it may be useful to return to the question introduced in Chapter I, the motivations for Soviet behavior in the Horn of Africa, and to speculate how the correlation of forces in this instance might have been assessed.

Africa, like all of the less developed areas of the world, has been viewed by the Soviets as a land of promise from the viewpoint of accelerating the decline of capitalism and the rise of world socialism.⁵⁵ Particularly with the successes of the independence movements in the late 1950s and early 1960s, the Soviets hoped to see, and if possible to assist, the rapid degeneration and collapse of the industrialized capitalist states. It was expected that this would occur as the colonies broke the strangle hold of imperialism. When the expected collapse failed to materialize, it was explained away as the result of the lack of African class consciousness, a deficiency which the Soviet Union sought to correct by support to progressive regimes in the hope of influencing shifts to socialist paths of development.⁵⁶

While not the most progressive new African state by Soviet standards, Somalia at independence in 1961 was at least a national democracy (i.e., an independent state controlled by the national bourgeoisie, and no longer a colony), which placed it politically at a more advanced stage than its neighbors at the time. Further, due to its desire for arms--a desire which the U.S. refused to satisfy--Somalia presented an opportunity which could not be passed up. Although Soviet policy concerning generous support to even "revolutionary democrats" had changed in the late 1960s, the earlier Soviet assistance efforts in Somalia bore fruit in 1969 with the military coup which brought the socialist-oriented government of President Mohammad Siad Barre to power.

Disenchanted with its lack of success in Africa, the Soviet Union in the late 1960's adopted a more forward posture in the developing world. This posture had been initiated ". . . with the aim not just of winning political or ideological influence in the Third World, but of strengthening the Soviet bloc's economic base and reducing the economic superiority of the West."⁵⁷ The new policy ". . . shifted emphasis from the use of economic aid as a means of gaining political influence to the use of political and economic influence as a means of securing privileged economic advantages for the Soviet Union and its bloc."⁵⁸

This phase of Soviet foreign policy in the Third World has been characterized as being exploitative since it relied on counterposing to Western imperialist power ". . . a 'stable division of labor' between the Soviet Union and its bloc on one side and the developing countries in the U.S.S.R.'s emerging zones of influence on the other."⁵⁹

Somalia offered little in the area of economic advantage to Moscow, but it may have remained important for another reason: the military factor. The emergence of Soviet military power was mentioned earlier as having been of great importance. The growth of international socialism's military strength has been credited with forcing the acceptance of peaceful coexistence by the West. Growing naval might was certainly one feature of this increasing military strength, and it was in this connection that Somalia continued to play an important role. Because of certain weakness in the U.S.S.R.'s naval capabilities (such as reliance on shore-based air support and ship replenishment), the air and naval facilities in Somalia were vital to a growing Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean.

While Soviet interests seemed to be well-served by the relationship with Somalia, a series of events in Ethiopia apparently caused the Soviet Union to undertake a reappraisal of the situation in the Horn of Africa, and ultimately led to a major change in its policy in the region. The first of these events was the overthrow of Emperor Haile Selassie in 1974. "As early as December,

1974, the new government declared that it sought to transform the country into a socialist state with a one-party system, collective farms, and government control of all productive property."⁶⁰ Initially, there were several reasons the Soviet Union was slow to make any major overtures to the new Ethiopian government. First, the derg was factionalized (it was not until February, 1977, that Lieutenant Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam emerged as the undisputed first figure).⁶¹ Second, in Ethiopia's Eritrea Province, a guerrilla war was raging; the Soviet Union was providing support to the predominantly Marxist Eritrean liberation movements.⁶² Third, the Soviet Union was already committed to military support of Somalia, which in turn was committed to supporting the Western Somalia Liberation Front (WSLF) in the Ogaden.

It was not until the Dergue unveiled its political program on April 21, 1976--a full 19 months after Selassie was deposed--that the Kremlin moved to improve its relations with the new Ethiopian government significantly. After the publication of the Dergue's political program, the Soviet Union proclaimed that PMAC was leading a "national democratic revolution" and had become an "active participant in the anti-imperialist and anti-colonial struggle."⁶³

As has been mentioned, Ethiopia had clearly been moving since 1975 in a direction which could be considered "progressive" in the Soviet view. However, due to Ethiopia's numerous internal disruptions--economic, political, social--it was not certain that even with massive economic and military assistance Ethiopia would ever become

a profitable enterprise in harmony with Moscow's new strategy. However, there were other factors which might have influenced the U.S.S.R. to look favorably on prospects for supporting Ethiopia.

That Ethiopia could be considered a politically important country in the region and on the continent needs little elaboration; thus, on this point alone Moscow may have considered providing some support. Further, Somalia was becoming somewhat of a problem for the Soviets. In the aftermath of the Arab-Israeli war of 1973, pan-Islam was becoming a stronger force in the Middle Eastern region, and Somalia as an Arab League member was no doubt influenced in a way which would be interpreted negatively by Moscow;⁶⁴ by contrast, it is a logical assumption that Ethiopia's revolutionaries were committed to atheism in keeping with the Marxist orientation they professed. Additionally, Somalia seemed to be on the verge of violating one aspect of the bilateral treaty it had with the Soviet Union by inviting the U.S. to make use of Somalian facilities, an offer it hoped would prompt the granting of badly needed foreign aid.⁶⁵ This certainly would have been received as a negative signal by the Soviets.

Another aspect likely to have been worrisome to the Soviet Union was the growing mood in the Red Sea region to limit Soviet military activity. Prominent in the movement were the Sudan, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt, but other littoral

states including Somalia were also involved.⁶⁶ Only Ethiopia was not a party to the movement.

In December, 1976, the Ethiopian government reportedly made a secret agreement with the Soviet Union for the provision of perhaps as much as \$100 million worth of military aid.⁶⁷ Shortly after this agreement, the U.S. ". . . decided to terminate military aid to Ethiopia altogether, officially because of gross violations of human rights."⁶⁸ In April, the derg expelled the U.S. MAAG and forced the closing of the U.S. facility near Asmara. These actions suddenly presented the USSR with the prospect of a potential new Marxist-Leninist client in the Horn.⁶⁹

Summary

How can the concept of correlation of forces help frame the questions confronting Soviet policy in the Horn? Based upon what we know about the concept, analysts in Moscow would have been viewing the developments in the Horn on a class basis, not on the basis of Somalia versus Ethiopia. By re-examining some of the facts already presented, it may be possible to see the problem as the Soviets conceived it.

At the time of Haile Selassie's overthrow, Ethiopia was a semi-feudal, semi-capitalist state, and was clearly an ally of imperialism: the U.S. provided economic and military support to Ethiopia and maintained a military base at Asmara. The coup which toppled Selassie's regime brought more progressive forces to power. Although these

progressive forces were committed to launching Ethiopia on a course of socialist development, they were also faced with considerable opposition from various forces of reaction, including world imperialism.

The inchoate revolution in Ethiopia would be a positive force contributing to the advance of the position of socialist internationalism only if it succeeded in crushing the internal, indigenous sources of reaction. Imperialism had lost its "suzerainty" in Ethiopia, which might be reimposed if the derg failed to consolidate its position.

Somalia's military backing of the WSLF in the Front's struggle for national liberation of the Ogaden region of Ethiopia forced a decision by Moscow. In arriving at that decision an analysis of aspects of the regional and world correlation of forces must have been made. The basic question must have been: providing support to which of the two progressive forces in the Horn most benefits the forces of international socialism?

Although the Soviet Union believes itself to be justified (even obligated) in aiding struggles for national liberation, the situation which existed in 1977 in the Horn was not normal. Moscow was being forced to choose between supporting a war of national liberation on the one hand and national democratic revolution on the other. Support to the WSLF could mean the failure of Ethiopia's revolution, the ascension to power of reactionary forces, and the return of imperialism to a position of influence.

Support to Ethiopia would insure the success of the national democratic revolution and eliminate the influence of the forces of imperialism. The Soviet Union may have thought it doubtful that Somalia would permit imperialist forces to rise to a position of influence similar to the position they had held in Ethiopia; Somalia's actions had begun to appear somewhat reactionary, but the country most probably would remain a force in the non-aligned movement rather than fall completely under the influence of the forces of imperialism.

On a higher level, the forces of imperialism were not likely to actively support Somalia with military assistance. This conclusion could have been based upon stated U.S. policies on arms transfers to Africa.⁷⁰ In addition, the positions of essential equivalence between the forces of socialism and the forces of imperialism, made possible by Soviet military growth, would deter direct military action on the part of the U.S.

Perhaps because support to the forces of national democratic revolution would have the greatest adverse impact on the world position of imperialism, the Soviet Union decided on following that course. While the provision of support to Ethiopia would result in the loss of Soviet basing in Somalia, this loss might be only temporary. Forces of reaction which had encouraged the Somalian actions would be thoroughly discredited by the failure of the Somali military action, and such contradictions would

have been expected to resolve themselves dialectically in an historically progressive fashion. Although there is no conclusive evidence, the agreement to supply arms to Ethiopia most probably would have been on the basis of an Ethiopian quid pro quo, and is strongly suggested by the subsequent development of Soviet ship repair facilities at an island near Massawa.⁷¹ Finally, it must be remembered that even if this proposition failed, the liberation elements in Eritrea were still quite active and might likely have accepted direct Soviet assistance in return for promises of future privileges.

It cannot be proven that the analysis of the correlation of forces just suggested is in any way similar to the analysis the Soviets might have conducted. But this application of the concept of correlation of forces does allow a Western observer to see the question from a Marxist viewpoint. It is in this way that an understanding of the correlation of forces can be useful to the analyst in the West. If the use of the concept fails to produce the specific courses of action ultimately adopted by Moscow, it at least allows what is probably a more accurate estimate of overall Soviet goals and objectives than do Western frameworks which assign non-Marxist motives to a Marxist government.

CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSIONS

Summary

A basic assumption in this inquiry is that Marxist ideology is important to a Soviet policy maker in formulating options or arriving at decisions on foreign policy questions. Acknowledging from the outset the impossibility of proving this hypothesis, this study purports that the concept of the correlation of forces can be shown to be a valid vehicle for understanding the manner in which a policy maker approaches a problem.

This examination has suggested that too often analysts in the West tend to minimize the ideological element of Soviet foreign policy. Because peace and stability are valued in the West as essential for prosperity and human development, it is difficult to accept Soviet ideological pronouncements which reject these values and substitute conflict as the essential ingredient for world development, progress, and even peace. Consequently, Western assessments of Soviet intentions quite often assign motives which are based on non-Marxist values. The result is an inability to explain fully at times the causes for Soviet behavior in specific situations, or a failure to define Soviet objectives in certain instances.

Yet, as was shown, a great deal has been written in Soviet publications addressing the importance to foreign policy questions of accurately assessing the correlation of forces. Western analysts and scholars tend to ignore this material for several reasons. First, correlation of forces frequently is obscured in English translations. The analyst unable to read Soviet source documents in Russian and forced to rely on translations may not recognize the concept when reading these translations. Second, correlation of forces is often confused with non-Marxist models for measuring relative international positions. This confusion is a result both of the translation problems already mentioned, and of a tendency to believe that correlation of forces is merely a jargonistic disguise for balance of power. This latter tendency stems from the difficulty in accepting the sincerity of a Marxist's belief in that creed.

This study shows that not only is correlation of forces different from balance of power and other Western models because of the class frame of reference it uses to compare world forces, but it is also a natural extension of a Marxist world view. Unlike balance of power, which has as its purpose the maintenance of a stable balance between nations, the correlation of forces is a concept of dynamic change. The Soviet purpose in assessing the present correlation of class forces in the world is to discover the alignment of these forces (i.e., their reciprocal positions in terms of political, economic, military, etc.), and to

adopt policies which will accelerate the progress of history. Despite Western reluctance to accept the validity of such a concept or the principles underlying it, correlation of forces accords well with the fundamental tenets of Marxist-Leninist doctrine.

Correlation of forces has been shown to be not an easily quantifiable set of variables, but instead a manifestation of a world view clearly at odds with Western views. The concept is a natural outgrowth of what might be called a "cognitive map" fundamentally different from the mind set from which we in the West interpret historical change and other phenomena. Observing the same historical phenomena through the lens of Marxism-Leninism, the Soviet analyst sees causes which would not be assigned by his non-Marxist counterpart. Operating from a belief that certain objective laws drive historical development, he is no more able to perceive of those events in a non-Marxist way than those who do not understand Marxism-Leninism are able to estimate Soviet intentions in dialectical materialist terms.

As was just stated, the Soviets tend to see the U.S. through a Marxist glass darkly. In their analysis of the motives for Western adherence to a balance of power concept of international relations the Soviets engage in their own form of mirror-imaging. "How to explain this blindness, this adamant clinging to a long obsolete 'governmental'

approach to world politics?" asks G. Shakhnazarov, referring to balance of power.⁷² In answer to his own question he at first explains:

This is largely due to the conservatism of bourgeois thought, to the inability, and to a certain measure of unwillingness to realize that the world has changed qualitatively, and that the facts and phenomena of the epoch of the socialist revolution cannot be explained on the basis of a concept of international relations which had done good service throughout all previous history.⁷³

But the Marxism in his soul will not allow him to stop here; there must be another reason beyond this conservatism. His answer is that balance of power continues to be embraced because it is to the advantage of the imperialists ". . . to promote the 'governmental' concept of international relations."⁷⁴ He explains:

This is done first of all because it is as though this eliminates the basic difference between socialist and capitalist countries, making it possible to blame the rivalry among "countries" for various conflicts which have arisen as a result of imperialist aggression. Secondly, because this makes it possible to conceal the imperialist foreign policy and its class content.⁷⁵

Of course, Shakhnazarov is not alone in ascribing motives to the West which are purely Marxian. For example, Sh. Sanakoyev, writing of what he calls the "renovated, modernized variant of the 'balance of power'" as advanced by Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski, maintains that we are not witnessing merely "the adherence of some ideologists and politicians to 'classical diplomacy,'" but that its adherents have a knowing class purpose; ". . . [balance

of power] is designed to preserve the status quo not only in the international-political but, above all, in the social sphere, to maintain and strengthen reactionary regimes, and is directed against revolutionary changes in the life of the peoples.⁷⁶ While it is possible that these motives are ascribed to Western policy makers by these and other writers⁷⁷ for political or propagandistic reasons, it is also quite possible that they have as great a difficulty thinking in non-Marxist terms as we have of thinking in their frame of reference.

In a similar way, Soviet perceptions of the cause for acceptance of peaceful coexistence and detente by the West are tied to a purely Marxist rationale. Because the correlation of world forces figures prominently in the Soviet explanation, it may be that the concept serves to cloud the vision of Soviet analysts perceiving Western motivations in the same way balance of power obscures the Western perception of Soviet motivations.

If the Soviet rationale is to be believed, peaceful coexistence has become the only logical relationship between the two camps with different social systems. For its part, the Soviet Union and the other countries of the socialist community claim to be peace-loving states.⁷⁸ They are peaceable because, as socialist states, they have eliminated the class antagonisms which alone lead to aggressive wars. On the other hand, the capitalist states, while still prone to war as a means of settling political

conflicts, have become less inclined to engage in aggression to achieve their class interests.⁷⁹ According to Soviet interpretation, the imperialist camp has come to realize that peaceful coexistence is a necessity.⁸⁰ This has taken place because the correlation of forces has shifted in favor of socialism.⁸¹ If such a shift has occurred, on what basis, using what criteria, based upon what comparison of what variables was this determination made?

Most evidence in Soviet sources seems to indicate that the military part of the equation has been the most important, the most significant in causing the shift. Since by Marxist doctrine the military potential of a state is dependent upon its economic and social development, these factors too must have contributed to the shift, but it is the increased military might of the socialist community, and particularly of the Soviet Union, that is most often mentioned as being pivotal. For example, in discussing the West's acceptance of detente and peaceful coexistence a Soviet writer had the following to say:

It is of paramount importance that precisely during. . .[the late 1960s and early 1970s] the West had to admit the untenability of all its illusions concerning military primacy. This had rather far-reaching consequences, for it has mostly been by force of arms that imperialism has traditionally exercised its influence on world development. It has also given top priority to armed strength in opposing socialism. The economic, scientific and technological capacities of the Soviet Union have, however, expanded sufficiently for it to oppose the imperialist countries with an equivalent military potential in every respect. That

meant putting an end to the chimera of Western military superiority underpinning the "position-of-strength" policy.⁸²

Other writers reinforce the perceived demise of Western military superiority:

Existing socialism's increasing might is making it ever harder for the imperialists to use military force in the attainment of their foreign policy objectives. Detente is sharply enhancing the role of diplomacy, of political rather than military solutions to international problems.⁸³

To recognize the real correlation of forces in the world means specifically to recognize the indisputable fact that the times of rude dictation by one country over others are gone. This is, above all, a result of the steady growth in the might of world socialism. . . .⁸⁴

Only losing absolute military superiority and realizing the limit beyond which the use of military force would no longer lead to the achievements of age-old political objectives, but could mean suicide, led the ruling circles of the capitalist countries to begin to understand the inevitability of peaceful coexistence.⁸⁵

These quotations typify the Soviet interpretation of the cause for and the result following the shift in the correlation of forces in favor of socialism. Clearly, it is the military might of the Soviet Union which is credited with bringing about the change. It would almost seem that the argument has come full circle from a refutation of balance of power as an obsolete militaristic doctrine to a new formulation of the same doctrine dressed in red. The only difference seems to be that balance of power ignores class distinctions while correlation of forces ignores sovereign states. The inability of either side to see the

world through the eyes of the other leads both to discount each other's pronouncements as being perfidious. George Kennan described this inability to communicate fully when he characterized the Soviet Union and the United States as being like ". . . two cross-eyed men who bumped into each other on the street The one said: 'Why in hell don't you look where you're going?' To which the other replied: 'Why in hell don't you go where you are looking?'"⁸⁶

The precarious nuclear balance which characterizes our world has become too dangerous to allow the United States and the Soviet Union to bump into each other simply because they do not look at each other properly. To state this imperative another way, it is essential that we know what Soviet planners are thinking, and to do this we must know how they think. Accurate estimates of Soviet intentions will only obtain if we know not only capabilities but also interests. Interests are only discernable if we understand Soviet values, and values are inextricably intertwined with ideology. This is not a novel observation. R. N. Carew Hunt observed that ". . . to discuss any problem with an intelligent and politically developed Communist is to become aware that he is living in a different climate of opinion from our own and that his values are not ours."⁸⁷ Yet we too often ignore this divergence.

We forget also that ideology is not dogma. Lenin, himself, stated that "Marxism is not dogma, but a guide to

action."⁸⁸ To reject ideology as the basis for Soviet actions because those actions do not seem to conform to a particular doctrine shows a lack of understanding of what ideology is. As Zbigniew Brzezinski observes,

No doctrine, however elaborate or sophisticated, can provide answers and guidelines to fit all aspects of historical development. The shaping of events necessarily involves situations that are either unforeseen or dictate a logic of their own, even if initially fitting the theoretical assumptions. Doctrine is then "creatively" extended, new principles are extrapolated from the original set of assumptions, new generalizations crystallize, and finally, the identity of the ideology emerges. Ideology is, in effect, the link between theory and action.⁸⁹

So it is a mistaken and potentially dangerous misconception to assume that ideology and the basic theoretical assumptions underlying it have been abandoned by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Only by gaining a deeper understanding of how that ideology shapes Soviet decisions will the West be able to deal effectively with what is widely perceived (accurately, I believe) as the Soviet threat. Correlation of forces is useful in this regard, first, because it is a distillation of ideological belief in a framework which includes the whole world, and second, because it focuses attention on those aspects of international affairs where there is the greatest divergence between the Soviet and Western perceptions. An understanding of the concept of the correlation of forces permits the employment of the same "cognitive map" the Soviet Marxist uses. Such an understanding is essential

not only to foreign policy makers at the highest levels of government, but even to tactical intelligence analysts grappling with the question of Soviet military intentions. To attempt to discern Soviet intentions at any level without an understanding of Marxist ideology and the role it plays in Soviet foreign policy is as hopeless an undertaking as an historian's attempt to explain Medieval Europe without understanding the role of Christianity in that epoch.

Returning to the story of the two cross-eyed men, a grasp on the concept of correlation of forces permits the Western analyst to "look where the Soviet Union is going," and thereby fashion policy in such a way that if we do "bump into him" the collision will not have occurred as a result of faulty vision.

ENDNOTES

¹Throughout this study the term "Western" is used to mean "non-Soviet". "Western" is intended to connote primarily the non-Marxist nations of Europe and North America, but the term may also include other non-Marxist states and peoples. This definition is awkward for two reasons. First, Marxism is a Western concept; it was in industrial Western Europe that the philosophy of Marx was born, and certain aspects of Marxist thought live on in the West in the Social Democratic movement so influential in Europe today. Second, because "Western" is meant to mean the opposite of "Soviet Marxist-Leninist," together these two definitions ignore the world's non-Soviet Marxists. Hopefully, the inadequacy of this label will not detract substantially from the understanding it is intended to convey.

²Vernon V. Aspaturian, Process and Power in Soviet Foreign Policy (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1971), p. 327; R. Judson Mitchell, "A New Brezhnev Doctrine: The Restructuring of International Relations," World Politics, April 1978, No. 3, p. 366.

³Compare: George F. Kennan, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," Foreign Affairs, July 1947, and "How Real is the Soviet Threat," U.S. News and World Report, March 10, 1980, p. 34.

⁴Louis J. Halle, The Cold War as History (New York: Harper and Row, 1967), p. 43.

⁵Ibid.

⁶Richard Pipes, "Detente: Moscow's View," Soviet Strategy in Europe, Richard Pipes, Ed. (New York: Crane, Russak and Co., Inc. 1976), p. 4.

⁷Ibid., p. 4-5.

⁸Ibid., p. 5.

⁹See: Tom J. Farer, "Ethiopia: Soviet Strategy and Western Fears," Africa Report, Nov. - Dec. 1978, pp. 4-8; Robert J. Hanks, "The Indian Ocean Negotiations: Rocks and Shoals," Strategic Review, Winter 1978, Vol. VI, No. 1, pp. 18-27; Colin Legum, "The African Environment," Problems of Communism, Jan. - Feb. 1978, pp. 1-19; Daniel S. Papp, "The Soviet Union and Cuba in Ethiopia," Current History, March 1979, pp. 110-114. The word derg means "council" in Amharic, and is often anglicized as "dergue."

¹⁰Alvin Z. Rubinstein, "Soviet Policy in the Third World in Perspective," Military Review, July 1978, pp. 2-9. O. M. Smolansky, "Soviet Policy in the Middle East and Africa," Current History, Oct. 1978, pp. 113-116, pp. 127-128.

¹¹Ethiopia's leadership had been besieged at that time by ethnic, religious, and political opposition groups which were taking advantage of the collapse of Haile Selassie's empire by asserting their various claims and programs. Some of the major movements with which the derg had to contend were: the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Party with its subordinate E.P.R. Army, the All-Ethiopia Socialist Movement, the Ethiopia Democratic Union, the Confederation of Ethiopian Trade Unions, the Afar Liberation Front, the Oromo Liberation Front, the Ethiopian National Liberation Front, the Eritrean Popular Liberation Forces, the Western Somalia Liberation Front, and in Djibouti, the African People's Independence League. See David Hamilton, "Ethiopia's Embattled Revolutionaries," Conflict Studies, No. 82, April 1977.

¹²In the course of this inquiry, in not one instance did a Soviet source even imply that the ideological factor was anything except the sole consideration in any question of foreign policy.

¹³Michael J. Deane, "The Soviet Concept of the Correlation of Forces," unpublished professional report, Strategic Studies Center, Stanford Research Institute, 1976, p. 5-6.

¹⁴This later version is one of the themes to be found in Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn's vigorous essay, "Misconceptions About Russia Are a Threat to America," in which he strongly criticizes the West for attributing Soviet behavior to a Russian cultural mind-set. Solzhenitsyn argues that it is dangerous for the West mistakenly to ascribe to features of Russian cultural tradition the brutal and totalitarian aspects of Marxism-Leninism as practiced in the Soviet Union. To do so blinds the West to the real enemy, the universal evil: communism itself. Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, "Misconceptions About Russia Are a Threat to America," Foreign Affairs, Spring 1980, pp. 797-834.

¹⁵Deane, op. cit., p. 43.

¹⁶The terms "Marxist", "Marxist-Leninist", and "Soviet Marxist-Leninist" are used interchangeably throughout this study. Because there are perhaps as many brands of Marxism as there are Marxists in the world today, my purpose is not to assign a unanimity in the interpretation of Marxism to all these believers; instead, since this

study is concerned with Soviet (as opposed to Maoist or Menshevik or Trotskyite, etc.) interpretations and applications of Marxism, these labels are meant to convey only the Soviet views. I extend my apologies to purists; my intention is merely to avoid the monotonous use of the unwieldy phrase "Soviet Marxist-Leninist".

¹⁷Alfred G. Meyer, Marxism: The Unity of Theory and Practice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954), p. 6.

¹⁸George H. Sabine, A History of Political Theory (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1961), p. 763.

¹⁹Ibid., p. 755.

²⁰R. N. Carew Hunt, The Theory and Practice of Communism (New York: Macmillan, 1963), pp. 24-25.

²¹Meyer, op. cit., p. 14.

²²Ibid.

²³Ibid.

²⁴Hunt, op. cit., p. 46.

²⁵Meyer, op. cit., p. 17.

²⁶Ibid., p. 15.

²⁷Ibid.

²⁸G. Shakhnazarov, "On the Problem of Correlation of Forces in the World," Kommunist, No. 3, Feb. 1974, as translated in Joint Publications Research Service Report No. 61776, Translations from Kommunist, No. 3, February 1974, 17 April 1974, p. 98.

²⁹N. Lebedev, "The USSR's Effort to Restructure International Relations," International Affairs, Jan 1976, p. 1.

³⁰Sanakoyev, "The World Today," p. 44.

³¹Ibid., p. 42.

³²Ibid., p. 43.

³³Y. Kashlev, "Imperialist Foreign Policy: An Ideological Breakdown," International Affairs, Jan. 1979, p. 58.

³⁴Sanakoyev, "The World Today," p. 42.

³⁵Ibid.

³⁶Shakhnazarov, "On the Problem of Correlation of Forces in the World," pp. 103-104.

³⁷Sanakoyev, "The World Today," p. 42.

³⁸Quoted in Ibid. Of course, economic interests also determine Soviet policies, but these "economic interests" are not synonymous with "profit motive." "Economic interests" here is meant to convey the idea that because history is economically determined, the class in control in any society adopts foreign and domestic policies which advance its class interests.

³⁹Shakhnazarov, "On the Problem of Correlation of Forces in the World," p. 97.

⁴⁰Ibid., p. 98.

⁴¹Ibid.

⁴²Mitchell, "A New Brezhnev Doctrine," p. 378.

⁴³See: George F. Kennan, Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-1941 (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand, 1960), pp. 11-32. Louis Fischer, The Life of Lenin (New York: Harper and Row, 1964), pp. 84-87, 262-264, 266-268, 348-355.

⁴⁴One American political scientist prefers to use the term "bipolycentrism" to describe the post-bipolar system. Speaking principally of the East-West situation, John Spanier, in his Games Nations Play (New York: Praeger, 1972), states: "While bipolarity has passed, the new distribution of power has not become multipolar either. "Because the producers [of security in the system] were deadlocked in a balance of terror, their allies regained a measure of freedom for diplomatic independence and maneuver. "In bipolycentrism, the new centers of foreign policy decisions have remained formally in alliance with the superpower; but they have also rebelled against his intra-alliance hegemony and they have asserted their own interests more vigorously. ". . . [E]ach superpower must compromise with its allies to keep their support." pp. 82-83.

⁴⁵Georgi Shakhnazarov, "The Victory - The World Balance of Strength - Peaceful Coexistence," New Times, No. 19, May 1975, p. 6.

46Most of the articles by Soviet authors listed in the bibliography devote some space to criticisms of Peking.

47See A. Vakhrameyev, "Detente and the World Balance of Forces," International Affairs, January 1979, pp. 79-80; Shakhnazarov, "On the Problem of Correlation of Forces in the World," pp. 100-102.

48v. Kortunov, "Socialism and International Relations," International Affairs, No. 10, October 1979, p. 45.

49Kashlev, "Imperialist Foreign Policy: An Ideological Breakdown," p. 64.

50Shakhnazarov, "On the Problem of Correlation of Forces in the World," p. 107.

51Ibid.

52Ibid.

53Ibid.

54Deane, op. cit., p. 21.

55For a discussion of Soviet hopes for Africa in the advancement of socialism, see Colin Legum, "The African Environment," and David E. Albright, "Soviet Policy," in Problems of Communism, Jan. - Feb. 1978.

56Albright, op. cit., pp. 23-24.

57Richard Lowenthal, "Soviet 'Counterimperialism,'" Problems of Communism, Nov. - Dec. 1976, p. 52.

58Ibid., pp. 52-53.

59Ibid., p. 53.

60Papp, "The Soviet Union and Cuba in Ethiopia," p. 110.

61Ibid.

62Albright, op. cit., p. 36.

63Papp., op. cit., p. 112.

64See Legum, op. cit., p. 16; F. Stephen Larrabee, "Sudanese-Soviet Relations Reach a New Low." Radio Liberty Research RL 138/77, June 3, 1977, passim.

⁶⁵Irving Kaplan, et al., Area Handbook for Somalia (Washington: Department of the Army, 1977), p. 188.

⁶⁶Larrabee, op. cit., p. 5.

⁶⁷Papp, op. cit., p. 112.

⁶⁸Gerard Chaliand, "The Horn of Africa's Dilemma," Foreign Policy, No. 30 (Spring 1978), p. 121.

⁶⁹Ibid.

⁷⁰See "Speech, July 1, 1977, St. Louis: U.S. Policy Toward Africa," The Secretary of State (Washington: Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Office of Media Services), P. 5-6.

⁷¹Papp, op. cit., p. 114.

⁷²Shakhnazarov, "On the Problem of Correlation of Forces in the World," p. 103.

⁷³Ibid.

⁷⁴Ibid.

⁷⁵Ibid.

⁷⁶Sanakoyev, "The World Today," p. 44. Emphasis in the original.

⁷⁷See: N. Lebedev, "Socialism and the Restructuring of International Relations," International Affairs, Feb. 1978, p. 11. Sh. Sanakoyev, "Imperialist Foreign Policy and Bourgeois Politology," International Affairs, Feb. 1978, pp. 80-81. V. Kortunov, "The Leninist Policy of Peaceful Coexistence and Class Struggle," International Affairs, May 1979, pp. 85-86. A. Vakhrameyev, "Detente and the World Balance of Forces," International Affairs, Jan. 1979, pp. 81-83.

⁷⁸Virtually all Soviet sources abound with references to the peace-loving nature of socialist states.

⁷⁹See Marxism-Leninism on War and Army (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1972), Chap. 2, for a detailed discussion of the nature of wars and their class content.

⁸⁰See Sanakoyev, "The World Today," pp. 45-46; Shakhnazarov, "On the Problem of Correlation of Forces in the World," pp. 108-111; Kortunov, "Socialism and International Relations," p. 45.

⁸¹Deane devotes the greater part of one chapter detailing with Soviet pronouncements on the shift of the correlation of forces in favor of socialism. Deane, op. cit., p. 25-33.

⁸²Kortunov, "Socialism and International Relations," p. 45.

⁸³Lebedev, "Socialism and the Restructuring of International Relations," p. 9.

⁸⁴Sanakoyev, "The World Today," p. 46.

⁸⁵Shakhnazarov, "The Problem of Correlation of Forces in the World," p. 99.

⁸⁶George F. Kennan, Russia and the West Under Lenin and Stalin (New York: Mentor Books, 1961), p. 16.

⁸⁷Hunt, op. cit., p. 8.

⁸⁸Ibid., p. 7.

⁸⁹Zbigniew Brzezinski, Ideology and Power in Soviet Politics (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1976), p. 97-98.

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