A Comparison between US-Soviet Military Doctrine from an Egyptian Point of View
Abstract
This study analyzes the ground force tactical doctrine of the armed forces of the United States and the Soviet Union. It focuses on division and lower level units and attempts to highlight the strengths and weaknesses of each country's doctrine. Significant differences exist in the organizational structure and tactical philosophy of the army of each country. Soviet reliance on their experience in World War II leads them to place heavy reliance on armor, artillery, and the mechanization of other arms to achieve highly mobile units. The density of systems on the battlefield leads them to employ a limited span of control for their commanders, which requires a highly orchestrated and controlled battle within a centralized command and control structure. The United States, on the other hand, having participated in two wars since 1945, has developed reliance on sophisticated weapons and other systems which they believe will offset a quantitative inferiority. In addition, their system of command and control, compared to the Soviets, places high reliance on decision making at lower echelons.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jun 05, 1981
- Accession Number
- ADB060157
Entities
People
- Abdel Hamid Saleh Hafiz
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College