

UNCLASSIFIED

AD NUMBER
ADB074378
NEW LIMITATION CHANGE
TO Approved for public release, distribution unlimited
FROM Distribution limited to U.S. Gov't. agencies only; Proprietary Info.; 4 Jun 82. Other requests for this document must be referred to Commander, US Army Combined Arms Center & Fort Leavenworth, Attn: ATZL-PTS-IS. Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027.
AUTHORITY
USACGSC ltr, 2 Dec 2004

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

ADB074378

RESCUE ASSAULT FORCES--INTREGATED STRATEGIC
ROLE IN NATIONAL SECURITY

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

JOE DOUGLAS PRICHARD, MAJ, USA
B.S., Ouachita Baptist University, 1967

DTIC
SELECTED
JUN 22 1983
S
A

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
1982

DISTRIBUTION LIMITED TO U.S. GOV'T AGENCIES
ONLY; PROPRIETARY INFO. 4 Jun 82
OTHER REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION MUST BE
REFERRED TO: HQ TRACOC, ATTN: ATCS-D,
FORT MONROE, VA 23651

83-2292

83 06 22 026

DTIC FILE COPY

Unclassified

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (When Data Entered)

AD E 1151 0000

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE		READ INSTRUCTIONS BEFORE COMPLETING FORM
1. REPORT NUMBER	2. GOVT ACCESSION NO. DA 3074 3780	3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER
4. TITLE (and Subtitle) RESCUE ASSAULT FORCES--INTEGRATED STRATEGIC ROLE IN NATIONAL SECURITY		5. TYPE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVERED Master's Thesis
		6. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER
7. AUTHOR(s) Prichard, Joe Douglas		8. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(s)
9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS Student at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027		10. PROGRAM ELEMENT, PROJECT, TASK AREA & WORK UNIT NUMBERS
11. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS HQ TRADOC, ATTN: ATCS-D, Fort Monroe, VA 23651		12. REPORT DATE 4 June 1982
		13. NUMBER OF PAGES 173
14. MONITORING AGENCY NAME & ADDRESS (if different from Controlling Office)		15. SECURITY CLASS. (of this report) Unclassified
		15a. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE 4 JUN 1982
16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of this Report) Distribution limited to U.S. Government agencies only; proprietary information. Other requests for this document must be referred to HQ TRADOC, ATTN: ATCS-D, Fort Monroe, Virginia 23651.		
17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the abstract entered in Block 20, if different from Report) Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.		
18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES Master of Military Art and Science (MMAS) thesis prepared at CGSC in partial fulfillment of the Master's Program requirements, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027.		
19. KEY WORDS (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) National Security, Unconventional Warfare, Terrorism, Hostage Events, Hostage Rescue, Prisoner of War Rescue, Rescue Equipment, Rescue Vehicles, Rescue Aircraft, Airfield Assault		
20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) This study examines the adequacy of present U.S. counterterrorist strategy and force development as an integral part of U.S. National Security policies. Emphasis is placed on countering the hostage and kidnapping duration event forms of terrorism and their destabilizing effect on U.S.-Third World relationships. The study includes a historical review of force development as a function of national security objective since the end of World War II. The historical		

DD FORM 1 JAN 73 1473

EDITION OF 1 NOV 65 IS OBSOLETE

Unclassified

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (When Data Entered)

Unclassified

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE(When Data Entered)

aspect identifies those major weapons system programs which will likely dominate defense expenditures in the decade(s) ahead.

The concept of an inadequate counterterrorist strategy will focus on the threat to U.S. National Security posed by changes taking place in the Third World. The increased U.S. dependence on foreign Third World natural resources and Soviet geostrategic gains are presented as a basis for challenging the current force development emphasis on nuclear and conventional forces.

To meet the challenge of the possible inadequacy of current counterterrorist priority, a corollary to this thesis examines the potential contribution to National Security which could be made by a permanently organized rescue assault force equipped with the best available strategic transport technology.

Unclassified

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE(When Data Entered)

RESCUE ASSAULT FORCES--INTREGATED STRATEGIC
ROLE IN NATIONAL SECURITY.

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

JOE DOUGLAS PRICHARD, MAJ, USA
B.S., Guachita Baptist University, 1967



Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
1982

83-2292

DISTRIBUTION LIMITED TO U.S. GOVT AGENCIES
ONLY; PROPRIETARY INFO 4 Jun 82
OTHER REQUESTS FOR DOCUMENT MUST BE
REFERRED TO: HQ AFM, ATCS-D,
FORT MONROE, VA 23651

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

THESIS APPROVAL PAGE

Name of candidate Joe Douglas Prichard

Title of thesis Rescue Assault Forces -- Integrated Strategic Role
in National Security

Approved by:

Gilbert A. Bernabe, Thesis Committee Chairman
MAJ Gilbert A. Bernabe, Ph.D

LTC Lloyd C. Ray, Member, Graduate Faculty
LTC Lloyd C. Ray, M.B.A.

Accepted this 3rd day of June 1982 by Philip J. Brooker
Director, Graduate Degree Programs.

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

RESCUE ASSAULT FORCES--INTEGRATED STRATEGIC ROLE IN NATIONAL SECURITY,
by Major Joe Douglas Prichard, USA, 173 pages.

This study examines the adequacy of present U.S. counterterrorist strategy and force development as an integral part of U.S. National Security policies. Emphasis is placed on countering the hostage and kidnapping duration event forms of terrorism and their destabilizing effect on U.S.--Third World relationships.

The study includes a historical review of force development as a function of national security objective since the end of World War II. The historical aspect identifies those major weapons system programs which will likely dominate defense expenditures in the decade(s) ahead.

The concept of an inadequate counterterrorist strategy will focus on the threat to U.S. National Security posed by changes taking place in the Third World. The increased U.S. dependence on foreign Third World natural resources and Soviet geostrategic gains are presented as a basis for challenging the current force development emphasis on nuclear and conventional forces.

To meet the challenge of the possible inadequacy of current counterterrorist priority, a corollary to this thesis examines the potential contribution to National Security which could be made by a permanently organized rescue assault force equipped with the best available strategic transport technology.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter	Page
I. Introduction	1
Chapter Endnotes	13
II. Development of National Force Structure and Strategy.....	15
National Defense Strategy Support and Development	17
U.S. Military Force Structure	18
Presidential Influence on Force Development	28
Chapter Endnotes	33
III. Challenge of the Third World	37
U.S. Dependence on Third World Resources	37
Geostrategic Issue of the Third World	45
Third World Terrorism	49
Summary of U.S.--Third World Relationship	53
Chapter Endnotes	55
IV. An Assessment of Strategy for Third World	59
Chapter Endnotes	74
V. The Potential Role of Technology in Counterterrorist Operations	77
Background of Technology in Warfare	78
Technology in Counterterrorism: The Iran Raid	81
Research and Development Process--Obstacle to Limited Use Technology	87
Industrial Incentive--Impact on Limited Use Technology	89
Chapter Endnotes	92
VI. Conclusions	95
Summary	97
Structure and Utility of a Rescue Assault Force	97
National Security Contributions of Proposed Rescue Assault Force	100
The Limitations of Technology	102
A Grand Strategy	103
Chapter Endnotes	106
VII. Recommendations	107
Chapter Endnotes	115
Appendix A	
Technological Concepts for Strategic Transitional Transport ..	
Appendix B	
Planning, Programming and Budget System--Executive Summary ...	

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure	Page
1-1 Force Employment Spectrum	10
2-1 Comparison of U.S. Military Investment Outlays with Estimated Dollar Costs of Soviet Military Investment Activities	22
2-2 National Defense Outlays as a Percent of GNP	23
2-3 Comparison of Defense Outlays	29
3-1 Import Reliance of 8 Critical Minerals and Metals	40
3-2 U.S. Stockpile of Critical Metals	41
3-3 America's Strategic Stockpile	42
3-4 Comparative Oil Traffic	48
3-5 Geographic Distribution of International Terrorist Incidents 1968-80	50
4-1 Warfare Threat Spectrum	60
4-2 Geostrategic Flanking Maneuver for the Defeat of Democracy	64
4-3 Warfare Threat Spectrum Based on Long-Term Survival of Democracy	66
4-4 Recuperation of Consumption	68
4-5 Economic Survival Threat Spectrum	71

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

In his address before the Association of the United States Army's 1981 annual meeting, the Commanding General of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, General Glenn K. Otis, made the following points:

The Army must not overlook the utility of elite special-mission units in anti-terrorism operations.

Of the major threats with which the Army must be prepared to deal, terrorism is perhaps (the) most significant at least in terms of the likelihood of its occurrence. "We've got to be ready to handle it, not just today, but for the foreseeable future."

We must equip, train, maintain and pay for a strong anti-terrorist force," for terrorism can be deterred "if they know they will face a force like the Special Air Service Regiment in Britain--we need that kind of capability.¹

From this public statement it appears that the higher echelon planners within the Army are convinced of the need to develop a force capable of effectively dealing with international terrorism that affects the U.S. and her allies.

There are two components to be submitted in this thesis. The first aspect contends that the present military counterterrorist strategy is not adequately integrated on a priority basis with other military strategies designed to meet national security objectives. This concept will be studied particularly in light of the increasing threat to U.S. National Security posed by Third World² instabilities. To meet the challenge of this view of inadequacy the second aspect of this thesis will be to examine the potential contribution to

National Security which could be made by a permanently organized rescue assault force equipped with the best available strategic transport technology.

For this thesis the term strategy is intended to describe those decisions and actions taken at the national level which will determine how various threats are counterred or deterred. Counterterrorism is used to describe those actions taken in response to a terrorist incident. Antiterrorism, which consists of active and passive measures designed to prevent occurrences of terrorism, will not be addressed to any great extent.

Regarding the first aspect of this thesis, there are several points to be presented within this study to support the contention of an inadequately prioritized counterterrorist strategy. In brief, the issues to be presented in support of this theme follow:

- o Force development trends within the Department of Defense (DOD) are determined largely in response to national agency assessments of potential threat to the current national security objectives determined by the presidential administration in office.
- o Long-range military force development often lacks consistency due to changes in presidential administrations and the corresponding changes in policy direction.
- o The high dollar military procurement programs are long-range in nature and as such drive the existing force structure inherited by each succeeding administration. In effect the existing force structure often dictates or limits the military aspect of a president's international strategy.
- o Current priorities in force development are oriented toward the traditional nuclear and conventional threats and perhaps are not adequately assessing the significance of the rapidly increasing threat posed by the Third World aspects of terrorism.

There is no broadly accepted definition of terrorism. Presently, the debate continues within the United Nations on a legal definition of terrorism which distinguishes between freedom fighters and criminals. For the purpose of this thesis, the general definition in Army Regulation 190-52 will be used: "The calculated use of violence or threat of violence to attain goals, often political or ideological in nature, through instilling fear, intimidation, or coercion. It usually involves a criminal act often symbolic in nature and intended to influence an audience beyond the immediate victims."

As explained earlier, there are two aspects of this thesis. The first part deals with the overall impact of a counter terrorism strategy on national security. With the broad aspect of national security in mind, it will frequently be more accurate to relate Third World threats and U.S.-Third World relationships in terms of low-intensity conflict, insurgency, or unconventional warfare. This is not intended to confuse but rather to refer to the level of conflict in any given example which poses the greatest potential threat to U.S. national security. The reader must keep in mind that terrorism in any form can be the prelude or concurrent activity of any of the escalating levels of low-intensity conflict (terrorism, insurgency, revolution, unconventional warfare, etc.). Therefore any low-intensity terminology used in this thesis also implies a potential use of terrorism at some point in the conflict. It must also be considered that low-intensity conflict has the potential to expand to mid-intensity conflict if the issues involved are sufficiently significant to national survival and other nations have the capability to become involved.

While part of this research will include the broad spectrum of terrorism, a narrow focus will be on the role of a rescue force in a situation such as occurred in Iran in 1979. The hostage form of terrorism has been selected as a model for study because it constitutes a "worst case" condition from the standpoint of the U.S. Government being able to directly influence the situation. In immediate event forms of terrorism such as bombings and assassinations, the counteractivities of evacuation, bomb defusing, and increased security measures can usually be carried out without threat to unwary or innocent victims. In a duration event such as a hostage or kidnapping situation, the terrorist holds an advantage of power in that his bargaining strength is contained in the threatened life of his hostages. As international terrorists gain more experience, the possibility exists that future hostages will be increasingly more difficult to rescue by force and will require better preparation on the part of the United States. The unwillingness of the United States to be blackmailed by terrorist groups is evident in the attitudes expressed by both Presidents Carter and Reagan.³ During the Iranian hostage situation, President Carter established the U.S. policy of no government concessions which condemns all terrorist acts as criminal and makes no concessions to blackmail. This policy also states that the United States will not pay, negotiate ransom, or release prisoners in exchange for hostages. This policy was given credibility as the United States demonstrated a determination of will by risking the lives of the Iran raid rescuers and the hostages rather than yielding to Iranian demands.⁴

If the U.S. national policy toward terrorism is to be characterized by nonsubmission, then a well-trained force will be required to combat terrorism. This force must reflect the character, resolve, and determination of a nation concerned about the safety of its citizens abroad and its image as a world power.

Personally, I never had any political or moral regrets about the rescue mission. I felt that we owed it to all concerned to try to rescue our people once there was a good chance of success. At the time, the likely alternative seemed to be either their prolonged incarceration or their murder by the Iranians. My greatest worry was that we would not succeed in preserving secrecy and in achieving surprise. Little did I dream that our failure would involve technology, an area where America normally excels. I knew throughout that there were risks involved, but that was unavoidable. I felt then, as I feel now, that not to have tried, while having the capacity to try, would have been shameful and unworthy of America.

Zbigniew Brzezinski⁵
April 1982

The term "rescue assault force" will be used in this study to describe a U.S. government sponsored special force with the sole mission of preparing and training for the rescue of international hostage and kidnap victims. The primary speciality of such a force would be the initial securing of the victim(s) from their captors hands. The skills required would include covert insertion of rescue personnel and possible violent actions to disarm the terrorist holding the hostage(s). The secondary skills desired would include the removal of the hostage(s) from the hostile environment with minimum destruction and the ability to coordinate and control any additional forces required in the rescue phase of a strategic rescue operation. This thesis will present a corollary to the potential contribution of such a rescue assault force. This theme will be the need to

incorporate the more technological advanced methods of strategic transport for a rescue assault force.

Surprise is a critical element of rescue operations. One of the most significant hinderances in achieving surprise is the strategic distance potentially involved in rescue operations. The distance from an operational staging base was a problem for the U.S. raid on Son Tay, the Israeli raid on Entebbe, and the U.S. attempted raid in Iran. In the latter case, the distance was a limiting factor which contributed to the failure of the mission. With strategic distances presenting such a formidable problem, it will be argued that a rescue assault force requires the capability to develop, procure, test, and train using the most advanced strategic transport means conceivable through modern technology. The terminology "strategic transitional transport" for this study includes more than the term implies. The problem and definition go beyond the basic transport from one point to another by strategic airlift. The requirement this thesis will explore is the need for the capability of a rescue force to depart a secure base, travel global strategic distances, and transition from a strategic deployment directly into a tactical rescue operation to secure hostages. To this add the requirement of maintaining optimum secrecy and achieving optimum surprise.

The technological problem of strategic transitional transport has been chosen for this thesis because it represents one of the greatest obstacles to successful rescue operations which need a priority solution. It also represents the type of large budget investment which would have to compete with other defense department funding under the present budget appropriation system. Because the current

funding strategy is focused on nuclear and conventional arms procurement, and will likely remain so, this thesis will argue that strategic transitional transport will require innovative technology to equal the myriad challenges of international terrorist hostage events.

The remainder of this introductory chapter will outline the specific issues and the purpose of each chapter in developing the thesis.

- (1) The trends of force development in meeting challenges of U.S. national interests since World War II and the impact of these trends affecting development of a counterterrorist force.
- (2) The increasing U.S. economic, political and geostrategic dependence on Third World nations and the need to secure U.S. interest abroad.
- (3) The probability of a continuing terrorist threat to U.S. interests by Third World nations as an economy extension of national power.
- (4) The historical contribution of technology to U.S. military development and the potential role of technology in counterterrorist operations.

The discussion in chapter 2 will review the events since the end of World War II which indicate that nuclear strategic forces, conventional mechanized forces in Europe, and development of rapid deployable light infantry units for Middle East contingencies will dominate defense spending in the 1980's. In reaching this conclusion, a study will be made of several factors which have interacted for more than three and a half decades since World War II to shape the present military force structure. The factors in this study include: past presidential administration national security policies, perceived potential enemy threats during each administration, the degree of

public support for defense policies, and finally, the Congressional budget appropriations provided to achieve national defense objectives.

Chapter 3 will examine the rise of Third World powers and their increasing influence in world affairs. The United States has grown increasingly dependent on Third World nations for both fuel and nonfuel minerals. This examination will highlight the significance of this dependence as it affects U.S. national security and emphasizes the importance of being able to project U.S. military power to secure significant or vital interests when and if required to do so by the national command authority. Although not in the scope of this thesis, the more desirable solutions to terrorist hostage situations are clearly recognized. It is assumed that U.S. respect for Third World nations' sovereignty will continue to be respected and that foreign governments will join in efforts to prevent and resolve terrorist incidents through international accord and law. This thesis does not deny the use of negotiated settlements that do not violate the limits of current U.S. policy toward terrorists is the preferred nonviolent solution for obtaining the freedom of hostage victims. The thrust of this thesis is that if and when the presidential decision is made to employ force, that deliberate preparation will have been made to include the most unreserved implementation of U.S. technological superiority.

During the past two decades, the national security policies of the United States have become increasingly concerned over the rise of power and influence of Third World nations.⁶ The military aspect of U.S. national security is particularly significant in two areas of U.S. foreign policy issues related to Third World nations. First is

the economic aspect of maintaining U.S. access to vital resources in Third World countries. Second is the strategic significance of the geographic spread of communist control and influence over Third World nations.

Specifically, chapter 3 will highlight the significance of vital resources and the geostrategic spread of communist influence as it impacts on U.S. national security. The study in this chapter will be made for the purpose of investigating the degree of influence the above two factors may have with regard to the potential future incidence of terrorism involving U.S. interests abroad. The study of terrorism will include the trends which indicate the probable continued occurrence of terrorist activities against the U.S. and its Western allies.

The development of military strategies and force structure are presently designed to provide appropriate response to those areas of enemy threat perceived by the national security council advisors to the President as presenting the greatest security risks to the nation. The most current assessment focuses on the threat of nuclear war as the most serious risk to the survival of the U.S. nation state. The degrees of particular types of risk are also assessed as to the probability of their associated occurrence. A graphic representation of this assessment follows with the military forces appropriate to a deterrence or a counterresponse.⁷




Figure 1-1. Force Employment Spectrum.
Source: Army 1981-82 Green Book, (October 1981).

Having established the seriousness of the Third World threat in chapter 3, chapter 4 argues that the use of the above assessment may be incongruent with the stated national interests of the Reagan administration:⁸

Survive as a nation state.

Remain a global power.

This argument will be presented not only to challenge current strategy formulation, but to further suggest the impact a shift in risk assessment might have for the implementation of improved counterterrorist forces. These forces include the rescue assault forces introduced earlier as the subject of this thesis.

Chapter 5 faces the reality that even if strategic policies were to shift toward a new emphasis on counterterrorism, the program funding procedures of the Department of Defense and Congress would move too slowly to affect the rapid change which possibly needs to take place. Therefore, chapter 5 examines the potential use of technology as a quick and affordable contribution or solution to the strategic transitional transport and operational needs of current U.S. counterterrorist units. This study of technology will include a short review of the open source technology employed by the Iranian hostage rescue attempt in 1980.⁹ This review of the United States' most recent special rescue operation will serve to illustrate some of the difficult challenges of remote long-range operations which may again cause international political difficulties for the United States.

Conclusions will be made in chapter 6 to assess the potential contribution of rescue assault forces to national security and the survival of Western democracy.

Chapter 7 presents recommendations for further consideration which possibly could contribute to the solutions of the problems facing future use of rescue assault forces in counterterrorist hostage events. A special emphasis on recommendations for the technological development of strategic transitional transport is presented as additional recommendations at appendix 1.

In summary, this thesis will submit that the United States dependence on the Third World has increased so dramatically that current assessment and force development strategies may not adequately assess the threat and accurately prioritize the preparations for a military response. Since force development trends will likely remain

focused on nuclear strategic and conventional forces, the limited budget expenditures for counterterrorism might appropriately focus on the advantages offered by superior U.S. technology. The technological superiority may be a particular advantage with regard to solving the difficulties associated with rescue operations over global strategic distances.

CHAPTER 1 ENDFOTES

¹Glenn K. Otis, "Army Must Fight Terrorism, Unrest, Too," 31, No. 12 (1981) 48, 50.

The viewpoints expressed represent the approved opinion of the Army as General Officer public addresses require DA approval. This opinion has been similarly voiced by the Secretary of the Army.

Also see: David C. Jones, United States Military Posture for FY 82 (1981), 111.

²Richard F. Staar, "U.S.S.R. and Red China in the Third World," NATO's Fifteen Nations, Vol. 25, No. 3 (1980), 82.

According to the widely-held theory of Mao Tse Tung, the First World consists of the two major superpowers (U.S. and U.S.S.R.); the developed countries of Australia, Canada, Europe, and Japan are the Second World; and the remaining lesser-developed countries in Africa, Asia (including China) and Latin America comprise the Third World.

³Jimmy Carter, "State of the Union 1980," Vital Speeches of the Day, XLVI, No. 8 (1980) 226.

In this address President Carter stated the U.S. would never yield to blackmail.

Ronald Reagan, "Inaugural Address; Putting America Back to Work," Vital Speeches of the Day, XLVII, No. 9 (1981) 260.

Although comments on terrorism are guarded, due to the fact the Iranian hostages were being released as he spoke, President Reagan admonished the enemies of freedom that the American people have the will to fight for peace. American's moral courage as a vital weapon was directed in an admonishment to those who practiced terrorism. Seven days later in a welcome home speech to the hostages, the President warned terrorists that the policy for future incidents would be one of swift and effective retribution.

⁴Jimmy Carter, "They Are Prisoners No More," Vital Speeches of the Day, XLVII, No. 9 (1981) 262.

Former President paid tribute to those raid participants who died in the rescue attempt.

⁵Zbigniew Brzezinski, "The Failed Mission," The New York Times Magazine, CXXXI, No. 45, 287 (April 18, 1982) 79.

⁶Francis P. Hoerber, Arms, Men, and Military Budgets, Issues for Fiscal Year 1978 (1977), foreward by Eugene V. Rostow, xii-xvii.

⁷Edward C. Meyer, "The Challenge of Change," Army 1981-82 Green Book, 31, No. 10 (1981) 14, 16.

⁸Casper W. Weinberger, SECDEF, before the National Security Affairs Conference, Fort McNair, Washington, D.C., 14 July 1981. DOD (Public Affairs) News Release No. 328-81, p. 2.

9J. L. Holloway, III, "Group Analyzes Reasons for Failure,"
Aviation Week and Space Technology, 113 (1980) 61-71.

The cited publication consists of a reprint of the unclassified
"Rescue Mission Report" conducted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff-Special
Operations Review Group in August 1980. The group consisted of a five
member General Officer panel which was chaired by Admiral Holloway.

CHAPTER TWO

DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL FORCE STRUCTURES AND STRATEGY

This chapter will review the historical development of U.S. national strategies since the end of WW II. For the purposes of this thesis, it is important to review how the United States has arrived at its present military force structure in terms of attempts made to protect U.S. national interests and support foreign policies. This study should make clear those evolutionary defense systems within the DOD which will likely remain "sacred cows" and, as such, remain unlikely to suffer at the expense of new military programs. The purpose of reviewing the historical development of force structure is to consider what possibility exists for quantum progress in funding technological development of the rescue assault force introduced in Chapter One.

Historically, the development and funding of U.S. forces has been in direct response to a need to protect the national interest of the United States. There have been as many definitions of national interest as there have been administrations, but basically, the interest remains much the same regardless of the rhetoric used by the National Command Authority to articulate them.¹ U.S. interests, whether they be vital, significant or important interests² have a tendency to evolve from U.S. ideology, economic and political concerns. Since WW II, our interests have been shaped by our concern in surviving as a democracy and maintaining global strength as a world power.³ As a participant in a world economic market, our economic

interests and therefore, our political and military interests extend beyond the U.S. geographical boundaries. This extension of interests is necessary to maintain access to sea lines of communication, access to economic markets and more importantly, in recent years, access to resources. Particularly significant is the access to raw materials and minerals of foreign nations. In order to survive as a nation, the majority of U.S. defense forces have been designed to respond to perceived nuclear and conventional threats by other nations and ideologies. Therefore, two forces are interacting in force development:

- global conventional power projection for economic and political security
- nuclear power for deterrence of perceived nuclear threats.⁴

More than any time in its history, the United States is faced with a multiplicity of military-related threats from external global sources.⁵ In Europe, NATO is faced by the Warsaw Pact nations with formidable conventional and tactical nuclear armies. The Soviet strategic nuclear threat persists from both inside the Soviet Union and from submarine launch platforms around the world. The Middle East and Indian Ocean Region remains a bubbling cauldron of instability which threatens interruption of vital oil resources to Western democracies. In the Caribbean and Latin America, communist expansion through leftist movements continues to threaten the geostrategic security of the U.S. southern flank. In Asia, the North-South Korean animosity threatens the security of that region. Additionally, the security of the Western world is threatened by acts of terrorism from factions such as Libya, the Palestine Liberation Organization, the Red

Brigade and others. At this crucial time when increased military spending is part of the strategic solution, the United States is in the midst of an economic recession. As of this writing, both public and congressional popular support for increased defense spending appears to be waning in favor of retention of social and welfare programs and avoidance of record deficit spending.⁶

NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY SUPPORT AND DEVELOPMENT

The successful support of any national defense strategy requires a cooperative integration of at least four factors:

- The accurate assessment of perceived threats to national interests.
- A national will supportive of U.S. involvement or participation in national strategies (military, political, or economic).
- Congressional appropriations funding of defense needs to adequately finance the military forces required to enforce policy.
- Popular political and public support for administration defense policies.

These factors separate national will from popular support; although closely related, they are not really the same. National will is better characterized by what the United States will do when pressed by external pressures or overt threats. Public opinion for defense spending has traditionally been nonsupportive. This nonsupport is usually reflected in congressional attitudes and directly affects appropriations for defense. As a result, congressional defense attitudes have traditionally perceived appropriations requests as either extravagant or inflated and therefore, have seldom financed the full measure of needs identified by military planners.⁷

Under the present system of defense planning, the President, with the advice of his national security advisors, identifies the threat and articulates a national defense policy for meeting that threat to the desired degree. Defense planners then identify the numbers and types of forces required to meet the prioritized needs in the defense policy. The DOD then submits a budget request to finance the required forces to Congress for approval. The difference in the amount the DOD requests, based on their perception of the need, and the money Congress actually approves has been traditionally referred to as "risk." In contemporary parlance of the Reagan administration, the risk has been referred to as the "margin of safety."⁸

U.S. MILITARY FORCE STRUCTURE

The dual requirement to provide both strategic nuclear forces and conventional forces has been a challenge to every presidential administration since the dawn of the atomic age.

We must implement an overall strategic modernization program that decreases the vulnerability of our strategic forces, restores our strength relative to the Soviets and assures that the Kremlin is denied any prospect of success in nuclear conflict. Accordingly, in our review of the FY 1982 Air Force budget, we are determined to ensure that sufficient funding was provided to carry out the essential modernization of our B-1 bomber, ICBM, and air defense forces as well as related combat communication and control capabilities.

General Lew Allen, Jr.⁹
November 1981
Air Force Chief of Staff

Of the potentially violent situations faced by the nation "nuclear war is the least likely" to occur, while the requirement to have "responsive conventional forces" has taken on a new and urgent meaning.

General Edward Meyer¹⁰
November 1981
Army Chief of Staff

Although these viewpoints appear predictably parochial to the service components they represent, the challenge to the U.S. military aspect of national security for the next decade lies in the reality that both of the officers are correct.

Although having achieved a nuclear monopoly at the end of World War II, the Truman administration actually did very little initially to provide direction for military force development. The administration, having completed a second installment on the "war to end all wars," focused its attention and efforts on America's desire for a return to normalcy.¹¹ The United States, under public and congressional pressure, accomplished one of the fastest demobilizations in history. In less than a year following VJ Day the Army declined from 8.02 million to 1.89 million soldiers and by 1947 reached 1.4 million.¹² President Truman's determination to balance the budget resulted in the "remainder" method of financing military expenditures. After all other domestic and foreign aid programs were budgeted, defense received the remainder.¹³ This reduction in resources left the Navy and Army (to include the Army Air Corps) to develop strategies for the "policy of containment" with existing resources. Added to the difficulty of scarce resources was the lack of specific national direction for planning and lack of cooperation among the services. All components--air, land, and sea--sought methods to prove that their own service could best employ the power of the atomic bomb.¹⁴ Faced with the concern over Soviet aggression in Greece and Turkey in 1947, the Truman Doctrine was formed and the evolutionary process began which changed the national military strategy from the traditional concept of "mobilization" to the theory

of "deterrence." This latter concept appealed to the American people and Congress because it represented an alternative to a large standing army which has traditionally been opposed in the American ideology.

Eisenhower not only inherited the same rationale for active nuclear force development following the Korean Conflict, but additionally, he was faced with the increasing Soviet challenge in the nuclear arms race. The Eisenhower administration's policy became known as "massive retaliation" and relied upon the U.S. nuclear arsenal to deter both nuclear and limited war threats. The credibility of the latter was uncertain to potential adversaries and allies because it was clearly overly punitive for limited conflicts or aggression.¹⁵ In a statement before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in March 1954, Secretary Dulles acknowledged the limitations of nuclear deterrence and cited the need for the U.S. and its allies to maintain "air, sea and land power based on both conventional and atomic weapons" which could be applied "on a selective or massive basis as conditions may require." The purpose of these forces also included a "mobile reserve" for use in small-scale conflicts and to react to indirect aggression and subversion.¹⁶ In spite of the administration's public recognition of this requirement, nuclear deterrence remained the top priority.¹⁷

Under Eisenhower's "new look programs" the decision was made that U.S. military policy would depend on nuclear weapons to meet contingencies less than general war. Nuclear systems continued to increase to offset a reduction in conventional forces.¹⁸ The strategic nuclear force development in the 1950's consumed as much as one third of the defense budget. This trend continued until 1966 when the Vietnam War took the lead in defense spending.¹⁹

Faced with the simultaneous challenges of a growing Soviet nuclear arsenal and communist expansion throughout the world, the Kennedy administration developed the policy of "flexible response."

Let every nation know, whether it wishes us well or ill, we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend or oppose any foe to assure the survival and success of liberty.


John F. Kennedy--Inaugural Address²⁰

Under this new policy, President Kennedy and Secretary of Defense McNamara attempted to develop a force structure to meet any level of threat with the appropriate selective response, either nuclear or conventional. In the early 60's, the Kennedy administration clearly recognized a dual nuclear and conventional mechanized threat from the U.S.S.R. along with their increased use of unconventional warfare and subversion for spreading communism to lesser developed countries.²¹ The establishment of a communist government in Cuba made the public more cognizant of this dual threat. The Army conventional forces were expanded from twelve to sixteen divisions and reserve and National Guard revitalized. To counter the growing communist unconventional threat, the U.S. Army Special Forces were expanded and improved.²²

With the Soviet Sputnik orbiting in space, a communist Cuba off the coast of Florida, the missile gap campaign issue and Soviet Premiere Khrushchev's prediction, "We will bury you," it was relatively easy for Kennedy to rally Congressional financial support to meet Soviet challenges on all fronts. This popular support for the arms race declined significantly, however, as the Vietnam War began to dominate defense spending in the late 60's. Figure 2-1, which follows, illustrates the comparative U.S. defense expenditures with

and without the cost of Southeast Asia (SEA) war. Also shown are comparative Soviet expenditures during the same period.²³

COMPARISON OF US MILITARY INVESTMENT OUTLAYS WITH ESTIMATED DOLLAR COST OF SOVIET MILITARY INVESTMENT ACTIVITIES



NOTES:

INVESTMENT INCLUDES RDT&E, PROCUREMENT AND MILITARY CONSTRUCTION

Figure 2-1. Comparison of U.S. Military Investment Outlays with Estimated Dollar Cost of Soviet Military Investment Activities.

Source: Annual Report to the Congress by the Secretary of Defense, Fiscal Year 1983.

The national will of the U.S. in the post Vietnam era did not favor large defense spending. The numerous "great society" welfare programs initiated during the Johnson administration competed fiercely

for Congressional appropriations.²⁴ Even though the size of the defense budget increased annually following the end of World War II, the buying power of the dollar in the 1970's continued to shrink as inflation increased. The actual gross national product vested in defense since 1955 has continued to decline except during the height of the Vietnam War era.²⁵




Figure 2-2. National Defense Outlays as a Percent of GNP
Source: The United States Budget in Brief FY 83 Office of Management and Budget.

The factors of less public support for defense spending and rampant inflation in the 1970's, along with the U.S.S.R.'s determination to be number one militarily, allowed the U.S.S.R. to surpass the U.S. defense establishment in both conventional and nuclear

arms.²⁶ Having extricated the U.S. from Vietnam in 1972, the Nixon administration was faced with the challenge of developing national security policies that were realistic in terms of a changing international community, the national will, and a declining economic posture. The Nixon policy concluded that nuclear superiority was impossible to maintain and an attempt to do so would only escalate the arms race. Therefore, a policy of "nuclear sufficiency" was adopted which promoted the concept that a sufficient counterforce was the best force level to maintain realistic deterrence.²⁷

With the Vietnam War over, planners for U.S. Army forces focused their attention on the reestablishment of a strong conventional army. Two areas of potential conflict were identified. The first was the potential for a large mechanized and tactical nuclear war in Europe against a Soviet force which was expanding far beyond the size required for conventional defense of the Soviet homeland. The second threat was a recognition of the lessons learned in Korea and Vietnam that the requirement could arise to fight a small-scale limited war in some other part of the globe.²⁸ This resulted in the "one and a half war" theory around which Army force structure would be developed throughout the 1970's.²⁹ The research, development, and procurement of Army systems to support the strategy of a one and a half war concept in the 1970's were dominated primarily by research and development efforts to meet the challenges of mechanized and armor warfare in the European environment. The more expensive tactical systems included medium-range tactical and theater nuclear missiles, improved fighter-interceptor aircraft, electronically guided antitank systems and the technologically sophisticated M-1 Abrams main battle tank.

A paradox seems to exist from the preceding discussions between the forces developed and the most probable types of conflict to occur. DOD spending for nuclear forces since the end of World War II and expenses for conventional forces since the end of the Vietnam War have been focused on nuclear deterrence and a possible European war, which has been regarded as the least likely type of warfare to occur. The essence of nuclear deterrence depends upon the devastating horror of an intercontinental nuclear exchange. The destructive force is intended to discourage an enemy nation from unleashing a nuclear exchange that would almost certainly invite retaliatory self-destruction.³⁰ The mechanized war in Europe, although currently recognized by many strategic planners as the greatest threat to U.S.-N.A.T.O. security, is, likewise, unlikely because of the unknown escalation which could occur through Soviet doctrinal use of tactical nuclear weapons.³¹ This paradox will be examined further in chapter 4.

The Nixon Doctrine which continued into both the Ford and Carter administrations was titled "Strategy for Peace." This policy consisted of the realistic deterrence policy to counter the Soviet threat as well as an increased reliance on allies to maintain stability in other regions of the world which held vital U.S. interests.³² National Security Council document number 162 had proposed as early as 1953 the dependence on foreign allied states armed with U.S. equipment to maintain regional stability.³³ In the aftermath of Vietnam, this was a much more popular option to continue supporting than providing U.S. forces in the Middle East to retain access and maintain an uninterrupted flow of oil to the Western democracies.

In an effort to fulfill a campaign platform issue, President Carter attempted to curb foreign military sales including those to the Persian Gulf and Middle East regions. In spite of popular public and Congressional support for the effort, the policies were ineffective and resulted in little or no change to arms sales abroad.³⁴

A "Twin Pillar" strategy was pursued by the Nixon administration which depended on Iran and Saudi Arabia to support the stability of the Persian Gulf region.³⁵

With the fall of the Shah of Iran during the Carter administration, one of the "pillars" collapsed and the 20-year U.S. investment in Persian Gulf stability vanished virtually overnight. The crisis which ensued posed new questions as to the ability of the United States to provide stability in Third World nations-- particularly in areas possessing vital resources for the U.S. and other Western democracies. The Iran crisis also caused an increased concern over the reliability of allied efforts to provide stability for U.S. vital interests.³⁶

The need to have a force responsive to foreign threats against U.S. interest in the Middle East was acted upon by the Carter administration in 1979 as a result of the Iranian crisis. This crisis threatened to interrupt the flow of Middle East oil to the dependent Western world. President Carter's partial solution was the creation in 1979 of the multi-service Rapid Deployment Force Headquarters at McDill AFB, Florida.³⁷ This planning organization quickly uncovered many shortfalls in the ability of the U.S. to transport and sustain a military fighting force in the Middle East. As a result of this revelation, a significant portion of the U.S. defense budget into the

late 1980's is to be consumed with increased production of air and sea lift capability.³⁸

The ground forces designated for the Army contingent of the Rapid Deployment Force include XVIII Airborne Corps and two of its subordinate elements consisting of the 82nd Airborne Division and the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile). These units for the past decade have been the contingency forces designated to respond to the so called "half war" emergencies.³⁹ In 1981 the Reagan administration directed through the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the Rapid Deployment Force be integrated into a proposed forward deployed Indian Ocean separate unified command.⁴⁰ This new command would be similar to the unified commands in Europe and the Pacific. This obviously provides the ability to react simultaneously to conflict in both Europe and the Middle East (or "two wars"). A new problem now confronts contingency planners: since the Rapid Deployment Force has evolved into this new command, what forces will be available to fight the recognized Third World (half war) threat? This threat becomes increasingly significant in light of increased turbulence in the political and military instability of Latin America and the Caribbean. A threat to significant minerals or investments in South America or Africa in the future could be as important as oil resources from the Middle East.⁴¹ Of the 36 nonfuel minerals essential to U.S. industry, 22 are crucially dependent upon foreign sources. By controlling the Republic of South Africa, Zaire and Zambia, the U.S.S.R. could severely and adversely affect the U.S. industrial society.⁴²

It is apparent from this assessment that the U.S. must achieve the capability not only to protect its investments abroad to protect its

economic power but also to prevent Soviet intimidation or coercion through control of significant or vital resource interests.

The magnitude of the Soviet arsenal coupled with its unbridled willingness since World War II to use force to subjugate European and Asian nations⁴³ makes it likely that U.S. defense spending in the 1980's and beyond will be forced to match the Soviet threat. This Soviet threat to the free world will force the U.S. to provide nuclear, naval, and conventional force deterrence.

PRESIDENTIAL INFLUENCE ON FORCE DEVELOPMENT

Regardless of the policies a U.S. president may desire to implement, the military force structure he has available to enforce those policies is largely inherited from his predecessor. The strategic direction he implants on force development is seldom realized in a single term of office. The national security objectives between the latter part of the Carter and the new Reagan administrations did not change significantly. This provided some stability in the direction force development was and is moving. The major change which has occurred is the increased funding the Reagan administration has been able to provide for national defense. Although both administrations had proposed increased spending, the Reagan budget proposals provide a rate of increase designed to quickly overcome current shortfalls in the defense posture.⁴⁴

COMPARISON OF DEFENSE OUTLAYS




Figure 2-3. Comparison of Defense Outlays.
Source: Office of Management and Budget printed in The Kansas City Starr, Sunday, February 7, 1982.

President Reagan has defined two U.S. national interests around which to design policy in the early 1980's:

- Survive as a nation state.
- Remain as a global power.

The current administration has listed five U.S. National Security Objectives to support these national interests:⁴⁵

- Prevent coercion of the United States, its allies and friends.
- Protect U.S. interests and U.S. citizens abroad.
- Maintain access to critical resources.
- Oppose geographic expansion of Soviet control and military presence worldwide.
- Encourage long-term political and military changes within the Soviet empire.

The methods for accomplishing these objectives will be determined primarily by the President and top cabinet officials. The tone of the objectives imply that a viable military force may be required to deter, influence, or enforce these objectives at some future time. Of course, the national command authority will make the key decisions as to what combination of political, diplomatic, economic, or military power will be used to achieve national security objectives. Should military forces be required, the broad spectrum of the objectives pose a challenge to the military planners in the Department of Defense. Given the budget limitations for all U.S. programs into the mid-1980's, the military will be pressed to provide adequate forces to execute the multiple operations plans which may be simultaneously required.

In summary, the complexities of funding forces to meet the perceived nuclear and conventional threats of the past have now been compounded with the requirement to quickly fund a deployable force capable of securing U.S. vital interests in the Middle East, Africa and possibly, Latin America. This chapter has highlighted those trends of force development dictated by U.S. national security interests since the end of World War II. President Reagan has made it clear that he believes that in order to protect American interests, the U.S. must be able to conduct foreign policy negotiations from a position of strength.⁴⁶ He has stated that our first military priority must be the restoration of U.S. strategic capabilities so that military power can give credibility to U.S. political, economic, and diplomatic powers. The second priority is the military power projection capability that can only be achieved through a balance

between the forces to be moved and the global transportation assets to move them.⁴⁷ These two priorities give credence to the assumption that strategic nuclear and strategic transport forces will receive the maximum funding possible until the window of vulnerability in these areas are closed.⁴⁸

From the information presented in this chapter the following assumptions are drawn for the continuation of the main thesis:

- Historical precedence since World War II has indicated a requirement to provide a viable and flexible military force composed of both strategic nuclear and conventional forces.

- The cost of the Vietnam War, public anti-military sentiment, antidefense spending attitudes and inflation have weakened the U.S. defense posture.

- Soviet aggression using surrogate forces, conventional forces and the threat posed by nuclear arms build up suggest that the U.S. must strengthen her military defense capabilities in spite of economic recession trends predicted for the early 1980's.

- The rise of international influence and power of Third World nations, particularly Africa and the oil exporting countries, is of significant interest to the U.S. because of U.S. dependence on minerals and economic investment in these countries.

- The ability of the Department of Defense to fulfill its role in the implementation of multiple national security objectives presents a demanding challenge given the limited budget appropriations likely to be available during a period of economic recession.

With the existing priority to fund conventional and strategic nuclear forces to meet the challenge of the most seriously perceived threats, the outlook for progressive funding of U.S. counterterrorist forces is somewhat dubious. Again, this prospect exists in spite of the fact that the terrorist threat is the more probable type of conflict to occur. (See Figure 1-1, page 10)

Discussion in subsequent chapters will suggest that Soviet anti-American objectives in the Third World made through the mechanism of terrorism is moving faster than U.S. efforts to curb them. Therefore, short-term solutions must be found to arrest the terrorist threat to Third World stability which in turn threatens Western democracy.

CHAPTER 2 ENDNOTES

¹The so-called "Carter Doctrine" which emerged from his 1980 State of the Union address does not differ significantly from that of the Reagan administration. Each new administration attempts to change the verbiage of national interests and policy objectives but in fact a higher order of reality limits the flexibility of radical changes in strategic policy directions.

²William O. Staudenmaier, "Strategic Concepts for the 1980's," Special Report of Strategic Studies Institute (1981), 4.

Vital Interest--of such importance as to have direct bearing on the attainment of basic U.S. national security objectives. U.S. would risk escalation to general nuclear war to protect vital interest.

Significant Interest--of such significance the U.S. would be willing to use military force to protect it, short of escalation to nuclear war.

Important Interest--of lesser significance than vital or significant interests, but important enough to use limited air, naval and logistical support. Ground forces would only be used in an advisory role.

National Command Authority--President of U.S. as Commander-In-Chief

³Francis P. Hoerber and William Schneider, Jr., Arms, Men and Military Budgets, Issues for Fiscal Year 1978 (1977), xi.

⁴Harold Brown, Department of Defense Annual Report Fiscal Year 1982 (1981), 4.

⁵Paul H. Nitze, "Strategy in the Decade of the 1980's," Foreign Affairs, 59, No. 1 (1980), 92-93.

Walter Andrews, "Meyer Warns of Global Strategy Gap," Army Times, 42, No. 29 (1982), 6.

⁶Ed Magnuson, "Playing It Cool or Frozen in Ice?" Time, 119, No. 12 (1982), 34.

⁷Stefan T. Fossony, The Strategy of Technology (1970), 78.

⁸Associated Press, "Defense Spending Bid is Aimed at Restoring Margin of Safety," Kansas City Star, 102, No. 117 (1982).

⁹U.S. Air Force, Air Force Policy Letter for Commanders (1 Nov 1982), 1.

¹⁰Jim Tice, "Meyer Stresses Conventional Forces Needed for Most Likely Challenge," Army Times, (Washington, D.C.), November 2, 1981, 7.

¹¹Gabriel A. Almond, The American People and Foreign Policy (1965), 54-56, 66.

¹²Amos A. Jordon, American National Security Policy and Process (1981), 60-61.

¹³Ibid., 63.

¹⁴Robert A. Doughty, "The Evolution of U.S. Army Tactical Doctrine, 1946-76," Leavenworth Papers, 1 (1979), 12.

¹⁵Op. Cit. Jordon, 52-53.

Samuel F. Wells, Jr., "The Origins of Massive Retaliation," Political Science Quarterly, 96, No. 1 (1981), 34-37.

¹⁶Ibid., Wells, 41, 42.

¹⁷Jerome H. Kahan, Security in the Nuclear Age (1975), 15-17.

¹⁸Ibid., 11-12, 15.

¹⁹William Schneider, Jr., Arms, Men and Military Budgets, Issues for Fiscal Year 1977 (1976), 136.

²⁰Op. Cit., Jordon, 73.

²¹Op. Cit., Kahan, 75-77.

²²Op. Cit., Jordon, 72.

²³Caspar W. Weinberger, Annual Report to the Congress Fiscal Year 1983 (1982), 11-6.

²⁴Colin S. Gray, "National Style in Strategy - The American Example," International Security, 6, No. 2 (Fall 1981), 40.

²⁵Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget, The United States Budget in Brief, Fiscal Year 1983 (1982), 22.

²⁶Francis P. Hoerber and William Schneider, Jr., Arms, Men, and Military Budgets, Issues for Fiscal Year 1981 (1980), 7, 17, 18.

²⁷Op. Cit., Jordon, 74.

²⁸Alden Willisma and David W. Tarr, Modules in Security Studies (1974), 52-53.

In his 1972 foreign policy report, President Nixon said, "Approaching strategic parity also means that the probability of challenge below the level of full-scale nuclear or conventional war has increased."

²⁹Richard Nixon, U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's: Shaping a Durable Peace (1973), 15, 187.

³⁰Bernard Brodie, War and Politics (1973), 375.

A Soviet viewpoint which may or may not still be valid was made by Premier Khrushchev upon signing the friendship pact with East Germany on June 12, 1964. He articulately stated, "Nuclear war is stupid, stupid, stupid! If you reach for the push button, you reach for suicide."

A contrasting viewpoint that the Soviets perhaps think they can win a nuclear war is presented in the following source:

Richard Pipes, "Why the Soviet Union Thinks It Could Fight and Win a Nuclear War," Commentary, 64, No. 1 (1977), 1-13.

³¹Cf., Figure 1-1 (Page 10), Force Employment Spectrum.

³²Richard Nixon, U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's: A New Strategy for Peace (1970), 5, 6.

³³National Security Planning Board, A Report to the National Security Council: NSC 162 (1953), 24.

³⁴Leslie H. Gelb, "PRM 12 Three Years Later," Aviation Week and Space Technology, 112, No. 12 (1980) 8-9.

Richard N. Strand, "The United States Arms Transfer Program - The Evolution of An Instrument of Foreign Policy", (MMAS Thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1980), 88-94.

³⁵Op. Cit., Nixon, Shaping a Durable Peace, 140-141.

³⁶Harold Borwn, Department of Defense Annual Report Fiscal Year 1982 (1981), vii.

³⁷International Institute for Strategic Studies, Strategic Survey 1979 (1980), 36, 37.

³⁸Casper Weinberger, Annual Report to the Congress, Fiscal Year 1983 (1982), III-106.

³⁹Charles D. McMillin, "Roles and Missions of Airborne, Ranger, and Special Forces in Contingency Operations," (MMAS Thesis, USA Command and General Staff College, 1979), 26, 37, 49.

⁴⁰Richard Halloran, "Deployment Force Seeks Permanent Mideast Post," The New York Times, CXXXI, No. 45, 166 (1981), A12.

⁴¹Editors, "Powder Keg at Our Doorstep," U.S. News and World Report, LXXXVIII, No. 19 (1980), 21-27.

⁴²Fred Warshofsky, "Strategic Minerals: The Invisible War," Readers Digest, 118, No. 706 (1981), 81.

⁴³Reference is to the armed Soviet incursion into Hungary (1956), Czechoslovakia (1968) and Afghanistan (1979).

⁴⁴Associated Press, "Defense Spending Bid is Aimed at Restoring Margin of Safety," Kansas City Star, 102, No. 117 (1982), 40A.

⁴⁵Casper W. Weinberger, before the National Security Affairs Conference, Fort McNair, Washington, D.C., 14 July 1981. DOD (Public Affairs) News Release No. 328-81, 2, 4.

⁴⁶Ronald Reagan, "Inaugral Address: Putting America Back to Work," Vital Speeches of the Day, XLVII, No. 9 (1981), 260.

⁴⁷Casper W. Weinberger, "Policy, Strategy, and the Budget," Defense 82, May (1982), 5, 6.

⁴⁸Clarence A. Robinson, Jr., "Emphasis Grows on Nuclear Defense," Aviation Week and Space Technology, 116, No. 10 (1982), 27.

CHAPTER THREE

CHALLENGE OF THE THIRD WORLD

Terrorism threatens to interrupt the stability of U.S. National Security relationships with Third World nations. An examination of the issues listed below will serve to identify the degree of concern that may be warranted with regard to combating terrorism and other low intensity conflicts which originate from or within the Third World. Of particular concern to U.S. National Security is the impact of interruption or curtailed access to strategic resources found in Third World countries.

This chapter will take an in-depth look at the national security challenges created by changes taking place in the Third World nations. This study will include three broad issues:

- (1) The impact of increased US dependence on vital and significant resources in Third World countries.
- (2) The geographical expansion of communist influence and domination of Third World states.
- (3) The degree of probability of a continuing threat of terrorism by Third World nations and the impact of terrorism on the U.S. and other western democracies.

U.S. DEPENDENCE ON THIRD WORLD RESOURCES

From the statements which follow it is apparent that both the U.S. and U.S.S.R. have been aware for some time of the critical need of vital resources to industrial survival.

*In the war against capitalism, Europe and America are the front, the colonial nations are the rear. You can't win at the front until you neutralize the rear.

We are exploiting the national ambitions of the colonial nations of the world and getting them into the socialist camp. That will deny the industrial nations of the west the fuels, raw materials, and the market without which the industrial nations cannot survive."

Stalin-1945¹

"Our aim is to gain control of the two great treasure houses on which the west depends: The energy treasure house of the Persian Gulf and mineral treasure house of Central and South Africa."

Brezhnev-1973²

"An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America. And such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force."

Carter's State of the Union Address³
January 1980

In the last decade, the U.S. dependence on Middle East oil was impressed upon the minds of the American public as a result of the 1973-74 oil embargo. Neither the oil dependence nor the increased reliance on African nonfuel minerals should come as a surprise threat to U.S. economic security. In 1948, President Truman commissioned a study to examine the world raw materials situation. The two and a half year study concluded that within 20-25 years America faced a materials problem of large dimensions.⁴ The 1973 oil crisis was right on schedule. The problem of U.S. dependence on African and Soviet nonfuel minerals is also on schedule but somewhat lesser known to the populace in general. Estimates by business experts have suggested as recently as October 1980 that a chrome embargo by the Soviet Union and Zimbabwe could bring the entire industrial world to its knees in just six months.⁵ West Germany has projected that a cut of only 30 per cent

in chromium supplies would cause a 25 per cent drop in their gross national product.⁶

Equally important for national security considerations is the lack of Soviet dependence on Third World nations for strategic minerals. The chart following (See figure 3-1) depicts the relative import dependence of eight critical minerals and metals between the western democracies and the U.S.S.R.

Former Secretary of Defense and of Energy James Schlesinger commented in September 1980 that "the task of dealing with the Third World is more complex than conforming to a checklist developed by the American Civil Liberties Union."⁷ This is a particularly important viewpoint in relation to civil rights issues which hamper U.S. relations with South Africa. In the midterm, South Africa is the United State's primary source of several strategic minerals. Together, the Soviet Union and South Africa control the following world production percentages of critical and strategic minerals:⁸

80% of gold

76% of chrome (critical and strategic)

90% of platinum

75% of manganese (critical and strategic)

90% of vanadium

IMPORT RELIANCE OF 8 CRITICAL MINERALS AND METALS




Figure 3-1. Import Reliance of 8 Critical Minerals and Metals. Source: Mechanics Illustrated, Vol. 78, No. 646, (March 1982), p. 58-59.

There is a recent example of the impact which can occur when the supply of a critical mineral (and in this case also strategic) is interrupted. The United States presently imports 93 per cent of its requirement for cobalt. In 1978, 68 per cent of the total U.S. cobalt imports came from the central African state of Zaire. Because of a Cuban-backed raid by Angolan-based Katangan insurgents on the mining facility of Kolwezi, Zaire, the supply of cobalt was temporarily halted. U.S. industry experienced serious production delays and the price per pound of cobalt jumped from \$6.40 to \$50.00.

The dependence of the U.S. on Third World nation's minerals goes beyond the critical day-to-day production requirements of U.S. industry. The strategic mineral stockpile of the United States is in a dangerous condition (See figure 3-2). In March 1981, Secretary of the Interior, James Watt, estimated "that of the 62 basic materials




Figure 3-2. U.S. Stockpile of Critical Metals

Source: Association of United States Army "Freedom in Peril: A Year End Assessment 1981" p. 5.

stockpiled, only 21 are stockpiled in sufficient quantity to meet national security requirements."¹⁰ These shortages are depicted in the following chart which indicates the metric tons on hand and the quantities to be purchased under the Regan administration's efforts to restore the strategic stockpile (See figure 3-3).

AMERICA'S STRATEGIC STOCKPILE:

US National Defense Stockpile of Minerals and Metals (Metric tons unless otherwise indicated)

<u>Material</u>	<u>Stockpile Target</u>	<u>Amount to be Purchased</u>
Aluminum group		
Aluminum metal	635,030	633,458
Bauxite, metallurgical grade (dry)	27,100,000	12,941,523
Aluminum oxide, abrasive grain group (tons of abrasive grain)	578,785	343,711
Bauxite, refractory grade (calcined)	1,400,000	1,225,401
Beryllium (contained metal in ore, alloy, and metallic forms)	1,107	144
Bismuth	998	54
Cadmium	5,307	2,436
Chromium (contained metal in ore ferroalloy and metallic form)	1,227,422	163,085
Chromite ore, refractory grade (dry)	771,108	416,023
Cobalt	38,737	17,870
Columbium (contained metal in concentrate, carbide, ferroalloy and metallic form)	2,200	1,061
Copper	907,186	880,834
Fluorspar, metallurgical grade (dry)	1,542,216	1,168,693
Fluorspar, acid grade (dry)	1,270,060	457,237
Graphite, Ceylon amorphous lump and Malagasy crystalline	23,859	2,623
Lead	997,904	452,653
Mica, muscovite, and phlogopite block	2,908	484
Nickel	181,437	181,437
Platinum group metals		
Iridium (troy oz)	98,000	81,009
Palladium (troy oz)	3,000,000	1,744,997
Platinum (troy oz)	1,310,000	857,360
Rutile (dry)	96,162	60,613
Tantalum (contained metal in carbide powder, metal, and mineral forms)	3,248	2,163
Titanium sponge	176,901	147,571

Figure 3-3. America's Strategic Stockpile.

Source: The China Business Review, Sept-Oct 1981, p. 66.

The oil embargo of 1973-74, the devaluation of the dollar on foreign currency exchanges, the ever-increasing dependence on Africa for industrial minerals, and the dependence on Middle East oil are all strong indicators that U.S. national security policies in the decades ahead must be strongly rooted in economic considerations. The ability of the United States to project power and to influence world affairs in the 1950's and 1960's was the result of strength in U.S. economic, military, and political posture.¹¹ As previously discussed in chapter 2, the Vietnam War and the U.S. national will following that war weakened the military establishment. During the late 1960's and early 1970's, the economic power balance shifted from the industrialized nations of the United States, Europe, and Japan to the oil exporting countries of the Arab world. The weakening of both economic and military clout has also affected the U.S. ability to achieve political security objectives.¹²

The proper balance of political, economic, and military concerns in the decade ahead will be difficult to achieve in concert with the goal of the Reagan administration to reduce and eliminate deficit spending. The challenge to defense planners will be to develop forces that can add credence to political efforts and adequate strength to enforce U.S. claims to vital and significant interests in the international arena. Of key importance are those interests in the Third World which are important enough that the U.S. would be willing to use military force to protect.

The continuing availability of critical resources through normal trade relations with Third World countries is threatened by increased economic participation by the Third World with the Soviet Union. This

increased Third World-Soviet trade relationship has occurred for a number of reasons. First, Third World countries, in an effort to become more independent, have recognized the advantages of diversifying their trade relationships so that a single trading partner cannot dominate political decisions through economic boycotts, sanctions, or coercion. For some Latin American and African states, this pursuit of economic independence has resulted in efforts to escape the traditional economic reliance on the United States. For other countries of the same regions, it has been more a matter of economic survival for them to search for other trade partners, to include the Soviet bloc. The Soviet Union pays in cash, is not overly concerned with balance of payments trade restrictions, and is less concerned with the effects of an unstable government upon their foreign industrial investments.¹³ On the other hand, U.S. industry has been disinvesting in Latin America and Africa due to the profit risk inherent with unstable, fast-changing revolutionary governments.¹⁴ For the present, most emerging lesser-developed Third World countries, in spite of efforts to expand trading partners, continue to recognize U.S. technology and marketing techniques as the most viable option for achieving economic progress and independence.¹⁵ The lesser-developed countries of Africa are seeking to develop industrial economies which are capable of participating as an equal partner in the world economy rather than remaining a mere supplier of raw materials to the West. To this end, Africa continues to seek Western involvement in their African progress but rejects those efforts which tend to force them into the former colonized role from which they are trying to escape.¹⁶

The above realities require a significant consideration in formulating foreign and economic strategies with Third World resource-rich

nations. The willingness of developing Third World nations to continue business ventures with Western democracies coupled with increased dependence upon these Third World countries by the United States, provides reason to believe that U.S. industry will, of necessity, continue to invest in Third World mining and industry.

This investment participation, which is vital to the economic aspect of U.S. national security, will continue to require the assignment of U.S. citizens abroad. Wherever this occurs, the U.S. citizen becomes a potential target for the terrorist committed to the "war against neo-colonialism, capitalism and imperialism."

The critical need for U.S. citizens abroad places an additional burden on U.S. military planning and resources when a military strategy is selected as the solution for the national military objective of protecting U.S. interests and citizens abroad.¹⁷

GEOSTRATEGIC ISSUES OF THE THIRD WORLD

In his book, Kingdoms of the Blind, Dr. Harold Rood carefully describes the geographical expansion of communist domination and influence since the end of World War II. Dr. Rood draws a comparison to the similarities of the U.S.S.R.'s potential use of the Warsaw Pact and "Finlandized" buffer states to the use made by Nazi Germany to launch the World War II offensives. This comparison appears valid as it might apply to conventional, political, and economic warfare.¹⁸

There is also a more ancient geostrategic comparison which is perhaps applicable to the present strategies of deterrence. Ancient dynastic warfare practiced in Asia contains examples of national conflicts involving geopolitical and geostrategic maneuver. In the ancient Chinese ideology, the natural order of society was to rule


through peaceful actions. To resort to actual armed conflict was regarded as an admission of failure to rule properly. Therefore, a dynastic ruler wishing to extend his influence would attempt, and most often succeed, to establish a political alliance with less powerful rulers through economic coercion or military intimidation. The selection of alliances with smaller nations was predicated on the geographic position of that state in relation to the true or ultimate objective nation. The collateral effect of this process eventually led to a condition in which the combined geostrategic position and total military strength of the alliance was so overwhelming that the objective nation would concede defeat without a single battle being fought. Some alliances would hasten the submission process further by closing trade routes at strategic chokepoints.¹⁹ This type of warfare considered in terms of Soviet expansion and influence in the Third World suggests relevance to the need to maintain the geographic stability of the Western world just in case a general war should occur. Unlike the Chinese, the Soviet's Marxist Leninist doctrine has no inhibition about resorting to armed conflict to secure the loyalty of their "alliances." Whereas the Chinese dynasties viewed armed conflict as a failure of the governing ruler, the Soviets rationalize the use of force as an expedient measure to more quickly achieve hegemony. The speed of Soviet expansion through force or coercion to obtain geostrategic advantages must therefore be made an issue of important concern in developing National Security Policies and Strategy.

As presented in chapter 2, the U.S. will be hard pressed in the 1980's to provide forces for all perceived threats. Limited budget resources simply will not allow the U.S. to provide forces capable of simultaneously covering every potential trouble spot in the world. By

threatening the southern flank of the U.S. through communist regimes in Central America and the Caribbean, the Soviets could force the commitment of military resources to guard that vulnerability. This, of course, would detract from assets available to be committed to NATO or the Middle East during hostilities or crisis. This diversion of resources is perhaps one consideration that has caused the Reagan administration to place emphasis on the need for a politico-economic and foreign aid solution to the insurgency in El Salvador. The Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, Thomas Enders, has publicly stated that the decisive battle for democracy in Latin America is now (1982) being waged in El Salvador.²⁰ It is possible, based on this statement, that the Reagan administration believes in the domino theory of communist aggression which was so clearly validated in Southeast Asia following the U.S. troop withdrawal.²¹ The geostrategic ramifications of the marxist-backed leftist control of Central America would have an unacceptable impact on the economic aspects of U.S. national security. U.S. shipping would be significantly degraded if denied the secure use of the Panama Canal during a low or mid intensity conflict.²² Nor could the military cargo sealift from the west coast supply NATO or Mid-East in a timely manner during limited conflict or general war.²³ Future U.S. energy needs might not be met without the oil market of Mexico's Caribbean basin.²⁴ As recently as 1979, 56 per cent of the refined oil entering the U.S. was refined in the Caribbean. Imported refined oil accounts for approximately 5 per cent of total U.S. oil requirements. Ten per cent of the total must be refined abroad partly because the U.S. lacks the deep water ports capable of handling super tankers. In addition to Caribbean refining,

the Caribbean ports are used to load super-tanker crude into smaller tankers for delivery to the U.S. ports.²⁵ Soviet naval and air advantages offered in the Caribbean by Cuban bases are already at a level which would have been intolerable prior to 1962. If the Soviets were to gain additional surrogate footholds in Central America, the potential during wartime for total control of the Caribbean sea routes could interdict 50 per cent of U.S. oil imports.²⁶ If the Soviets could likewise obtain the voluntary or intimidated use of eastern South American and western African states, the Atlantic passageway to Middle East oil could also be severely interrupted.²⁷ (See figure 3-4) The impact of interrupted supply lines would be more devastating to the European Economic Community than to the United States.

COMPARATIVE OIL TRAFFIC



The import of foreign oil by Western countries has made South Africa's geographic location at the southern tip of Africa a strategic keystone for the Free World. In 1978, an estimated 936 million tons of crude oil was transported around the Cape of Good Hope sea route.

Figure 3-4. Comparative Oil Traffic²⁸

Source: Moneymaker (October/November 1981), p. 42.

Control of the Cape (of Good Hope) route is tantamount, moreover, not only to control of the mineral resources of all of southern Africa, but also to control of Western Europe. Some 25,000 ships per year pass around the Cape, carrying about 90% of Western Europe's oil, 79% of its strategic minerals, and 25% of its food supplies. About 20% of U.S. oil also passes around the Cape, and varying percentages of U.S. mineral imports.

Warren Baker in Seapower,²⁹ Oct 80

It is not within the scope of this thesis to suggest solutions to the geostrategic changes taking place, but rather to illustrate that geostrategic problems do exist which cannot be ignored when considering U.S.-Third World strategies. If communism should achieve a geostrategic positioning so formidable that in a time of crisis, the U.S. could not hope to overcome it with conventional weapons, it is conceivable that submission might one day be the only alternative to nuclear escalation and annihilation. In short, a return to the ancient dynastic wars of strategic maneuver, or as Sun Tzu has stated:

"Violence is only one part of warfare and not even the preferred part. The aim of war is to subdue an opponent, in fine, to change his attitude and induce his compliance. The most economical means is the best: to get him--through deception, surprise, and his own ill-conceived pursuit of infeasible goals--to realize his inferiority, so that he surrenders or at least retreats without your having to fight him."³⁰

Can it be that the U.S. is pursuing an unrealistic goal of nuclear deterrence at the expense of a viable program to preserve a Western geostrategic advantage? Chapter 4 will examine this possibility in greater detail.

THIRD WORLD TERRORISM

As a contemporary instrument of war, systematic terrorism has roots which date back to the Russian revolution in 1878-1881.³¹ As a

serious threat to the United States and other Western democracies, however, there are some indications that terrorism has only begun. The distribution of terrorist incidents since 1968 indicates a definite propensity to occur in either the Western democracies or pro-Western nations³² (See figure 3-5).

Geographic Distribution of International Terrorist Incidents, 1968-80, by Category of Attack										
Total	Asia	Pacific	North America	Latin America	Western Europe	USSR/ Eastern Europe	Sub-Saharan Africa	Middle East/North Africa	Other	Total
Kidnaping	25	1	5	203	47	0	61	57	2	401
Barricade-hostage	4	0	8	51	38	2	2	33	1	139
Letter bombing	131	0	26	17	200	0	15	32	49	470
Incendiary bombing	36	7	85	101	390	3	6	113	12	753
Explosive bombing	98	16	325	496	859	16	28	489	46	2,371
Armed attack	21	0	4	54	52	1	23	122	1	278
Hijacking	21	0	29	35	30	3	11	38	6	173
Assassination	34	3	29	94	140	2	27	111	3	443
Sabotage	1	0	2	3	8	0	2	8	0	24
Exotic pollution	0	0	0	0	21	0	0	1	0	22
Threat	78	27	99	228	275	29	21	240	11	1,006
Theft, break-in	3	0	4	56	19	1	7	17	0	107
Conspiracy	9	1	9	17	36	1	4	30	14	121
Hoax	11	0	18	10	10	0	1	6	2	58
Other actions	13	0	12	10	39	1	5	22	14	118
Sniping	10	1	17	63	15	1	3	42	0	152
Shootout with police	0	0	0	8	6	0	0	1	1	16
Arms smuggling	2	0	2	0	20	2	2	20	14	62
Total Incidents by Country	495	56	674	1446	2205	62	218	1382	176	6714
Per-centage by Country	7.4	.83	10.0	21.5	32.8	.92	3.3	20.6	2.6	

MAJOR DEMOCRACIES

43%

Transitional Governments
of Latin America

+ 21%

Conservative Estimate of
Middle East Terrorism
directed against Israel

+ 15%

ESTIMATE OF TOTAL TERRORISM DIRECTED AGAINST WESTERN and
PRO-WESTERN DEMOCRACIES

79%

Figure 3-5. Geographic Distribution of International Terrorist Incidents, 1968-80, by Category of Attack

Source: Freedom in Peril: A Year-End Assessment 1981, p. 4.

Transnational terrorists who have never set foot on United States soil have succeeded in intimidating the American people, largely by savagery directed at Americans abroad. The kidnapping and murder of U.S. Ambassador John G. Mein by Guatemalan terrorists in 1968 began an epidemic of terrorism that, by 1975, had led to attacks on 82 U.S. diplomats and other officials abroad, 18 of whom were murdered.³³

Darrell M. Trent

In a March 1982 interview, CIA Director William Casey expressed the opinion that the United States should expect to see an increase in terrorism directed against U.S. interests. Mr. Casey also stated that the Soviet Union exports terrorism and Libya orchestrates it.³⁴ For years Colonel Muammar Gaddafi has been portrayed as an egomaniac in charge of one of the world's most active Third World terrorist organizations.³⁵ Between the years 1970 and 1980, Libya alone has been responsible for sixty-two terrorist incidents with thirty-two (or 52 per cent) of them successful to some degree.³⁶

One aspect of the terrorist mentality which democracies fail to recognize (or choose to ignore) is the sense of justification the terrorist feels for his action. In the communist writings of Trotsky and Lenin, the use of terrorism is specifically not ruled out as a weapon to be used in the struggle for liberation.³⁷ Today's modern terrorist feels that he is a soldier, not a criminal, and is therefore fully justified in using terrorist tactics to achieve both political and military objectives.³⁸ The principle risk to a radical or leftist terrorist's cause lies in the possibility that the terrorist incident may backfire causing a rising tide of antisentiment among the population. To the terrorist, this usually involves little risk in that the nations normally registering protests of inhumane or criminal

acts are usually in the "war zone"³⁹ and are considered enemies. The nations in the "peace zone," who are of either Marxist or other leftist persuasion, less often comment on the terrorists' act unless they are attempting to offer additional support for the justification of acts against Western oppression, imperialism, capitalism, etc. On the other hand, most Western democracies do not have the liberty to impose such harsh or severe countermeasures against the terrorist. In this century, the military forces of the French democracy attempted to use extreme counterterrorist and torture tactics to fight the terrorist revolution in Algeria.⁴⁰ Although the techniques succeeded militarily in the "Battle of Algiers," the public protest in France and throughout the world contributed to the political victory of the revolutionary FLN and the eventual independence of Algeria.⁴¹ The tactics against terrorism which are palatable to the tastes of most democracies are characterized by restraint, patience, and a willingness to engage in a protracted conflict. The experience of Great Britain in Northern Ireland is one such example of patience in a protracted conflict.

The fact that terrorist organizations are "cheap" to field and supply makes it that much more viable as a warfare technique for lesser-developed countries in the Third World. Both training and weapons are readily available from Moscow or Libya. General Otis expressed it this way:

Terrorism "looks to exert maximum leverage for very little risk of force" and "is available to even the poorest nations. What we have seen in the past few years is only scratching the surface."⁴²

SUMMARY OF UNITED STATES-THIRD WORLD RELATIONSHIP

This chapter has examined the dependence of the U.S. on foreign fuel and nonfuel minerals which dictates the presence of U.S. economic investment abroad. This foreign investment requires the presence of U.S. citizens in those Third World countries to conduct business. Additionally, U.S. citizens involved in political and diplomatic relationships are also required to assist with both economic and political interchange. The political aspects are particularly important to the geostrategic stability of the Third World, even where vital or significant economic ventures do not exist. These realities coupled with the articulated communist doctrine of destroying the U.S. economically through industrial dependence on Third World markets creates a multiplicity of challenges to U.S. political, economic, and military strategies. The measures required to check terrorism and provide protection for U.S. citizens abroad are demanding considerations for the prospects of economic, political, and geostrategic stability in the Third World. Since terrorism represents the most economical form of warfare to assist or accomplish the communist purpose in economic warfare, it is reasonable to presume the incidence of terrorism will continue or even increase. The Soviets have been previously cited as an exporter of terrorism. With the economic problems currently faced by the Soviet Union, it is also reasonable that they would opt for the most economic means possible to contribute to the U.S. industrial collapse. This is further reinforced in light of the continuing large expenses they feel compelled to dedicate to nuclear and modernized conventional armaments. William Vancleave has stated that the CIA and DIA estimate that Soviet defense expenditures

will continue to increase at a rate of 3 per cent per year. He believes that this growth could lead to a situation in which they might perceive that they can intimidate foreign economy in their favor.⁴³

Hence, it can be deduced that the probable use of terrorism by extremist Third World elements must be regarded as a serious threat to U.S. national security. Terrorist activities as part of other forms of low intensity conflict threaten to interrupt or destroy the U.S. industrial lifeline to foreign minerals. Terrorism also fosters the political instabilities of Third World nations which can eventually lead to geostrategic advantages which are unacceptable to both the U.S. national economic and defense postures.

CHAPTER 3 ENDNOTES

¹Ira C. Baker, "Russia Responsible for U.S. Crisis," Air Force Times, 40 (1979), 11.

²Geoffrey Stewart-Smith, "Toward A Western Grand Strategy for Global Freedom," Foreign Affairs Research Institute (1980), 13.

³Jimmy Carter, "State of the Union 1980," Vital Speeches of the Day, XLVI, No. 8 (1980) 227.

⁴U.S. President's Materials Policy Commission, Resources for Freedom; A Report to the President (1952), 5 volumes. This report is also known by its informal name "The Paley Report."

Also in the library of Congress see: The objectives of the United States Materials Resource Policy and Suggested Initial Steps in the accomplishment; A report by the chairman based on the report of the President's Material Policy Commission, and Federal Agency Comments thereon (1952).

⁵Tony Velocci, "The Resources Gap," Nations Business, 68, No. 10 (1980), 33-38.

⁶Editors, "Soviet Raw Materials Strategy; Cold War II or World War III?," Ground Defense International, 64 (1980), 12.

⁷James R. Schlesinger, "Third World Conflict and International Security in the 1980's," Survival, XXVI (1980), 281.

Tony Henfrey, "Is Your South African Gold Turning Red?" Money Maker, 2, No. 6 (1981), 43.

This article provides reference to civil rights issues impact on South African economic relationships to the rest of the world.

⁸Ibid., 42.

⁹Nancy Cooper, "Can Strategic Minerals Hog-tie America?," Mechanix Illustrated, 78, No. 646 (1982), 129.

William E. Griffith, "Soviet Power and Policies in the Third World: The Case of Africa," Adelphi Paper No. 152, Prospects of Soviet Power in the 1980's, Part II (1979), 42.

This reference reinforces Cuban involvement in the raid into Shalia Province of Zaire.

Fred Warshofsky, "Strategic Minerals: The Invisible War," Reader's Digest, 118, No. 706 (1981), 81.

It is also interesting to note that just before the Angolan invasion on Shalia Province, Soviet purchasing agents bought up large supplies of cobalt on the world markets.

¹⁰Cooper, op. cit., 58.

Herbert E. Meyer, "How We're Fixed for Strategic Minerals," Fortune, 103 (1981), 68.

The author of this article contends that shortag of the strategic stockpile is not as serious as suggested. Some of the shortages come from friendly sources such as Canada and Australia while others can be extracted in the U.S. though at a higher cost.

¹¹Amos A. Jordon, American National Security Policy and Process (1981), 289.

This chapter elaborates on the interdependence of U.S. economic, military, and political bases for a stable national security posture.

¹²Ibid.

¹³Editors, "Latin America: The Soviets find trade partners on the right," Business Week, No. 2694 (1981), 64.

¹⁴Walter Isaacson, "We Are All Americans," Time, 119, No. 10 (1982), 15.

¹⁵Francis P. Hoerber, Arms, Men, and Military Budgets: Issues for Fiscal Year 1981 (1980), 3.

¹⁶Abebayo Adedeji, "Africa: Permanent Underdog?" International Perspectives (1981), 15-20.

¹⁷Cf. (page 29).

This refers to U.S. National Security Objectives of the Reagan administration.

¹⁸Harold W. Rood, Kingdoms of the Blind (1980), 169-200.

¹⁹John k. Fairbank, Chinese Ways in Warfare (1974), 2-16, 84.

²⁰Walter Isaacson, "Point Man for U.S. Policy," Time, 119, No. 10 (1982), 16.

²¹It required only two years following U.S. troop withdrawals until South Vietnam and Cambodia were militarily defeated by the North Vietnamese Army in 1975.

²²Not only would Atlantic-Pacific shipping require additional time and money to travel around South America but the reliability of shipping around Cape Horn is subject to weather conditions known for their inconsistency. Shortcuts through the Strait of Magellan require the use of a licensed Chilean or Argentine pilot. The backlog of passage using only 34 (average) qualified pilots would cause delays to this option.

²³Casper W. Weinberger, Annual Report to the Congress, Fiscal Year 1983 (1982), 11-23.

In this source Secretary Weinberger states that half of NATO's supplies in wartime would transit from Gulf ports through the Florida Straits. Perhaps for political reason the quantitative significance of potential interdiction of the Panama Canal is not mentioned in the discussion of Central American countries.

²⁴Salvatore Pizzarro, "Mexico's Oil Boom," Current History, 80, No. 463 (1981), 49.

Petroleos Mexicanos (Pemex) indicates stocks of 60 to 100 billion barrels, placing Mexico in the top four oil reserves in the world. This includes the Bay of Campeche which has the highest yield per day in the world.

²⁵Richard Sim and James Anderson, "The Carribean Strategic Vacuum," Conflict Studies, 121 (1981), 3.

²⁶Robert S. Leiken, "Eastern Winds in Latin America," Foreign Policy, 42 (1981), 101.

²⁷Edward B. Atkeson, "Hemispheric Denial: Geopolitical Imperatives and Soviet Strategy," Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College (1976).

This study examines the aspect of Soviet military power projection from Africa as a potential part of the theoretical World Island defense of the Soviet Union.

²⁸Tony Henfrey, "Is Your South African Gold Turning Red?" Moneymaker, 2, No. 6 (1981), 42.

²⁹Warren P. Baker, "Next: A Resource War," Seapower, 23, No. 10 (1980), 61.

³⁰Op. Cit., Fairbank, 11.

³¹Walter Laqueur, Terrorism (1977), 11.

³²Association of the United States Army, Freedom in Peril: A Year-End Assessment 1981 (1982), 4.

³³Darrell M. Trent, "Terrorism: Threat and Reality," Vital Speeches of the Day, XLVI, No. 3 (1979), 82.

³⁴William J. Casey (editor interview), "The Real Soviet Threat in El Salvador--and Beyond," U.S. News and World Report, 92, No. 9 (1982), 25.

³⁵Editors, "Searching for Hit Teams," Time, 118, No. 26 (1981), 20, 22.

Jack Anderson, "Intelligence Reports Profile Libyan Leader," Kansas City Star, 102, No. 147 (March 8, 1982), 9A.

"Khadafy: A Political Zealot from His Early Days," Kansas City Star, 102, No. 148 (March 9, 1982), 11A.

³⁶John M. Handley, "Libyan Involvement in Terrorism," (MMAS Thesis, USA Command and General Staff College, 1981), 96-101.

This thesis offers an in-depth investigation of Libyan-sponsored terrorism and terrorism by other nations and groups in support of Libyan goals.

³⁷George E. Wales, "Algerian Terrorism," Naval War College Review, XXII (1969), 117.

³⁸*Ibid.*, 120.

Op. Cit., Trent, 79.

³⁹Stefan T. Possony, The Strategy of Technology (1970), 3.

⁴⁰Alistair Horne, A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962 (1977), 195-207.

⁴¹Op. Cit., Wales, 116.

⁴²Glenn K. Otis, "Army Must Fight Terrorism, Unrest, Too," Army, 31, No. 12 (1981), 50.

⁴³William Vancleave, Address to Command and General Staff College evening seminar, 5 April, 1982.

CHAPTER FOUR

AN ASSESSMENT OF STRATEGY FOR THIRD WORLD TERRORISM

It is the responsibility of the strategist not only to formulate strategies for future survival but to reexamine and challenge those precepts which serve as a basis for current strategies.

It is right that each succeeding generation should question anew the manner in which its leaders exercise such awesome responsibilities. It is right that each new Administration should have to confront the awful dilemmas posed by the possession of nuclear weapons. It is right that our nuclear strategy should be exposed to continuous examination.

Alexander Haig,¹ April 1982

The previous chapter examined the seriousness of the potential impact of terrorism on the ultimate survival of the U.S. economy and geostrategic posture. It may be considered prudent in light of those findings to challenge the national threat assessment on which force structure is based.

The purpose of this chapter will be to challenge the validity of the quantified risk assessment in developing U.S. national defense strategies. There is a relationship to the thesis of the argument which follows. Any change in threat assessment perceptions toward the terrorism and unconventional warfare end of the spectrum (See figure 4-1) could probably result in an increase in funding and priority for counterterrorist forces. An increased emphasis on counterterrorist forces might allow a more rapid implementation of the counterterrorist technological developments to be presented in chapter 5 following.

These counterterrorist developments would include the rescue assault force introduced in chapter 1.




Figure 4-1. Warfare Threat Spectrum.²

The figure above indicates that the greatest risk factors (although lowest probable) are associated with major conventional war, theater nuclear war, and strategic nuclear war. As discussed in chapter 2, the force structure of conventional and nuclear arms are heavily budgeted to counter this perceived threat.

Two questions should be asked to challenge this budget-driving concept:

Exactly what is being risked?

What is the relevance of quantifying that risk in the formulation of strategy?

The answers to these questions are not clearly answered in the figure or in the stated U.S. national interests of the Reagan administration which are:³

Survive as a nation state.

Remain a global power.

Considering the first interest, it is not clear what is meant by survival. If the interest is defined as the basic physical survival of the nation's population and physical environment, then survival could be attained through submission to the Soviet ideology. This would eliminate the threat of nuclear exchange which receives high impetus on the present risk factor chart. Such an action would most assuredly bring "peace"--Soviet peace.⁴ This course of action would not necessarily rule out the achievement of the second objective. Properly transitioned, a communist America could likely remain a global power under control of the Kremlin. The billions spent on defense as well as the rest of the U.S. economic base could be refocused in an effort to raise the world economy and standard of living. This would include better health and less starvation for the rest of the communist world. Communist America would have survived as a nation state and remained a global power for communism. Democracy in the world would disappear as an influential factor but the world and the U.S. nation state would

perhaps stand a more positive chance of survival from potential nuclear annihilation.

It must be realistically assumed then, that the definition which is intended is not mere survival of a nation state, but rather the survival of a democratic nation state.⁵ Further, the democratic nation state must remain a global power in terms of its ability to preserve U.S. democracy and to contribute to the survival of democracy elsewhere.

If then, the survival of democracy is the real issue around which U.S. national interests and strategies are designed, the question should be raised: what purpose is served by an attempt to quantify risks? If two factors (terrorism and nuclear war) are equally capable of ultimately destroying democracy, the end result remains the same-- the destruction of democracy. To conduct a defense strategy at one end of the threat spectrum at the expense of the other gives the impression of designing a plan to see how long the U.S. can "hold out" as opposed to how well the U.S. can survive across the full threat spectrum. The concept of rating threat on a quantified basis has all the qualities of crisis management focused on immediate problems (nuclear and convention war threat) and, as such, may ultimately prove short-sighted.

Part of the rationale which gives the Soviet nuclear threat a high priority is the obvious quick and violent destruction which could be brought about by a nuclear strike. It is important to consider for further discussion that the factor of rapid destruction associated with a nuclear strike is not likely to be altered in the future. Unless a dramatic disarmament soon takes place, the technology of nuclear arms and delivery systems will continue to absorb significant portions of the defense budget.⁶ The concept of continuing to place emphasis on

the nuclear threat when the conquest of democracy is also possible through the strangulation of the U.S. economy again gives the impression of a delaying strategy. This delaying strategy depends upon conditions improving on the nuclear threat end of the spectrum so that scarce budget resources can be reallocated to meet future increase of perceptions affecting the terrorism and unconventional warfare factors of threat. Given the current U.S. economic conditions, which include record unemployment,⁷ it is difficult to envision in the decade ahead when the economy will be able to afford keeping up in the continual nuclear and conventional arms race and simultaneously support increased resources to combat the terrorism and insurgencies which threaten Third World stability.

The present U.S. force structure design, based on perceived risk, allows the Soviet Union to apply on a strategic level the classical tactic of flanking maneuver used in modern warfare.⁸ If the Soviets can economically "fix" their U.S. enemy with an arms race focused on nuclear forces and European-based conventional forces, this would provide the Soviets time to conduct an inexpensive flanking maneuver in the Third World. This flanking maneuver could focus on an increased geostrategic advantage in the Western hemisphere which could contribute to the economic destruction of the United States, as well as an eventual conventional military advantage (See figure 4-2). The Soviets have demonstrated for over 20 years their willingness to sacrifice consumer goods and an improved standard of living in favor of a relentless build-up of military arms and political strength.




Figure 4-2. Geostrategic Flanking Maneuver for the Defeat of Democracy

Source: Author's Perception

Paul Nitze, one of the more notable strategic planners for the past three decades, outlined some of the concerns depicted in figure 4-2 above in a 1980 article in Foreign Affairs.

Let me outline some of the main Soviet strategic objectives for the 1980s. I would put high on the list the political separation of NATO Europe from the United States. A second aim is to increase Soviet influence and control over the Persian Gulf. A third is the encirclement and neutralization of China. A fourth is to stimulate trouble for the United States in the Western Hemisphere, particularly in the Caribbean. A fifth is the ability to deal successfully with the contingency of a direct Soviet military confrontation with Western military forces. A sixth is to build the image of the Soviet regime as a responsible, legitimate, peace-loving participant in the international community.

Each one of these aims warrants a separate Soviet strategy for its support. All six strategies are interrelated and mutually supportive.⁹

It would therefore seem important to the Communist's strategy how they will ultimately subjugate America. It is to the advantage of the Soviet Union to conquer the United States without the use of a nuclear holocaust. It is important in terms of preserving their own lives and economy while bringing under their control the United States with its resources and industrial base still intact. Additionally, without America as a protectorate, the industrial and technological plum of Japan would also soon be intimidated into submission.

It should likewise be equally important to the U.S. how democracy will defend itself from extinction from all threats. If, as presented earlier, it is more important for a democratic nation to survive rather than just the physical nation state, then it becomes conceptually immaterial to the U.S. whether democracy perishes in a vapor cloud or through industrial economic collapse. A poor, unemployed, economically broken, and resource-dependent America would have difficulty surviving a conventionally armed Soviet force invading from two oceans and a potential communist-dominated Latin America. This vulnerability would be further increased if the Soviets elected to employ chemical or toxin warfare for which the civilian population is unprepared.

With the above rationale, a case can be made for redrawing the force employment spectrum chart to look like this:




Figure 4-3

In this version of the chart, the risk is, in all cases, the same. The survival of democracy is the factor being risked. The methods available to achieve the destruction have no relevant values attached. This graphic does not focus on the near term, midterm, or necessarily long terms commonly associated with force strategies.¹⁰ The emphasis intended is what the Soviets consider the ultimate or eventual term.¹¹ If the Soviet ideology considers communism the eventuality of the world's destiny, then that is the real threat. It is a threat that the Soviets are determined to fulfill on any front, by any means, by any opportunity, regardless of how long it takes.¹²

If it can be assumed that it would serve the communist cause to acquire the United States without massive physical destruction, then a case could be made for directing defense force structure to the end of

the force employment spectrum which is more probable rather than current focus on the least probable events.¹³

To shift the force development emphasis to the terrorist end of the spectrum is not, however, the intent of the argument. The purpose of this argument thus far has been to challenge the validity of the quantifying risk inversely to the probability of occurrence. The force employment spectrum which depicts risk factors is only one of many analytical studies used to assist the formulation of strategies.

Attention will now be shifted to an entirely different type of analytical tool and further on in this chapter the two will be compared. There are a variety of "survival analysis" types of study which over the years have also been considered in projecting the post-strike survival factors which influence nuclear strategy development. One of the pioneers in this area of study was Herman Kahn. Over the past two decades, Herman Kahn has been an influential thinker in the design and development of strategy. In the mid-60's, he described a scenario in which the United States was involved in a nuclear exchange with the Soviet Union. As a physicist, nuclear strategist, and futurist, he made estimates as scientifically speculative as he deemed possible at the time. His estimates shown below indicated a projection that the industrial capacity of the United States would be reduced in the worst case to 20 per cent effectiveness immediately after the nuclear attack. A restoration to 100 per cent effectiveness would require some 10 years¹⁴ and assumes that a state of truce would exist between the two warring parties permitting reconstruction to take place.




Figure 4-4. Recuperation of Consumption

SOURCE: Herman Kahn, On Thermonuclear War, p. 94.

Although his estimates are based on data from the 60's, the information is still of value for theoretical considerations. It would seem logical to predict that Kahn's specific calculations would be, by now, quite inadequate due to the dramatic increase in Soviet nuclear build-up. This is not, however, the case as the following chart emphasizes.¹⁵

POSTNUCLEAR ATTACK STUDIES

STUDY	YEAR	FOR	ESTIMATED LOSSES	
			POPULATION	INDUSTRY
The Rand Study	1958	USAF	35%	55%
The SRI Study	1963	DoD	42%	45%
PAVUS-75	1967	Army	45%	35%
DAL-67	1967	DoD	45%	42%
PONAST II	1973	JCS	46%*	
			11%**	63%

*With 1973 civil preparedness capability.

**With crisis relocation and expedient fallout shelter.

The more recent destruction estimates, made by civilian research groups for the government, vary from 25 per cent to 40 per cent for initial post strike capacity. Although the estimates of initial reduction capacity are less, the recovery time is about the same as Kahn's estimates, 9-10 years. The more recent studies have predictions on overall gross national product (GNP) recovery instead of "consumption" as in Kahn's model. Recent studies rate America as highly vulnerable to nuclear attack due primarily to lack of preparedness; but only in the most severe scenarios is recovery ruled out.¹⁶

The recovery data just presented is available to the same national strategy formulators who rely on quantified threat assessment for strategy and force development design. In fact, it is the President who presently is a driving force in the development of civil preparedness through the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). This seems remarkable in that there is a contradiction in the use of quantified risk assessment and GNP post strike recovery projections to develop a single overall strategy for national security.

The poststrike recovery time table projects that restoration of the industrial capacity of the U.S. democracy is possible. Any analytical model that provides an estimate of U.S. economic recovery time in a poststrike nuclear environment would suffice, but for this argument Kahn's more pessimistic estimate is satisfactory. Using Kahn's model, (figure 4-2) the industrial base starts off at a nuclear poststrike 20 per cent production level following the "least likely" event to occur. In other words, the least likely method for destroying America is quantified in risk assessment as posing the greatest overall risk; yet this nuclear destruction has a potential recovery projection for the

poststrike democracy. In this scenario, democracy, although "nuked", still has a prognosis for survival through industrial recovery.

When this prognosis for the survival of democracy through post strike industrial recovery is compared to the Soviet strategy of destroying America's industrial base through the Third world, an obvious contradiction occurs. If the Soviet strategy should work to bring the United States to its knees through the destruction (or gross reduction) of economic and industrial capacity,¹⁷ then the prospect for democratic survival would be slim. This is true because the Third World strategies designed to bring about the severance of U.S. lifelines to markets and resources would also remain in place to prevent U.S. recovery. In short, if the war of economics (declared by Stalin and Breshnev in the opening of Chapter 3) should succeed; then conceivably the United States could be economically repressed to the 20 per cent level, as in the nuclear strategy example, and kept there until democracy surrendered or was too weak to resist a forced nonnuclear take over.

If Kahn's concepts were translated into an Economic Survival Force Employment Spectrum, the graphic might look like figure 4-5:




Figure 4-5. Economic Survival Threat Spectrum.

Source: Author's perception

This chart would satisfy the beliefs of those strategists who perceive that economic and industrial survival is inseparable from the strategies to insure the survival of democracy.¹⁸ It may be that there are strategists in the administration, Congress, and the National Security Council who believe in this concept. If so, their beliefs are not reflected in the current inversely proportional threat analysis (See figure 4-1) which dictates defense force development and expenditure priorities.¹⁹

An additional consideration in this comparison is also necessary. If in fact a nuclear strike on the U.S. should become a reality, the importance of a stabilized pro-western Third World becomes essential. Recent poststrike analysis studies stress the vital role of foreign aid (the United States as recipient) to provide industrial minerals and energy resources. Again, if the Soviets control the Third World and the strategic chokepoints of ocean transport, GNP recovery would be either slow in coming or impossible.²⁰

A reconsideration of the potential destruction capabilities across the entire threat and risk spectrum is possibly needed to enhance the survival of the United States and Western democracy. All risks must be judiciously countered by strategies sufficient to prevent the collapse of democracy by any threat. In a resource-dependent nation plagued with inflation and recession, the U.S. strategy for the survival of democracy must consider quantifying the importance of counterterrorism as a priority which, at a minimum, approaches the deterrence significance of the "least probable" nuclear threat.

The realities of strategy formulation and force development, as presented in chapter 2, are characterized by evolution as opposed to revolution. If the threat of democratic destruction through Third World factors were immediately adopted on a parity level with the nuclear threat, the strategy and force development changes required for a quantum improvement in counterterrorist and other low intensity conflict strategies would take years to implement.²¹ The following chapter, therefore, will examine a potential area of contribution to counterterrorism which may be exploitable and affordable in the near

future. The use of properly applied technology has the potential to make a contribution to filling the gap of any possible inaccuracies associated with threat and risk assessment.

CHAPTER 4 ENDNOTES

¹Alexander Haig, "Peace and Deterrence" Current Policy No. 383 (April 1982), 1.

²Cf. Figure 1-1 (Page 10).

³Casper W. Weinberger, SECDEF, before the National Security Affairs Conference, Fort McNair, Washington, D.C., 14 July 1981. DOD (Public Affairs) News Release No. 328-81, p. 2.

⁴Op. Cit., Haig, 4.

⁵Robert Leider, "An Old Strategist Speaks to the Young," Military Review, LIV, No. 2 (1974), 3-4.

In this Essay the author cites two vital interests: The well-being of the citizenry or the way-of-life interests which nurture the hopes and aspirations. Second is the prevention of the nation's murder or survival interest. The former is embedded in the concepts of democratic freedom; therefore the two combined form a physical survival of democracy interest.

⁶Casper W. Weinberger, "Where We Must Build--And Where We Must Cut," Defense 81, December, (1981), 11.

This one page summary of the Reagan Strategic Program, based on Congressional testimony, highlights five major programs for U.S. strategic forces.

⁷Associated Press, "U.S. Unemployment Total Reaches a Record," Kansas City Star, 102 (1982), 1A.

⁸Frances P. Hoerber and William Schneider, Jr., Arms, Men and Military Budgets, Issues for Fiscal Year 1978 (1977), xxii, xxiv.

Edward Mead Earle, Makers of Modern Strategy (1973), 402-405.

The flanking strategy presented is based partially on the "rimland theory" corollary to Mackinder's "heartland theory" of geo-politics. With control of the rimland being critical to the defense of the heartland (U.S.S.R.) it has been postulated that the Grand Strategy of the Soviets is the control of the rimland.

Lewis A. Tams, "World War III, the Final Phase--Finlandization," Vital Speeches of the Day, XLVII, No. 5 (1980), 154-157.

A similar but more elaborate double envelopment approach involving both Western democracy and China is described in the cited speech. Also included is a comparison of an ancient Mongol tactic of controlling chokepoints of communication's routes.

The concept depicted in figure 4-2 also embraces Liddel Harts "indirect approach" theory of warfare.

For a presentation of the threat to East Asian shipping depicted in figure 4-2 see: Geoffrey Godsell, "Soviet Naval Threat to Japan Oil Route Grows," The Christian Science Monitor, 72, No. 190 (1980), 1.

Also see for concept of Third World flanking: Francis P. Hoerber, Arms, Men, and Military Budgets, Issues for Fiscal Year 1978 (1977), foreward by Eugene V. Roston, xxiv.

⁹Paul H. Nitze, "Strategy in the Decade of the 1980s," Foreign Affairs, 59, No. 1 (1980), 87.

¹⁰William O. Staudenmaier, "Strategic Concepts for the 1980's," Special Report of Strategic Studies Institute (1981), 21.

These terms refer to periods of time for threat assessment and defense planning purposes.

Near term (2-3 yrs.), midterm (3-10 yrs.) and long term (10-20 yrs.).

¹¹Op. Cit., Hoerber & Schneider, xxv, xxvi.

Marxist and Leninist doctrine support the belief that eventually the revolt of the masses will lead to a system of world-wide socialism (communism).

¹²Op. Cit., Tambs, 155.

In 1973 Brezhnev announced at a communist conference in Prague that the U.S.S.R. would achieve global hegemony by 1985.

Warren P. Baker, "Next: A Resource War?" Sea Power, 23 (1980), 56.

¹³Maxwell D. Taylor, "Reagan's Military Policy Is In Trouble," Washington Post, 332 (1981), p. A15.

As the former Army Chief of Staff under Eisenhower and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff under Kennedy and Johnson, the author expresses similar concern that the most probable threats are being neglected under the Reagan defense plan.

¹⁴Herman Kahn, On Thermonuclear War (1978), 90-95.

¹⁵Defense Civil Preparedness Agency, Department of Defense DCPA Nuclear Attack Environment Manual, Chapter 8 (separate) (1973), panel 30.

¹⁶The following documents provide information on postnuclear strike recovery estimates which is more recent than Kahn's work on the subject.

S.I. Auerback, Final Report on Postattack Ecology (1973).

F.W. Dresch, Criteria for Early Postattack Economic Viability of Local Areas (1974).

Roger J. Sullivan, Survival During the First Year After a Nuclear Attack (1979).

David W. Peterson, Development of a Dynamic Model to Evaluate Economic Recovery Following a Nuclear Attack, Final Report, Vol I, Descriptions and Simulations (1980), 5, 7.

Henry B. Weil, Development of a Dynamic Model to Evaluate the Effect of Natural Resource Policies on Recovery Following a Nuclear Attack, Final Report, Vol I, Descriptions and Simulations (1981), 10-11.

¹⁷Cf., p. 38.

Refers to quotes by Stalin and Brezhnev threatening the survival of the Western world through economic destruction of industry.

¹⁸Robert Leider, "An Old Strategist Speaks to the Young,"
Military Review, LIV, No. 2 (1974), 4-6.

In this article economic considerations for U.S. national survival are repeatedly ascribed as part of strategy. The theories of doomsday economists and ecologists Paul Ehrlich and Dennis Meadows are cited as potentially true.

¹⁹The Force Employment Spectrum is a graphic representation of DOD application of National Security Council assessments. The threat assessments determine the types of forces requested to counter the threat assessment.

²⁰Op. Cit., Peterson, 7.

Op. Cit., Weil, 10, 11.

²¹Op. Cit., Staudenmaier, 18.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE POTENTIAL ROLE OF TECHNOLOGY IN COUNTERTERRORIST OPERATIONS

The starting point for strategy must not be that which is possible; we must discover what is necessary and try to achieve it.

General d' Armee Andre Beaufre¹

In the previous chapters we have examined the significance of U.S. involvement in the Third World and the terrorist threat that exists as a result of that involvement. It has also been shown that the sustainment of existing nuclear and conventional defense programs will continue to be expensive and necessary segments of the national budget. The additional funding for adequate counterterrorist forces, in spite of an obvious need, faces uncertainties under the conditions of a depressed economy and other priorities.

The purpose of this chapter is to consider the potential advantages to be offered by exploiting technology to the fullest in counterterrorist operations. The aggregate contribution from related sectors of the military, engineering, and industrial communities could possibly offset the disadvantages of limited funding and personnel available for counterterrorist operations. This study of technology will first review the role of technology as it has contributed to the military art in both nuclear and conventional arms development. Having established the credibility of the use of technology in warfare, the Iran rescue raid will be studied from the context of technology. This study of the

raid will consider the technology employed, technology available but not used, and existing technological shortcomings which limit or complicate special operations.

BACKGROUND OF TECHNOLOGY IN WARFARE

Superior technology has been the single most significant factor undergirding the U.S. competitiveness in the arms race during the last two decades.² The Vietnam War in the 1960's consumed most of the defense budget which otherwise might have been devoted to modernizing the U.S. defense arsenal. In the 1970's defense spending depended on technology to keep up with the Soviet's ever-increasing defense spending.³

Critics of increased defense spending in the early 1970's have often argued that superior technology provided the U.S. a decisive edge which made further research and procurement a waste of money. This argument was further supported by those who espoused the belief that since both superpowers had sufficient nuclear arsenals to destroy the world several times over, further development was unnecessary.

At every milestone in the tremendous race of technology, there is always a group of smug scientists and beleaguered managers who wearily proclaim that a technological plateau has finally been reached. They then say it is not only safe but prudent to slow down the development pace because everything under the sun has now been invented and only incremental improvements on existing knowledge are necessary for the future. Galloping technology always makes fools of these prophets by taking new and astonishing leaps into the unknown.

Robert Holz-1970⁴

Technology has indeed made several leaps since the time both super powers possessed the ability to annihilate each other.

Scientists and engineers of technology have reduced the cumbersome size of the first generation nuclear ICBM's. Multiple independently targetable warheads have been developed for existing rockets. Delivery systems have become more accurate. Most recently, the United States has developed the neutron warhead capable of enhanced radiation effects which allows smaller yield weapons to accomplish the lethality of larger weapons.⁵ Technology has also provided both the American and Soviet nuclear submarines the capability of providing nuclear launch platforms which can remain at sea for months. This capability negates the requirement for numerous submarine port facilities throughout the globe to conduct nuclear warfare.

In the nuclear arms race, technology is one of the few areas in which some experts believe the United States still enjoys some margin of superiority.⁶ (See figure 5-1.) How long this technological edge will prevail remains open to much speculation. For years the Soviets concentrated on building nuclear and conventional weapons in spite of their limited technology. Simultaneously, their efforts to improve technology continued without having to dedicate large expenditures for research. This was possible through "buying" and when not commercially available, "stealing" technology through espionage (possible directly from the U.S. or through Third World parties). Both of these techniques enabled the Soviet's own research efforts to make quantum progress in recent years.⁷

The competition in technology has also continued in conventional arms development. The Soviet and U.S. armies now have vehicles which swim rivers or snorkel under them, combat helicopters armed with

RELATIVE U.S./U.S.S.R. STANDING IN THE 20 MOST
IMPORTANT BASIC TECHNOLOGY AREAS

Basic Technologies	U.S. Superior	U.S./U.S.S.R Equal	U.S.S.R. Superior
1. Aerodynamics/Fluid Dynamics			x
2. Automated Control	x		
3. Computer	x	←	
4. Directed Energy			x
5. Electrooptical Sensor (including IR)	x		
6. Guidance and Navigation	x	→	
7. Hydro-acoustic	x		
8. Intelligence Sensor	x		
9. Manufacturing	x		
10. Materials (Lightweight and High Strength)	x	→	
11. Microelectronic Materials and Integrated Circuit Manufacture	x	←	
12. Military Instrumentation	x		
13. Non-Acoustic Submarine Detection			x
14. Nuclear Warhead			x
15. Optics	x	→	
16. Propulsion (Aerospace)	x	→	
17. Radar Sensor			x
18. Signal Processing	x		
19. Software	x		
20. Telecommunications	x		

NOTES: -- The list in aggregate was selected with the objective of providing a valid base for comparing overall U.S. and U.S.S.R. basic technology. The technologies were specifically not chosen to compare technology level in currently deployed military systems.

-- The technologies selected have the potential for significantly changing the military balance in the next 10 to 20 years. The technologies are not static; they are improving or have the potential for significant improvements.

-- The arrows denote that the relative technology level is changing significantly in the direction indicated.

-- The judgments represent averages within each basic technology area.

SOURCE: The FY 1981 Department of Defense Program for Research, Development, and Acquisition, Statement by Dr. William J. Perry, Undersecretary of Defense for Research and Evaluation, to the 96th Congress, 1 February 1980, p. 11-36.

sophisticated missile, rocket and gun systems, antitank munitions optically guided to their targets by wire and sophisticated anti-aircraft missile systems both vehicle-mounted and hand-held. Additionally, the U.S. has computerized systems for firing tank guns and artillery units.

In future air battles, fighter pilots can engage targets using sophisticated acquisition systems that defeat the enemy beyond visual range. Navigational systems allow aircraft to deliver missiles or paratroopers to unseen targets in all weather conditions.⁸

The technology battlefied envisioned for the future already extends to outer space. Present strategies for future conflict now press technology to develop methods of destroying the other's satellite advantage.⁹ The race is now on to develop laser and particle beam technology as missile defense systems for employment in outer space or from ground defense bases.¹⁰ Ground systems for conventional warfare are also envisioned to incorporate laser and particle beam technology. On the conventional battlefield, laser equipment that marks targets for terminally guided artillery and aircraft munitions will soon be fielded.¹¹

These are but a few examples which illustrate the reality of increased demand placed on technology as a significant aspect of future warfare.

TECHNOLOGY IN COUNTERTERRORISM: THE IRAN RAID

Having briefly examined the validity of technology applied to the longstanding threats of nuclear and conventional warfare, we will now examine the status of technology as it relates to combating the threat of terrorism. The study of the Iran rescue attempt which follows makes

it apparent that every effort had not been made to fully realize the potential of technology specifically applied to strategic transitional transport for counterterrorist situations. The present day application of technology to special operations comes from innovative use of military hardware already fielded for conventional forces.

As mentioned earlier, this research is not intended to make an in-depth study of the broad spectrum of terrorism but will focus more on the threat to national security and world instability created by acts of mass terrorism such as that which took place in Iran in 1979 with the capture of American hostages.

The review of the Iran rescue attempt, which was conducted by the specially convened General Officer Board following the aborted hostage rescue attempt in April 1980, clearly indicated that the greatest overall deficiencies contributing to the failure were a combination of overemphasis on security and a cumbersome command and control arrangement.¹² While these conclusions present an indictment to the organization command and control of the raid force, there should be considerable reservation about condemning the insistence on security. It is important to consider that "secrecy" and "surprise" were the main reasons cited by the Israeli planners for the Entebbe raid's success.¹³

To improve the overall command and control and security aspects of any required rescue special operations in the future, the board made the following recommendation:

A Counterterrorist Joint Task Force (CTJTF) be established as a field agency of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with permanently assigned staff personnel and certain assigned forces.

A detailed study of the cited report and its recommendation make clear to the reader that the proposed organization not only would correct the problems of command and control but would also contribute to maintaining the security requirements demanded in covert operations. The contribution to security would result from the fact that all or most planning functions would be carried out within the same headquarters. In the Iran rescue attempt, there were three separate elements--ground forces, helicopter forces and C-130 elements which, for the most part, trained independently and were not totally rehearsed in the overall plan to be conducted. Following the failure of the rescue, a new joint command was formed at Fort Bragg, NC commanded by a brigadier general. Part of the mission of the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) is to specialize in joint counterterrorist planning and training for any future contingencies. In future terrorist or hostage situations, this new command should greatly accelerate the time required to prepare a multiservice force tailored to any specific requirements.

With the recognition that a command and control structure (JSOC) now exists which presumably will be more effective in coordinating joint service contingency rescue operations, our attention will now focus on the use of technology to enhance the success of future antiterrorist missions which may be required.

Using the results of the General Officer Review Board,¹⁴ an examination will now be made of the Iran hostage rescue mission. This mission has been selected for scrutiny because it represents the most recent attempt of this type of rescue operation by U.S. forces. The situation in which the hostages were held captive is not unlike those

that may be anticipated in future incidents in Third World nations with radical unstable governments. There is little doubt that any future rescue missions required will also be compared to the Iran rescue attempt. This examination will concentrate on the operational realities which can be related to current or future aspects of technological development. These operational considerations have been divided into six categories:

- Distance to the objective area.
- Navigational devices available.
- Requirement for communications security.
- Hostile environmental considerations.
- Potential radar threat.
- Night vision devices available.

The distance to Tehran from any U.S. bases from which to launch a rescue attempt was among the most formidable problems. Not only did the rescue mission have to contend with infiltrating Iran some 950 miles without detection,¹⁵ but additionally, the refueling of helicopters and security at the remote refueling site posed difficult logistical problems. The plan called for sixteen C-130 Hercules aircraft and eight RH-53D helicopters to rendezvous at a desert refueling site. Although this force seems large for a clandestine operation, it was considered necessary given the remoteness of Tehran from U.S. bases of operation. Although technology has provided air refuelable helicopters, such operations using present technology are impractical in black-out conditions at the low altitudes required to infiltrate under enemy radar. The notable technological shortfall for this particular operational aspect is the nonexistence of a long-range helicopter for contingency operations involving exceptionally long distances.

The navigational aids employed by the helicopter force did not represent the best technological state of the art. The navigation technique used by the helicopter pilots depended on visual meteorological conditions using night vision goggles. The pilots expressed little confidence in the PINS and OMEGA systems which had been installed on their aircraft. These latter systems are designed for use on fixed wing aircraft for global navigation. The aircraft were not equipped with terrain following radar or forward looking infrared radar, which, although they emit a signal, would have aided navigation through the two dust storms encountered. In this case, the danger of radar detection would have been reduced by the dust storm. The storm would have masked the emitted signal from enemy reception. This is an example of technology not being applied to the fullest extent on a highly specialized mission of national importance.

The demand for communications security contributed significantly to the ultimate failure of the rescue attempt. During the helicopter flight to the desert refueling site, the pilot of aircraft #5 had a wing stress fracture indicator light come on indicating a possible serious safety problem for extended aircraft operation. The pilot had no knowledge that one aircraft had gone down and that another continuing to the refuel site had a hydraulic problem. Since the pilot did not know these facts and was restricted from communicating his own difficulties, he decided to return to the Nimitz. This loss of this third aircraft contributed to the decision to abort the rescue mission. The report of the General Officer Board suggested that the Nimitz could have transmitted by secure radio¹⁷ all required information to the helicopter crews. Additionally, if communications

technology had been employed to the maximum, each helicopter could have been fitted with a burst transmitter which would have minimized operations security vulnerability.¹⁸ Critical burst transmissions of one or two seconds could then have been deciphered by the Nimitz and transmitted by secure voice to the entire helicopter force. The report indicates that if the pilot of aircraft #5 had known about the clear weather conditions ahead, that one aircraft had been abandoned and another had a hydraulic problem, he would have continued to the objective refueling site.¹⁹ As with the navigation systems, the full breadth of communications technology was not used.

Another technology-related problem facing the rescue planners was the possession of modern radar systems by Iran. To reduce the mission's exposure to radar interception, the C-130's and RH-53's employed low level flight to avoid detection. For the Iran rescue attempt, there were no radar defeating electronic warfare (EW) systems available which were appropriate to covert operations.²⁰ The use of active EW measures might well have caused undue attention of radar operators that something unusual was taking place. Presidential and DOD press releases on the Stealth Bomber research indicate that technology now provides for aircraft penetration of enemy radar systems. Perhaps in future operations certain aspects of this technology will also be applicable to the covert insertion of rescue assault troops in territory protected by enemy radar systems.²¹

An example of the more sophisticated equipment used in the rescue attempt was the night vision devices which allowed flight operations under blackout conditions. The use of this equipment represents the application to special operations of equipment funded and designed for

the entire military force. The research and development of night vision devices stems from an Armywide requirement, not a specific need tailored to special operations.

These examples presented are not intended to be critical of the operation undertaken by courageous men and their talented leaders. The examples are extracted from the United States' most recent raid and rescue operation to illustrate that in most one-of-a-kind-type operations, there will exist special operational considerations and restrictions which might be overcome through the application of the superior technology possessed by the United States.

RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT PROCESS-- OBSTACLE TO LIMITED USE TECHNOLOGY

Why does the long-range transport aspect of the type of operation just reviewed seem to be technologically shortchanged? It can be argued that until the Iran hostage incident occurred, the impetus was not present to force the production of high technology sophistication for such unforeseen and limited contingencies.

It makes sense to assume that research and development projects under the DOD concentrate on clearly identifiable needs and probable requirements for future warfare.²² Programs to develop weapons or support systems focus on projects that affect a broad spectrum of U.S. forces. For example, the research and development for an armored personnel carrier or attack helicopter under present DOD policies are frequently tailored to meet both Army and Marine combat requirements. With slight modifications, the "jeep" or 1/4 ton truck has for years met the tactical requirements of all services. The same is true for individual protective (gas) masks and M-16 rifles. The research and

development projects esoteric to specific smaller-scale missions given to units of Special Forces, SEALs and Air Force Special Operations Forces have not traditionally received the budget priority which would provide the incentive for industry to develop small-scale production equipment for strategic deployment.

The forces that were to conduct the actual seizure of the hostages were from a classified organization which was a derivative of the more traditional Army Special Forces units.²³ The type of procurement accounts authorized to Special Forces and certain special units within Special Forces allow for the purchase of commercially developed equipment. This type of funding provides for rapid acquisition of the latest communications systems and special purpose weapons required for special contingency missions of limited scope. What is obvious from the review of the Iran raid is that modification or technological upgrading of expensive end-item equipment is less flexible. End-item equipment includes the one or two-of-a-kind type of specialized strategic transport aircraft potentially required for successful special rescue operations. If it were not for the security risks involved, the helicopters for the Iran rescue mission could have been technologically upgraded in the time available. Their capabilities with regard to navigation and communication could have been improved significantly. Modifications or production of specialized equipment by elements of industry or even military civilian technologists during a crisis would have involved an increase in security risk.²⁴

It may be significant for future rescue attempts that the United States develop a farsighted, technologically superior method of

providing covert strategic deployment of rescue forces. This capability must provide a quicker global response if desired, and also negate the security risks inherent in conducting operations from foreign staging bases.

Development of a covert strategic deployment system would likely pose funding difficulties given the competing budget priorities of the 1980's and the traditional characteristics of U.S. force development. Traditionally, the U.S. has fielded forces and developed equipment only in response to initiatives by adversaries and potential adversaries.²⁵

INDUSTRIAL INCENTIVE--IMPACT ON LIMITED USE TECHNOLOGY

Although force structure designers project forces required for 10 and 20 years into the future, the research and development and procurement efforts consistently lag behind largely due to the appropriations system of the Planning, Programming and Budget System which only extends 5 years into the future.²⁶ These short 5-year range appropriations are further restrictive to industry incentive by 1-year contractual rules which the Reagan administration is attempting to change to multiple-year contract arrangements between government and industry.²⁷ Industry has a reduced incentive to spend gross amounts of engineering effort to develop systems which, even if competitive, will only receive a 1-year contract. If this is an attitude that prevails for multimillion dollar contracts, it is no surprise that little effort would be devoted to developing specialized limited-use equipment. For example, a contractor would have little interest in developing a strategically deployable heavy lift helicopter capable of a 1,500 mile trip. For such a helicopter the production, engineering,

and operating costs would be high and the routine use of such an aircraft would be very limited.

An additional concern for U.S. arms producers is to focus their profit motives on "big money" weapons systems which have a potential for overseas foreign markets. A production weapons system with foreign potential relieves much of the business risk and pressure of a one customer (United States) product, which is subject to fluctuations with each new presidential administration.²⁸

In summary, this chapter has examined some of the typical technological advances in the past two decades which, in spite of reduced equipment quantity, have kept the United States qualitatively viable in most areas of defense development.

A review of the ill-fated Iran hostage rescue attempt indicates that the potential exists for additional implementation of technological advances in communications, navigation, and electronic warfare for conducting counterterrorism rescue type operations. Also identified were technology shortfalls. The most obvious shortfall is the inability of the U.S. to strategically deploy rescue forces with a technologically advanced covert deployment and infiltration technique which allows for immediate transition to a tactical operation requiring the extraction of noncombatants.

Two factors have been identified which, by their nature, will tend to impair the rapid development and acquisition of technological advances for counterterrorism forces:

First is the inherently slow-moving congressional budgeting process which has its flexibility reduced even further by the competitive funding perceptions of four separate military services. This unwieldy

Planning, Programming and Budget System represents an obstacle to quantum advances in any new defense concept or system. The systematic difficulties inflicted by the PPBS have been recognized by Secretary of Defense Weinberger. Planned efforts to overhaul and streamline the system are included in an executive summary at appendix B. Secondly, the lack of incentive by industry to engineer and develop limited use small-scale production technology presents an additional hinderance to the implementation of state of the art technology to counterterrorism operations.

In the following chapters, recommendations will be made which may contribute to overcoming the difficulties identified above.

CHAPTER 5 ENDNOTES

¹Stephen T. Possony, The Strategy of Technology, (1970), 57.
Retired General Andre Beaufre was the founder and Director of the
Institute Francais d' Etudes Strategiques, Paris, France.

²Ibid., 186, 189.

³The rationalization employed by advocates of reduced defense investment during the early and mid-seventies focused on a U.S. technological superiority. The argument prevailed that it was not necessary to match the Soviets quantitatively because U.S. quality compensated for a disparagement in numbers of weapons systems and forces.

⁴Op. Cit., Possony, XX (Foreword).

⁵Daniel Gans, "Neutron Weapons: Solution to a Surprise Attack?", Military Review, LXII, No. 1 (1982), 25-31.

⁶Carnegie Panel on U.S. Security and the Future of Arms Control, Assessing the Balance: Defense Spending and Conventional Forces (1981), 42.

⁷Richard N. Perle, "Raiding the Free World's Technology," Defense 82, February (1982), 10-15.

⁸The All Weather Air Delivery System (AWADS) provides the capability to accurately deliver parachutists or aerial resupply to drop zones under conditions of restricted visibility.

The navigational system of the Cruise missile internally compares radar imagery to programmed terrain data and corrects for differences in order to maneuver and strike the preprogrammed target.

⁹Edwin G. Pipp, "The Military Stake in the Space Shuttle," ARMY, 31, No. 9 (1981), 22-26.

Walter Andrews, "U.S. Drafting a Plan to Alter Space Treaty," Army Times, 42, No. 31 (1982), 23.

¹⁰Op. Cit., Pipp, 25.

¹¹Both the "Copperhead" artillery round and the air delivered "Laser Guided Bombs" are guided to their target during the terminal phase of flight by ground or air-based laser target designators.

¹²J.L. Holloway III, "Review Group's Conclusions Reported," Aviation Week and Space Technology, Vol. 113, No. 13 (1980), 91.

Stephen Webbe, "Hostage-rescue Mission's Weak Link: too-tight Security?", The Christian Science Monitor, 72 (1980), 3.

13Haim Oren, "Entebbe Raid Briefing to Command and General Staff College Class of 1982."

This briefing was presented by Col. Oren who was the operations officer for the Israeli rescue operation on Entebbe in 1976. The importance of surprise and secrecy are the opinions of the briefer.

A similar conclusion can be drawn from the following source: William Stevenson, 90 Minutes at Entebbe (1976).

14The results of the board review are published in three consecutive articles in Aviation Week and Space Technology. See footnote 10, Chapter One.

15Editors, "Debacle In The Desert," Time, 115, No. 8 (1980), 14.

16J.L. Holloway III, "Report Cites Mission's Lack of Review," Aviation Week and Space Technology, 113, No. 12 (1980), 142, (Col. 3).

17Ibid., Holloway, (Vol. 113, No. 13), 88 (Col. 3), 89 (Col. 1).

18Burst transmitters are electronic devices into which alpha-numeric messages are manually encoded and then transmitted with an ultra-fast brief transmission which must be decoded by the receiving station. The decoding process is done electronically and therefore does not involve a delay in reading the message.

19Op. Cit., Holloway, 85 (Col. 3), 88 (Col. 1).

20Although "chaff" dispersed into the atmosphere is effective at disrupting air defense radar systems, the methods of dispersing chaff from aircraft would in itself have presented a potential operations compromise.

21Walter Andrews, "Stealth Aircraft Set for 1982 Production," Army Times, 42d yr., No. 32 (1982), 23.

The cited article contains a reference to an advanced technology bomber with an intercontinental range. A stealth aircraft of sufficient size to carry intercontinental fuel loads and ordinance, possibly could be adapted to the covert strategic deployment of rescue assault forces.

22Jim Tice, "Army Plans for Year 2000 Battles," Army Times, 42 (1982), 1.

23Spencer Rich, "Charlie's Angels': Extreme Versatility Is Strike Force Goal," The Washington Post, 103, No. 143 (1980), A16.

24The installation of specialized and non-standard equipment would have increased the curiosity and speculation of technologists and electronic mechanics who would have performed unusual modifications. Security risks increase proportionately with the number of individuals, in or out of the military, who know or suspect something extraordinary is in-the-making.

25In the Spanish-American War few American infantry units had been provided "smokeless powder". Between WW I and WW II, the U.S. lagged behind European countries in the fielding of the 105mm Field Artillery Howitzer and the development of a modern tank. The latter was regarded, until the German Blitzkrieg, as an infantry support weapon.

26A presentation of the complexities of the Planning, Programming and Budget System exceed the limitations of the scope of this thesis. For those readers unfamiliar with the system and its relationship to Congressional appropriations, an executive primer is provided as Appendix B. This defense publication by the Army Director of Program Analysis and Evaluation succinctly describes the present system and trends for future improvement.

27Vincent Puritano, "Getting Ourselves Together on Systems Acquisition," Defense 81, October (1981), 13.

28Editors, "Striking It Rich on Defense," Business Week, No. 2737 (1982), 102-106.

CHAPTER SIX

CONCLUSIONS

It was the most triumphant rescue of modern times. For years terrorists had shocked the world with skyjacking and wanton murder of innocents. Then guerillas hijacked an Air France jetliner, flew the passengers to Uganda and, during a week of agony, bargained for lives. Only hours before the deadline, Israeli commandos in C-130 propjets raced over 2,500 miles from Israel to Entebbe airport, and in a blaze of gunfire, freed 102 hostages.

This was a time when the fate of a nation was determined in one hour by a small band of brave men.

Shimon Peres
Israeli Defense Minister¹

The quote above, which refers to the Israeli hostage rescue at Entebbe, manifests the level of pride to which a nation's honor can be elevated as a result of daring success. Like the attempted hostage rescue by U.S. forces in Iran, the Entebbe raid was characterized by the risks inherent in a long-range strategic operation. Like the Iran raid, the Entebbe mission was vulnerable to failure. The Entebbe raid had critical events which could well have resulted in a debacle similar to that experienced by the United States. There are many contrasts and comparisons which can be drawn between the two raids but perhaps the most significant comparison is the impact of success or failure.

To what extent can the demoralization of a nation be measured as a result of a failure such as the abortive Iran rescue attempt? What is the relative impact on the confidence of the U.S. populace in its government's power projection capability? The long-term answers to these questions will require years to accurately assess.

As U.S. allied nations mold and reshape their foreign policies, they are in fact seeking to develop power relationships to secure their own survival interests. These nations look for success in their allied relationships. Excuses for weakness or failure only contribute to destabilization of the Western alliances and make them more likely to remain neutral during critical situations. The Soviet Union has achieved an intensified global image of U.S. indecisiveness and hesitation through their surrogate activities in Angola, Ethiopia, and Shaba province.² The Iranian crisis has also contributed to this image, although Soviet involvement is not as readily apparent.

The ability of the United States to respond to future attacks of international terrorism are likely to have a profound affect on the world's perception of American power. The political, diplomatic, and economic aspects of U.S. national power will remain heavily dependent on foreign perception of U.S. military power projection capability and the willingness to use it when necessary. Moreover, the various aspects of power chosen by the President to influence foreign policies will largely be determined by the confidence in military power projection capabilities. The deterrence aspect of U.S. nuclear and conventional forces are only part of the military's contribution to U.S. national security strategy. Confidence must also be achieved in the military's ability to conduct successful constrained operations in situations where brute force is counterproductive. If the U.S. fails to demonstrate a viable capability to protect its citizens involved in foreign diplomatic or economic ventures abroad, then a perception of U.S. weakness is certain to continue which will impact on political and economic efforts to stabilize U.S. national security interests.

SUMMARY

This research has presented a realistic perspective of the threat of terrorism to U.S. national security and further suggested changes in strategy to counter this threat.

The key points are summarized as follows:

The force structure of the U.S. Armed Forces has evolved from requirements to counter perceived threats to U.S. national interests. The current budget and future proposals indicate a threat assessment which emphasizes the importance of strategic and tactical nuclear forces as well as conventional forces for general mechanized war.

The U.S. has become increasingly dependent over the past two decades on Third World nations for raw fuel and nonfuel minerals for industry. The U.S. also depends on favorable Third World alliances to foster geostrategic stability. The threat of terrorism and limited unconventional wars pose particular destabilizing dangers for U.S.-Third World security relationships.

The seriousness of American economic conditions coupled with Soviet geostrategic expansion in the Third World nations possessing U.S. vital interests presents considerations which challenge the rationale for quantifying the risks that threaten the survival of democracy.

National strategies are evolutionary and slow-moving largely as a result of a deliberate Congressional budgetary process. A quantum change to counter terrorist capabilities is not likely to occur in the midterm given current U.S. economic conditions and nuclear force priorities.

The expeditious acquisition of rapidly changing technology for counterterrorist operational forces has the potential to enhance rescue operations of future hostage situations. The most apparent and significant technological limitation of the Iran hostage rescue attempt was the difficulties associated with the covert infiltration and extraction in remote areas involving strategic distances.

STRUCTURE AND UTILITY OF A RESCUE ASSAULT FORCE

Given the apparent need for an effective counterterrorism rescue assault force, several questions arise as how best to achieve the most effective force with budget restraints and competing priorities. Questions about organization, size, command and control, interaction with other forces, employment, and funding all pose serious challenges to military contingency planners. The following discussion is offered

for consideration as possible solutions to force development of a rescue assault force.

The emphasis for rescue assault missions from both an operational and technological standpoint must be on covert deployment and infiltration to first secure the safety of the kidnapped or hostage victims.

Although present airborne and special forces units have many unique deployment and infiltration capabilities, there are also inherent risks involved in employing these units in a counterterrorist action of limited scope. With modern national technical means and radar systems possessed by anti-Western nations, it is almost impossible to conduct a covert strategic airborne deployment without a high risk factor of potential failure. Airborne assaults must have a somewhat benign environment or the expected casualty rate can be anticipated as high.

While several forces such as the 82nd Airborne Division and Special Forces have the mission of evacuating refugee or American personnel from foreign countries during crisis,³ the need exists to improve upon the operational conduct of covert rescue and evacuation of mass hostages. The overt insertion of either of the above forces would almost certainly bring about the murder of captive hostages.⁴ It is very probable that a large-scale operation employing the highly trained ground assault team and a larger airborne force could have extracted the Iranian hostages. This could have been accomplished using a combination of covert operations to secure the hostages and overt force to remove them. The cost and risks of such an operation, however, would have been high.

A rescue attempt on this large a scale might be appropriate in some future situation but when employed against a more developed Third World

nation possessing modern military equipment and technology, certain risks impair rescue options. Logically, the factors which had to be considered by President Carter as Commander in Chief included:

The possibility of many paratrooper casualties resulting from an attempt to secure an evacuation site such as Tehran International Airport. The loss of fighter pilots supporting a forced entry into Tehran.

The possibility of starting a general war with Iran which could expand into other Persian Gulf states.

The possible incursion by the U.S.S.R. to honor their treaty with Iran which the Soviets still consider valid. Even if this did not result in armed U.S.-Soviet conflict, it would likely leave U.S.S.R. in control of Iran.

The indignation of world opinion for risking global conflict.

The possible condemnation by U.S. allies for what they might regard as overreaction in a situation where the possibility of diplomatic resolution did exist.

The type of counterterrorism force envisioned by General Otis for future terrorist contingencies would round out the recommendation by the Special Operations Review Group to include assigned forces in the following manner:⁵

--"A" Force, for the lower levels of conflict, would have about 500 men, of whom 430 would be combatants.

--"B" Force would be brigade-sized with more helicopters and air defense and antitank weapons.

--"C" Force would be of similar strength but "tailored to different types of terrain" and would require "no more than four days to get there."

The composition of these proposed organizations do not differ significantly from airborne, air assault, and special forces units already in existence. The very size of the proposed forces does not correct the most overriding requirement for a counterterrorist rescue assault force--the requirement for covert strategic deployment and

infiltration of the objective area. Conceptually, the type of force suggested by General Otis would contribute to the secondary phases of counterterrorist operations better than a special task organized ad hoc unit made up of current forces. However, unless more sophisticated methods of covert deployment and infiltration are developed, the proposed force would suffer the same employment restrictions incumbent on current special purpose forces. If a covert capability is lacking and if the hostages are killed when the enemy detects the counterterrorist rescue force coming, there will be little consolation in taking violent retribution on the terrorists.

The type of rescue assault force envisioned by this thesis would consist of less than 250 men. Their responsibilities would include planning, covert infiltration, seizure of captives, and command and control of the entire operation to include the existing airborne units or larger forces envisioned by General Otis.

NATIONAL SECURITY CONTRIBUTIONS OF PROPOSED RESCUE ASSAULT FORCE

This proposed highly specialized force, equipped with the very best technology, would have the potential to make several contributions to national security:

(1) By having a small highly specialized force capable of rescuing hostages, a larger more destructive force would not have to be used. Without the escalation associated with larger military forces, a quicker return to stabilized relations would likely be accomplished between the United States and the country in which the hostages are held captive.

(2) The reassurance offered by a competent rescue assault force would encourage continued economic ventures abroad by U.S. industry. Participation in U.S. business investments and mining ventures in Third World nations, which are essential to a strong U.S. economy, would be more attractive if the safety and security of workers assigned overseas could be increased. Additionally, U.S. diplomatic missions abroad could enjoy the same enhanced sense of security.

(3) By possessing a viable counterterrorist force, acts of attempted coercion and hostage taking by some potential U.S. enemies might be deterred.

The limitations of the latter potential contribution are subject to disagreement. The deterrence potential of a counterterrorist force by definition also makes the organization an antiterrorist force because it passively prevents terrorism. The deterrence values associated with the strategies of nuclear and conventional deterrence depend upon a rational adversary. The ranks of terrorist organizations are filled with irrational and martyr-oriented "cause fighters." These individuals cannot be universally depended upon to recognize or appreciate the deterrent aspects of a superior or capable counterforce. Additionally, if a counterterrorist force were to be touted as a deterrent, the scheme might backfire and only serve to make the terrorist more determined and cunning. Evidence does exist which indicates that regular military units who are trained in counterterrorist surveillance techniques, are effective in reducing the frequency of terrorist events. Although this technique by British troops had a significant deterrent effect in Ireland, it has not stopped terrorist events entirely. To escape close scrutiny at home in Ireland, the Irish Republican Army has moved into the international arena to continue terrorist activities in support of their cause.⁶ This thesis principally supports the development and use of a rescue assault force as a low profile counterterrorist force. Furthermore, the capabilities and details of any successes or failures in future operations must remain highly classified and not be aired in the interest of deterrence or freedom of information.

THE LIMITATIONS OF TECHNOLOGY

As presented in chapter 5, a superior technological advantage has given the United States a qualitative edge in the arms development race for the past three and a half decades. There are areas which were covered in which the potential exists for improved technological counterterrorist strategies in the areas of communications, navigation, and electronic warfare.

The purpose of this thesis has not been, however, to suggest that technology is the panacea for counterterrorist operations. Certainly, technology must be combined with effective organization, leadership, and strategy.

The resolution of the Iranian hostage situation was an example of a military failure and diplomatic success. The fight against terrorism must be waged with every political and economic strategy available. The challenge for military policymakers is to ensure that the optimum resources have been dedicated in a deliberate effort (as opposed to a desperate effort) to train and equip counterterrorist forces prior to their being called upon to provide a military response.

Technology as a tool for such a priority mission needs to be layered with a myriad of backup and alternatives. Backup options may also be technology-dependent but the backup must exist to reduce the risk of total failure. The Iran raid basically had one course of action with critical events linked to mission abortment or failure. Likewise, the successful Entebbe raid was planned and executed with critical events which could have resulted in abject failure. Perhaps no plan is so poor that it will not succeed given sufficient good

luck. The opposite is also true that no plan (regardless of technological preparation) is so good that it will not fail given sufficient bad luck.⁷ The U.S. policies toward terrorism must be prepared to accept failure while at the same time providing responsible leadership and funding to reduce the operational risk of failure to the minimum.

A GRAND STRATEGY

This thesis has avoided addressing the relative merits or disadvantages of a well-defined and announced "National or Grand Strategy." This author believes that such a strategy would suffer the same inconsistencies that accompany the policy changes of each succeeding presidential administration. To be fully effective a constitutional change would likely be required to enable a more long-range consistent branch of government to design and form national policy. Proponents for a grand strategy argue that it would provide a more cohesive framework around which to focus all forms of national power.⁸ Although this would provide a more consistent direction for military strategy and force development, there are counter arguments to the formulation of a long range national strategy. Those who oppose the need for grand strategy believe that an announced strategy would only provide a roadmap for the Soviets to use in designing counter strategies.

The debate of these issues will be left to the desires of the lawmakers, but in conclusion one point needs to be made relative to the Soviet grand strategy.

Unlike the United States, the Soviet Union has been very outspoken on their national purpose of world hegemony. True, the United States has publicly announced its role in preserving democracy, but the

Soviets are more vocal, definitive, and specific about their grand strategy. Perhaps they feel no need for reservation in announcing this strategy recognizing that the bureaucracy, idealism, and naivete inherent in democracy will not be decisively responsive to the controlled initiatives of Soviet efforts. The gaps in the "margin of safety" so frequently addressed by President Reagan represent a growing testimony of the accuracy of the Soviet thought process postulated above. The Soviet strategy has made it clear they will not tolerate a falling away from or movement counter to Marxist ideology. They reinforced this strategy in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Afghanistan, and most recently reinforced by their stand in Poland. Soviet strategy has announced that they will maintain a superiority in nuclear and conventional forces. President Reagan has announced his concern over the present military advantages of the Soviets.

As presented in chapter 4, the Soviets have also announced a strategy to destroy democracy through the economic control of vital resources. U.S. strategies have reacted to Soviet strategy by the maintenance and, in some areas, improvement of nuclear and conventional arms. In the areas of stopping the seemingly unchecked expansion of Soviet influence in the Third World, the U.S. strategy appears woefully deficient. By insisting on attempts to impose U.S. principles, ideology, and civil rights on other Third World nations, America has been losing the battle of Soviet expansionism. While the United States leans on principles, the Soviets lean on any weaker power that opposes their expansion. While the U.S. policies are admirable and correct for democratic principles, it must somehow develop a less complacent approach to preventing the Soviet hegemony of the Third World which threatens U.S. geoeconomic and geostrategic survival.

This thesis has highlighted the severity of the Soviet threat through the use of the Third World and challenged the assessment of that threat as being less quantifiable than the threat to democracy through nuclear or conventional arms destruction. Directly related to the U.S.-Third World relations and stability is the increasing threat of terrorism, particularly to the political and economic instability which can be created by terrorist and hostage events. This thesis has proposed as a priority to countering potential terrorism, the expanded funding and support of a rescue assault force to deal with potential hostage and kidnapping terrorist events. As a corollary to this proposal, special emphasis has been placed on an intensive technological development of a strategic transitional transport system to enhance the operational capabilities of the rescue assault force.

A strategy for counterterrorism must be more effectively integrated with other defense priorities if the Soviet Grand Strategy is to be arrested and the continued survival of democracy assured. There is an inherent quality in the U.S. ideology that an accused is innocent until proven guilty. This quality transformed into politics has long allowed adversaries to benefit from prolonged U.S. attitudes of giving the aggressor the benefit of the doubt. If America delays too long in collecting evidence of Soviet intentions in the Third World, the possibility exists that following the trial, the verdict and sentence will be delivered by the Soviet politburo.

.... Throughout the ages, effective results in war have rarely been attained unless the approach has had such indirectness as to insure the opponents unreadiness to meet it. The indirectness has usually been physical, and always psychological.

In strategy, the longest war round is often the shortest way home.

B. H. Liddell Hart⁹

CHAPTER 6 ENDNOTES

¹Haim Oren, "Entebbe Raid Briefing to Command and General Staff College Class of 1982."

²William E. Griffith, Prospects of Soviet Power in the 1980's (1979), 42.

³Charles D. McMillin, "Roles and Missions of Airborne, Ranger, and Special Forces in Contingency Operations," (MMAS Thesis, USA Command and General Staff College, 1979), 49, 51, 53.

⁴David Charters, "Swift and Bold: An Appraisal of Hostage Rescue Operations," Conflict Quarterly, 1, No. 1 (Summer 1980), 27, 30.

This article presents an example of hostage murder as a rescue attempt was made in Stanleyville, South Africa in 1964. The author also makes a point that hostage murder is unpredictable, citing the murder of hostages in the Iranian embassy in London following six days of apparent successful negotiation.

⁵Glenn K. Otis, "Army Must Fight Terrorism, Unrest, Too," Army, 31, No. 12 (1981), 50.

⁶U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Subcourse P732, "Security Assistance Operations," Lesson 5, presented May 7, 1982. The British Liaison Officer Colonel Pulverman provided the following information in the course of his lecture on the conflict in Northern Ireland: In an article published in the Dublin magazine 'Magill' in 1978, the PIRA spokesman said that quote "one of the main reasons for the reduction (in terrorist activity) was simply the extended and more sophisticated nature of British surveillance.... which makes operations much more difficult than was thought conceivable a few years ago". There is no doubt that PIRA have a very real fear of our covert operations, a fear of being caught red-handed in the act. Again in Magill but this time in September (1980) we read--"IRA leaders admit that 5 out of 6 operations are now aborted due to surveillance."

⁷J.L. Holloway, "Review Group's Conclusions Reported," Aviation Week and Space Technology, 113, No. 13 (1980), 90 (Col. 3), 91 (Col. 1).

Op. Cit., Charters, 31.

Neil C. Livingstone, "States in Opposition: The War Against Terrorism," Conflict, 3, Nos. 2/3 (1981), 113.

⁸Hugh Sidey, "Needed: A Grand Strategy," Time, 119, No. 3 (1982), 19.

⁹B. H. Liddell Hart, Strategy (1967), 25.

CHAPTER SEVEN

RECOMMENDATIONS

Upon the completion of their investigative review of the Iran rescue attempt, the General Officer Review Board made six major recommendations:¹

Recommendation. It is recommended that a Counterterrorist Joint Task Force (CTJTF) be established as a field agency of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with permanently assigned staff personnel and certain assigned forces.

Mission. The CTJTF, as directed by the NCA, through the Joint Chiefs of Staff, would plan, train for, and conduct operations to counter terrorist activities directed against U.S. interests, citizens, and/or property outside the United States.

Concept. The CTJTF would be designed to provide the NCA with a range of options utilizing U.S. military forces in countering terrorists acts. Such forces might range from a small force of highly specialized personnel to a larger joint force.

Relationships. The Commander, CTJTF (COMCTJTF) would be responsible directly to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). The CTJTF staff should be filled with individuals of all four Services, selected on the basis of their specialized capabilities in the field of special operations of various types.

Forces. The organic forces permanently assigned to the JTF should be small and limited to those which have a unique capability in special operations.

Recommendation. It is recommended that the Joint Chiefs of Staff give careful consideration to the establishment of a Special Operations Advisory Panel, comprised of a group of carefully selected high-ranking officers (active and/or retired) who have career backgrounds in special operations or who have served at the CINC or JCS levels and who have maintained a current interest in special operations or defense policy matters.

While these recommendations represent a pragmatic approach to an "in-house" Department of Defense solution for future counterterrorist problems, perhaps the recommended concept does not go far enough to exploit the total potential assets available to combat terrorism. The following recommendations provide ideas and concepts for further consideration or research to arrive at the optimum method for combating the increasing threat of terrorism. The recommendations in this chapter are general in nature and concentrate on the organizational and funding aspects of counterterrorist forces in general. The recommendations for the increased use of technology for strategic transport and assault by any existing or eventual U.S. counterterrorist force are included separately in appendix A. The appendix represents a collection of technological concepts envisioned (by this author) as being representative of the type of thought processes which need to be brainstormed. These ideas are intended to stimulate creative technological approaches for overcoming the deployment and employment limitations imposed on rescue assault operations. The general recommendations contained in this chapter cover five areas of potential considerations regarding counterterrorist rescue assault forces:

Establishment of a separate military service or separate government agency for counterterrorist operations.

Establishment of a streamlined funding process.

Establishment of a special research and development, and rapid procurement branch for the U.S. counterterrorist organization.

Implementation of incentives for contributions by industry.

ESTABLISHMENT OF A SEPARATE MILITARY SERVICE OR
SEPARATE GOVERNMENT AGENCY FOR COUNTERTERRORIST OPERATIONS

An organizational advantage characteristic of Israeli counterterrorist forces is that all service components are under a single commander.² As previously stated, upon the recommendation of the Iran raid review board, a new command was established to coordinate joint service counterterrorist operations. The effectiveness of the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC)³ might be increased by making it a separate service of the Department of Defense or a separate governmental agency. As a separate service, the JSOC and its proposed rescue assault force would be directly controlled by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) under the President's command. It is not uncommon during any crisis situation for each service to competitively seek a "piece of the action." This service in-fighting, even when disguised as coordination and joint support, presents unnecessary impediments to the decision maker who attempts to maintain intraservice rapport and still accomplish the assigned mission. The JSOC commander should have most of his personnel and equipment assets assigned or on call with no questions asked nor explanations necessary to anyone except the Chairman, JCS. This degree of pretailored responsiveness could conceivably reduce the reaction time of the counterterrorist force and clearly identify command relationships. If the U.S. counterterrorist forces were made a separate government agency, the current airborne and special forces units could continue their main duties and remain available to participate in counterterrorist operations. With the President as Commander in Chief of both the Armed Services and the counterterrorist force, he could place the required military forces under operational control of the counterterrorist force commander.

It is envisioned that routine interface would occur between the counterterrorist agency and designated military forces which would facilitate efficient operations. Interface would include need-to-know knowledge of contingency plans by commanders of "ear-marked" military units. As a separate government agency, the counterterrorist force links to CIA information would possibly be made more responsive without the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) as a time consuming intermediary.⁴ DIA assets would also remain responsive to counterterrorist force requests.

A separate government agency would have greater flexibility, and perhaps appeal, to recruit its force membership from a wider variety of expertise. Instead of being primarily linked to military expertise, a governmental counterterrorist agency could draw upon experts from the military (JSOC), FBI, CIA, federal marshals, Secret Service, industrial procurement and research organizations. Also available for full or part-time employment would be a number of foreign service officers either retired or "out of favor" who would possess planning information on their special regional areas of concentration. The civilian police forces possessing Special Weapons Assault Teams provide another area of untapped experience for plans and operations in urban environments. In short, many people with needed expertise might be more willing to contribute to national security through a counterterrorist government agency if it were not so clearly labeled as a strictly military organization. The assistance or direct involvement of National Air and Space Administration officials and engineers could be of particular significance in the implementation of technological approaches to air deployment and employment techniques for counterterrorist forces.

In Brian Crozier's book The Strategy of Survival, the author takes the governmental agency concept a step further by suggesting the counterterrorist force be part of an international organization under NATO⁵. While this measure may be regarded as too expansive for clandestine operations requiring optimum security, the direct access to the European INTERPOL intelligence and information system would possibly be useful to many potential counterterrorist operations.

ESTABLISHMENT OF A STREAMLINED FUNDING AND RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT PROCESS

As a separate command, which now exists, or as a separate service or government agency, as suggested above, the funding processes for special counterterrorist forces should be separate from the normal defense budget. A counterterrorist force represents the President's "hip pocket" military response to terrorist incidents. Since the President already has the responsibility and authority to employ such a force⁶ it seems prudent that the readiness of this force be removed from the competitiveness of other defense programs and the bureaucratic slowness of normal defense budgeting. Even if fielded as a separate service, the funding could most effectively be managed as if the counterterrorist service were a separate government agency. By funding as a separate agency, similar in nature to the FBI or CIA, the research and development of counterterrorist systems could keep pace with rapidly evolving technology and avoid conventional force research and development competition within the Department of Defense. As counterterrorist capabilities of Western nations improve, the possibility exists that terrorist efforts will likewise become more innovative and difficult to counter. The normal research and development and

budgeting process within the DOD requires a cumbersome review process based on interservice perceptions of priorities. It has become a system of interservice compromise not unlike the Congressional legislative processes. The Joint Service decisions made must then be approved by Department of Defense recommendations through the President's budget. The present system is simply too rigid for the flexibility needed to counter the multifaceted inventions of terrorist groups.

ESTABLISHMENT OF A SPECIAL RESEARCH/DEVELOPMENT AND
RAPID PROCUREMENT BRANCH FOR THE U.S.
COUNTER-TERRORIST ORGANIZATION

The precedent for expeditious research and development and procurement has already been established with the implementation of the High Technology Test Bed program in the 9th Infantry Division at Fort Lewis, Washington.⁷ In order to fully realize the potential of technological advances applicable to counterterrorism, a portion of a counterterrorist organization should be dedicated to researching and investigating relationships between deployment or employment requirements and technological advances in science and industry. It is through such a branch that interface would be established with civilian industry and government agencies such as NASA. This interface would include the exchange of ideas and concepts as well as the construction and testing of limited small-scale production equipment. While such a branch is initially envisioned as a catalyst for technology applicable for counterterrorist operations, it is probable that the research, development and procurement branch would soon become the focal point to which science and industry would submit their own unsolicited ideas for

consideration. As already presented, limited-use equipment provides little profit motivation for industry. A large part of the special research and development branch responsibility would involve effective personal relations with science and industry to instill a sense of purpose and unselfish dedication to the limited but essential national security tasks of the counterterrorist service or agency.

IMPLEMENTATION OF INCENTIVES FOR CONTRIBUTIONS BY INDUSTRY

Idealistically, civilian industry would be so impressed with the obvious need for a sophisticated counterterrorist force to protect their own interests abroad that they would demonstrate inordinate efforts toward such a project. With the reality that the needs are abundant and the dollars are few during recession periods, the whole-hearted support for limited-use equipment fielding is less optimistic. Any of the following three suggestions or various combinations might be considered for increased support from industry:

Tie contracts for limited-use counterterrorists equipment to major military product contract awards. For example, in order to be awarded an aircraft production contract a company might also be required to produce a one-of-a-kind aircraft(s) at a reasonable (as opposed to punitive or prohibitive) cost.

Provide special tax deduction incentives to industries for limited-use equipment produced or engineering and testing effort conducted.

Assess U.S. industrial corporations abroad with a personnel security tax for each individual U.S. citizen working in a foreign country. This tax would go directly to the budget for counterterrorist operations.

The advantage of the latter recommendation is that the taxpaying public would perceive that the "big money industries" would be shouldering a greater responsibility for the protection of their

profitmaking activities abroad. This perception would probably prevail even though the costs would likely be passed on to the U.S. consumers. The main objection to this tax should be that it would diminish the recognition that the nation as a whole benefits and is moreover dependent on overseas (Third World) investment for national security and survival. Until this fact is driven home to the American populace, the public concern for communist expansion in the Third World may never reach the required level until too late for an adequate response.

RETROSPECT: THE COST OF COUNTERTERRORIST SECURITY

In the opening of chapter . of this thesis, a quote by General Otis was cited which referred to the competency of the British Special Air Service Regiment. If U.S. security planners, which constitutionally includes the Congress, are to seriously address the impact of terrorism on the economic and geostrategic posture of the Third World, then perhaps the following comment from Conflict Quarterly must be considered in the decisions for a Third World strategy:

A unit honed to the standards of the British Special Air Services Regiment cannot be created overnight from hastily assembled volunteers of diverse organizational and training backgrounds, nor will it result from part-time service and training. Furthermore, a rescue force should be equipped with the highest quality weapons, vehicles and kit--it is an expensive venture. But again, one need only compare the German operations at Munich and Mogadishu to appreciate the consequences of poor training and the wisdom of investing time and money in the creation of a high quality force.⁸

CHAPTER 7 ENDNOTES

¹J.L. Holloway III, "Review Group's Conclusions Reported," Aviation Week and Space Technology, 113, No. 13 (1980), 91.

²Haim Oren, "Entebbe Raid Briefing to Command and General Staff College Class of 1982."

³Cf., p. 83.

⁴J.L. Holloway III, "Group Analyzes Reasons for Failure," Aviation Week and Space Technology, 113, No. 11 (1980), 71.

⁵Brian Crozier, Strategy of Survival (1978), 189, 190.
Norman Podhoretz, "Lesson of Failure," The Washington Post, 103, No. 147 (1982), A19.

⁶Robert G. Kaiser, "In Stunned Congress, Wariness and Concern Over War Powers Act," The Washington Post, 103, No. 143 (1980), A13.
A congressional challenge to the President's authority to commit U.S. troops to this type of operation was surfaced following the Iran raid. No change was made to the 90-day troop commitment without congressional approval policy which still exists.

⁷John Costello, "The Strategic Implications of a High Technology Light Division as Part of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force," MMAS Thesis, USA Command and General Staff College, 1982.

⁸David Charters, "Swift and Bold: An Appraisal of Hostage Rescue Operations," Conflict Quarterly, 1, (1980), 31.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BOOKS

- Almond, Gabriel A. The American People and Foreign Policy. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1965.
- Association of the United States Army. Freedom in Peril: A Year-End Assessment 1981. Arlington, Virginia. Association of the United States Army, 1982.
- Brodie, Bernard. War and Politics. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1973.
- Crozier, Brian. Strategy of Survival. Westport, Connecticut: Arlington House Publishers, 1978.
- Fairbanks, John K., and Frank A. Kierman, Jr. Chinese Ways in Warfare. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1974.
- Griffith, William E. Adelphi Paper No. 152. London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1979.
- Hart, B.H. Liddell. Strategy. 2nd revised ed. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., Publishers, 1967.
- Hoeber, Francis P., and William Schneider, Jr., eds. Arms, Men and Military Budgets, Issues for Fiscal Year 1978. New York: Crane, Russak and Company, Inc., 1977.
- Hoeber, Francis P., William Schneider, Jr., Norman Polmar and Ray Bessette, eds. Arms Men, and Military Budgets, Issues for Fiscal Year 1981. New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1980.
- Horne, Alistair. A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962. New York: The Viking Press, 1977.
- International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Strategic Survey 1979. London: Neil Moore Associates, 1980.
- Jordan, Amos A., and William J. Taylor, Jr. American National Security, Policy and Process. Baltimore and London: The John Hopkins University Press, 1981.
- Kahan, Jerome H. Security in the Nuclear Age. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1975.
- Kahan, Herman. On Thermonuclear War. Westport Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1978.
- Laqueur, Walter. Terrorism. Boston-Toronto: Little, Brown and Company, 1977.

Earle, Edward Mead, editor. 2nd printing. Makers of Modern Strategy, Military Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1973.

Possony, Stefan T. and J.E. Pournelle. The Strategy of Technology, Winning the Decisive War. Cambridge, Mass.: Dunellen, 1970.

Rood, Harold W. Kingdoms of the Blind. Durham, North Carolina: Carolina Academic Press, 1980.

Schneider, William Jr. and Francis P. Hoerber, eds. Arms, Men and Military Budgets, Issues for Fiscal Year 1977. New York: Crane, Russak and Company, Inc., 1976.

Staff, Carnegie Panel on U.S. Security and the Future of Arms Control. Challenges for U.S. National Security: Assessing the Balance: Defense Spending and Conventional Forces. New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1981.

Stevenson, William. 90 Minutes At Entebbe. New York: Bantam Books, Inc., 1976.

Williams, Alden, and David w. Tarr, eds. Modules in Security Studies. Lawrence, Kansas: Allen Press, Inc., 1974.

GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS AND STUDIES

- Auerback, S.I., P.B. Dunaway and R.C. Dahlman. Final Report on Postattack Ecology. By: Environmental Sciences Division, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, Tenn., 1973. For: Defense Civil Preparedness Agency, Washington, D.C. DCPA Work Order No. DAHC 20-70-C-0375 and Atomic Energy Commission Contract No. W-7405-eng-26.
- Brown, Harold. Department of Defense Annual Report Fiscal Year 1982. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, January 1981.
- Defense Civil Preparedness Agency, DCPA Attack Environment Manual, Chapter 8 (separate). "What the Planner Needs to Know About the Post-Shelter Environment." Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973.
- Dresch, F.W., and H.T. Ellis. Criteria for Early Postattack Economic Viability of Local Areas. By: Strategic Studies Center, Stanford Research Institute, Menlo Park, California, 1974. For: Defense Civil Preparedness Agency, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington, D.C. Contract DAHC 20-73-C-0274, Work Unit 3521A.
- Executive Office of the President Office of Management and Budget, The United States Budget in Brief, Fiscal Year 1983. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1982.
- Haig, Alexander. Peace and Deterrence, Current Policy No. 383, United States Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Washington, D.C., April 6, 1982.
- Holloway, J.L., III, Chairman. Rescue Mission Report. Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff--Special Operations Review Group, August 1980.
- Jones, David C. United States Military Posture for FY 82. (with supplement by the Joint Chiefs of Staff) Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1981.
- Hixon, Richard. U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's: Shaping a Durable Peace. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, May 1973.
- Nixon, Richard. U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's: A New Strategy for Peace. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, February, 1970.
- Office of the Secretary of the Air Force. Air Force Policy Letter for Commanders. Washington, D.C.: AFRP, 1 November 1981.

Peterson, David W., William S. Silverman, Henry Birdseye Weil, and Sarah Willard. Development of A Dynamic Model to Evaluate Economic Recovery Following a Nuclear Attack, Final Report, Volume I: Description and Simulations. By: Pugh-Roberts Associates, Inc., Cambridge, Mass., 1980. For: Federal Emergency Management Agency, Washington, D.C., Program Manager: George F. Divine, Contract DCPA 01-78-C-0302, Work Unit 4341-B.

Puritano, Vincent. "Getting Ourselves Together on Systems Acquisition," Defense 81, October. Arlington, Virginia: Armed Forces Information Service, October 1981.

Staudenmaier, William C. Strategic Concepts for the 1980's; Special Report. Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: USAMC Strategic Studies Institute, May 1981.

Sullivan, Robert J., Kurt Guthe, William H. Thomas and Frank L. Adelman. Survival During the First Year After A Nuclear Attack, Final Report. By: System Planning Corp., Arlington, Virginia, 1979. For: Federal Emergency Management Agency, Washington, D.C. Dr. David W. Bensen, Contracting Officer's Technical Representative, Contract No. DCPA 01-78-C-0297, Work Unit No. 3539C.

U.S. National Security Resource Board. "The Objectives of the United States Materials Resource Policy and Suggested Initial Steps in their Accomplishment; A Report by the Chairman based on the report of the Presidents Material Policy Commission and Federal Agency Comments Thereon. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1952.

U.S. President's Materials Policy Commission. Resources for Freedom; A Report to the President. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1952.

Weil, Henry Birdseye, William S. Silverman, and David W. Peterson. Development of A Dynamic Model to Evaluate the Effect of Natural Resource Policies on Recovery Following Nuclear Attack, Volume I: Description and Simulations. By: Pugh-Roberts Associates, Inc., Cambridge, Mass., 1981. For: Federal Emergency Management Agency, Washington, D.C., Program Manager: George F. Divine, Contract DCPA 01-78-C-0302, Work Unit 4341-B.

Weinberger, Casper W. Address to National Security Affairs Conference, 14 July 1981. Washington, D.C.: DOD (Public Affairs) News Release No. 328-81, 1981.

Weinberger, Casper W. Annual Report to the Congress Fiscal Year 1983. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, February 8, 1982.

Weinberger, Casper W. "Where We Must Build and Where We Must Cut," Defense 81, December. Arlington, Virginia: American Armed Forces Information Service, December 1981.

Weinberger, Casper W. "Policy, Strategy, and the Budget," Defense 82,
May. Arlington, Virginia: American Armed Forces Information
Service, May 1982.

PERIODICALS

- Adedeji, Abebayo. "Africa: Permanent Underdog?" International Perspectives, March, April 1981.
- Anderson, Jack. "Intelligence Reports Profile Libyan Leader." The Kansas City Star, Vol. 102 No. 147 (March 8, 1982), 9A.
- Anderson, Jack. "Khadafy a Political Zealot from His Early Days," The Kansas City Star, Vol 102 No. 148 (March 9, 1982), 11A.
- Andrews, Walter. "Meyer Warns of Global Strategy Gap," Army Times, 42d yr., No. 29 (March 1, 1982), 6.
- Andrews, Walter. "Stealth Aircraft Set for 1982 Production," Army Times, 42d yr., No. 32 (March 22, 1982), 23.
- Andrews, Walter. "U.S. Drafting a Plan to Alter Space Treaty," Army Times, 42d yr., No. 31 (March 15, 1982), 23.
- Associated Press, "Defense Spending Bid is Aimed at Restoring Margin of Safety." The Kansas City Star, Vol. 102, No. 117 (February 7, 1982), 39, 40A.
- Associated Press, "U.S. Unemployment Total Reaches a Record," The Kansas City Star, Vol. 102 No. 153 (March 15, 1982), 1A, 6A.
- Atkeson, Edward B. "Hemispheric Denial: Geopolitical Imperitives and Soviet Strategy," Strategic Studies Institute U.S. Army War College. (June 10, 1976).
- Baker, Warren D. Colonel (USMC Retired). "Next: A Resource War?" Sea Power, Vol 23, No. 10 (October 1980), 55-61.
- Bizzarro, Salvatore. "Mexico's Oil Boom," Current History, Vol. 80 No. 463 (February 1981), 49.
- Brady, Sabina E. "China's Strategic Minerals and Metals," The China Business Review, Vol. 8 No. 5 (September-October 1981), 66.
- Brzezinski, Zbigniew. "The Failed Mission," The New York Times Magazine, Vol. CXXXI, No. 45,287 (April 18, 1982), 28, 79.
- Carter, Jimmy. "State of the Union 1980," Vital Speeches of the Day, Vol. XLVI, No. 8 (February 1, 1980), 226, 227.
- Carter, Jimmy. "They Are Prisoners No More," Vital Speeches of the Day, Vol. XLVI, No. 9 (February 15, 1981), 262.
- Casey, William J. "The Real Soviet Threat in El Salvador--And Beyond," U.S. News and World Report, Vol. 92, No. 9 (March 8, 1982) 25-26.

Charter, David. "Swift and Bold: An Appraisal of Hostage Rescue Operations," Conflict Quarterly, Summer 1980, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Summer 1980), 26-32.

Cooper, Nancy. "Can Strategic Minerals Hog-tie America?" Mechanix Illustrated, Vol. 78 No. 646 (March 1982), 57-59, 129-130.

Deutsch, Karl W. "Prospects For the Future," Parameters, Vol. VII, No. 2 (1977), 77-86.

Doughty, Robert A. "The Evolution of U.S. Army Tactical Doctrine, 1946-76," Leavenworth Papers, No. 1 (August 1979), 40-41

Eaker, Ira C. "Russia Responsible for U.S. Crisis," Air Force Times, Vol. 40 No. 23 (December 31, 1979), 11.

Editors. "Latin America: The Soviets find trade partners on the right," Business Week, No. 2694 (June 29, 1981), 64.

Editors. "Powder Keg at Our Doorstep," U.S. News and World Report, Vol. LXXXVII, No. 19 (1980), 21-27.

Editors. "Searching for Hit Teams," Time, Vol. 118 No. 26 (December 21, 1981), 20, 22.

Editors. "Debaiche In The Desert," Time, Vol. 115, No. 8 (May 5, 1980), 12-19.

Editors. "Soviet Raw Materials Strategy; Cold War II or World War III?" Ground Defense International, Vol. VII, No. 64 (May 1980), 10-12.

Editors. "Striking It Rich on Defense," Business Week, No. 2737 (May 3, 1982), 102-106.

Gans, Daniel. "Neutron Weapons: Solution to a Surprise Attack?" Military Review, Vol. LXII, No. 1 (January 1982), 25-31.

Gelb, Leslie H. "PRM 12 Three Years Later," Aviation Week and Space Technology, Vol. 112 No. 12 (March 24, 1980), 8-9.

Godsell, Geoffrey. "Soviet Naval Threat to Japan Oil Route Grows," The Christian Science Monitor, Vol. 72, No. 190 (August 22, 1980), 1, 10.

Gray, Colin S. "National Style in Strategy--The American Example," International Security, Vol. 6 No. 2 (Fall 1981), 40.

Halloran, Richard. "Deployment Force Seeks Permanent Mideast Post," The New York Times, Vol. CXXXI No. 45,166 (December 18, 1981), A12.

Holloway, J.L., III. "Group Analyzes Reasons for Failure," Aviation Week and Space Technology, Vol. 113 No. 11 (September 15, 1980), 61-71.

- Holloway, J.L., III. "Report Cites Mission's Lack of Review," Aviation Week and Space Technology, Vol. 113 No. 12 (September 22, 1980), 140-144.
- Holloway, J.L., III. "Review Group's Conclusions Reported," Aviation Week and Space Technology, Vol. 113 No. 13 (September 29, 1980), 84, 85, 88-91.
- Henfrey, Tony. "Is Your South African Gold Turning Red?" Money Maker, Vol. 2, No. 6 (October/November 1981), 40-45.
- Isaacson, Walter. "Point Man for U.S. Policy," Time, Vol. 119, No. 10 (March 8, 1982), 16.
- Isaacson, Walter. "We Are All Americans," Time, Vol. 119, No. 10 (March 8, 1982), 15.
- Johnson, Robert G. "In Stunned Congress, Wariness and Concern Over War Powers Act," Washington Post, 103d yr., No. 143 (April 26, 1980), A13.
- King, Alwyn H. "U.S. Global Retrenchment and the Army of 2000," Parameters, Vol. IX, No. 2 (June 1979), 47-55.
- Leider, Robert. "An Old Strategist Speaks to the Young," Military Review, Vol. LIV, No. 2 (February 1974), 3-15.
- Leiken, Robert S. "Eastern Winds in Latin America," Foreign Policy, No. 42 (Spring 1981), 101.
- Livingstone, Neil C. "States in Opposition: The War Against Terrorism," Conflict, Vol. 3, No. 213 (1981), 113.
- Magnuson, Ed. "Playing It Cool or Frozen in Ice?" Time, Vol. 119, No. 12 (March 22, 1982), 34.
- Meyer, Edward C. "The Challenge of Change," ARMY (1981-82 Green Book) Vol. 31 No. 10 (October 1981), 14-22.
- Meyer, Herbert E. "How We're Fixed for Strategic Minerals," Fortune, Vol. 103 No. 3 (February 9, 1981), 68.
- Nitze, Paul H. "Strategy in the Decade of the 1980's," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 59 No. 1 (Fall 1980), 87, 92-93.
- Otis, Glenn K. "Army Must Fight Terrorism, Unrest, Too," ARMY, Vol. 31 No. 12 (December 1981), 48, 50.
- Pipes, Richard. "Why the Soviet Union Thinks It Could Fight and Win a Nuclear War," Commentary, Vol. 64 No. 1 (July 1977), 1-13.
- Pipp, Edwin G. "The Military Stake in the Space Shuttle," ARMY, Vol. 31 No. 9 (September 1981), 22-26.

- Podhoretz, Norman. "Lesson of Failure," Washington Post, 103d yr., No. 147 (April 30, 1980), A19.
- Reagan, Ronald. "Inaugural Address; Putting America Back to Work," Vital Speeches of the Day, Vol. XLVII, No. 9 (February 15, 1981), 260.
- Rich, Spencer. "Charlie's Angels': Extreme Versatility Is Strike Force Goal," The Washington Post, 103d yr., No. 143 (April 26, 1980), A16.
- Robinson, Clarence A. Jr. "Emphasis Grows on Nuclear Defense," Aviation Week and Space Technology, Vol. 116, No. 10 (March 8, 1982), 27.
- Sanders, Sol W. "The New Violence Brewing in Central America," Business Week, No. 2691 (June 8, 1981), 74.
- Schlesinger, James R. "Third World Conflict and International Security in the 1980's," Survival, Vol. XXII No. 6 (November-December 1980), 281.
- Sidey, Hugh. "Needed: A Grand Strategy," Time, Vol. 119 No. 3 (January 18, 1982), 19.
- Sim, Richard and James Anderson. "The Caribbean Strategic Vacuum," Conflict Studies, No. 121 (August 1980), 3.
- Starr, Richard F. "U.S.S.R. and Red China in the Third World," NATO's Fifteen Nations, Vol. 25 No. 3 (June-July 1980), 81-88.
- Stewart-Smith, Geoffrey. "Towards a Western Grand Strategy for Global Freedom," Foreign Affairs Research Institute, London, 1980, 13.
- Tambs, Lewis A. "World War III: The Final Phase--Finlandization," Vital Speeches of the Day, Vol. XLVII No. 5 (December 15, 1980), 154-157.
- Taylor, Maxwell D. "Reagan's Military Policy is in Trouble," The Washington Post, Vol. 332 (November 2, 1981), A15.
- Tice, Jim. "Meyer Streese Conventional Forces Needed for 'Most Likely Challenge'," Army Times, 42d yr. No. 12 (November 2, 1981), 7.
- Tice, Jim. "Army Plans for Year 2000 Battles," Army Times, 42d Yr. No. 29 (March 1, 1982), 1.
- Trent, Darrell M. "Terrorism; Threat and Reality," Vital Speeches of the Day, Vol. XLIV, No. 3 (November 15, 1979), 79-83.
- Velocci, Tony. "The Resources Gap," Nations Business, Vol. 68 No. 10 (October 1980), 33-38.

- Wales, George E. "Algerian Terrorism," Naval War College Review, Vol. XXII No. 2 (October 1969), 26-42.
- Warshofsky, Fred. "Strategic Minerals: The Invisible War." Reader's Digest, Vol. 118 No. 706 (February 1981), 81-85.
- Webbe, Stephen. "Hostage-rescue mission's weak link: Too-tight security?", Christian Science Monitor, The, Vol. 72 No. 191 (August 25, 1980), 3.
- Wells, Samuel F. Jr. "The Origins of Massive Retaliation," Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 96, No. 1 (Spring 1981), 34-37, 41, 42.
- Will, George F. "Fear of Facing the Truth," Newsweek, Vol. XCIII No. 4 (January 22, 1979), 88.

UNPUBLISHED SOURCES

Costello, John. "The Strategic Implications of a High Technology Light Division as Part of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force," MMAS Thesis, USA Command and General Staff College, 1982.

Handley, John M. "Libyan Involvement in Terrorism," MMAS Thesis, USA Command and General Staff College, 1981.

McMillin, Charles D. "Roles and Missions of Airborne, Ranger, and Special Forces in Contingency Operations," MMAS Thesis, USA Command and General Staff College, 1979.

National Security Council Planning Board. A Report to the National Security Council: NSC 162. Washington, D.C.: Unpublished, September 30, 1953.

Strand, Richard M. "The United States Arms Transfer Program -- The Evolution of An Instrument of Foreign Policy," MMAS Thesis, USA Command and General Staff College, 1980.

Vancleave, William. Address to Command and General Staff College evening seminar, 5 April, 1982.

APPENDIX A

- CLASSIFIED -

SECRET NOFORN (U)


Published Separately; On File

Combined Arms Research Library
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

APPENDIX B

PLANNING, PROGRAMING & BUDGET SYSTEM

—AN EXECUTIVE PRIMER—



MG PATRICK M. RODDY
DIRECTOR PROGRAM ANALYSIS & EVALUATION
NOVEMBER 1981



DACS-DP

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

SUBJECT: Planning, Programing and Budget System - An Executive Primer

Inclosed for your information is a copy of "Planning, Programing and Budget System - An Executive Primer." It was prepared as a simple and brief overview of the Planning, Programing and Budget System (PPBS) process. It is intended to remove some of the "black magic" of the PPBS and to provide a simple explanation for the layman who must from time to time work with the "experts."

Because the PPBS process is many things to many people, this perspective necessarily includes biases. If you accept what follows with a recognition that the PPBS is both a tool to discipline the resource allocation process and a vehicle to define, examine and change what the Army does, you will be able to use the PPBS to accomplish your objectives. The keys to "playing" effectively in the process are anticipation, appreciation of the time lines, and active participation when it doesn't seem to matter so you are prepared to "play" when it does.

I sincerely hope this brief effort helps some and doesn't bore others. I would be very pleased to receive comments on how we might improve on this approach.

1 Incl
PPBS - Executive Primer

PATRICK M. RODDY
Major General, GS
Director, Program Analysis
and Evaluation

DISCLAIMER

The views, opinions, and/or findings are those of the author and should not be construed as an official Department of the Army position, policy or decision, unless so designated by other official documentation.

PLANNING, PROGRAMING & BUDGET SYSTEM

—An Executive Primer—

BACKGROUND:

The Planning Programing & Budget System (PPBS) process had its origin in the McNamara era and has been evolving ever since. The system as we know it today has changed dramatically from its humble beginnings and some brief comment about why the changes, as opposed to what they were, is a good way to introduce the subject.

Prior to what I call the McNamara era, the Services essentially did their own thing on an annual basis and submitted a budget to Congress. When Mr. McNamara became SECDEF he brought with him some expertise on how to control large organizations—the major tenet being the need to restrict and control change. His management approach resulted in each Service program being documented in a single book, and he became the approving authority for any changes to that book. Thus any Service that wanted to add, delete or revise something in the book had to obtain SECDEF approval. It soon became apparent that there was a great deal of similarity between the potential outcome for a forward pass in a football game and SECDEF action on a change request. In the case of the forward pass it could be complete, incomplete or intercepted—two of the outcomes being bad. In the case of change requests they could be approved, disapproved or ignored—again only one out of three outcomes being good.

The Services responded to this control, over time, by literally swamping OSD with change requests on the apparent assumption that the more you ask for the higher the probability some will be approved. To accommodate this phenomenon an office was added at OSD, and we saw the emergence of an OSD PA&E. The original responsibility of this office was to evaluate and recommend to the SECDEF which change proposals had merit and which did not. In the beginning the PA&E analysis was focused on technical merit, defense needs and adequacy of the proposal. Over time, however, this rather *pure* objective became prostituted to the realities of resource constraints. Soon the analysis and evaluation of change proposals, submitted by the Services (under a rule that—if they got approved they got the dollars), began to focus on affordability as opposed to need or technical merit. More and more OSD analyses of proposals resulted in the disapproval of change requests under the guise of technical deficiency when, in fact, it was an affordability problem.

As this fact of life emerged, it became apparent that a system to discipline the frequency, timing, quantity and value of change proposals was critical. That, in turn, resulted in the PPBS framework as we know it today where changes would be submitted on a cyclic basis, outyear implications were required, and OSD would provide guidance on do's and don'ts.

From that point to the present the PPBS process has been constantly evolving, both because of internal OSD initiatives to make the system more responsive and because of pressures external to OSD to do things differently. Today, I think it is safe to say that the PPBS encompasses the full range of activities that support both DOD and Army decisionmaking on the allocation of resources and, hence, is the focus during the remainder of this primer.

OVERVIEW:

As I implied at the outset I would not attempt to provide a detailed description of the PPBS process but would instead hopefully provide a familiarity with the process in layman's terms. Subscribing to the adage that a picture is worth a thousand words, Figure 1 graphically portrays the system as we know and love it today.




Figure 1

Before I begin to elaborate on the process I must succumb to the need to define, briefly in my terms, what planning, programing and budgeting mean. Planning, in the context of PPBS, includes the definition and examination of alternative strategies, the analysis of changing conditions and trends, threat and technology assessment, and efforts to understand both change and the long- term implications of current choices. Programing includes the definition and analysis of alternative forces, weapon systems, and support systems, together with their resource implications; and the evaluation of options for variation therein. Budgeting includes formulation, justification, execution, and control of the budget. It is very important, at the outset to understand that my definitions relate to the functions performed and not to a specific organizational element that performs them. Accepting these definitions as adequate for further discussion, I will now transition to some specifics of the PPBS process.

There are really two kinds of systems operative in Headquarters Department of Army today (fig 2).




Figure 2

The administrative system consists of the bureaucratic controls we establish essentially to *move the mail* and provides the procedures and policies we follow to communicate in a standard format within the headquarters. The program and budget

system establishes, and in some cases disciplines, how we communicate both inside and outside the Army in terms of planning, programing and budgeting. This PPBS is primarily a DOD internal system although it is now creeping into the vocabulary of Congress and other Executive Branches. It is milestone oriented and ultimately influences activity levels, late hour/weekend work requirements, leave schedules and the disposition of everyone it touches.




Figure 3

The entire system has its origin in an assessment of Army capability, both today and what it is desired to be in the future. As shown in Figure 3 this capability is influenced by Congress, fulfilling its constitutionally mandated responsibilities and by the Executive Branch as national strategy is formulated and promulgated.

Were we to array the functions required to provide, sustain and enhance capability and associate them with the elements of PPBS we might see a correlation similar to that seen in Figure 4. The impression conveyed that there is no overlap is in error; however, the degree of overlap between functions is a topic that generates heated discussions. Suffice to say it is not a heel-to-toe relationship.




Figure 4

With that rather simplistic overview I will now turn to the so-called start point of the annual PPBS process—the planning function. I show in figure 5 the *What* aspects of planning. You will note that something new has been added to the definition seen earlier—a time frame. The reference to 5 years is interpreted differently by different folks. Some contend that the plan must cover at least 5 years and begins immediately after the budget year. Others contend that *beyond 5 years* means the plan starts where the Program Objective Memorandum (POM) leaves off (normally 5 years out from the Budget). I personally subscribe to neither—the plan should begin in the third year of the POM and extend a minimum of 10 years beyond. My experience indicates that near year momentum from prior and current year budgets does not provide enough flexibility for the planner to change direction or emphasis significantly. If the planner concentrates on the out years of the program, and is patient, in 2-4 years the program will reflect the plan. If the planner is not patient and tries to be a *mover and shaker* in the immediate future, he or she is now performing the programing function. When that occurs the planning function is de-emphasized (not performed) and the program lacks objective and focus in the out years. It also goes without saying that stability in the planning function is critical if the plan is to be relevant. If the plan lacks consistency or is not realistically attainable it loses credibility and is soon ignored.

PLANNING

WHAT.....

- BROAD STRATEGY AND PLANS
- BEYOND 5 YEARS
- RELATIVELY UNCONSTRAINED
- ESTABLISHES OBJECTIVE FORCE LEVELS
- DEPARTURE POINT/GOAL FOR PROGRAMING

WHO.....

- JCS (JSPD)
- ODCSOPS (ARMY GUIDANCE)
- ACSI (THREAT)



Figure 5

In Figure 5 we also introduce the *who* aspect of planning in its simplest form. Every element of the Army Staff is involved in the planning function but the *biggies* in the PPBS arena are highlighted. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) annually produce a document called the Joint Strategic Planning Document (JSPD) that outlines the *prudent risk* force required by the Joint and Specified Command Commanders to execute the national military strategy. The resulting force structure is called the *Planning Force*. This planning force may or may not be affordable but it becomes a planning objective.

The second major player is the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (DCSOPS) who is responsible for development of the Army plan. This document is also produced annually. While both the JSPD and the Army Plan are formidable documents to sit down and read for complete comprehension, they are critically important documents in the process. Every executive should be familiar with the time frames when these documents are in final development (staffing) and receive a briefing on major thrusts and general content—they will subsequently be major drivers in the resource allocation process that follows.

Finally I show the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence (ACSI) as the *keeper of the threat*. The threat assessment is fundamental to force capability assessment. The threat is not the one we face today; it is what we expect to encounter in the last year of

the POM and beyond. By forecasting what the threat will be in those outyears we can then compare five year program initiatives to make sure we are oriented on the right objective.

I now transition to a brief discussion of what those strange folks called programmers are up to. . .

PROGRAMING FUNCTIONS




Figure 6

In Figure 6 we depict what might be described as the job description of a programmer. He or she endeavors to translate the goals and objectives of the planner into finite actions with resources applied. The programmer considers alternatives and tradeoffs but always remains focused on the planner's objective. Perhaps the most critical task of the programmer is to integrate all the different requirements into a balanced program. The program balance only becomes difficult when it must be achieved within constrained resources (more on this later).

I display in Figure 7 what appears to be a different definition of programing than shown earlier. This really is not the case although it is academically a little more precise. What's important in this graphic are the questions that the programmer must address. Hopefully at this point an issue I raised at the outset is becoming clear—the programing function cannot be performed by one central activity in the organization. The programing function must be an integral part of every major staff element. When all the programmers on the Army staff get-together they talk about these questions and they address the conflicts, the alternatives and the tradeoffs—but always oriented on the planner's objective.

DEFINITION OF PROGRAMING

**THE ART OF TRANSLATING GUIDANCE INTO ACTION.....
TO PRODUCE COMBAT CAPABILITY BY THE TIMELY AND
BALANCED ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES**



- HOW BIG WILL THE ARMY BE ?
- WHAT FORCES WILL IT CONTAIN ?
- WHAT WILL THE ARMY BUY ?
- WHERE AND WHAT WILL THE ARMY BUILD ?
- WHAT ARE EXPECTED RESOURCE CONSTRAINTS ?

Figure 7

If you are still with me, we should now talk about what it is that programmers produce (other than headaches and confusion). Given that a few bright folks are malassigned into the programing function they should produce a document that displays the Army program over the next 5 years. They would probably call it a POM because that's what programmers have always called it.




Figure 8

Figure 8 shows what the major ingredients of that POM really are. It shows what the Army proposes to do with the dollars it has been told it can expect in each of the next five years in terms of forces, manpower, training, procurement, R&D, construction, logistics and all the other things it takes to sustain the force. Once this document is approved by our boss up in OSD it is then called a Five Year Defense Program (FYDP).

Now approval of the POM is not just a short note from SECDEF to SecArmy saying *OK on your POM*. Sometimes OSD doesn't like our *stewardship report* on how we would allocate the resources. In cases where we disagree or where issues are raised, there is a big meeting with all the *war lords* from OSD and each of the Services, and this deliberative body, called the Defense Resources Board (DRB), tries to reach some accommodation. Normally we win some and lose some and we find out how we fared when the SECDEF publishes his decision in what we call the Program Decision Memorandum (PDM). This decision memo tells us what parts of our POM are OK and what we have to fix before we submit a budget.

Humming right along, we have now reached the point in late summer where a piece of the program must now transition to the budget function.

PROGRAM BUDGET BREAD LOAF




Figure 9

Figure 9 shows the POM, now called the Five Year Defense Program (FYDP), as a loaf of bread divided into five parts each representing one year of the FYDP. As we begin budget preparation we slice off the first year and reformat that year from programmer language into budgetary terms. The remainder of the loaf is set aside for a couple of months and another slice (year) is added to the back end and it will be baked into another POM next year.

In Figure 10 we depict the *what* and *who* in the budget process of PPBS. The key step that *triggers* budget formulation is receipt of the Program Decision Memorandum (PDM) from OSD that is essentially a final report card on our POM. The translation of that first year of the POM (now FYDP) into budget language and format is a formidable task that involves every element of the Army staff and Secretariat.

In Figure 11, I endeavor to show how the program relates to the budget and the perspectives of those performing the budget and program function. On the left side of the matrix we show the programming view which endeavors to look at packages (sometimes referred to as Program Development Increment Packages or PDIP). These packages try to address all appropriations associated with that specific program line as the programmer endeavors to look horizontally across all appropriations. Because

WHAT.....

-

WHO.....

- Figure 10**

ARMY PROGRAM AND HOW IT RELATES TO THE ARMY BUDGET



This situation is alluded to when you hear the question *does that number include all the tails?* What is really being asked is *does the resource total shown include all the dollars or resources required from each appropriation to do what needs to be done?* The figure shows the budget perspective which looks down vertically, thru all programs, oriented on a specific appropriation. In theory, if we could put the whole Army program in this matrix, the programmer would read left to right to determine total cost of each specific program. The budget officer would look vertically to determine the total value of the appropriation and could further see what piece of that appropriation was designated for each program. Our ultimate objective is to produce this matrix; however, we still have a long way to go.

PROGRAM TO BUDGET TRANSITION




Figure 12

Figure 12 highlights the fact that the PPBS is not a successive process where nothing starts until the preceding function has concluded. The program to budget transition really involves 3 separate functions all going on simultaneously. At the top we show the year of execution or the current operational year—in the current case that would be FY 82, which we just started. The second function shown is labeled budget and identifies the preparation of next year's budget—in the current case that would be FY 83. The third function shown is labeled program and shows that the program formulation process for the next POM submission has already begun. When you look at

the today arrow it becomes apparent that all three functions are occurring simultaneously and they are interrelated. A simple example to point out interdependence might be the procurement of a *widgit* which we had budgeted to buy in FY 82. For some reason (cost, technical, etc.) we see that we cannot execute as we planned. This will probably change our assumptions for FY 83 and we will modify our budget submission. Because our residual five year program had assumed that FY 82 and FY 83 were already *locked up* in terms of what FY 82 and FY 83 would produce, those subsequent program years will also now have to be modified. This simple example is one of many types where execution problems will drive changes back into the program years and perhaps even influence the plan.

Figure 13 points out what the competitors are that annually try to get into the program as a claimant for resources.

THE COMPETITION




Figure 13

First there are those essential things that must be done. They have their origin in either changing strategy, doctrine, changing threat or a recognition that something is broken and must be fixed. The second claimant is unknown-unknowns that are either surprises or represent a hedge against a risk we are not willing to accept. Third, there are decrement restorals which is another way to say we should put back in what we took out last year. Fourth there are those proposals which highlight that if we bought what we want faster we could save money. Another way this issue is referred to is *front end resources to achieve economic rates*. Finally, we show new initiatives which

are those things that respond to a demonstrated need and are trying to get resourced. Because the Army can only accommodate so many *adds* to the existing program, there must be some criteria established to evaluate the competition.

Figure 14 highlights some of the criteria used in this discrimination process.




Figure 14

The first test is to determine if the need or requirement is documented. Next is it affordable and, if not, how will it be resourced? Does the requirement complement existing or planned organization and doctrine? Is the proposal supportable in terms of dollars and spaces now and in the future? Next we examine for sensitivity to Congressional intent. There are many other *tests* that are applied. This *testing process* is referred to as the Army prioritization process and is under the staff direction of the DCSOPS with the entire Army staff *playing*. This prioritization process is now formalized in a system called mission area analysis and might simplistically be defined as a technique where all the needs of the army are segregated into mission areas and rank-

ed by mission area contribution. The product of each mission area is then integrated into an Army master priority list. Because this mission area concept is also still in its infancy, the optimum prioritization process is still in the future.

We have now *stepped on most of the rocks* as we walked across this *PPBS river*. Because I am in the programing business, and this is my paper, I now feel I have the liberty to address some specifics on the PPBS process and inject some opinions that may not be shared by many.

ROAD MAP TO PROGRAM ANALYSIS




Figure 15

I depict in Figure 15 what, all too often, is the road map that the Army follows in program development. Astute readers will note that we proceed from step 1 in the deciding mode to step 6 in the implementing phase. I really can count and the point I try to raise here is that we sometimes skip 4, that's right 4, intermediate steps.




Figure 16

Figure 16 adds those 4 omitted steps and, you will note, appreciably increases the content of the deciding phase. My rejoinder here is that we must constrain our enthusiasm to get into the implementation phase and spend more time in a rigorous decision making process.

I have tried in Figure 17 to display who the major players in the formal PPBS process are (any paper of this length should have at least one wiring diagram). At the bottom of the diagram I show the Program Budget Committee (PBC) which involves every element of the Army staff and the Secretariat.

This PBC is supported by three smaller committees which specialize in the areas shown. The PBC is the first formal committee with staff-wide participation that addresses the program or budget as an entity. The PBC is co-chaired by the Director of Army Budget (DAB) and Director, PA&E. The input from Army major commands (MACOMs) comes to the PBC membership annually in two forms— program input is called the Program Analysis and Resource Review (PARR) and budget input is called

FRAMEWORK FOR..... PLANNING PROGRAMING & BUDGETING




Figure 17

the Command Operating Budget (COB). The PBC makes initial decisions and recommendations as a body and proposes appropriate program or budget positions to a committee called the Select Committee (SELCOM). The SELCOM members are the principal vice presidents on the Army Staff (DCSOPS, DCSRDA, DCSPER, etc.) and the committee is chaired by the Vice Chief of Staff. Those SELCOM meetings that address major PPBS events are designated Joint SELCOM meetings and membership is expanded to include Secretariat principals. The Joint SELCOM meetings are co-chaired by the VCSA and the USA.

The results of the SELCOM are then presented to the SA/CSA for approval. Shown at the top of figure 17 is the decision body referred to earlier called the DRB. During the planning, programing and budgeting phases of PPBS the major issues requiring resolution are addressed by this body. Chartered membership includes only ASD principals, Service Secretaries, Chairman JCS, and is chaired by the DEPSECDEF. As occasions warrant, the Service Chiefs are invited to attend.

With full recognition that the preceding has been disjointed I would like to take the reader by the hand and take a fast spin through an abbreviated PPBS cycle. We will start our rapid journey on 1 Oct of any given year and we will trip lightly through the succeeding 15 months.

On 1 October, despite all the other things going on, the planning phase of the PPBS is now going into high gear. The JSPD was received 2 weeks earlier. The OSD staff, working under the direction of the USD for Policy and in close coordination with the Services and JCS, is formulating the planning objectives and goals for the Defense Department. This planning effort is partially constrained by a macro resource allocation that estimates the resources potentially available in the outyears and estimates of costs. This planning effort will be reviewed in a series of DRB meetings into December when finalized Defense Guidance will be approved. The Services are invited to participate in the development of this guidance although they do not have *veto rights*.

The Defense Guidance will be forwarded to the services in mid-January, and will include fiscal guidance (total obligation authority) for each of the 5 program years.

The Army staff begins POM development in earnest in January. February, March and thru mid-April the POM development pace steadily intensifies and PBC and SELCOM meetings become more frequent and longer. The ASA offices are invited and encouraged to play all along the way. All memos, read-ahead packages and decision papers developed in this process are provided to the Secretariat.

By mid-April it is hoped that all major issues relating to the Army Program are resolved and approved by the CSA & SA. The Army staff now turns to writing the narrative portion of the POM and articulating rationale. The POM is normally submitted in mid-May to OSD.

The OSD reviews the POM and develops issues which are ultimately *captured* in seven books. These books are provided to the Services for comment/reclama and beginning in mid-July a series of DRB meetings are held to make tentative decisions on each of the books and the issues contained therein. At the conclusion of the DRB meetings the results are reviewed, decisions are made, and a Program Decision Memo (PDM) is issued by the DEPSECDEF. This PDM essentially approves the POM, as modified by decisions on issues, and *locks up* the Army fiscal levels and major program initiatives for the 5 POM years. This PDM should be received in late August.

From late August to late September the ARSTAF transitions the first year of the approved POM to budget format and a budget is submitted to OSD the first week of October.

Beginning in late October and lasting through November the Army budget will be *scrubbed* jointly by OSD and OMB and issues will be raised for Army comment. The Army will respond with *reclamas* and the major issues will be resolved in a series of DRB meetings through the month of November. The month of December is the period for minor *fine tuning* of the budget in preparation for submission in mid-January.

That has been a 15 month *foot race* through one cycle. I have clearly not done justice to all the complexity and interrelationships involved nor have I adequately described the extent of the overlap in various functions.

EXECUTION—PPBS BECOMES PPBES

A final thought: in the past the Army's managers of the PPBS have focused their attention on the Planning, Programing and Budgeting elements of the process as if they fully identified all the essential ingredients of the complete system. There remains a major deficiency as we tend to leave out the *real world* aspect of the process—the execution of the programs/budgets in the field. There is a compelling need to formally acknowledge the requirement to *capture* execution as a critical element of the process—we propose to begin by renaming the process the PPBES.

It is only in the execution of the approved and resourced programs that we can evaluate the work that has gone into the early three stages of the process or simply restated—*did we get what we thought we paid for?* If we have designed an attainable, workable program and defined it clearly to both our field commands and the Congress, and provided the resources, we should be able to execute the program successfully and demonstrate that achievement to ourselves and others. If we have not met this challenge, it will become perfectly obvious during the year of execution.

Sometimes we find in execution of our programs that we face problems that we had not foreseen; these might include strikes in the plants that produce our weapon systems, changing international events/commitments of our forces, changes in our national political commitments, etc. These are facts of life and we have to be able to accommodate and incorporate changes into the other ongoing PPBS phases of the process. But in execution we have to cope. We have to make certain that we get the greatest output—the most progress towards our stated goals—for the resources that have been made available. The new Administration has recognized this need to evaluate our execution of the approved programs. Secretary Weinberger has established formal performance reviews for designated programs on a regular basis. Deputy Secretary Carlucci tasked the Service secretaries to be fully accountable for the management of their program execution process.

Even though additional funding is being made available to the Defense establishment, it is essential that each Service insure that programs are honestly evaluated. We must insure that our resources are optimized and we have to be honest enough to identify the losers and either fix them or kill them to insure that funds and manpower are applied to programs that give us the capability that we need.

We have, in the past, transferred PPBS responsibility to the field commanders for execution. While they must have the flexibility to manage the available resources to meet their assigned missions, they too have to know that they are responsible for identifying non-productive or ineffective programs. We have to look at program execution in terms of the program outputs and not simply as the accounting for funds obligated and expensed through the finance system. We also have to have effective feedback from the operators at the lowest level of our system to top management to insure that we eliminate our unworkable programs and our mistakes early in the following program and budget processes.

The Comptroller now has an initiative to develop plans and procedures for a quarterly review of the program/budget execution process. His intent is to preserve the *Commander's Army* while receiving data to measure and evaluate program/budget execution. We have to remind ourselves that no matter how good the plan, program or budget is in the abstract at DA, OSD, OMB, and Congress, it will all have been futile if we cannot make the programs work when we pass them to the field for the actual execution. Thus the Army has taken the initiative to describe the process as PPBES—reemphasizing the need for timely, responsive and effective assessment of execution.

At this juncture the readers should be prepared to examine the calendar of the total PPBES cycle at Figure 18. Here I have endeavored to show the critical milestones of the entire process. It is my objective to publish monthly an *exploded* version of this chart depicting what the key events will be in the forthcoming 3 months (Figure 19). This projection will be provided to all the PPBS participants to facilitate calendar adjustments and provide some visibility of what's ahead.


In closing, I feel compelled to add that this PPBES process will continue with or without participation. The momentum of the system was established years ago, and, although we can make modest internal adjustments, the train is not going to stop to let someone get aboard. There is ample opportunity for interested offices and individuals to get involved; however there are no engraved invitations. Despite the fact that there are major reviews in the process, the time to *influence the action* and make a mean-

ingful contribution is long before the *moguls* meet to make final decisions. Hand-wringing and emotional appeals at the final hour may be good for the soul but seldom provide the remedy sought.

Admittedly programmers are a strange group and Secretary Marsh probably provided the best description when he said: *Programers seem to be nice people but they talk funny*. In mitigation and extenuation I offer the following programmer developed definition for your consideration:

"Heroes may well be operationally defined as those who engage in battle without prior cost/benefit analysis, or with a built-in bias in favor of the benefit side".

CALENDAR OF KEY PPBES EVENTS




COB COMMAND OPERATING BUDGET
 CRA CONTINUING RESOLUTION AUTHORITY
 DG DEFENSE GUIDANCE
 DRB DEFENSE RESOURCES BOARD
 EPA EXTENDED PLANNING ANNEX
 JPAM JCS JOINT PROGRAM ASSESSMENT MEMO
 JSPD JOINT STRATEGIC PLANNING DOCUMENT

PARR PROGRAM ANALYSIS RESOURCE REV
 PBD PROGRAM BUDGET DECISIONS
 PDM PROGRAM DECISION MEMORANDUM
 POM PROGRAM OBJECTIVE MEMORANDUM
 TAA TOTAL ARMY ANALYSIS

Figure 18

THREE MONTH CALENDAR OF KEY PPBES EVENTS

CALENDAR DE KEY PPBES EVENES



NOV	DEC	JAN
6 SECDEF ON TAA-88. 6 MACRO ANALYSIS BRIEFING TO CSA. 6 EST PBO ON 83 BUDGET FROM OSD. 6 DMB'S BUDGET BRIEF TO OSD/OMB U/A PROGRAM BUDGET GUIDANCE TO THE MACROS. 19 WEEK STOCKMAN MEETS W/MAT. SECURITY DIVISION. 20 OMB ON FY 83 BUDGET 20 DMB ON DG SEC 1-IV. 25 MCA PROGRAM REVIEW PUC. U/A ARMY GUIDANCE. VOL 111 - THE ARMY PLAN - PUBLISHED. 27 DMB ON DG SEC V-VI.	4 EXPLICIT RECEIPT OF THE FINAL PBO. FIRST OMB DMB W/PRESIDENT ON KIRKING BUDGET. 9 FINAL PBO RECEIVED. 10 JAR: SECDEF RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE PRESIDENT ON FY 83 BUDGET. 11 SECDEF MTG W/PRESIDENT ON BUDGET. U/A DMB: BUDGET MEETING (ASSUMING) PRELIMINARY APPROVAL/ADJUSTMENT. U/A DMB PROVIDES FINAL BUDGET GUIDANCE TO 14-15 SERVICES. 16-24 PRINT OF FY 83 PRESIDENT'S BUDGET. END USIP(1) PUBLISHES DG. SEC VII. LIST OF MAJOR UNRESOLVED ISSUES AND PROBLEM AREAS REQUIRING FURTHER STUDY. END DMB ON PLANNING ALTERNATIVES.	EARLY DEFENSE GUIDANCE (DGI) FINAL DRAFT FOR REVIEW BY SECDEF. 5 ARMY'S FY 83-87 FYDP AND ANNEXES UPDATED 15 MACROS SUMMIT PAPERS & PARTS TO HQDA 16 OSD BUDGET PRESS BRIEF 18 FY 83 OSD BUDGET SUBMITTED TO CONGRESS MAY 22 DG PUBLISHED END ARMY'S PROGRAM BUDGET GUIDANCE (PBG) DISTRIBUTED TO THE MACROS

Figure 19



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
U.S. ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE
1 REYNOLDS AVENUE
FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS 66027-1352

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF:

ATZL-SWY

2 December 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR ATTN: Larry Downing, DTIC-ACQ, Defense Technical Information Center, 8725 John J. Kingman Road, Suite 0944, Fort Belvoir, VA 22060-6218

SUBJECT: Change in Distribution

1. Request a distribution statement change to the following documents:

ADB158650, King, Michael R., "Jedburgh Operations: Support to the French Resistance in Central France from June through September 1944", dated 07 June 07 1991.

ADB148370, Rosner, Elliot J., "JEDBURGHS: Combat Operations Conducted in the Finistere Region of Brittany, France from July-September 1944" dated 01 June 1990.

The distribution statement change, effective 10 November 2004 per Dr. Samuel Lewis, Military History Department, US Army Command and General Staff College, subject matter expert and Reviewer, should read the following: (A) Approved for public release: Distribution unlimited.

ADB074378, Prichard, Joe Douglas, "Rescue Assault Forces--Integrated Strategic Role in National Security" dated 04 June 1982

The distribution statement change, effective 4 October 1995 per LTC Dan Karis, US Army Command and General Staff College, subject matter expert and Reviewer, should read the following: (A) Approved for public release: Distribution unlimited.

2. POC for this request is Rusty Rafferty or John Rogers, Reference Librarians Classified Documents Section, DSN 585-3128 or COM 913-758-3128 or FAX: DSN 585-3014 or COM 913-758-3014.

EDWIN B. BURGESS
Director
Combined Arms Research Library