Surprise and Preemption in Soviet Nuclear Strategy

Abstract

This paper assesses, from the Soviet perspective, the significance of the concept of surprise and preemption in Soviet nuclear warfare strategy. Four dimensions were examined: (1) Soviet Perceptions pf the Role of Surprise and Preemption; (2) Surprise and the Conventional-Nuclear War Interface; (3) Elements of a Surprise (Preemptive) Nuclear Strike; (4) A Fallback Option: Launch on Warning.

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Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
Apr 01, 1983
Accession Number
ADB075070

Entities

People

  • Glenn A. Bailey
  • Glenn E. Skaggs
  • James R. Fitzgerald
  • Steven H. Spayd

Organizations

  • National War College

Tags

Communities of Interest

  • Counter WMD
  • Weapons Technologies

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Air Force
  • Civil Defense
  • Combat Operations
  • Combat Readiness
  • Employment
  • Military Doctrine
  • Military Operations
  • Military Science
  • Military Strategy
  • National Security
  • Nuclear Warfare
  • Security
  • Strategic Weapons
  • United States
  • War Colleges
  • Warfare
  • Warning Systems

Readers

  • Strategic Security Studies