An End to Ad Hocism in the Joint Warfare Arena: A Recommended Solution.
Abstract
The mistakes in Planning, Command and Control, Organization and Training that plagued the attempted Iranian hostage rescue operation were revisited during the Granada operation. This paper compares the lessons learned in both operations, and purposes a solution to end the ad hoc nature and inherent dangers of Joint Force contingency operations. The United States has enjoyed little success in conducting Joint Force operations. Many problems are apparent and appear time after time, but to date, there are few substantive corrections presented by the military leadership of the Armed Forces to correct these serious deficiencies. In fact, Congress has, by enacting Public Law 99-433, forced the military to create a command that is not needed, thus doing the military leaderships' job for them. Four alternatives are presented to prevent the mistakes which characterize joint operations from being repeated in the future. The fourth proposal, which creates a sixth Service, stands out as the most feasible method for ending ad hocism in the Joint Warfare arena.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- May 15, 1987
- Accession Number
- ADB114747
Entities
People
- Theodore A. Duck
Organizations
- Naval War College