Harmonizing the Chemical Weapons Convention with the United States Constitution
Abstract
On-site verification inspections under the Draft Chemical Weapons Convention of facilities in the United States pose unprecedented legal difficulties. Federal implementing legislation can advance most of the Draft Convention's obligations, to permit inspections in accord with the Constitution. In some instances, changes in the United States' negotiating position may be desirable to assure constitutionality. The Draft Convention creates a regime that introduces international law enforcement to the tasks of verifying destruction of existing chemical weapons and preventing new weapons production. The Draft Convention establishes an elaborate mechanism for regulating all production and acquisition of weapons-capable chemicals by States Parties. The success of these restrictions will be verified through two types of on-site inspections: (1) routine inspections of declared facilities; and (2) challenge inspections at both declared and undeclared facilities or locations without delay. Both types of inspections contemplate that the State Party within which the challenged site is located will actively cooperate with the International Organization. Chemical Weapons Convention, Fifth Amendment, Verification, Treaty Ratification, Implementing Legislation, Fourth Amendment, On-Site Inspections.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Apr 01, 1992
- Accession Number
- ADB163637
Entities
People
- Barry Kellman
- Edward A. Tanzman
- Jerry R. Stockton
Organizations
- Braddock Dunn & McDonald