Analysis of the Execution of Counter-Drug Strategy in Bolivia Using the Low Intensity Conflict Imperatives
Abstract
This study investigates the actions of U.S. military personnel conducting the counter-drug mission in Bolivia in accordance with the Bolivian/ U.S. Counter-Drug Strategy. The analysis determines if U.S. personnel, in executing their mission, are complying with the low intensity conflict (LIC) imperatives. The study uses Operations Blast Furnace- and -Snowcap conducted in 1986 and 1989 respectively as illustrative examples to analyze the execution of the counter-drug mission. The LIC imperatives are the doctrinally approved truths acknowledged as essential to the successful planning and execution of LIC operations. The counter-drug mission is a subset of peacetime contingency operations: therefore, the analysis provides a validation of the imperatives as an analytical tool. The study concluded that U.S. personnel did not comply with the LIC imperatives. The failure to comply has a direct correlation to the failure to stop the flow of cocaine from Bolivia. Counter-Drug Strategy, Bolivia, Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) Imperatives, Operation Blast Furnace.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jun 05, 1992
- Accession Number
- ADB167057
Entities
People
- Sergio De La Pena
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College