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
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**A PREFACE TO A POLICY
OF ATLANTIC UNITY**

by

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Advance Study Paper No. 16

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*This paper is a translation which the author
has not had an opportunity to review.*

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NATO—PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS

*Conference of The Center for Strategic Studies,
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These advance study papers will form the basis of the two-day discussion and debate. The papers will not be presented formally at the conference, but will be available prior to the conference through the Center. After the conference, revised and updated papers, with the conference discussion, will be published in book form.

A PREFACE TO A POLICY OF ATLANTIC COHESION

The purpose of this paper is to try to place the current problems of the Atlantic Community in long-range perspective; to show that it would be to the mutual interest of the Atlantic nations to tighten the political, economic, cultural, and military bonds which unite them, however loose these bonds may appear at present.

The writer has no illusions about the actual possibilities, at least in the immediate future, of establishing such a policy, but is convinced that, without a clear picture of the common interests of the various nations of the Atlantic Community, present-day problems cannot be resolved satisfactorily.

If the writer appears skeptical of the real possibility of establishing among the North Atlantic nations a true Atlantic Community in the near future, he is still more skeptical of the possibility for these countries to solve the problems which will confront them if they do not succeed in establishing such a community.

While this statement is oriented toward an essentially economic point of view, it takes into consideration the fact that the economic problems cannot be separated from the general political, sociological, and cultural framework. Special attention is given to a study of cooperation in relation to the principle of national supremacy.

Introduction

The events of the last 50 years have clearly demonstrated that most of the basic Western problems involve the Atlantic countries.

It has become more and more obvious that there is in fact an inter-dependence among these nations.

For a half century these nations have continually been confronted and are confronted still with several basic questions: Would it be to their advantage to tighten their bonds, and, if the answer is positive, what course of action should they take? What obstacles confront a given policy, and are these obstacles surmountable?

I plan to discuss five basic points:

- The essentials of the current state of affairs
- The traditional point of view
- Solving the problem of an Atlantic Community
- The doctrine of national sovereignty
- The present possibilities

The Current State of Affairs

First of all, what question are we attempting to resolve? The problem is that of our Western civilization or, more precisely, the civilization of the Atlantic nations.

This civilization is based on one fundamental principle—human dignity. This principle, in turn, has two corollaries. The first, concern and respect for basic differences, differences which constitute the key to the unusual developments of the Atlantic nations. The second, the belief in the necessity and the possibility of the peaceful resolution of human conflicts within a suitable political and judicial framework, following a predetermined set of laws and procedures.

This civilization is threatened today, and to the future historian, the twentieth century will appear to be characterized by a staggering decline in Western policy.

What are the causes of this situation? We can identify three

primary causes. The first two, for the most part, are external to the Western sphere; Communist totalitarianism at this moment, and, looking into the future, the growth of hunger and misery throughout the world, a danger even more terrible than the present threat of Communism. The third cause is internal in nature. It is our own demoralization, our basic distrust of others, our lack of cohesion, our refusal to sacrifice the trivial for the essential, our refusal to be loyal to the ideals of our own civilization.

The Communist Threat

The Communist threat manifests itself in different forms depending on whether it operates in the Soviet or Chinese sphere.

We must realize that in the Soviet sphere the doctrine of Communist totalitarianism has, as of this moment in history, passed its zenith. Since the death of Stalin a profound evolution has taken place in Russia, the true nature of which has not yet been fully understood by our contemporary civilization. The historian of the future, however, will see this continuing and persisting evolution as the birth of a new era. However, the still-powerful Stalinist factions are opposing this liberal revolt, and Western disunity could serve only to reinforce them. Our disunity, by causing these factions to underestimate our real solidarity, could lead the opponents of the evolution to an act of aggression which might entail a new conflict, and which would probably be the downfall of humanity.

Totalitarian communism looms as a different kind of threat in China. Chinese communism is now at the same stage as was Soviet communism in the 1930's, but in the light of the current world situation and the possibility of China's becoming a nuclear power within the next two decades, the danger is potentially much greater than that of the 1930's.

Henceforth, it behooves the West to speed up the liberal evolution in Soviet Russia and in the satellite countries, and to erode the Communist ideology *before* China achieves the rank of a nuclear power.

The Growth of Hunger and Poverty

The second threat which will surely confront the Atlantic nations sooner or later is the spread of hunger and poverty in some parts of the world in contrast to the prosperity of the Western world. This peril is even more ominous than the Communist threat, since it results not from an ideology which we can combat, but rather from inherent circumstances which seem almost inalterable.

There exists in the world today a disparity of real income far greater than the disparity which might exist within the various countries. Approximately four-fifths of the world population has an income which amounts to less than one-fourth of the income of the average American; half of the population has an income which is less than one-twentieth the average American income; and perhaps one-fourth of the world population has an income which amounts to less than one-fiftieth of the American income. Although the Western nations enjoy unprecedented prosperity, hundreds of millions of people live each day under the most deplorable conditions.¹ For those people who are aware of the importance of even a one to two ratio among the average incomes of the United States and Europe, the above-mentioned inequality seems to be enormous.

As a whole, South America, Africa, and Asia, representing two-thirds of the world population, are undernourished. Half of the world's population is at least partially undernourished. Even more than the comparison of food consumption, the comparison of industrial consumption demonstrates the enormous gap between the underdeveloped and the "developed." The average ratio reflecting the huge disparity is as

follows: 1 to 20 for the textile industry; 1 to 16 for coal; 1 to 37 for steel; 1 to 332 for telephone communications; 1 to 150 for the radio industry; and 1 to 230 for the motor vehicle industry. The above statistics must be understood in relation to the fact that average real income reflects a ratio of only 1 to 20.

Even more revealing, perhaps, are the statistics on illiteracy, the number of doctors per capita, and the life expectancy in the underdeveloped nations, the nations of average development, and the prosperous nations. While the illiteracy rate in the developed nations is approximately 3 per cent, the rate is nearly 80 per cent in the underdeveloped countries. The ratio for the number of doctors per 1000 persons is 1 to 7. Finally, the ratio of life expectancy is 1 to 2. Thus, in the period 1941-1950, life expectancy in India was 32 years compared to 67 years in the United States.

If we establish as a logical disparity index, the relationship between a given income and an average of larger incomes according to Pareto's law the coefficient of inequality in the world as a whole would be approximately seven. It is thus about three and a half times higher than the estimated figure for the Western nations. The social problem presented here on a worldwide scale appears to be far more urgent than is the case in the Western countries. The solution to the problem is already presenting many difficulties.

In this sense, the expression "proletarian nations" seems to the people of the Western countries to be much more justifiable than "proletarian masses." Fortunately, peoples of the world live in different regions, for it is evident from past experience that such great inequality within individual countries would have long since provoked massive revolution of world-wide proportions.

In no way excluded is the fact that class war in any form might soon be seen in an international rather than a national framework. "It is,

above all, the awareness of economic inequalities," writes M. Manadou Dia, one of the most qualified of African leaders, "that gives rise to a growing feeling of national proletarianism which will turn the nations of Africa and Asia—both faced with the same struggle—against the West. With the awareness of the problems of underdevelopment appears a new element, that of the proletarian nations grouped on 'the lifeline of imperialism,' in contrast to the prosperous nations and having a geographic location which widens the economic gap. We obviously find here the most original element of the revolution of the twentieth century. It is here that we become aware of the extreme gravity of the situation. It is here that we become aware of what is at stake; namely, world peace."²

The average annual rate of growth of the world population for the five 50-year periods between 1700 and 1950 is as follows: 2.66, 3.10, 4.40, 5.16, and 7.98 per cent. On a logarithmic graph based on time function, we find that there are five closely aligned corresponding points. Thus, during each 50-year period, not only did the population grow geometrically but also the rate of growth itself. By extrapolating, we arrive at a population figure amounting to 4 billion and 7 billion for the years 2000 and 2050 respectively. This would mean a doubling of the world population one century from now.

It is worth noting that an even more marked acceleration of the growth of the world population has distinguished itself recently (17 per cent from 1950 to 1960 as against only 8 per cent between 1900 and 1950). If a rate of increase such as 17 per cent were to persist, the population in the years 2000 and 2050 would be approximately 6 billion and 14 billion respectively. Hence the world population would undergo a quintupling within one century.

In tabulating on the basis of a population figure of 4 billion by the end of the century, the food deficit, which jumped from 1 per cent in 1913 to 11 per cent in 1939, and to 14 per cent in 1955, will probably

rise to 20 or 25 per cent. This means that the lack of sustenance in the world, already very pronounced, will grow to dangerous proportions, as far as we can see, in the near future.

Overpopulation does not manifest itself only, as many believe, in countries that virtually suffocate because of the rapid multiplication of their population, such as India and China. It manifests itself as well, although obviously on a much smaller scale, in Western Europe, in Russia, and in the United States. Hence it is inexact to contend that the population of the Western countries is below the optimum. It has long since reached and passed by far its optimum.

The only plausible reason that the West could have for viewing its population growth in a favorable light is as follows: confronted with the amazing demographic growth in the rest of the world, the world political balance could, if the population were to remain stationary, become somewhat too unfavorable. Even in view of the present rate of expansion, the percentage of the European population and the North American population, as seen in terms of the world population, would be only 7 per cent one century from now as against 30 per cent for 1950. But to assert that a country can rely on its population figures in order to solidify its security in this atomic age seems somewhat unreasonable. If, in order to fasten its present military security, each country involves itself resolutely in the population race, it will invariably lead to long-range difficulties which will probably be insurmountable.

At this point, the case of China merits specific attention. In 1954, the population of China's mainland was 583 million and the figure was to have reached 700 million by January 1960. The annual increase, which was approximately 12 million in 1954, is today at least 15 million, and it will soon reach 20 million. Such a population boom can only serve to lead China to larger economic difficulties. Grave eco-

conomic difficulties have already been felt between 1960 and 1961, difficulties which forced China to establish a rationing program. However, these are only the first signs, the precursors to far greater difficulties yet to come.

The future appears gloomy; gloomy for China and equally so for her neighbors, for no one can foresee today what one billion starving Chinese, to whom political agitators could easily represent the foreigner as the evil force responsible for their misfortunes, might do in the next few years.³

We can only zealously hope for progress in the economies of the underdeveloped nations, but even such progress would not fail to raise up new difficulties. To take an example: on the basis of the 1960 world population and with the hypothesis that the standard of living in the world would reach the average standard in America in 1960, the lead reserves in the world would be exhausted within three years.

This aspect of the development of underdeveloped nations seems, up to this point, not to have reached the attention of the experts! It is easy enough to formulate programs of development on paper, but no one seems to be concerned with recognizing and confronting the realities of the problem. In view of present technology, and assuming that the population figures remain at their present level, it seems indeed to be a *physical impossibility* that all the peoples of the world will reach the current American standard of living.

At any rate, between 1950 and 1958, the rate of annual increase in the world population was 17 per cent. Today it is probably in the neighborhood of 20 per cent, and we fear that in the near future the figures will rise even higher. In one way or another, the present demographic expansion cannot continue. It would be impossible. This impossibility—evident when we consider that in eight centuries the result would be a population density of 44 people to each m^2

(square meter) of land⁴—will be felt within the next few decades and the only certainty is that the political implications will be considerable. *No matter what the state of technological progress may be, the world is running blindly toward an untenable situation.*

One should realize in fact that the present production growth maintained in the Western nations cannot sustain itself indefinitely. The 2.55 per cent rate of annual production growth in America between the years 1913 and 1957 appears at first glance to be quite modest. However, it is easy to realize the unusual character of this form of computation. In actuality, one gold coin, weighing perhaps the weight of several postage stamps, invested at compound interest at the modest rate of 2.65 per cent per annum during the year 4000 B.C., would have yielded in 1961 a mass of gold equaling as many constellations (each in turn composed of thousands of billions of golden suns) as the multitudinous seconds which have elapsed since that time.

If we consider, then, the population expansion or the cumulative effects of technological progress, these statistics would surely indicate that we are living in an absolutely *exceptional* period in history which cannot last for too long.

Already, in the overpopulated cities of Asia, day-to-day living is becoming absolutely impossible as a result of crowding together too large a population in too small a space. What the nature of the situation will be several decades hence (for the present population growth is going to continue) one can predict up to the point where the absurdity of the situation will be absolutely shattering.

If this growth continues, and according to all indications the trend will persist for at least the next few years, it is absolutely futile to hope for any form of tangible progress in the standard of living. The only progress we may anticipate is in dreadful poverty. Let us dare to say that unless birth control measures are applied in

one form or another, by all the peoples of the earth, it would seem difficult to discard the possibility that the world could someday end in an immense atomic holocaust set off by a world war fought to gain possession of the last available blades of grass.

To say the least, it is completely illusory to believe that the problem of hunger in the world could be resolved without a halt to the population rise, which seems unlikely, at least within the next few decades.

Yet the politicians who determine Western strategy continue to assert that in any reasonably dynamic economy, the rate of annual growth should average 5 per cent per year; and taking into account all their statements, the result seems to be that within a short period of time, if the West agrees to certain appropriate endeavors, the underdeveloped countries will reach a standard of living comparable to ours, and that, at any rate, the starvation problem existing in the world could, in one way or another, be resolved.

In promulgating such shining hopes which are carelessly reasoned out and, to say the least, foolish, we take upon ourselves obligations we are not prepared to meet and we run the risk of seeing ascribed to the very principles of Western civilization (based on the decentralization of decisions, a market economy, the price mechanism, and private property) the responsibility for a defeat, and thus the arousing of the resentment and hate of hundreds of millions of people.

At any rate, swift as technological progress may be, the population growth in the West is such that sooner or later, if the current trend continues, it will bring about a serious drop in real wages in the most developed present-day economies. One or two centuries, perhaps even several decades, would be sufficient to bring about such a change. As in the past, there is a great possibility of misunderstanding and of making the liberal system of the West responsi-

ble for a decline in the standard of living although it could hardly be blamed for such an event. Such is the internal danger which awaits Atlantic civilization if it survives long enough to face the inevitable consequences of the population growth in the West today.

But this internal danger, great as it may be, is nothing when compared with the external danger which exposes Atlantic civilization to the demographic tidal wave which is engulfing the rest of the world.

In sum, I agree with Bertrand Russell that the world population problem represents a potential danger perhaps even more appalling than the atomic bomb.

The Demoralization of the West

The third danger which we must face is our demoralization, our loss of confidence in the principles of our civilization, our mutual distrust, our general protectionism vis-a-vis one another.

It is a fact that a large segment of public opinion in Western Europe, and even in the United States, no longer adheres as strongly to the principles which have given force to Western civilization and which explain its extraordinary development during the last century. The Western nations seem troubled and demoralized by the apparent success of certain collectivist economies and they seem to be losing confidence in their own principles.

I would like simply to point out here that, contrary to common belief, the Soviet economy, on an average, has not developed more rapidly than the Western economy, if one compares the two economies at the various stages of development. Even if we consider the same period in history (1913-1955), the most recent figures of the National Bureau of Economic Research show that the production per worker has grown, on the average, only 1.7 per cent per year in the Soviet Union, as against 2.8 per cent in the United States. If we consider

the economy as a whole, these figures become: 1.3 per cent for the Soviet Union as against 1.9 per cent for the United States. These statistics are the same as those arrived at by Colin Clark with regard to man-hour production for the period 1913-56.

May I point out further that the system of a market economy and private property has permitted France to quintuple its real hourly wages between 1850 and 1957, to reduce its work-day by nearly one-half in the course of one century, to reduce its percentage of illiteracy from 53 per cent in 1832 to less than 3 per cent at present, and to extend the life expectancy of the population as a whole from less than 23 years in 1835 to 68 years today. Similar advancements have been made in the various countries of the West, while the population in Western Europe has doubled, and the population in North America has sextupled.

All of these figures, together with the observations I have had the occasion to develop elsewhere,⁵ show that on the basis of an objective analysis, there is no indication that Soviet development has been at all superior to development in the Western nations. In fact, quite the contrary appears to be true.

Not only has the Soviet system proved to be less effective than the Western economies, but between 1929 and 1953 its human toll has proved to be extremely heavy. Although the development of the Western economies in the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th was accompanied by a continuous and relatively rapid improvement of the standard of living, real wages in Soviet Russia have increased relatively slowly. This small increase is in itself but a mere trifle when compared with Soviet methods of persecution based on large-scale deportations, forced labor camps, and mass executions to which they have had to resort⁶ and which constitute absolute defiance to the principles of a civilization which has slowly liberated itself through the ages.⁷

As far as we are able to judge today on the basis of the information at our disposal, the human toll in Communist China has not been less heavy.

The second danger, the mutual distrust of one Western nation for the other, has not ceased to be a crippling force. To take but one example, the British and French governments had carefully planned the Suez intervention without even informing the United States government of their intentions. The chosen date for the action had been determined in view of the impending United States elections, which virtually paralyzed the American government. By the same token, France and England laid a smoke screen which obscured the Soviet intervention in Hungary, and, to a great extent, they rescued Soviet communism from an enormous defeat.

What more could we say about the situations in the Congo, Algeria, Cuba, and Vietnam? Everywhere the Western nations have been, and continue to be, in more or less cunning opposition; and in defending their supposed claims, the only far-reaching result which might be obtained is the curtailment throughout the world of united West.

Each Western nation defends itself from the others on several levels: economic, cultural, and political.

On the economic level, Europeans are afraid of being submerged by American competition and refuse to accept a policy of free trade with North America, which appears to them to be the inevitable path to United States economic domination over Europe. If the Europeans fear economic domination by the United States by reason of their superior economic productivity, Americans fear no less the idea of being submerged by European commodities as a result of the low salary scale in Europe relative to that in the United States.

The apprehensions of one country or another are justified to the extent that each would like to see an immediate removal of trade

restrictions, but they are by the same token unrealistic to the extent that this lowering would be progressive and sufficiently realized only within 20 or 30 years.

Many Americans, on the other hand, are afraid of being drained economically if their ties with Europe were to be restricted. But if the variation in the standard of living between Europe and the United States is presently in the neighborhood of a 1 to 2 ratio, the variation existing between the average income of the different states of the United States is even greater.⁸ By the same token, the present variation existing between Europe and North America continues to diminish by reason of the dynamic nature of the present-day European economy.

Europeans and Americans, stifled by various fear complexes, forget that the very principle of their civilization, which has served as their strength and explains their prosperity, is based on the determined confrontation with competition.

On the cultural level, protectionism, although less well-known, is manifested on a still larger scale than on the economic level. In all the Western countries, young students are taught, for the most part, on a strictly nationalistic basis.

On the political level, our protectionism can be understood in terms of the partitioning and isolation of political systems and the absence of any common political institution.⁹

On each of these levels, we ultimately revert back to ourselves. We fear the power or the competition of our neighbors; and, locked up in our particular interests, we reject the bold confrontation of our differences—an essential principle of our civilization and a condition for any real progress.

The Two Choices

The future is undoubtedly much more disquieting than we might want to believe, and we are proceeding blindly toward extremely difficult situations. Faced with such perspectives, what can we do? First of all, it is essential to know what we really want and where we want to go. We must be able to distinguish clearly between the possible courses of action and be aware of what they actually imply. Schematically, two main courses of action are open to us: the traditional path, or the realization of an effective Atlantic Community.

The Traditional View

The first course of action open to us is to take the traditional path which has been followed up to the present, that of agreements and treaties between sovereign states.

This position is at first glance the most enticing, for it has the advantage of flexibility. While not establishing a fixed policy, it offers to each nation the possibility of adapting itself to local conditions and to new situations. It is neither opposed to nationalism nor contrary to tradition. This position has, as well, the advantage of respecting national differences, a consideration which all nations that adhere to the principles of a free society cannot possibly overlook. Hence, this course of action appears to be the simplest since it does not entail any radical modification of national policy.

However, various factors, all of which merge, seem to cast doubt upon the long-range effectiveness of this point of view, particularly in view of the new technological state of the modern world.

Two world wars have demonstrated that it is fruitless to expect from simple treaties and alliances an effective guarantee of peace. These two wars, whose effects have been particularly disastrous for

Europe, and have been for her the equivalent of two civil wars, have shown that the true interest of the European nations is to be found in areas other than the belief in absolute principles of national sovereignty. Whoever would have proposed to the great nations of Europe at the beginning of the 19th century, to Great Britain, France, and Germany the renunciation of even a part of their national sovereignty would have been regarded as a dangerous and utopian "egg-head"! But today almost everyone sees clearly where the real utopia was and where true realism was to be found.

But even though the state of affairs in 1964 might be potentially more dangerous than it was at the beginning of the century, the solutions which are continually being proposed are motivated by a limited type of nationalism. We have here a general world phenomenon that can be understood by the nations which have recently acquired their independence, but which is not so readily understood by the most economically and politically developed nations of the world.

During the past twenty years, the Western nations have anxiously tried to preserve the autonomy of their national policies, but if we are to judge these policies not on the basis of motives (which have been and are now highly respectable) but on the basis of results, we may justifiably doubt their effectiveness, precisely from the point of view of the nationalistic interests which they intended to preserve. Has the nationalist-oriented policy followed by France during the many years in Indochina and Algeria proved in the long run to be the most advantageous? Did the Franco-British intervention at Suez prove to be the most favorable course of action for France and Great Britain? Have the national policies of the United States almost everywhere in the world actually been a reflection of America's true interests? If we judge this on the basis of the decline of Western influence throughout the world, a decline which has taken place during the last twenty years, if we judge it by the increasing unpopularity of Westerners throughout

the world, we may in all fairness question the effectiveness of their policies. ¹⁰

At the heart of the Atlantic alliance, the United States seems to be maintaining ultimate authority with regard to the utilization of atomic arms, and it is necessary to recognize that, *in view of the present state of affairs*, it might be an error on the part of the United States to relinquish this authority. Nevertheless, such a situation inevitably creates feelings of uneasiness which it would be dangerous to disregard or underestimate. The situation, furthermore, creates irresistible centrifugal forces at the heart of the Atlantic alliance, forces which serve to dangerously divide the Western camp. This writer has no particular sympathy for the foreign policy of General de Gaulle, but it certainly appears that some of his basic contentions are far from being groundless. The conclusions he draws appear to be somewhat inexact, but the basis of de Gaulle's contentions seems to be valid. If it is legitimately impossible for an American to accept the idea that the protection of basic U.S. interests could eventually be jeopardized by too close a union with her European allies, it is no less impossible for a European to believe that the decision to resort to the supreme defense of the atomic bomb, should be left, in effect, solely to American authority the moment that Europe's major interests might be at stake.

Can the West Europeans be certain that the Americans would back them with as much determination as was evidenced during the Cuban crisis, and who could really believe that the United States would risk having, for the defense of Europe, its territory partially destroyed in a nuclear war? For want of such an assurance that which would be tantamount to certainty—and a simple promise can never be equivalent to certainty—one can be assured that the forces of disintegration within NATO, already at work, will continue to develop.

If the fundamental problem of the control of atomic weapons cannot be resolved today with a solution that is unanimously accepted, could we not find the basic reason in fundamental misconception of what should be the nature and the direction of the relationships among the Western countries?

At any rate, the most basic question is that of the proliferation of atomic weapons in the world. Other than making commonly acceptable agreements, which may be nothing but verbal statements or dedications to a temporary state of affairs, who can validly refuse France, for example, the right to have her own atomic weapons? Should not what was valid yesterday for the United States and Great Britain be valid today for France, and tomorrow for Germany and Italy, and all the other countries? Besides, who can be certain that tomorrow a new and revolutionary method will not be devised which will make the atomic bomb available to every country?

The progressive accession of every nation to atomic weapons, together with the unlimited application of the prevailing principle of national sovereignty, can have finally only one consequence: a third world war, an atomic war. The precise date remains uncertain, but the forecast in itself appears much too probable, unless an essential change takes place in the policies of the various nations.

Finally, it is a truism to emphasize the world achievements in the realm of communications; but in order for a truism to exist, it must be accepted as an essential fact. The past political concepts of national self-sufficiency are no longer adaptable to new conditions. The possibilities of contact and consequently of differences among political groups have been multiplied, and the need for an institutional framework is felt, a framework in which disputes could be peacefully settled according to predetermined procedures.

The writer is not inclined to side with various forms of centra-

lized organization which stifle individual action and suppress the legitimate aspirations of the minority. On the contrary, his entire philosophy is opposed to the Jacobin conception of a centralized state, and he is convinced that the organization of any community should be as decentralized as possible. But he cannot help asking himself whether, in the world today, the best means of preserving these inestimable advantages, which are the respect for individuality and a wide decentralization of decisions, could be furnished through the unrestricted application of the principle of national sovereignty, so that it would correspond as well to the basic policies of the United States as it does to the aspirations of General de Gaulle.

The Solution to the Problem of an Economic Community

Opposing the traditional policies whose effectiveness can legitimately be questioned, the alternative of an Atlantic Community presents to the North Atlantic nations one solution to their problems. *In view of the present state of public opinion*, this alternative appears to the United States and to Europe (as well as to the writer of this paper) as a difficult feat to accomplish. But illusory as it may seem at present, we can legitimately ask ourselves whether it will not constitute, at least in the long run, a valid solution which must be examined and discussed. We can ask ourselves whether it does not constitute a course of action worth exploring in great detail—a course of action which is in the basic interest of the North Atlantic nations. In particular, we can ask whether the question of national sovereignty is well defined when presented to the public as a choice between all or nothing.

The Prerequisites of an Effective Atlantic Community

First of all, if our security today can be based only upon our resolute determination to oppose force with force, an all-out war (barring the unexpected) hardly seems likely, at least for the next decade; or

the havoc of a new war would be such that the conqueror of tomorrow could only find himself in a worse situation than the victor of yesterday.

At least in the foreseeable future, the real struggle between the democratic West and the totalitarian East will probably be on the economic, social, and ideological levels. The Western system can eventually win out if, while satisfying the imperative demands of its own security, it shows decisive superiority on the economic, social, and humane levels—in scientific progress and efficiency, a rise in the standard of living, and the true deliverance of man from material and political restrictions which threaten to enslave him.

If, consequently, the West wishes to survive it must strive to strengthen the system of a free society, based on the decentralization of decisions and the maximum utilization of human initiative and individual effort, a system which has permitted itself an unprecedented continual growth in its standards of living and cultural possibilities.

This system is the only one which could simultaneously foster the realization of the broadest social ends and the greatest economic and scientific progress within the framework of its society—a society in which the individual is effectively protected from any loss of freedom and from any form of totalitarian domination by a wide decentralization of power, particularly economic power.

The maintenance, strengthening, and extension of this type of social framework presupposes, on the international level, the disappearance of all obstacles to the most efficient utilization of material resources and the most complete development of individuality. Modern societies have been able to reach their degree of development only by abolishing all the trade obstacles among the various regions within each nation. The same situation exists today among the nations, and the obstacle must be surmounted.

In the ideological struggle confronting the democratic nations,

the military element, important as it may be, *is hardly sufficient*. As necessary as it might be and actually is, it is in itself only a negative factor. The essential factor is, and can only be, the psychological strength and the effective functioning of the ideals in question.

If a true Atlantic Community were to be established economically, culturally, and politically, it would make our Atlantic world a powerful pole of attraction capable (through its very existence and taking into account the enormous prosperity which it would possess), of breaking up little by little the totalitarian world of the East. The people of the West probably have at their disposal decisive means to destroy peacefully the totalitarian ideology without having to spend hundreds of millions of dollars.

Furthermore, an effective Western union could compensate for its numerical inferiority which, magnified in the decades to come, would be much more sensitive politically in view of the fact that industrial development in the other continents will have enabled them to enlarge their military potential.

In addition, the realization of an effective Atlantic Community would offer immense advantages to the Atlantic countries. It would bring unprecedented prosperity and would permit a very rapid rise in the standard of living in both Europe and North America. Whatever the foreseeable prospects may be on the industrial plane—such as the utilization of inexpensive atomic energy—these prospects are nothing when compared to the possibilities offered by a careful removal of the barriers to trade between Western Europe and North America.

Only the prosperity brought about by the liberalization of trade restrictions in the Atlantic network would enable the North Atlantic nations to face simultaneously the three conditions necessary to preserve social and international peace: the rise of national standards of living, aid which is so important to the underdeveloped countries,

and armaments which unfortunately thrust upon the free world the lesson of past years.

Finally, such an Atlantic Community would represent a new stage in the progress of Western civilization, progress which in the past has consisted, as I remember it, of gradually settling the differences among mankind within the framework of a political and judicial structure following a predetermined code and procedure. The refusal to establish a true Atlantic Community is equivalent to a refusal to apply the very principles which make up our civilization.

Confronted with the dangers we face—the danger of present-day Communist totalitarianism and that even graver danger, the growth of hunger and poverty which will affect hundreds of millions of people in the decades to come—an Atlantic Community may undoubtedly be considered desirable. But this Community would justify itself, *above all*, through the application of the very principles of our own civilization. It would be advantageous in itself in terms of the many new horizons it would open. This Community should be established *even if* the horizon which unfolds before us were not laden with many ominous clouds, forerunners of the storm.

To summarize, a true Atlantic Community appears to be extremely desirable for at least three reasons:

- (1) Through its very presence, through the force of attraction it would have, through the very power of its example, it would strongly contribute to the breaking up of the totalitarian ideology which is already in serious difficulty.
- (2) Through the strength of its numbers, it would compensate, at least in part, for the disequilibrium of forces resulting from the stronger population expansion in the rest of the world.

(3) It would constitute progress in itself and be a source of many kinds of progress, including economic and cultural; it would reflect a new stage in Western civilization, leading to a fuller realization of its possibilities; and it would serve the entire world as an example to follow in order to assure progress and peace.

The Implications of a True Atlantic Community

One can naturally debate what might constitute a true Atlantic Community, and it is quite certain that a large variety of institutional methods may be considered.

But whatever these methods might be, and taking into account, a necessary period of transition, a real Atlantic Community would imply *in the end*:

- an Atlantic common market
- a minimum of common political institutions

The Possibility of an Atlantic Common Market

First of all, an actual Atlantic Community would imply, on the economic level, a situation in which all artificial obstacles, customs barriers, quotas, and various restrictions would be effectively eliminated. These restrictions inhibit the free flow of the factors of production and prevent them from being used most efficiently. Contrary to an opinion too widely held, the realization of an Atlantic common market is a *feasible* operation and, as far as can be judged, it would be *very advantageous* for all its participants.

Taking into account the relatively great differences in the levels of productivity and the standards of living between Europe and the United States, we face serious problems in striving for an Atlantic common market. The problems we face are of the same nature as

those presented by the suppression of trade barriers, tariffs, and quotas in Europe, only here they occur on a much larger scale.

However, the extensive studies pursued for the past twenty years on the realization of a European common market show that such problems are technically soluble and that they would be even easier to resolve within the enlarged framework of an Atlantic Community than within the limited framework of the European community.

The problems raised by the lifting of trade restrictions are identical to those raised by rapid technological progress. In both cases temporary disadvantages must be accepted for the sake of permanent advantages in the form of increased productivity and higher standards of living.

The obstacles, which we must surmount, demonstrate that an Atlantic common market cannot be created at a moment's notice; it can only be achieved through a creative approach and a continued effort.

A Minimum of Common Political Institutions

From a political point of view, the existence of an effective Atlantic Community would imply extending to the Atlantic domain, for the purpose of managing common interests, the principles of democratic policy which have been applied in each of our countries. In such an Atlantic Community, the participating nations must manage their common interests and settle their differences within a much wider framework and on the basis of a mutually accepted law and pre-established procedures.

Such a solution would imply the creation and establishment of a minimum of common political institutions. The discussion of what such institutions might be is outside the scope of this paper. One

can, however, consider various proposals, but in any case their establishment could only be gradual.

The only truly important point to recognize is that the establishment of a political community, however limited its conception might be, would mean the transfer of some of the states' sovereign rights to a common political authority having *limited by real* powers.

I would like to clear up at this point any confusion. When I speak of the transfer of certain sovereign rights belonging to the states, it must be understood that the transfer of this *minimum* of rights is implied by the effective joint pursuit of the common objectives which have been prescribed. It must also be understood that *the larger the geographic zone we are considering the more this transfer can and must be reduced.*

Thus there can be no question of contemplating the transfer to an Atlantic political authority of a body of rights equivalent to the one presently assumed by the American federal state, nor even the one which the majority of public opinion in the "European Six" seems prepared to transfer to the European community. Such a transfer is neither necessary nor desirable. *It is simply a matter of delegating this minimum of rights which, taking into account the experience already acquired, can be considered indispensable for the effective attainment of common objectives.*

Whatever the possible solution may be, there could be no question of any sudden alteration. It is a matter of advancing cautiously in a new direction. At the start, all delegation of rights should remain very limited and, in any case, be furnished with protective clauses preserving each nation from that which is unacceptable.

If it is established, as I believe it to be, that the unlimited and unrestricted application of the principle of absolute national sovereignty leads to an impasse and renders impossible the realization of the

common objectives which the different peoples of the North Atlantic consider as essential, then it might be worth the trouble to explore, in a most prudent way, another path, that of setting up a minimum of common institutions endowed with very limited but real powers.

Political Priority

The creation of an Atlantic common market, or even an Atlantic-wide trade liberalization, could lead to profound transformations and could in fact be advantageous only if such transformations took place. *This solution would be acceptable only if the participating countries were assured that these transformations were to have in reality a permanent character which could not be challenged overnight.*

The economic ties in themselves are fragile; and a true common market, or even a large trade liberalization, is really acceptable only if the risk of everything being challenged is not present. Consequently, any economic integration is possible, can be advantageous, can be accepted, and can be maintained only if a certain degree of political integration is carried out at the same time.

Whatever progress has already been made by the European common market, *a total economic integration of Western Europe is conceivable only within the framework of a certain degree of political integration.* Even if all the objectives of the Common Market Treaty were attained, one would still be quite far from a true common market. On the other hand, if a common market is established and customs duties are eliminated finally, it is clearly anticipated that, for lack of harmony in the systems of taxation, tax compensations on different merchandise will have to be collected in a permanent fashion. In any case, no provision of the Common Market Treaty foresees the disappearance of customs at the frontiers of the six participating countries of the Common Market at the end of the period of transition.

The December 1963 negotiations of the "Six" on agriculture and Chancellor Erhard's statements of March 19, 1964 about the impossibility of Germany's accepting a reduction of some of its agricultural prices for 1964 and 1965 must convince us of the tremendous difficulties inherent in a common market without an appropriate body of common political institutions. Even in the European Community of Coal and Steel, after eight years of (practical) application, one is still *very far* from a *true* common market.

Even if one were to suppose that the obstacles to the establishment of an economic community had been crossed, some extremely strong autarchic tendencies would still exist within the community which could only be effectively surmounted in the framework of a corresponding political community. The best example one can give is that of the American Civil War. At the very time when political unity existed, powerful opposing interests on the economic level almost broke up the Union and a war was necessary to restore unity. Who can assert that within the framework of a simple common market treaty, the American States would not have invariably separated in two distinct groups?

Who can assert that if a strong depression occurred, the established ties would not break very rapidly and that the egotistical forces of the various nationalisms would not prevail over any regard for European cohesion?

On the Atlantic economic level, our farthest objectives lead today only to the partial re-establishment of the state of economic freedom which existed prior to 1913. Who does not see how fragile were the economic ties among the different Western nations since there was nothing on the political level to complement them?

This necessity is forcefully manifested by the total failure of all the efforts made between the two wars to restore free trade. On

a great many occasions, the decisions of experts have been unanimous in recommending the freeing of international trade. But although the circumstances were relatively favorable since the policy of centralized and authoritarian planning of the states was then developed only to a small extent, the results obtained were always negligible. Meanwhile, the principle of autarchy has progressed little by little. The reason for this—and one cannot emphasize it enough—has been essentially that the national governments have remained complete masters of their policies and have neither consented to nor considered any delegation of powers to an international authority in the economic area.

The bitter experience of the past should serve as a lesson for the future. We must carefully analyze the reasons why our past efforts to eliminate the obstacles to the free circulation of the means of production have failed, and we must glean the lessons pertinent to our course of action. We must remember that it is vain to hope for efficiency and stability when agreements may be broken at any time.

Furthermore, it is doubtful whether one can efficiently prepare a certain degree of political integration by starting with economic integration. Economic integration constitutes in fact the best means to reinforce the awareness which the different national interests have of themselves and, consequently, to jeopardize, possibly irremediably, the future of a real community.

In my opinion, the establishment of a minimum of common political institutions must precede, or at least accompany, the economic union. This is an essential condition. One must divert public opinion away from the dangerous illusion that the development of an economic community is possible without a minimum of common political institutions and thus that the freeing of trade could of itself prepare the road to a real political community.¹¹

Seen in this light, one should have no illusions about the possible

success of the "Kennedy Round" in strengthening and extending in a substantial and durable manner the economic ties between Europe and North America. The progress which can be achieved from an "economic partnership" not reinforced by a "political partnership" will necessarily remain marginal.

If it is largely illusory to consider under present conditions the creation of a workable Atlantic Community, it is even more illusory to believe that anything solid and durable will take place on the Atlantic economic level without a minimum of appropriate institutions, notably of a political order.

I cannot agree with those who maintain that what is indispensable for the economic relations of the European countries would not be valid at all for the economic relations of the Atlantic nations. Quite to the contrary, in the event of even a relatively moderate policy of trade liberalization, greater risks would be encountered by both sides of the Atlantic and the institutional guarantees necessary for the "Six," would be even more indispensable on this broader level. For the past twenty years I have defended the principle of free trade on national and international levels and I have advocated a policy of expanding trade on the Atlantic scale. But I would consider as absolutely unrealistic any serious attempt to broaden trade without previously setting up appropriate common economic and political institutions.

Neither can I follow those who suggest that the functional approach can constitute a valid solution. *The functional approach can be effective only if associated with a vast political conception of unity. In and by itself, it can achieve only very limited results, unstable and completely unadaptable to the real needs of the peoples of the North Atlantic.*

This proposal does not mean that the general and political approach is easy nor even that it is immediately workable. It simply

means that the present chances of strengthening or even of maintaining the cohesiveness of the Atlantic alliance are weak, and that it would be very dangerous to allow ourselves to think that—for lack of a general and political approach, declared to be totally impossible—the substitution of traditional policies could constitute a valid solution. Who could therefore maintain that without the general approach of the Treaty of Rome the few strides taken thus far, although very limited, could have been realized?

The "realist" thesis appears to me too certain that its aims are actually possible. One can ask oneself if this "realistic" attitude does not lead to a dangerously utopian philosophy.

The Preliminary Steps to an Effective Atlantic Community

If we agree that an effective Atlantic Community would bring positive advantages to the participating nations, it is essential that we emphasize very strongly its preliminary stages.

The first necessary step is the transformation, as soon as possible, of the economic Europe of the Six into a political Europe. Without this transformation, one can legitimately doubt the possibility of realizing a true economic Europe, and *a fortiori*, an important trade liberalization on the Atlantic scale.

The second step is to open the "European Six" to any European nation (particularly to Great Britain) which would accept its fundamental economic and political principles.

Only a solidly structured Europe could constitute a desirable and acceptable partner for the United States, and only such a solidly structured Europe could discard the fear of losing its own personality in a closer association with the United States.

The next step would be a substantial effort on the informational and cultural levels, for a closer association of Europe and North

America would imply a considerable change of the various public opinions.

To state these conditions is to underscore the difficulties—even the impossibility under present conditions—of establishing a true Atlantic Community. But no human enterprise can succeed without delays or materialize without planning in theory and in fact. Unless the North Atlantic nations attempt to plan their future lucidly, they may find themselves disunited and weak at a crucial moment.

An Atlantic common market and a real Atlantic Community are possible, but not without *an effective and permanent political willingness* to achieve them by all the participants.

The Dogma of Absolute and Unlimited National Sovereignty

The establishment of a real Atlantic Community and the transfer of certain of the states' sovereign rights to a supernational authority, even on a limited basis, naturally raise numerous objections on which I would like to comment briefly.

The General Objection to National Sovereignty

The realization of an effective Atlantic Community would undeniably imply an eventual renunciation of the principle of unlimited national autonomy. But in reality the significance of this renunciation is much smaller than it would seem at first sight.

First of all, one cannot emphasize enough that the various nations of the West have in fact *already* renounced a certain part of their national sovereignty. Who can validly maintain that Belgium in the Congo, France in Algeria, Germany in Berlin, the United States in Cuba, have been, or are now, able to effect the policy of their choice

without taking into account the position of their partners in the Atlantic alliance?

But this renunciation, however effective it may be, is worthless, for it is carried on in confusion, disorder, and mutual distrust. It is purely negative and, excluding any real joint action, it is practically devoid of effectiveness.

In the second place, the question is not so much the surrender of national sovereignty as the delegation by the citizens themselves of a part of their inalienable rights to a superior political authority. There is in reality no surrender, but simply transfer. The real objective of the various states is not national sovereignty in itself; it is essentially material prosperity, the safeguarding of fundamental political liberties, peace, and finally, as stressed in the American Constitution, the happiness of its citizens. What must be sought, consequently, is the system of political institutions which is most appropriate to the safeguarding of these essential ends, and if it seems that a certain political community of the Atlantic world might better succeed than our own national institutions, would it not be in the interest of all citizens of the Atlantic nations to uphold its realization?

In any case, and even within the framework of traditional policies, any treaty, any international obligation, the moment one has the positive intention to respect it, is a real limitation of sovereignty. Public opinion seems to exaggerate completely the difference between the partial renunciation of national sovereignty implied by our respect of treaties and the partial renunciation of this sovereignty implied by the realization and functioning of an Atlantic Community. One wonders if, in all of these discussions on a possible renunciation of national sovereignty on a reduced scale, we do not in the final analysis attribute more weight to appearances than to realities and attach more importance to words than to their true content.

May I say furthermore that, in a mutual political arrangement, the effective threats to the real independence of the participating countries are far less important than one might suppose according to the letter of the law. The operation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), for example, has shown that when the fundamental interests of a participating country were in question, the other countries have always renounced the literal application of the Treaty, for each country realizes perfectly well that if it shows insufficient comprehension of its neighbor's difficulties today, it may itself be the object of the same lack of understanding tomorrow. Whatever the case, the possible threat of an eventual secession is always sufficient to prevent any unreasonable application of the letter of the Treaties.

Finally, one of the essential principles of our common civilization is the peaceful settlement of differences following a pre-established code and procedure. Consequently, the delegation of a certain number of limited, but real, powers to a common political authority appears as a *necessary* consequence of the very principles of our civilization.

The Real Interest of the Americans

From the strictest American viewpoint, I would like simply to emphasize two points.

First of all, the real danger of an autarchic and nationalistic orientation exists in Europe today. The temptation for the Europeans to enclose themselves in their own community can be very great, and can even constitute a Third Force, something which many Europeans have proposed in these past years. It might be easy and it might appear politically advantageous, at least in the present, for one political agitator or another, for one group or another, for one nation or another, to advocate a policy of independence toward the two blocs and to attempt some vast association with the third world. Now, who does

not see that such a political orientation could finally prove to be very disadvantageous to the interests of the United States? Who does not see that such a split of the West into two separate and opposing groups would leave the United States dangerously isolated? Who can maintain that the political isolation of the United States would not place them finally in a very dangerous situation? That is the whole question. Is it possible for the United States to follow a policy which assures them absolute independence and at the same time to maintain and develop friendly ties with their allies?

In the second place, who can say what the answer of the American people would be if they were asked to choose between the traditional policy based on unlimited national sovereignty and an important breakthrough toward an Atlantic Community; between the burden of increased military spending and the possibility of a rapid dismantling of the Communist ideology; between the evident dangers of a divided West and the legal renunciation of national sovereignty, which has already been renounced in fact.

Can one really doubt the extraordinary impact which the decision to create an *open* Atlantic Community would have on the Communist world? My conviction is that the Communist ideology could not long survive the impact of that decision.

In a sampling of public opinion by Elmo Roper, the question was asked:

"Do you feel that the world situation is going to make it necessary to give up some of our national sovereignty, or do you feel that we should hold on to our national sovereignty at all costs?"

Only 12 per cent of the Americans chose the first alternative, while 67 per cent chose the second. At the same time, however, 79 per cent considered it highly desirable to maintain their alliances. One wonders

what these 79 per cent would do if this retention "at all costs" of total national sovereignty were in the end to lead the United States to renounce its principal alliances.

This type of opinion must be interpreted in the light of the information at the disposal of those who were interviewed at the time of the survey, and *it cannot be dissociated from this information.*

We Europeans, after two "suicidal" wars, have begun to understand that maybe there was something erroneous and dangerous in the myth of unlimited national sovereignty. And the difficult lessons which Europe has learned may be of value to the United States.

Europe's Main Concern

Europe's apprehensions regarding an eventual Atlantic Community are no smaller than those of the United States; *they are probably even greater.*

Paralyzed by some kind of inferiority complex, and manifested by a skillful and tenacious anti-American propaganda which is far from being Communist in origin and which is very powerful in all the European countries, the Europeans dread the idea of being dominated by the United States.

In reality, on the political as well as on the economic level, the apprehensions, of certain Europeans, of seeing United States domination of an Atlantic Community appear to me as unjustifiable. With regard to the population, the material resources, cultural, and technical know-how, the United States could in no way dominate the countries associated in such a Community. Actually, the result would be a mutual balancing of forces of the different members of the Atlantic Community, which would prevent the predominance of any one nation as is the case among the totalitarian governments.

The fears common to Americans and Europeans are insignificant when compared to the importance of what is at stake. Who can deny that, if the Atlantic nations at the beginning of this century had united themselves in a common political organization following the principles of their civilization, the two world wars could have been avoided. Will it take the colossal destruction of a third world war with the practical annihilation of all mankind to teach us how minute are our objections before the enormity of that which is at stake?

The Objections of the Third World

If the decision were taken by the Atlantic nations to involve themselves, resolutely in the formation of a true Atlantic Community, they would certainly be accused of taking part in such a plan because of a selfish desire to safeguard their personal interests. However true this may be, the danger of it happening is actually far smaller than might appear at first glance.

First of all, I am convinced that if the danger of a third world war were to be forestalled, at least for two or three decades, by our decision to manage our mutual problems in a group, such a decision would in the long run prove to be decidedly more advantageous to all mankind—probably saving it from nuclear destruction.

Under any condition, the aid which the West will be able to send to the third world will be sufficient to meet the scale of their real needs only if the economies of the Atlantic nations are made as effective as possible; and this efficiency can be accomplished only within the framework of a true Community.

Finally, the Community which we are to form must remain *open*. It must be able ultimately to include, following an expedient method code, the other countries holding the same ideology and attached to the same democratic principles. But for the moment, we must remain realistic and begin at the most effective level possible.

The Possibility of Maintaining National Diversities Within The Framework of an Atlantic Community

Faced with the possibility of an Atlantic Community which could contribute powerfully to the resolution of most of our problems, *the only essential question is that of safeguarding our national diversities.*

We are all passionately attached to our own soil, our own language and customs, our own diversities, fully convinced that the maintenance of these diversities is *essential*. Western civilization is based on the respect of diversities. It is these diversities which have enabled it to become what it is and to attain unprecedented levels of progress. These diversities themselves result from the fundamental principle of respect for human individuality which is at the very base of our civilization.

Unfortunately, confronted by a simplifying ideology, by a sphere whose organization is based on totalitarian principles—the very negation of diversity—a government which is too decentralized and too diversified, represents, in the implacable war to which we are exposed, a serious handicap.

Basically, we have a distrust for the unexpected and for our neighbor, but it remains to be seen whether, in refusing to give up what is trivial, we will eventually lose what is essential. In order to maintain diversity among the Western nations, in that which is essential, is it not necessary to reject it when it is fruitless? Essential diversities can be maintained only if, faced by the totalitarian world, the Atlantic camp succeeds within the framework of its common ideology in the mutual aim of setting into motion an effective united policy.

From the above, we can conclude that in order to safeguard our necessary diversities, the very foundation of our Western civilization, the Atlantic nations should group themselves within the framework of common institutions.

The only question which arises from this is the following: *is it possible to define the institutional ties which effectively preserve national diversities (at least those which are essential), while assuring the effectiveness of united action for the defense of common interests?*

Is it possible to find some political working agreement which would answer the fears of the smaller nations of being dominated by the larger ones, and the larger nations' fears of being stifled by the smaller ones?

The appropriate reply to this question may be, it seems to me, affirmative. The United States and Switzerland have demonstrated that the organization of a true community, based on the general principles of a free society, is definitely possible.

History demonstrates, furthermore, that only such a political organization could offer the people the surest guarantees for preserving their true freedom, their particular way of life, and their own civilization. If the organization is democratic, the wider the extent of the community, the more effective will be its opposition to the totalitarian tendencies. One of the main principles of democracy is the concept of the separation and balance of powers, and there is no conceivable democratic organization without such separation and balance.

In essence, only such an organization could today, assure the endurance of true patriotism. The uniting of the free peoples of the Atlantic area probably constitutes today the only real guarantee to their national autonomy, and it is only by overcoming their disunity and by renouncing absolute sovereignty which is merely illusory that they can safeguard their diversity.

What the Western Nations Can Do in the Meantime

The establishment of a true Atlantic Community would doubtlessly enable us to face successfully the major difficulties and dangers. However, we must recognize that public opinion is not ready for such a

solution—either in Europe or in the United States. The situation is unfortunate, but it must be seen as it is and not as we would wish it to be.

Henceforth, and for the present, we must be satisfied with more modest but certain measures, which, if appropriately applied, could point us in the right direction.

It is possible that such a delay might prove disastrous to us but all we can do is to realize that it is inevitable and to strive for our common good with all our strength and will.

The consensus in Europe and in North America seems to be that effective action must be taken from this moment on, on three different levels.

Economic Policy

On the economic level, three large lines of cooperation are available. First, an enlarged Atlantic mutual aid program; second, an association as all-encompassing as is politically possible between North America and the Common Market; and finally, a common policy for the development of the Third World.

The Development of Atlantic Mutual Aid

First of all, whether these common organizations are created or not, the Atlantic nations must furnish each other with mutual assistance of the widest variety in order that they may better face their problems.

Such had been the object of American Marshall Plan aid during the years following World War II. Such should be the present-day objective of the European nations with regard to aiding effectively the United States in solving its problems of balance of payments deficits and, on the other hand, the problem of monetary liquidity posed by the functioning of the gold exchange standard.

Since 1958, a persistent deficit has appeared in the American balance of payments—in the amount of about 3.5 billion dollars a year, which has entailed, among other things, massive outpourings of gold—in spite of the fact that the commercial balance of the United States shows an ample credit. This persistent deficit is due in large part to the extent of military and economic aid sent abroad by the United States.

In order to cope with this situation, an internal deflation of prices would be sociologically difficult and economically not very desirable. Limiting the expenditures of American tourists, lessening investments abroad, reducing military spending abroad, reducing aid to underdeveloped countries, limiting importations into the United States—all constitute disadvantageous solutions for the free world as a whole. Aid, in the form of loans from Europe to the United States, can temporarily ease a difficult situation, but does not resolve anything completely. An extensive system of controls on the American economy would present, along with all sorts of repercussions, immense political dangers to the United States as well as to Europe.

Other than an undesirable but widely accepted price-raising policy abroad, particularly in Europe, there exist only two means for remedying the deficit in the American balance of payments: a devaluation of the dollar in relation to the other currencies (which would permit increased exports abroad, or a lowering of the tariff barriers of the countries friendly to the United States (which would achieve the same result without having recourse to the solution of devaluating the dollar).¹²

The countries friendly to the United States are in a position today to help the U.S. substantially. Besides, for Europe it is only a question today of discharging a debt of gratitude. Certainly, a certain lowering of European tariff barriers with respect to American exports would probably be met with a strong opposition by at least a part of European

public opinion,¹³ but I think that this opposition could finally be surmounted if the agreement to be reached could be negotiated *on a reciprocal basis*, and if it were understood that in case of a reversal of the situation and the appearance of a substantial deficit in the European balance of payments, the United States would pledge to lower their protective tariff to help Europe effectively in return.

Moreover, it is necessary to emphasize that *in the hypothesis of stable prices* in Europe,¹⁴ and short of renouncing their policy of economic and military aid, the United States would not, outside of a lowering of the European protective tariff, have any recourse other than devaluating the dollar in relation to other currencies, which would have the precise effect of increasing American exports.

The situation of short-term liquidities of the United States is even more difficult. The policy of the "gold exchange standard" has had the result that the United States could not in any way cope with widespread requests for redemption and would be forced to have recourse to an embargo on gold. The present situation is *dangerous and unstable*, with the two problems of the deficit in the balance of payments and of the liquidities aggravating each other.¹⁵

For these two problems it is beyond doubt that Europe can give very effective aid to the American economy, but may I recall here that the support presently lent by Europe results only from unwritten rules of good neighborliness, and that any crisis could reduce it very substantially overnight. The situation would be quite different in the case of a real Atlantic Community.

The Development of Exchanges With the Common Market

In itself desirable, a very broad liberalization of exchanges on the Atlantic scale would be under present conditions technically and politically difficult, even impossible. It would be tantamount to super-

imposing on a European common market in process of formation a type of free-exchange zone without common political institutions, while the European nations would not yet have succeeded in integrating themselves into a common political framework.

The impossibility of superimposing the Treaty of Rome upon the Common Market with a zone of free exchange has already been amply demonstrated at the time of the discussions with Great Britain. Each argument could be taken up again and easily transposed into what concerns a substantial liberalization of exchanges on the Atlantic scale which would be strengthened in another connection with the application of the most-favored-nation clause, with respect to Third World countries.

In the course of recent years, the peoples of the six Common Market nations have begun to realize that their manner of thinking and living, their civilizations, the ideals to which they are passionately attached, can thrive only if they succeed in entering into partnership within the framework of a true economic and political community. For many, of whom I am one, the Economic Europe of the Common Market ought to be transformed without delay into as vast as possible a Political Europe, assuring unity and at the same time safeguarding necessary diversities. From this point of view, any economic agreement or international policy which could compromise the construction of that political Europe ought to be excluded.

This is what constituted yesterday, in my eyes and in the eyes of the majority of the Europeans in the Six, and what perhaps still constitutes today, the difficulty of the full participation of Great Britain in the Common Market, for adherence to the Treaty of Rome cannot be simply reduced to an economic formula. *Above all* there must be an adherence to the political spirit of the Treaty which constitutes only one step toward a politically-integrated Europe.

This is what today constitutes the very great difficulty of a substantial liberalization of exchanges on the Atlantic scale. In spite of the existence of common institutions, too many difficulties are already appearing in the realization of the Common Market for the Six to be able to accept added difficulties immediately, while the foreseen liberalization would not appear to take its place in an intrinsically desirable comprehensive construction nor seem to give all the participants the necessary guarantees.

In the present situation, the idea of an equal partnership between North America and Europe is in itself a very seductive idea; but one must not conceal the fact that without some common institutions, *without a vast political plan*, the reality that can emerge from the idea is in fact *very limited*, even if the Common Market nations would be unanimous in making every effort toward widely liberalized Atlantic exchanges.

Policy of Aid to Underdeveloped Countries

As far as underdeveloped countries are concerned, it seems essential that a common policy be defined and implemented by the North Atlantic nations.

To be effective, this common policy must be based on *true* Western ideology. From this point of view, the essential articulation of the aid that the West must give to the Third World should rest on wide liberalization of exchanges and on lowering of its tariff barriers, direct or indirect, visible or invisible, with regard to the products that the Third World can advantageously export. These products are essentially raw materials, and particularly tropical products, products of the crafts, and all manufactured products requiring a large amount of labor.

The required Western effort toward provision of such aid poses some formidable problems. However, the reciprocal liberalization of exchanges between the West and the Third World constitutes probably the only really effective way of development. It is, in addition, the only one which can lead to an effective redistribution of burdens. It is the only way which can lead to an effective increase in living standards, not only in the countries of the Third World, but equally in the developed countries of the West.

Political Institutions

On the political level, three basic measures could be envisaged: first of all, the creation of a NATO Council empowered, on questions of common interest, in specified fields, to make decisions by a qualified majority; second, the creation of a "Commission" suitably empowered to study common problems and make recommendations; third, the creation of an Atlantic Parliamentary Assembly whose role would be only advisory and whose members would be designated by the national parliaments.

The details of method matter little. A *beginning* from which we can progress is of foremost importance.

Cultural Policy

The most effective means of preparing a true cultural Community of free peoples would be to increase cultural exchanges. The expenditures to be pledged in this field are nothing compared to the decisive advantages which could be derived from them.

A real Community could not possibly be decreed. It is in learning to know each other better that peoples can erase the misunderstandings which separate them and become accustomed to mutual appreciation.¹⁶

Conclusions

The Real Task of the Political Leaders of the West

First of all, the political leaders of the West should not lose themselves in technological details, they should not take the places of the experts, but should clearly define the experts' work. Certainly the temptation is very strong for them to limit themselves to easy work which consists of devoting their efforts to defining a certain number of technical clauses which might ameliorate the present situation. However, their true task is to cope effectively with the real questions of our times, those which involve our liberties and our very lives.

The Lessons of the Past

It is advisable to take into account the lessons of history. *The past teaches us that the essential part of our difficulties has found its origin in our unfaithfulness to our own principles.*

Marxist communism of the twentieth century found its origin and its strength in the inhuman organization of our societies at the beginning of the industrial era. Here let a single example suffice. In the first half of the nineteenth century in Europe, five-year olds had to work from 13 to 17 hours a day in the spinning-mills and even at the bottom of the mines. Would such situations have been possible then if our societies had been faithful to their fundamental principle of human dignity?

Two world wars found their origin in our inability to regulate our differences peaceably. Totalitarian communism was born of the first world war and emerged extraordinarily reinforced from the second.

Today it is our differences and our disunity which constitute the essential strength of the ideology of totalitarian communism.

In order to remain faithful to the principles of its own civilization the West must be capable of passing through another stage: the unity of the Atlantic world.

One could not spend too much time meditating on the Greco-Latin civilization. That civilization, which lasted nearly 15 centuries, finally perished because the hellenistic world showed itself incapable of freely uniting itself. When Rome finally succeeded in establishing union by force, it was too late and the apogee of the Greco-Latin world lasted scarcely more than a century. Today we are in a comparable situation.

Our Future is in Our Hands

From the analysis that I have just presented, it can be inferred that our future depends on us. It depends neither upon the communist world, nor upon the Third World. *To find the real cause of our difficulties we do not have to look into the outside world. Essentially, the cause resides in ourselves and stems from our own weaknesses.*

The broad outlines of the solutions are evident. At least, a real Atlantic Community appears very desirable. The Atlantic world must convince itself that, disunited, it is heading inevitably toward its ruin and that the international politics of the great democratic nations can be effective only if implemented in a concerted manner.

The West must reinforce its political, economic, and military cohesion. The world of today is losing itself on the road of outdated nationalism. We must surmount all the inherited feelings of false nationalism and head resolutely toward an international Atlantic organization actually founded on democratic principles.

If such a solution were chosen, the peoples of the North Atlantic would probably succeed in averting a new worldwide conflict and they could then come to know, at least in the next decades, a "golden age" without precedent in the history of mankind. Some absolutely unheard-of possibilities offer themselves to us today. Can we understand that it depends upon us alone whether the apogee of Western civilization has yet to arrive, or has already passed us by?

In recent years the policy of the Atlantic world has suffered from the dearth of coordination and long-range planning.

Nothing could be more dangerous for the West today than to limit its action to some half measures, under cover of a false realism, and to postpone decisions which alone can decisively change the course of events. Such conduct would only divert public opinion from real problems and genuine solutions.

Proposing under the cloak of realism to await more favorable conditions for undertaking effective action to strengthen Atlantic solidarity would be no more than an expression of false realism which would carry the seeds of its own destruction.

Can we not see that we run into deadlocks everywhere, that we continually encounter utterly unsolvable problems and that there is probably some reason for that? In reality, the doctrine of intangible maintenance of national sovereignties cannot by itself give any really efficacious solution to the problems confronting us.

To conclude a future impossibility from the present impossibility of a true Atlantic Community is begging the question. Yesterday, the European Common Market was only a chimera. Today it has begun to be a reality. An Atlantic Community, such as I have described it, is certainly possible a few years from now, but only on the condition that it be prepared *starting today* and that there be the *political will*

effective enough to carry it out. A radical and immediate change of public opinion in the United States and in Europe is highly unthinkable, but their education is possible and their eventual evolution quite conceivable.

In this discussion of what the Atlantic relations should be, one could truly ask oneself whether the real utopians are not those who call themselves realists and whether the actual realists are not in the end those who are called utopians.

The future is full of dangers for the Western world and its civilization. There is probably only one far-reaching, unprecedented political solution which could radically modify the course of events: that of the Atlantic Community.

May I say to the pessimists that the objections which come to mind today regarding the construction of a real Atlantic Community are exactly the same as those which were present in 1948 at the Congress of The Hague, concerning the possibility of a European Community.

The sacrifices which must be made in order to build a real Atlantic Community are few when compared with our freedom and our lives. In order to preserve appearances more than realities, do we not risk persisting in outdated solutions which will lead us only to deadlocks, even to catastrophic situations in the end. Must we not then sacrifice the trivia in order to safeguard the essential?

Unprecedented possibilities present themselves, possibilities which can offer the West and all of humanity a great chance. Will we be lucid enough to see the problems confronting us clearly, clairvoyant enough to perceive their realistic solutions, and courageous enough to defend these solutions in the face of public opinions? Or shall we be like those Byzantine monks who gathered to discuss the sex of the angels while the Turks were besieging Constantinople?

Everything seems to indicate that the Atlantic nations will walk blind and disunited towards a future full of threats. But perhaps they will know how to meet the challenge while there is still time.

Footnotes:

¹ All these figures and those which follow are taken from: "ALLAIS: Le Tiers-Monde au Carrefour," *Cahiers Africains* (1962).

² *Nations Africaines et Solidarite Mondiale*, p. 13.

³ Let us recall here that 100 million Chinese died of hunger during the 19th century, at a time when the population of China included only 450 million inhabitants.

⁴ At the rate of 20 per cent, the figure of the population will be multiplied by 7 in one century, and by 52 in two centuries. Within eight centuries, the continuation of such a demographic expansion will result in a population density of 44 inhabitants per square meter of the earth's surface, including oceans, polar regions, and high mountains.

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⁷ Allais, *Productivités, niveaux de vie et rythmes de croissance comparés en en Russie soviétique, aux Etats-Unis et en France* (Productivity, standard of living and rhythm of growth as compared in Soviet Russia, in the United States and in France), *Travaux de l'Academie des Sciences Morales et Politiques*, 109th year, 4th series, 1956, 1st week, pp. 137 to 163.

⁸ Thus, when the average income per capita in the United States was \$1,940 in 1956, the average income of Mississippi was only \$964, and that of Arkansas was \$1,088, while the average incomes of California, Connecticut, and Delaware were \$2,419, \$2,673, and \$2,859, respectively. The established maximum difference thus represents around 100 per cent of the average income. *Economic Almanac* (1958) p. 417.

⁹ We are dealing here with a political, not an economic, cultural, and military plan.

¹⁰ The present popularity of General de Gaulle in the Third World cannot be interpreted as a Western success, for that popularity actually stems from widespread anti-Western feelings.

¹¹ Cf. Maurice Allais, *L'Europe Unie: Route de la Prosperite'*, Calmann-Levy (1960).

¹² Contrary to an all too common opinion, I think that the devaluation of the dollar, as compared to other currencies, involves far less dangers than ascribed to it. A sensible devaluation would make the American currency overnight the strongest in the world, while permitting the United States to continue its policy of foreign aid, both economic and military, without compromising its policy of internal expansion.

¹³ The effort which has to be made is probably less important than one generally thinks, if one considers that the deficit in the balance of the American payments, let us say around 3 billion dollars, represents only about 5 per cent of the total imports of the EEC and of the EFTA, let us say around 60 billion dollars.

¹⁴ It seems possible today, if not probable, that the problem of the deficit in the American balance of payments will be solved by inflation in Europe.

¹⁵ May I express my opinion here, namely that the only reasonable remedy for the current situation is a re-evaluation of gold ranging from about 1 to 2 from 1 to 3.

The arguments which have been put forward to combat such a measure, namely the windfall from which South Africa or Russia could benefit, are insignificant if one compares them to the dangers of the current situation.

With a re-evaluation ranging from 1 to 3, the problem of liquidities would be solved for many years—both for the United States and for Europe. Only some taboos, which are, moreover, easily explained from the sociological viewpoint, prevent us from implementing this sensible solution.

¹⁶ Generally speaking, I believe, at this point, that I should refer the reader to the Declaration of the Atlantic Convention of the One Hundred Citizens of NATO, presided over by Mr. Herter (Paris, January 20, 1962). This declaration offers an ensemble of immediately applicable proposals on the institutional, political, economic, and cultural level, which I endorse wholeheartedly.