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
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NATO

Problems and Prospects

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THE CENTER FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES
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**AMERICA'S FORGOTTEN REVOLUTION
OF 1789 — AND ITS MEANING
FOR ATLANTICA NOW**

Advance Comments by

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Federal Union, Inc.

April 1964

Mr. Streit's comments
were received prior to
the conference.

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**THE CENTER FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES
Georgetown University
Washington, D.C.**

AMERICA'S FORGOTTEN REVOLUTION OF 1789 -
AND ITS MEANING FOR ATLANTICA NOW

Much as the names London and Paris, in news dispatches are taken to mean Britain and France, the name of our capital often means to the world our government and people. This was true even before this city and this government existed or we formed one people. They all resulted from the Federal Union whose advent we commemorate today - and George Washington's leadership was decisive in this achievement. But even before this vast creation, his virtues had made his name renowned through the civilized world, a symbol of the free principles the 13 States had declared in 1776, the most potent yeast that freedom then possessed with which to transform a world far more sodden with oppression than is ours today.

Today, the name Washington stands for the world's strongest power. But does this name now have the revolutionary fermenting force for our ideals it had when its power came from moral virtues, rather than from missiles and money?

In his Farewell Address, Washington asked: "Can it be that Providence has not connected the permanent felicity of a people with its virtue?" To assure to Washington now the power for freedom and union it had when that name stood also for a living man, must we not have the virtue to remember the great creators and creative acts that gave us our present material power?

* * *

It was on March 4, 1789, that our Federal Union began "the career it has so grandly run" to quote the great English historian of freedom, Lord Acton. The slowness with which it began to function reflects the apathy and hostility it still had to overcome. New York City was then the capital, and it hailed with cannon and bells the dawn of March 4th. But though that date had been officially set nearly six months previous as the day for the Federal Government to begin work, it could not start to function, for only eight Senators and 14 Representatives had arrived. Neither House had a quorum.

Only 11 states had then ratified the Constitution, and though these included New York, its State government remained so hostile to the new Federal Union that the presidential electors, who had cast their votes for President in February, included no New Yorkers,

and no Senators from New York appeared in the Senate until mid-July. The number of Representatives the Constitution gave the 11 States totalled 59 - but it took nearly a month before the 14 reached, on April 1, the 30 needed for a quorum and the House could do business. The Senate was then indeed a club; there were only 22 Senators - but it took more than a month, it was April 6th, before the eight grew to 12 and the Senate had a quorum. Only on that day could the two Houses meet jointly and count the electoral ballots and announce the unanimous election of George Washington as President.

This dragging of feet explains why George Washington did not leave Mount Vernon for his inauguration until April 16 - six weeks after the day set for the Federal Government to begin. **Ironically, the Father of our Country never got to serve his full four-year term even while living. He was shortchanged by eight years.** His first term ended not four years after April 30, when he was inaugurated, but four years after March 4, 1789 - for that day remained, and still remains, the birthday of our Federal Union.

This birthday was marked every four years thereafter by the inauguration of the President and a new Congress on March 4, until 1933 when the 20th Amendment advanced the date to January. Since then this birthday has been increasingly forgotten. Even this 175th anniversary passed with no official celebration of March 4th. Nothing marked that day this year except half a dozen speeches on the Floor of the House (three of them by members present here today, Congressmen Zablocki, Findley and Schwengel) and a luncheon which our organizations held in New York in historic Fraunces Tavern, where Washington said farewell to his officers at the end of the Revolutionary War.

If any day deserves to be celebrated by us every year, it is March 4, for it marks an even more revolutionary event, in some major respects, than July 4th. This "Forgotten Revolution" drastically changed the United States from an association or alliance of sovereign State Governments, as it was under the Articles of Confederation, into a Federal State composed, Primarily, of sovereign Citizens rather than States. And it was

much more than that: It was one of the greatest breakthroughs in world political history, as eminent foreign scholars have testified.

We now think of the Constitution as a means for governing domestic rather than foreign affairs. But to the people of each of the 13 States it came as a bold "experiment" (to quote Washington) in foreign policy - a new way to govern their own State's relations with the other 12, and the rest of the world - a way so new as to be unheard of. It was far worse than that to Patrick Henry, who nearly killed it a-borning. Convinced it would destroy the liberty of Virginians, he almost persuaded them not to ratify it. He told them this Constitution was "extremely pernicious . . . and dangerous," "oppressive," "absurd," "the most fatal plan that could possibly be conceived to enslave a free people," and "a solution as radical as that which separated us from Great Britain."

Radical it was indeed. It completely reversed the system on which the United States Congress under the Articles of Confederation was based. Both systems applied the Roman maxim of "divide and rule" - but in opposite ways: The Confederation applied it to divide the American people (or rather, to keep them divided) into New Yorkers, Pennsylvanians, Virginians and so on, and let their State Governments rule not only their purely State affairs but their common affairs with the people of the other States.

The Constitution allowed the American people to rule the United States as well as their own State Governments; it did this by uniting the people while keeping all their Governments divided - the States Governments independent of one another, the Federal Government independent of them all, and its legislative, executive and judicial branches separated from each other, and its Senate from its House.

Under the Confederation the relations of the 13 States were set up basically the same as those of the 15 Atlantic allies now. Each had its own armed force, trade barriers, currency, citizenship, and foreign policy - when Massachusetts closed its ports to British ships, rival Connecticut opened its harbors to them. Common affairs were handled, as in the NATO Council, through a one-house body (Congress) composed of delegates named, instructed and paid by their State governments. Each State had one vote - and a veto over any change in the Confederation - and the Congress (again like the NATO Council) had no power to enforce its resolutions, or make delinquent States furnish their military or financial quotas. The U. S. President was as powerless then as the NATO President is now.

It was the Federal Constitution that gave the U. S. what we now take for granted - its common market, common currency, common citizenship, common standing armed force. It was Federal Union that gave us our common government, one representing the people directly rather than their State governments - a common government with voting power proportioned to population, and no State having a veto, with power to govern the fields transferred to it by operating directly on the citizens through a strong Executive.

The Constitution reversed no less revolutionarily the purpose of the previous, so-called "united States." The confederal aim was to maintain the "sovereignty, freedom and independence" of each of the States that made it. The federal purpose was and is to preserve the sovereignty of the citizens who made the Constitution - "We the People of the United States in order to . . . preserve the blessings of liberty to ourselves . . . do ordain and establish this Constitution."

This transformation from Confederation to Federal Union was so profound as to constitute a "Second American Revolution" much more extraordinary than the preceding one we all remember, the one which set up those 13 "free and independent States."

The 13 Colonies were not the first to break away from the mother country and become independent. Nor were they the first to set up democracies and unite them in a confederacy. This had been done by the ancient Greek City States. But the 13 were the first to solve the problem that had always baffled mankind and had led to the destruction of democracy ever since the ancient Greeks failed to solve it: How to unite democracies effectively, democratically, enduringly? How to balance equitably big and little states? How to save liberty from its hereditary twin foes - tyranny and anarchy, too much government and too little?

As Lord Acton said of the 13 some 70 years later: "They had solved with astonishing and unexampled success two problems which had hitherto baffled the capacity of the most enlightened nations; they had contrived a system of federal government which prodigiously increased the national power and yet respected local liberties and authorities; and they had founded it on the principle of equality, with^{out}/surrendering the securities for property and freedom."

They achieved this historic breakthrough, as Tocqueville pointed out, by "this Constitution which . . . rests, in fact, on a theory that is entirely new, and which stands as a great discovery in modern political science."

"Revolution" connotes something relatively great in scope done in relatively little time by relatively new ways. By all these three acid tests, the Second American Revolution outranks the first one.

In scope: It was not only greater in comparison with past human achievement, but in comparison with even the latest comparable efforts. The European Union movement has gained great, and deserved credit for its achievements, yet the

yet the European Common Market is only one item among those which the Constitution wrapped up in its Federal package.

As for speed: It took Europe nine years from the first proposals in 1948 to reach the stage of signing in 1957 the Treaty of Rome - under which the Common Market of the Six Nations would be completed by 1970 - another 13 years (President de Gaulle permitting) or 22 years in all. Now turn back the clock to the sun dial era. The State of New York has the honor of having been the first government to propose formally (thanks to Alexander Hamilton) that a Federal Convention be called to "revise and amend" the Articles of Confederation. That was on July 20, 1782. Five years later the Convention met, drafted and signed the Federal Constitution - all in 1787.

After long and strenuous debate in a number of the States it was ratified by enough of them for the Federal Government to be inaugurated less than two years later - seven years from start to completion. This in the sun dial, oxcart age, when it took 24 days to carry the Declaration of Independence from Philadelphia to South Carolina by the fastest means available.

Yet the peoples of the 13 States did far more than begin a common market in those seven years; they set up at the same time a common currency, defense force, foreign policy, citizenship, Government. All this was done as a step in the dark, a bold "experiment" undertaken despite the warning of Patrick Henry against a solution which that fiery revolutionist called "as radical" as the separation from Great Britain. By way of comparison, that First American Revolution took eight years - from the Declaration of Independence to the ratification of the peace treaty in 1783 - or 18 years if one starts with the Stamp Act in 1765.

Let us turn to our third acid test. That first American Revolution was achieved in the age-old way - by violence, bloodshed, war - eight years of war. The Second American Revolution was achieved in a new way - peacefully - not merely

without war but without any bloodshed or violence, to my knowledge, except one minor riot in Albany, N. Y. It happened on the Fourth of July 1788, while the New York State Convention, elected by the people to approve or reject the Constitution was meeting in Poughkeepsie - only halfway through its heated six weeks debate on the subject. Only one man was killed and 18 injured in that Albany riot.

In our time most Americans profess to attach high importance to peaceful solution of this very problem. And well they should, since they had to suffer the bloodshed of two World Wars and be faced by another atomic one before they would enter even the Atlantic alliance. One might expect such a generation to consider as revolutionary indeed the fact that their forebears made the giant breakthrough from alliance to federation without war and with practically no violence or bloodshed. Yet this revolution is the forgotten revolution - forgotten even by our generation. So much do we still seek peace by rating the victories of violence as more memorable, more heroic, more revolutionary than the triumphs of reason.

Some will say - indeed, many here and in Europe have said to me through 25 years - that it was relatively easy for the people of the 13 States to do all they did in so little time with so little violence, and therefore it wasn't so great a thing after all. They mean that they assume it was easy, compared to the problems they see facing the step from alliance to union in the Atlantic community now.

It seems to me that those who faced the situation in America then were in a much better position to judge its difficulties than we are now - especially the great majority of us who are so incredibly ignorant of the conditions in which this Second Revolution was achieved. Patrick Henry was by no means the only one who found that this breakthrough was as "radical" as the one we remember so well.

To Alexander Hamilton it was more than a revolution, it was a "miracle." We have time to hear only three other witnesses, two Americans and one European. We call to the stand first George Washington.

Only three months before the Federal Convention met, he wrote General Knox on February 3, 1787, "I believe that the political machine will yet be much tumbled and tossed, and possibly wrecked altogether, before such a system . . . will be adopted. The darling Sovereignties of the States individually . . . would give their weight of opposition." Still more gloomily General Washington wrote a month later, March 10, to the Foreign Secretary of Congress that the latter's opinion that "attempts to alter or amend it [the Articles of Confederation] will be like the proppings of a house that is ready to fall, and which no shoars can support (as many seem to think) may also be true. But is the public mind matured for such an important change as the one you have suggested? What would be the consequences of a premature attempt? . . . A thirst for power, and for the bantling, I had like to have said monster, for sovereignty, which have taken such fast hold of the States individually will . . . form a strong phalanx against it . . . It is more than probable that we shall exhibit the last melancholy proof, that mankind are not competent to their own Government."

How often I have been told that "the public is not ripe" for even an Atlantic Federal Convention, that it would be too dangerous to risk failure! The difference between these modern nay-sayers and Washington is that he nonetheless agreed to stake his prestige by serving as a delegate. When, after a three-day horseback ride from Mount Vernon, he arrived at Independence Hall on May 14, the day set for the Convention to open, he found the only other delegation present was the one from Philadelphia.

With such proof of public apathy or hostility, his modern successors in office would, I fear, have saddled their plane and jettied home. The Father of our Federal Union merits that title because he stayed, cooling his heels for 11 days until a quorum of seven delegations allowed the Convention to open May 25th.

During those 11 days that tried the souls of the Founding Fathers, "practical" delegates urged that the Convention - if it ever could open - limit its efforts to some halfway measures which the people might approve. But George Washington, deeply as he shared the prevailing pessimism, intervened with one of the most decisive speeches in human history. Certainly it was the shortest of important speeches. Here is the whole of it:

"It is too probable that no plan we propose will be adopted. Perhaps another dreadful conflict is to be sustained. If, to please the people, we offer what we ourselves disapprove, how can we afterward defend our work? Let us raise a standard to which the wise and the honest can repair; the event is in the hand of God."

Result: The "practical" men gave in, and the Convention began with so revolutionary a spirit that it ignored its instructions - which limited it to merely amending the Articles of Confederation - and set out to draft a whole new government on lines which the delegates themselves believed would work - and they left the result to the people, and to the hand of God. Six weeks later the Convention had come to complete deadlock, after such wrangling that Washington on July 10, wrote to Hamilton (who had been called back to New York):

"I almost despair of seeing a favorable issue to the proceedings of your Convention, and do therefore repent having had any agency in the business."

But he ended his letter by saying characteristically: "The crisis is equally important and alarming, and no opposition under such circumstances should discourage exertion until the signature is fixed."

When the Constitution was finally signed on September 17th, Benjamin Franklin - my second witness - gave the testimony you have on your program on the dangers and difficulties the signers had thus overcome. Speaking of the finished

Constitution, he said:

"I think it will astonish our enemies, who are waiting with confidence to hear that our councils are confounded like those of the Builders of Babel; and that our States are on the point of separation, only to meet hereafter for the purpose of cutting one another's throats."

Such was the danger of wars among the 13 States then, in the considered judgment of so realistic a man as Poor Richard, so experienced a statesman as Franklin, then 81.

Today, there is no danger of any war among the 15 NATO allies - but so timid are the successors of Washington and Franklin now that they cease all effort when President de Gaulle vetoes some elements in the Administration's Atlantic "partnership" plan. The mounting Atlantic disunion, which results from their own lack of vision and courage, is to them not urgent incentive to redouble efforts to unite the Atlantic Community but justification for ceasing them - and seeking accord with Moscow instead of with Paris, our oldest ally.

Europeans are now among the first to assume that the change from alliance to Federal Union among the 13 States was far too simple to be compared to the difficulties of making such a change now. But when the U. S. Constitution was signed, Europeans were, indeed, "astonished." Small wonder, for Europeans found the difficulties facing Union then so impossible to surmount that my third witness - Josiah Tucker, Dean of Gloucester - wrote in 1781:

"As to the future grandeur of America, and its being a rising empire under one head, whether republican or monarchical, it is one of the idlest and most visionary notions that ever was conceived even by writers of romance. The mutual antipathies and clashing interests of the Americans, their differences of governments, habitudes and manners, indicate that they will have no centre of union and no common interest. They never can be united into one compact empire under any species of government whatever; a disunited people till the end of time, suspicious and distrustful of each other, they will be divided and sub-divided into little commonwealths or principalities, according to natural boundaries, by great bays of the sea, and by vast rivers, lakes and ridges of mountains."

Massachusetts ratified the Constitution after prolonged debate by a majority

of only 19. Despite Washington's endorsement, Virginia, after listening to Patrick Henry denounce the Constitution for three weeks - and raise fears of civil war - ratified it by only 89 to 79. Despite the Federalist papers - written to win a majority for the Constitution in the election of delegates to the New York Convention - the people elected a two-thirds majority of them opposed to ratification. Hamilton had to argue through six weeks before, ^{by} one of the greatest forensic feats in history, he finally persuaded them, by 30 to 27, to ratify the Constitution. So it was that the world's first Federal Union government came to be born 175 years ago.

What are the lessons in our forgotten American Revolution of 1789 for the people of the 15 nation-states of Atlantica today? I see many, but I shall touch on only three or four, depending on the time I have left.

The first lesson is that we Americans, Atlanticans and all the non-communist world have far more to gain now from studying our Forgotten Revolution than our Remembered one. The principles of free government in our First Revolution's Declaration of Independence began toppling autocrats in Western Europe in May 1789, when they helped lead to the meeting of the States General in France. In the 175 years since the French Revolution began spreading these principles in Europe, a number of nations there have grown into stable democracies. Their growth in freedom, combined with the force of the example of the 13 colonies in breaking away from the British Empire, has led, particularly in the last decade, to the transformation of their colonies in Asia and Africa into independent nation states - usually without the wars that marked the much earlier break-up of Spain's American empire. Only the Russian, Red Chinese and Portuguese empires now remain to be broken up by the principles of the First American Revolution.

The transformation of the Western European empires into scores of small independent nations has come at a time when mass production and mass destruction,

together with the rise of communist dictatorship, have made even the strongest democracies unite in the Atlantic alliance. The challenge of "unite or perish" which the 13 States faced after independence, and solved at the dawn of the steam-electric age by their Forgotten Revolution, faces the strongest Atlantic democracies far more imperatively now, at the dawn of the jet-atomic age. Its solution is no less vital to the inexperienced new nations - but they have no possibility whatever of solving it effectively by regional federations if the Atlantic democracies fail to meet this challenge - fail to provide the world with a pilot plant on international democratic federal union. If they fail to do this promptly, the undeveloped nations of Asia, Africa and Latin America are doomed, I believe, to go the way of Cuba, Zanzibar and North Viet Nam. If we do rise to the challenge, then I am confident that the remainder of this century will see our Forgotten Revolution spread federation of the free through the world as the Remembered Revolution spread independent nationalism through the first half of our century. Which will it be?

I come to the second lesson of the Forgotten Revolution. It is this: It is much more prudent and practical to build the Atlantic pilot plant on the broad lines of the Federal Union which has already stood the test of 175 years, than along the lines which the Administration is now following.

Atlantic Union has progressed so far in the past 25 years that it is no longer a question of whether Atlantica should be effectively united, but only of How. There are two major answers to this question. One is the Administration's Atlantic partnership plan; the other is the plan we uphold, for an Atlantic Federal Union in which all the NATO nations would be member states.

Both plans depend on federal principles, but the partnership one would apply them only in western Europe. It seeks to solve the problem of balancing the American colossus with the European nations by federating the latter in a

European Union, so that it would thus become equally colossal. The two giants would then be united by a bar called "partnership" which has never been defined, but which would obviously be much weaker than federation.

This plan was originally called "Operation Dumbbell" by its State Department authors. They were thinking in terms of the gymnasium - two equal spheres connected by a bar - but with all respect to them I believe that the slang sense of "dumbbell" more accurately describes this operation.

I have time to mention only two of the reasons why I think this plan is unsound and unworkable. One is that ^{the} Dumbbell balance is essentially the old European balance of power between sovereign nations, which has never worked to prevent war and depression. Two sovereign democracies are bound to differ on how to advance peace and freedom just as two political parties do. But there is no way on earth to get sovereign powers to agree short of war, and since neither wants war, the result is stalemate. For more than a year now the United States has been deadlocked with a much smaller power - France. And in other ways, with another smaller power - Britain. How much worse the stalemate would be, were it between two equally powerful sovereign Unions, European and American! To stake life and liberty on the hope that the reverse will then be true, that equality in national power will make for agreement and prevent dangerous deadlocks, is to fly in the face of all experience, to the height of folly.

Operation Dumbbell is also unsound because it would bridge the Atlantic by building only the approach on either side on tested federal principles - and then connecting the main span, between the two towers, by the fragile principle of "partnership." There it depends on the old European balance of power - equivalent to stretching a tight rope between the two towers of the Atlantic suspension bridge and relying on diplomats to balance their way across - across the ocean.

Our plan would build the longest span of this great bridge by the strongest, not the weakest principles - by federal principles all the way across, and not just

at the two approaches. Put in federal, instead of engineering terms, our plan would solve the problem of balance between the American colossus and the small European nations by the time-tested federal balance between the House and the Senate. It safeguards the people of the larger states by their voting power in the House and those of the smaller states equally by their voting power in the Senate. Though no law can be passed without the approval of both Houses, and deadlock is theoretically possible, there has been, in practice, no serious danger of stalemate - and none whatever in times of grave danger from abroad. For, over and above both the House and the Senate, stand the sovereign citizens of the Union, on whom all the members of both Houses depend for office.

It is the partnership plan which President de Gaulle has blocked. His motives may have been the wrong ones, but personally I am very grateful to him for having halted Operation Dumbbell, and thus given people an opportunity of seeing the folly of this project and turning to the sound alternative before it is too late. The United States drifted into Operation Dumbbell without its implications and basic principles ever having been subjected, so far as I know, to close scrutiny by those in power or by most others.

President de Gaulle, by my reading of his various statements, has always left the door open to our Atlantic Federal plan. I wish I had time to point out how it meets many of his main objections to the partnership plan. Suffice it to say now that, until the United States Government proposes Atlantic federal union along the lines we propose, and he rejects it, I for one shall continue to believe that the obstacle lies much more in Washington than in Paris. I have been told on good authority both in Washington and Paris that the United States Government has never even sounded him out on Atlantic Federal Union.

The third lesson to be drawn from our Forgotten Revolution is that the sound way to solve the problem of Atlantic unification is to tackle it as a whole - again by the method that has now worked for 175 years - and not piecemeal, by the little

tested method that is now being followed officially. This method, called by its supporters the "functional approach," has set up among the Six Nations in Europe first the Coal and Steel Authority, then Euratom and later the Common Market. The plan is to add next a common currency, then a common defense force, and finally a common government.

The fact is that these economic, monetary, military and political elements in the problem are closely inter-related, much as are the digestive, circulatory, muscular and nervous systems of our bodies. To tackle them separately seems to be simpler, but the successes are illusory - as I had ample opportunity to observe when covering for the New York Times such efforts at the League of Nations in the period between World Wars. Whatever progress one makes in one function is jeopardized by failure to advance proportionately in some other function. In a recent example, the Nassau agreement on weapons triggered President de Gaulle into blocking the development of the Common Market.

The Founding Fathers of our Federal Union had the revolutionary wisdom to create through the Constitution a body politic complete with all these inter-related organs or functions. Because of our reluctance to study afresh our Forgotten Revolution it seems to many that it is much harder for us to do this now in Atlantica. Be that as it may, why not first try at least the method that worked and see what we can do?

Full-fledged Union will take years, of course, to achieve. This does not mean, however, that we must leave the attainment of this goal to the mercy of time, and meanwhile concentrate on meeting this and that crisis with this and that "practical" gimmick. To build one's "dream-house" takes time, too - but jerry-building will never turn the dream into reality. The goal cannot be gained without a definite decision to build the house, followed by selection of architects to prepare the plans and builders to turn the blueprints into building. To put these decisions off indefinitely because the final goal takes much longer than the first step is the opposite of practical.

This is true of Atlantic Union, too; the basic decisions take relatively little time, there is no sense in deferring them further, and every reason to take them now. What does this mean, concretely? It means a decision by the President to invite the NATO allies to send delegates to meet with U. S. delegates in another Federal Constitutional Convention, patterned broadly on the one in 1787, to take - subject to ratification by their peoples - the following positive, creative actions:

1. Declare that the goal is the transformation of the NATO alliance into, eventually, a full-fledged Federal Union, that is, one with a common citizenship, foreign policy, defense force, and freemovement of money, goods and men through its territory - which would guarantee the continued independence of each Member Nation as regards its purely national affairs, and could admit other nations that so desired, when it agreed that this would advance its purpose.

2. Draft a Federal Constitution to speed attainment of this goal by:

A. Listing the Bill of Rights, or individual liberties, and the other peaceful purposes which this Union of the Free would be made to advance.

B. Establishing a democratic government with a Federal Senate and House, and an Executive and Judiciary to pursue these aims;

C. Assigning to this Government the task of working out, as a whole, the transition to complete Union in the various inter-related fields to be given it, and fixing a definite time-table for the attainment of each - a common currency to be achieved in ___ years, a common market in ___ years, a common defense force in ___ years, and free movement of citizens throughout the Union in ___ years.

Certainly there would be conflicting views in such a convention, and many compromises would have to be made. But the Convention would be spared the difficulty of working out the details of transition which the drafters of the Rome Treaty incorporated in that voluminous document which set up the Common Market. All such questions would be left to the New Union Government to answer. This Convention, like the one in Philadelphia, could concentrate on the basic political problem - and turn out as short a document as the U. S. Constitution.

If the French Government refused to participate, or, participating, refused to sign or ratify the resulting Constitution, the other nations could still federate. How long could even General de Gaulle keep France out of a Union that included the U. S., Canada, Britain, Belgium, The Netherlands, the German Federal Republic, Italy - to mention no more? There is so much support for Atlantic Union already among the French, including the Gaullist leaders, that one could confidently expect France to enter such a Federation soon, if it were not among the founders, as I am confident it would be. **of the Founding Fathers.**

The fourth and concluding lesson we can draw from the Forgotten Federal Revolution is the most important: It is to meet the challenge of our day with the revolutionary vision and courage. This means abandoning three delusions we now cherish. One delusion is that we can succeed in meeting our oceanic challenge with half-way measures that even such statesmen as Washington, Franklin, Hamilton could not succeed with among 13 English-speaking States in "easier" conditions.

Our second delusion is that we do not need even to attempt to federate Atlantica with the revolutionary scope and speed with which they achieved their great breakthrough. We talk of the explosion of population, of new nations, of technological and scientific advance that is shrinking the world at revolutionary speed - and we nurse the delusion that we don't need to advance with revolutionary speed and on a revolutionary scale in the political field, in constituting effective free international government in such a world.

Our third delusion is that we can meet our challenge without demanding of our leaders the revolutionary character, heroic courage, farsighted vision and sublime faith in the sovereign citizen which Washington, Franklin, Hamilton and a galaxy of Founding Fathers provided 175 years ago.

Let us be done with these delusions. Let us be done with them now. We are not so feeble that we cannot do what our fathers did, and what we expect our children to do. We, too - each of us here, and all our friends and fellow citizens - we, too, can do far better than we have yet begun to do. We, too, can raise a standard to which the wise and the honest can repair. We, too, can have Washington's faith that if we will but raise that standard, the hand of God will turn the event our way.

We of Federal Union, Inc. and of the International Movement for Atlantic Union have that faith. We have already raised anew Washington's standard of Federal Union of the Free. We invite you cordially to help us carry it forward to another "astounding" triumph of human reason, and of the human Spirit.

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