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
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# NATO

## Problems and Prospects

May 7-8, 1964



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# ATLANTIC ALLIANCE AND EAST-CENTRAL EUROPE

by

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## ATLANTIC ALLIANCE AND EAST-CENTRAL EUROPE

*There are two kinds of realists: those who manipulate facts and those who create them. The West requires nothing so much as men able to create their own reality.*

Henry A. Kissinger

An event in East-Central Europe—the *coup de Prague* of February 1948—was the decisive political fact which prompted the Western European and North American nations to begin urgent and formal negotiations which ended a year later with the establishment of the defensive Atlantic alliance. During the ensuing fifteen years, the Western and Soviet blocs faced each other in the middle of Europe, and although the dividing line on the river Elbe remained stable, both blocs experienced momentous changes in their internal structures and relations.

This paper will explore three important facets of these changes: (1) the emerging dispute between NATO's Anglo-American and Franco-German members concerning the policies to be adopted toward the Soviet or Communist dominated East-Central Europe; (2) internal developments in the Soviet bloc itself; (3) the relevance of Western disputes and intra-Soviet bloc problems for the future of both the Atlantic alliance and Western and Eastern Europe.

The aim of the paper is thus to show why the events and prospects of East-Central Europe should attract attention of Western policy makers no less today than a decade and a half ago.

### Disagreements Within Atlantic Alliance About East-Central Europe

Since the establishment of NATO, its very defensive character has fitted perfectly well with the United States' "containment" policy toward the Soviet Union. Nobody among the U. S. partners in the alliance has challenged that policy, and even when for a while, in 1952 and after, it was rebaptized as "liberation" its basically static character did not change. The rebellions of Soviet satellites in 1953 and 1956, and the repressions by the Red Army, were followed by dismay or anger in the West, but no Western government nurtured any intention to interfere in what was tacitly acknowledged as Soviet imperial domain. Toward divided Germany, Berlin, and the "people's democracies" the Western attitude was twofold: morally, the West could not approve the postwar changes in Eastern Europe, because they were obviously imposed on the population by force, and because the Soviet Union had patently violated its international obligations by creating the satellite realm; politically, the West was resigned to accepting the *status quo* under the condition of not recognizing it formally. The right of self-determination which the U.S. government advocated so strongly in Asia and Africa, often even against the governmental policies of its NATO partners, was never considered as anything but a rhetorical exercise when dealing with the Soviet Union. The Western European nations were too weak, and thus unwilling, to ask on their own account the Soviet Union to "de-Stalinize" its foreign policy. On their part, the Soviet rulers, particularly after the experiences of 1956, pressed for international agreements which would officially consecrate the *status quo* in East-Central Europe and thus dispose of the problem of the legitimacy of their satellites.

During the last several years prominent public figures in the Western world have suggested more or less elaborate plans of "disengagement" in Central Europe.<sup>1</sup> These plans have been designed to eliminate the direct confrontation of the antagonistic nuclear powers in the heart

of Europe, and to contribute in this way to lessening of international tensions and increasing the chances for serious negotiations about disarmament and genuine peaceful solution of problems. Although the plans have remained essentially as material for academic discussions, the United States government under the Kennedy Administration, in agreement with the British and even if *a posteriori*, with some of the Western European governments, has shown an inclination to explore in direct talks with the Soviets the possibility of some new arrangements, particularly concerning the problems of Berlin and Germany in general, which should achieve some of the results that the individual proponents of "disengagement" advocated. In 1962 and 1963, however, the plans favored by the United States were opposed, once obliquely, the second time openly and vigorously, by Western Germany and, especially, France. Open opposition of two leading Western European powers to the ideas of American diplomacy was indeed something new in the post-war history of the Atlantic alliance. It merits careful scrutiny.

The first instance of Western European suspicions concerning American direct talks with the Soviets over Berlin occurred in April 1962, when the Germans leaked to the press the original U.S. scheme for an International Access Authority to Berlin as a means of torpedoing it.<sup>2</sup> The plan provided for the establishment of an authority in which East Germany would enjoy the same status as the Federal Republic, the creation of several East-West German commissions to deal with German problems, a nonaggression treaty between NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries, and an agreement to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries.

The suspicion of the French and German governments that bilateral U.S.-Soviet negotiations could lead to an accommodation at their expense led the French government to take a series of strong attitudes during the first half of 1963. In the first place, General de Gaulle, in the

famous press conference of January 14, 1963, in which he turned down as premature the British application for membership in the European Economic Community, also criticized sternly any idea of a "colossal Atlantic Community under American dependence and leadership which would soon completely swallow up the European Community." He emphasized at the same time that what France wanted and was working for was "a strictly European construction" and denounced the idea of a NATO multilateral atomic force.<sup>3</sup> Only a few days later, on January 22, a treaty between the French Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany was signed, with three fields of application: foreign policy, defense, and education and youth. Commenting on the treaty before the French National Assembly on June 12, Maurice Couve de Murville, French Minister of Foreign Affairs, made some precise statements about the deeper meaning of the treaty:

Europe — that signifies two things: the union of the free Europe first, then a stable European settlement, when the Soviets will have changed sufficiently, that is to say, the establishment of a relative balance between the Russian Empire to the East and the united free Europe to the West. In order for the European union to be constituted, in order for the balance to be established, Germany must necessarily be on our side, that is to say, linked to France. If Germany should turn toward the East, the Western fringe which we represent will be submerged sooner or later. If Germany does not make a choice, the threat will be permanent, and we also know how we will end. . . .

If French-German cooperation succeeds as we intend, that is, evolves toward a real political union of Western Europe, far-reaching transformations will take place, for the good of all, firstly in the relations of the participating European countries themselves, then between them and their allies — and first of all the United States. The final result of this would be *the alliance of Europe and America in every domain on an equal footing.* <sup>4</sup>

The same set of ideas, but with a still greater precision, was affirmed by General de Gaulle during his next press conference, held on July 29, 1963. After taxing the Yalta conference as "deplorable," and stating that the Atlantic alliance was at the same time "an elemental necessity" and in need of "important modifications," he spoke of "great changes which modify the character of hegemonic solidarity which, since the last World War, has marked the United States relations with France." Before discussion the agreement banning nuclear tests which was just about to be signed between the United States, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain and explaining the reasons why France would not join the treaty and would continue to equip itself with nuclear weapons, General de Gaulle made the following statement, which touches upon a vital part of the problems with which this paper deals:

The United States which, since Yalta and Potsdam, has nothing, after all, to ask from the Soviets, the United States sees tempting prospects opening up before it. Hence, for instance, all the separate negotiations between the Anglo-Saxons and the Soviets, which, starting with the limited agreement on nuclear testing, seem likely to be extended to other questions, notably European ones, until now in the absence of the Europeans, which clearly goes against the views of France.

France, in effect, has for a long time believed that the day might come when a real *détente*, and even a sincere entente, will enable the relations between East and West in Europe to be completely changed and it intends, if this day comes. . . to make constructive proposals with regard to the peace balance, and destiny of Europe. But, for the time being, France will not subscribe to any arrangement that would be made above its head and which would concern Europe and particularly Germany. As for a draft nonaggression pact — which we are told, was discussed in Moscow — between the States belonging to NATO and the leaders of the countries subjected

to the Kremlin's yoke, I must say right away that France does not appreciate this assimilation between the Atlantic Alliance and Communist servitude.<sup>5</sup>

These sentences of the French President — which are so typical for his statecraft: precise statements of present policy coupled with vague hints about future diplomatic initiatives — acquire even greater interest in relation to an article written by an ardent French *gaullist* (of Polish origin) and published in the distinguished French review *Politique Etrangère*.<sup>6</sup> Under the significant title "For an Independent and Reunified Europe" the author, Alexander Kawalkowski, tried to present in unequivocal terms what he believed were the deeper thoughts and strategic and tactical intentions of the French President. According to Mr. Kawalkowski, any agreement between Washington and Moscow, with British participation, tending to freeze the Elbe line as a definitive boundary between the Atlantic and Soviet blocs would represent a "new Yalta" and would be detrimental and unacceptable to Europe:

The present iron curtain, strengthened by an eventual new political agreement, would serve as a boundary between the United States and the Soviet Union. Today's Europe, cut in two pieces, but without abandoning hope for reunification, would be definitely replaced by two Europes: the American and the Soviet.

The policy which the author ascribes to General de Gaulle is to "open an alternative with regard to the deadlock of the American-Soviet system, the deadlock which worsens in proportion with the consolidation of the system." Mentioning the famous speech made by General de Gaulle on March 25, 1959, in which he terms German reunification a "normal destiny of the German people" under the condition that the reunified Germany "does not open the question of its present frontiers;" i.e., recognizes the Oder-Neisse frontier between Poland and Germany — Kawalkowski offers then a vision which, whether he ascribes it to de Gaulle or offers it as a suggestion to him, is certainly worth quoting here:

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A Europe, inspired by the idea of its independence would have the means to pay the price for its complete liberation. Once in possession of its own means of defense, classical and nuclear (the latter thanks to France) but not before, Europe will realize that the Atlantic Alliance is no longer an indispensable condition for its security. From this moment on, Europe will be in a position to propose to the Soviet Union a new solution which would represent an alternative to the system USA — USSR. The principle points of these projects would be the following: the Russian troops would evacuate Eastern Germany and all the European satellite countries, primarily those adjoining the European Economic Community . . . These countries would recover the free exercise of their national sovereignty and would be free to associate themselves with Europe economically and even politically. The Atlantic Pact as well as that of Warsaw would be dissolved. The American troops would be evacuated. Europe, enlarged by the admission of former Soviet satellites would bring to Russia massive economic aid.

The author foresees that the Soviet rulers could reject the entire idea, but asserts that in that case the perspective of European reunification would "revive not only the hopes but also a genuine fermentation capable of generating the powerful internal pressures behind the iron curtain." These pressures could convince the Soviet Union that it was in its own interest to accept the scheme of European unity.

Kawalkowski's article merits extended attention, because it puts the finger on some sore points within the Atlantic alliance (the European suspicions about a "new Yalta" which the American diplomacy is allegedly tempted to conclude), indicates the new vitality of Europe as a genuine partner of the United States and potential negotiator with the Soviet Union on equal footing, and hints that the Soviet Union has lost the

ideological and economic game in East-Central Europe. This certainly optimistic conclusion serves as a good introduction to a dispassionate analysis of Soviet policies toward the satellites under Stalin and Khrushchev.

### **The Shifting Scene of East-Central Europe**

"The most outstanding single fact about East-Central Europe in the last fifteen years has been that despite the total foreign and domestic Communist domination and Western inability to influence directly its destiny, the region and its peoples have witnessed an amazing degree of active and passive resistance to ideological indoctrination and absorption in the Soviet bloc."<sup>7</sup> To justify this assertion and to emphasize its multiple meaning we will review briefly the most important aspects of satellites' existence under Stalin and after.

#### *Stalinism*

The first couple of postwar years in East-Central Europe saw a transition from genuine coalition regimes to monolithic Communist rule (with the exception of Yugoslavia and Albania where the Communists were in saddle from the beginning). These years have been followed, with seemingly increasing efficiency between 1947-48 and the death of Stalin, by a distinctive process of political subjugation of East-Central European states to the Soviet empire. To what extent the imposed pattern of uniformity corresponded to Stalin's growing distrustfulness may be seen from his angry indictment of a Communist Balkan Federation discussed rather vaguely by Tito and Dimitrov at the end of 1947 and beginning of 1948. This absolute unwillingness to allow any independent move, even if inspired by the greatest zeal to serve the Communist cause, led in June 1948 to the spectacular excommunication of the most militant Communist regime, Tito's in Yugoslavia, from the

Cominform. Thereafter, the screws were progressively tightened on all the satellites, and the closest bilateral relations between Moscow and every East-Central European country were established. In January 1949 the Council of Mutual Economic Aid (COMECON) was founded as a counterpoise to the OEEC and West European economic consolidation under the Marshall Plan; but, contrary to the functioning of new mechanisms in Western Europe, COMECON remained for several years chiefly a sponsor of bilateral trade agreements concluded between its Eastern European members.

One of the most important characteristics of this period of Stalinist domination was the multiplication of similar economic structures in East-Central Europe, each country having to become a sort of "miniature reproduction" of the USSR: "The unprecedented and unlimited power over all means of production in this very large part of the world has not been used to integrate internationally the economies of the several countries contained within it."<sup>8</sup> Stalin's conception of "socialism in one country" had to be applied in the satellite countries too, everybody having to develop heavy industry, to wage war on *kulaks*, and to destroy small, private industry and individual craftsmanship. The underpinning of economic collectivization was political terror, applied against all real or potential political enemies and including more or less violent purges of the Communist parties themselves. As the counterweight to terror — or, if one prefers, terrorism in its more subtle aspect — systematic efforts were made to inculcate the young generations of East-Central Europeans a primary loyalty to the Soviet Union.

At the same time, overt or camouflaged exploitation of individual countries by the USSR was a current practice and had several aspects: the imposed shift in the trading directions of the region; the overpricing of Soviet goods and underpricing of products coming from East-Central

Europe; the functioning of joint companies in Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria; the maintenance of Soviet troops and technical advisers, etc. Such an over-all economic relationship has permitted the Soviet Union to gain during the 1945-1956 period a total of \$20-25 billion through the exploitation of the satellites.<sup>9</sup> To realize the full scope of this gain, one should notice that the volume of Soviet aid to the bloc between 1946 and 1955 amounted to about \$2 billion, or about \$200 million a year.<sup>10</sup> This is, among other things, what Tito had in mind when at the Sixth Congress of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, in November 1952, he declared:

In reality, this enslavement of little peoples, as was shown by the enslavement of Poland, Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and so on, has only one aim, which certainly is not world revolution, but world hegemony and mastery by the Soviet Union, as an imperialist power, over other peoples.<sup>11</sup>

Domestic autarky worked out under total subservience to the Soviet Union had brought some results similar to those in the Soviet Union under its early Plans: significant increases in industrial production — especially in heavy industry and engineering, rapid growth of the industrial working class, rapid urbanization, uneven but significant progress toward land collectivization, etc. Moreover, through the socio-political changes accomplished during a brief period of time, the image of revolutionary history in the making served both the cause of the Soviet empire and gladdened the hearts of Communist parties around the world, unswervingly following Stalin's leadership. On the other hand, the list of shortcomings or overt failures has been no less impressive: the low level of agricultural output; the general neglect of consumers' goods production; currency "reform;" elaborate, expensive, and unfulfilled schemes such as the Danube-Black Sea canal project in Rumania; extraordinary inefficiency and waste; the production of goods of poor

quality; forced labor — particularly in Bulgaria, Rumania, and Czechoslovakia, etc.<sup>12</sup> In consequence, along with the average decline in the standard of living went a growing feeling of apathy or bitter dissatisfaction, the cynical realization of the gap between professed goals — still boasted of by the official propaganda — and the reality of everyday life. Stalinist imagery of a new, radiant society, necessitating a "much fuller development of personality through social virtues of responsibility and organizing ability in every unit," as exulted over by some Western panegyrists,<sup>13</sup> took on a different color in the eyes of a sharp inside observer: "There is something impalpable and unpleasant in the human climate of such cities as Warsaw or Prague. The collective atmosphere, resulting from an exchange and a re-combination of individual fluids, is bad. It is an aura of strength and unhappiness, of internal paralysis and external mobility."<sup>14</sup> The rulers in Moscow must have realized even before Stalin's death that unless prompt and effective measures were taken to bring about a change, the entire "people's democratic" system was verging on catastrophe, or, as Nikita Khrushchev expressed in his usual colorful way: "We should have been booted out summarily."<sup>15</sup> Stalin's death, in March 1953, came at the right moment to speed up the salvage operation.

*The "new course" and the gathering and subsiding of the storm*

Very soon, indeed, after Stalin's exit from the stage, his successors inaugurated both internally in Russia and in the satellite realm the so-called "new course," which has had uneven applications and results in East-Central Europe. In 1953 the workers' riots in the Czechoslovak cities Pilsen and Ostrava in May and June, the uprisings throughout East Germany on and around June 17, the most unusual speech which the new Hungarian premier Imre Nagy delivered before the National Assembly on July 4, criticizing some basic tenets of Stalinist practice — all this indicated that the days of Stalinist calm and uniformity were over.

Still, the "new course" was far from meaning something identical for all the countries. In Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and Bulgaria the reforms were limited to technical improvements within the established Stalinist framework; in Poland and Hungary the "new course" went deeper and in reality attacked some of the basic Stalinist evils. Whether "technical" or "substantial" in form, the "new course" meant concessions to agriculture and peasantry, the readjustment of proportions between heavy and light industry, an increase in consumer goods production, a rise in living standards, and a new respect for the "forms of Socialist legality."<sup>16</sup> Timidly at first, but with growing intensity, a nonconformist movement among intellectuals began together with these official measures. The deep-rooted awareness of suppressed national feelings and the irresistible yearnings for freedom, which both seemed to be withering away as long as Stalin lived, pushed their way forward everywhere. The Stalinist seed resulted in "bitter harvest."<sup>17</sup>

The "new course" was, however, neither coherent nor efficient. With Khrushchev's replacement of Malenkov in February 1955, it appeared that the clock would be turned back to Stalinism, especially because emphasis was again put on the priority of heavy industry. This seemingly backward turn was certainly most spectacular in Hungary, with the comeback of Rakosi in April 1955 and Nagy's indictment for "rightist, opportunist policies" and exclusion from the Party. It was impossible, however, to revert to Stalinism without Stalin. Very soon, Nikita Khrushchev himself, with his remarkable intuition of threatening political realities, inaugurated his own "new course," going beyond Malenkov in opening safety valves through the dangerous game of de-Stalinization. His spectacular reconciliation with Tito in May 1955 and his denunciation of Stalin's "cult of personality" in his historic secret speech at the 20th Congress of the CPSU were the two most daring elements of his new political line. It seemed, indeed, during the first nine months of 1956, that Khrushchev's policies, and particularly his

endorsement of the Titoist concept of "different roads" toward socialism, were to lead to the dismantling of Stalin's empire. And while for him, as for Tito, the new approach had as its purpose the reformation of the satellites in order to make the Communist regimes more acceptable and more efficient, the Hungarian revolution went a qualitative step further and, beyond "national communism," seemed to represent, in Milovan Djilas's words, "the beginning of the end of Communism."<sup>18</sup> The Soviet military intervention established "order" in Hungary, and prevented not only Hungary's withdrawal from the Soviet bloc and internal political democratization, but also the spread of the anti-Soviet and anti-Communist flow of tide everywhere else. The flow actually threatened to engulf the regimes of the "people's democracy" and to have unpredictable consequences in Russia itself. The realization, however, that again as in 1945 the West was unable to do anything for Hungary<sup>19</sup> or East-Central Europe at large was a terrible blow to popular hopes and expectations. Soviet force and resoluteness again contrasted ominously with the lack of any Western initiative.

#### *Khrushchev's "Grand Design"*

The naked display of Soviet power in Hungary on November 4, 1956 was closely preceded by a pledge on the part of the Soviet government which not only openly recognized the sins of Stalinist imperialism, but contained a promise to the Hungarians to stop meddling in their affairs. On October 31, both *Pravda* and *Izvestia* printed on their front pages a short but solemn declaration of the Soviet government under the title "On the Principles of Development and Further Strengthening of Friendship and Cooperation between the Soviet Union and Other Socialist States." The substance of the declaration was twofold. On the one hand, the Soviet government admitted in unmistakably self-critical terms the existence of "violations and errors which demeaned the principle of

equality in relations among the socialist states" and promised to review with Poland, Hungary, and Rumania the question of Soviet troops stationed on their territory. On the other hand, the Soviet government stated that "the countries of the great commonwealth of socialist nations can build their mutual relations only on the principles of complete equality, of respect for territorial integrity, of state independence and sovereignty, and of noninterference in one another's internal affairs." Four days later, despite the explicit statement in the declaration that the "further presence of Soviet military units in Hungary could serve as an excuse for further aggravation of the situation," the Red Army's violent intervention in Hungary's internal affairs belied the substance of the October 30 declaration. Whether this blatant discrepancy between the Soviet words and deeds represented a specific form of Machiavellian cunning, or testified to the genuine vacillation of the Soviet leadership between the two possible courses of action, remains open to speculation.

The Hungarian revolt, despite the brutal suppression of it, did not lead to the reimposition of Stalinist terror. To the contrary, it has convinced the Soviet leaders, Khrushchev in particular, of the absolute necessity to reform Soviet-satellite relations in at least two respects: to give to individual Communist leaders greater freedom in shaping domestic affairs, under the condition that they remain faithful to the essentials of solidarity within the Soviet bloc; and to de-Stalinize the pattern of economic relations between the USSR and the smaller states of the bloc. What Khrushchev must have had in mind was not simply to employ the classic "carrot and stick" policy,<sup>20</sup> but to go beyond and to devise subtler and more efficient ways to foster imperial cohesiveness for which some techniques of Western European economic integration offered an example worth emulating.

Already in 1955 Khrushchev had discovered that the dormant COMECON (there was only one plenary session of the Council of the COMECON

between August 1949 and March 1954) might be resuscitated as a convenient means of coordinating the economic activities of the various bloc countries. The ferment of the year 1956 and the October thunderbolt finally convinced him that COMECON was potentially an ideal — and strangely forgotten — method of binding the Communist states together. After several conferences at various levels during 1957, the real beginning of the new phase of COMECON activities came in May 1958 during a conference in Moscow on economic cooperation attended by First Party Secretaries and Premiers of COMECON countries and by high-level observers from Communist China, Mongolia, North Korea, and North Vietnam. The basic principle which emerged from that meeting was a "bloc-wide economic integration through extra-long-term supranational planning."<sup>21</sup> The target to be attained was the elimination of differences in the level of development of individual countries, and the means was the concept of the "socialist division of labor," i.e., increased specialization in various fields of production among the COMECON members. This specialization should be the combined result of both short-term and broad "perspective" planning for the entire huge territory of the USSR and East-Central Europe.

On two occasions in 1959, Nikita Khrushchev formulated in public his views and intentions. At the 21st Congress of the CPSU he developed a "theory of simultaneity," i.e., stated that "by successfully employing the potentialities inherent in socialism, the socialist countries will enter the higher phase of Communist society more or less simultaneously."<sup>22</sup> A few days after the Congress, speaking in Leipzig on March 7 at the Ninth All-German Workers' Conference, he made his ideas even more explicit. "Speaking of the future," he said, "it seems to me that the further development of the socialist countries will in all probability proceed along the lines of consolidation of the single socialist economic system. . . . The common economic base of world socialism will grow stronger, eventually making the question of borders a pointless one."<sup>23</sup>

The manifesto of the conference of representatives of 81 Communist and workers' parties which took place in Moscow in November 1960 — and which was the last successful effort of the already clashing Russian and Chinese leaderships to agree on a common stand concerning the widest range of ideological and political problems, international as well as inter-Communist — expressed in two basic concepts the principles which should inspire the relations between the Communist parties and *a fortiori* the relations between the Communist states. On the one hand was the concept that "the socialist camp is a social, economic, and political community of free and sovereign peoples united by the close bonds of international socialist solidarity," that "every country in the socialist camp is insured genuinely equal rights and independence," and that the socialist states are "guided by the principles of complete equality, mutual advantage, and comradely mutual assistance." On the other hand the manifesto of the conference extolled "the system of international division of labor through the coordination of national economic plans, specialization and cooperation in production within the world socialist system on the basis of voluntary participation."<sup>24</sup> The new program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, adopted at its 22nd Congress in the fall of 1961, endorsed the same two basic principles in practically identical terms.

It is beyond the scope of this paper to try to outline how the practical work of the COMECON unfolded behind the screen of the aforesaid lofty ideological postulates. Suffice it to say that the bursting activities of the organization's multiple permanent and specialized commissions and subcommissions, covering practically all the fields of economic life, were matched only by the secrecy in which they conducted their difficult work of economic coordination. Perhaps a supreme initial difficulty was that COMECON was built on the principle of national sovereignty and that its decisions were conditioned by the unanimity rule, so that the absence of a central authority with decision-making

powers was paralyzing any progress toward genuine supernationalism in the economic realm. More than anybody else, Nikita Khrushchev was aware of the shortcomings of such a state of affairs. To remedy it a summit meeting of the First Party Secretaries of the COMECON countries was convened in Moscow in June 1962. The most significant decision of the meeting was the creation of an Executive Committee as a superior authority of the organization. The obvious aim which Khrushchev pursued by pushing toward centralization and decision-making powers for the COMECON was clearly outlined in his famous article published in the September 1962 issue of the *World Marxist Review* under the title "Vital Questions of the Development of the Socialist World System." The central theme of the article, which may be legitimately considered as the most authentic formulation of his "grand design" for the future of the Soviet bloc, was outlined in the following two paragraphs:

The socialist countries are now at a stage when the conditions have ripened for raising their economic and political co-operation to a new and higher level. At this level a special significance is acquired by co-ordinated national-economic plans, socialist international division of labor, and by co-ordination and specialization of production which will guarantee successful organic development of the socialist countries.

The socialist world system is now at a stage when it is no longer possible correctly to chart its development by merely adding up the national economies. The task now is to do everything to consolidate the national economy of each, broaden its relations and gradually advance towards that single world-wide organism embracing the system as a whole which Lenin's genius foresaw.

Not content with enunciation of these general principles, Khrushchev took great care to point out how in practice the "grand design" should materialize. First of all, *economic planning on the scale of the*

*socialist world system* should be introduced. Consultations to this effect were under way on plans for the next twenty years. Second, the member States of COMECON should allocate funds for *building common enterprises*. Mutually-agreed-upon national investment plans should determine contributions of every socialist country, proportionate to its economic potential, for developing those vital branches of economy which would serve the common needs. Third, the *specialization of production* should be determined, i.e., COMECON's directing organs should decide what branches (in what area of production and on what raw material base) should be built in each of the countries. To secure the most effective utilization of the means allocated for capital building, it would be advisable to reswitch some of the allocations from country to country. It was to cope with these enormous tasks that an Executive Committee of the COMECON invested with broad powers was to be instituted.

It seems, however, that the aforementioned Moscow "summit meeting" of June 1962 fell short of Khrushchev's expectations. Speaking before the Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the CPSU on November 19, 1962, he urged the necessity of new COMECON meetings at the highest level for taking other steps forward along the path of developing economic cooperation. And again he insisted: "We must move more boldly toward establishing a single planning agency for all the countries in common."<sup>25</sup> There were indeed many reasons for asking "bolder moves," for his ingenious plan was encountering mounting problems and oppositions.

#### *The difficulties of East-European integration*

To assess the scope and depth of difficulties the Soviet Union is facing in the attempt to integrate its economy with the economies of the satellites involves a great number of problems, both economic and political. Some of them existed from the beginning, others are piling

up; some were created by local conditions, and still others are the result of international circumstances. Since it is impossible within the scope of this paper to analyze this maze of problems, we will merely enumerate them, and this quantitative enumeration will demonstrate their qualitative importance.

To begin with, the countries of East Central Europe are unequal in size. The distribution of their national resources is uneven, and there are considerable differences in the level of their industrialization. (Taking Eastern Germany's industrial production per capita as 100, the percentages of other countries were in 1960: Czechoslovakia 110, Poland 60, Hungary 55, Rumania 36, Bulgaria 33.) Moreover, their economic life has unfolded according to strictly national, autarkic plans, and the planning techniques employed differ. The question of prices and profits, now in the foreground of economic discussion in the Soviet Union,<sup>26</sup> poses grave problems in the smaller countries of the bloc as well.<sup>27</sup> It is obvious therefore that the economic basis of self-sufficiency in every single country offers insuperable obstacles to an integrated, centrally-planned socialist economy of the Soviet bloc as a whole. There are many problems which cannot be solved in a non-market economy, unless a central supranational body has the authority to impose the solutions. And even in that case the magnitude of problems is certainly enormous: how to determine in which country investment in a given branch of productive activity will be most fruitful; how, in view of the fact that prices in the Soviet bloc are divorced from the outside world, to determine and compare production costs; how to achieve greater mobility of capital, labor, and managerial and technical skills, when the USSR is already a "capital-hungry state"; how to achieve the goal of more rapid growth of less developed bloc countries while adhering to the principle of specialization. Other no less difficult questions also arise: how much industrialization, how much decentralization, how much increase in wages, how much consumer goods? With

increased intra- and extra-bloc ambitions will it be possible to solve all these problems without again overburdening the industrial workers and frustrating growing consumer demands?<sup>28</sup> Difficult under any circumstances, these problems are unsolvable as long as the principle of national sovereignty in economic affairs is observed. Here lies indeed a basic paradox: Stalin, who had totally disregarded the national sovereignty of his satellites, did not think it necessary to impose upon them a genuine supranational economic integration, although he had at his disposal all the political means to implement such an economic end. Khrushchev has a clear vision in this respect, but he cannot use at present the political preeminence of his country in the same way Stalin did. Today's Soviet representatives in the COMECON must argue, try to convince, be ready to make concessions and be satisfied with the compromises — and not simply give orders. Even the supreme argument of force fades in the light of the successful Albanian defiance and the increasing challenge of Chinese Communists. The emergence of a competitor to the Soviet Union within the Communist world offers the satellites an opportunity to maneuver which they would not have had without the Sino-Soviet rift. And the specter of a dynamic Western Europe certainly does not alleviate Khrushchev's problems.

The preceding considerations are clearly reflected in the case of Rumania's successful opposition to Khrushchev's "grand design." This opposition stems from the unwillingness of the Rumanian rulers to accept the basic premise of the "socialist division of labor" which would mean that instead of their ambitious program of industrial expansion, Rumania should concentrate on the production of oil, petrochemicals, light industry, and foodstuffs. But to assess the peculiar nature of that opposition one must take into account that the Rumanian Communist regime is one which has been most reluctant in recent years to implement the policy of de-Stalinization, and, contrary to other satellite countries, the victims of Stalinist purges have not been rehabilitated in

Rumania. One can say therefore that the Rumanian regime, headed by Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej (who as an uninterrupted leader of the Party organization since 1945 has shown supreme ability to remain at the top and to survive in the deadly game of Communist politics), continues to pursue the old Stalinist concept of economic autarky with the emphasis on heavy industry producing capital goods. In this sense the Rumanian six-year plan, covering the period 1960 through 1965, anticipates in particular an increase in the volume of electrical power and iron ore production, while the main target was and remains the construction of the huge Galati Steel Works in the eastern part of Rumania. Machinery and equipment in considerable quantity were to be supplied for the Galati project, according to an agreement, by Soviet Russia. But, if recent information is correct, the original agreement failed to materialize, and Western firms and experts are replacing the Soviets.<sup>29</sup>

Although news concerning the state of COMECON affairs is extremely scanty, and one must be careful to distinguish between realities and wishful thinking, indications are that the Rumanian viewpoint has, at least temporarily, the upper hand. The session of an enlarged plenum of the Rumanian Communist Party's Central Committee, held March 5-8, 1963, i.e., immediately after a Moscow meeting of COMECON's executive committee, has issued a communiqué which, while endorsing in principle the "socialist division of labor," has nonetheless insisted on the spirit of the November 1960 Moscow statement and its postulate of "observance of national independence and sovereignty, of full equality of rights, comradely mutual aid and mutual benefit." More explicit, however, was an article by the Rumanian economist, I. Rachmuth, published in the July 1963 issue of the Bucharest review *Problems in Economics*. Here are the most characteristic excerpts from the article giving the Rumanian interpretation of Lenin as opposed to that of Nikita Khrushchev:

Building communism on a world-wide scale is incompatible with the notion of dividing countries into industrial and agrarian states, into developed and underdeveloped countries. . . .

How do we wipe out the major differences between the socialist countries? The answer lies in the establishment and development of a technical-material base for socialism, introducing socialist industrialization by concentrating on production of the means of production, specifically, the machinery industry. Socialist industrialization is a major preoccupation of our country. . . . Setting out to build the socialist state, the Rumanian Workers' Party took as the cornerstone of its economic policy Lenin's words: "The only real factor in the consolidation of resources, in the establishment of socialist societies, is found in large-scale industry. . . .

Just as internally the criterion of efficiency as an absolute cannot be permitted, so in the field of specialization and cooperation between the socialist countries, economic efficiency and profitability cannot be the one and only criterion.<sup>30</sup>

The Rumanian prime minister Ion Gheorghe Maurer has amplified the meaning of these arguments in an article published in the November 1963 issue of the central theoretical organ of the Rumanian Communist Party, *The Class Struggle*. Dealing with the most important problems of the Soviet bloc and the Communist world, and echoing in many instances the official Moscow stand, Maurer has introduced however some proposals and formulations which could hardly please Khrushchev's ears. One was his suggestion that *all* socialist countries (i.e., China too) should belong to the COMECON; the other was his insistence that "no Party can allow itself to impose upon other parties its line and its conclusions, or to put itself above the Party leadership in one country

or another, or to work on the replacement of a Party leadership, or to give support to groups within or without the fraternal parties of other countries."<sup>31</sup> While such a statement in its obliqueness could equally well have as target both the Russian and Chinese Communists, it is perhaps legitimate to interpret it as a mildest possible echo of the June 14, 1963 letter of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party to the Russian Communist Party, which, among other things, charged that:

It would be great-power-chauvinism to deny these basic principles [of the Moscow November 1960 declaration] in the name of "international division of labor" or "specialization," to impose one's own will on others, infringe on the independence and sovereignty of fraternal countries or harm the interests of their people.<sup>32</sup>

The self-appointed role of the Rumanian Communists in the spring of this year to be the "honest brokers" between Moscow and Peking, as well as a series of internal measures in Rumania tending to limit the Soviet Russian cultural and political influence while stressing the theme of Rumanian nationalism, are other indications that the relations between the Soviet Union and one of its reputedly most subservient satellites have entered a new phase which could be termed neither integration nor rebellion.<sup>33</sup>

The Rumanian attitude which epitomizes the viewpoint of industrially less developed countries of the Soviet bloc, as opposed to the regimes of highly industrialized states which are much more favorably inclined to the scheme of economic "specialization," has convinced the Soviet Union that for the time being it would be best not to impose supranational integration. Thus, an official communiqué issued after a meeting of first Party secretaries which took place in July 1963, stated that "the best possible basis for multilateral coordination of plans is provided by bilateral consultations between member nations."<sup>34</sup> This decision has been followed by a series of bilateral agreements and the creation of intergovernmental commissions for economic and scientific-technical

cooperation between the Soviet government and the individual satellite states (Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria). At the moment when these lines are written, the old approach of bilateralism has taken precedence over the new scheme of integration.

It would be erroneous however, to conclude that Khrushchev's retreat from 1962 plans represents their abandonment or that the pivotal role and the interests of the Soviet Union in East-Central Europe are seriously jeopardized because of satellite reluctance to obey unconditionally. In fact, the USSR continues to enjoy a distinctly privileged position within the bloc. Although the Western experts disagree about the causes and scope of the continuous Soviet economic discrimination vis-à-vis the satellites, it is incontrovertible that the Soviet Union reaps commercial advantages at the expense of other bloc states, or prevents their trade benefits by channeling their exports to a large extent toward the USSR.<sup>35</sup> Likewise, "the rate of growth for the USSR [in 1962] was the highest or one of the highest, although in view of the trend toward equalization of the economies of the countries concerned the reverse should theoretically be the case."<sup>36</sup> Finally, despite the setback in the full-fledged integration, the economic coordination within the bloc and satellite dependence upon the USSR have advanced. The establishment of the International Bank of Economic Cooperation in Moscow, which began functioning on January 1, 1964, should facilitate multi-lateral trade settlements (based on the Soviet ruble), although here again the initially planned credit-dispensing function of the bank has not been accepted. Second, the recently completed "Friendship Pipeline" linking the USSR with Poland, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and Hungary, i.e., bringing Soviet crude oil to East-Central Europe, will not only represent a technical improvement in transportation methods, but will increase the economic dependence of these countries on the Soviet Union. The completion of the intra-bloc electric power grid, and considerable improvement achieved in the field of various modes of traffic and

transportation,<sup>37</sup> will have the same effect. The feverish activity of COMECON organs (over 170 meetings held during 1963) was certainly not devoted only to overcoming disagreements, and the project (to be completed in 1965) to build in Moscow a 25-story, 350-foot high palace for COMECON, is another proof that Khrushchev has postponed but not abandoned the hope to succeed where Stalin had failed.

### **Alternative Policies Toward East-Central Europe**

In one of his famous 1957 Reith BBC lectures, George F. Kennan has discussed the "dangerous and unsatisfactory situation from everyone's standpoint" in East-Central Europe. His rather gloomy prediction at that time was that the state of the satellites could not remain unchanged for a long period of time and that "there must either be further violent efforts by people in that area to take things into their own hands and to achieve independence by their own means, or there must be the beginning of some process of real adjustment to the fact of Soviet domination."<sup>38</sup> Both prospects seemed "appalling" to Mr. Kennan, for in the case of the former the West would again be unable to render effectual aid to the insurgents, while the latter alternative seemed to him morally intolerable. Seven years after this pessimistic judgment, changes in both Western and Eastern Europe suggest the possibility of an emerging third alternative. Let us examine some of the aspects of such an alternative.

First of all, the success of the European Economic Community and the manifold problems which beset the Soviet Union at home and abroad have significantly altered the general relationship between the two parts of Europe. The dynamism of the Common Market has taken the Soviet rulers aback. Nothing indeed in their ideological books or in their political and diplomatic expectations has prepared them to see a society "condemned by history" emerge as the most inventive region in

the world. Western Europe's capability to surmount its seemingly insuperable fratricidal tendencies, its ingeniousness to devise pragmatically the most stimulating forms of economic and social progress, even its present propensity to question the "hegemonic leadership" of the United States without whose help it would have been unable to gallop along the road of history — all this has been a continuous repudiation of the favorite theme of the decaying bourgeois society of the West. On both the ideological and practical levels the Soviet theoreticians and practitioners of politics have been unable to cope coherently with that phenomenon and to determine their course of conduct accordingly.<sup>39</sup>

What was initially considered a simple extension of American imperialism in Europe and an unworkable capitalist patchwork, was suddenly transformed into a workable concern — workable to such an extent as to present a threat to the Soviet Union. On the political level, the Franco-German alliance has adopted a much tougher line in dealing with Soviet diplomacy than the more distant "Anglo-Saxon" powers. Economically, the mechanism of the Common Market and particularly its moving toward unified prices and rising trade barriers, is weakening the over-all trade positions of the Soviet bloc vis-à-vis Western Europe: "The basic fact [is] that while East-West trade constitutes about one-fifth of the total trade of the Soviet bloc, it is only a marginal fraction — about one twenty-fifth of the total — of Western European trade. Furthermore, the commodity pattern being what it is, the bloc suffers from the long-range trend in the world market which works distinctly against the seller of primary produce."<sup>40</sup> Psychologically, the very success of the Common Market, i.e., its pragmatic and working economic integration, contrasts oddly with the Soviet bloc's admitted inability to progress along the same road, Khrushchev's insistence notwithstanding.

The challenge of Western Europe should be compounded with a series of other problems which confront the Soviet Union domestically and internationally: the slowdown in the rate of Soviet economic growth and the obvious failure of agriculture; the foreign aid commitments to Afro-Asian states and Cuba, which are not all paying the expected political dividends while representing an obvious burden to the Soviet treasury; heavy allocations of the productive capacity to military purposes which handicap the prospects of "peaceful economic competition" with capitalism; the already analyzed setbacks in the scheme of integration with the satellites; and last but not least, the ugly quarrel with China.

All this certainly does not mean that the resourceful and imaginative premier Khrushchev is left holding only worthless and unusable cards. There are too many places in the world where the disputes among the Atlantic partners or loss of American influence and prestige compensate for Khrushchev's own troubles with his obstreperous Chinese rival. Curiously enough, the same conflict with China, which in the world at large threatens Soviet preeminence in the international Communist movement, helps Khrushchev in some of his political and diplomatic initiatives in Europe. The results he has achieved thus far should by no means be underestimated. If he has failed to subvert the regime of Enver Hoxha in Albania (which he certainly tried to do in 1960),<sup>41</sup> he has succeeded in neutralizing the impact of Tito's heresy, and aligning Yugoslavia's foreign policy on the Soviet in all essential issues. As for Western Europe, Khrushchev's de-Stalinization has considerably facilitated the work of local Communist parties, especially in Italy and France. Thus the concept of the "popular front," which seemed a few years ago to have been totally buried, should not be discarded under the present circumstances. It might emerge indeed as a major political if not governmental force in these two countries. The "soft" line of that old Comintern professional Palmiro Togliatti, and the present trend toward

a new "popular front" in France<sup>42</sup> could, if successful, create confusion in Western Europe and paralyze the progress of the Common Market. Likewise, the Rapacki plan, whose essential target was always to detach the Federal Republic of Germany from the Atlantic alliance,<sup>43</sup> was revived in March of this year with some very encouraging effects, from the Soviet viewpoint, in the Western world.

Most important, however, is Khrushchev's attempt "to maneuver the United States into a position of joint sponsorship of the division of Europe, in the hope of stabilizing the present partition and, perhaps, eventually creating new political opportunities for Soviet diplomacy."<sup>44</sup> This brings us back to our initial examination of French and German suspicions that the United States might indeed be ready to cooperate with the Soviets in freezing the European *status quo*. The situation is rendered even more intricate and tense because the Franco-German partnership and General de Gaulle's views in particular are assailed in other quarters of the Common Market, the most vigorous attacks coming from the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Paul-Henri Spaak, former Secretary General of NATO, and reputedly a man highly regarded by Washington. What makes things truly paradoxical and puts the American leadership and NATO's cohesion under particular stress, are some specific aspects of de Gaulle's and Spaak's behavior.

De Gaulle, who is systematically accused both in Europe and the United States of undermining Western solidarity and consequently helping Khrushchev in the pursuit of one of his perennial diplomatic aims, represents at the present moment a particular hindrance to the Soviet Union because of his opposition to new "Yalta" solutions and because of his policy of closest alliance with Western Germany. On the other hand, Mr. Spaak, for years the incarnation of Atlantic solidarity and opposition to Soviet plans, today endorses some of the basic tenets of Soviet policies in Europe. He has recently accused General de Gaulle

in one of the most influential American magazines, of being the chief cause of the "most serious crisis that the Atlantic alliance and the European community have so far experienced."<sup>45</sup> And not satisfied with this indictment, in an interview given on May 15, 1963 to a correspondent of *Izvestia*, he found it advisable to qualify the Franco-German January 1963 treaty as a "bad thing." He went on also endorsing the principle of peaceful coexistence in the form suggested by his interviewer, supporting "without hesitation" the Soviet proposal for a non-aggression pact between NATO and the Warsaw bloc, and calling "useful" the Rapacki plan for a denuclearized zone in Central Europe, which as Secretary General of NATO he had denounced as a Soviet device to undermine the Atlantic alliance.

It would be absurd, of course, to accuse Mr. Spaak of pro-Communism (just as it would have been absurd to accuse Neville Chamberlain and Edouard Daladier in 1938 of pro-Nazism). What the versatile Belgian statesman has probably and sincerely in mind is that Nikita Khrushchev is the best partner the West could have in the Kremlin; that he is a man genuinely dedicated to peace; that a nonaggression pact between the two blocs would be desirable because it would contribute to the lessening of international tensions and the further mellowing of the Soviet bloc; and that the Common Market should foster direct contacts with COMECON, while the individual Western European countries should establish the commercial relations of "perfect normality" with the individual COMECON members, as the Belgian Minister of Foreign Trade declared recently in Warsaw on the occasion of signing a new three-year trade pact between Benelux and Poland.<sup>46</sup> Mr. Spaak's ideas are certainly not isolated; they represent a sort of consensus of many official and public opinions on both sides of the Atlantic (the brilliant *Reporter* European correspondent, Edmund Taylor, informs his American readers that the Belgian minister is sometimes called "Polaris" Spaak among the European diplomats because of his championing of the

Kennedy Administration's defense policies, and also that "Spaak can be looked upon as a kind of outrider for the British Foreign Office").

The conflict between the views of the visionary de Gaulle and pedestrian Spaak is presently irreconcilable (not merely for reasons already discussed), although it is not easy to pinpoint de Gaulle's real plans and it is even more difficult to foresee his moves so often made abruptly and to everybody's astonishment. The closest, perhaps, we can come in penetrating de Gaulle's perspective of the future is to quote from his 1964 New Year's message:

Without yielding to delusions indulged in by the weaklings, but also without losing the hope that human freedom and dignity will finally triumph everywhere, we should envision the day when, perhaps, in Warsaw, Prague, Pankow, Budapest, Bucharest, Sofia, Belgrade, Tirana, Moscow, the Communist totalitarian regime which still constrains the captive peoples, will bit by bit evolve in a sense compatible with our own transformation. Then will be opened to the entire Europe the perspectives compatible with its resources and its abilities.<sup>47</sup>

A few weeks later, Maurice Couve de Murville, rejected in most categorical terms any idea of neutralization of Central Europe, meaning above all Germany:

For us, Central Europe is vital because it is a question of life or death. It is a question of our survival. We think that neutrality would be a great danger in Central Europe, because neutrality means a vacuum, and it would be a vacuum between the immense mass of Soviet military might and what would be left of Western Europe, that is, France, the Benelux countries, and Italy.<sup>48</sup>

With these remarks in mind, the difference of approach to the problems of the Soviet bloc between the French President and the former NATO Secretary General, becomes even sharper, particularly on one specific point. For General de Gaulle, who is certainly not opposed to contacts of various kinds with the Communist states, these contacts are subordinate to waging bigger historical battles. Whatever might be his intimate and narrower purposes, and whatever one may think about the disproportion between his aims and the means at his disposal, he challenges Khrushchev on the scale of a continent. De Gaulle refuses to facilitate Khrushchev's plans in Europe, and when he opposes any settlement of European problems without the participation of Europeans themselves, he opens the only historical perspective which in the final analysis may pull down the Iron Curtain. In this sense—a supplementary paradox—he, the French "chauvinist," emerges as a much more genuine European than the champion of Western European integration, Paul-Henri Spaak. When de Gaulle denounces Yalta (old or new), the *people* in East-Central Europe understand the language of freedom it implies; Spaak to the contrary seems satisfied to deal only with *governments*, and his European message to captive nations fails to reach or move anyone.

This distinction between the Communist regimes and their motives, and the peoples in East-Central Europe and their aspirations, is, in the opinion of this writer, of crucial importance for a successful Western policy. Here also the scene is shifting and new situations are arising. This is what a competent and on-the-spot observer has recently expressed in the following way:

Despite these emerging differences among them, the Communist nations remain Communist. In each, the writ of the party central committee is law, leadership is self-perpetuating, the courts and press are politically controlled, the secret police is ubiquitous if no

longer omnipotent. Voluntary association is sharply curbed, and travel remains a privilege rather than a right. In the domain of political freedom, the atmosphere at its best approaches that of Franco Spain. . . .

Has Eastern Europe's increasing variety made the Kremlin stronger or weaker? In the short run, the answer seems clear. The situation today is considerably less explosive than it was at Stalin's death. . . .

However, the Soviet leader has purchased this relative security at the price of ideological disunity, the rise of nationalism and an unmistakable decline in Russian authority.<sup>49</sup>

These diagnostics convey two different aspects of political reality not to be overlooked. One is that *all* Communist regimes are determined to maintain their monopoly of political power, and their curbing of conspicuous Soviet influence is essentially the "removal of unnecessary irritants without any tangible loss for the regime or for the Kremlin."<sup>50</sup> The emphasis on "nationalism" is therefore used as a safe device to subdue or frustrate the authentic popular patriotic feelings. The fact, however, that some of the Communist regimes are adopting measures which flatter national (without quotation marks) consciousness and thus defy Soviet plans is no less significant. Even if these measures are taken with a view to winning people's allegiance and enlarging the Communist power-base, they also mean that the regimes are aware of a "far more popular ferment than is visible on the surface. A sense of injured national pride, disgust with the incompetence of the bureaucrats who rule economic life, revulsion against past and present injustices, and the desire for the rights of free men, all play a role in this ferment."<sup>51</sup>

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Moreover, the cracking monolithism of the Communist world movement is necessarily accompanied by the decreasing cohesion within every single Communist party. If Imre Nagy reposes with a Soviet bullet in his head, and Milovan Djilas rests in jail, it does not mean that their heretical ideas are not present in the minds of many Communists in East-Central Europe, even among those who are the official guardians of Party orthodoxy. The myth of the "class solidarity" of the bourgeoisie has today its counterpart: the exploding myth of Communist "class solidarity." Is it not, then, obvious that Nikita Khrushchev needs to achieve these political (the conclusion of a nonaggression pact) and economic (Western economic help in various forms, from the already concluded wheat deal to the still only rumored multibillion dollar loan) agreements with the West in order to gain time, acquire supplementary means, and secure free hands to right things at home and tighten control over East-Central Europe. If history teaches us anything, it would be so easy to demonstrate that he behaves today as his Bolshevik predecessors did many times before when they needed, and obtained, capitalist help to overcome Communist shortcomings.

The picture of disarray in both Soviet and Western blocs, outlined briefly on the preceding pages, shows how vulnerable both sides are, and how in the months and years ahead the present flux in inter- and intra-bloc relations could decidedly tip the scale in favor of either side. The decisive question will indeed be which side will better succeed in putting its own house in order while profiting from the obvious contradictions within the enemy camp. The fluidity of the relations observable today within the Soviet bloc, and to a varied degree within every Communist party of the bloc, poses the crucial question of the most appropriate Western attitude toward the bloc and its individual parts. The problem is of course extremely delicate and complex, and the absence of a real consensus within the Atlantic alliance on how to tackle it makes things

even worse. There are three approaches to that question, and they should be briefly expounded as a sort of conclusion to this paper.

There are first of all those who, although from totally opposite motives, advocate a simple wait-and-see attitude on the part of the West. Because they are indifferent to the fate of East-Central Europe, or because their emotional reaction to communism is such that they refuse every contact with it, their attitude may be characterized as total "immobilism," whose final result could only be the fulfillment of either of two alternatives suggested by George Kennan.

The second approach corresponds roughly to Mr. Spaak's ideas. Its essential shortcomings, in the writer's opinion, are threefold. First, it makes a vital political and psychological concession to Soviet policies by formally recognizing the division of Europe. Second, it is based on wishful thinking that appeasement of communism will make it necessarily more acceptable and will push the Communist regimes toward genuine democratization. Third, it implies that doing business with the Communists on the usual and strictly apolitical basis, or even that extending to them aid and other economic privileges will make them friendlier to the West. Such a policy seems to us self-defeating; it facilitates rather than complicates the tasks of Soviet diplomacy and helps the Communist regimes, particularly their most conservative elements, to consolidate their presently uneasy situations. Everyone in the Communist bloc—the Kremlin, its faithful or wavering followers in the bloc, dissident Communists—and the overwhelming majority of people, non-Communists as well as anti-Communists, could have only contempt for such a timorous attitude. To grant the Soviet Union and the Communist bloc leaders, politically and morally, the right to perpetuate their domination within the bloc, while the Western European Communist parties continue and increase their undermining work, would reveal Western Europe's lack of wisdom and courage. And this

in the final analysis could not but have catastrophic consequences. In this case, also, Mr. Kennan's two alternatives remain the only choice.

The third approach (which does not necessarily coincide with General de Gaulle's ideas) would require the use of diplomatic and political means in the service of the great cause of European unity. The United States would have to play a crucial role here. Its first task would be to refuse to accept the present Soviet proposals and to refuse to cooperate with the Kremlin in denying to East-Central Europe the right of self-determination. Zbigniew Brzezinski has with his usual keen insight described the possible consequences of such an American policy: "By striving for a Soviet-American rapprochement, based on an acceptance by Washington of the division of Europe, the Franco-German challenge might be converted into a destructive feud inside the Western alliance and possibly might even lead ultimately to a new Rapallo."<sup>52</sup> In fact the Atlantic alliance should strive to achieve a broad consensus on a coherent common policy toward the Soviet bloc, functioning on three levels: negotiating with the Soviet government which still holds the key of East-Central European destiny; entering into multiple relations with the satellite governments because of their political power at home; speaking to the captive nations above the heads of their rulers whom they have never freely chosen.

Negotiations with the Soviet Union have usually been an exercise in futility, for the essential Soviet attitude has been contained in the simple Leninist principle which Nikita Khrushchev has made the cornerstone of his foreign policy: "What is mine is mine, and what is yours is negotiable." The diplomatic contacts we advocate here presuppose a patient but firm effort to arrive at a settlement which would mean neither a NATO nor a Warsaw Pact victory over its rival but their "disengagement" through the establishment of a unified Europe, whose both parts could then cease to be members of military alliances which, by the same token,

would have lost their initial purposes. The Soviet rulers would certainly reject any thought of such an accommodation as long as they think they could obtain Western assent to absorb the satellites definitively. If to the contrary, the West refuses to acquiesce in Soviet imperialist desires, and if the conflict with China worsens, and if some other Communist party within the bloc shows anti-Soviet inclinations, such a multiplicity of pressures might convince the Soviet leaders that a genuine agreement with the West and a writing-off of satellites who have become an economic burden and political liability, could be an acceptable policy. On the Western side, "the dissolution of NATO would not be a disaster if the alliance no longer faced a threat and hence had outlived its *raison d'être*."<sup>53</sup>

On the second level, contacts with satellite governments would again presuppose Western initiatives designed to facilitate the goal of European unification. What the West should try to accomplish here, taking into account variations in the individual situations of every country in East-Central Europe, would be to open the flow of human contacts, and to convince particularly the technical strata within the Communist regimes that it is in their interest to seek closer ties with the West.

Finally, while any incitement of captive nations to rebel against their masters must be radically rejected, the West should convey to them the sense of a common destiny and the promise of a common and free European future. The longshoreman from San Francisco, Eric Hoffer, has expressed it in a superb fashion:

It seems to me that the ideal object of identification for the people in the satellite countries is the vision of United Europe: a closely federated sub-continent, beautiful and powerful, possessed of more talent, skill, and learning than any other part of the world, and with a history unequal in brilliance and achievement. A Europe, moreover, in which people can work, study, teach, build, trade,

travel, and play wherever they please, and feel at home everywhere. Compared with this vision, Russia is a global slum, Asia a graveyard, and America merely one more cause for pride—the handiwork of Europe's undesirables dumped on a virgin continent."<sup>54</sup>

Such a vision, as Hoffer himself states, does not rise of itself. It must be projected and diffused by a vigorous movement in the non-Communist part of Europe, and must have the full support of the United States. For peoples of East-Central Europe such a vision already has and could acquire even greater attraction. In the final analysis, even the people of Russia, looking to the clouds of the Far East, might realize that the "westernizing" trend, which has always existed as one of the components of Russian history, represents the real guarantee of a better and freer future. Furthermore, the Soviet leaders themselves, if Western firmness and self-confidence thwart their expanding ambitions, may realize that in the age of nuclear weapons, Chinese peril, and technical progress, a genuine understanding with the West, bringing peace and prosperity to all, is more important than the worn-out ideological slogans.

All this seems remote from reality in the light of the present state of affairs in the West. Still, the West has at its disposal all the ingredients to pursue successfully a global policy which would lead to the results depicted above. The tools are in Western hands. Western courage and wisdom, or lack of them, will determine the shape of the future.

## Footnotes:

<sup>1</sup> For a useful survey of various "disengagement" proposals, see Eugene Hinterhoff, *Disengagement* (London: Stevens and Sons, Ltd., 1959). — An excellent article on the same issue is James E. Dougherty, "Zonal Arms Limitations in Europe," *Orbis*, Fall 1963.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Henry A. Kissinger, "The Essentials of Solidarity in the Western Alliance," *The Conservative Papers* (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1964), pp. 20-22.

<sup>3</sup> See the entire text of the press conference in *Speeches and Press Conferences*, No. 185, published by the Service of Press and Information, French Embassy, New York.

<sup>4</sup> *French Affairs*, No. 158, published by the same French Press Service in New York, pp. 2-3 and 5. Italics added.

<sup>5</sup> *Speeches and Press Conferences*, No. 192, p. 8.

<sup>6</sup> *Politique Etrangère*, Paris, No. 3, 1963, pp. 195-220.

<sup>7</sup> Milorad M. Drachkovitch, "Soviet Satellites: Challenge to U.S. Policy," *The Conservative Papers*, p. 39.

<sup>8</sup> Gunnar Myrdal, *An International Economy* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1956), p. 147.

<sup>9</sup> Jan Wszelaki, *Communist Economic Strategy: the Role of East-Central Europe* (Washington, D.C.: National Planning Association, 1959), p. 71 ff.

<sup>10</sup> Joseph S. Berliner, *Soviet Economic Aid* (New York: Praeger, 1958), p. 51.

<sup>11</sup> Sixth Congress of the Yugoslav Communist Party, November 2-7, 1962. Stenographic notes (in Serbo-Croatian), Belgrade, 1962, p. 38.

<sup>12</sup> Cf. Robert F. Byrnes, "The Climax of Stalinism, 1950-1953," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, May 1958, pp. 9-10.

<sup>13</sup> Doreen Warriner, *Revolution in Eastern Europe* (London: Turnstile Press, 1950), p. 173.

<sup>14</sup> Czeslaw Milosz, *The Captive Mind* (New York: Knopf, 1953), pp. 23-24.

<sup>15</sup> As quoted in Imre Nagy, *On Communism. In Defense of the New Course* (New York: Praeger, 1957), p. 66.

<sup>16</sup> Cf. Edmund O. Stillman, "The Beginning of the 'Thaw,' 1953-1955." *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, May 1958, p. 13.

<sup>17</sup> Cf. Edmund Stillman (ed.) *Bitter Harvest: The Intellectual Revolt Behind the Iron Curtain*. (New York: Praeger, 1959). This volume is a real anthology of essays, poems, and short stories written by "angry" intellectuals in Communist countries throughout the world.

<sup>18</sup> "The Storm in Eastern Europe," *New Leader*, November 19, 1956.

<sup>19</sup> The most symbolic meaning of the Hungarian revolution was perhaps expressed in the teletype message the Hungarian News Agency sent to the Associated Press bureau in Vienna in the early morning of November 4, when the Soviet troops suddenly attacked Budapest: "Long live Hungary and Europe! We shall die for Hungary and Europe." As quoted in Melvyn J. Lasky (ed.), *The Hungarian Revolution. A White Book* (New York: Praeger, 1957), p. 230.

<sup>20</sup> The changed Soviet attitude toward the most restive satellites, even before the 1956 events, took various forms: exemption from the domestic contribution to the maintenance of Soviet occupation troops (East Germany), emergency loans (Hungary), postponement of payments of past debts (Poland). This has led a Western expert to call these three countries a new "net liability region" to USSR, while the more docile Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and Bulgaria continued to be "net asset regions" from the point of view of Soviet domestic economic interest. Victor Winston, "The Soviet Satellites—Economic Liability?" *Problems of Communism*, No. 1 (January-February 1958), pp. 14-20.

<sup>21</sup> Cf. Alfred Zauberman, "Economic Integration: Problems and Prospects," *Problems of Communism*, VIII, No. 4 (July-August 1959), p. 23.

<sup>22</sup> *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, XI, No. 5 (March 11, 1959), p. 17.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, XI, No. 13 (April 29, 1959), p. 6.

<sup>24</sup> *New York Times*, December 7, 1960.

<sup>25</sup> *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, XIV, No. 48 (December 26, 1962), p. 11.

<sup>26</sup> Cf. Marshall I. Goldman, "Economic Controversy in the Soviet Union," *Foreign Affairs*, April 1963.

<sup>27</sup> Cf. Wolfgang Berger, "Socialist Economy and International Cooperation," *World Marxist Review* (February 1964). This article is an unusually frank discussion of difficult and unresolved problems existing both in East Germany and in the Soviet bloc at large.

<sup>28</sup> The following articles offer rich documentation about COMECON's problems: Alfred Zauberman, "The Soviet Bloc and the Common Market," *The World Today* (London, January 1963); A. Alexeyev, "The Council of Mutual Economic Assistance: Tasks and Prospects," *International Affairs*, September 1963; Stefan C. Stolte, "Liberman and Comecon," *Bulletin* (Institute for the Study of the USSR, Munich), November 1963; Robert S. Jaster, "The Defeat of Khrushchev's Plan to Integrate Eastern Europe," *The World Today*, December 1963; S. C. Stolte, "Economic Cooperation in the Communist World," *Bulletin*, February 1964; Michael Gamarnikow, "Comecon Today," *East Europe*, March 1964.

<sup>29</sup> Cf. "Rumänien und die COMECON—Integration," *Wissenschaftliche Dienst Südosteuropa*, April 1963; "Rumänien und die COMECON—Planung," *Ibid.*, July–August 1963; J.F. Brown, "Rumania Steps Out of Line," *Survey*, October 1963; Louis Ramerie, "Tensions au sein du Comecon: Le Cas Roumain," *Politique Etrangère*, No. 3 (1963).

<sup>30</sup> As quoted in the English translation published in *East Europe*, October 1963.

<sup>31</sup> As quoted from the article, "Der Standort der rumänischen KP," *Wissenschaftlicher Dienst Südosteuropa*, October–November 1963.

<sup>32</sup> *The New York Times* (Western edition), July 5, 1963.

<sup>33</sup> Cf. Valentin Toma, "Rumänien zwischen Rebellion und Integration," *Europa Archiv*, November 10, 1963.

<sup>34</sup> *Pravda*, July 28, 1963.

<sup>35</sup> According to Dr. H. Mendershausen's calculations ("The Germs of Soviet-Satellite Trade: A Broadened Analysis," *The Review of Economic Statistics* (Cambridge, Mass., May 1960), the satellite countries paid between 7 and 16 per cent more during the period 1955–58 for their imports from the USSR than the countries of Western Europe. Aleksander Kutt used similar methods in his analysis of Soviet foreign trade statistics. His conclusion was that "the East European countries lost in the six-year period 1955–60, a total of more than five billion dollars in their trade with the USSR." ("Exploitation in Soviet-Bloc

35 (continued)

Trade," *East Europe*, May 1962). Professor Franklyn D. Holzman has disputed these findings, but has concluded on his own that the bloc countries must be losers in foreign trade because of the "Soviet-imposed policy of forcing the members of the bloc to conduct the bulk of their trade within the bloc. This is where blame on the Soviets should be focused." From his letter to the editor of *East Europe*, June 1962. See on the same subject the already quoted article of Stefan C. Stolte, "Liberman and Comecon."

<sup>36</sup> Stefan C. Stolte, "Economic Cooperation in the Communist World," p. 21.

<sup>37</sup> Cf. Werner Gumpel, "Das Verkehrswesen im Integrationsprozess der Comecon-Staaten," *Osteuropa Wirtschaft*, June 1963, pp. 81-101.

<sup>38</sup> George F. Kennan, *Russia, the Atom and the West* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1957), pp. 34-35.

<sup>39</sup> The following two articles analyze thoroughly the discrepant approaches employed by Soviet official sources in recent years in discussing the process of integration in Western Europe: Marshall D. Shulman, "The Communist States and Western Integration," *International Organization*, III, (1963). Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Russia and Europe," *Foreign Affairs*, April 1964.

<sup>40</sup> Alfred Zauberman, "The Soviet Bloc and the Common Market," p. 35.

<sup>41</sup> Cf. William E. Griffith, *Albania and the Sino-Soviet Rift* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1963), p. 47.

<sup>42</sup> Edmond Taylor has demonstrated a peculiar political acumen in describing this phenomenon in two of his articles in the *Reporter Magazine*: "A New Popular Front?" June 20, 1963, and "Rumblings on the Left," January 2, 1964.

<sup>43</sup> See in this sense Adam Rapacki's article, "The Polish Plan for a Nuclear-Free Zone Today," *International Affairs*, January 1963.

<sup>44</sup> Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Russia and Europe," p. 442.

<sup>45</sup> Paul-Henri Spaak, "Hold Fast," *Foreign Affairs*, July 1963, p. 619.

<sup>46</sup> Cf. "Monsieur Spaak goes to Warsaw," *East Europe*, January 1964, p. 21.

<sup>47</sup> *Le Monde*, January 2, 1964.

<sup>48</sup> From an interview given to the magazine *U.S. News and World Report*, March 16, 1964, pp.71-72.—In his March 25, 1959 press conference, General de Gaulle has unequivocally expressed his hostility to "recognize this [Pankow] regime as a sovereign and independent state because it could not have been born and could not exist except by virtue of the Soviet occupation and because of an implacable dictatorship." He added then his sentence, already mentioned, that the "reunification of the two parts into a single Germany which would be entirely free seems to us the normal destiny of the German people, provided they do not reopen the question of their present frontiers to the west, the east, the north, and the south, and that they move toward integrating themselves one day in a contractual organization of all Europe for cooperation, liberty, and peace." *Speeches and press conferences*, No. 128, p. 3.

<sup>49</sup> Anatole Shub, "Moscow's Satellites—In and Out of Orbit," *New York Times Magazine*, March 15, 1964.

<sup>50</sup> "1963 in East-Central Europe," Assembly of Captive European Nations *News*, New York, Nos. 105-107, January-March 1964, p. 12.

<sup>51</sup> "Evolution in Eastern Europe," *New York Times*, editorial, March 27, 1964.

<sup>52</sup> Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Russia and Europe," p. 442.

<sup>53</sup> S. F. Giffin, "Untangling an Alliance," *Orbis*, Fall 1963, pp. 473-474.

<sup>54</sup> Eric Hoffer, *The Ordeal of Change* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1963), p. 88.