


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
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NATO
Problems and Prospects

May 7-8, 1964



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POLITICAL SOVEREIGNTY, LEADERSHIP, AND COOPERATION

by

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Foreign Affairs Committee
of the Bundestag

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NATO—PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS

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POLITICAL SOVEREIGNTY, LEADERSHIP, AND COOPERATION

The political sovereignty of the member states of NATO and the leadership of the alliance by the United States of America on the basis of her superior political, economic, and military power were unequivocally the foundation of the Atlantic alliance at the beginning of the 1950's. The synthesis of these factors made possible the collaboration of the member states which has become the functional principle of the alliance. For the sake of clarity, these three terms require a somewhat more detailed interpretation.

Sovereignty

The concept of sovereignty is complex and controversial. Its substance can be interpreted in a positive or negative sense — in the negative as freedom from outward compulsion, in the positive as the very essence of national power. Sovereignty is both a political and a legal concept, and can be taken as absolute or relative.¹ In this context, it is the negative content and the political aspect which arouse our interest rather than the legal aspect. Since we are concerned with states in the Western Hemisphere, states which have subordinated their legal order to international law, the term sovereignty must be taken as relative, not absolute.

Sovereignty in the sense of international law can mean, as far as limited by international law, not an absolute, but only a relative supreme authority. Supreme means

in this context only insofar as it is not subjected to the legal authority of any other states; and the state is then sovereign when it is subjected to international law, not to the national law of any other state.²

In the narrow sense of the word, political sovereignty presupposes that a state can freely and independently shape its external relations with other states. But can states, in particular medium-sized and small states, which no longer possess power in the real sense of the word or even the power to decide whether to go to war or remain at peace, still be termed sovereign? This degree of independence has never in the past been so problematical as it is today in view of the might of continental powers, the development of military techniques in a nuclear age, and the ideological conflict between East and West. As recently as the last century even a small state could evade the pressure of another state or group of states by choosing neutral status or by changing its alliance commitments.³ It is by no means axiomatic nowadays that a state can extricate itself from a web of political entanglement by choosing neutrality. Transition in a neuralgic zone of world politics from one ideological bloc to another can be a step toward the end of liberty.

Thus, not only the small states, but also the larger ones, are bereft of this way of escape, so that political sovereignty in the sense of genuine independence from external influence is extremely problematic. In this context, in the world of today, when the association of groups of states is the rule and not the exception, another restriction on political sovereignty is possible. Can one speak of politically sovereign states when such states relinquish their sovereignty by participating in long-term treaties or by sharing it with others? Modern constitutional theory admits the possibility of political sovereignty in both cases. On this basis, neither the restriction on the actual external freedom of action of a state nor a temporarily contractual restriction

on its exercise of sovereign rights deprives it of its sovereignty, as long as the state in question is not subjected to the national law of any other state.

For despite a massive pressure which is today exerted in so many forms on the smaller and middle-sized states, these states still retain the possibility of replying to such pressure with their political "no", regardless of the consequences which may possibly arise for them from the adoption of such an attitude. As long as a state still retains in the political-existential sphere the possibility of issuing such a refusal, it can still justifiably lay claim to being considered a sovereign state.

The fact that juridical obligations exist between and within states is not sufficient to call into question the essentials of sovereignty, for just so long as a state retains the capacity to have the final word on the political plane, that state remains sovereign.⁴

Cooperation and Integration

"Cooperation," the result of the interplay between political sovereignty of the member nations and the leadership exercised by the United States, means, for our purposes, the working together of politically independent states, in principle on the basis of unanimity. I say in principle because none of the smaller member states has thus far in practice used its veto to delay or obstruct a majority decision in the alliance. Any negative decision on the part of one of the smaller states would merely enable the state in question to withdraw from the implementation of a decision taken by the alliance as a whole. That a veto by one of the larger states such as Britain or France would, in view of the unanimity principle laid down in the treaty, make a resolution impossible, has been clearly demonstrated by the experience of recent years.⁵

The counter notion to *cooperation* is *integration*. In a narrower sense, this term means, in the realm of international law, the transfer of sovereign rights and functions from the competence of a single partner state to common organs of a community or association of several states. In part of NATO, especially in the field of military command structure, integration was first achieved after the resolutions of the 1952 NATO conference. Here integration would mean the beginning of institutionalized decision-making with obligatory consequences for all members. Thus one must ascertain in this context whether the principle of collaboration will and can remain the functioning principle of NATO during the 1960's, especially after 1969, or to what extent as a whole or in partial areas of NATO activity the application of the integration principle is expedient and desirable, regardless of whether its application is acclaimed by all the members of the alliance.

Leadership

The very real American superiority founded on the United States monopoly in nuclear weapons, which was actually overwhelming during the first decade of the alliance, compensated for all practical purposes any divergence in the specific interests of the smaller member states until the end of the 1950's. The ultimate result was that American superiority made possible a more or less uniform will within the alliance which gave the United States the right to assume the role of leader of the Western alliance against the Soviet-led Eastern alliance.

The uncontested American leadership of the alliance can be divided into two distinct periods: the period dating from the foundation of the alliance until the Korean war, and the period dating from the Korean war until 1958. During the first period, the NATO alliance was for all practical purposes purely a guarantee pact; i.e., the legal form in which the United States of America clothed her military obligations

in Europe, while the other member states contributed but little to the military effort of the alliance. During this period, America's nuclear potential was both the shield and the sword of the alliance. Thus it was correct at the time to describe NATO in its essentials as

the traditional guarantee pact committing its members, particularly the United States, to come to each one's assistance on the basis of the minimal peacetime collaboration. The commitment of the United States was the essential feature of the defense system.⁶

As noted above, this situation changed after the outbreak of hostilities in Korea when, due to the establishment of a central headquarters (SHAPE) in 1951, and other supreme commands (SACLANT and Chan-Command) in 1952, NATO assumed the attributes of a semi-integrated military organization. The requirement of an integrated defense of the North Atlantic area gave impetus to the establishment, in September 1949, of an elaborate structure of civilian and military committees and planning groups. After the creation of a permanent civilian body (the council deputies for the daily coordination of the work of the subsidiary bodies of the alliance) the North Atlantic Council was made, at the Lisbon Conference, a permanent body with permanent representatives and a secretary general.⁷

However, it must not be overlooked that even the partial application of the principle of integration within the scope of the alliance did not result in any fundamental change in the features just described. "The impact of supreme power and leadership, exercised by the United States, remained the basis of coherence of the alliance essentially as the multilateral framework for reinforcing America's guarantee to involve herself in the defense of Europe."⁸ By no means the least of the pillars upholding the credibility of American obligations in Europe is the formal tie entered into by the United States within the system of mutual obligations in conjunction with more than 14 countries.

With few exceptions, at no time during the 1950's did the European NATO countries contribute to the general armament effort by as much as they might have done. Rather, they concentrated their energy on the economic reconstruction of Europe. The rearmament of the European nations served first and foremost to reduce Europe's vulnerability to subversion, indirect attack, and very limited direct attack.

The confidence of the European allies in the alliance, and especially in the leadership of the United States, was essentially weakened by two events of historical importance. The first was the emergence of the Soviet Union as a nuclear power, and, to an even greater degree, the success of the Soviet Union in building up delivery systems for nuclear weapons; the second was the economic and political consolidation of Western Europe.

The implication of this evolution was not immediately understood. It was only when the Kennedy Administration promulgated the McNamara doctrine, which displaced the strategy of massive retaliation as formulated under John Foster Dulles and Admiral Radford, that the European nations were aware of their new strategic situation.

This weakened the decisive component within the alliance system, the fact of United States leadership, while, on the other hand, the claims of a number of the member states to sovereignty were more strongly emphasized. This is a development which would be even more evident if there were European development toward political unity. NATO was therefore subjected to a dangerous and simultaneous weakening from two sides. The crisis in NATO arose essentially over two questions. One was the disunity of the NATO partners regarding the substance of military strategy, the other the question of the control of nuclear weapons. Even if it were possible to bring about agreement among the member states of NATO regarding military strategy — and this is not only a purely organizational problem — there would still be the ques-

tion of the control of nuclear weapons, which, although primarily a political and military problem, also has important organizational ramifications. The difficulties of solving these problems are enhanced by the fact that the NATO member states do not agree on the extent of the threat posed by the Soviet bloc. The less seriously that threat is taken the greater will be the reluctance within the alliance to enter into any far-reaching obligations.

The Question of Organization

Quite apart from problems of a purely military nature, the malaise within NATO has a specific political ground: some of the NATO member states feel that they are not sufficiently consulted on vital matters of foreign policy. If one asks whether technical collaboration is the ideal form of organization for NATO (and that is the implicit theme of this paper), one should determine, before dealing with material problems, whether an organizational reform of NATO has become necessary, and whether and to what extent such a reform could solve NATO's problems. Political and organizational matters are closely interwoven within the complex of NATO problems.

If one were to compose an inventory of the present situation in NATO, bearing in mind the question of whether we want collaboration or integration, one would arrive at this conclusion. Within NATO itself, three forms of organization have evolved: -collaboration, integration, and the purely national sphere of influence.⁹ If we proceed from the loosest to the most highly developed form of organization in the light of the alliance goals, we find that there are areas completely removed from the process of internationalization and reserved for purely national control: the build-up and training of the armed forces, the type and duration of military service, the payment of the troops, the form of the high command and its relationship to civilian authority, and finally, the

disposition of the armed forces under the condition that their deployment requires the consent of the NATO command.

In addition, there are the further military considerations of the national infrastructure organization, logistics, and the production of armaments.

The system of international collaboration on the basis of unanimity had its place in alliances of bygone days. Lack of cohesion in this organizational form is reduced by coordination of the alliance as a whole by the Secretary General. Added to this, we have funding on the basis of an annual review and mutual assistance where this is a part of NATO agreements; logistical supply and production in limited form in specific areas, with collaboration being implemented less in the over-all framework of NATO than within the more limited framework of specific groups of countries; a limited degree of standardization of certain military equipment; and loose collaboration in the fields of technical research and development, armaments production, the coordination of air traffic within the European NATO area, civilian emergency planning, and — the most important element — political planning and consultation among all the allies.

What about the third stage — integration? Even in peacetime there are integrated staffs for units above the division level. These integrated staffs have no command control of their own in peacetime, but general staff planning for all nations is carried out around them, and the practicability of this arrangement is tested in joint exercises. Although the degree of integration of command structure in peacetime cannot be compared with that of previous alliances, it is relatively small (particularly in peacetime) when compared with the complete fusion of national prerogatives. But there is a high degree of integration, however, in the so-called common infrastructures, which are commonly funded and administered by the alliance organizations (airfields,

telecommunications facilities, pipelines and fuel dumps, naval facilities, radar warning facilities, air defense ground installations, special ammunition dumps, rocket launchers, etc.). Military planning may also be regarded as integrated to a certain degree, since it is the basis for joint operations by the alliance as a whole in the event of war.

The entire strategic deterrent of the United States — with the exception of the British V-bomber force — is outside the competence of the alliance, as is the developing French atomic strike force. Since NATO's conventional forces as such are below the level which formerly was regarded as indispensable to the shield function of the alliance, a decisive weapon is removed from the realm of both alliance cooperation and alliance integration.

Since the ultimate decision to use tactical atomic weapons also lies with the President of the United States, NATO's scope of effect must be regarded as limited. It is hardly surprising that this is one of the reasons for the uneasiness — justified or unjustified — of the parties to the alliance. An attempt at a solution for this problem will be discussed below.

All previous efforts to achieve genuine integration within the alliance in peacetime, especially in the fields of logistics, production, equipment, and command structure, have proved fruitless. The division between national and international decision-making powers on the question of war and peace remains unclear and will continue to remain unclear. Every NATO country reserves the right in her constitution — whether written or unwritten — to make the ultimate decision whether to remain at peace or to go to war.

Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty contains no automatic obligation to have recourse to arms. Unlike Article 4 of the Brussels Treaty, the North Atlantic Treaty contains a series of conditions which do not constitute a complete military assistance obligation. It is agreed that

an armed attack on any one or more of the partners constitutes an attack against all.

The absence of appropriate provisions is partly compensated by the regulations governing the immediate preparation of the alliance for an imminent outbreak of hostilities. Depending upon the degree of urgency involved, an imminent outbreak of hostilities will lead to a formal alarm resolution in the NATO Council or to a state of military alert which SACEUR can declare in its sphere of command while simultaneously informing the ministers of defense of the countries concerned. Any alert resolution places the NATO alliance, or part of it, in a state of alert, and automatically entails — depending upon the degree of alert — the subordination of the command structure to SACEUR. In these fields, the standardizing power of the factual plays a more important part than the integrating factor of the NATO alliance. But it cannot be denied that even here NATO lacks, for very understandable reasons, an absolutely clear delineation of areas of responsibility. At any rate, this points to the tremendous importance of the presence of United States forces in Europe.

Equitable Burden Distribution

Where in NATO is the transfer of functions from one area of responsibility of another most important? The retention of certain national responsibilities has slowly but surely developed to the point of threatening the cohesion of the alliance as such. The order of competence reflects the priority of the interests of the specific countries. The NATO countries have joined together in the cause of common defense. If the NATO partners have united for the purpose of common defense, then the alliance can operate harmoniously only when duties as well as rights have been distributed equitably. The problem of equality is certainly not purely quantitative today. The only reasonable way of apprais-

ing all the factors (which are complicated to an even greater degree by the balance of payments problems) is to distribute the burdens according to highly differentiated criteria. But it is even more important to insure that such distribution is carried out not on the basis of bilateral negotiations, but exclusively by multilateral consultation.

There are two ways of transferring functions hitherto performed by individual countries to the level of collaboration or integration. The first is to lay down the type and extent of the financial effort to be made in the field of armaments, and the second is to determine the form and duration of armed service. The one-sided efforts of the United States to secure a more equitable burden distribution have so far failed to achieve any signal success. That is why all the parties to NATO will have to come to grips with this vital question and get down to the establishment of a fundamentally new system of distributing the alliance burden.

Financial requirements could be considerably reduced if the degree of weapons and equipment standardization were to be increased. The present chaos in specifications, even in the light of understandable national interests, is inexcusable in view of the possible consequences in the event of war. That applies in particular to ammunition, small arms, machine guns, and vehicles.

The process of internationalizing research and development in the field of weapons and equipment must be rapidly accelerated, even if the framework of NATO should prove to be too large for this task, in view of the differences in military requirements. The need for the concentration of research and development on a regional basis or for specific projects is becoming increasingly urgent, particularly in view of the constant increase in the cost of modern weapons.

In the future NATO should refrain from authorizing any further weapons development unless such development — and here I exclude

the United States — is accepted on the basis of joint production for a major region and is jointly financed. This is a unique opportunity for international coordination of all new developments. Joint development and research projects automatically lead to coordinated or even common forms of production. We have had proof of the feasibility of such joint action not only in the development of the F104G, but also in the design and construction of the Hawk, the European Sidewinder, and the Fiat G-91 fighter. This development could be accomplished either through the manufacture of American weapons under license, or on the basis of original European developments. With all due recognition of the necessity for relieving some of the strain on the American balance of payments position by purchasing weapons, one must ask whether it might not be a good idea, and even in the interests of the United States, to have European industry develop and produce weapons to a greater extent. The best way of arriving at a constructive solution in this matter would appear to be the division of the tasks involved. Effective progress may be expected more quickly in the field of armaments production as well if it is placed on a regional (European) basis.

The greatest weakness in NATO's organization lies in the fact that logistics is primarily the responsibility of the individual nations. Operational command and logistics are two inseparable factors in modern warfare. The NATO commanders have no immediate control over supplies, stocks, and facilities, during peacetime; and, in time of war, their control is confined to supplies in the combat zone.¹⁰

Lines of supply are under national control, as is transportation. To be sure, in recent years, a certain amount of progress has been made in these fields: the development of a common infrastructure, as well as a common network of pipelines for fuel supply, and the establishment of a common telecommunications system in the European command area. But this is not enough. It is simply incomprehensible

that the command of the forces should be entrusted to integrated staffs while the materiel needed by the troops remains unintegrated. The integration of logistics would of necessity entail a higher degree of standardization of weapons and equipment. It was in this spirit that the Western European Union (WEU) Assembly passed Recommendation No. 56 on December 1, 1960, recommending to the NATO Council that:

allied commanders be given adequate control in peace and full control in war over all logistics resources earmarked for forces assigned to their command, and that the logistics system of the allied forces be integrated.

The formation of the logistics centers within the SACEUR area of command, coupled with the creation of a European transportation division under a European head vested with adequate powers, would constitute a purposeful initial step toward such a new development. That a development of this kind would call for a fundamental change in NATO practice is axiomatic. Special attention would have to be devoted to the question of insuring a common and adequate stockpile of, and service maintenance for, advanced weapons under the control of SHAPE. Beyond the framework of Europe, it would be advisable to have a long-term NATO plan for all logistical requirements and a system for requisitioning and reporting would be especially advisable, to mention just the most important measures that could be taken. If a European collective defense authority were set up on the basis of the ideas generated by the Institute of Strategic Studies in London,¹¹ it could, without in any way jeopardizing the cohesion of NATO, assume important tasks in the field of planning and developing European armaments production and in the standardizing of modern weapons systems. Thus, an important initial step toward adapting the NATO structure to the structure of Europe (which has changed since the NATO treaty was signed) — a step which would be in the direction of realizing a European-American partnership — could be taken. Europe's importance as a whole would be

enhanced and the European nations would be accorded a higher degree of responsibility which might provide a greater degree of self-assurance.

Additional Reforms

Other NATO reforms are necessary in addition to these changes. The most urgent is the strengthening of NATO's administrative machinery. This could be brought about by strengthening the status of the NATO Council and the position of the Secretary General; by modifying the command structure; by changing the functions of SACEUR; and by eliminating the Standing Group in Washington, replacing it by fully integrated chiefs of staff responsible to the civilian authorities of NATO. The proposals, put forward by Alastair Buchan, would seem to merit serious consideration.¹²

There is no doubt that changing competences and the implementation of the ideas sketched above would constitute an important step toward the internal consolidation of the alliance. Nevertheless, the decisive reasons underlying present malaise would persist. One such reason is the absence of a universally acknowledged military strategy for the NATO *European* area; another lies in the fact that nuclear weapons — the deciding factor in any war today — are not, with the exception of the British V-bombers, under NATO command; and still another lies in the lack of adequate consultation and coordination in the foreign policies of the member states. If we do not succeed in the course of the coming years in arriving at unanimous, satisfactory solutions to these problems, the present trend of internal loosening will continue in NATO. The Western world simply cannot afford to risk the political and military consequences of such a development.

Consequences of the New Nuclear Strategy

Only in recent years has the relinquishing of the strategy of massive retaliation — a logical consequence of the military and technological developments which since 1957 have made the United States of America, for the first time in her history, immediately vulnerable — become clear, in all its implications, to the European nations. It was the development of a comprehensive nuclear strategy under the Kennedy Administration which brought about this realization. The strategy of graduated deterrence or controlled nuclear response brings to light the possibility of conflicts of interest between Europe — especially the continental European states — and the United States of America. It shows that the United States and Europe are no longer in the same boat, as they once seemed to be. Although the concepts of a threshold and a pause and the idea of waiving a first-strike strategy appear reasonable and understandable in Europe when considered in the abstract, they are somewhat doubtful in several respects when viewed concretely in the perspective of European interests. The decisive questions for any European appraisal of the merits of this strategy are: Where exactly is the atomic threshold within the framework of American strategy, and how is the "pause" calculated for the use of atomic weapons?

The concept of counterforce strategy is well fitted to the deterrence of attack on the United States itself and it can be soundly based on the assumption of an American second strike. But it is more dubious as a protective strategy for Europe unless the United States is prepared to strike first when large-scale hostilities break out.¹³

Furthermore, with regard to the European countries, one is confronted with the question of what would become of the counterforce strategy should the Soviet Union succeed in rendering its own retaliatory forces invulnerable. The prospects of more or less conventional major military operations in Europe, beyond defending a probing action

or some other kind of limited operation, have called forth considerable concern in Europe, a concern which has gradually been realized by the people themselves. Added to this is a rationally unjustifiable but nonetheless latent distrust of the political dialogue (which is actually regarded as reasonable) between the two atomic superpowers on a large number of questions affecting the fate of Europe. This last point is an extremely complicated phenomenon deriving from a multiplicity of psychological factors which, given their explosive nature, could in the long run jeopardize the atmosphere of trust and confidence on which the alliance is based. The most important reason for the NATO crisis, is, after all, a lack of consensus on the basis of military strategy and all its political implications. Writing in *Foreign Affairs* in July 1963, Buchan says:

There is little difficulty in tracing this uneasiness to its original source: On the European side, it springs from the sense of irritation, impotence, and even despair, which the individual allied countries feel in doing business with a nation which has many times their own strength and resources, a nation which is self-sufficient to an extent they can no longer hope to be, and whose policy, once painfully evolved by a cumbrous process of internal debate, is extremely hard to alter.

This brings up the problem of the integration of nuclear weapons in NATO, and especially the problem of their control. The United States should try to understand the fact (regardless of whether it is still an unalterable fact) that the European nations, situated as they are on the front line, find it difficult to accept the fact that the ultimate decision on the effective defense of their territory should lie with a political authority separated from their coasts by a vast ocean. It is a fact which is more easily accepted by a country such as the Federal Republic of Germany — which is in greater jeopardy than all the other European countries, and whose national tradition has been broken by a

deep hiatus caused by the disaster of national socialism and the last World War — and even more readily accepted by the smaller European countries than by countries such as Britain and France. All the same, it cannot be denied that this fact constitutes for every country a problem which is primarily divorced from the question of trust in American leadership. That is why large sections of Europe had pinned such great hopes on the grand design of President Kennedy, who would ultimately have extended the partnership to the military field so that, in the long run, it would have been impossible to exclude nuclear weapons. The crisis of the Western unity movement since the breakdown of the Brussels negotiations in January 1963 is therefore much more serious than is generally supposed.

The MLF and National Deterrents

In the Federal Republic of Germany it is not thought that the differences between American strategy and a legitimate European need for security are so great that they cannot be reduced to a tolerable minimum given good will on both sides. However, it has become so very urgent to try to clear up this difference in strategy that any lengthy delay would be bound to entail serious consequences. The United States proposal to form a multilateral atomic striking force, and the resolutions passed at the Athens and Ottawa NATO conferences to bring the non-nuclear powers into the central planning and control of American atomic strategy, have the full approval of the Federal German Republic, the Parliament, and, in the main, public opinion.

Both United States proposals imply the possibility of taking into consideration not only European national interests, but also supra-national interests within the scope of the decision-making process if there is to be a true and comprehensive unification of Europe. Jean Monnet, the President of the Committee for the United States of Europe,

to which prominent political leaders from every party and from the free trade unions of Common Market Europe belong, proposed in his speech in Bonn on February 25, 1964 that a specific clause on Europe be included in any future agreement on the formation of an MLF.

In this context, it was naturally understood in Europe that the offer of the American government on July 4, 1962 of partnership between the United States of America and Europe presupposed that Europe would be able to speak "with one voice."

This in turn presupposes the inclusion of Great Britain and the other European states which have stated their willingness to join the European Common Market in any future European political union, and it also presupposes their organization on the basis of true political integration. In this way the road to a solution to the nuclear problem in NATO would be opened — a road which was hinted at in the speech made by the American President in Brussels on November 8, 1963, as well as in the speeches made by McGeorge Bundy in Copenhagen on September 27, 1962, George W. Ball in Bonn on April 2, 1962, Robert Schaezel in Enstone and Berlin in August 1963, and in the works of Robert Bowie¹⁴ and Henry Kissinger.¹⁵

For the time being, the only constructive solution to the problem of nuclear weapons in Europe is the American idea of an MLF. In a final phase, many years from now, if a genuinely politically united Europe should come into being, the MLF should be split into two parts — a European part and an American part. A collective European atomic defense community would then be the partner of American nuclear forces assigned to NATO, with both closely integrated into the Western alliance under a centralized command. The ultimate decision on the use of nuclear weapons within the framework of NATO would then rest with the President of the United States on the one hand, and with the competent organ of the European political union in the form of a collec-

tive defense community on the other. Such a system of decision making would correspond to the practice adopted during the last war, whereby the President of the United States and the British Prime Minister were responsible for reaching decisions on the most important military questions. Since the order to employ nuclear weapons can in its ultimate form come from only one person, it should be left to the decision of the American President, who would thus be regarded as the implementing organ of an American-European partnership.

The alternative — national deterrent powers in Europe (even if they were combined) — is not, in the long run, desirable. It seems to me dubious whether this course of action would offer a transitional solution to the problem, as suggested by Henry Kissinger. This applies particularly if one looks at the matter from the European perspective. One cannot separate the development within NATO from the evolution of a united Europe. National deterrents in Europe constitute an element of disintegration within Europe. This applies to France as well as to Great Britain. If there are European powers with a special status which qualitatively distinguishes them in a fundamental way from the other member states, the basic idea of a community within Europe will be endangered. Apart from differences of political, military, and economic strength, there cannot be two different classes of powers within Europe. A political Europe of tomorrow will be either a cooperative structure or it will not survive. That is also the main argument against the idea of a tripartite directorate inside or outside NATO. Bearing in mind the Athens and Ottawa resolutions, and the chance of a collective development such as that of an MLF, most of the European states, possibly even Britain and France, would sooner or later be prepared to accept the preponderance of the United States until final European political integration could be accomplished. A clearly worded American offer taking into consideration the situation set forth here would certainly facilitate such a development. However, let it be repeated that

any dissolution or loosening of European-American ties in the defense of Europe would, from the European point of view, entail dangerous consequences. That is why any such development should be accompanied by a strengthening of Atlantic ties. This point of view is not accorded sufficient appreciation in certain places in Europe.

One point, however, must be clear: Important though the problem of strategy may be, it must in the final analysis be a reflex of the common policy of the NATO states. Military strategy is not an isolated or alienable function of alliances or their members; it is the integrating component of the over-all policy of allied partner states. After all, politics and military strategy are ultimately inseparable.

In the past, alliances were entered into for a given purpose valid only for a given period of time, with political goals and the coordination of military means in accord.

Today the conflict between East and West which gave birth to NATO has a global and all-embracing nature. It was not confined to countries, but is between two civilizations. It affects not only states, but whole continents. It is therefore not a matter for armies, but for entire peoples.

When we talk about the risk of victory or defeat, we are not concerned with the fate of armies, but — for the first time in history — with the destruction of the substance of entire nations. No alliance as comprehensive as this can in the long run continue to exist unless one succeeds in coordinating to a high degree, or even integrating, those member states' policies which are of significance to the alliance as a whole. The greater the differences in the interests of the individual partners, the more difficult the way to a common policy.

That it is difficult to coordinate the interests of a world power of continental dimensions such as the United States with those of the

smaller European countries is obvious. That is why the unification of Europe in integrated form is of such fundamental importance to the ultimate consolidation of the NATO alliance itself.

Need for Consultation

In view of the waves of tension and relaxation of the conflict between East and West, such consolidation is made all the more important if it is a justifiable assumption that this total conflict with the Eastern bloc is a challenge which will last for at least a whole generation.

It is only the enormity of the risk and the danger that threatens all which facilitate cooperation among different nations. However, even these elementary facts are not sufficient alone to insure that collaboration.

The meaning of insufficient consultation for the coherence of the alliance has seldom been made clearer than in the course of the last year.

The Suez Crisis, the Nassau Agreement and its repercussions on France, the French veto in Brussels, the recognition of Peking by France, the course taken by the operations in the Congo, and the question of trade with Cuba, to cite a few examples, illustrate the fateful effects on the alliance of lack of consultation and coordination in Western policy. It is not that the importance of this question has not been recognized. In fact, the contrary is true. The results of investigations by the Committee of Three on Non-military Cooperation within the framework of NATO, accepted by the North Atlantic Council at a meeting held on August 13, 1956, constitute a classical text on the subject.

If one disregards contingency planning for Berlin, an agreed procedure on the policy to be adopted by the NATO countries in questions of disarmament, and the modest beginning of an attempt to settle issues and differences of opinion amicably between NATO member states,

those recommendations are meaningless. The "Committee of Three Wise Men" came to the conclusion that

greater unity can only develop by working constantly to achieve common policies through full and timely consultation on issues of common concern. Unless this is done, the very framework of cooperation in NATO, which has contributed so greatly to the cause of freedom, and which is so vital to its advancement in the future, will be endangered.

Any changes in national strategy or policy which affect the coalition are made only after collective consideration.

An alliance in which the members ignore each other's interests or engage in political or economic conflicts, or harbor suspicions of each other, cannot be effective either for deterrence or defense. Recent experience makes this clearer than ever before.

From the very beginning of NATO, then, it was recognized that while defense cooperation was the first and most urgent requirement, this was not enough.¹⁶

The report boils down to the conclusion that the fate of NATO will ultimately depend upon whether we succeed in developing the alliance, in pursuance of the goals set forth in the North Atlantic Treaty, into an Atlantic community. Sometimes, say the authors of this report, it appears that the great lesson taught to the European states by two World Wars — that the age of national states, at least in Europe, is, in this age of nuclear science, gone forever — has fallen into oblivion.

In the opinion of the authors of the report, close Atlantic ties would by no means exclude regional ties within Europe: "the moves toward Atlantic cooperation and European unity should be parallel and complementary, not competitive or conflicting." This anticipates the idea of a partnership between Europe and the United States.

All these ideas were collated in the grand design of the late American President to form an over-all concept for the alliance. The failure of this idea for the time being is therefore of decisive importance to the cohesion of NATO.

If, then, in view of the present impossibility of finding a worldwide solution to the problem, the importance attached to the principle of consultation is enhanced, one must clearly understand that consultation means more than an exchange of information, more than apprising the NATO Council of national decisions which have already been taken, and even more than an attempt to gain support for such decisions. According to paragraph 42 of the above mentioned report, it means "the collective discussion of problems in the early stages of policy formation, and before national positions become fixed."

In favorable cases, the recommendation in the conclusion stresses, such discussion will lead to collective decisions on matters of common interest to all the allies. "In favorable cases, it will insure that no member undertakes anything without previous knowledge of the views of the other members." These words demonstrate how far we still are from implementing the recommendations accepted by the NATO Council in 1956.

It is obvious that consultation has practical limits, since, for the time being and in the absence of more comprehensive solutions to the problem, ultimate decisions still rest with national governments. Since, however, most international political decisions affecting the immediate interests of the coalition are incapable of solution at the national level, the necessity for common decisions is all the more obvious. In other words, a system of collaboration on the basis of unrestricted sovereignty and the preponderance in power of the United States is no longer conducive to solving the problems of the alliance.

Economic Aspects

Finally, a word about the importance of the economic aspects of the alliance.

It is self-evident that politico-military collaboration cannot exist where there is economic friction. Not only in the military and political fields, but also in the field of economics, the recommendations contained in the report compiled by the Committee of Three (especially paragraph 61) are an anticipation of the conversion of OEEC into OECD, the goals of the Trade Expansion Act, and, if other chapters of the same report are taken into consideration, the foundation of an Atlantic community. On the other hand, the fundamental importance of the speech made by the American President in Philadelphia on July 4, 1962 lies on the one hand in the fact that the creation of a future partnership between Europe and America has become an official American policy, and on the other in the fact that the proposal of a partnership of equals offers the functional principle on which such a community is to be based. The birth of a partnership of this kind would necessarily alter the entire structure of NATO, as noted in the previous discussion of the nuclear question.

The most important matter in connection with this fact is that the prerequisite to a partnership in the field of economics already exists. The European Economic Community alone, even without Britain, is the first trade power on earth. If the Brussels negotiations had not broken down last January, the negotiations of the Kennedy Round would already bear the insignia of a trade partnership, which was the object of the Trade Expansion Act.

As long as Europe fails to fulfill the prerequisites on the basis of which the President of the United States offered a partnership among equals in his speeches in Philadelphia and Frankfurt, no trade partnership can be founded except in a still very inadequate form. The new

constellation in the field of commerce and economics, however, makes possible an approach to the procedure of a partnership, at least in certain important sectors.

The Kennedy Round will be the first test of the feasibility of setting up partnership relations between the two continents.

If one considers that economic collaboration embraces such important policy fields as currency, trade, agriculture, development, and economics in general, one sees clearly the measure in which the trend from all sides leads towards the development of ever closer links between Europe and the United States.

It is only when this development toward partnership has made further progress — and a united Europe is a decisive prerequisite for such progress — that the conflicts of interests which today seem insuperable will automatically die down or be completely extinguished. The complete maintenance of sovereignty and the priority of national interests in their entirety over regional group interests makes any permanent or ultimate solution to the problem impossible.

The answer, then, to the threat posed by the conflict between East and West, despite the polycentric development within the Communist bloc, can only be complete unity within the Atlantic world.

Footnotes:

¹ Georg Schwarzenberger, *The Forms of Sovereignty in Current Legal Problems*, X (1957), p. 246ff.

² Hans Kelsen, "The Principle of Sovereign Equality of States as a Basis for International Organization," *Yale Law Review*, LIII (1944), p. 207ff.

³ Georg Erler, "Staatssouveränität und internationale Wirtschaftsverflechtung," *Berichte der deutschen Gesellschaft für Völkerrecht*, Heft 1 (Karlsruhe, 1957), p. 39ff.

⁴ Gerhard Leibholz, "Sovereignty and European Integration," *Sciences Humaines et Integration Européenne* (Leyden, 1960).

⁵ The adoption of the principle of Article 6.2 of the OECD Treaty to NATO, proposed recently by Secretary General Stikker, would improve substantially the functioning of the alliance.

⁶ Robert Endicott Osgood, *NATO—The Entangling Alliance*, p. 21ff.

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹ Eberhard Menzel, "Nationale und internationale Strukturformen der NATO," *Europa Archiv* (August 25, 1963).

¹⁰ Frederick W. Mulley, *The Politics of Western Defense* (London, 1962).

¹¹ Alastair Buchan, "Partners and Allies," *Foreign Affairs* (July 1963)

¹² Alastair Buchan, *Foreign Affairs* (January 1962)

¹³ Alastair Buchan and Philip Windsor, *Arms and Stability in Europe* (London, 1963), p. 73.

¹⁴ Robert R. Bowie, "Tensions within the Alliance," *Foreign Affairs* (October 1963), p. 49.

¹⁵ Henry A. Kissinger, "NATO's Nuclear Dilemma," *National Security: Political, Military, and Economic Strategies in the Decade Ahead*, ed. David M. Abshire and Richard V. Allen (New York: Praeger, 1963), p. 293ff.

¹⁶ *NATO—Facts about the North Atlantic Treaty Organization* (Paris: NATO Information Service, January 1962), p. 260.