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
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NATO

Problems and Prospects

May 7-8, 1964



THE CENTER FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES
GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY
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SOME MILITARY ASPECTS OF NATO

by

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NATO—PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS

*Conference of The Center for Strategic Studies,
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SOME MILITARY ASPECTS OF NATO

Preface

NATO military policy must be considered in the context of an alliance made up of countries which, although they have subscribed to it military forces in order to provide for their collective defense, have not surrendered to NATO their national sovereignty. The NATO powers not only vary greatly, insofar as their individual military capabilities are concerned, but they also have many diverse national interests, responsibilities, and aspirations. It is difficult to believe that the member countries will, in the foreseeable future, take those steps which would be necessary to make NATO a supranational political entity. The fact that all the nations must continue to agree to any common course of action is thus a most important limitation to be considered in the planning and execution of allied defense measures. That they do agree in allied councils is an indication of the effectiveness of NATO.

NATO's problems are all complex and interrelated and there are many constraints placed on the allied planners who must take into account numerous factors in addition to the purely military. The determination of the threat, together with the forces and strategy necessary to cope with it, is, in itself, a task requiring considerable background. There also must be an appreciation of the political, economic, psychological, and other factors involved if the plans are to be realistic. Since the expertise in these fields is ordinarily found in the civilian ranks, the civil-military relations in NATO and in the nations themselves become an important aspect of the alliance. While this fact is, in my view, generally appreciated by the military, the reverse is not

always true. Too often we have proposed unilateral solutions to political and economic problems which have grave military implications for the alliance as a whole.

I propose to discuss several aspects of the current military questions facing NATO in its development of nuclear and conventional forces. In evaluating these problems, however, it is important that we first understand something about the machinery the alliance has developed to handle defense matters. It has been said that the most remarkable thing about the NATO military establishment is the fact that it works at all. But it does work and its effectiveness has increased through the years. *How* it works, however, is not too well understood by many.

The Military Structure

At the top of the military structure, reporting directly to the North Atlantic Council, is the Military Committee consisting of the Chiefs of Defense Staff of the nations contributing forces to the alliance. It has as its executive agent the Standing Group, composed of senior officers from the United States, the United Kingdom and France. The Standing Group is charged with the responsibility for "the highest strategic guidance in areas where allied NATO forces operate." Since it is located in Washington it has a representative, assisted by an allied staff, stationed in Paris to maintain liaison with the Council in Permanent Session.

The three major NATO commanders, the Supreme Allied Commanders Europe and Atlantic, and the Commander in Chief Channel, who are charged with preparing and finalizing defense plans for their areas, determining force requirements, and deploying and exercising the forces under their command, report through the Standing Group. They do, however, have the right of direct access to the Chiefs of Defense Staff and Ministers of Defense and, in certain circumstances, to the heads of government of the NATO countries.

In both the Standing Group and the Military Committee there must be complete agreement before any NATO decision is made, but as in the Council itself, it requires only one "reservation" to prevent positive action. By the same token, once an allied position on NATO strategy or other matter has been established, it cannot be changed unless all concur. None of the representatives in these two bodies can make a military decision or, for that matter, a military judgment unless it is in accord with the views of his government. Nevertheless, while the consensus may represent the lowest common denominator of all national views, the machinery is there to develop an agreed NATO position.

If the Secretary General and the international NATO staff, or the members of the Council themselves, desire what has been referred to as "pure military advice," they can't get it at the Standing Group level or above. This isn't as disturbing, since they would probably go to SHAPE anyhow, as is the fact that all the requests and recommendations of the major allied commanders must be processed through the Standing Group, and the more important ones through the Military Committee, before they get to the Council. Since the individual members of these groups must go to their governments for instructions, this can take a very long time and, because of lack of agreement, it is even possible that no action at all will be taken by them.

The approval of force requirements for NATO is illustrative. The three major allied commanders, in close coordination with each other and the international staff, develop the over-all requirements and country programs for the provision of the forces necessary to meet the threat. However, neither of the two highest military bodies, because of their very nature, will approve or disapprove these requirements before sending them on to the Council and the nations.

Each member of the Standing Group and of the Military Committee might, as individuals, agree for planning purposes with the total mili-

tary requirement and perhaps with that for every country except his own. If he indorsed the country force programs submitted, however, this might be interpreted to mean that his particular nation was making a firm commitment for the future. The members of the Council thus do not get the recommendations from the highest military echelons to which they are entitled and must necessarily look to the major allied commanders for advice on this subject.

If the Standing Group, and perhaps the Military Committee, would consider the commanders' over-all force requirements by regions, before the programming by individual countries was undertaken, they might be able to reach agreement in a reasonable length of time. The matter of adjusting the force requirements by nations could then be worked out by the major commands and the international staff. With an approved military determination of the minimum forces needed to meet the threat in each area, one source of dissension would be removed. The big question would still remain, however, what should each country provide?

Various suggestions for improvement of the top military organization have been advanced.

The appointment of a NATO Minister of Defense to solve the politico-military problems with which the alliance must contend is one of these. It is doubtful, however, that any nation would delegate to such an individual sufficient authority to make his appointment worthwhile. NATO is not a true political body so he could not, as the responsible member of "the government," control the size of the forces, the expenditure of funds, nor accept any risks which might be involved. These are responsibilities which the national Defense Ministers can not and should not relinquish.

The organization of a committee of the major NATO commanders to replace the Standing Group and the elimination of the Military

Committee in Permanent Session, has also been put forward as a way to reduce bottlenecks and to furnish the Council with more objective allied advice. This has not been found acceptable, partly because of the nationalities of the individuals involved—there are two American commanders and one British but no French—and also the fact that the demands placed on the Chiefs of Defense Staffs themselves, in the reconciliation of national military views, would be too time consuming.

Increasing the size of the Standing Group to give representation to additional countries, although it might appear to have political merit, would probably only make matters worse. In this connection, it should be noted that the three Standing Group nations are the occupying powers in Berlin, potentially the most explosive area in NATO, and still have certain residual occupational responsibilities in the Federal Republic of Germany. There is the closest cooperation among the three nations in the exercise of these national responsibilities and, in times of real stress, they have always stood shoulder to shoulder agreeing promptly in just about every important decision.

It is at the level of the major allied command headquarters that we first find an organization which is subject to the authority of a single individual and which looks at its problems from a purely allied point of view. My comments are based on my experience in Allied Command Europe, but I know the other major commands function in much the same manner.

General Lyman L. Lemnitzer is presently the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR). Because of U.S. national responsibilities with respect to atomic matters, Berlin and West Germany, and the fact that U.S. authorities should hold only one military man responsible in Europe, he also is the Commander in Chief of all United States forces in this theatre. The Europeans, however, look upon him primarily as SACEUR, the allied commander charged with the defense of the entire

European area. The acceptance by them of an American commander as one who has the collective interest of the alliance uppermost in his mind is a tribute to the individuals who have occupied this position. As SACEUR, General Lemnitzer reports to and receives his instructions from the NATO authorities, *not* the United States. Unfortunately, there are some in Washington who do not appreciate this fact and, on occasion, put great strains on the alliance by failing to first check to see if proposed U.S. military directives to Europe are in accord with current allied policies.

The present representation of the different countries on the staff at SHAPE is determined by a carefully worked out formula which seeks to allot positions in accordance with national capabilities and contributions to the alliance. This is a complex problem with a great many variables, but it was developed by an allied staff, approved by an allied commander and is generally accepted by the nations as being realistic and fair. The staff is completely integrated, multilateral if you will, and is imbued with a sense of devotion to the alliance and loyalty to its commander which is truly amazing. It must be experienced to be believed.

Also located at SHAPE are the National Military Representatives of the nations having forces in Allied Command Europe. They are there to maintain liaison between SACEUR and their own Ministers of Defense but are not a part of the SHAPE staff. This arrangement makes it easier for the officers who are assigned to SHAPE to look at the allied problems objectively—they know their own country's interest are being handled by the National Military Representatives.

While the SHAPE staff itself is integrated, the company-sized troop contingents which support the headquarters are not. It is generally accepted that these men and women, living in barracks, who have different customs, speak different languages, eat different foods, drink

different beverages, and receive different rates pay, function better when they are organized into national units under an allied headquarters commandant. This is a point to be remembered when considering multi-lateral forces.

The chain of command from SHAPE down through the various allied headquarters is quite clear and operational procedures are well understood. The combat formations, ground, sea, and air, are of course all under their own national commanders. This is not only a matter of insuring that they have the greatest possible combat effectiveness, but the matters of administration and logistics, which are national responsibilities, are also involved.

While there have been, and will continue to be, honest differences of opinion, the individual members of the NATO allied forces have, through the years, worked together extremely well. There have been times when there were rather severe divergencies between certain of the NATO powers, but this has had little effect on the nationals of those countries insofar as their work in the allied commands was concerned. They have kept their eyes on the Soviet threat and have cooperated wholeheartedly in developing and executing the plans of the NATO commanders to meet this threat.

Each year hundreds of military personnel "graduate" from the NATO commands and return to national assignments. They have been broadened in their outlook and imbued with the importance of the alliance to its members and to the free world. While recognizing its many limitations, they are for the most part convinced that, on the military side, it can and must be made to function effectively. The allied military organization is undoubtedly the most cohesive influence in NATO.

Some Nuclear Issues

The nuclear problems in NATO, both real and imaginary, are, of course, under continuing consideration by both the political and military authorities of the alliance. The IRBM's have been removed from England, Italy, and Turkey and, since the missile threat has not diminished but is increasing, must be replaced. Polaris submarines have come into the picture and the matter of European deterrents is under active discussion. It might be useful to take a very brief, pragmatic look at a few of these issues.

Independent nuclear deterrent may be a useful term politically to describe a national nuclear force but the reasoning behind the creation and maintenance of such a force should be kept in mind. Despite the many assurances given by the United States, there is concern on the part of certain Europeans that the American strategic forces might not be employed in the event of a nuclear attack on Western Europe. Or, to put it in terms more palatable for Americans, that the USSR might well have doubts that the United States, when it considered the destruction which would surely be visited on North America, would honor its commitments to Europe. Both Great Britain and France, then, feel that they must have "independent" strategic nuclear forces in order better to provide for their security and also to add weight to their views in the international arena. These forces, they state, will greatly enhance the deterrent to a Soviet attack on Europe.

There is only one nuclear deterrent force in the free world today which militarily can be considered "independent"—that of the United States. Knowing this, it does not seem possible that either the United Kingdom or France would use their strategic nuclear forces against the Soviet Union unless they were assured of U.S. support. To contemplate their employment independently elsewhere is difficult. At the same time, it is unrealistic to think that the United States would not consult with its allies before committing her own strategic forces.

I think it is generally agreed that, from a NATO viewpoint, the funds required for the development of the French *force de frappe* or the British Polaris submarines might better be expended on other defense projects. It does not appear, however, that any military arguments or any number of cost-effectiveness studies are going to deter the United Kingdom or France from going ahead with programs to provide their own "independent deterrents." It now seems to be primarily a matter of national prestige.

The United States takes a dim view of any further proliferation of nuclear weapons. It also feels that the centralized civilian control of all these weapons is most important. The picture of the American President and the Soviet Chairman making moves up—and hopefully down—the escalation ladder, as in a telegraphic chess match, becomes a bit cloudy if others also are to play a part. At the same time, the United States recognizes the legitimate wishes of the Europeans to participate more fully in nuclear planning, so certain steps were taken at the meeting of the Council in Ottawa a year ago to accommodate these desires.

European participation in NATO nuclear matters has not been generally appreciated. For years the allied commanders of the various regions, together with the allied staff at SHAPE, had developed the nuclear strike program for Allied Command Europe. Throughout the command there were, according to General Lemnitzer, over 1000 allied officers participating in nuclear planning and other nuclear activities. SACEUR has had his representatives at Omaha ever since this single U.S. operational headquarters was established and has *coordinated* his allied plans with those of the U.S. strategic forces. The Strategic Air Command has always had a liaison team at SHAPE. At Ottawa notice was taken of the fact that this was going on and United States approval was given to a previous SACEUR proposal that allied representatives at Omaha consist of officers of both United States and other nationalities.

The appointment of a nuclear deputy to SACEUR may have had some political merit, in a vague sort of way, but it never made any military sense. As a matter of fact, the SHAPE staff had just been reorganized to bring all planning and operations closer together and to readjust national representation. It also was hoped to get away from any idea of a U.S. monopoly of allied nuclear matters by giving even greater authority in this field to officers of other nations. SHAPE is not unaccustomed to handling superfluous deputies of one kind or another, however, so they should be able to adjust to this requirement without upsetting the functioning of the staff too much. Hopefully, this can be done without degrading the position of the senior German general at SHAPE, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Operations who was charged with the supervision of all planning, including nuclear planning. After all, one of the underlying reasons for the steps taken at Ottawa was the desire to satisfy what was expected to be future German nuclear aspirations without actually giving them the weapons.

The multilateral sea-borne force, which has been proposed, undoubtedly has considerable appeal to many who feel that it provides for greater European participation in strategic nuclear decisions. This increased participation is more apparent than real, however, as long as the United States retains the sole authority to direct the use of the nuclear weapons. There will be no real difference, as far as the political decision to fire is concerned, between these weapons and those with which a Dutch or a German nuclear strike squadron may be armed. The strikes all are targeted by the responsible allied commander and coordinated with those of external forces, but none of the U.S. owned weapons may be released by the American custodial units except by authority of the President of the United States. If a "corporation" consisting of the participants in the multilateral force were to be given the political authority over the weapons now held by the United States,

we would have greater proliferation and the problem could become even more complicated for NATO as a whole.

While I am sure SACEUR will welcome the addition to his command of any force with two hundred missiles, militarily the idea of multilateral manning has many shortcomings. In all other types of forces we achieve the greatest effectiveness by organizing them in national units. If an arrangement like that used as an expedient by the U.S. Army in Korea is envisioned, that is U.S. units with "fillers" of some other nationalities, the force will not only fail to achieve its political objectives but its very organization will be counter-productive. Should there be any idea that a single ship can be commanded by more than one captain, in other words that we can have multilateral control at this level, we will have what Professor Kissinger so appropriately calls "control through the threat of mutiny." Admiral Arleigh Burke, former U.S. Chief of Naval Operations, has stated:

One cannot have a multiple manning or mixed manning of a submarine which will serve two purposes: first as an effective ship, and second to have national representatives on that ship control the situation, particularly in this kind of an organization. In this kind of organization the man who has the key, the captain, controls the situation, and everything depends entirely on what the captain wants to do. Either that ship is effective and obeys the orders of the captain or the ship is not effective and you can have multiple control. If there is going to be some way for a multinational force, it must be at a level which decides when to shoot and then the orders go out to all ships that now is the time to shoot.

The principal nuclear threat to Europe today is the hundreds of IRBM's, of various types and vintages, in the western USSR. These are point targets which should be engaged by weapons of great accuracy—the less accuracy, the more weapons or the greater the yields that must be used. Now that the Jupiters and Thors have been removed, the only missiles in Europe by which these IRBM's and other fixed targets in the USSR may be engaged are carried on Polaris submarines.

There should be a "mix" of both land- and sea-based mobile MRBM's, under SACEUR's command, to attack the targets which directly threaten Europe. Ideally these weapons should be deployed in considerable depth. The land-based missiles should be true counterforce weapons designed to fire with great precision from previously located points. They would be an evident deterrent force but, since they would move around, would be far less vulnerable than any airfield. They would, of course, have less survivability than a Polaris submarine. In comparing the vulnerability to detection of a land-based mobile MRBM and a surface missile ship, General Norstad suggested that essentially it is the difference between locating a needle in a hay stack and a needle on a billiard table.

From both a military and cost-effectiveness point of view, a mobile, land-based MRBM appears to be the best weapon system to take out the fixed enemy missile emplacements, airfields, and communication centers. It also could be used against certain enemy air defense installations and thereby enhance the effectiveness of the manned bomber forces.

The argument, admittedly oversimplified, for the sea-borne force with *no* land-based missiles, goes something like this: Stationary land-based missiles would draw hostile fire so no country would want them on its soil. Mobile missiles, moving around on land, would have the problem of national boundaries to contend with, and without French participation could not be deployed in depth; therefore, send them all to sea. But a national ship at sea, like those belonging to the United States, could be sailed outside the control of the alliance and the captain might go off and start a nuclear war of his own, thus the ship must be multilaterally manned so the crew can prevent any such action.

SACEUR directly controls an allied nuclear force now and frequent exercises are held to make certain that it functions properly. He, as are his subordinate regional commanders, is served by a multilateral

allied staff. With the forces which would be available to him in Allied Command Europe, he has the capability, in a matter of minutes, of initiating conventional war, the selective use of nuclear weapons, or all-out nuclear war. Frequent checks are made to insure that he at all times has positive control over the use of nuclear weapons of any type. All these procedures work now and are constantly being improved.

But before he can undertake any type of military action, SACEUR must be authorized to do so by the NATO political authorities. Before he, as the United States Commander-in-Chief in Europe, can direct the release of nuclear weapons to any allied commander, including United States commanders, he must have a positive directive from the President of the United States.

The *military* part of the nuclear problem, i.e., the targeting, the organization of the forces, the procedures for committing them, etc., has been satisfactorily solved. Everyone knows exactly what to do when ordered. It is the *political* part of the problem which has not been solved, at least not to the satisfaction of some of the NATO nations.

The Secretary General, the Council and the international staff have long sought a realistic answer to this difficult question. Because it is recognized that with fifteen fingers on the trigger, or the safety catch, the NATO organization is too cumbersome to function effectively in an emergency, various ideas for streamlining procedures have been advanced. Weighted voting by the members of the Council, as a way to speed up the decision making process, appeals to some but not all. The development of NATO-agreed guidelines for an "executive agent," such as the President of the United States, is another solution which would, in effect, recognize the existing situation.

General Norstad, in an address to the Atlantic Council in January 1963, suggested that the authority over the nuclear capability which supports NATO defense plans should be vested in the alliance itself.

To act for the Council in time of emergency he recommended an executive body which would be responsive to it, consisting of representatives of the nations contributing nuclear weapons. The Secretary General could preside over this group but not necessarily as a voting member. Variants of the plan would provide for German representation and perhaps that of one or two other countries elected on a rotating basis.

The threat list must be covered while this problem of NATO political control is being worked on, which will probably be for some time. If NATO assigned forces, using for the most part American owned weapons, can't take care of the threat, the national forces of the United States must assume the responsibility. But the other two Standing Group nations either now have or will have a national nuclear capability. The British Bomber Command has been assigned to SACEUR, with a string attached so that it can still be called an "independent" national force, but it covers essentially the same targets as it did prior to such assignment. The five new British Polaris submarines, according to Defense Minister Thorneycroft, are to be part of a national deterrent, but presumably their targeting also will be coordinated with those of other nuclear strike forces so that there are not duplications in one area at the expense of gaps in others.

What of the French? It appears that they are eventually going to have a national nuclear capability no matter what the cost may be. Is there any reason to feel that they would not want to coordinate their strike plans with those of the other free world forces? They do not wish to place their strategic nuclear forces under NATO command, as they have their tactical nuclear units which deliver U.S. weapons, but, if Cuba and Berlin are any criteria, they certainly appreciate the need for cooperation in any endeavor of a magnitude requiring the use of nuclear weapons.

Fifty Mirage bombers are not exactly what is required in Europe, however. Their airfields will be vulnerable to Soviet IRBM attack and their ability to penetrate to a defended target at any depth is questionable. Fifty—or preferably more—mobile MRBM's, on the other hand, would help fill a real military requirement and would complement the other national forces of the United States and the United Kingdom. But how do the French get the missiles, with the proper warheads, in time to be of any material help? About the only way seems to be to let them buy them, or the "know-how" of manufacture, from the United States, giving such assurances of cooperation in the planning and execution of strikes as may be expected from the British with their national forces.

This, of course, may sound like a reward for bad behavior to many U.S. and NATO authorities and perhaps is impracticable in the existing political climate. Americans, in particular, would balk at any such action if they had the feeling that in some way blackmail was involved. Logically, however, if the United States can justify the sale of wheat to the USSR because it is *not* of strategic importance, it would seem that it could justify the selling of missiles to an ally because they are. Legally, if it could be administratively determined under the terms of the Atomic Energy Act that the French have progressed to the extent that they are now qualified to receive nuclear assistance, it could benefit the United States in two ways. First, since the United States evidently has a capacity for the production of surplus fissionable material, the balance of payments would be helped if we were to exchange some of this surplus for French gold. Secondly, every target that was taken over by French missile forces would be just one less for the United States to cover at increased range and increased cost.

As a practical matter, there doesn't seem to be any doubt but that the United States, Great Britain, and France, would consult, at least with each other and with the Secretary General, before taking any de-

cision to commit their nuclear forces. In the event of a "bolt from the blue," a massive nuclear attack without warning, there should be no question but that we would immediately respond in kind. If our conventional forces were in danger of defeat, we should certainly use at least tactical nuclear weapons. In other cases there should be some time for consultation. Since the Council has and should continue to develop general guidelines for the employment of NATO military power, the decision making process perhaps is not as dark as some would paint it.

Germany is not in the same position treaty-wise as Britain or France. It has certain limitations placed on its armaments and is specifically prohibited from manufacturing nuclear weapons. It does have tactical nuclear delivery vehicles, some of rather considerable range, but the weapons themselves are in United States custody. While some, or all, of these tactical nuclear weapons might be released for use prior to the employment of the strategic nuclear forces, it is hard to picture them being withheld if the situation required the use of such forces. The German officers on the allied staffs at SHAPE and elsewhere have a very important voice in the military planning of nuclear strikes. Whether or not this will be sufficient to take care of future German aspirations, I do not know. So far, I have heard no expression of a desire by the Germans to have their own nuclear weapons.

Conventional Forces

There is a tendency to devote so much attention to the more intriguing nuclear issues that matters such as the provision of adequate conventional forces and logistics support, which in the long term are probably more important, have not been and are not being given sufficient consideration. If we seek to achieve political flexibility at the moment of truth, however, we must have the necessary military formations and supplies in being and in the proper locations. When ten-

sions rise sufficiently, the task does not appear at all insurmountable; when they subside, there are a thousand reasons why the goals cannot be achieved. We've missed Mr. Khrushchev's sabre rattling for some time now so the problem is not moving toward a solution as fast as it should.

Nations rationalize shortcomings in conventional forces very simply by going back to the "trip-wire" and "massive retaliation" concept, with one minor difference, thus, "If any Soviet attack is launched it must, because of the great differences in the strength of the conventional forces, be met initially with at least tactical nuclear weapons. This means that immediately there is great danger of escalation to all-out thermonuclear war. The Soviets realize this and will not, therefore, risk even a limited conventional attack." The fact that since the creation of NATO there has been no Soviet attack of any kind is cited to support this argument.

The allied military authorities in Europe do not consider this reasoning to be valid, however. They feel that war could come as a result of a lesser undertaking; it might develop from an accidental clash of forces, or from a probing operation which, though intended to remain small, might get out of hand. It could happen as a result of an error of judgment or a miscalculation of the NATO will and determination.

The so-called "shield forces" have always been a requirement to give flexibility to NATO response and provide credibility to the overall nuclear deterrent. Without these forces, reaction to attack would be on an all or nothing basis and NATO would be faced with a choice of extreme alternatives: accepting defeat or initiating general war. The "pause" which they would permit, however, has never been defined precisely in terms of time or space; it might last for a few hours or possibly a few days. It might even be obvious, because of the build-up of forces, that the period of contemplation of the awful consequences of his act had already passed before the enemy ever launched his

attack. While the allies should employ only conventional forces if they are adequate to the situation, there should be no question but that nuclear weapons will be used if they are required to stop a hostile advance.

Commencing immediately west of the Iron Curtain are the population centers, the national resources, the great industrial complexes, and the ports of central Europe which, if lost to the Soviets, would be a tremendous blow to the whole of the western world. SACEUR, who from the very beginning of NATO has been directed to defend as far forward as possible, has recently established stronger covering forces and has ordered that allied ground forces plan to conduct a mobile defense commencing just west of the Iron Curtain. This concept of a more forward defense, of course, calls for adequate forces properly deployed; some 30 M-Day divisions and comparable air forces.

To be most effective, the peacetime stations of the forces should be as close as possible to the areas in which they are expected to fight. However, the locations of most non-German troop units were originally determined by postwar occupation missions and early defense plans. Through the years considerable sums have been invested in their development so that changes or exchanges will not be an easy matter.

The logistics systems of the different countries, particularly that of the Federal Republic, must also be taken into consideration. The matter of wartime supply is difficult at best—in the Central Region it is particularly complicated. If the equipment in NATO were completely standardized, the problem would be considerably easier of solution. As it is, serious difficulties would be created in time of war if, in locating units, steps are not taken to insure that they can be readily supplied with the particular types of ammunition and equipment they require. Because of the costs involved, it will probably be many years before a completely satisfactory peacetime deployment is achieved. In the meantime, it is hoped that any conflict will be preceded by a

period of tension sufficiently long to allow the movement of the forces from their current locations to the area they are to defend.

Unfortunately, many of the European nations are not now providing in the Central Region the forces which they can and should provide.

There has been some modernization of the existing units and the United States has not only stockpiled the equipment for two additional divisions in Europe, but has also successfully conducted massive trans-Atlantic lifts to exercise the troops in the use of this equipment. The total available forces, however, still fall short of the established goals.

In the United States this fact exasperates those who feel that if the European countries will not accept what many Americans consider to be their fair share of the burden of defending the Central Region, there is no sense in the United States trying to do it for them. Some, including one former SACEUR, mindful of the gold-flow problem, believe that several U.S. divisions should be withdrawn from Europe now. Others seem to think that through the introduction of more realistic budgetary procedures, the lagging nations can be made to see their way clear to improving their defense posture.

The withdrawal from Europe of any significant numbers of U.S. forces could have disastrous effects on the alliance. This would probably be the one area where American leadership would be followed with alacrity by many of her allies. Rather than being spurred on to greater efforts in the face of a U.S. pull back, many of the Europeans would quickly justify further curtailments in their own forces. Those who have doubted that the United States would meet their NATO commitments for nuclear forces would be quick to say, "I told you so."

Reductions in the number of indigenous civilians employed by United States forces can have a more subtle but similar effect. Unless the activity in which they work is to be eliminated or curtailed, these civilians will have to be replaced by military personnel. There may be

a possible saving of gold, but there is a certain concomitant loss in the combat effectiveness of the total force. This follows because it just happens to work out that for every civilian employee replaced by a soldier there is one less fighting man in the combat units. If a price tag could be put on combat effectiveness, this would be identified as a very expensive operation.

Various alternative suggestions have been made for the improvement of the defenses of Europe without increasing the strength of the regular forces. A "barrage" or barrier of atomic demolitions along a sizeable stretch of the front would permit the reduction of forces in that area and their use elsewhere. Its emplacement in time of peace, and perhaps in time of tension, is not feasible for political reasons. The establishment of a fortified zone along the entire Iron Curtain has also been advocated but there are both military and political objections to this.

Although the Germans have made great strides in the buildup of their active units, they continue to be limited by the shortage of trained officers and non-commissioned officers. The booming economy, with its demands for manpower, also makes it difficult for them to increase the size of the armed forces much above what it is right now. More combat and service support units are needed to achieve a balanced force however; too much reliance is still being placed on the United States. Steps are being taken to create reserve units, composed of men who have completed their active duty tours, to help fill this gap.

While SACEUR has directed that in case of ground attack a mobile defense be conducted, the cities of the Federal Republic are not going to move and no matter what is said they, and perhaps others, will have to be defended. There will be people living in the cities who could do much to provide for this defense in time of war—men who have served their tour in the active army and the first line reserve and who could

be organized in militia units for this specific purpose. They could be composed of individuals who were not physically fit for full field duty, like the "stomach battalions" of World War II, but could give a good account of themselves in the defense of their own homes. With these organizations, the commanders of the active regular field forces would have much greater flexibility and could conduct a truly mobile defense in depth. Like the Swiss militia, such a self-defense force could contribute to the deterrent with a graduated response in periods of tension. It would certainly make evident the will of the people to resist. In time of peace, the labor force would not be affected.

There may be some, particularly in Europe, who will look askance at this build up of German military strength. If this is a cause for concern, one way to counter it would be for the other European powers to increase the size of their own forces. The shortfalls in the Central Region could be overcome if the participating nations would make the necessary effort. France alone, if she would match but half the German contribution to NATO, could balance the books.

Summary

1. NATO has developed as an important and effective organization which does surprisingly well from a military viewpoint in developing workable plans and policies to meet the common threat. There is a constant exchange going on between the political and military sides of the NATO house during which the many practical aspects of attaining a viable defense posture are examined. As a result, a mutual understanding, at least of what is involved, has developed. This understanding has proved much more important in times of crisis than any set of specific directives which might have been drawn up.

Although the alliance machinery may at times turn slowly and creak rather loudly, if it were consistently used by all the nations in

keeping with the spirit of the treaty, it could be made to operate more effectively. Many of our problems are created because the NATO machinery is disregarded or is not used properly by one or more of the allies.

2. The nuclear issues are primarily political, not military, and, to quote an old Army saying, "the buck is never passed down." Military measures proposed as answers to political problems should be examined critically to determine their impact on the combat effectiveness of the forces and to ascertain whether they do, indeed, solve anything politically.

There is a requirement for a credible nuclear deterrent in Europe. This should consist of a combination of both land- and sea-based MRBM's to meet the Soviet threat effectively and at the lowest cost.

3. European conventional forces should be built up and modernized, particularly in the Central Region. In addition to regular formations, reserve forces also should be organized.

Rather than encouraging the Europeans to assume a greater share of the NATO defense burden, the withdrawal from Europe of any substantial number of U.S. troops would have the opposite effect.