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
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# NATO

## Problems and Prospects

May 7-8, 1964



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┌ NUCLEAR POLICY AS  
IT AFFECTS NATO ┘

by

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**NATO—PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS**

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These advance study papers will form the basis of the two-day discussion and debate. The papers will not be presented formally at the conference, but will be available prior to the conference through the Center. After the conference, revised and updated papers, with the conference discussion, will be published in book form.

## NUCLEAR POLICY AS IT AFFECTS NATO

### What is Nuclear Policy?

Nuclear policy is part of a country's national policy; its task is to help secure the national objectives. When a country is a member of an alliance, its national policy should accord with the general objectives of the alliance insofar as possible. This presupposes a clear-cut common policy (grand strategy), or at least a generally recognized scale of political priorities. The more partners there are the more difficult it will be to reach a common policy and to fix priorities. In a coordinated alliance of equal partners, such as NATO, a consensus is especially difficult of achievement. The decisions of the NATO Council can be made by unanimous vote only, and its members are subject to the directives of their own governments. On a somewhat lower level the same applies to the NATO Military Council. In contrast, the Warsaw Pact is a subordinated alliance, a hegemony; its "council" has an advisory capacity only, and there is a single supreme commander who is always a Russian marshal and gets his orders from the Kremlin without any discussion by the council.

This disparity makes it all the more necessary for NATO to develop a common grand strategy, and for its members to adapt the national policies to the broad objectives of this strategy.

### U.S. Nuclear Policy

When NATO was founded the United States Government had already committed itself to a distinct nuclear policy in accordance with its over-

all policy of trying to establish world peace and promote social progress, better living standards, and greater freedom by means of the United Nations. Under the impression of the frightful havoc atomic bombs had wrought on Japanese cities, President Truman endeavored to bring atomic energy under international control and effective supervision. In this way, he hoped its use for destructive purposes could be prevented. He felt that he could not make this effort and at the same time continue full exchange of nuclear knowledge with the British as during the war, for they planned to produce fissionable material for military as well as for peaceful purposes. In the fall of 1945, therefore, the U.S. Government terminated this cooperation in spite of previous agreements.

The McMahon Bill "for the control and development of atomic energy" introduced in the Senate on December 20, 1945 left some latitude by stipulating that a Board of Atomic Information should "provide for the dissemination of related technical information with the utmost liberality as freely as may be consistent with the foreign and domestic policies as established by the President." In the Atomic Energy Act, however, passed on August 1, 1946, the section title "Dissemination of Information" had not only been altered to "Control of Information" but its contents had also been greatly changed to prevent atomic knowledge from getting into the wrong heads. Distribution of fissionable materials to any foreign government, the British included, was strictly prohibited.

There were two reasons for this reversal of policy. One was that attempts to control atomic energy by international agreement and supervision continued under the Baruch Plan. The other was that many Senators considered interchange of atomic knowledge a threat to security. This was vividly demonstrated by the fact that Alan Nunn May, a British physicist working on nuclear problems in Canada, had been discovered giving information on nuclear matters to the Soviets.

As early as November 1945, Molotov had announced that the Soviet

Union would soon have atomic energy. This declaration in conjunction with Nunn's treason gave the first warning of future developments deeply affecting nuclear policy, although at the same time the Soviet Government showed itself willing to cooperate on the problem of a commission on atomic energy.

The United States had embarked on an idealistic attempt to harness nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and the welfare of humanity. To achieve this goal, it had put up with the bad feelings of its British allies, but had neither prevented the British from pursuing their plans nor the Soviets from gaining access to nuclear secrets. Moreover, even then it could be expected that other nations would before long have nuclear weapons.

#### **Other Major U.S. Postwar Policies**

In the same period immediately after the war, the Soviet Union ruthlessly seized as much territory as possible. The United States Government, finally aroused by the Soviet Union's wholesale annexation and subjugation of East European nations and by its attempts to gain a foothold in Turkey, Iran, and Greece, carried out two decisive operations as part of a far-sighted grand strategy: the implementation of the Marshall Plan and the creation of NATO. The objectives of the Marshall Plan were to effect European recovery, and, in the long run, to establish and maintain closer economic and political cooperation in Europe. The objectives of the Atlantic alliance were (and still are): furthering stability and well-being, strengthening the free institutions, preserving the peace and security, and maintaining the collective defense of the North Atlantic area.

In view of persistent Communist aggression NATO has been pre-occupied with defense problems, although ultimately other objectives should prevail. As a result nuclear policy has been considered part of

military strategy only, whereas it is actually part of the grand strategy of the alliance.

In the first years of NATO's existence this caused hardly any difficulties. The British had reconciled themselves to the fact that their own progress in nuclear matters was slowed down and that costs were much higher than with American assistance. Their first bomb was detonated in 1952. The other European allies, still suffering greatly from the ravages and aftereffects of World War II, were only too glad to rely on American leadership and protection. In fact, they put more trust in the concept of "massive nuclear deterrence" than the situation warranted, and took their time about rearming themselves. However, the detonation of the first Soviet nuclear bomb in the fall of 1949 ended American monopoly much earlier than had been expected. The Communist attack on South Korea in 1950 indicated what might happen to ill-prepared nations. The war in Korea also showed that the atomic bomb was not a panacea for every difficult situation, and that massive retaliation might be a policy of doubtful value. The doubts increased when the Soviets followed with a hydrogen bomb early in 1953, only a few months after the Americans. This had been made possible because several scientists in addition to Alan Nunn May betrayed nuclear secrets to the Russians. How much classified material was stolen by Soviet agents will probably never be known.

The United States intensified its efforts and has kept the lead in the nuclear race by a wide margin. For a long time, however, it did not change in the least its nuclear policy laid down by the McMahon Act, although the situation had varied fundamentally, from the political as well as from the military viewpoint.

### Effects of U.S. Policy

The aims of the inspired national policy that created the Marshall Plan and NATO had been to give Europe strength and unity. The aims of the nuclear policy expressed by the Baruch Plan and the Atomic Energy Act had been to give the world controlled atomic energy for peaceful purposes, and to prevent its use for military weapons and its abuse for power politics. Whereas NATO and especially the Marshall Plan had succeeded beyond expectation, the Soviet Union had put an end to the Baruch Plan, and the Atomic Energy Act had proved a failure. It had not stopped developments in the Communist bloc where Soviet Russia evidently was in possession of most nuclear secrets and a growing number of weapons. Red China received Soviet assistance for building up its own nuclear potential. No neutral country could be prevented from going in for nuclear research which might result in the construction of weapons. Technical progress was bound to continue.

Within NATO, on the other hand, United States nuclear policy annoyed important allies, to the detriment of good relations in the alliance. It did not end nuclear research and development in Great Britain and France but it caused duplication and triplication of this most expensive kind of work, and thus set back conventional armaments to a high degree.

### Nuclear Weapons in NATO

As NATO is not a hegemony like the Warsaw Pact, mutual trust and confidence play an important part in keeping alive the spirit of the alliance. It is not surprising that the McMahon Act did nothing to promote such mutual trust, for it was conceived as part of the national policy of a single country prior to the formation of the NATO alliance. It proved unfortunate, however, that it was not revised after the United States had changed its national policy fundamentally. This decisive step had been made possible by Resolution 239 introduced by Senator Vandenberg and

adopted on June 11, 1948, by an overwhelming majority in the United States Senate. Contrary to the old policy of "non-entanglement" going back to Washington's testament and to the Monroe Doctrine, Resolution 239 authorized the President to join alliances in the interests of national security and within the Charter of the United Nations.

No corresponding measure was taken with respect to nuclear policy, although this might have been the time to reconsider the whole problem in its political effects. A way could have been found to permit those allies who occupied themselves with nuclear development to share some U.S. knowledge, and thus bind them together more closely in the interests of the alliance — at the same time stipulating that they spend more money on conventional armament. No such step was taken, and Great Britain and France went their separate ways in nuclear matters.

Thus it came about that not only the least satisfactory of the possible roads was taken but also the changeover to either a NATO nuclear force or a double nuclear force consisting of a United States and a European component was rendered difficult. There has never been any doubt that NATO needs strong nuclear forces as the sword of retaliation, supplemented by effective conventional forces as the shield in a military strategy which is essentially defensive. At first the conventional land forces were far too weak but United States nuclear superiority was so overwhelming that the European allies felt secure under this protection. With the increase of Soviet nuclear and missile power the United States itself was threatened and its nuclear strength lost much of its practical value as Europe was more and more exposed to Soviet medium and short range missiles. At the end of 1955, the NATO Council decided to equip the Atlantic forces with atomic weapons, and two years later it decided to establish stocks of atomic warheads readily available for the defense of the alliance in case of need. Medium range ballistic missiles were put at the disposal of the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe (SACEUR),

but the weapons remained in U.S. hands and under U.S. control. Only the President could give orders to launch them.

In the meantime, a number of countries had shown interest in creating their own facilities for developing nuclear power. Outside the NATO area, Red China was resolved to use it for military purposes. Within NATO, France followed Great Britain and began to form her own *force de frappe*. This was a most expensive undertaking because attempts to bring about Franco-British collaboration were not crowned with success.

Again, the weakest part of NATO suffered most. The conventional land forces in Central Europe have not yet reached the strength called for by the NATO Council in 1952. As a consequence of their nuclear policy, the British have never been able to bring their Army on the Rhine up to full strength. They have 180 V-bombers equipped with nuclear weapons, and they have started on a program of four submarines with 12 Polaris missiles each. The French are giving their armed forces a completely new look. They have cut down the number of their active divisions to six — very mobile, highly mechanized, and equipped with atomic weapons of their own. In addition, there will be 54 nuclear bombers of the Mirage type, and three submarines, each with 16 missiles similar to Polaris. The cost of this nuclear force will rise from 13 per cent of the defense budget in 1963 to 25 per cent in 1970.

When finished and ready, each of these two forces will represent only a tiny fraction of the American nuclear potential. On the other hand, taken together, they will probably come up to 10 to 15 per cent of Soviet nuclear strength. To some extent, these figures are an explanation of the contrasting views on the value of the West European nuclear forces.

The American opinion is that the United States possesses so strong and so variegated nuclear armaments that there is no need for national

nuclear forces in Europe. At best, these are too small to be effective; at worst, they are dangerous for our own side because they might invite the Soviet Union to take pre-emptive action, and thus precipitate rather than prevent an all-out war. In any case, they are very expensive and uneconomical. Moreover, countries developing an independent nuclear force have been unable to contribute their full share to conventional defense in Western Europe.

On the whole, the nuclear efforts of Great Britain and France have been considered superfluous from an economic and military viewpoint and from the standpoint of attempting to gain undue influence on United States political decisions. Even at a high level, it has been said that they are "inimical to NATO."

#### **British Views on Nuclear Strategy**

That is one side of the coin. The other looks somewhat different. As far back as 1955, Churchill expressed the British ideas that since behind the Iron Curtain there are large administrative and industrial targets, an effective policy of deterrence must include the capability of paralyzing them at the outset of a conflict, or very shortly thereafter. Churchill expressed the belief that unless the British furnished their own contribution, they could not be certain that in an emergency the weapons of other nations would be used in complete accord with British wishes — or that the targets most threatening to Britain would be attacked first.

And the British *Statement on Defense, 1964*, presented to Parliament by command of Her Majesty, February 1964, states:

The keystone of this policy is the prevention of war. If we and our allies fail to prevent major war, none of the other objectives can be attained. Nuclear weapons are so devastating that, unless we prevent them from being used, we shall not be able to secure the homeland

or carry out our obligations to those who rely on us. Yet, until true disarmament becomes a reality, it is the overwhelming power of these very weapons and the determination of the nations not to provoke their own destruction that keep the peace . . . and in the present state of the world no other realistic policy is apparent. Early and provident fear, as Burke said, is the mother of safety.

It is the Government's policy not only to contribute forces to the main strategic deterrent, but to maintain an independent British deterrent. . . .

. . . To suggest that the independent deterrent might be abandoned in the interests of non-dissemination overlooks the fact that if there were no power in Europe capable of inflicting unacceptable damage on a potential enemy he might be tempted — if not now then perhaps at some time in the future — to attack in the mistaken belief that the United States would not act unless America herself were attacked. The V-bombers by themselves are, and the Polaris submarines will be, capable of inflicting greater damage than any potential aggressor would consider acceptable. For this reason the British nuclear forces make a unique contribution to the main deterrent.

### **French Views on Nuclear Strategy**

The French views are rather similar. They see the European nuclear forces as a European security problem, not at all directed against United States policy, but necessary to give the Soviet leaders something to think about. An efficient force deployed in Europe and not subject to an American veto would serve as a warning. Whatever ideas the Soviet Union might have about the United States, there would be another nuclear force ready to strike back at once.

The French acknowledge that U.S. deterrence will cover at least

90 percent of the European security risks. It is the task of the national nuclear forces to give a somewhat greater percentage of security. To wipe out European national nuclear forces without incurring unacceptable damage, the Soviet Union would be compelled to use such a large part of its own forces as to be decidedly weakened against the United States. Thus the national nuclear forces would constitute an additional risk to the Soviet Union and add perceptibly to the deterrent. It goes without saying that such forces must be really efficient and capable of causing enough damage to handicap Soviet action. Sufficiently strong national nuclear forces would help to allay the widespread European doubts whether the United States would use nuclear weapons unless America was immediately threatened.

In this context it may be mentioned that in the Federal Republic of Germany President Kennedy's declarations in Frankfurt and Berlin in the summer of 1963 did much to disperse similar doubts. Besides, a sober evaluation of the situation is bound to show that the United States simply cannot afford a Soviet advance into NATO Europe which would give the Communists an advantage in position and an increase in power that would imperil the American continent.

### **German Views on Nuclear Strategy**

The position of the Federal Republic of Germany is different from that of Great Britain and France. In the Paris Treaty of 1955, by which Germany joined the Western European Union prior to NATO, it undertook not to produce any atomic, biological, and chemical (ABC) weapons. The German attitude has not changed, and in view of the delicacy of the nuclear problem for Germany, is not likely to change. There is no foundation whatever for the allegations sometimes heard in allied countries that the Federal Republic is striving hard for the possession of nuclear weapons (which, incidentally, is not forbidden under the treat-

ies). Such allegations help the Communists in their barrage of unfounded assertions of West German "militarism" and "revanchism." What actually has happened is that the Federal Government and especially the Minister of Defense repeatedly have stressed the importance of tactical nuclear weapons in the shield forces. Their reason is that certain knowledge that there were no tactical nuclear weapons in the three German Army Corps sectors would give the Soviet Union an undeserved and dangerous advantage, which would enable them to concentrate their forces for a breakthrough far more easily than if opposed by tactical nuclear weapons.

The Soviet Union is known to possess such weapons. Therefore, the defense must be widely dispersed. Denying tactical nuclear weapons to the German sectors would be a grave disadvantage to the whole of the Central European front.

It should be made quite clear that the Government of the Federal Republic has never asked for the control or possession of these weapons, believing that they should remain in American hands, although control might be delegated to SACEUR under certain circumstances. Mutual trust and confidence within the alliance are considered far more valuable to the Federal Republic than the possession of a few atom bombs.

In this context it may be mentioned that it would be appreciated (and worthwhile politically) if our allies took a more determined stand against the endlessly repeated and never substantiated attacks against the "militarists and revanchists in the Federal Republic"; e.g., in the United Nations and at Geneva where the Federal Republic is not represented. This is part of the Communist anti-NATO and anti-nuclear campaign (i.e., as long as these weapons are not in their own hands). It can be expected at every conference, and it is not enough simply to wave it aside. A much better answer would be that it was Khrushchev himself who in 1959 said that he could incinerate the whole of the Federal Republic with eight hydrogen bombs.

Far too often these Soviet allegations are repeated without discrimination. Politicians and journalists acknowledge that so far the Federal Republic has kept its word but darkly hint at an "appetite for nuclear weapons that will grow." There are enough safeguards against any tendencies of that kind in the Western European Union (WEU) and NATO treaties. Any changes in this sector of nuclear policy have to be discussed in the Councils, and require a two-thirds majority in WEU and a unanimous vote in the NATO Council.

### What Is the Soviet Nuclear Strategy?

It would seem more valuable — but nobody appears to take much interest in it — to get an answer to several questions on Soviet nuclear policy: how is control of nuclear weapons regulated behind the Iron Curtain; how many fingers are on the trigger over there; how far can a dictator afford to delegate this kind of power? Will the next dictator feel himself bound by the signature of his predecessor and what might be the consequences of a not impossible de-Khrushchevization? Together with the fact that Marxist-Leninists consider coexistence another form of class war with no holds barred (except all-out war) this tends to show that as long as the tension between East and West is not really eased all attempts at pulling the nuclear teeth of deterrence by creating nuclear-free zones are to be viewed with the greatest distrust, for they can be supervised with far less reliability than a nuclear test ban.

All this has a direct influence on nuclear policy as part of NATO policy. It is always in the mind of the statesmen in the government of the Federal Republic which, after all, is not more than a narrow strip of territory, densely populated, directly in the path of a Soviet main thrust in a possible war, and always in the path of the Communist main thrust in the actual cold war. Therefore, West Germany is far more interested in successful deterrence than in powerful retaliation. Nuclear

weapons are indispensable, but they are only part of the deterrence. To be successful it must be implemented by impressive conventional forces (and by an adequate civil defense). In addition, political strength is imperative, expressed by a homogeneous grand strategy (including a nuclear policy), a firm attitude of government and citizens, and flexibility in political action in the widest sense.

### NATO Goals

Apprehension has resulted from a blurring of the goals of the alliance in recent years, from a decrease rather than an increase in the stability sought in the treaty, and from the failure of nuclear policy to take into account the problem of a stronger and more self-confident Europe. Nuclear policy has, in fact, exerted a somewhat disruptive influence, more in the political than in the military field.

In the *Revue de Défense Nationale* of February 1962, Général André Beaufre, formerly Deputy Chief of Staff at SHAPE and later French member of the Standing Group wrote:

The decision to use atomic arms has too many political consequences to be automatically delegated to one of the allies, even if this one possesses almost all the atomic resources . . . .

The atomic autonomy of the U.S.A. involves as a corollary the autonomy of its partners: the limited nature of the alliance means leaving outside it one of the most important military factors.

And one of the most important political factors may be added.

It does not seem quite logical that the Americans do everything for a full economic partnership — that in the military field they integrate their conventional forces and put a considerable part under NATO command, and at the same time keep their nuclear forces entirely under national command.

Certainly, nuclear weapons do not fit into the old concepts because of their enormous military effects and political consequences. However, we have to find ways and means to manage these problems, for technical progress will go on. Even the Swiss are of the opinion that today every army must possess nuclear weapons because only in this way can a country show its resolution to defend its liberty under any circumstances. In 1963 they disclosed that from raw materials to scientists they have all the prerequisites to manufacture small atom bombs and shells. In a plebiscite, the majority of the people voted against prohibiting atomic weapons.

In NATO, the United States has gained its short-term goal of preventing an all-out war, but more by its technical and military superiority than by superior policy and exploitation of the ever-changing situation. However, it has paid rather a high price, for by its nuclear policy it has contributed to some disjunction within the alliance. This is not so severe that it could not be remedied, and it is easier to judge after the event than in the middle of a development. By laying too much emphasis on massive nuclear reaction, the United States has realized rather late that it has contributed to driving underground the war which the Communists wage on the rest of the world. The results have been reverses in Southeast Asia, where nuclear arms cannot influence the situation, and in Cuba where they could do so only when the Soviet Union tried to install its own nuclear arms on the island.

#### National Goals within NATO

Two of the most important NATO allies went their own nuclear way, the British with less commotion than the French. There were several reasons for their actions. Nuclear armaments seem to be considered the ticket of admission to the status of a great power, or an indispensable sign of national sovereignty, regardless of the fact that nowadays not

even the two super-powers command the degree of independence formerly enjoyed by all members of the "Concert of Great Powers." However, the most important reason is lack of confidence in the United States. Some of the European members of NATO have grave doubts whether the Americans would actually commit everything they have in the case of a Soviet attack on Europe alone. This distrust has been augmented by lack of knowledge concerning U.S. nuclear means and plans. The comparative lack of public discussion of strategic questions in European countries may have contributed to this deficiency. In the Federal Republic, for example, strategic studies are not emphasized by research groups or universities. As a consequence, problems of technical and military strategy are generally judged more from sentiment than from reason.

By setting up their own nuclear forces Great Britain and especially France have reintroduced nationalistic tendencies which seemed passé in the Europe of the Schumann Plan, the Common Market, and the Western European Union, thus slowing down the process of European unification — a long-range target of U.S. grand strategy. It is most important to overcome these setbacks and to improve the cohesion of the alliance. Only a strong unbroken front with a pronounced resolution to act in case of need will impress the Communists, for they are over-sensitive to power.

It is to be regretted that General de Gaulle's 1958 suggestion that Atlantic unity be consolidated through the creation of a political directorate composed of France, Great Britain, and the United States "never received even the courtesy of an acknowledgment" [W. W. Rostow]. For a considerable time, the consequences of United States nuclear policy were not foreseen. Not until 1960, were the first steps taken to remedy the situation. After that, a number of measures followed which lead in the right direction although they do not yet constitute a full solution of these knotty problems.

### **Dawn of a New Nuclear Policy**

The first was an agreement with Great Britain to make Polaris missiles available on a continuing basis, which was a distinct move away from the McMahon Act. That it was a deliberate beginning of a new policy is shown by the stipulation to develop new and closer arrangements for the organization and control of strategic Western defense. It was explicitly stated that such arrangements could in turn make a major contribution to political cohesion among the nations of the alliance. As a first measure, the 180 British V-bombers (with British nuclear weapons) were assigned to NATO.

The British Government reserved the right to use this force "at discretion" if supreme national interests were at stake. Unfortunately, this reservation was noticed mainly in the other European countries, as was the simultaneous scratching of the Skybolt project. From a military and economic viewpoint this was probably right but it was published by the European press in a rather unpropitious form.

The allocation of the British V-bombers and five U.S. Polaris submarines to NATO was the beginning of a multinational force which in the course of time might develop into a genuine NATO nuclear force. In the eyes of the other countries its main disadvantage is that the nuclear weapons of these forces remain under the control of their own governments and can be withdrawn at any time.

### **MLF**

As an alternative, the United States suggested a multilateral force (MLF) in the form of submarines or surface vessels with Polaris missiles. The crews were to be composed of men of the countries sharing the costs, and the nuclear weapons were to be furnished by the United States and to remain under United States control. This plan was probably sprung too suddenly on the world and at first met with considerable

criticism in the countries that were meant to participate. Subsequently criticism gave way to a more sober evaluation of MLF possibilities.

The submarine project was soon dropped as too expensive and too difficult in the training of the crews. The surface ships are much easier to handle and cheaper to build and run. Their military value is lower than that of the submarines (at least as long as anti-submarine warfare does not make considerable progress). With Polaris III they have a range from the waters west of the Iberian peninsula to Central Russia. This gives them a wide area of ocean to hide in. To shadow them constantly would mean an enormous Soviet expenditure. Tactically, they serve not as a substitute for Polaris submarines but as a valuable supplement. In the light of the experience of German sailors in several allied navies in the last years, very few human difficulties are to be expected, and none that cannot be solved by a careful selection of the men.

The main drawback of the MLF project would seem to be that it does not provide a satisfactory solution for the recurrent problem of creating a NATO authority entitled to order the use of nuclear weapons.

Opinion of the MLF varies. A British publication, *The Navy*, has described it as "politically undesirable and militarily indefensible." Several governments have given MLF a somewhat guarded acceptance. Mr. von Hassel, the German Minister of Defense, says that it is not the task of MLF to solve all the problems of cohesion and defense. Yet it would help to give an answer to the Soviet MRBMs which threaten Central Europe in increasing numbers, and it would represent a strong military potential in any case. Jean Monnet, the President of the Executive Committee of a United Europe, says that the differences in the question of nuclear armaments concern our existence, our safety, and our liberty because they prevent the unification of Europe and moreover the political and military association of our two continents. Europe must participate in, and contribute to nuclear armament. A common action of the

West is indispensable. In the present difficult situation the proposed MLF can, in his opinion, perhaps constitute a temporary solution and fill a dangerous gap.

The British Government intends to participate in the experiment of training a mixed crew in a United States destroyer to gain some first-hand knowledge of how it works, and experience for the actual MLF. Objections from various sides (e.g., Mr. Nelson Rockefeller) that with the MLF there would be too many different nuclear forces in NATO are not quite valid in the light of the experience with the far more variegated "crazy-quilt" of conventional forces in NATO. Given clear directives, the military in the integrated staffs will take this problem in their stride. Their cooperation is more advanced and running more smoothly than many people realize. In this respect, there is true progress in NATO.

The vociferous objections of the Soviet Union to the MLF can be taken as a sign that it is not quite so inadequate as sometimes considered in the West. It should be emphasized that it is not an unlawful road for the Germans to gain admission to the atom club. The German line is neither to press for the MLF nor to turn it down, but to cooperate within the frame of the obligations accepted by the Federal Republic. There is one point, however, which has hardly been mentioned. Forward defense and the situation in Central Europe make it imperative to have strong conventional forces all along the Iron Curtain. To increase the number of active divisions to more than thirty would be very expensive, and there is hardly room enough for them. The best solution would be an efficient territorial defense, somewhat like in Switzerland or in the Scandinavian countries. This would not be cheap, either, if these men are to be well-armed and ready for action within a few hours in an emergency. It should be carefully examined, therefore, how much German money is to go into this kind of defense, and how much into the MLF. This problem of finding an optimum can be solved only with political cooperation on the basis of mutual confidence.

From the political point of view, the MLF gains importance in combination with two other measures made possible by the change in U.S. nuclear policy. They are the appointment of allied officers to the Joint Strategic Targeting and Planning Section at the Headquarters of Strategic Air Command at Omaha, Nebraska, and the institution of a Nuclear Deputy of Supreme Allied Commander Europe at SHAPE near Paris. So far, not enough attention has been given to these improvements by the European public. They are most important, however, for from now on, Europeans will participate far more in forming nuclear strategy. It may be mentioned that cooperation in target planning has not been neglected in the past. In this respect, too, the military have gone about their duties in a matter of fact way; they have acted and reacted flexibly.

In the up and down of nuclear policy the removal of the old-fashioned liquid fuel missiles from Turkey and Italy after the Cuba affair and the lack of visible consultation at the test ban negotiations influenced European opinion negatively. The declarations of Secretary of Defense McNamara on the immense nuclear strength of the United States and on the increase of the nuclear potential in Western Europe have greatly contributed to clearing the atmosphere again. Taken together, all these details show how many-sided nuclear policy has to be, how many seeming trivia have to be watched. It might be noted that Americans because of their shorter and simpler history are inclined to be more optimistic in foreign politics than Europeans with over 2,000 years of sad experience behind them.

### Conclusions

All the measures mentioned above are tactical moves showing a change in the direction of nuclear strategy, which however has not yet been formulated. Nor has the grand strategy of the alliance been formulated; rather, it has been obscured. Stability, freedom, and common de-

fense are still the goals, but they cannot be reached without cohesion and cooperation. There is general agreement that over-all policy should strive at avoiding the use of nuclear weapons as long as possible, and that there should be a nuclear strategy permitting a flexible reaction in case of nuclear attack from the other side — although there is slight hope to keep nuclear war limited once it has begun.

As shown by Marshal Sokolovsky's book *Military Strategy* (1962), the Soviet military leaders evidently are prepared almost exclusively for an all-out atomic war without any restrictions. They are evidently adherents of a counter-city strategy. It appears, however, that Khrushchev himself has a clearer picture of the situation, quite apart from the fact that as a rule the Soviet leaders do not like to take great risks.

True, they were overconfident in Korea and in Cuba. It is all the more important to show them a firm determination to prevent more misunderstandings of that kind. A main prerequisite would be to tell them unequivocally whose finger is on which nuclear trigger, and that the owner or owners are resolved to act at a certain fixed point according to the situation. "There must not be the slightest doubt in the mind of the Communist leaders that our system of collective security is efficient." [Minister von Hassel]

In theory, the ideal solution would be a political integration of the Atlantic nations. This is a distant aim, hardly feasible in the near future. A closer integration of Western Europe seems more practicable. It had already started on various roads and made good progress until it got stuck for various reasons, among them American nuclear isolationism. At the moment, strengthening the position of the NATO Council does not seem very hopeful, but it should be kept in view. In the political field, improved consultation will have to follow nuclear strategic coordination. There are also possibilities in the NATO committee of political advisers.

In December 1963, for the control of nuclear armament, General

Norstad suggested a solution somewhere between a single national authority acting for the alliance, and common and equal responsibility of the fifteen members. He sees it in a small, responsible group composed of one representative each from the United States, France, and Great Britain, with the Secretary General of NATO as coordinator.

The WEU assembly in Paris early in December 1963 considered NATO strategy and nuclear forces and recommended:

that NATO defense planning . . . provide the political authority with the widest possible choice of action; . . .

that there be developed within NATO a unified strategic planning system aimed at the development of a common strategy;

that to this end NATO governments undertake consultations toward the elevation of the NATO Council into a high level allied forum for unified strategic planning with appropriate military advisory staff, the membership of such a revised NATO Council to be drawn from the highest levels of government;

that such a revised NATO Council should engage in strategic planning in the broadest sense: political as well as military planning on questions affecting war and peace.

These objectives can be reached only with cooperation, coordination, and cohesion which in NATO are not yet sufficiently strong. They are good in the military sphere, probably because military defense has been much in the foreground. That holds for nuclear armament, too, which has been considered mainly a military means of combat. But that is not enough. Evidently, we are in a new phase of political relations between the nations. As Secretary of Defense McNamara said:

There is no true historical parallel to the drive of Soviet Communist imperialism to colonize the world. This is not the first time that ambitious dictators have sought to dominate the globe. But none has ever been

so well organized; possessed so many instruments of destruction; or been so adept at disguising ignoble motives and objectives with noble words and phrases.

The Soviet Union has never been reticent in using force where it will pay. However, technical progress has created weapons which are practically useless for war because they will leave broken and vanquished peoples, if any life at all. Therefore, all-out war is improbable, and yet, as an act of desperation or misjudgment, not impossible. We can be sure that the Soviet drive will continue as a different type of war, with ideological, subversive, and economic means, and with hot war used as a threat.

The free world is confronted with the danger of being annihilated physically by a nuclear holocaust or being destroyed spiritually by the methods of the cold war. Therefore, it must employ a strategy which deters military aggression effectively, and which resists and overcomes all forms of ideological and subversive war. This will be a long process, and we have before us a kind of limited war in which — as it did 200 years ago — clever maneuvering will play a role at least as important as military weapons. In these operations the nuclear threat is an important tactical maneuver.

This new situation is bound to influence all deliberations and decisions on the sharing of nuclear control within the alliance. It is often said that first a United Europe should be created, with a supranational government endowed with authority to receive nuclear knowledge and weapons. As the Communist menace is shaping, this might take too much time and be too late. Of course, European unification is to be promoted in all possible ways, and NATO integration not neglected. But simultaneously, ways should be explored to let the allies participate in nuclear responsibility, and to handle nuclear policy not only as a military, but also as a political and psychological instrument.