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STUDY ON ARMY ASPECTS OF THE MILITARY
ASSISTANCE PROGRAM IN VIETNAM (U)

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STUDY ON ARMY ASPECTS OF THE MILITARY
ASSISTANCE PROGRAM IN VIETNAM (U)

CONTENTS (U)

UNCLASSIFIED

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UNCLASSIFIED

U. S. ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

UNCLASSIFIED

1 June 1960

STUDY ON ARMY ASPECTS OF THE MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM IN VIETNAM

1. (U) Purpose: To examine the Army aspects of the Military Assistance Program in the field to determine its overall effectiveness and, if appropriate, to recommend courses of action for improvement.

2. (U) Background: The vast differences in terms of reference and nature of the threat as applied to the many countries receiving aid make selection of a truly representative worldwide sample nation impractical. Many of the basic principles governing the establishment and maintenance of an effective military force structure in the Western European NATO nations are invalid for application in the slowly developing countries of SE Asia. Since the U S Army has much actual experience data with respect to the type threat existent in Europe and Korea, the study should explore an area in which our experience is more limited. Thus the example selected would most profitably be a MAAG operation in an area where the primary threat is an irregular force employing unorthodox organization and tactics. South Vietnam appears most typically representative of such a situation; study findings in this area would have the broadest possible application and would be of value in a wide variety of similar cases. Vietnam was selected therefore to be the primary country of investigation.

3. (U) Scope:

a. The study will examine:

(1) The history and development of the Military Assistance Program.

(2) The history, background, and current status of Vietnam.

(3) The evolution to the current organization, materiel, support, operational concepts, and doctrine of the South Vietnamese Armed Forces.

(4) The history, organization, operations, and functioning of the US MAAG, Vietnam.

(5) The opposition forces in Vietnam and the use of unconventional warfare in that country.

b. From the above information, the study will develop conclusions as to overall effectiveness and recommendations for improvement of the Military Assistance Program as it concerns South Vietnam.

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4. (U) Discussion.

a. (U) Military Assistance Program.

Annex A includes a complete background of the development of the Military Assistance Program (MAP) along with a discussion of its present organization and assigned responsibilities for administering the program.

At their inception, US military aid programs were of an emergency nature - temporary measures to achieve specific objectives. The time has long since passed when military assistance can be considered as a temporary measure. So long as the threat of Communist aggression and subversion remains, there will be a need for selective military assistance to preserve and strengthen the capacity of the free world nations to resist Communist pressures and participate in the common defense. The organization and administration of military assistance is being adjusted to this long term concept.

The Draper Committee made an exhaustive review, analysis and evaluation in 1959 of the entire Mutual Security Program to include both the Military and Economic Assistance Programs (CGSC Archives reference N-18681.1-A, three volumes). The committee was thoroughly convinced that the Mutual Security Program was a sound concept and had been highly successful in achieving its major objectives in the national interest. The committee members felt that the Military Assistance Program had provided the mortar giving cohesion, strength, and credibility to our collective security arrangements. They found that the scope and purposes of the MAP had changed markedly since the program was hastily instituted over a decade ago. Although administration of the program had greatly improved, deficiencies in planning and execution were cited which required correction. A complete recapitulation of the study recommendations is listed in Appendix 1 to Annex A.

With respect to management of the Military Assistance Program by and within the Department of Defense, the committee recommended that a Director of Military Assistance be named to supervise the overall military program. General W. B. Palmer was named to that post early in 1960. DOD published on 19 May 1960 a Military Assistance Manual to be effective on 1 July 1960 which includes the implementing instructions for many of the committee recommendations for improvement. This manual includes specific responsibilities

of the Department of Defense, the Services, Unified Commands, and MAAGs with respect to planning, programming, and administering military assistance. (CGSC Archives reference N-17067.16.)

Department of Defense published on 31 Mar 1960 the Basic Planning Document for Military Assistance. This secret document (CGSC Archives reference S-17067.17) provides order of magnitude dollar guidelines from FY 62-66 for the MAP and includes specific Mutual Security Objectives Plans for each Unified Commander and for each country within his area of responsibility. This is another implementation document for certain of the recommendations made by the Draper Committee.

b. (U) Background and current status of South Vietnam.

(U) A comprehensive analysis of the historical background, current status, and pertinent information pertaining to South Vietnam is contained in Annex B.

(1) (S) Political.

(U) The Republic of Vietnam occupies an exposed position face to face with a powerful and threatening Communist enemy. Vietnam is one of the three countries in Asia where a free government and a Communist regime compete directly for the same territory and a whole nation. The successful halting of the march of Communism in South Vietnam since the 1954 armistice constitutes a considerable obstacle to further Communist territorial expansion elsewhere in Southeast Asia. President Ngo Dinh Diem's regime has achieved remarkable stability since South Vietnam gained independence in 1954, and continues to be strongly anti-Communist as well as pro-US. However, his policy of strict control in the political, military, and economic fields has caused a certain amount of internal dissatisfaction. Should the President's exercise of personal authority be extended further, the resultant frustration of government officials might weaken the united support for his regime which the situation requires. Likewise, the President's stern policy measures and his emphasis on internal security have led to some criticism of the Government. This emphasis on internal security stems from the continuation of Communist-inspired violence and subversion, and such incidents as the assassination of local officials in rural areas of southern Vietnam.

(U) The Republic of Vietnam is an independent constitutional republic in which an elected executive virtually is all-powerful, although a unicameral National Assembly exercises nominal legislative power. A rudimentary separate judicial branch in provided by the constitution but, as yet, has not been organized. President Ngo's government, in practice, functions as a ministerial autocracy supported by personal loyalties. There is only one effective political party, the National Revolutionary Movement (NRM), directed by the President's family through an elite hard core of followers. The small, controlled, legal opposition constitutes political opposition in name only. Much more important is the illegal opposition composed of Communist guerrillas, subversives, and sympathizers together with members of various dissident politico-religious sects.

(U) Although all formerly were associated in a federation under the French, South Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos have taken substantially different paths since the Geneva agreements in 1954. South Vietnam broke with the French and allied herself firmly with the US; Cambodia pursues a neutralist policy and has recognized Communist China; Laos currently is pro-West but is not as closely aligned with the US as South Vietnam. These differences have not led to major difficulties in Vietnamese-Lao relations but Vietnamese-Cambodian relations continue strained as a result of long standing border disputes and Cambodian recognition of Communist China.

(2) (U) Economic.

In spite of increased economic stability, Vietnam continues to depend on foreign aid, the largest part of which goes to support the military establishment. United States aid still accounts for approximately 85 percent of imports and two-thirds of the budgetary revenues.

Total exports of Vietnamese rice, rubber, and other minor products pay for only approximately one-third of Vietnam's imports. United States economic aid since 1954 has kept the country on its feet financially and makes up the difference in the unfavorable import-export ratio. Nearly 75 percent of US aid, however, is spent to maintain military forces for defense against possible Communist aggression, and does not benefit the economy directly.

With US backing the currency has remained fairly stable at a somewhat inflated level. The official exchange rate is approximately 35 piasters to the US dollar and another rate of approximately 74 to 1 is available for tourists and certain businessmen.

(3)(U)Psychological

Despite its rebellion against French colonial rule, Vietnam has allowed French culture to become part of its own, and still retains closer cultural ties with France than any other Western nation. French culture and the widespread influence of Roman Catholicism, together with centuries-old pressure of Chinese civilization, are the determining factors in the psychology of the educated Vietnamese elite, the former mandarin class, who now run the Government in Western style.

The European influence is not so important for the vast majority of Vietnamese who are mostly peasants. The more lively Western ideas have not aroused them to progress. The psychological outlook of the average Vietnamese consists of static traditionalism and apathy toward progress or change. This results partly from the prevalent religions, which are Confucianism, Taoism, Buddhism, and such hybrid beliefs as those of the Cao Dai and Hoa Hao sects; even the many Catholics of Vietnam hold a faith colored by a background of animism and ancestor worship.

(4)(U)Subversive Factors

Low standards of living, political immaturity, illiteracy, resentment toward to West as a result of the French colonial days, and the desire to become independent internationally are all factors which make South Vietnam susceptible to Communist subversion. Growing civilian and military distaste for the authoritarian practices of the Ngo regime further have facilitated the Communist cause. The present threat, however, comes from Communist guerrillas in the field, the sympathizers who support them, and their agents who have infiltrated both the Government and the various antigovernment politico-religious sects.

The originally non-Communist dissident groups (Hoa Hao, Binh Xuyen, and Cao Dai), which were defeated and dispersed by the army, remain only as isolated remnants scattered throughout some of the villages. Some

of these groups, totaling 1,100 to 1,300, have come under Communist control. Additionally, the Viet Cong has set up small armed groups in a number of villages of West Cochin China. The strength of these armed Communist cadres is estimated to be from 1,500 to 2,000.

c. (U) Armed Forces.

From a loose conglomeration of combat battalions and various supporting units under French command in 1954, and under the aegis of, and with the impetus furnished by the US MAAG, the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces have evolved into a balanced defense force. This force consists of three corps, with seven infantry divisions (tailored to meet the existing situation in Vietnam, rather than "mirroring" US or or other divisions) and supporting arms and services, together with small but appropriate naval and air forces. These armed forces have a US-supported strength ceiling of 150,000 (army, 140,000; navy and air, 5,000 each plus certain minor non-US-supported units) and are backed by a full-time, paramilitary civil guard (50,000) and a part-time armed village militia (50,000). These total forces have the mission of (1) maintaining internal security (eventually to become the primary mission of the civil guard and other civil security forces when those organizations reach a satisfactory state of organization, training and equipment, at which time the armed forces will become the "backup" force), and (2) providing limited initial resistance to attack from Communist North Vietnam.

Considerable progress has been made in all fields of military operations and administration, although as yet serious weaknesses still hamper the development of effective command control and staff action. The weaknesses stem primarily from an inherent inferiority complex of the bulk of the people, and from a consequent lack of knowledge and application of the principles of good leadership. Further handicaps to rapid development and effective command reaction exist within the highest levels of the armed forces. Here a cumbersome structure with divided and duplicating lines of authority is found which prevents the undue concentration of power in the hands of any one person--except the President himself.

Tactical doctrine and organization are to a large degree dictated by the highly varied terrain. Profiting from lessons of 1946-1954,

US training guidance has emphasized aggressive, hard hitting mobile divisions with high firepower, organized to insure close mutual support. New emphasis is being placed upon mobility allied to good unit coordination and massed firepower.

US advisors must bear in mind that certain unusual (to an American) types of terrain favor guerrilla operations and require different types of offensive and defensive tactics: rice flatlands, elephant grass-covered plateaus and rolling hills, steep forested mountains, and dense jungle. The training problem is also complicated by the natural characteristics of the Vietnamese, who, though completely at home in the cities, villages, ricefields and plantations of the lowlands, avoid the jungle and are afraid of the mountains. Continued special emphasis must be placed upon training for tactical operations and administrative support in the jungle and mountain regions. The Viet Minh have learned to use such regions to their advantage; so must the South Vietnamese.

(C) In calendar year 1959, MAP training in the US and in other countries was provided for the following Vietnamese personnel:

	In US	In Other Countries
Army	1014	90
Navy	206	-
Air Force	233	42

d. (U) Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG)/Temporary Equipment Recovery Mission (TERM) - Vietnam.

(U) Annex D provides specific information on both MAAG-Vietnam and TERM-Vietnam to include a brief history, present organization, operational responsibilities, administration, accomplishments to date, and major unsolved problem areas.

(C) MAAG-Vietnam was designated as such on 28 Oct 1955 and is the outgrowth of MAAG-Indochina, the first increment of which arrived in Saigon on 2 August 1950 as a logistical MAAG. The Geneva Accords of 1954 resulted in the establishment of an US MAAG personnel ceiling of 342 spaces. The MAAG began to assume training responsibilities for Vietnam early

in 1955 and this coupled with the rapid withdrawal of the French in 1955-1956 made it obvious that there was an urgent necessity to increase the size of the MAAG.

(U) In view of the personnel ceiling established on the MAAG by the Geneva Accords, a subterfuge was adopted in the form of TERM. A strength of 350 military spaces was authorized for TERM ostensibly to facilitate the processing and recovery of excesses of US equipment in Vietnam. While recovery work was accomplished, a basic purpose of TERM was to provide additional personnel to advise the Vietnamese Armed Forces.

(U) The TERM directive required that it operate separately from MAAG, thereby creating organizational problems at all MAAG/TERM levels. For example, this arrangement placed the G1, G2, and G3 advisory functions in the MAAG and the G4 advisory functions under TERM, a situation which was not conducive to integrated staff planning. This major deficiency--the separation of TERM from MAAG--is presently being corrected. TERM is to be phased out and its personnel and functions will be transferred to MAAG. The new MAAG T/D to result from this integration will not be available for 30 to 90 days, but is known to have 685 personnel spaces or 7 less than the combined total of the present MAAG and TERM.

(U) In addition to purely MAAG logistical and training type functions, MAAG-Vietnam in coordination with the US Embassy and CINCPAC is responsible for the implementation of certain emergency plans for the protection and evacuation of US Nationals and US sponsored non-combatants. MAAG-Vietnam is also responsible for the implementation under CINCPAC of certain cold and hot war plans for Vietnam and mainland Southeast Asia.

(U) In the administrative field, MAAG-TERM provides certain administrative support for other US agencies and US sponsored agencies in Vietnam. In turn, the MAAG is given some administrative support by other US agencies in Saigon and by the Vietnamese Government.

(U) A major unsolved personnel problem is the rapid turnover of the majority of the US personnel assigned to MAAG/TERM. By the time they have been on their jobs long enough to have reached a high state of proficiency, they depart and their replacements must go through the same time consuming breaking-in process.

(U) Most of the information required for obtaining a complete picture of MAAG/TERM-Vietnam organization, operations, administration, accomplishments and major problems were not available during the period of this study. Voids exist in the following areas:

(1) (S) Current or planned organization of the MAAG. Latest information available to the study group dates from 1956 to 1958. However, as was indicated above, a consolidation of MAAG and TERM is imminent. The impact of this consolidation on the previous organization is not known.

(2) (C) Information at CINCPAC level. Information is lacking at this important level both as to administration of the MAP and as to actual operational control, restrictions, guidance, support, etc, rendered to the MAAG-Vietnam. It is known, however, that CINCPAC has several emergency operational and war plans for Vietnam which are to be implemented by the MAAG.

(3) (U) Current MAAG-Vietnam operations. The narrative statements on the MAAG-Vietnam operations in 1959 which might reflect current activities, objectives, accomplishments, and problems are not available. Neither are the implementations planned by the MAAG for CINCPAC war plans nor the degree and source of all administrative support rendered to the MAAG by other US sources or the Vietnamese known.

(U) As a result of requests initiated by the study group, it is expected that a portion of the additional information desired will be arriving in piecemeal form within the next 90 days. Whether this additional material will provide sufficient information to complete an analysis or will merely point out the areas for additional requests for material is unknown. Only limited information could be obtained from personnel who have recently returned from Vietnam, since they are required to execute a certificate that they will not divulge information concerning the MAAG operations (Appendix 10 to Annex D).

e. (C) Resistance Activities and Countermeasures.

(U) The communist concept for protracted war in Asia was practiced most successfully by the Viet Minh. With patience and perserverance the Viet

Minh made every effort to build a regular army while emphasizing the integration of political, economic, and military operations to win not only the war but the minds of the people. During the eight year war with the French, the Viet Minh resistance force, consisting of both guerrillas and subversives, assumed a new significance as a tool of war and as an important logistic and propaganda agency for regular military forces. Their operations, as those of other successful resistance movements have been, were based upon speed of movement, surprise, deception, undermining of enemy morale, security, winning the collaboration of the populace, timely intelligence, and detailed planning and rehearsal.

(U) It is self evident that where communists are determined to conquer the people and territory of slowly developing countries, they will employ unconventional warfare as the most suitable and least costly approach. The reasons were clearly demonstrated in Indochina where it enabled the Viet Minh to defeat the French. This form of warfare permitted the Viet Minh to retain the mobility so essential to jungle and mountain operations, facilitated the gathering of detailed, accurate, and timely intelligence information, kept the level of violence at a low enough level to preclude the active intervention of another major power, accomplished the slow attrition of the French while permitting the Viet Minh to build the regular forces necessary for the final battles, offset the serious logistics problem by the very primitiveness of transportation methods, and surmounted the manpower shortage by making political and economic operations inseparable from military operations.

(U) Subversive and guerrilla operations by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) (North Vietnam) in South Vietnam continue to be a serious threat to the peace and security of the Republic of Vietnam (RV) (South Vietnam). Countermeasures by the RV includes military - civil cooperation in pacification of the population, offensive as well as suppression operations against DRV guerrillas, local village security against guerrillas, and more stringent national laws.

(U) Resistance activities and countermeasures are discussed more fully in Annex E.

5. (S) Conclusions:

a. (U) Military Assistance Program.

(1) (U) As a major part of the overall Mutual Security Program, the Military Assistance Program has been, and continues to be, a major factor in preventing the further spread of international Communism into those areas under the aegis of the MSP. The very thorough study by the Draper Committee indicated the tremendous value of the overall program. Recommendations involving legislative action as well as executive branch actions were made by the Committee to further improve the program. Prompt, positive, and detailed actions have been taken at the executive and departmental levels to implement these recommendations, primarily in the planning, programming, and budgeting areas.

(2) (S) As to Vietnam, the MAP has been the major factor in organizing, equipping, and progressively improving the training of a not inconsequential army of seven divisions and an airborne group, with supporting naval and air forces. Without US assistance and impetus in the development and training of these armed forces the newly (1954) independent Republic of Vietnam could not have survived.

b. (S) Vietnamese Armed Forces.

(1) (C) Slow but steady improvement has taken place in the armed forces, in the fields of organization, equipment and training. They are now generally capable of maintaining internal security and of limited defense against external aggression.

(2) (S) The President continues to organize military units outside the aegis, and contrary to the advice, of the US MAAG. These non-US-supported units are of questionable value and tend to drain the best people away from US-supported units. Also they may result in a requirement for US support, not previously programmed.

(3) (C) Marked improvement in attitude and ability (and, as a conquence, of proficiency of the units to which assigned) is noted among those Vietnamese officers who have received schooling in US schools. These officers have become thoroughly familiar in an abstract way with US operational

and administrative doctrine; but, with the exception of the relatively few who have visited units such as the 25th Infantry Division in Hawaii, they are not familiar with the day-today modus operandi of the US Army. Further return from the monetary investment involved in sending officers to US schools could be obtained by attaching them to US units for observer training following their school courses, under the provisions of paragraph 15b(3), AR 551-50.

(4) (U) The following major deficiencies continue to require special attention:

(a) (U) The unwieldy high command (Department of National Defense - General Staff) structure.

(b) (U) Inadequacy of communications, both "long lines" and tactical.

(c) (U) Insufficiency of administrative support, including stockpiles of most types of supplies and materiel.

(d) (U) Weak leadership and professional attitude (conforming to the national "way of life"), which, in turn, affect overall unit proficiency, and especially: an active, positive approach to the solution of all problems; proper maintenance of materiel; and proper maintenance of health and sanitation measures.

(5) (U) Programs of national mobilization (coordinated by the Permanent Secretary General for National Defense), conscription, reserve forces, and Civil Guard and Self-Defense Corps organization, equipment and training, are under development.

(6) (U) The Army is still required to engage from time to time in major pacification (internal security) operations, pending the development of a higher state of operational effectiveness of the Civil Guard and the Self-Defense Corps. Since units have considerable personnel turnover and are filled out with draftees, who have had only basic and perhaps advanced individual training before arrival in units, the orderly pursuit of a progressive unit training schedule is essential to unit effectiveness. Each commitment to an operational (pacification) mission, though of some

training value, in general interrupts the planned training of participating units and delays arrival at a satisfactory state of operational readiness. The commitment of an excessively large force to a pacification operation is wasteful and detrimental to morale, and unduly affects training.

(7) (U) Paradoxically, in view of their passive, acquiescent way of life, the Vietnamese Armed Forces exhibit an abundance of confidence concerning their ability to defeat the Communists, and reunite their country. This overconfident attitude cannot be substantiated, either in terms of combat units or administrative support. Any effort in the near future on the part of the Armed Forces to reunite their country by force would certainly meet with an unfortunate outcome; onerous as the present partition may be to the free Vietnamese People, it is to be preferred to certain defeat following premature military action aimed at reunification.

c. (U) MAAG/TERM - Vietnam.

Lack of information on present and proposed future MAAG/TERM organization and operations precludes the detailed formulation of truly valid conclusions in this area.

(1) (U) Except for the problem of having two supposedly separate organizations (MAAG/TERM) operating in Vietnam (a condition which is now being remedied by consolidation), the study did not reveal any major deficiencies in the MAAG operation per se. Considering the limitations and restrictions of the Geneva Accords, the objectives of the MAP in Vietnam are being effectively met by the MAAG.

(2) (U) However, the following are fairly obvious conclusions on the general problem areas which, if improved, would increase the efficiency of MAAG Vietnam:

(a) (U) There are insufficient qualified administrative personnel in the MAAG/TERM headquarters - file clerks, mimeograph operators, US mess personnel, maintenance personnel, and typists, etc. This condition requires officer advisory personnel to spend considerable time doing or supervising purely administrative tasks at the expense of more essential duties. In the field advisory detachments these problems are greatly

magnified because of the relative size of the field advisor detachments compared with that of the MAAG headquarters. Additionally, problems of local supply, vehicle maintenance, housing, messing, sanitation and health conditions require the constant supervision or actual "doing" by the field advisory teams themselves. This situation results from the tight military personnel ceilings dictated by the Geneva Accords.

(b) (U) The rapid turnover of the majority of personnel assigned to MAAG/TERM. By the time these short tour people have been on their jobs long enough to reach a high state of proficiency, they depart. Their replacements must go through the same time consuming break-in process.

(c) (U) Since establishment of the Military Assistance Institute, a considerable number of (but not all) officers enroute to MAAG-VN have had the benefit of attending one of its courses. This has resulted in a marked improvement in individual motivation and job proficiency and in overall MAAG effectiveness. Some officers, however, continue to be sent to the MAAG without benefit of the Military Assistance Institute schooling.

d. (C) Resistance Activities and Countermeasures.

MAAG advisors to RV must be cognizant of past Viet Minh and current DRV resistance activities and should continue to make every effort to prevent a repetition of French shortcomings in countering DRV resistance activities.

6. (S) Recommendations:

a. (U) Overall Military Assistance Program.

In view of the comprehensive Draper Committee Study and recommendations and the implementation actions already initiated, no recommendations are considered necessary for the overall program.

b. (S) Administration of the Military Assistance Program in Vietnam.

It is recommended that the following actions be taken or be initiated by the MAAG Vietnam concerning:

(1) (S) The Vietnamese Armed Forces.

(a) (C) Continue the past close monitorship of and experimentation with the organization and training of units of the Vietnamese Armed

Forces, with a view to continued improvement of their capabilities in light of the local terrain and the forms of war known and expected to be practiced by the enemy.

(b) (S) Discourage the organization of military units outside the US-supported 150,000-man ceiling until such time as (1) the 150,000-man force is fully trained and equipped and (2) Vietnam can fully support the additional forces.

(c) (U) Continue the present high emphasis on US school training of Vietnamese officers, noncommissioned officers, and technicians.

(d) (U) Program observer training of Vietnamese officers in US units following school training (paragraph 15b(3), AR 551-50).

(e) (U) Continue efforts to provide for optimum communications and administrative support activities, including stockpiling of supplies and materiel.

(f) (U) Continue to emphasize professional attitude, aggressive leadership, and effective command control.

(g) (U) Stress improved standards of:

1. Maintenance of materiel.

2. Sanitation, personal hygiene, and public health.

3. Unit effectiveness.

(2) (S) The Vietnamese Government.

(a) (C) Continue efforts to develop an improved structure for the Armed Forces high command (Department of National Defense - General Staff).

(b) (C) Continue to assist in the development of sound programs of:

1. National mobilization.

2. Conscription.

3. Reserve forces.

4. Civil Guard and Self-Defense Corps organization, equipment, and training.

5. Officer procurement and noncommissioned officer development.

(c) (S) Assist the Vietnamese government in evaluating the necessity of committing units to pacification missions and in selecting units therefor whose training and overall unit effectiveness will be enhanced, insofar as possible, rather than diminished by such missions. Also, assist in determining the necessity of proposed pacification missions and in establishing the size and composition of the force to be committed (balancing operational vs. training requirements).

(d) (S) Discourage the development of an attitude of "reunification of Vietnam by force."

(3) (C) The MAAG Operations.

(a) (U) Increase the proportion of MAAG-Vietnam personnel attending the Military Assistance Institute prior to their movement to Vietnam, thereby reducing on-the-job break-in and orientation time required in Vietnam.

(b) (U) Increase the number of MAAG-Vietnam personnel authorized dependents, thereby reducing the rapid personnel turnover and the resultant adverse effects on the MAAG operation.

(c) (C) Either increase the total number of MAAG Military personnel spaces to allow additional administrative support personnel or increase the number of US and indigenous civilians assigned to MAAG in administrative support duties to relieve military personnel spaces for essential advisory duties.

7 Inclosures:
Annex A (U) - Military Assistance Program, with Appendix 1.
Annex B (U) - Historical Background and Pertinent Information on Vietnam.
Annex C (S) - The Armed Forces of the Republic of Vietnam, with Figures 1-6.
Annex D (S) - US Military Assistance Advisory Group - Vietnam, with Appendices 1-10.
Annex E (S) - Resistance Activities and Countermeasures.
Annex F (U) - Glossary of Abbreviations.
Annex G (U) - Bibliography.

ANNEX A (U)

MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM

CONTENTS (U)

[redacted]

ANNEX A (S)

UNCLASSIFIED

MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM

INTRODUCTION (U)

The military and economic vitality of the Free World has been fostered by the United States for well over a decade, with our foreign aid activities changing in size and character in accordance with the requirements of world conditions.

American aid dollars began to flow abroad for the first time during World War I and its immediate aftermath. About $7.0 billion was loaned before the Armistice and $3.25 billion afterwards. At that particular time, however foreign aid was only vaguely regarded as an integral part of United States foreign policy. Until World War II, foreign aid consisted mainly of loans. The transfer of fifty destroyers to Great Britain, which was fighting to stem the tide of Nazi conquest, in exchange for base rights in British territories in the Western Hemphisphere, marked a radical departure for United States foreign aid policy. This marked the first instance of military equipment being furnished without a condition of ultimate financial reimbursement.

The Lend Lease Program of World War II expanded our aid activities. Materiel was provided to Great Britain and the Soviet Union under Lend Lease arrangements. A total of thirty-eight countries received over $49.0 billion in Lend Lease assistance, with the bulk going to Great Britain ($29.0 billion) and the Soviet Union ($10.8 billion); France ($2.6 billion) and China ($1.3 billion) were other major recipients.

At the outset of World War II the United States had envisaged an orderly transition to peacetime programs when hostilities had ceased. Before the war had ended it became obvious, however, that the task of financing the reconstruction necessitated by the havoc being wrought would be beyond the capacity of private enterprise and/or existing agencies. As a consequence, the United States expended over $14.5 billion for such purposes during the 1945-1948 period. Great Britain received over $3.7 billion dollars under the Financial Agreement of 1946, the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Agency (UNRRA) received over $3.2 billion, an additional $2.0 bill[illegible] was added to Lend Lease, and the newly formed Philippine Republic and Nationalist China received substantial grants.

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(Downgraded to Unclassified when separated from Sec VI)
(Only SECTION VI) (is classified)

The European Recovery Program, more popularly termed the Marshall Plan, was operative from April 1948 to December 1951. It was authorized by the Economic Cooperation Act of 3 April 1948, and was administered by the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA). Under the terms of the European Recovery Program, the United States agreed to give, or lend, money to the various European Governments participating in the program and these governments, in turn, agreed to purchase commodities through private channels of trade and sell them to their citizens for local currency. The European Recovery Program was terminated in December 1951, after the American Government had advanced over $12.5 billion to the participating nations. These funds had enabled the 'Marshall Plan' countries, as a whole, to increase their gross national products (GNP) by 25%, industrial production by 64% and agricultural production by 24%.

Although the major share of our efforts during this time period was directed toward European recovery, other parts of the world were not neglected. For example, under the China Aid Act of 1948, $463.0 million was made available to the Chinese Nationalist Government. The Philippines was also of vital interest to the United States because of its former affiliation with us.

Our economic and military aid to South Korea still constitutes the ROK's main economic support and enables it to maintain a substantial military force.

The Chinese Communist triumph on the Mainland also stimulated the flow of U.S. aid to Southeast Asia, and substantial aid was given to the anti-Communist forces during their lengthy struggle in the Indochina area. Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos still rely heavily on the United States for economic and Military assistance.

SECTION I

MUTUAL DEFENSE ASSISTANCE PROGRAM

1. General

The Mutual Defense Assistance Program (MDAP) came into being shortly after the formation of NATO. It was authorized by the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of October 6, 1949, the basic authority under which the United States provided military assistance to other nations.

The emphasis in Mutual Security in 1950 shifted from economic recovery to urgent rearmament. Allied rearmament, on the scale undertaken after 1950, would have been impossible without the concurrent economic recovery fostered by the Marshall Plan and the critical margin of military support entailed in U.S. military assistance.

U.S. military assistance, granted on a bilateral basis, was independent of the Regional Alliances being formed by the Free World but it contributed substantially to their might.

2. Collective Security Arrangements

As a means of strengthening its security, the United States departed from its traditional peace-time policy of isolation after World War II and formally adhered to the Inter-American, North Atlantic, Anzus (U.S., Australia and New Zealand) and Southeast Asia Treaties. In addition, the U.S. has concluded bilateral defense treaties with Japan, Korea, the Philippines and Nationalist China, and is an active supporter of the Central Treaty Organization.

a. North Atlantic Treaty

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is the most active regional alliance. In line with the principle of collective self-defense, its fifteen member nations have pledged that an attack against one or more of them within the treaty area would be considered as an attack against them all. NATO enables the participating countries to develop their individual and collective ability to resist aggression by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid. However, the NATO agreement is more than a defensive military alliance; the signatories are pledged to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and to encourage economic and cultural cooperation.

NATO gradually has evolved into a smoothly functioning military coalition where the forces of member countries are divided into forces assigned in peacetime to NATO Commands, forces earmarked for these Commands, and forces remaining under National Command. The military goal of NATO is to achieve a realistic program for the buildup and modernization of forces through the mechanism of inter-governmental cooperation in planning national defense

contributions based upon military requirements and economic capabilities. Nevertheless, NATO cannot tell member states what to do nor can it compel any state to abide by its decisions. Rather, NATO operates on the principle of consultation among its fifteen sovereign members, with each retaining independence of decision and action.

b. Southeast Asia Treaty

Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) includes Australia, France, the United Kingdom, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand and the United States. SEATO is designed to provide political, economic and military solidarity of effort against aggression in Southeast Asia. Although the Governments of Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam are not formal members of this Pact, a Protocol of the Treaty re-affirms the determination of the member nations to support these states in maintaining their freedom and independence. SEATO's Asiatic members have registered significant economic and security progress under the auspices of this Treaty and it is anticipated that future developments within this organization will increase the efficiency and the scope of its work. The United States has provided economic and technical cooperation under various programs of mutual assistance in addition to, and apart from, the financial assistance rendered by the United States.

c. Central Treaty

The Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) is the successor to the Baghdad Pact which was concluded between Turkey and Iran in February 1955. The organization subsequently was enlarged to include the United Kingdom, Pakistan and Iraq. The headquarters of the Pact was permanently moved to Ankara, Turkey in the Fall of 1958. In the face of Iraq's withdrawal on 24 March 1959, the other members pledged a continuation of their efforts to maintain peace and security in the 'Northern Tier' area of the Middle East by collective action. CENTO embodies a regional system of collective defense against aggression within the framework of the United Nations. It serves as a basis of promoting peace, political stability and economic well-being within its geographical area.

d. Inter-American Treaty

The Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Continental Peace and Security met in Rio de Janeiro in 1947 and drafted the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance. Although not as well defined as NATO, the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, generally known as the 'Rio Treaty', has as its basis the principle that an attack on one American State is an attack on all. This Treaty binds the United States and twenty Latin American Republics and is our oldest regional mutual defense alliance.

3. Accomplishments

Military assistance, together with collective security arrangements, has greatly strengthened the Free World and provided an effective deterrent to the Communists. With two notable exceptions, Tibet and North Vietnam, the Communists have not acquired any additional territory through aggression or subversion since MDAP shipments commenced in 1950. Military assistance has made many friends for the United States.

Recipient countries also have reaped economic benefits. Although military assistance often entails an economic burden for recipient states, it has supported the stability required for economic growth, provided indigenous people with needed skills and facilitated the participation of the armed forces in economic development.

SECTION II

THE MUTUAL SECURITY PROGRAM

1. General

The Mutual Security Program (MSP) encompasses interrelated military, economic and technical assistance, which is designed to contribute to the attainment of the same objective - Free World security. Mutual Security Program operations complement United States foreign policy objectives accordingly, MSP procedures and directives are under constant review and study to insure the most effective use of available funds and resources.

2. Development

Prior to the enactment of the Mutual Security Act of 1951, United States foreign aid programs were administered by separate government agencies with

relatively little coordination. The Mutual Defense Assistance Program (MDAP), provided the military backbone for allied collective security arrangements and was authorized by the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 6 October 1949. Another phase of U. S. foreign aid was ushered in with the Act for International Development which was passed in 1950. The latter Act authorized the funding needed for technical assistance to the underdeveloped areas of Latin America, Asia, Africa and the Middle East. This type of assistance enables us to share our scientific knowledge and modern techniques with underdeveloped and poverty-stricken lands.

These major programs and our other postwar aid ventures - i.e., the Truman Doctrine, Aid to China, etc, - were consolidated into a single Mutual Security Program by the Mutual Security Act of 1951. This consolidation has enabled the United States to implement foreign aid programs more efficiently and intelligently thus enhancing the prospects for realization of our foreign policy objectives.

The Mutual Security Act of 1951 established a Director of Mutual Security to supervise military, economic and technical assistance activities. The Director of Mutual Security, in turn, charged the Department of Defense, the Mutual Security Agency and the Technical Cooperation Administration of the Department of State with administration of the military, economic and technical assistance portions, respectively, of the Mutual Security Program.

The original Act has been amended and revised by subsequent Acts of Congress. A 1953 modification of the Mutual Security Program tightened the program's organizational and administrative structure. The Foreign Operations Administration (FOA) was established and replaced the Mutual Security Agency. The Director of the Foreign Operations Administration assumed the responsibilities of his predecessor such as the continuous supervision and the general direction and coordination of all the foreign assistance programs, including the military assistance responsibilities of the Secretary of Defense. In doing so, he took over the direction of the four basic components of the Mutual Security Program.

a. Military Assistance - which consists of direct contributions to military strength, primarily military end-items, plus the training of foreign nationals in the usage and maintenance of end-items.

b. Defense Support - which consists of raw materials, commodities, machinery and tools, plus financial assistance to support the defense production of our allies.

c. Technical Assistance - which consists primarily of technical assistance to underdeveloped countries.

d. Development Loan Fund - a fund to strengthen friendly foreign countries by encouraging the development of their economies.

The Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended, provided for the termination of the Foreign Operations Administration by 30 June 1955. On that date, the FOA was abolished by an Executive Order and its functions were transferred to the Department of State and Department of Defense. A semi-autonomous agency - the International Cooperation Administration (ICA) - was established within the Department of State and assumed the FOA functions applicable to the Department of State; the functions involving military aspects were assigned to the Department of Defense. The Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended, is still the basic authority under which the Mutual Security Program operates.

Congress recently established an 'Office of the Inspector General and Comptroller' within the Department of State, responsible for seeing that the overall Mutual Security Program is being implemented effectively. His authority with respect to military assistance operations will be limited to investigating, reviewing, approving, recommending and consulting.

3. Military Assistance Program

a. Purpose

The Military Assistance Program is designed to support, as necessary, (on a deficiency basis) those indigenous forces which, in conjunction with the United States and other allied forces, will constitute a balanced force capable of providing adequate resistance to aggression in accordance with regional defense plans. Basically, it is the strong right arm of the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended, since it serves as the strongest instrument in the accomplishment of that Act's objectives.

The objective of the Military Assistance Program is to furnish eligible allied military forces with the end-items, spare parts, peculiar supporting materiel, and other equipment that will contribute to the maintenance of world peace. Training assistance is also furnished so that foreign military forces can attain maximum effectiveness as expeditiously as possible.

The United States carefully considers the economic capabilities of the specific countries involved when developing Military Assistance Programs. Except for overriding military considerations, the U.S. discourages the build-up of indigenous military forces beyond a level that the country involved can ultimately support. The Mutual Security Program, including the MAP, encompasses economic-political considerations as well as those of a military character.

b. Eligibility

The Mutual Security Act authorizes military assistance for any nation whose increased ability to defend itself is deemed important to the security of the United States by the President, provided that nation is otherwise eligible to receive such assistance. Equipment and materiel are made available for the sole purposes of maintaining internal security and self-defense of the recipient nation, and/or to permit it to participate in the defense of its area or in collective security arrangements and measures consistent with the Charter of the United Nations.

Congress has applied the following conditions to particular areas:

In the North Atlantic area, military assistance should be so administered as to support concrete measures to promote greater political federation, military integration, and economic unification in Europe.

In the Near East and Africa, military assistance will be furnished to any nation in order to permit it to participate in the defense of its area but shall be furnished only in accordance with plans and arrangements which shall have been found by the President to require the recipient nation to take an important part therein.

In furnishing military assistance in Asia, the President shall give the fullest assistance, as far as possible, directly to the free peoples in that area, in their creation of a joint organization, consistent with the

Charter of the United Nations, to establish a program of self-help and mutual cooperation designed to develop their economic and social well-being, to safeguard basic and liberties, and to protect their security and independence.

Military equipment and materials may be furnished to the other American Republics only in furtherance of missions directly relating to the common defense of the Western Hemisphere which are found by the President to be important to the security of the United States. Unless the President determines otherwise, internal security requirements shall not be the basis for military assistance programs to American Republics.

Generally, in underdeveloped countries administrators of the military assistance program shall encourage the use of foreign military forces in underdeveloped countries in the construction of public works and other activities helpful to economic development.

c. International Agreements

The President prior to furnishing assistance to any eligible country, concludes agreements with that nation. These initial agreements, entitled 'Agreement of Aid', provided that the United States would furnish those countries military and economic aid. Subsequently, the United States has entered into bilateral or multilateral agreements with most nations of the Free World providing for direct military assistance.

While these agreements cover a wide range of subjects and often vary, most can be grouped into the following eight broad categories:

(1) Mutual Defense Agreements - These agreements provide for collective self-defense. The United States has signed four multilateral regional pacts -- the Rio Pact, the NATO Treaty, the Anzus Treaty and the Southeast Asia Treaty -- and it has effected bilateral mutual defense treaties with the Philippines, South Korea, the Republic of China and Japan.

(2) Mutual Defense Assistance Agreements - Before military aid can be given to any country, the United States first must agree with the prospective recipient on relations between the two countries for the period the program is to be in force. An important purpose of the agreements is to insure that

recipient countries accept the commitments Congress deems necessary in order to receive aid. All military assistance agreements are bilateral except those with Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam. Since these states were part of the French Union when the agreement was concluded, aid to them had to be arranged on a multilateral basis with France as a party.

(3) Agreements Relating to the Assurances Required under the Mutual Security Act of 1951 - The Mutual Security Act of 1951 stipulated that recipients of United States economic and military aid give certain general assurances.

(4) Facilities Assistance Agreement.

(5) Offshore Procurement Agreements.

(6) Agreements for Mutual Security Military Sales.

(7) Agreements for Performance by Members of Army, Navy and Air Force Missions of Duties of Military Assistance Advisory Groups, and Agreements Relating to Military Missions.

(8) Disposition of Military Equipment Agreements.

d. Termination

The Mutual Security Act requires the President to terminate all, or part of the assistance furnished whenever he determines that a given nation is not making its full contribution to its own defense or to the defense of the area of which it is a part, or when the assistance being provided:

(1) is no longer consistent with the national interest or security of the foreign policy of the United States; or

(2) would no longer contribute effectively to the purpose for which such assistance is furnished; or

(3) is no longer consistent with the obligations and responsibilities of the United States under the Charter of the United Nations.

Assistance to any nation may, unless sooner terminated by the President, be terminated by concurrent resolution of Congress.

e. Grant Aid

The major part of our military assistance is given on a grant aid basis. Under this portion of the Military Assistance Program, the recipient

bears none of the cost of the materiel or training provided. A total of thirty-seven countries are eligible for 'Grant Aid' assistance under normal procedures. The military assistance authorized includes military equipment, other materiel, training and other services. The training provided under the MAP not only insures the proper use of U. S. furnished equipment, but also serves to provide the military forces of our allies with training cadres. In actuality, we are helping them to establish and standardize training and operational procedures which can be supported indigenously when U.S. participation is withdrawn.

f. Mutual Weapons Development Program

The Mutual Weapons Development Program was established by Congress as part of the FY 1954 Mutual Defense Assistance Act. It is jointly administered by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Development and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. Its broad objective is to increase the defensive capability of the United States and its allies by accelerating the research and development of advanced types of nonnuclear weapons and equipment. The Mutual Weapons Development Program is also expected to develop items especially suited for the needs of our allies which, at the same time, will be more economical to operate and maintain than corresponding items produced in the United States.

Under this program, the participating countries finance a share of the costs, while the United States provides technical advice and limited financial assistance.

Belgium, France, Italy, Norway, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom are the nations currently participating in the Mutual Weapons Development Program.

g. Weapons Production Program

The United States has entered into arrangements with its NATO allies for the production of military equipment, including missiles, in Europe. These arrangements have been formalized in a Weapons Production Program (WPP) which is designed to assist friendly countries in establishing and/or

expanding facilities for the manufacture and maintenance of military equipment. One important objective, from the point of view of the United States, is to reduce costs to the U.S. Government in its grant aid materiel programs. Under the WPP, the United States may furnish up to a maximum of 50% of the cost of production facilities including provision of engineering or other services, samples of material plus specialized test equipment and tooling.

h. Offshore Procurement

The Offshore Procurement Program (MAP-OSP) is an arrangement whereby some mutual defense items are procured from production sources outside the United States. Offshore Procurement Agreements have been concluded with a number of countries. Under these agreements, certain mutual defense items are manufactured by the industry and the country concerned for use by its own armed forces or those of other allied nations; the costs involved are borne by the MAP. While the recipient country is obliged to inspect and accept items, the United States retains final authority in inspection, testing, quality control and acceptance.

4. Economic Assistance

a. Purpose

The primary purpose of our mutual defense programs is to protect the security of the nations concerned by preventing war, if possible, and by prosecuting it successfully if necessary.

Programs of economic development and technical cooperation help our Free World partners to become stronger and better ones by increasing their capacity to work with us in affairs of mutual concern. Defense Support, the Development Loan Fund, the Technical Cooperation Program, a variety of Special Assistance Projects and proceeds derived from the sale of surplus U. S. agricultural products abroad are used to pursue this aspect of the Mutual Security Program.

b. Defense Support

Defense Support is that economic assistance which is required in addition to Military Assistance in order to secure a specific contribution

to the common defense by another country in which U. S. military aid is helping to support significant military forces. In short, it helps these countries to create and maintain economies that contribute to their security as well as to our own. The types of aid provided under Defense Support runs the gamut of military, political, sociological, educational and public health assistance. The Defense Support Program is administered by the International Cooperation Administration (ICA). Field responsibility in Defense Support matters is primarily the concern of the Embassies and/or United States Operations Mission (USOM).

The bulk of Defense Support (80%) goes to six countries on the perimeter of the Sino-Soviet Bloc -- Greece, Turkey, Pakistan, Vietnam, Taiwan and Korea. Since these countries maintain approximately eighty active divisions and commensurate air and naval establishments, any diminution of Defense Support would result in a corresponding decline in the Free World's defense posture.

c. Technical Cooperation

Technical Cooperation is a program for the international exchange of technical knowledge and skills through training, demonstrations, surveys and similar activities designed to contribute primarily to the balanced and integrated development of the economic resources and productive capacities of economically underdeveloped areas. The United States has introduced innovations to increase the skills of the peoples of these countries and thereby improve their standards of living.

Projects vary widely in size, complexity and duration. Some involve only the use of a few specialists, whereas others involve a long term, complex group of activities. The largest and most fundamental activities are concentrated in three basic fields -- agriculture, health and education. In some countries, where industrialization is considered synonymous with economic advancement, industrial and mining projects are most in demand.

d. Development Loan Fund

The Development Loan Fund (DLF) is a government corporation established to support long-range growth in the less developed economies of the world. It provides capital for development projects and programs through direct loans and other forms of credit.

The Development Loan Fund lends money for specific, economically sound and technically feasible projects. It does not program annual country aid levels and is under no compulsion to obligate its funds within fixed periods; thus, it is able to concentrate on long-range economic growth. The Development Loan Fund operates on a revolving basis -- thus, loan and interest payments become available for new credit activities. The Development Loan Fund is designed to supplement investment from other public and private sources rather than to compete with other financing when it is available on reasonable terms.

e. Special Assistance

Special Assistance is economic aid that is necessary to achieve political, economic, humanitarian and other objectives of the U. S. in any country where the U. S. is not providing military assistance in support of significant military forces. The needs of such assistance cannot appropriately or fully be provided under Technical Cooperation or from the Development Loan Fund. Special Assistance is programmed country by country.

f. Surplus Agricultural Products

Two programs authorize the sale of U. S. surplus agricultural commodities to other friendly nations with payment to be made in local currency rather than in U. S. dollars. Section 402 of the Mutual Security Act sales are made only for mutual security purposes, while Title I of Public Law 480 sales are made for the purpose of regaining and expanding U. S. markets for agricultural commodities. Local currency proceeds of sales may be used for economic development and other purposes related to the Mutual Security Program.

SECTION III

ADMINISTRATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM

1. General

The Mutual Security Act of 1959 provides that the military assistance appropriation shall be part of the Department of Defense budget after FY 1960, and calls for a continuing military assistance authorization, on an experimental basis, for two additional years (FY 1961 and 1962). This focuses the

responsibility on the Department of Defense for the planning, programming and execution of military assistance within the framework of policy guidance laid down in the National Security Council and by the Department of State.

2. Organization and Responsibilities

a. Secretary of Defense

The Mutual Security Act charges the Secretary of Defense with the primary responsibility for the determination of military end-item requirements; the procurement of military equipment in a manner which permits its integration with service programs; the supervision of end-item use by the recipient countries; the supervision of the training of foreign military personnel; the movement and delivery of military end-items; and, within the Department of Defense, the performance of any other functions with respect to the furnishing of military assistance, including the establishment of priorities in the procurement, delivery and allocation of military equipment.

b. Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Joint Chiefs of Staff provide the Secretary of Defense with advice on military assistance matters. Such advice will include, but not be limited to: recommending military objectives, force objectives, scale of equipping and priorities of attainment; a continuing review to insure that military assistance is in consonance with U. S. military strategy; recommending priorities of allocation of military resources among recipient countries; the review of military assistance plans and programs submitted by the Unified Commands; and, the review of manpower and organizational requirements for MAAGs, including the nomination of military personnel for positions as Chiefs of MAAGs, based upon the recommendations of the Military Departments.

c. Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs

One of the positions of Assistant Secretary of Defense is designated as the Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs (ASD/ISA). He is charged with: the development, coordination and establishment of Department of Defense positions, plans and procedures pertaining to the Military Assistance Program; supervising, administering and directing the

Military Assistance Program; and planning, organizing and monitoring the activities of Military Assistance Advisory Groups, including joint United States military advisory groups and training missions insofar as they concern military assistance functions.

d. Director of Military Assistance, OASD/ISA

The military assistance elements within the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs (OASD/ISA) were reorganized on 25 November 1959. The Office of the Deputy, ASD/ISA for Military Assistance was designated the Office of Military Assistance. The operating head of this office is the Director of Military Assistance who is charged with directing and supervising all Department of Defense aspects of military assistance.

e. Military Departments

The individual Services (Army, Navy and Air Force) are responsible for preparing data necessary for the development of programs and budget estimates, and providing advice and recommended changes in programs in accordance with instructions of ASD/ISA with respect to cost, availability, source of supply (stock, and U. S. production), delivery forecast and funding requirements of such programs. Subsequently, the Services procure and deliver to recipient countries the materiel and services included in approved programs in accordance with delivery schedules approved by ASD/ISA.

The Services provide ASD/ISA recommendations and technical assistance as to proposed Weapons Production Programs, and implement such programs when approved. The Services also provide technical assistance, facilities, advice and recommendations as requested by ASD/ISA and the Director of Defense Research and Engineering relative to the Mutual Weapons Development Program.

The Services also integrate procurement for Military Assistance Programs with services procurement programs. They provide the MAAGs and the Unified Commands, as appropriate, with technical military advice as to weapons systems, tactics and doctrine, and pertinent information relating to logistic support.

Each Military Department, in respect to the area or areas assigned to it, is responsible for providing administrative support, subject to the direction and policy guidance of ASD/ISA.

f. Unified Commands

With respect to the Military Assistance Program within their area of responsibility, the Commanders of the Unified Commands: correlate military assistance plans and programs with U. S. military plans; supervise and direct the development of recommended plans and programs in accordance with the Basic Planning Document for military assistance and other pertinent instructions provided by ASD/ISA; and, under the direction of ASD/ISA, present and justify military assistance plans and programs for their area at all review levels, including assistance in the justification before the Congress.

The Unified Commands direct and supervise submission of budget data for administrative support programs, as required by the Military Departments; direct and supervise the activities of the MAAGs in their areas; and, provide the necessary technical assistance and administrative support. They also coordinate offshore procurement activities carried out by their respective subordinate procuring agencies, make recommendations to ASD/ISA regarding proposed Weapons production projects and other similar programs and provide technical assistance in the study of proposed projects and the execution of approved programs.

For the purpose of military assistance activities only, CINCarib's area of responsibility comprises all of Latin America, CINCEur's comprises all of Europe, North Africa and the Middle East (including Pakistan) and CINCPac comprised the Far East and Southeast Asia. This assignment of area military assistance responsibility, however, does not authorize the Commanders of the Unified Commands to exercise supervision over the separate Service training missions in their areas. (The Commanders of Unified Commands will call upon the appropriately designated Mission Chief to provide the necessary information and assistance required to conduct an efficient Military Assistance Program within countries where no MAAG establishment exists.)

g. Country Teams

The basic organization for the administation of the Mutual Security Program is the United States 'Country Team'. This team is under the supervision of the senior American Diplomatic Representative -- the Ambassador or Minister. By law and by Presidential instruction, the Ambassador is responsible for coordinating and supervising all United States policies and programs in his country. He is, in fact, the personal representative of the President.

The 'Country Team', however, is not a formal organization per se. Instead, the term is used to indicate the cooperative effort of the various agency representatives in a given country. If, for example, a country is receiving both military and economic aid, the team is naturally composed of the Chiefs of the Diplomatic Mission (Embassy or Legation), the Operations Mission of the International Cooperation Administration (ICA) and the Military Assistance Advisory Group.

The Operations Mission (ICA) administers defense support and technical assistance, formerly the responsibilities of the old Mutual Security Administration (MSA), Technical Cooperation Administration (TCA) and Foreign Operations Administration (FOA) Missions. The Military Assistance Advisory Groups carry out the military portion of the Mutual Security Program at the country level, working in close coordination with its ICA counterpart.

h. Military Assistance Advisory Groups

Military Assistance Advisory Groups (MAAGs) are representatives of the Secretary of Defense in the countries to which they are accredited. They have such relationships with the Chief of the U. S. Diplomatic Mission as are prescribed by current executive orders and other pertinent instructions.

Under the military command of the Commanders of the Unified Commands, the MAAGs:

(1) Make recommendations to the Commanders of Unified Commands concerning military assistance in their respective countries.

(2) Develop military assistance plans and programs in cooperation with the Ambassador and other elements of the Country Team and submit them to the Commanders of the Unified Commands.

(3) Make recommendations to the Commanders of Unified Commands concerning offshore procurement of military assistance materiel or services.

(4) Observe and report on the utilization of materiel furnished by and personnel trained at the expense of the United States.

(5) Administer military sales transactions in accordance with current instructions.

(6) Provide appropriate advisory services and technical assistance to recipient countries on military assistance.

(7) Work directly with the Military Departments and appropriate military area commands in arranging for receipt and transfer of military assistance materiel, training and services to recipient countries.

(8) Provide liaison with the country involved with respect to weapons production and offshore procurement matters.

Direct communication is authorized between the service sections of the MAAGs and their respective Military Departments on technical and administrative matters.

Each MAAG is a joint organization headed by a Chief, chosen from one of the Services, under whose direction the three Services Sections administer the Army, Navy and Air Force aspects of military aid for the country concerned.

The precise status of MAAG personnel in host countries varies according to the provisions of the applicable Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement with each country, the host country's interpretation of privileges and immunities accorded under international law and comity and the applicability of other agreements such as the Status of Forces Agreement.

In all host countries, MAAG personnel operate as part of the United States Embassy and are under the direction and control of the Chief of the Diplomatic Mission. As part of the Diplomatic Mission, their status is the same as personnel of coresponding rank in the Diplomatic Mission.

Full diplomatic status is generally granted to the senior military member and to the senior Army, Navy and Air Force officers and their respective

deputies. Country interpretations of full diplomatic status differ, but it usually comprises privileges and immunities accorded by international law and customs, including immunity from the host country's civil and criminal jurisdiction, immunity of official papers from search and seizure, right of free egress, exemption from customs duties or similar taxes or restrictions in respect of personally owned property imported by such personnel into the host country for their personal use and consumption without prejudice to the existing regulations on foreign exchange, and exemption from external taxation by the host country upon salaries.

A second category of personnel, usually the remaining commissioned members of the MAAG, enjoys the same privileges and immunities, except that diplomatic automobile license plates, inclusion on the 'Diplomatic Lists' and social courtesies may be waived by joint action of the host government and the United States.

A third category of personnel, normally the non-commissioned MAAG personnel, receives the same status as the clerical personnel of a Diplomatic Mission. These privileges and immunities vary among countries, but they normally include immunity from suit for official acts, free entry of personal effects required for performance of official duties, exemption from taxation upon salaries and right of free egress.

Each Service has the primary responsibility in selecting replacements for its MAAG personnel, but the MAAG Chief, usually a General or Flag Officer, is subject to approval by the Assistant Secretary of Defense. He not only has to perform his military duties effectively, but he also has to deal diplomatically with his counterparts in the host country, civilian officials of the host government and the United States Ambassador.

3. Military Aid Determination

a. General

The decision to give military aid to a foreign country is made at the Presidential level. This decision is based upon broad policy objectives outlined in National Security Council directives and is coordinated by the representatives of the government departments primarily concerned with

military aid. Once preliminary negotiations have been completed, the country formally requests military aid from the United States. Upon approval and agreement between the United States and the country, a Military Assistance Advisory Group is sent to the country to supervise the planning of the military aid program.

b. Military Aid Policy

It is the policy of the Department of Defense that the Military Assistance Program shall be administered in accordance with the provisions of the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended. Chapter I of that Act states:

'It is the purpose of this chapter to authorize measures in the common defense, including the furnishing of military assistance to friendly nations and international organizations in order to promote the foreign policy, security, and general welfare of the United States and to facilitate the effective participation of such nations in arrangements for individual and collective self-defense.'

The Department of Defense further directs that the program shall be administered in accordance with the foreign policy and the security objectives of the United States. It shall support and be in consonance with U. S. military strategic plans and objectives, and shall be budgeted so as to compete for financial support with other activities and programs of the Department of Defense. In addition, the development of regional defensive systems and self-support capabilities suitable for multinational participation shall be encouraged.

It is the policy of the United States to hold to a minimum the cost, both to the United States and to recipient countries, of equipping, operating and maintaining military forces by using austere standards and other appropriate means consistent with United States security objectives. Military Assistance Programs shall take into consideration the economic capabilities of the specific countries involved. As countries receiving grant aid military assistance develop a greater economic capability, grant assistance should be reduced and the country encouraged to purchase or produce

its own military equipment, supplies and services. Except for overriding military considerations, the United States should discourage the build-up of indigenous military forces which the country cannot ultimately support.

Military assistance programs should, where feasible, encourage the use of indigenous military and paramilitary forces in underdeveloped countries in the construction of public works and other activities helpful to economic development, provided that such participation does not significantly detract from the capability of the forces to perform essential military missions.

Recipient countries should be consulted in planning military assistance. However, no commitments involving future performance or expenditure of U. S. funds will be made or implied without prior approval of the Secretary of Defense.

c. Military Aid Planning.

The military assistance plan should provide a long-range, time-phased schedule of actions by areas and countries intended to assure that the furnishing of military assistance directly supports U. S. military and foreign policy objectives. It should set forth: the missions of foreign military forces to be supported by U. S. military assistance and a time schedule for activating them; a time schedule for furnishing major categories of weapons and equipment as military assistance; a time schedule for the performance of related activities such as local production of military items, military construction and progressive achievement of standards of individual and unit training; and, other pertinent guidance, such as support of economic or other development projects. The plan should be developed within realistic overall order of magnitude dollar guidelines for military assistance by area and, as appropriate, by country.

The planning process, as conceived by the Defense Department will include:

(1) The development and issuance of a Military Assistance Basic Planning Document by the Defense Department;

(2) Preparation and/or submission of military assistance plans and supporting data by the Unified Commands and other designated agencies;

(3) Coordination and approval of plans by the Defense Department; and,

(4) The adjustment of plans by the Unified Commands and other designated agencies.

The Military Assistance Basic Planning Document will be based upon the Mutual Security Objectives Plan (MSOP) -- setting forth U. S. national objectives and specific political-military-economic objectives to be accomplished through military assistance -- and will contain guidance for preparation of long-range plans and programs by the Unified Command and the MAAGs. The Military Assistance Basic Planning Document will include: Appropriate sections of the MSOP and supplementary guidelines and instructions; order of magnitude guidelines within which military assistance is to be planned; applicable assumption as to the availability of resources other than from MAP; and additional guidance concerning the development of military missions, tasks, force structure and other subjects.

The Unified Commands, and other designated agencies, will issue to their subordinate elements appropriate sections of the Military Assistance Basic Planning Document, and such supplementary guidelines and instructions as may be appropriate.

The Military Departments will provide the Unified Commands, and other designated agencies, with appropriate information concerning the availability, supply source, programming lead time, and cost of items and services.

d. Military Aid Programming

Long-range programming of military assistance is a detailed listing of specific requirements and of the funds needed to finance them, area by area and country by country, for each of three consecutive years. It should be developed by the MAAGs and the Unified Commands on the basis of the approved long-range military assistance plan and in accordance with applicable supplementary instructions of the Defense Department.

Military Assistance Programs will be submitted annually and will include the requirements to be approved and funded in each of the three years comprising the programming period.

The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs, is responsible for placing the Military Assistance Programs for the ensuing fiscal year in final form for submission to the Congress. At this stage of program development, the State Department would review the program on political and economic grounds as well as in terms of the approved long-range military assistance plan.

e. Military Aid Approval

After Congress acts, the Department of Defense will adjust the programs as necessitated by Congressional enabling and appropriation legislation, and make a final foreign policy and economic policy check with the Department of State.

SECTION IV

ARMY IMPLEMENTATION OF THE MA PROGRAM

1. General

It is obvious that our military allies cannot achieve their potentially vital contribution to the common defense if their armed forces are inferior because they lack materiel or because that which they possess is outmoded.

Under the Military Assistance Programs, the Department of the Army furnishes materiel in general use by United States forces to friendly foreign countries designated by the President to receive such assistance. In addition to furnishing equipment, or 'hard goods', the Department of the Army trains or arranges for the training of members of foreign armies. Another important Army objective is the improvement of the logistics capabilities of underdeveloped countries.

Where available and approved, the Tables of Organization and Equipment (TOE) of the recipient army are the basis of our support under MAP. If none have been developed, modified United States Army TOEs are used until sufficient experience data can be assembled. In the absence of either, as in the case of 'soft goods', minimum austere standards are applied in determining country requirements.

A further important Army objective is to furnish our allies in those nations having limited logistics capabilities with simpler, less complex weapons and equipment.

2. Responsibilities

a. Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Army is responsible for reviewing MAP requirements and asset data developed and submitted by the Unified Commands. Further review determines if the major forces recommended for support are in accord with force objectives; if appropriate support units are included; and that allowances of equipment are in consonance with or less than U. S. allowances. He is also responsible for approving MA Programs on a world-wide basis for presentation to the Secretary of Defense, and for developing supply and training plans for the support of such programs consistent with the mission of the Department of the Army.

The Secretary of the Army implements MA Programs approved by the Secretary of Defense, in furtherance of policies, procedures and instructions established by the Secretary of Defense. The Secretary of the Army also insures that programs are in consonance with the basic military programs of the Department of Army which support United States plans and objectives.

The Department of the Army is responsible for furnishing or causing to be furnished, all necessary support activities and personnel required under the Army MAP for the Unified Commands.

The Secretary of the Army has delegated his MAP logistics responsibilities to the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Logistics), who is responsible for the discharge of those functions through his staff.

b. Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics

The Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics (DCSLOG) exercises overall supervision of the Army Military Assistance Materiel Programs for the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Logistics). This responsibility has been further delegated to the Mutual Security Division, Office of the Director of Supply Operations, ODCSLOG.

The Mutual Security Division is also responsible for the coordination, supervision and implementation of Department of the Army overseas civilian and economic rehabilitation programs and for similar type programs of other

Governmental and international agencies who, by joint agreement with the Department of Defense, assign responsibility and necessary funds for procurement and supply of a large segment of their requirements to the Department of the Army.

The Mutual Security Division maintains a continuing follow-up with the Technical Services, United States Army Overseas Agencies and Oversea Commands to insure delivery of programmed supplies to recipients within DCSLOG or MAAG established delivery time.

The Mutual Security Division exercises general staff supervision over the furnishing of MAP requirements which are provided as 'services' and which are not contained in materiel programs.

c. Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel

Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel insures assignment of experienced and qualified Army personnel to the MAAGs and Missions, including the assignment of experienced logistics officers nominated by DCSLOG. Preparatory instruction of personnel designated for MAAG assignment includes a 160-hour course of instruction at the Military Assistance Institute in Arlington, Virginia and supplemental language qualification courses, if desired by the Chief of MAAG to which the individual is being assigned.

d. Comptroller of the Army

The Comptroller of the Army develops and presents to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) the Army portion of the MAP budget data that is required for presentation to the Bureau of the Budget. After the Military Assistance Programs are approved, the Comptroller of the Army provides certain additional justification for the funds required to implement the Army's portion of the MAP. The materiel portion of the program, which is usually 80% of the total, and the services portion are administered and justified by the Mutual Security Division, ODCSLOG.

e. Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations

The Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations formulates the Department of the Army position on military assistance policy and planning

to include missions, tasks, strategic and MAP force objectives, requirements for force development and general courses of action. He also monitors Army operational activities of overseas Commands, MAAGs and Missions with relation to the Military Assistance Program and the U. S. Army portion of the Military Assistance Training Programs. This includes establishment of training policies and procedures, the development and execution of training programs, and the coordination of these programs with all interested agencies.

f. U. S. Army Oversea Supply Agencies

The U. S. Army Oversea Supply Agency (USAOSA), New York, has logistical responsibility for European and Middle Eastern countries and for all participants of the Mutual Security Military Sales Program. USAOSA, San Francisco, has logistical responsibility for Pacific and Asian countries; the agency at New Orleans, for Central and South American and African countries. This responsibility continues until every item on every requisition has been shipped or cancelled.

3. Materiel Program

After funds for the Military Assistance , Programs have been apportioned among the military services and the Secretary of Defense has issued the approved programs to the military services, the Mutual Security Division transmits the Army Military Assistance Programs to the various supply agencies for implementation. These programs are also distributed to Department of Army staff agencies, Unified Commands, and the U. S. MAAG or Mission in the individual recipient country.

The programs are then subject to changes in the form of requests for amendments from the MAAG. Such requests require approval by the Unified Commands and are generally based upon changes in either the country forces or the materiel requirements of those forces. Other changes include substitutions, changes in force objectives, local situations and revised political and military considerations.

4. Training Program

The overall objectives of this program are to strengthen the concept of collective military defense by assisting allied countries to strengthen

their internal security and to develop their military forces in consonance with both their external military threat and their economic capability.

Use of Mobile Training Teams, Technical Representatives and Training Missions and Groups and the training of foreign personnel in U. S. schools and facilities.

a. Attainment of combat effectiveness of MAP-supported forces.

b. Proper maintenance and operation of MAP-provided equipment.

c. Self-sufficient country training programs.

d. Increase of the skill of country military personnel to a high degree which will permit transition to more modern equipment.

e. Responsibility for maintenance of overseas internal security (in selected countries).

f. Tangible evidence of the collective defense concept.

(The Air Force and Navy have similar responsibilities and programs in the implementation of the Military Assistance Program.)

SECTION V

MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION

1. In an effort to seek a more realistic solution to the difficulties being encountered in the formulation and implementation of the Mutual Security Program, certain changes in the planning and programming process are being instituted for application beginning with the next full program cycle, FY 1962. These changes are designed to permit (1) a greater precision in the specification of Mutual Security Program Objectives and the Courses of Action stemming therefrom; (2) a more effective integration of political, economic and military considerations in planning and in program development and implementation; (3) greater participation and voice in the planning and programming process by the Country Team and, in the case of military assistance, the Unified Commands; (4) a more realistic assessment of requirements and priorities of accomplishment within long-term plans, and (5) a means of measuring and assessing the significance in terms of US National security interests of any major shortfall between the achievements

of objectives and the programs in support thereof. These changes are reflected in various directives and manuals published by the Department of State or Department of Defense which are implementing instructions for certain recommendations made by the Draper Committee (Appendix 1).

2. During late January and early February, a CINCPAC Team briefed representatives of all PACOM MAAGs on the new concepts and tentative CINCPAC procedures for initiating long range military assistance planning. It is anticipated that finalized CINCPAC guidance will be promulgated in the near future. (Further details on CINCPAC implementation of the MAP were not available.)

SECTION VI

CURRENT STATUS OF THE MUTUAL SECURITY PROGRAM IN VIETNAM

1. (U) General

Vietnam has been strongly on the side of the Free World since it won its long struggle for independence -- a struggle which left it in a weakened, seriously disrupted economic condition. The Armistice Agreement which divided the country left under Communist control the norther part, which possesses the bulk of the natural resources. That Agreement further imposed conditions which limited Vietnam's ability to defend itself and restricted our means of providing military assistance. Despite these difficulties, Vietnam has in the span of five years developed into a stable, anti-Communist country whose military and economic strength are increasingly important in a fertile and relatively underpopulated area that borders on the territory of the aggressive Chinese Communists. Vietnam's strength and steadfastness will be a major factor in preserving the independence of the nations of Southeast Asia.

This heartening progress, which is being closely watched by other Asian nations, is the result of courageous leadership, the industry of its people and generous American aid.

With agricultural production appreciably restored, Vietnam is now meeting most of its food requirements and is slowly increasing exports of farm and plantation products such as rice and rubber. The country's

adequate land resources are being developed rapidly. Further, light industry production is being increased to diversify the economy and to reduce import requirements. U.S. economic aid has contributed to these gains while preventing the inflation which might have vitiated the efforts necessary to achieve them.

Vietnam has been able to devote increasing attention to the kinds of activity which will promote economic development, and it has been possible to reduce American aid very substantially. Yet internal security remains tenuous, and the costs of armed forces large enough to discourage the Communists, added to the political necessity of maintaining a reasonable rate economic progress, are beyond the present capacity of the nation's economy. Vietnam still requires grant assistance to strengthen its basic economic structure and to enable it to maintain the minimum forces essential to its continued security.

2. (U) Objectives of Military Assistance in Vietnam.

The Objectives of the Military Assistance in Vietnam are to assit the Vietnamese Government in organizing, equipping and training armed forces capable of maintaining internal security and providing limited initial resistance to attack by the Viet Cong.

3. (U) Country Contributions.

Although most of the pay and allowances of troops, the cost of arms and equipment, and training guidance is provided by the United States, the Vietnamese continue to show great willingness and energy in absorbing such training and in organizing and utilizing forces to achieve and maintain internal security. The Vietnamese contribution to the costs of its military establishment has increased from eighteen percent of defense expenditures in CY 1959 to a planned twenty-four percent in CY 1960.

4. (U) MAP Accomplishments in Vietnam.

In addition to the training conducted in Vietnam, 3,644 Vietnamese military personnel have received training in the United States up through FY 1959. An additional 726 were trained in third countries or at U.S. facilities overseas. The FY 1960 program provides for the training of 1,375

Vietnamese military personnel in the United States and 226 in third countries. Progress has been made during the last year in equipping as well as training the Vietnamese Armed Forces. This is almost entirely attributable to the Military Assistance Program. Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces are developing into a well-organized and trained military establishment with sound, realistic plans designed to counter external aggression. MAP arms and training have enabled the regular forces of Vietnam to reduce the internal communist threat to the point where the economic growth of the country can proceed.

1 Incl:
Appendix 1 - Extract, Recapitulation of Recommendations by the Draper Committee

APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX A (U)

EXTRACT

* * * * * * *

VOLUME I

Composite Report
of
The President's Committee
To Study the United States Military Assistance Program

August 17, 1959

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III. RECAPITULATION OF RECOMMENDATIONS

A. Planning for Military Assistance

That the Executive Branch take the required action to put into effect procedures for long range planning of military assistance, the key aspects of which are:

1. time phased planning for three and ultimately five years in terms of foreign policy and national security objectives;

2. a requirement that continuation of military assistance to each particular country depends upon continued affirmative findings by the State and Defense Departments that such country programs will support United States military and foreign policy objectives;

3. State Department participation at an early stage in such planning to give foreign policy guidance;

4. a greater degree of decentralization of planning responsibility to the Unified Commands and the Military Assistance Advisory Groups;

5. increased participation in planning by the Country Team under the direction of the Ambassador;

6. clarification of Executive Branch regulations to permit greater consultation with our allies where appropriate in planning military assistance, so as to produce a more effective total effort including better utilization of the resources of recipient countries; and

7. a requirement that all military assistance plans, incluidng order of magnitude dollar guidelines by area (or in appropriate cases by country), be approved by the State and Defense Departments before their implementation.

B. Development of the Military Assistance Program and Presentation to Congress

That the Executive Branch take the required action to put into effect procedures for programming military assistance, the key aspects of which are:

1. three year, time phased programs;

2. greater decentralization of programming responsibility to the Unified Commands;

3. establishment and annual revision on the continuing basis of dollar guidelines for three year programming period;

4. increased participation in the programming process by the Country Team under the direction of the Ambassador; and

5. justification of the program to the Congress by representatives of the Department of Defense assisted by representatives of the State Department and International Cooperation Administration on a coordinated basis agreed to by the State and Defense Departments.

C. Leadership Role of the Ambassador in Planning and Programming Military Assistance

1. that United States Ambassadors as personal representatives of the President provide a strengthened leadership in the planning and programming of military assistance to assure that all United States programs for the country to which the Ambassador is accredited are consistent and effectively carry out United States foreign policy objectives for the country concerned;

2. that United States Ambassadors assigned to countries in which there are important United States military assistance and other aid programs should have appropriate experience and competence in this field when appointed and should be given indoctrination and training in the special requirements of the post to which appointed;

3. that United States Ambassadors assigned to countries in which there are important United States assistance programs should be provided with a senior staff assistant qualified to assist him in planning and coordinating the several United States aid programs.

D. Inclusion of Military Assistance Appropriation in the Department of Defense Budget

That the request for the military assistance appropriation for Fiscal Year 1961 be included in the Defense Department budget and submitted to the Congress in a separate title of the regular Defense Department Appropriation bill, with the appropriation to be made directly to the Department of Defense.

E. Continuing Authorization for Military Assistance

That at the current session of Congress the Executive Branch request a revision of the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended, to place the authorization for military assistance on a continuing basis.

F. Implementation of the Military Assistance Program After Appropriation

That the Executive Branch take the required action to put into effect improved procedures for implementing the Military Assistance Program after appropriation, the key aspects of which are:

1. that the Secretary of Defense should be given clearer responsibility for executing the program;

2. that after appropriation and at subsequent stages of implementation the State Department should be free to propose additional military assistance primarily for foreign policy purposes and to disapprove country programs for inconsistency with approved plans, foreign policy and other assistance programs;

3. that any disagreements between the Departments of Defense and State should be resolved promptly by the Department heads, and in the few cases where this cannot be done they should be settled by the President;

4. that once programs are funded flexibility ordinarily should be secured by use of the President's Mutual Security Contingency Fund appropriation; and

5. that the President should define in an appropriate executive order or letter to the interested agencies the respective roles and relationships of the Secretaries of State and Defense in the planning, programming, and execution of the Military Assistance Program in accordance with the recommendations of this report.

G. Management of the Military Assistance Program

Department of Defense

That there be established within the Department of Defense:

1. A Director of Military Assistance, who at least initially might well be a suitably qualified officer of the armed forces, active or retired, of appropriate high rank;

2. Assistant Directors of Military Assistance for the several geographic areas; and

3. A small independent evaluation staff.

Delegation of Greater Authority to Unified Commands

1. that military assistance planning and programming should be further decentralized to the United States Unified Commands overseas:

2. that the organization and staffing of the Unified Command headquarters be modified, including assignment of an Economic Advisor, as necessary to permit the Unified Commands to exercise their expanded role;

3. that all military elements conducting military assistance operations should be brought under the authority of the appropriate Unified Commands; and

4. that the Unified Commands should be consulted and kept adequately informed on a timely basis of all pertinent information relating to the planning of military assistance programs for their areas or to the implementation of programs for their areas already funded by the Congress.

Speedier Allocation of Funds to the Military Departments for the Procurement of Military Assistance Materiel

1. that the Executive Branch establish procedures so that each office, agency or department charged with responsibility for reprogramming military assistance after appropriation, for reviewing military assistance programs at this stage, for transmitting firm programs and allocating funds to the military departments, and for submitting and acting upon apportionment requests, take the necessary action as speedily as possible and within specific time limits established by the Executive Branch;

2. that the Executive Branch establish procedures so that requests for apportionment of military assistance funds and of Department of Defense funds to finance the procurement of military assistance items in anticipation of reimbursement are made and acted upon concurrently, using a simultaneous justification and the same data; and

3. that the Executive Branch take required action so that two-thirds of the funds to be utilized for military assistance materiel in each fiscal year are made available to the military departments within 30 days after the military assistance appropriation becomes law; four-fifths within 60 days; and the balance, less any reserve deemed necessary for contingencies, within six months.

Improvements in Military Assistance Actions by the Military Departments

1. that the Defense Department take required action to insure that within the military departments high level command attention is given to the Military Assistance Program, and in particular that after funds are allocated to them for the procurement of military assistance materiel, necessary procurement and related supply actions are greatly accelerated; and

2. that highly qualified and experienced personnel are assigned to the program.

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June 3, 1959

ANNEX B (U)

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND PERTINENT INFORMATION ON SOUTH VIETNAM (U)

CONTENTS

ANNEX B (U)

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND PERTINENT INFORMATION ON SOUTH VIETNAM (U)

INTRODUCTION

Vietnam is one of the major areas of conflict between the Soviet bloc and the Free World. Like other such areas--Korea, Germany, and China -- Vietnam is divided into two zones, one of which is occupied by a Communist Regime.

Both zones in Vietnam have developed full-fledged systems of government and distinct social and economic institutions. One is the Republic of Vietnam (RV), with its capital at Saigon, and the other is the Communist regime, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV), with its capital at Hanoi. The Communist regime has deeply affected not only political and military institutions, but, as elsewhere in the Soviet orbit, has had a pronounced effect on economic life as well as on the family, religion, social values, and patterns of living in general. In brief, Vietnam's cultural traditions have had to bow to the Marxist doctrine that has been imposed upon the Vietnamese who live north of the parallel, the zone allotted to the Communist regime as a result of the Geneva cease-fire agreements of 1954. This cleavage of Vietnam, not only into two territorial zones, but also into two separate societies with different social, economic, and political orientations, should never be forgotten when dealing with any Vietnamese problem.

Since this study is about Vietnam, it is natural that it should consider Vietnam as a whole and concentrate on the Vietnamese proper, that is, the inhabitants of Vietnam who are ethnic Vietnamese. Though they represent nearly 90% of Vietnam's 26 million population, they live in only one-fifth of the whole territory (the rice-bearing lowlands). The vast hills and jungles of Vietnam are inhabited by approximately 2 million members of non-Vietnamese groups, ranging from the almost-Chinese Nungs in the North to the almost-Indonesian Chans in the South. These minority groups -- and there are several score of them--have their own patterns of living, their own social values, and their own forms of intellectual expression.

SECTION I

GEOGRAPHY AND CLIMATE

1. Geography.

Vietnam is located on the eastern flank of the South Asian peninsula. It is bordered on the north by China, on the west by Laos, and Cambodia, and on the east and south by the China Sea. The demarcation line between South and North Vietnam stipulated by the 1954 Geneva agreement is the 17th parallel.

The southern zone (The Republic of Vietnam) comprises the 13 provinces of the central part of Vietnam and the 22 provinces of the southern part of the country. It has an area of 170,231 square kilometers. The northern zone (The Democratic Republic of Vietnam) consists of the 29 northern provinces and the four northern most provinces of Central Vietnam. It has an area of 104,103 square kilometers.

North Vietnam consists of a series of delta lowlands facing the Gulf of Tonkin and a mountainous hinterland extending to the borders of neighboring Laos and China to the northwest. Most important of the lowlands is the triangular delta of the Red River (Song Coi) which is the economic heart of the country. It includes the Red River "rice bowl", the capital, and the port of Haiphong. South of the Red River delta are the smaller coastal lowlands of Thanh Hea at the mouth of the Song Ma and Vinh in the lower reaches of the Song Ca. The capital of North Vietnam is Hanoi (1953 population, 188,600). Other important cities are Dien Bien Phu and Mon Cay.

The Republic of Vietnam extends for approximately 1,100 kilometers along the axis of its crescent shape. At no point is it wider than 240 kilometers. It is slightly larger than the state of Washington.

The southern zone has three main landform divisions - the southern section of the rugged Chaine Annamitique Mountains, the coastal plains, and the Mekong Delta. The Chaine Annamitique covers about 75% of the country. This area consists mainly of heavily dissected hill lands, rolling to hilly plateaus. The hills are generally rounded and are 100 to 200 meters higher than the surrounding broad valleys. The plateau areas have rolling surfaces

and are predominantly 300 to 1,000 meters above sea level. Local relief may be as much as 250 meters in this area.

The coastal plains are generally less than 25 miles wide. The surface is generally level, but becomes gently rolling towards the highlands. In places, mountain spurs extend to the sea and divide the coastal plain into sections. Sand dunes, 4 to 20 meters high, are common.

The delta area is characterized by a flat, poorly drained surface, crisscrossed by numerous tributaries of the Mekong and a dense network of canals and smaller streams. The elevation of the delta generally does not exceed 6 meters above sea level; slopes are generally less than 1 percent. The northern section is dominated by stands of evergreen forest, and the marshy Mekong Delta is one of the world's leading rice producers.

The capital of South Vietnam is Saigon. The population of Saigon-Cholon and its main suburb, Giandinh, is 1,800,000. The port of Saigon is a vital factor in the economic life of South Vietnam and is on the Saigon River, 45 miles inland from the sea. Other important South Vietnamese ports are Nha Trang and Qui Nhon. Da Nang, primarily a military port, is now being expanded to receive an increasing amount of commercial traffic. Camranh can be used as a deep water anchorage. Other important cities are Hue (95,000) and Da Nang (77,000).

2. Climate.

Climatically, Vietnam is divided into two regions, the northern and the southern. During the winter monsoon (November through March) the northern area, above the Chaine Annamitique is subject to moist trade winds from the north Pacific Ocean which cause the characteristic cloudy rainy season. Heaviest precipitation occurs during October and November. During these two months up to 50 inches of rain may fall. The southern area has its dry season with comparatively fair weather at this time. Saigon receives an average of eight inches of rain during those months. During the summer monsoon season (June through September) conditions are nearly reversed. Very heavy rainfall (50 inches in Saigon) prevails in the south. The northern section experiences variable condition in summer.

Several typhoons can be expected to affect the coast each year, usually between July and November. Summer-like conditions prevail during the transitional periods. Mean daily temperatures for a representative northern section station are 90° F. in January. Mean minimums are 78° F. in June and 65° F. in January. At Saigon, in the southern area, the mean daily maximum in April is 95° F. and the minimum 70° F. in January. The absolute minimum temperature recorded at Saigon is 57° F.

SECTION II

HISTORY AND GOVERNMENT

1. Indochina

a. General.

The history of Indochina before the French intervention in the 19th century is largely one of the periodic in-migrations of various Asian peoples and of the rise and fall of rival empires. Due largely to the difficulties of internal communication across the central mountain chain, as well as to the impinging cultural pressures of India and China, no one political power was ever able to extend its authority over the entire peninsula. Instead, two widely separated centers of civilization developed: one under Chinese cultural influence in the Red River delta of the north, the other under Indian cultural influence in the delta regions and Tonle Sap (Great Lake) basin of the south.

About the year 1800 A.D., the political configuration of Indochina began to approximate modern conditions. The peninsula was divided among three lowland powers, Annam (modern Vietnam), Cambodia, and a group of Lao principalities, all of which held much of the same territory as they now control today. The mountains and uplands had become a refuge for remnants of the other populations of Indochina and for tribal peoples infiltrating southward from China.

The Annamites, known in modern times as Vietnamese, had their historic origins in the Red River delta near the modern metropolis of Hanoi. They were still in a primitive culture stage when the Chinese invaded their homeland in the second century B.C. and placed them under a subjection which endured for more than a thousand years. The Chinese called their conquest Tonkin (Eastern Capital) and later renamed it Annam (Pacified South). In time these names made their way into geographic nomenclature, with Tonkin referring to the general area of the Red River delta and Annam to the coastal regions further south. Since World War II both Tonkin and Annam have been replaced by the common designation Vietnam (Transcendent South) which does not bear the connotation of former subjection to foreign rule.

The millenium of Chinese rule left a profound imprint upon the character and society of the Annamites. By introducing the concept of an

Emperor as the "Son of Heaven" and the culture of irrigated rice, the Chinese laid the foundation of a stable political system and an expanding population. By establishing schools and fostering the observance of Chinese customs and rites, the conquerors successfully molded the Annamites into their own cultural world. Confucian ethics, Taoist philosophy, and Buddhist theology became as much an integral part of the Annamite tradition as of Chinese life itself.

In 939 A.D. the Annamites ousted the Chinese and established an empire of their own which retained merely nominal vassalage to Peking. The stage was now set for expansion southwards. Moving with extreme slowness, taking up one river valley at a time, the Annamites pushed their way down the eastern coast. Everywhere the pattern of their conquest was the same. They left the uplands and mountains to primitive tribesmen and settled only in the lowland areas which were suitable for the cultivation of irrigated rice or for coastal fishing. By 1700 A.D. the Annamites had reached the borders of Cochin-China.* By the time of the French intervention in 1858, they had overrun the Mekong delta and were threatening Cambodia.

The Cambodians, or Khmers, are a people of predominantly Indian culture who are the descendants of an ancient empire which reached its zenith in the period 800-1200 A.D. It extended its power into neighboring Thailand and Burma. After 1500 A.D. Cambodia entered upon several centuries of decline during which it maintained its existence with difficulty against Thailand on the west and the rising Annamite Power on the east. By the 19th Century it had fallen into a condition of ignominious vassalage to both countries and was saved from probable extinction only by the timely arrival of the French.

The Lao of northwest Indochina are the offshoot of a massive migration of Thai peoples from southern China which occurred at various times from the 7th to the 14th centuries A.D. The Thai invaders spread to the south and west, dividing into three principal branches: Lao, Shan, and

*"Cochin-China," now known as southern Vietnam, was a name devised by Portuguese explorers who visited Indochina during the 16th Century. It appears to have a connotation similar to Indochina, since Cochin is the name of a small province in India.

Siamese. The Lao and Shan remained in the highland valleys of Burma, Thailand, and Indochina where, after brief periods of greatness, they split into numerous small principalities. The Siamese overran the broad plain of the Mennam River and established a kingdom, first at Ayuthia and then at Bangkok. In time the Siamese also turned on their northern Thai brethren and sought to extend their dominance over the Shan and Lao. West of the Mekong River, where there is a Lao population of several millions, the Siamese were generally successful. East of the Mekong the history of the Lao principalities after 1500 A.D. became largely the record of a small people struggling with some success to maintain themselves against the encroachments of the Siamese and Annamites.

As empires contested for the Indochinese lowlands, the pattern of civilization in the mountains followed a separate course. Most of the southern and central uplands remained the home of aboriginal tribal groups whose primitive ways of life remained substantially unchanged during the course of centuries. In the north the mountains were gradually overrun by feudal tribal peoples of Chinese origin, some of whom arrived as early as the 13th century A.D. while others were as late as the 1880's. One small piedmont area of southeast Indochina and portions of the Cambodian plain became the refuge of the Chams, a people whose kingdom had once dominated Cochin-China and southern Annam before it fell prey to the relentless tide of Annamite expansion.

b. Impact of French Colonialism.

French economic and cultural penetration of Indochina began as early as the 17th century, in the person of a few score merchants and Catholic missionaries. It did not develop into outright colonialism until the latter half of the 19th century. In 1858 a French naval squadron seized the Annamite port of Tourane in retaliation for the ill-treatment of some missionaries. This was discovered to be a strategic error, since Tourane had no profitable hinterland and was unsuitable as a base of supply. The attack was then shifted south to Cochin-China. Saigon fell to the French in 1859, and the remainder of Cochin-China was annexed outright as a French colony in 1862-1867. During the same period the independent kingdom of Cambodia, which was hard-pressed

by both Siam and Annam, gratefully accepted the offer of a French protectorate.*

Although the French conquest of Indochina began over the missionary problem, the driving motive behind the venture was the development of the peninsula as a trade route into southern China. In 1866-1868 an exploratory mission travelled up the Mekong to explore its possibilities as a means of inland communication but found it nearly useless because of the rapids along its middle course. French commercial interest then shifted to the Red River in northeast Indochina, with the inevitable result that fresh conflicts broke out with the Annamite empire. In 1884, after several wars and campaigns, both Tonkin and Annam were placed under French protectorate, with the Emperor of Annam continuing to hold formal court at the imperial palace in Hue. Nine years later the conquest of Indochina was completed with the establishment in 1893 of a French protectorate over the Lao principalities.

Under the French aegis Indochina passed for the first and only time in its history to a unified political control. By decrees of 1887 and 1897 the peninsula was federated into an Indochinese Union under the authority of a French governor general alternately resident at Hanoi and Saigon. Local governments were of two types, direct and indirect. In the direct governments the French took the lion's share of administration and interfered most extensively with the traditional order of native life. The colony of Cochin-China and the protectorate of Tonkin were under this type government. The indirect governments were the protectorates of Annam, Cambodia, and Laos, in which the administration remained largely in the hands of native officials acting under the supervision of resident French governors.

Under the influence of the colonial regime, Indochina also entered the mainstream of the modern world. French entrepreneurs explored the country, stimulated agricultural production, opened mines and factories, and introduced regular highways and railroads. The rapid growth of such major population centers as Saigon, Hanoi, and Haiphong provided a great stimulus to foreign and domestic trade. Efforts were also made to improve

*The establishment of the Cambodian protectorate was facilitated by the Treaty of Bangkok (1867) in which the Siamese relinquished all claim to Cambodia in return for annexation of the two western Cambodian provinces of Battambang and Angkor. These provinces were returned to Cambodia in 1907, were seized again by the Siamese in 1941, and were returned once again to Cambodia in 1946.

health and education standards. A university was founded at Hanoi in 1917, and each year the most promising students were sent to France for further study.

Yet whatever the material and cultural achievements of the French in Indochina, they never succeeded in securing the permanent loyalty of the peoples whom they governed. The root of the opposition to the French lay in the Annamite territories, where there was a proud national sentiment that never reconciled itself to foreign domination. It found frequent expression in acts of conspiracy, rebellion, and terrorism which plagued almost the entire period of colonial rule. In Cambodia and the Lao principalities, the pressure of French control was so slight that there was rarely any positive popular reaction either for or against the colonial regime. The tribal groups which inhabited the mountains of Indochina were devoid of national consciousness. Their relationships with the French were regulated entirely by prevailing views of local tribal interests. Some of the most primitive mountain groups in central Indochina were not finally brought under French control until the mid-1930s.

c. Struggle for Independence.

World War II, the fall of France, and the Japanese occupation of Indochina in 1940 prepared the end of colonial rule over Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. For a time, however, the full impact of these developments was not readily apparent. Although the Japanese occupied the peninsula in force, they were content to treat it for several years as "friendly occupied territory." They made no attempt to encourage local nationalists and left civil administration entirely in the hands of the French Vichyite colonial regime.

In March 1945 the situation altered radically. The Japanese moved their South Pacific headquarters from Singapore to Saigon, ousted the French administration in a sudden coup, and called upon the Indochinese peoples to proclaim their independence. The old colonial fabric disintegrated almost without a blow. Most of the Annamite territories passed under the control of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) which represented in its early stages a coalition of several nationalist groups under the presidency

of the veteran Vietnamese Communist, Ho Chi Minh. The reigning Emperor of Annam, Bao Dai, was persuaded to abdicate his office and to declare his adherence to the republican cause. In Cambodia the King announced the end of the French protectorate. His counterpart in Laos, the elderly King of Luang Prabang, was reluctant to follow suit but eventually yielded to strong Japanese pressure. To complete the new political alignment of the peninsula the Japanese encouraged Lao nationalists to proclaim the union of all the Lao principalities into a Kingdom of Laos under the rule of the former King of Luang Prabang.

After the Japanese surrender in August 1945, Indochina was placed under joint British and Chinese Nationalist occupation as prescribed by the Potsdam conference. The British held the territory south of the 16th parallel and offered no obstacle to the re-establishment of French control over southern Vietnam, Cambodia, and southern Laos. In the north, the Chinese proved much less obliging. They allowed the DRV to maintain its capital in Hanoi and delayed their departure until March 1946. At this time the French signed a diplomatic agreement with the Vietnamese nationalists in which the DRV guaranteed that the return of French troops to northern Vietnam would not be opposed. The departure of the Chinese also paved the way for the restoration of French rule in northern Laos.

On all sides in Indochina it was now agreed that a substantial revision of the former colonial status of the peninsula was necessary. The French were anxious to establish a new Indochinese Union which would increase local political and economic autonomy but at the same time would retain final authority in the hands of a French High Commissioner and of ministers appointed directly by him. This proposal was acceptable to the Cambodian and Lao kingdoms and to puppet Vietnamese governments which the French hastily set up in Cochin-China and Annam. The DRV continued to hold effective political control in Tonkin, had strong clandestine support in the remainder of Vietnam, and refused to abandon any of its vital powers. It was joined in its opposition to the proposed Union by many Cambodian and Lao nationalists who believed that their governments were too subservient to the French.

After several months of uneasy truce and inconclusive negotiations, all prospects of a peaceful settlement in Indochina disappeared when

French naval bombardment of Haiphong in November 1946 was followed by a DRV attack on Hanoi in the following month. Thereafter hostilities spread into almost all areas of the peninsula, developing into a civil war which lasted for nearly eight years.

The bulk of the fighting occurred in Vietnam. The Vietnamese Communists, better known as Viet Minh and now known as Viet Cong, early took command over all other nationalists in the DRV by virtue of their superior leadership and skill in conspiratorial organization. From the first they abandoned the cities and concentrated their forces in the countryside. There they built up a strong following and launched frequent attacks on communication routes and centers of population. The French lacked sufficient forces to conduct an all-out campaign against the Viet Minh guerrillas. They fought largely a holding operation designed to protect the cities and vital delta areas from serious Communist penetration.

While the French pinned down most of their forces in the struggle against the Viet Minh, the remainder of Indochina teetered at times on the verge of anarchy. More than a third of Cochin-China passed under the control of two Vietnamese political-religious sects, the Cao Dai and Hoa Hao. These sects established their own private armies and acted for all practical purposes as states within a state. In Cambodia the royal government was beset by partisan activities fomented by the Viet Minh and a dissident nationalist movement known as the Khmer Issarak (Free Cambodia). In Laos the Francophile regime was opposed first by the Lao Issara (Free Laos) movement and later, after most of its leaders had made their peace with the French, by a Communist-dominated off-shoot of the Lao Issara known as Pathet Lao (State of Laos). Meanwhile the mountain tribes of Indochina hovered uneasily between all sides, some seeking neutrality, some throwing in their lot with the French, and some declaring their support for the Viet Minh.

For several years the issue in Indochina remained uncertain. The French were bolstered after 1950 by large amounts of U.S. economic aid and military equipment. They managed to contain the Viet Minh within fairly manageable limits. In those parts of Indochina outside Viet Minh control

they achieved a diminution in nationalist discontent by gradually abandoning their former colonial prerogatives. In March 1949 a self-governing State of Vietnam claiming sovereignty over Tonkin, Annam, and Cochin-China was created under the former emperor, Bao Dai. Later in the same year similar concessions were made to Laos and Cambodia. In 1953 and early 1954 the French granted full independence to all three countries. Indochina ceased to exist as a single political unit.

Only the problem of the DRV remained unsolved. Instead of waning through attrition or losing supporters to the Bao Dai government, the Viet Minh grew more powerful every year, particularly after the Communist victory in China opened new possibilities of organization and supply. In 1949 regular Viet Minh troops appeared in action in north Vietnam for the first time. In the following year they were strong enough to capture all but one of the French military strongholds along the Chinese frontier. Beginning in 1952 the Viet Minh passed increasingly to the offensive. In 1953 Viet Minh forces twice invaded Laos. They inflicted a crushing defeat on the French at Dien Bien Phu in North Vietnam in 1954 and penetrated deep into both Laos and Cambodia. Their clandestine resistance organizations intensified activities throughout Vietnam. By April 1954, a diplomatic settlement of the Indochinese crisis was at last undertaken. At that time it was calculated that the DRV controlled approximately one-half of the total Vietnamese population and more than one-half of all Vietnamese territory.

d. Geneva Conference.

The Geneva conference of April-July 1954 brought to an end the Indochinese civil war. It was attended by representative of France, the DRV, Laos, Cambodia, the State of Vietnam, the United Kingdom, Communist China, and the USSR. Of these only the State of Vietnam refused to sign the accords reached at the conference. The United States abstained from the Geneva discussions. Later the United States declared unilaterally that it would not seek to modify any of the accords reached at the conference and would regard any resumption of aggression in Indochina in violation of the accords as a serious menace to international peace and security.

Inasmuch as the Geneva accords still constitute the political instrument by which many of the international affairs of Indochina are

regulated, the major decisions of the conference are briefly summarized below.

(1) Vietnam.

The major accomplishment of the Geneva conference was the cessation of hostilities in Indochina. This was facilitated by the partition of Vietnam into two zones divided roughly at the 17th parallel. The northern zone, which had always constituted the Viet Minh stronghold, was consigned entirely to the DRV. The southern zone was awarded to the State of Vietnam.

Another provision of the Geneva accords called for the evacuation of the military forces remaining in the territory of the other side within a period of 300 days. In addition, all civilian residents in either zone were to have the option of choosing the zone in which they wished to live. Some 750,000 persons moved from the northern to the southern zone and a much smaller migration from the south to the north

Neither of the two Vietnamese zones was permitted to receive reinforcements of foreign troops, arms, or military supplies, or to establish new military bases. Nor could either government have foreign bases in its territory nor enter into military alliances. As a partial exception to this rule the French military forces present as of 1954 in the southern zone were allowed to remain at their established strength.

The independence of Vietnam and the principle of Vietnamese national unity were formally recognized at Geneva. It was provided that the permanent political status of both zones would be regulated by free and secret elections to be held in July 1956 under international supervision. These elections were never held because the government of the southern zone later announced that it felt no obligation to comply with the directives of an agreement to which its representatives at Geneva had refused their assent.

(2) Cambodia

The Geneva conference formally recognized the independence of Cambodia and provided for the evacuation of all foreign troops remaining in the country within three months after the signing of the accords. The conference agreed that Cambodia had the right to seek foreign military aid again in the future if its security was threatened.

(3) Laos.

The Geneva conference also formally recognized the independence of Laos. It provided for the evacuation of foreign military troops and allowed Laos to seek foreign military aid in the future if its security was threatened. At the request of the Lao government, the country was permitted to retain two French military bases on its territory and French military instructors for its army. The Communists won a corresponding concession when it was decided that the Pathet Lao insurgents who did not choose to lay down their arms would be allowed to regroup as independent units in the two northeastern Lao provinces of Phong Saly and Houa Phan.

Supervision of the implementation of the Geneva accords in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos was entrusted to International Control Commission (ICC) teams composed of Indian, Canadian, and Polish representatives under an Indian chairman.

e. Current Political Status

Indochina still remains divided into the four political units recognized by the Geneva conference. The frontiers of Laos, Cambodia, and the Republic of Vietnam have been guaranteed against Communist aggression by a September 1954 declaration of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) alliance. The member powers agreed to consider a Communist attack against any or all of the free states of Indochina as an attack against themselves.

None of the four states of the peninsula shows marked inclination to return to an Indochinese union of the type fostered by the French colonial regime. Laos, Cambodia, and the Republic of Vietnam have received substantial amounts of U.S. foreign aid, but have shown little instinct for mutual cooperation. They have generally insisted on following divergent foreign and domestic policies. The DRV has been drawn completely into the Communist orbit.

The Kingdom of Laos is the largest and least populous of the Indochinese states. It is a constitutional monarchy and attempts to steer a neutralist course in world affairs. In December 1957 the two provinces of Phong Saly and Houa Phan, which has been constituted a regroupment area for the Pathet Lao forces under the terms of the Geneva accords, were returned

to Royal Lao control in exchange for recognition of the Pathet Lao as a legitimate political party and the admission of two of its leaders into the Lao cabinet.

The Kingdom of Cambodia is a constitutional monarchy but is actually dominated by a single political party under the leadership of its former king, Norodom Sihanouk. Although it has taken vigorous measures against internal Communist subversion, Cambodia maintains a predominantly neutralist course in international policies.

The Republic of Vietnam (RV) is the smallest but second most populous Indochinese state. It was established in its present form in October 1955 after a popular referendum in which 98 percent of the electorate voted to abolish the former State of Vietnam headed by Bao Dai. The RV is theoretically a constitutional republic on the Western model. Actually it is an authoritarian state under the personal rule of its president and premier, Ngo Dinh Diem. The RV is militantly anti-Communist in its foreign and domestic policies and claims dominion over all Vietnam.

The Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) is the second largest and most populous of the Indochinese states. It is completely under the control of the Vietnamese Communist Party, known officially as the Dang Lao Dang (Vietnam Workers Party). The DRV refuses to recognize the legitimacy of the RV and persistently acts by open propaganda and clandestine means to secure the union of all Vietnam under Communist control. DRV subversive agents are also active in Laos and to a much lesser extent in Cambodia.

2. Republic of Vietnam

a. General.

The legality of the present Republic of Vietnam Government was confirmed in October 1955. A referendum offered the people a choice between Emperor Bao Dai as chief of a state patterned on the old regime and Ngo Dinh Diem as chief of state of a republic. The vote was heavily in favor of the latter. The Republic was proclaimed with Mr. Ngo as President. The government of the new state is heavily dependent today upon the financial and material support of the United States. In spite of this dependence and of the fact that it controls only one-half of the territory of Vietnam, it is

making major progress toward economic independence compatible with its status as an independent nation.

b. Foreign Relations.

The Government follows in its foreign relations the objectives of insuring and strengthening its autonomous status while, at the same time, maintaining and enhancing national prestige. To these ends, it has established diplomatic relations with other nations and concluded treaties and agreements with outside powers which would be of aid to the development of Vietnamese industry, commerce, and economic life.

The Republic was accorded only a secondary position so far as representation was concerned at the Geneva Convention. The government neither signed nor ratified either the treaties guaranteeing its independence or the armistice agreement although these documents established the independent status of the nation.

The Republic of Vietnam has been recognized diplomatically by all of the neutral or so-called Western Bloc nations. While not a member of the United Nations, it is represented on several specialized agencies of that body. It regularly sends observers to United Nations meeting and to meetings of the Colombo Plan nations. The country participated officially in the Bandung Conference in 1955. It is not a member of the SEATO although that organization guarantees the independence of the country. A positive attempt to present the Republic of Vietnam's political ideology was undertaken in 1957-58 when President Ngo and his colleagues traveled to many Western and friendly Asian countries. Similarly, representatives of friendly nations have made visits to Vietnam. These things serve to indicate the permanence of the new state and its ever-increasing prestige in the community of nations.

Relations between Vietnam and the United States have been close. United States moral and material support has been a significant factor in fostering the development and stability of this young republic. Our aid to Vietnam started as early as 1950, before the present boundaries became fixed. At that time, assistance was channeled through the French. Since September 1954, all aid has gone directly to the new republic. The value of this

assistance totals many millions of dollars annually. It includes a large supply of military equipment to improve the capabilities of the South Vietnam Armed Forces.

Equally as important as the military assistance, the economic aid provided through the United States Operations Mission (USOM) has permitted economic development of the country. The period of occupation during World War II and the eight years of strife between the French and the Communists caused a major disruption of normal economic life throughout Vietnam. France and Australia also have contributed to the rehabilitation of South Vietnam's economy.

Under USOM auspices, Michigan State University has a group of experts working in Saigon to assist in the training of young civil servants and to advise the government concerning sound principles of governmental organization. United Nations teams and private relief agencies also have been active in South Vietnam.

As a part of the economic rehabilitation, the Republic of Vietnam has re-established normal trade relations with various friendly nations. It has increased the quantity of its exports to create a more favorable balance of trade. South Vietnam does not have either diplomatic or trade relations with Communist China and North Vietnam.

A major foreign relations problem facing South Vietnam concerns reunification at some future time with North Vietnam. The Communist ideology in North Vietnam is diametrically opposed to the basic fundamentals of the anti-communist government of the Republic of Vietnam. Any amicable settlement of the obstacles preventing reunification appears to be remote at present. The Government of the Republic of Vietnam favors eventual reunification elections. It contends, however, that such elections must be postponed until the citizens living in North Vietnam are free of Communist coercion and possess the same freedom of decision enjoyed by those individuals residing south of the 17th Parallel.

Another highly desirable development would be an improvement in relations between Vietnam and Cambodia. Traditional animosities have been aggravated since the dissolution of French political control within

Indo-China. Unsettled border disputes as well as residual financial questions from the breakup of French Indo-China in 1953 remain sources of friction. Such disputes prevent the establishment of mutually advantageous friendly relations.

c. Governmental Structure.

The Republic of Vietnam is organized under the terms of a Constitution adopted in October 1956. This provides for the separation of powers among the executive, legislative, and judicial branches in much the same way as in the United States.

The Constitution accords paramount authority to the executive branch. The president promulgates the laws, appoints and dismisses civil and military officials, concludes, and ratifies treaties and internation agreements after approval by the legislature. He is also Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. The President is elected for a period of five years. The Vice President would succeed him should the Presidential office become vacant.

Below the Presidency, the Cabinet Council includes the heads of 15 Executive Departments (Ministers) and certain other leading Officers of the Government.

The unicameral legislature is known as the National Assembly. It is composed of deputies elected by direct suffrage by electoral constituencies. The present National Assembly has 123 members.

The Judicial branch of the Government is not yet on a par with the Executive and the Legislative branches. In fact, the Constitution makes no provision for the organization of a judicial system although it does state that "The Judiciary shall have a status which guarantees it independent character." The administration of the courts and the interpretation of the law are currently handled by the Department of Justice as a part of the Executive branch of the Government.

The territory of Vietnam is divided into 36 provinces. These constitute the second level of governmental organization. There are also four cities, Saigon, Hue, Dalat and Danang (Tourane), which have provincial status. Below the provinces are districts, cantons, and villages. Each provincial administration is appointed by the central executive branch of

the government and operates provincial courts, provincial budgets, and public properties lying within its boundaries. The head of a province is known as Chef de Province (Chief of the Province). He is responsible for public order and safety and for the administration of the provincial budget. He also presides over official ceremonies within the province.

Between the provincial chiefs in the northern and central sections of the country and the central government in Saigon, special representatives of the president have supervisory powers over the administrative operations of several provinces.

The districts within a province are organized along the same lines as the provincial administration. Their administrative structure is known as a prefecture. A district is made of several cantons which in turn are composed of several villages. Each of these administrative divisions is a miniature organization of the agency above it in the hierarchy.

At the local level the village is the significant organ of government. To at least eight out of every ten Vietnamese, the "government" is the administration which runs his village. This is the administration which controls the taxes he must pay and the public works he must maintain, and decrees which young men in the village shall undergo military duty when conscription quotas must be filled. Village life is administered today as it was long ago, by a Council of Notables composed of the leaders and wealthy men of the community. These men elect their various officers. The president acts as the village representative when this is required. The official who corresponds most closely to a mayor is usually the most junior member of the Council of Notables. This man keeps the village records and the village seal. He is the only member of the council whose appointment requires approval from the Chief Prefect of the district administration. Thus, this man is at once a representative of the village and of the central government. The line of communication between Saigon and a village would be through the President's Administrative Delegate to the Chief of the Province, to the Chief Prefect of the District, through the Elder of the Canton and finally to the President of the village.

d. Political Parties.

Political parties have existed in Vietnam for over 30 years. Many of these groups were really little more than lobbying agencies for special interests. Leadership of political efforts has always come from the old Mandarins or administrators of the old regime, the landowning and business leaders, and the intellectuals. Other segments of the population have had no experience or training in political organization and behavior.

There are in existence in the Republic of Vietnam today three major political parties. They are the National Revolutionary Movement (NRM), the Revolutionary Worker's Party (RWP), and the Movement for the Struggle for Freedom (MSF). In addition to these organizations there are other splinter groups which make up a small independent movement strong enough to hold 15 seats in the National Assembly. There is no organized political group now operating openly in the Republic of Vietnam which is clearly in opposition to the government.

One of the first major problems President Ngo had to face when he took office was to quell the open rebellion by three powerful sect groups. Two of these, the Cao Dai and Hoa Hao, were organized on the basis of special religious beliefs and displayed both verbal and military opposition to any opponent. The third, the Binh Xuyen, had grown out of an early band of river pirates. These three groups had no political beliefs other than an opportunistic dedication to spoils and wealth by plunder and illegal means. Upon taking office, President Ngo moved quickly to eliminate these three sources of trouble for his regime. He was quite successful and today faces no problem from that quarter.

There is no party of Communist sympathy operating today in South Vietnam even though there continue to be small contingents of armed Communists in some of the southern provinces.

Catholicism exerts a strong influence in Vietnamese politics south of the 17th Parallel. The Catholic segment of the population represents the best organized and most cohesive political force in the country today. The attitudes of this segment range from the strong nationalist and anti-French, anti-Communist views to a position of neutralism adopted by certain

high-ranking members of the clergy. This influence has been seized upon by some politically dissident group as well as the Communists in the north for their own propaganda advantage.

e. Basic Political Issues.

Most of the basic domestic issues facing the Government of the Republic of Vietnam result from the Government's efforts to develop a sound economy and from the presence in the country of large numbers of foreign ethnic groups.

A basic economic problem confronting the government in 1955 was the predominant position occupied by the Chinese minority in business and commerce. To eliminate Chinese (and to a lesser extent Indian and French) preeminence in the economic sphere, the government decreed that henceforth only persons of Vietnamese nationality would be permitted to operate eleven basic businesses which were considered essential to the livelihood of the average citizen. The subsequent withdrawal of large sums of Chinese-owned capital initially had a depressing effect on the economy but recently business has shown signs of recovery from this shock and is expanding.

Another basic program which has had widespread effects has been the encouragement of foreigners permanently resident in Vietnam to become Vietnamese citizens. Since the largest foreign minority is the Chinese, this program has affected them princiaplly. At first, most of the Chinese population resisted attempts at "nationalization," but a growing number of Chinese residents are accepting this status.

The nationalization program has also effected the Cambodian minority. The Vietnamese consider the minority groups within their national boundaries to be Vietnamese citizens and subject to Vietnamese civil law. The Cambodians within Vietnam, however, consider themselves subjects of the King of Cambodia and not subject to instructions issued by the Government of Vietnam. Future negotiation are anticipated to discuss solutions to this problem.

SECTION III

POPULATION

1. Ethnic Origin and Minorities

The vast majority of the approximately 12,000,000 people now inhabiting the Republic of Vietnam are Mongoloid in origin. They are the descendants of Nomadic tribes which migrated from eastern Tibet several centuries before the Christian era and settled in the Red River Delta in northern Vietnam. This ethnic group today comprises about 85 percent of the population.

The remaining 15 percent of the population is composed of mainly six minority groups: the Chinese, the mountain tribesmen, the Cambodians and Chams, the Indians and Pakistani, and the Europeans. The largest group, the Chinese, number approximately 850,000, of whom about 600,000 reside in the Cholon district of Saigon and the rest mainly in other urban areas. They play an extremely important role in commerce at every level in the import-export trade, and in banking.

The half-million "Moi" (actually a Vietnamese word for "savage" used indiscriminately to cover a number of mountain tribes) are probably descendants of the original non-Mongolian inhabitants of Vietnam. They now inhabit the highlands, living as dry-rice farmers or as nomadic hunters and having little contact with the Vietnamese and other lowlanders.

The Cambodians (or Khmers) and Chams are the remnants of two peoples who once divided the rule of what is now the Republic of Vietnam, Cambodia, and part of Laos. About 400,000 Cambodians inhabit the part of the Mekong Delta south and southwest of Saigon. About 3,500 Chams still remain in four isolated areas north and northeast of Saigon.

Indians and Pakistani number perhaps 4,000. While a few are employed in government service, more are active as merchants, money lenders, and owners of rice land. There are probably no more than 10,000 Europeans, now in South Vietnam, most of these are French.

2. Socio-economic Factors

a. Working Classes

Despite a marked increase in an urban working class in the Republic of Vietnam, the overwhelming majority of the population is farmers.

Superimposed on this traditional economic base of peasant subsistence farmers, there is developing a middle class and a group of wage earning industrial and commercial plantation workers who comprise less than 10 percent of the total population. The economic elite, most solidly represented in Saigon and in the old imperial capital of Hue, is composed partly of wealthy business industrialists or landowners, Westernized intellectuals, and highly placed government and religious figures.

Thousands of Vietnamese earn a livelihood as paid plantation laborers, as unskilled coolie labor, or by performing more skilled tasks as rubber tappers or operators in plantation processing plants.

Members of the urban working class work as coolies on the docks, on construction jobs, and in factories doing the lifting, carrying, and hauling that are done mainly by machines in the West. Others operate bicycle or motorized rickshas, drive small French taxis, work as plumbers, carpenters, and painters, and at other skilled and semi-skilled occupations. An increasing number of men are now working in small machine shops to meet the growing demand for miscellaneous metal products. This economic class is expanding although at present it is of approximately the same composition as during the period of French Colonialism.

The decade of war caused many families to abandon their farms and seek the relative security of the city. Vacant lots, alleys, and canal banks became sites for their flimsy shelters. Large slum quarters quickly sprang up in addition to the thousands of houseboats in the canals. The city of Saigon, in particular, absorbed several hundred thousand of these displaced peasants.

b. Social Strata

The structure of Vietnamese society has been repeatedly altered during the long history of foreign political and cultural domination; however, it still contains vestiges of traditional prestige factors.

The upper class currently embraces about 3 percent of the population and includes Westernized intellectuals, professional people, and highly placed government and religious figures. Most of these people are also either landowners or descendants of the old landed aristocracy or

Mandarin families. While wealthy Vietnamese business men, industrialists, or landowners are part of the economic elite, they find only a precarious footing in the upper social classes unless they are Western-educated or are connected with the traditional socially elite families.

In the villages and rural areas considerable respect is accorded teachers, Catholic priests, Buddhist bonzes, and all educated persons. All schoolteachers are accorded upper-class status in rural areas although they are likely to be counted in the middle-class in urban areas.

In the urban areas particularly, an expanding middle social class is developing which corresponds to the economic middle class. In this class are found most civil servants, commercial office workers such as secretaries, stenographers, and translators, schoolteachers, shop owners and shop managers; and non-commissioned officers and company-grade officers of the Armed Forces. Although many Chinese and Indians rate middle class status from an economic viewpoint, they are considered by many Vietnamese to be among the lower class socially.

c. Customs

Many of the traditional social customs are still common among all strata of Vietnamese society. Some have been modified by the acceptance of certain Western social concepts, particularly among the wealthy, educated, upper-classes in the urban areas. Even here such acceptance is in many cases conditioned by the values and attitudes instilled by deep-rooted Vietnamese culture.

The Vietnamese concept of the universe and man's place in it and the great importance of the family and the village are conditioned to a great extent by religion. To the Vietnamese, the physical world, the social order, and man's place and condition in both are essentially pre-ordained and unchanging. This destiny concept produces a high valuation on stoicism, patience, adaptation, and courage in the face of adversity. Religious beliefs may affect social customs in ways which would not normally occur to even the most sympathetic and perceptive Westerner. One example might be the belief derived from religious and philosophical

concepts that parts of the human body possess their own hierarchy of value or worthiness. The head is considered almost sacred while the feet are held in low esteem. As a result of this, it is a gross insult to pat a child on the head or to cross the legs while seated so that one's foot points at an individual.

The Vietnamese are intensely proud of their civilization and of their national identity. Their basic social outlook, however, revolves around the family and the village. The preeminence of the family extends throughout every level of Vietnamese life. Not only are ancestor-worship and veneration of elders a deep motivation of much social behavior, but there is unspoken acceptance of the family as the most important unit in the culture. The individual has an absolute obligation, to be violated only at the risk of serious dishonor, to care for members of his family before other individuals and to prevent any of them from being in want.

The position of women in Vietnamese life is determined by the Confucian order, in which they are totally subordinate to men. In practice, particularly among the urban middle class and in connection with the family financial affairs, the wife may exercise a great deal of responsibility. Except among the Westernized upper-classes, however, the wife does not participate so actively in social affairs as her husband.

An important social diversion for many Vietnamese is gambling, from childhood to old age and at every social level. Government operated national lotteries constitute an important source of revenue. However, at present, the government discourages gambling and is urging its citizens to refrain from all games of chance as being unproductive luxuries.

3. Education

Through all the changes the Vietnamese have seen in the last 150 years, one major constant has been a deep reverence for learning.

Before the French came, Vietnam was run at all levels of administration by officials called Mandarins, who were chosen on the basis of education alone. The aristocracy of learning was the only aristocracy of any continuing importance in old Vietnam. Learning was prized not only for its own sake, but as the main road to wealth, power, and social standing.

Primary education was carried on by the village schoolmaster, whose home generally served as the village school. Almost all boys learned at least a few hundred Chinese characters, and many went on to the works of philosophy and history which formed the core of Confucian scholarship.

With the coming of the French, the formal educational system changed considerably. Both the Confucian and the French systems were pyramidal in that a series of successive winnowings sharply reduced the number of persons who went on to each higher level of study. The French system also retained the close connection between high standing in the civil service examinations and the award of responsible government positions. Nevertheless, the French system and two major policies in particular were responsible for the breakdown of the Confucian order and of Confucian scholarship. First, beginning in the 19th century, the French encouraged the Vietnamese to write their own language in the Latin alphabet, quoc ngu. Second, in the early years of the 20th century the French "reformed" the civil service examinations, making European rather than Confucian learning the requisite for success. As a result of these policies, Confucian studies lost the prestige which had formerly led young men to give them the years of arduous study they demanded.

The present school system is administered by the Secretary of National Education in the national government and retains substantially the form of the French school system. The three-year elementary school program has been compulsory for children of both sexes since 1952. The government is attempting in evening classes to raise the literacy rate among older people. Primary schools have a five year curriculum of reading, writing, arithmetic, natural science, principles of morality, composition, drawing, manual training, physical education and domestic science.

The four-year course of the First Division of the secondary school system is divided into classical and modern sections. Students of both sections study a number of basic subjects taught in Vietnamese, but those in the classical section study classical Vietnamese literature and Chinese characters. Those who choose the modern section study French and English. The three-year course of the Second Division continues the general pattern

of the first, but gives students the option of continuing their language studies or of substituting programs of natural science or of mathematics and philosophy.

The goal of secondary education is the stiff baccalaureate examination, which is passed by about one of every 200 students entered in the elementary schools. The baccalaureate is required for admission to the five-year university program or to the advanced technical schools. The Vietnamese baccalaureate represents a standard at least as high as the completion of two years at the best American universities.

In addition to public schools at the primary and secondary levels, private schools educate many students. These schools follow the public school curriculum and are regulated and subsidized by the Department of Education. There has also been a special school system for Chinese. Under a recent agreement the French government will continue to operate its own primary and secondary schools leading to the French baccalaureate. In addition, there are a number of normal schools to provide high school teachers, an industrial technical school, specialized governmental technical schools, and a school of applied arts, where the traditional fine arts of Vietnam are taught, including goldsmithing, lacquer work, cabinet work, and tapestry making.

At the university level, the National University of Vietnam in Saigon is the most important institution. It has a student body of about 1,500. Its scholastic standards are high. There are also universities at Dalat and Hue as well as several technical schools of university rank, including an Institute of Public Administration operated in Saigon by Michigan State University.

Higher education in foreign countries is greatly sought after by advanced students. The Vietnamese Government grants passports for study abroad to students taking courses not offered in Vietnam. In any year at least 1,000 to 1,500 Vietnamese students will be studying abroad. Perhaps half of this number is in France, a smaller group in the United States, and substantial numbers are in Belgium, Canada, Switzerland, India, and Indonesia.

4. Religion

The religious atmosphere in the Republic of Vietnam is characterized by a tolerance of various religious beliefs. The 1956 Constitution states that the country shall have religious freedom and no one religion is designated as official.

Many different religions exist in Vietnam. There is no clear-cut boundary between them. One person may hold a half-dozen beliefs simultaneously without incurring friction. The pervading doctrines of Confucianism and Taoism are Chinese in origin. Buddhism came to Vietnam via China and Tibet and is also widely accepted. In many instances, these doctrines have been greatly modified by the influence of a multitude of indigenous beliefs which have never been entirely eradicated. The Emperor of Jade, a religious figure taken from Taoism, is worshipped by virtually all Vietnamese. However, Confucianism has far outdistanced both Buddhism and Taoism in popular appeal. Confucius himself has become a deity and his teachings exercise the major religious influence in the country.

In addition to being a purely ethical system, Confucianism regulates relations between people, such as the relation between sovereign and subject, father and son, wife and husband, younger to older, and friend to friend. It imparts a harmonious unity to the political and social fabrics of Vietnamese life.

Since World War II and the period of civil strife that followed, the influence of Confucianism has gradually decreased. Nothing has yet emerged to replace the fallen Confucian order, although Catholicism and the new religious sects are making strong attempts to fill the gap.

Nearly nine-tenths of the Vietnamese people officially regard themselves as Buddhists. This must not be taken to mean, however, that they practice Buddhism to the exclusion of other religious beliefs and doctrines. Buddhism apparently satisfies emotional needs that are beyond the range of practical Confucianism.

There are two major branches of Buddhism, the Mahayana or Greater Vehicle and the Hinayana or so-called Lesser Vehicle. While both branches are represented, Vietnamese Buddhism is chiefly Mahayana. The approximately

200,000 adherents of Hinayana Buddhism are all found in the south among the members of the population of Cambodian ancestry.

Another religion of some importance in the Republic of Vietnam is Taoism, which resembles Confucianism and Buddhism in its Chinese origin. Beginning as a speculative philosophy centering on the notion of man's oneness with the universe, Taoism priests are regarded by the Vietnamese people as skilled diviners and magicians particularly adept in controlling the spirit world.

Christianity came to Vietnam with the very outset of Western penetration in the 16th and 17th centuries through the Spanish and Portugese Roman Catholic missionaries. As a result of persistent missionary efforts (frequently in the face of persecution by emperors who feared Western political and economic control), approximately 10 percent of the population of the Republic of Vietnam are Catholics. This is the highest proportion of Catholics of any Far East country except the Philippines.

The wealthier and more formally educated classes in the cities contain a greater proportion of Catholics than do other Vietnamese groups. With the initial advantage of a Western education in church schools during their early years, Vietnamese Catholics find it easier to obtain foreign scholarships and to make the most of Western training.

American Protestant missions have operated in Vietnam since World War I. Until recently their activities were limited in the main to the mountain tribes of the high plateaus. With the gradual rise of American assistance and influence, there has been an increase in Protestant activity in the lowlands. /Alliance Christian and Missionary and Seventh Day Adventist missions now exist in several cities, and some Vietnamese Protestant students are now sent to the United States for advanced theological training.

With this diversity of religious activity, the most startling commentary on the picture of religion in Vietnam is the growth of certain indigenous sects which have arisen in the recent past. The most important of these are the Cao Dai and the Hoa Hao. The Cao Dai doctrine draws heavily on both Christianity and Buddhism while its ritual is strongly influenced by traditional Vietnamese spirit worship. Founded in 1919, the

Cao Dai faith has its great cathedral and the seat of its administrative organization at Tay Ninh, a city about 90 kilometers northwest of Saigon. There are approximately 500,000 Cao Dai adherents.

The Hoa Hao is essentially a reformed Buddhism sect founded in 1939 by a young man named Huynh Phu So, who gained within one year more than 100,000 converts to his new doctrine. The Hoa Hao religion has proved to be very attractive to the peasants in southwest Vietnam who like the simplicity of the rituals, the animistic ideas blended into the worship, and the absence of the necessity to construct elaborate temples or pagodas in which to conduct religious ceremonies. At the high point of its popularity shortly after World War II, Hoa Hao believers numbered approximately 2,000,000. Huynh was killed in 1947, however, and a leader of comparable stature has not emerged.

During the period of the Indo-China War from 1946 to 1954, the French authorities encouraged the Cao Dai and Hoa Hao leaders to maintain the security of the areas occupied by their adherents. Thus both sects created armed forces numbering thousands of men to provide security throughout the countryside. Subsequent to the July 1954 cease-fire in Vietnam, these autonomous armed elements were found to be incompatible with the Vietnam governments' plan to establish a national civil administration throughout the territory of the Republic of Vietnam. A portion of the armed forces of the sects soon surrendered to the government, but the remainder had to be eliminated by armed counteraction by Government Security Forces. At present, these sect-armed units are no longer a significant security problem within Vietnam.

5. Language

Vietnamese belongs to the Tibeto-Burman sub-family of the Indo-Chinese languages. These languages are all monosyllabic and tonal in varying degree. The Indo-Chinese languages are all very ancient and with the passage of time have largely replaced the Austro-Asiatic languages in Southeast Asia.

Vietnamese is divided into three mildly differentiated major dialects, northern, central, and southern. Within each dialect there are

a number of subdialects. The major differences are in vocabulary, pronunciation, and use of the tones. The subdialects of Upper Central Vietnam (from Tourane to Vinh) are markedly different from all the others in phonetics and are characterized as archaic.

The Vietnamese language held a status inferior to the Chinese for many centuries, and its first known script was an adaptation of the Chinese characters. The transportation of this specially derived demotic script, known as chu nom, into the Latin alphabet was begun by Jesuit missionaries in the sixteenth century. It did not reach a definitive form until 1624.

6. Health

Health is a major problem in Vietnam, although the government, with the assistance of United Nations and United States health organizations, is making progress in improving health and sanitation standards. Traditional Vietnamese attitudes toward disease and sickness are closely linked to conceptions of the spirit world and its influence upon daily life. Consequently, most Vietnamese have developed a resignation to pain and other effects of disease. Modern medical practice, however, has gained a ready acceptance among those exposed to Western influence.

Professional medical practitioners are scarce and concentrated mainly in urban areas. Under French rule, the Vietnamese became accustomed to French health officers and doctors. While they continue to respect foreign doctors in general, they feel more at ease with Western-trained doctors of their own nationality. The so-called "Chinese doctor" (who might be either Chinese or Vietnamese), using methods of treatment, and herbs and drugs developed systematically by the Chinese through thousands of years of practical experience and experimentation continue to play an important part in Vietnamese medical care. Western-trained doctors and other medical personnel remain in short supply despite increasing numbers of graduates from the medical school in Saigon.

The average Vietnamese probably consumes daily less than two-thirds the calories consumed by the average American. Even so, problems of actual starvation seldom exist. The Vietnamese are largely vegetarians. Meat is a luxury reserved for special occasions. Their diet is usually

deficient in proteins, vitamins, and minerals, a situation which lowers general resistance to infectious diseases and is responsible for the occurrence of rickets and beri beri.

Rice is the staple food. The Vietnamese generally prefer polished white rice, a variety in which the outer husk (containing most of the vitamins and protein) has been removed and only the starchy interior remains. The second most important food is corn, which sometimes serves as the staple food in the absence of rice. This basic diet is supplemented with a variety of local fruits and vegetables when available; the chief sources of protein are soy beans and fish, and a pungent sauce (nuoc mam) made from salt pickled fish. With the assistance of several international agencies, the government has undertaken projects to increase the cultivated acreage and the variety of food products grown in the country.

The problem of malaria is sometimes exaggerated; many are inclined to classify different fever-producing ailments under this category. Actually, it is serious only in the upland regions, the so-called "malaria belt," which takes in more than half of the area of Vietnam but less than one-tenth of the population. Large parts of the densely populated lowland areas, including the city of Saigon, are free of malaria-bearing mosquitoes.

Since achieving independence, the Republic of Vietnam has assumed full control of all health establishments. A Department of Public Health has been established in the national government and includes a Sanitary Police Service. The department is charged with the direction of hospitals, health protection, and public sanitation. The government has instituted intensive programs of public health treatment and education, and has fully utilized the still scarce medical and hospital facilities through hospitalization, outpatient clinics, and mobile health units.

Assisted by the United States, the Vietnamese have dug nearly 2,000 wells throughout the Republic so that even smaller communities now have access to fairly clear drinking and cooking water.

7. General Character of Society

a. General

Although actual combat has stopped, Vietnam is today at war with itself. Many of its conflicting forces are worldwide in scope. On

one hand is the European civilization with its skeptical questioning, its powerful machines, and its contending ideologies; on the other is Chinese communism, with its all-encompassing system of political, economic, and social control.

Conflict within Vietnamese society extends beyond this ideological division between Western liberalism and Chinese communism. Within the Communist camp, the Communist leader, Ho Chi Minh, still wears the garb and beard of a village elder and quotes the Confucian classics. The officials surrounding him quote Mao Tse-tung and wear Stalin-style suits. On the Nationalist side, many Vietnamese have publicly changed political allegiances several times in a short period. Others, like recently-elected President Ngo, have steadfastly spurned compromise. Even greater numbers of Vietnames are adrift, or straddling the fence.

The educated elite of any of these Nationalist groups can no longer command the unquestioning reverence once afforded them. They must now struggle to win acceptance even within the confines of the village.

b. Village Life

Ninety percent of the Vietnamese live in peasant villages surrounded by bamboo hedges which mark the sharpest boundary in Vietnamese life. "The Emperor's law stops at the bamboo hedge," the Vietnamese used to say. When a mandarin visited a village, he stopped outside the hedge until the villagers ceremoniously conducted him inside. Today the bamboo hedge remains a symbol of important differences between city and village. Villagers think of city people as cunning, grasping, and immoral; city people consider villagers ignorant, suspicious, and untrustworthy.

The villagers constitute an overwhelming majority of the population. They are the economic base of Vietnamese life. Their rice crops support officials, artisans, merchants, and professionals in the towns and cities. Thus the peasant has traditionally held a high place in the social scale.

While the city people are likely to be more conscious of time in terms of hours, most villagers think only in terms of functional time - the time it takes to boil rice, or to plant a field, or the span between harvests.

c. Adaptation and Adjustment

The Vietnamese respect a proverb which points out that the supple, bending reed survives storms which break the strong but unyielding oak. The recently-installed republican regime has replaced the dragon on the former coat-of-arms with a bundle of bamboo reeds which to the Vietnamese represent endurance above all vicissitudes. This suppleness is crucially important to them. They do not admire firmness and consistency as primary qualities. They admire adaptability.

Adjustment of principles to a given situation rather than firm adherence to immutable principle is demonstrated in the Vietnamese approach to justice. Vietnamese courts have long shown little concern over legal precedent. On the whole, they feel no need for a reasonable degree of consistency from decision to decision. Instead they decide each case according to the special circumstances of the persons involved. In judging a suit for damages, for example, the court considers the relative ages of plaintiff and defendant, their relative social standing, occupations and wealth.

Loyalty is a respected value to the Vietnamese. But to change sides after a suitable delay will rarely be branded as desertion or treachery. Today both the Communist and the anti-Communist administrations contain "turncoats." Honesty is also an admired virtue, but it would be considered foolish to sacrifice one's family's interests for the sake of being fair toward strangers. Thus the Vietnamese recognize shadings in the values which the Westerner tends to look upon as "all black" or "all white."

d. Civil Strife

The Vietnamese consider that society is made up of dangerous, conflicting forces that man cannot fight but must learn to live with by simple, common-sense adaptation and adjustment. One of the phenomena to which the Vietnamese have adapted over the centuries is political warfare within their own country. Throughout most of their long history, civil wars between rival dynasties have been more common in Vietnam than in any other Far Eastern country. Several times in the past the land has been partitioned by rivals for supreme power as it is today.

The great mass of Vietnamese people do not see the present struggle for power in the terms that outsiders see it. To outsiders the Hanoi government stands for international Communism. The Saigon government stands for Western democracy. Although the Vietnamese leaders are well aware of the issues involved between these two ideologies, the common people are not. They see the struggle in the simpler terms of independence and land reform. Both issues are being thoroughly exploited by the Communists in order to gain mass support.

e. Independence

The Vietnamese profoundly resent foreign control. They want doclap, utter unconditional independence. Ho Chi Minh gained the respect of even the bitterest anti-Communists for successfully resisting the French, at first without benefit of foreign help. He now denounces the Saigon government as an American puppet. Anything Americans do which lend any color of plausibility to this charge strengthens him. But any sign of heavy dependence upon Red China or Soviet Russia tends to weaken him--and such signs are becoming increasingly numerous.

f. Land Reform

Even though most Vietnamese farm land outside of South Vietnam is already divided into tiny plots owned by the peasants who work them, there is still not enough land to go around. The Communists have loudly promised land to all, but this promise is no more than an empty slogan designed to capture the allegiance of hundreds of thousands of landless peasants. Nor is there any land available for further distribution in the North even if the Communist promises were sincere. In this respect the government in Saigon has a major potential advantage in the reserves of arable land available in the area it controls.

g. Face

To the Vietnamese it is but simple common sense to reason that, since people often judge by appearances, appearances are important. Through preserving the forms of essential human relationships, people feel reassured about their continuance. Sons impoverish themselves to provide their father with an elaborate funeral--but they gain great face. Such examples pervade Vietnamese society.

Because the Vietnamese value adaptability so highly, the people do not lose face by inconsistency. Where Americans expect a leader to "stick to his guns," the Vietnamese expect a leader to adjust his thinking to changing circumstances. In less than two years, Emperor Bao Dai supported first the French, then the Japanese, then the Viet-Minh, then the Americans, then switched back to the French. Not even Communist propaganda made much of these changes. They made sense to the Vietnamese people, because at that time circumstances were changing quickly and in their eyes a prudent man should also change his loyalties quickly. Several other prominent political leaders have changed sides several times since then without losing face.

While this stress on the importance of appearances is found throughout the Far East, it has perhaps been carried farthest in Vietnam. Often a powerful force can be propitiated by displaying before it the appearance or tokens of mastery while withholding the substance. For centuries the Vietnamese rulers propitiated powerful Chinese emperors in this way, by humbly acknowledging their inferiority, by sending "tribute" payments, and by requesting confirmation of their own titles. These tokens satisfied the powerful Ming and Manchu emperors, who sent "gifts" in return for the "tribute" and who graciously and condescendingly issued patents confirming the Vietnamese in their rank.

Powerful spirits are treated the same way. People bring offerings of paper money, incense, rice wine, and expensive food to the temples. They burn the paper money and the incense, but take home the rice wine and food for themselves. The spirit gets the tokens, but the suppliants keep the substance. Such actions often appear to Americans to be pointless except when they are used as a fraud or deception. But these are not deceptions. No one is fooled. They are symbolic acts, similar to an American mayor presenting the keys of the city to a distinguished visitor.

The importance of face makes public opinion a powerful force for harmony in the villages. To bring dishonor on ones' family and village is a serious matter. The threat of ostracism by village or expulsion by family is a strong deterrent, far stronger than the punishment that can be meted out by law.

h. Family Loyalty

A most important force for harmony in Vietnamese society is family loyalty. The entire society rests upon the kinship system. The basic social unit has the large household of an older man and wife, their married sons, daughters-in-law, and grandchildren. While this extended social unit is becoming less common today, family ties still bind as they have for thousands of years.

The family system was traditionally strengthened by land-holding customs. The Vietnamese peasant family traditionally raised or made nearly everything it used, and this pattern is still found throughout most of the country, especially in the North. Most land was owned in small family parcels--only in the last century have large plantations developed.

To build upon this foundation of family life, the Confucian philosophers found their mortar in hieu, or "filial piety." Taking for their premise that feelings of love and respect for parents were innately ingrained in people, they built an entire system of social relations with it. A proper son who cultivated his natural feelings of respect for his father would as a consequence be a useful member of the community and a dutiful subject of the king. The most important religious ceremonies in Vietnam continue to be the rites of the family ancestor cult, where feelings of filian piety are still the most respected value in Vietnamese life and are manifested by veneration of departed ancestors.

i. Learning

The scholar has lost his traditional position as a leader of Vietnamese society. While today many leaders and administrators are scholars, new leaders are emerging who can make no claim to scholarship. A good education, however, is still a highly-revered asset.

Though Confucian learning has almost completely disappeared, the traditional Confucian respect for learning remains. Education is still the chief road to fame and glory, and still brings wealth and power to the successful. Even though the literacy rate went down for a time under the French occupation every village has people who can read and literacy is on the ascendancy. The mass of uneducated peasants is still very

unsophisticated and likely to readily accept written statements which would strike a Westerner as absurd. The Western-educated elite, however, tend to weigh written statements critically and are in fact over-critical, looking for hidden meanings. While Americans tend to think of learning as a means to some practical end, the Vietnamese usually consider learning as a valuable end in itself.

j. Leadership and the Moral Order

Confucianism once provided the moral order which village and city, peasant and gentry shared. When the French occupied Indochina, they did not set out to destroy the moral order; their administrators tried to confirm and support it. But the moral order depended on Confucianism through which the Vietnamese were educated for Key government positions. Thus, French changes in education and public administration inadvertently resulted in the destruction of this moral order.

The French did not disturb purely religious institutions. They did, however, set out to "reform" local patterns of government along modern European lines and to make available European higher education. In doing so they seriously weakened the Confucian order. The mere fact that the French conquered Vietnam dealt a heavy blow to the traditional order. Confucianists had been conquered by non-Confucianists.

But the final blow was the French "reform" of the traditional civil service examinations just before World War I which required European rather than Confucian learning for success. The Vietnamese turned avidly to the French educational system and took pride in beating the French at their own game. The scholar-gentry class this system produced governs South Vietnam today. Its members are no longer Confucian scholars. They are Western scholars. Many hold Western university degrees.

Where the traditional Confucian scholar looked backward to an ideal past, the Western-educated elite who rule Vietnam today look forward to an ideal future. Their problem is to transmit this image to the peasants behind the bamboo hedges and to win acceptance of these goals. Independence is a goal on which all Vietnamese passionately agree. It is hardly a real issue any longer, though it remains an important propaganda

tool. Democracy is not an important issue in the eyes of most Vietnamese today, though it may become one.

The struggle for control of Vietnam is between the Communist bureaucracy in Hanoi and the modernized scholar-gentry bureaucracy in Saigon. In many ways communism resembles Confucianism. Both are secular political philosophies which offer a complete system of values as well as an entire way of life. Both are reform movements which offer an ideal image of society as a model toward which change can be directed. Both place little value on formal religion and high value on formal education. Both require of their followers an early strenuous intellectual and moral discipline. But communism is in other ways very different from Confucianism and far from attractive to the tradition-oriented Vietnamese peasant. Its insistence on consistency and thoroughness does not fit the traditional Vietnamese preference for adjustment and adaptation. Its demand that the party and the state receive the highest loyalty conflicts with the traditional feeling that this loyalty belongs to the family.

k. Authority and Negotiation

The traditional Vietnamese government stressed unity of power and hierarchical subordination. In theory the emperor was all-powerful. He was the head of the huge family of Vietnamese and was expected to care for them like a father. His orders were transmitted through the chain of command to provinces, to districts, to cantons and finally to villages by the mandarins of the imperial civil service who administered these units.

In politics, as in other aspects of Vietnamese life, the ideal solution is not firm adherence to principle but settlement of conflicts by negotiation and bargaining. Until as late as autumn 1955, the Cao-Dai, Hoa-Hao, and Binh Xuyen sects were openly in arms against the Saigon government and through clandestine radio stations bitterly denounced its leader, Ngo Dinh Diem, as a rebel. They maintained allegiance to Bao Dai against Ngo. But at the same time negotiations continued with the Saigon government. The Vietnamese feeling is that ideally none of the parties should be utterly crushed; rather, the best way would be to work out some kind of mutually satisfactory arrangement among them all.

In Vietnam no position taken is irretrievable, no commitment is final. Bao Dai's former viceroy in Tonkin is now a minister in the Ho Chi Minh government, while several men who were once Communist officials now hold key positions under Ngo.

1. Attitudes Toward the Outside World

In their international relations, the Vietnamese can be expected to make shrewd appraisals of their own situation and to bergain readily. They are prepared in their own minds to give much ground if necessary, but they patiently, tenaciously, and skillfully negotiate for the last ounce of advantage.

At first view, Vietnamese attitudes may seem conflicting toward powerful foreigners. On one hand, the foreigners are disliked; on the other, they are admired and respected. For example, the Chinese have for two thousand years been admired and respected as the center of civilization. At the same time they have been feared. From the sixteenth to the nineteenth centuries the Vietnamese looked down on Europeans as ignorant and vicious barbarians. Since the French conquest, the Vietnamese intellectuals have transferred to Europe, especially to France, their traditional attitude toward China. They see the United States in a somewhat different light as a result of the American record in colonial affairs and the success of American aid.

m. The Present Situation

The great mass of Vietnamese have not taken sides in the current conflict. They are trum-chanh, "under the blanket," waiting to join the winning side. Unlike Europeans or Americans, the Vietnamese feel no compulsion to choose sides or to take a stand in time of crisis. Western-educated Vietnamese feel a little uncomfortable about being trum-chanh, but tradition-oriented Vietnamese do not. They feel it is wise to wait and see. They cannot be expected to choose sides or express their allegiance whole-heartedly in the present struggle until they are sure which side is winning. They will watch events in coming years carefully for signs of the outcome.

SECTION IV

RESOURCES AND ECONOMY

1. Agriculture

Approximately 90 percent of the people of Vietnam derive their livelihood from agriculture. Most of them are employed in growing rice and rubber; the rest are engaged in fishing, mining, forestry, and the processing of products of these industries. Rice culture comprises three-fifths of all agricultural activity.

Most of the people of the Republic of Vietnam live in the lowlands, particularly the fertile coastal plains of the central region and the Mekong delta. The swampy delta area can be cultivated only after considerable drainage. The cultivated area of Vietnam could be increased appreciably if the hill and mountain plateaus were free of malaria and the Vietnamese overcame their traditional dislike of residence in mountain regions. Some soils of these upland areas have a special fertility and their extent makes them one of the important agricultural resources. Tree and bush crops such as lac, tea, and latania appear to be the most promising means of utilizing such areas at present.

In general, Vietnam is a country of large landholdings, absentee landlords, tenants who operate 60 to 80 percent of agricultural land, and landless agricultural laborers. The agricultural practices of Vietnam require enormous manual labor.

Canals constructed primarily for transport and drainage purposes provide the basis for an irrigation system. Because of the wide seasonal variation in rainfall from year to year, irrigation is necessary to insure stable production of rice and other crops.

Rice dominates Vietnam's agriculture. Other major crops are rubber, corn, kapok, tobacco, tea, and pepper.

Rubber is grown chiefly on the famous "Terre Rouge", which is a soil belt stretching from near Cap St. Jacques, near the northeast edge of the Mekong Delta, northwestward into Cambodia. About 90 percent of the rubber production is on large plantations which cover a total area of about 160,000 acres and are owned almost entirely by French and Belgian capital.

Vietnamese and Chinese growers account for the rest of production on small landholdings.

Corn production of Vietnam in 1953 was estimated at only 15,800 tons compared with a prewar annual production of 300,000. In the past kapok has been one of Vietnam's most important export crops but it is now reduced in importance owing to unsettled conditions, transportation difficulties, and aged stands. Exports fell from 500 tons in 1949 to 393 tons in 1952. Production of tobacco is inadequate for domestic demands. Vietnam imports raw tobacco as well as some manufactured tobacco products.

Green tea production is concentrated in plateau regions. Since 1934, however, large European tea plantations have been established to produce black tea.

Pepper plantations located in central and south Vietnam produced only 25 tons in 1953-1955 mostly for the domestic market. Some 15,500 tons of copra were produced in 1950 and 1951, of which 5,000 tons were exported each year. Vietnam also produces a wide variety of oilseeds, including cottonseed, castor beans, soybeans, tung, candlenut, rubber seed, sesame seed, and peanuts. Small quantities of cajeput, waterlily, lotus, camellia, ling, and citronella oil are produced. Additional agricultural products include cassia, nux vomica, sweet potatoes, manioc, quinine, various tropical fruits, and garden vegetables. Anise, betelnut, mustard, cola nuts, opium, gamboge, areca nuts, aniseed, tamarind seeds, indigo, mangrove bark, and gallnuts are produced and exported in small quantities.

2. Forest Products

No virgin forests now exist in Vietnam because they were extensively exploited over the last half-century to meet the needs of the country. The major part of the present forests are of secondary growth with limited commercial value. Pine oil, pitch, turpentine, natural rosins, waxes, balsams, and beeswax are produced primarily for local use.

3. Fisheries

Fishing is a leading occupation. Fish form an indispensable part of the Vietnamese diet and are an important export item. Although catches of fish have been drastically reduced in recent years and exports have declined, fish still remain an essential element in the economy. Nuoc-man,

a fish sauce with a high vitamin content, is an article of great importance in native commerce and uses a major portion of the fishing catch.

4. Natural Resources

Although Vietnam does not rank high in the production of any important minerals, it does have a variety of mineral resources. North Vietnam is the richest from the mineral standpoint, possessing large deposits of coal, iron, and phosphates, and smaller deposits of manganese, zinc, lead copper, calamines, silver, tin, wolframite, antimony, steatite, barite, kaolin, molybdenum, and many kinds of stone.

In the Republic of Vietnam there are few known mineral resources other than some coal, phosphates, gold, precious stones, white sand, kaolin, and salt. Indications of radioactive minerals have been discovered, however, and explorations therefor continue.

5. Industry

Manufacturing is comparatively undeveloped in Vietnam. Most manufactured products are imported. The great majority of the people engaged in "manufacture" are simple artisans who use the primitive equipment which their ancestors used for centuries. A few large factories were developed under the French rule for the production of goods which did not compete with those of metropolitan France. Most of these are French-owned monopolies or near-monopolies. A few small workshops were established by Chinese and to a lesser degree by Vietnamese. Most of the large industrial plants are located in North Vietnam close to the coal and other mineral resources now controlled by the Communist Regime.

Plants for processing rice, rubber, and chemicals, as well as tobacco factories, shipyards, textile mills, and distilleries are located in the Republic of Vietnam.

Some of the rubber is processed into tires and tubes in Saigon. Most of the raw rubber products are exported.

The Saigon-Cholon area produces and consumes fair quantities of chemicals. Oxygen, acetylene, carbon dioxide, and absorbent carbons are produced in quantities approximately sufficient to satisfy the local demands. Most of the Republic's rubber production facilities in the Saigon area are supplied with local chemicals. Chemical production also includes some

output of fertilizers, vegetable oils, soaps, perfumes, paints, and varnishes, but additional quantities of these products must be imported. Magnesium cement is used for millstones for the rice-milling industry. Small-scale processing of locally grown tobacco is widespread, but large-scale tobacco processing is concentrated in Saigon-Cholon.

Large-scale textile manufacturing is concentrated in North Vietnam but some smaller mills are located in Saigon. Since Vietnam produces only a small percentage of the raw materials needed for textile manufacture, it depends on imported raw material. Weaving is done largely as a household industry.

Some Vietnamese distilleries use modern equipment and methods to work rice, molasses, and corn, but others use primitive equipment in making drinking alcohol, as well as alcohol for use as a motor fuel.

Three sugar refineries in Vietnam make white and brown sugars, molasses, and rum and molasses alcohol.

Other small industries include the manufacture of rugs, articles from coconut fiber, dyes from forest products, bricks and tile, buttons, candles, furniture, shoes and other leather goods, and glassware and ceramics.

The farmers make many of their own farm tools, but some agricultural implements are manufactured in the Saigon area. Repair and construction facilities for small vessels, a few mechanical workshops, engineering works, and some foundries and repair shops also exist.

Traditional handicraft industries constitute an essential factor in rural community life and are carried on by farmers and family groups throughout Vietnam. In addition to the preparation of foods and the distillation of alcohol, these pursuits include the making of embroidery and lace, fish nets, hammocks, rope and twine, rattan furniture, clothing, and a variety of articles for everyday use, such as mats and baskets. Other activities engaging the attention of the local population include the making of jewelry, religious figurines, bamboo fans, brass and copper articles, sampans, pottery, coconut products, peanut products, and vermicelli. Lacquerware, mother-of-pearl inlay, carved ivory, and porcelain are other handicraft products.

6. Power

Annual production of electricity in the Republic of Vietnam was 140 million kilowatt-hours in 1953. The principal generating plants are thermal installations, which in the past have used coal from North Vietnam. Recently they have been dependent upon imported coal from other sources. Many of the plants serving towns are equipped with diesel or producer-gas engines and use fuel oil imported from Indonesia. While the country contains many hydroelectric sites, none of importance have been developed.

Control of the electric power industry is in the hands of a few French companies. A National Office for Distribution of Electric Energy was created recently in Vietnam for the purposes of reconstructing power lines and installing thermal plants to distribute electric power to rural areas and to promote development of cottage and small-scale industries.

7. Transportation and Communications

a. General

The transportation net of Vietnam is centered on Saigon, a river port located on the Saigon River about 45 miles from the South China Sea. Saigon is normally accessible to ships of 6.5 meter draft but there is a 3.5 to 4 meter tidal range over the entrance bar. Fully loaded Victory and Liberty ships can enter the harbor only at high tide. A mooring and pilot station is located off a sheltered roadstead at Cap Saint Jacques at the entrance to the Saigon River.

Saigon harbor extends for about 4 kilometers along the right bank of the river. The port area consists of two sections. One contains three berths and the other has nine berths. The Port is well equipped with cranes, warehouses, and fueling facilities.

b. Railways

Vietnam has about 1,380 kilometers of railroads. Approximately 1,200 kilometers are in operation. The rail system consists principally of a single line leading north along the coast from Saigon to the 17th Parallel with several shore branches. Railroads were badly damaged during hostilities. Although reconstruction has been under way since 1954, the main line is now completely repaired. Some repaired sections are limited to rail cars and trailers with maximum axle load of eight tons.

The Vietnamese rail system is single-track meter-gauge throughout. Passing track and servicing facilities are located at stations. Only one train at a time is permitted to operate between two stations. The railroad system has about 112 steam powered locomotives. Many are over 40 years old, and less than 70 percent are in service. Six French diesel-electric locomotives are on order. The passenger car inventory of 150 units is insufficient to meet traffic demands. Some freight cars have been converted to passenger use. There are about 1,200 freight cars, half 10-ton 2-axle and half 20-ton 4-axle types.

c. Highways

Highways are the most important and most widely distributed lines of communication in Vietnam. The highway system consists of approximately 14,000 kilometers of road. About 3,000 kilometers are bituminous-surfaced, 6,000 are gravel-surfaced, and 5,000 are earth-surfaced. Roads are divided into two broad categories, national roads and local roads. National roads are primarily hard surface and are constructed on a crushed stone base. They are 3 to 6 meters wide. Shoulders are usually built above the road-surface level, with the result that surface drainage flows toward the center of roads. Roads are drained by ditches cut through shoulders at irregular intervals. Local roads are usually of gravel or earthen construction and can be traveled only by jeep or four-wheel-drive vehicle during the rainy season (June-October in the south, September-February in central Vietnam).

A group of American experts surveyed the highway system in 1955 and made proposals for a two-phase development project. In the first phase, personnel would be trained in the essentials of maintenance and repair of existing roads. This part has been completed. In the second phase, which is now underway, new construction and permanent repair of existing roads was to be undertaken. The Republic of Vietnam finances current maintenance and part of the war damage rehabilitation costs. United States aid finances major repairs and new highway construction.

d. Water Transport

The Mekong Delta area is served by a complex network of canals and streams. These are widely used by junks and sampans to transport

agricultural produce to markets. The effectiveness of these waterways as lines of communications is limited, however, since the channels tend to silt up rapidly, maintenance is irregular, and there are no navigation aids. The only major inland waterway in the country is the Mekong River, which is navigable to beyond the Cambodian border by vessels of 4.5 meter draft.

e. Air Traffic

All major urban areas are served by "Air Vietnam," the only domestic airline. Air Vietnam uses primarily C-47 type aircraft, although several of the airfields are capable of handling much heavier aircraft. Airfield improvement is one of the projects included in the United States assistance program.

f. Communications

Telecommunications in Vietnam are barely adequate. Intercity landlines have been destroyed or have almost completely deteriorated. Landlines that once existed through Cambodia to Thailand and through northern Vietnam to China have been destroyed. The Saigon-Cholon area has the only significant telecommunications facilities, most of the available telephones, an international and domestic radiocommunications station, and a broadcast station. Present domestic communications are dependent on a number of low-powered radiocommunication stations in the larger towns. The two submarine cables to Hong Kong and Singapore from Cap St. Jacques near Saigon are out of commission.

8. Finance

a. Currency and Exchange

The unit of currency of the Republic of Vietnam is the piaster of 100 centimes. On 17 December 1955, the Republic of Vietnam issued an ordinance which fixed piaster quotations in the foreign exchange market in Saigon. At the official rate, 35 piasters equal $1 US, or 1 piaster equals about $0.029. Foreign trade is conducted at this rate.

Since 1 January 1955, Vietnam has administered its own foreign exchange resources. These are derived from French expenditures, exports, and direct American economic aid to Vietnam. United States aid

now provides the chief source of foreign exchange and is being used for the import of goods from world wide sources.

The 17 December 1955 ordinance created an official market for foreign exchange in Saigon. It also provided for the establishment of a system of priorities for financial transfers for those enterprises and residents considered of "incontestable usefulness" to the Vietnamese economy.

b. Banking

The National Bank of Vietnam was created at the end of 1954 with the usual powers and functions of a central bank. It has the exclusive privilege of issue in the Republic of Vietnam and provisions are made for maintaining a reserve of 33 percent in gold or foreign exchange against the note issue. The Bank has three controls over the volume of credit: (1) the requirement of 10 percent reserves deposited with the Bank by commercial banks; (2) the fixing of rediscount rates; and (3) the power to limit the volume of certain types of loans by banking establishments.

The National Bank may discount, rediscount, buy, sell, or make advances on some negotiable instruments. It may grant advances up to one year against certain promissory notes. It is authorized to sell National Treasury bonds and securities for the government and to pay interest on government securities through its facilities. The Bank has control over the formation of new banks and changes in banking establishments.

There are generally no maximum rates on loans by financial institutions. The rates normally charged by the large commercial banks vary between five and eight percent, but unstable conditions may cause them to be considerably higher. By preference of the borrowers, loans made by private banks are largely on an over-draft basis. "Money lenders" and others lending money charge much higher interest rates.

9. Insurance

The commonly written branches of life and property insurance are available from local representatives of approximately 70 French, British, and American and three Vietnamese insurance companies. Marine

insurance premium volume is the largest written, followed in order of importance by inland transportation, fire automobile, workmen's compensation, and life. There is a government war risk insurance scheme under which stocks of essential commodities may be insured against loss resulting from insurgent attack or sabotage. Under this scheme, insurance companies are authorized to issue special government insurance certificates concurrent with regular fire coverage. Government marine and aviation war risk insurance is also provided to cover goods but not persons.

Insurance regulatory legislation is modeled on French law. Foreign non-life insurance companies wishing to operate in Vietnam are required to make qualifying deposits with the Treasury. Automobile third-party liability insurance is compulsory for commercial vehicles. Workmen's compensation insurance is not compulsory under present legislation.

SECTION V

EVOLUTION OF US POLICY

1. General.

There was little international interest in Indochina during 1946 and 1947. The problems of the Dutch in Indonesia were before the United Nations, and little concern was given Vietnam. The Soviet Union was silent with respect to Vietnam, the United States had not developed a clear-cut policy position and was not yet deeply concerned about the strategic position of Indochina in Southeast Asia. France was the only nation which had economic interests in Indochina extensive enough to involve it in the country's affairs.

The United States did, however, have an important interest in France, which American policy-makers appeared to consider a key to the defense and the recovery of western Europe. As a result The State Department was sympathetic when France argued that if it lost Vietnam, it would lose North Africa and most of its empire as well which would result in an economic and military disaster for that country. When the fact was added that Communists comprised the Vietnamese resistance forces, the United States Government was not inclined to be openly critical of French policy in Indochina.

From the beginning of the war in 1946 to mid-1949 the United States abstained from involvement in the Indochina war. However, a dilemma of colonialism versus nationalism was present and was reflected in U. S. policies and actions. Marshall Plan aid to France for use in Europe was making francs available for pursuit of the war in Indochina. On the other hand, the State Department publicly welcomed the formation of the new state of Vietnam and expressed the hope that the legitimate aspirations of the Vietnamese people for independence would be achieved.

The primary concern to the United States during this period was expanding Communism. It was this concern that gave rise to the policy of "Communist-Containment." Although of little apparent import to the situation in Vietnam at the time, this policy was later to involve the U. S. directly.

By 1949 the West was becoming increasingly aware of the Communist threat. Ho Chi Minh, a Moscow-trained lifelong Communist, had up until 1949 succeeded in maintaining that his efforts were a nationalist resistance movement. However, due to the fear of France gaining American support or the emergence of a Communist China to the north, or both in 1949 Ho broke openly with the West. His declaration of allegiance to international Communism was completely counter to the U. S. policy of "containment." This turn of events resulted in United States aid to the French and Communist Chinese aid to the Viet Minh. The Indochina war thus became a major internation problem, with the threat of Communist Chinese intervention present from this time on.

From the United States point of view the situation had changed from one of non-involvement to one of considerable concern over the Communist threat to the balance of power in Southeast Aisa. This change would appear to have removed the colonial dilemma and, therefore, should have made it possible for the United States to pursue a single policy based on containing Communism. Such was not the case. Hardly had the preliminary arrangement been made for extensive aid to the French when the United States informed the Bao Dai government of the "confident best wishes" of the American Government "for the future state of Vietnam with which it looked forward to establishing a closer relationship."

At the Four Power Conference in Berlin in January-February 1954, it was agreed that a conference would be convened in Geneva on 26 April to negotiate a settlement for Korea and to discuss means to end hostilities in Indochina. However, the Viet Minh attacked Dien Bien Phu in mid-March with a strength and determination which surprised the world. It was the crucial battle of the war and it had a tremendous psychological effect in Indochina and France. In France, peace at any price became the demand.

2. <u>The Geneva Conference</u>.

Any hope which may have existed for negotiating through strength at Geneva was quickly dispelled during the weeks immediately preceding the

Conference. Recognizing the peril of Dien Bien Phu, the French appealed to the United States for immediate intervention, which the United States was unprepared to give. The United States tried to offset this inaction by issuing a call for united action against the Communists in Southeast Asia. This attempt failed since both the British and the French felt committed to negotiate a settlement.

The United States was in no position to take over leadership at Geneva. It would not give concessions to the Communists but at the same time had nothing to offer to either side as an alternative. Unlike the U. S., Britain had a plan for the division of Vietnam which was finally accepted. As evidenced in Berlin earlier, the Russians seemed ready to negotiate on Indochina. Communist China was ready to make concessions and to gain Viet Minh consent to them. The French were present but they were already militarily and politically defeated in Indochina despite the United States assistance.

From these circumstances a series of situations developed which determined not only the course of the diplomatic and political negotiations but the situation under which Vietnam exists today. First is the situation concerning the two nations, Communist China and the United States, who were vitally concerned with the balance of power in the area. Without their assistance neither side could have sustained their war efforts. Communist China did not actively participate in the Conference. The United States decided to withdraw the official American representation at Geneva, thereby weakening the Western position by giving the general impression that the U. S. was withdrawing completely from the Conference. Later a U. S. representative was returned to the Conference, but as an observer, not as a participant. Second, is the situation concerning the objectives for which the war had been fought. The war was essentially a colonial war for France. For the Vietnamese, it was one of national liberation. It meant an extension of the sphere of Communism for the Sino-Soviet Bloc, and conversely for the United States it signified containing Communism.

The third situation concerns the Communists, who came to the Conference vested with strength yet chose to conduct the negotiations in a spirit of compromise.

One possible explanation for such a concession is that continuation of the Indochina war might foreseeably end with a complete military disaster for France. This may have caused the United States to become an active participant and thereby assert itself as a military power on the Asian continent. Another appraisal of Communist concessions is that they may have visualized the whole of Vietnam falling to them by default in the near future, despite the provisions of the agreement.

On July 21, 1954, some six weeks after the talks had started, agreement was reached at Geneva to end the nearly eight years of hostilities.

3. Post Geneva Conference.

One of the most striking features of the post-Geneva era was the complete lack of national unity in South Vietnam. Despite the years of bloodshed based on nationalist inspirations, there remained a short-sighted struggle for immediate gains among the various political groups, sects and factions, none of which were broadly based in the people. All such groups were completely absorbed in their individual quests for power and were oblivious to the Communist Viet Minh, the only ones who stood to gain if factionalism persisted.

In mid-June 1954, Ngo Dinh Diem was named Prime Minister by Bao Dai. Ngo had a theoretical mandate of full powers from the Chief of State. In practice, however, Ngo controlled virtually nothing within the government and certainly not the National Army, surete, or police. His strength rested primarily in his own intense nationalism, incorruptible traits, the recently arrived refugees from the North (primarily Catholic), and a tenuous alignment with two quasi-religious sects, the Cao Dai and Hoa Hao. Fortunately, Ngo proceeded with the task at hand. His success in establishing a national government has been noteworthy.

The new government was the first truly national government of the country. It was confronted from the start with a series of almost

insurmountable difficulties. A basic problem was that the Ngo government was in office but not in power. However, Ngo undertook the tasks of gaining political control of the army and the police the religious sects, and the incoming refugees. In May of 1955 Ngo announced the government's intention to hold general elections for a National Assembly. A country-wide census was taken during the summer and early fall in preparation for the elections. The government announced that as a first step toward establishing a democratic government, a referendum would be held to give the population the choice of deposing Bao Dai and entrusting Ngo with formation of a government or of keeping Bao Dai. Some 97.8% of the voting population participated, with 98.2% of the total vote in support of Ngo. This overwhelming majority helped immeasurably to strengthen the prestige of the government. Three days after the referendum, the government declared Vietnam a republic with Ngo Dinh Diem as its first President.

4. Republic of Vietnam - United States Relationship.

From the Geneva Armistice, the U. S. and France were destined to a reversal of roles in Vietnam. France had pursued a policy which led to total political defeat, but she had assumed the responsibility of guaranteeing to the Viet Minh the various provisions of the Armistice. The U. S. on the other hand, had assumed no direct obligations at Geneva and was and is interested in an active policy of building up the Nationalist government by all possible means.

The interest of the United States in Southeast Asia is very closely tied in from a strategic standpoint to what is commonly called the offshore island chain. The offshore island chain has in essence two land bases - the Korean Mainland in the North, and Indochina in the South. In between are the islands themselves -- Japan, the Ryukyus, Formosa and the Philippines. The chain also extends into Australia and New Zealand further to the south. The U. S. has a security tie of one sort or another with each of these areas.

The primary objective of United States policy from early 1954 to the present time is simply stated. It is to strengthen the Free World and to curb the power and prevent the expansion of Communism. United States

policies for attainment of this objective in Vietnam are:

To support a friendly non-Communist government in Vietnam and to help diminish and eventually eradicate Communist subversion and influence.

To help the Government of Vietnam establish the forces necessary for internal security.

To encourage support for Free Vietnam by the non-Communist world.

To aid in the rehabilitation and reconstruction of a country and people ravaged by eight ruinous years of civil and international war.

ANNEX C (S)

THE ARMED FORCES OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM (U)

CONTENTS (U)

FIGURES

ANNEX C (S)

THE ARMED FORCES OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

INTRODUCTION

(S) The Armed Forces of the Republic of Vietnam, with a current strength of about 142,000 personnel, have evolved since 1954 from a loose conglomeration of units primarily at battalion level, under French Union military control, into a balanced, organized national defense force entirely under Vietnamese command. The Vietnamese National Army (VNA) (132,000 personnel) represents the major force. A Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF) (4,300 personnel, 139 aircraft) and a Vietnamese Navy (VNN) (5,200 personnel, no major combat vessels) have limited reconnaissance, patrolling and transport capabilities in support of ground elements. The armed forces are almost completely dependent on US assistance for training and logistical support.

(U) Although the Armed Forces as such are young, they are acutely aware and intensely proud of a long and illustrious military history, including the expulsion of the Chinese after eight centuries of occupation, in 931 A.D.; the defeat of Kublai Khan's invading Chinese forces in 1428; and the militant migration of the Vietnamese people to the south conquering the powerful Cham and Khmer (Cambodian) Kingdoms as they expanded their nation, culminating, in 1700, in their occupation of all the territory today known as Vietnam. Additionally, many Vietnamese saw service in the French Army during and between the two world wars, and many Vietnamese officers, noncommissioned officers and soldiers proudly wear today French decorations and service medals won not only in Indochina but also in Europe, North Africa and Syria.

(S) In addition to the regular armed forces, the Civil Guard (Bao An Doan), a force of full-time uniformed, armed personnel, and the Self Defense Corps (Dan Ve Doan), a partially armed non-uniformed village militia, with an authorized strength of 50,000 men each, assist in maintaining internal security. These latter two are presently receiving limited (<u>but increasing</u>) training and logistical support from the US MAAG.

(S) The armed forces are capable of generally maintaining internal security, and of executing delaying operations in the face of enemy attack, but would be incapable of prolonged, effective resistance to full-scale

attack by North Vietnamese or Chinese Communist military forces. In conjunction with the US MAAG, Vietnam has prepared plans for the defense of its territory, but has no known mutual defense arrangements with her neighbors in Southeast Asia.

SECTION I

DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE

1. Historical

(U) The establishment of the armed forces antedates the establishment of the Republic. During the years following World War II, French concessions leading to the creation of an independent Vietnam were accompanied by corresponding agreements providing for the formation and development of the armed forces. The first contingents were created during 1949 from Vietnamese troop units already in existence--native auxiliaries to the French Union forces in Indochina--cadred by French military personnel.

(U) These Vietnamese-manned and financed armed forces were first provided for in the 8 March 1949 Accords between France and Vietnam. These Accords were further elaborated in the France-Vietnamese Military Conventions of 30 December 1949 and 8 December 1950. A series of decrees by the government of Bao Dai, who was recognized by the French as Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces of the new State of Vietnam, provided a juridical basis for the evolving armed forces. A Ministry of National Defense headed by a Secretary of State for National Defense was established on 19 September 1949. A Vietnamese Air Force was authorized on 25 June 1951 and a Vietnamese Navy on 6 March 1952. The Marine Corps was authorized by decree of 13 October 1954.

(U) Vietnamese forces had increased to about 205,000 personnel by 1954; they consisted principally of infantry units with French officers and non-commissioned cadre. Vietnamese units fought during the Indochina War on the side of the French Union forces under command of the French Commander in Indochina. The Republic of Vietnam was not a signatory to the armistice agreement negotiated at Geneva in July 1954; however, the Vietnamese government did agree to abide by the provisions of the armistice agreement. Subsequent development of the armed forces was therefore limited by the provisions

of the agreement, particularly those prohibiting the introduction into Vietnam of reinforcements in troops and materiel and the establishment of new military bases.

(C) French officers and cadre were withdrawn from Vietnamese units in 1955, although French advisers remained to offer training assistance until 1957. The Civil Guard was organized, also in 1955, and the Self Defense Corps was initiated, later to be authorized by decree in April 1956. The establishment of the Republic was accomplished on 26 October 1955, followed on 26 October 1956 by the promulgation of the Constitution which designated the President as the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. In 1957 conscription was initiated. The present organization of the armed forces was established by government decree of 3 October 1957. (This organization, providing as it does poorly defined, conflicting and vague lines of authority, was adopted in the face of US MAAG opposition thereto.)

2. Defense organization (Figure 1)

(S) The President is the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, and exercises his authority through a Secretary of State for National Defense. (At present this post is held by the President, who utilizes his Special Staff as an advisory board on matters concerning the armed forces and at times as a direct command agency over individual military units.) The Secretary of State for National Defense is aided by an Assistant Secretary and by a Director of the Cabinet. The logistical services have a dual subordination: to the Secretary of State for National Defense through the Director General of Administration, Budget and Comptroller (ABC) for administrative control, and to the general staff for command control. The general staff is referred to as a Joint Staff for the Armed Forces, but in reality it is organized and functions as an army general staff with the added responsibility of supervision over the small navy and air force.

(S) The Civil Guard is subordinate to the Department of the Interior, and the Self Defense Corps is under the Office of the Secretary of State at the Presidency; both these organizations would come under the Department of National Defense in wartime. Within the Department of National Defense there is also a small (1,000 - 3,000-men) elite police investigative force

known as the Vietnamese National Gendarmerie for special investigations and for determining disposition of captured dissidents.

3. Military manpower and morale

(U) a. Manpower

Military manpower resources, based on population estimates of 1 January 1959, are shown below:

Age Group	Total males	Physically fit for military service
15 - 19	614,000	370,000
20 - 24	484,000	290,000
25 - 29	359,000	200,000
30 - 34	355,000	180,000
35 - 39	341,000	130,000
40 - 44	319,000	110,000
45 - 49	264,000	50,000
Total 15 - 49	2,736,000	1,360,000

Average number reaching military age (18) annually: about 110,000

(U) Personnel for the armed forces are obtained through voluntary enlistments and by conscription. The military service law enacted 29 June 1953 prescribes a continuing active and reserve obligation for all male citizens between the ages of 18 and 45. Under the current conscription program, which was initiated 1 August 1957 and amended in January 1959, male citizens aged 20 and 21 are called up for an 18-months' service period.

(U) b. Morale

Morale, which was very low following the ceasefire in 1954, has risen markedly as a result of new motivation, training, and operational successes against dissidents. The government has instituted measures to improve the morale and loyalty of the armed forces and to reinforce the anti-Communist orientation of the troops through troop information and education programs supervised by the G-5 Section (psychological warfare) of the General Staff. Vietnamese soldiers have displayed a willingness to

endure primitive living conditions and physical hardships, but are not militaristic by inclination partly because of Buddhist and Confucianist teachings. Some dissatisfaction among officers has been expressed because rewards and promotions are in some instances due to political rather than military activities. It is probable, however, that this dissatisfaction is neither widespread nor serious. Dissatisfaction has also been expressed among naval and air force personnel because of the old and poorly maintained ships and aircraft which they use.

4. Strength trends

(S) The first army elements in 1949 consisted of about 25,000 men with French officers and noncommissioned officers. Army strength increased rapidly, to 50,000 in 1950, 65,800 in 1951, and 150,000 by 1953. A small air force of about 1,345 men had also been activated by 1953. At the close of hostilities in 1954 the armed forces numbered about 205,000 men, including 1,500 navy and 3,500 air force. Following the June 1954 ceasefire, and the subsequent division of the country, Army strength decreased rapidly; desertions were high during the redeployment of troops from North Vietnam to the South. During the reorganization period, French officers and noncommissioned officers were withdrawn, and a lightly armed auxiliary force was inactivated. Army strengths have continued to decrease since that time, while navy and air force strengths have gradually increased. The armed forces as a whole, however, have remained below the 150,000-man strength supported by the US. Strengths since 1955 are shown below:

Date	Army	Navy	Air Force	Total
1955, 1 Jan	170,000	1,500	3,500	175,000
1956, 1 Jan	152,000	4,200	3,400	159,000
1957, 1 Jan	138,600	4,900	3,500	146,900
1958, 1 Jan	131,500	4,900	4,000	140,400
1959,				
January	135,500	5,000	4,600	145,100
April	132,600	5,000	4,700	132,300
July	133,500	5,100	4,800	143,400
October	132,000	5,200	4,800	142,000

(U) In 1955 when the Civil Guard was formed, about 66,000 men were transferred to it from previous paramilitary organizations. This number was gradually reduced to about 54,000 by the end of 1955 and 50,000 by 1958. During 1959 this force remained a little below 50,000 men, varying between 46,000 and 48,000. Actual strength of the Self-Defense Corps (Village Militia) usually is between 40,000 and 50,000, although it drops occasionally a little below 40,000.

5. Economic support

(U) The economy is incapable of entirely supporting the armed forces either financially or materially, either under peacetime or war conditions. In peacetime South Vietnam can supply basic foodstuffs and limited items of clothing to its armed forces. The country has no capability for munitions production. There are no known plans for mobilization of the economy in time of war, although the coordination of the total national effort is recognized as a function of the Permanent Secretary General for National Defense.

6. Training

(U) Training is conducted under guidance of the US MAAG, along lines similar to US training methods. Since the ceasefire in July 1954, armed forces training has been marked by a gradual reorientation from French doctrine and training methods to those of the United States. Training advice was supplied by French advisers in 1954. Unites States participation was initiated in late 1954 through the establishment of a composite group of United States (from MAAG) and French advisers in an organization called the Training Relations Instruction Mission (TRIM). French Army personnel were gradually withdrawn during 1955 and TRIM was inactivated in April 1956; thereafter army training became solely the responsibility of the US MAAG. French training missions with the air force and navy were withdrawn in June 1957 and the US MAAG then took over these additional functions. Sizeable numbers of Vietnamese officers also have received or are receiving training in US service schools or in schools sponsored by the United States in overseas areas.

(U) In the years immediately after 1954, training suffered because of the necessity to commit armed forces units on internal security missions,

and because the armed forces were undergoing extensive reorganization. Marked improvement took place after 1957, however, although training is still deficient in many aspects.

7. Logistics

(U) Responsibility for the planning and control of the procurement of supplies and equipment theoretically rests with the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics. He is assisted by the directors of the various logistical services including a Director of Navy Technical Service and a Director of Air Technical Service. No procurement of major items of military equipment is performed by the Vietnamese, however. The United States, through its grant-aid programs, is the source of equipment, and the determination of needs and major planning for procurement are in the main performed by U.S. military advisory personnel in Vietnam. There is some local procurement of quartermaster items and medical supplies, but Vietnam depends heavily on outside sources for such material, also.

(U) Prior to 1 June 1955 the United States supplied military equipment and financial aid of the Vietnamese forces through the medium of the French Union Forces Headquarters in Indochina. Since that time aid has been supplied directly to Vietnam through the US MAAG.

(U) Major logistical problems remaining to be solved are as follows:

(U) a. Redistribution of materiel in accordance with the new division organization.

(U) b. Sufficiency of communications equipment, to include not only tactical equipment but also fixed "long lines" wire and wireless telephone systems.

(U) c. An adequate road net, whose accomplishment is in turn hampered by shortages of engineer heavy equipment.

(U) d. The outmoded vehicles still on hand, for which components and spare parts no longer exist.

(U) e. Adequate reserve stocks which (except for ammunition) in general do not yet exist.

(U) These problems are recognized by the Vietnamese, the US MAAG, and DCS/LOG, DA. Steps are being taken to correct them, as follows:

(U) a. A redistribution of materiel consonant with the new division TOEs is under way. Little additional delivery to the Vietnamese is required

in the changeover to the new division. (For communications equipment, see b, below.) Though a major logistical problem, it can be and is being solved locally. MAAG HQ in Saigon undoubtedly receives periodic report on this subject, and can apply "pressure" as required.

(S) b. Adequate long range communications in this vast, undeveloped country is a national (not only a military) problem; it is heightened by the vulnerability of installations to sabotage and guerrilla activity. A contract was let in December 1959 for the construction of a VHF "long lines" system which should materially reduce the problem.

(S) Tactical communications equipment shortages are a problem of recent origin, whose urgency has become manifest with the increased guerrilla activity since January 1960, and the deployment of troops in an effort to stamp out these guerrillas. Previously, sufficient radio equipment was on hand for training, and additional equipment was given a low priority by the MAAG (AN/PRC - 10 radios, for example, had been given last priority in the FY 60 program). Deployment of units over large areas in an antiguerrilla role, however, has created an immediate demand for the TOE radio equipment (the priority of the AN/PRC - 10 radios was recently changed from last in the FY 60 program to second), which in turn will require accelerated procurement and shipment.

(S) c. All possible means are being exploited to improve the road net: USOM (ICA) is sponsoring several national and regional roadbuilding projects, with construction by civilian contractors (usually US). Additionally, Vietnamese Army engineer units and their equipment are used on other road building or improvement projects and at times to reinforce civilian projects. Nevertheless, the overall shortage of heavy equipment imposes serious delay in the accomplishment of an adequate road net.

(S) d. By 30 June 1960 all vehicles in the hands of the Vietnamese Armed Forces of US World War II manufacture will have been recently rebuilt under MAAG aegis (some in Saigon, most in Japan). This still does not overcome the fact of the age and obsolescence of this equipment and the absence of spare parts and replacement components from the supply system. The ultimate solution to this problem is now beginning to be realized, in

the regional program, under the aegis of PACOM, under which the vehicular fleet of all US - supported armed forces in the Pacific area are being replaced by new vehicles of Japanese design and manufacture. Though not interchangeable with US vehicles, components or parts, the new Japanese vehicles will eventually provide a solution to this thorny problem.

(U) e. Gradual improvements in stock levels and in storage facilities therefor are being made.

c. Military budget

(U) Responsibility for preparation and control of the military budget rests with the Director General of ABC (Administration, Budget, and Comptroller) in the Department of National Defense. The military budget is prepared on a calendar year basis, and is incorporated into the national budget for the approval of the National Assembly. In practice, large-scale foreign financial assistance is necessary to support the armed forces, and the military budget usually includes anticipated foreign aid support. The military budget includes expenditures for the Self Defense Corps; however, the Civil Guard is supported from the civil budget. Recent defense budgets are shown below:

South Vietnam Defense Budgets

(in millions of U.S. dollars*)

	1956	1957	1958	1959
Defense Expenditures**	199	193	172	175.6

* Shown at official exchange rate, 1 piastre equals US $0.0287.

**Includes U.S. support to military budget, but does not include cost of U.S.-supplied equipment.

(U) Accounting for defense expenditures is the responsibility of the Director General of ABC. Some financial responsibilites are also given to the Inspector General for Military Expenditures, who is primarily concerned with the verification of credits allocated for various military expenses and of receipts for work accomplished and items furnished.

[redacted]

SECTION II

ARMY

1. General

(U) The Vietnamese National Army (VNA) represents almost 94% of the authorized personnel strength of the armed forces and is the predominant element of the military establishment. Administrative direction for the army is furnished by the General Staff which, although nominally a joint staff for the armed forces, is staffed entirely by army officers (Figure 2). The top military commander is the Chief of the General Staff. He is assisted by the Chief of Staff, who also functions as Deputy Chief of Staff for the Army and in that capacity is, in theory, the army commander (Figure 3). In practice the Chief of the General Staff is actually the army commander, although on occasion the President exercises direct command over military units. The army is steadily improving in combat effectiveness, although lack (until recently) of qualified senior commanders, the low educational level existing throughout Vietnam, and a cumbersome and conflicting staff organization hinder rapid improvement.

2. Organization

(U) For military command and administration, the republic of Vietnam is divided into four large Military Regions (Quan Khu) (numbered 1, 2, 4, and 5), and a small Capital Military Region, which includes the immediate environs of Saigon. The four major military regions are further divided into districts (Tieu Khu) which correspond generally to the civil provinces. The highest field headquarters is the army field command (roughly equivallent to a field army), created in December 1958, which is responsible for coordination of combat training in peacetime and for direction of combat operations in time of war. Three corps headquarters, under the field command, are responsible for training and operational planning in their respective areas.

(U) The basic tactical unit is the standard infantry division, with an authorized strength of 10,450 personnel. It consists of 3 infantry regiments, 1 artillery battalion, 1 4.2" mortar battalion, 1 combat engineer (pioneer) battalion, and normal company-size supporting elements (Figure 4).

As the result of extensive testing, the army was reorganized during 1959 into these new standard infantry divisions. The previous light divisions (authorized at 5,000 men each), field divisions (authorized at 8,100 men each), and territoral regiments were disbanded. Airborne troops are organized into an airborne group, currently of 5 airborne infantry battalions. The armor branch consists of armored cavalry regiments (approximately equivalent to US Army squadron) each containing one squadron (US troop) of M24 light tanks and two squadrons of M8 self-propelled 75-mm howitzers. Separate artillery battalions are equipped with either 105-mm howitzers or 155-mm howitzers. Tactical units are operationally subordinate to the army field command and corps. They may be temporarily placed at the disposal of military region commanders or specified commanders when they are committed to internal security operations.

(U) Two types of specialized units are now being formed for specialized operations, in the face of US MAAG opposition thereto, at the direction of the President: 75 commando companies and 6 separate infantry battalions. These units are not US supported -- but, like the civil guard, they may eventually come under the aegis of the US MAAG. They are being formed in order to intensify and improve the effectiveness of the antiguerrilla and antisubversive campaign. US MAAG objection thereto is based on the probable stripping of regular units of their best personnel and hence of their effectiveness.

(U) The commando companies are to be of 131 men each; 35 companies are to be composed of Army volunteers, and 40 of civil guard or Army Reserve volunteers. As of 25 April 1960, 7 such companies had been formed, 3 of which having already been employed in combat.

(U) The 6 separate infantry battalions are supposed to be activated by 30 June 1960.

3. Strength, composition, and disposition

(U) Authorized army personnel strength is 140,000; actual strength on 1 December 1959 was about 132,000. Combat units include 7 infantry divisions, 5 airborne infantry battalions, 1 presidential guard brigade (battalion combat team), 4 armored cavalry regiments, and 8 separate

artillery battalions. About 27,000 troops are in the northern area (Second Military Region) just south of the demarcation line with North Vietnam. These troops include one corps headquarters, 2 infantry divisions and 1 armored cavalry regiment. About 40,000 troops are in the central mountainous plateau and the central coast east of the plateau area/(Fourth Military Region), and include 1 corps headquarters, 3 infantry divisions and 1 armored cavalry regiment. In the southern areas (First, Capital, and Fifth Military Regions) there are 65,000 troops, including the field command headquarters, 1 corps headquarters, 2 infantry divisions, the airborne group, and 2 armored cavalry regiments.

4. Training

(U) Pre-induction training is given in high schools to physically fit males 15 years of age or older. Graduates of this two-year compulsory training program do not receive any military rank, but if they are later inducted they are sent to officer candidate school.

(C) Army training is conducted according to standard training cycles similar to US training programs. The primary cycle is 32 weeks, divided into 6 phases which begin with basic infantry training and carry progressively through to division maneuvers during the last 2 weeks. A succeeding 52-week cycle includes a repetition of the first cycle and an additional 20 weeks of general training. Employment on pacification operations, however, frequently interferes with the pursuit by units of necessary training.

(C) Large-scale (up to corps size) maneuvers are conducted periodically in the relatively unpopulated plateau region (Kontum, Pleiku, Ban Me Thuot, M'Drak). Division maneuvers are conducted in areas adjacent to home stations and/or near M'Drak, on the road linking Ban Me Thuot with the sea.

(C) The principal training establishment is the Quang Trung Training Center, near Saigon, which gives an 8-weeks basic training course to all recruits and advanced courses to infantry soldiers. The training is well organized and instructors are generally competent. Training in other branches of service is given at specialized training centers including several under the Thu Duc Military Schools Center. Regular officers are trained at the Military Academy at Dalat (with a four year curriculum, for classes entering since 1957). They also receive further career schooling at the Thu Duc Military Schools complex, at the Command and General Staff College in Saigon, and

in schools abroad. Large numbers of reserve officers, obligated to serve two years, are produced at the Officer Candidate School at Thu Duc. The continuing development of the schools system will make it possible to reduce the number of personnel which must be sent abroad every year for specialized and advanced training.

5. Logistics

(U) Each technical service has a central or base depot located in the vicinity of Saigon, and a field depot in each military region which is the issuing agency to divisions and other tactical organizations. (However, in the Capital, First and Fifth Military Regions, the base depots in Saigon also act as issuing agencies.) In addition to the field depots, there are depot annexes or supply points for rations, petroleum products, and ammunition in order to bring these supplies in proximity to troops. Units customarily draw supplies on the basis of requisitions submitted to issuing agencies; in addition, supply agencies utilize periodic reports from tactical units to initiate necessary supply action.

(U) In time of war, military region headquarters will, according to the situation, assume logistical responsibilities for units in their respective territories, aided by special advisers from the central logistical offices. Storage and issue operations are being patterned after US procedures, but generally the operations have not reached a satisfactory standard. The supply system is seriously hampered by lack of adequate roads and railroads, limited numbers of trained and experienced personnel, inadequate storage facilities, and equipment shortages.

6. Materiel

(U) Materiel is nearly all of US origin and World War II design and manufacture. Major exceptions are some British 25-pounder field pieces, now in reserve, and some French trucks as well as French small arms in the hands of the civil guard and Self Defense Corps. Much of the US materiel is old and worn; there is, therefore, a high repair and rebuild requirement which is complicated by lack of spare parts for equipment no longer in production. With regard to wheeled vehicles this unsatisfactory situation is being relieved by extensive rebuild (in Japan) and replacement (by new

materiel of Japanese design and manufacture) programs conducted by PACOM on a regional basis, leading to the eventual equipping of all US-supported forces in the PACOM area with modern general purpose vehicles of Japanese origin. Much of the engineer equipment is so worn that it should be salvaged. Over half of the tactical radio and wire equipment is of World War II vintage, but, when in repair and properly maintained, is still useable. This materiel is being replaced with current US materiel, however.

(U) The quality of maintenance is poor compared to US Army standards, but is improving. The army is sufficiently organized and trained to absorb the US Military Aid Program (MAP) equipment on hand and programmed. However, the lack of full TOE equipment, plus the lack of a war reserve, other than ammunition, seriously reduces the capability of the army for sustained combat.

SECTION III

NAVY

1. General

(U) The navy is a small force of limited capabilities, heavily dependent on US assistance for training and guidance as well as for ships, spare parts and other durable goods. The shortage of technical personnel, the small size of the navy, and the inexperience of naval personnel severely limit effectiveness. The navy is capable only of very limited river and coastal patrol.

2. Organization

(U) The Commander of the navy is the Naval Deputy of the Chief of Staff of the General Staff of the Armed Forces. The Naval Deputy is assisted by a naval staff, headed by a Chief of Staff, and composed of three divisions or bureaus: N-1 (Administration, N-3 (Operations), and N-4 (Logistics) (Figure 5).

(U) The shore establishments and operating forces, all directly subordinate to the Naval Deputy, consist of 6 commands: Naval Stations and Schools, which controls training, the Saigon port office, and coastal naval stations; Naval supply center, Saigon; Marine Corps Group, consisting

of a headquarters and service company and 3 battalions; Sea Forces, consisting of all of the seagoing ships; River Forces, composed of small river craft assigned to river patrol; and the Naval Shipyard, Saigon.

3. Strength, composition, and disposition

(U) The navy is composed of 5 large submarine chasers (PC), 2 small submarine chaser (SC), 2 coastal minesweepers (MSC), 3 old coastal minesweepers (MSC(O)), 4 landing ships, medium (LSM), 2 large landing ships, support (LSSL), 5 large infantry landing ships (LSIL), 6 utility landing craft (LCU), 1 light cargo ship (AKL), and 23 service craft. In addition there are over 80 small landing craft and launches, most of them in reserve. Most of the ships and small craft are of U.S. World War II construction. The 2 SC will probably be disposed of, as they are in poor condition. The 2 MSC, which were recently transferred under the MAP, and an additional one yet to be transferred, will replace the 3 MSC(O), which will probably be scrapped. Most of the ships are based at Saigon except for the small craft of the River Forces which are based at various small river bases, and a few craft based at Nha Trang for use by the Naval School.

(U) Personnel strength as of 1 October 1959 was approximately 5,200 officers and men, including 1,435 in the Marine Corps. More than half the total personnel are stationed in Saigon.

4. Training

(U) All ashore training is concentrated at the Naval School at Nha Trang, and is considered adequate. Specialist training for officers, such as engineering, is usually received at civilian institutions or abroad. No advanced officer training is given in Vietnam. Naval advisers have assisted in improving training at Nha Trang, and training for both officers and enlisted men is provided at U.S. Navy schools and establishments.

5. Logistics

(U) The Department of National Defense is responsible for naval logistics, but lines of authority are poorly defined, leading to confusion and delays in procurement. Within the navy, logistics planning is the responsibility of the N-4 of the Naval Staff; the Commanding Officer, Naval Supply Center, Saigon, is responsible for the procurement and issuance of

supplies. Saigon is the main logistics center; outlying bases have only a limited logistic capability. The Saigon Naval Shipyard, a large facility with all the usual shops and drydocks, is capable of accomplishing most types of ship repairs.

SECTION IV

AIR FORCE

1. General

(U) The mission of the Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF) is to provide air support to the army. It has a limited capability for air-ground support and air transport operations. Good proficiency in visual reconnaissance and liaison flights has been demonstrated. The air force relies almost entirely on the United States for logistics support and for training advice.

2. Organization

(U) The air force is subordinate to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Air, who is also the Commander of the Air Force. He is assisted by a small headquarters staff, which includes the Deputy Chiefs of Staff for Operations and Training, Materiel, and Personnel. The tactical squadrons report directly to the Air Commander. (Figure 6).

3. Strength, composition, and disposition

(U) A total of 139 aircraft (21 F8F, 34 C-47, 9 H-19, 18 T-6, 54 L-19, 2 C-45, 1 Aero Commander) comprise the inventory. Personnel strength as of 1 July 1959 was 4,800, including 213 trained pilots. There are 6 tactical squadrons: 1 fighter-bomber (F8F), 2 transport (C-47), 2 liaison (L-19), and 1 helicopter (H-19). Air activity is centered at four airfields: Tan Son Nhut (Saigon), Da Nang, Nha Trang, and Bien Hoa.

4. Training

(U) The principal training center is at Nha Trang, where the following courses are offered: preflight and flight (L-19, T-6), refresher flying, the first phase of aircraft mechanic's instruction, and basic military. Maintenance and technical schooling are also given at Bien Hoa and Tan Son Nhut airfields.

(U) Many of the pilots have received some training in the United States. A number of technicians have also been trained in the United States or at

U.S. Air Force installations in the Pacific area. In addition, US Air Force training teams are sent from installations in the Pacific area to South Vietnam for specific types of instruction.

(C) About 40% of the skilled personnel are products of French training schools, but French participation in the training program has now ceased.

5. Logistics

(C) All of the major aircraft, with the exeception of 3 C-47, 2 C-45, and 1 Aero Commander, were furnished by the United States, and all are supported through U.S. assistance. Spare parts and petroleum products are also paid for through US assistance funds.

(U) Logistics procedures are the responsibility of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Materiel. Air force items are requisitioned through the Directorate of Technical Services-Air Force, and minimum stock levels are maintained by field units. Common-use items are furnished directly by the army.

(S) Maintenance in all units is satisfactory except in the F8F squadron. (The F8F are of World War II manufacture and spare parts are difficult to procure. Replacement of these old fighter aircraft by modern AD4s is programmed.) Some major maintenance and repair is accomplished at Bien Hoa Depot, but most of the major overhauls are performed by commercial firms in Saigon or Hong Kong.

6. Air facilities

(S) South Vietnam's air facilities system of 36 airfields and 3 seaplane stations includes 4 primary, 6 secondary, and 26 minor airfields. The 4 primary airfields are Tan Son Nhut (Saigon) Da Nang, Nha Trang, and Vung Tao. Tan Son Nhut and Da Nang each have 7,870-foot asphalt-and-concrete runways capable of supporting all jet aircraft types except heavy and medium bombers. Nha Trang's 6,020-foot asphalt and Vung Tao's 6,300-foot pierced-steel- plank-over-asphalt runways can support pre-century jet fighters and B-57 jet light bombers. Ancillary facilities at the primary airfields range from excellent to fair. Tan Son Nhut is a modern, well-equipped international civil airfield with joint military usage and is the best in free Indochina. Da Nang is comparable in size but is less active and lacks permanent runway lighting. Vung Tao is infrequently used since

the departure of the French, and existing facilities need modernizing. Nha Trang is an active military training base with adequate supporting facilities except for runway lighting.

(C) Three of the 6 secondary airfields, Bien Hoa, Dalat/Lien Khang, and Hue, have asphalt or pierced-steel-plank-over-asphalt runways capable of supporting C-54 (Navy R5D) transport aircraft. Ban Me Thout East has a 3,937-foot concrete runway which can support C-130 transport aircraft weights. Loc Ninh and Thu Dau Mot have paved runways capable of supporting C-46 aircraft. Supporting facilities at the secondary airfields (excepting Thu Dau Mot, which has none) range from adequate to good. Bien Hoa (with runway lighting), Hue, and Dalat/Lien Khang are the better equipped secondary airfields.

(U) Most of the primary and secondary airfields serve the scheduled civil aviation carriers as well as the Air Force.

(C) Of the 26 minor airfields, half of which are plantation airstrips, 7 have asphalt or pierced-steel-plank runways and the rest are of laterite, gravel, or sod. Fourteen minor airfields have an all-weather capability, and 6 have a dry-weather capability, for C-47 (Navy R4D) transport aircraft operations. The other 6 airfields are limited to use by light, liaison-type aircraft. Except for army or plantation radios, the minor airfields have almost no supporting facilities.

(S) No major runway construction is in progress, but lesser improvements at three airfields were completed in 1959. At Tan Son Nhut, high-intensity lights were installed on the main runway, and fences which obstructed taxiways were removed. Jet fuel facilities were installed at Da Nang, and an asphalt taxiway was constructed at Nha Trang. In a program extending through 1963, the communications and navigational aids at 10 airfields (Tan Son Nhut, Da Nang, Ban Me Thout East, Vung Tao, Dalat/Lien Khang, Hue, Nha Trang, Phan Thiet, Qui Nhon, and Soc Trang) are being improved. In a MAAG-recommended program, extending through 1965, Bien Hoa, Vung Tao, Tan Son Nhut, and Tuy Hoa airfields are planned for development to meet requirements for jet aircraft. Proposed construction includes permanent surface 6,000-foot runways at Ban Me Thout East and Tuy Hoa, improved surfacing of

existing runways at Vung Tao and Da Nang, and a new 10,000-foot concrete runway (estimated completion in March 1961) and concrete overlay of the present main runway (completion by March 1963) at Tan Son Nhut. The construction of new airfields with crushed rock and asphalt runways in the vicinity of Rach Gia and Ca Mau by the end of 1961 is under consideration.

SECTION V

COMMENTS AND OBSERVATIONS

(U) Despite sincere and reasonably effective effort on the part of the US MAAG over the past 5 years, certain inherent weaknesses continue to plague the Vietnamese Armed Forces. The eradication of these weaknesses will not be an easy matter, for, far from being peculiar to the armed forces, they are national in character and stem from generations, nay, centuries. They must be recognized, understood, and continuously and seriously, yet tactfully dealt with by every MAAG officer who has any dealings whatsoever with the Vietnamese military. The ascendancy of any one of these weaknesses could well mean defeat on the field of battle for a Vietnamese unit or for the Republic--and, tragically, the Officer Corps do not yet recognize these weaknesses (despite continuous admonition by the MAAG at every level), and, consequently, do not take effective measures leading to their elimination. Some of the more critical weaknesses are discussed in succeeding paragraphs.

(C) Leadership. With some encouraging exceptions, leadership on the part of leaders and commanders at all levels is generally substandard and often grossly deficient, with, consequently, ineffective command control and poor or wholly nonexistent unit effectiveness. This weakness stems from the long-standing nature of the Vietnamese people: passive, submissive, fatalistic, accustomed to being led rather than leading, pastoral and non-mechanical, and living at little more than a bare existence level. Likewise hereditary leaders by tradition engaged only in study of the classics, contemplation, writing, and relatively luxurious living, never deigning to understand, much less communicate with the common people. Coupled with this is inheritence of the traditional French Army attitude of never checking on a subordinate, for such would indicate lack of faith. The imposition of modern military organization and materiel upon such a society of necessity imposes many urgent problems which require solution before the military

machine can be said to be effective. The Vietnamese Armed Forces today lie somewhere between the "launch point" of imposition of modern organization and materiel and the "apogee" of satisfactory effectiveness. The MAAG officer must constantly strive to guide the Vietnamese toward this apogee, by every tactful means. He must teach the Vietnamese how to exercise effective command control and command supervision; how to teach; how to inspect; how to gain the confidence of his command--in short, how to command. There has been considerable progress realized in the past several years, but the goal is still far off. It would appear that one of the best ways of teaching this important aspect of command would be for the Vietnamese officers sent to the US for schooling to spend an additional month with (observing) a US unit upon completion of their formal schooling. (Such a program has been successfully applied in MAAG Japan.) This observer training would <u>show</u> the Vietnamese effective leadership and command control in a unit, rather than merely <u>telling</u> them about it.

(U) Other major deficiencies are derivatives of the deficiency in leadership.

(U) <u>Health, Nutrition, Sanitation</u>. These are so basic as to require little elaboration. Military effectiveness is impaired, however, by beri-beri (100% preventable if unpolished, rather than polished, rice is eaten from time to time), malaria (controllable through weekly ingestion of a simple pill), and the various diseases associated with unsanitary conditions. All of these can be controlled within the military environment, though their control throughout the population will be much more difficult. Commanders must be taught why and how to effectively enforce appropriate preventive measures, and they must also be taught their responsibilities therein.

(U) <u>Maintenance of Materiel</u>. Again, this subject is so basic as to require little comment--without, however, minimizing its importance. As discussed under leadership, above, brief service with (observation of) a US unit on the part of Vietnamese officers sent to the US for schooling would <u>show</u> and <u>teach</u> the Vietnamese officer how to satisfactorily maintain and use his materiel.

(U) All of the above deficiencies are recognized and being corrected. They will require continuing special emphasis, however.

(U) National Command Structure. The various organisms comprising the Department of National Defense are at the present time so organized as to have somewhat less than optimum effectiveness: there are conflicting, duplicating channels of command and communications; there are duplicate offices or agencies having primary or overlapping interest in certain affairs; and various major agencies of the Department are installed in widely separated areas, so as to hamper coordination, rapid staff action, and decision making.

(U) An example of conflicting and duplicating channels of command is where a division commander receives orders from both the corps commander (who should be his undisputed boss) and the region commander in whose region his division is stationed. Another example is where the President, by means of his SCR-399 radio net (NCS in a radio van in the garden of the presidential palace) sends operational orders to a regiment direct, bypassing the Department of National Defense, the general staff, the field command, the corps and the division. Still another example is where a chief of an arm gives orders to a unit of that arm, the unit being at the time assigned to a corps.

(U) An example of duplicate agencies of primary interest (and of their subordination) is the presence of a "director of air technical service" (who is nominally directly under the chief of the armed forces general staff but is subordinate to the Director General of Administration, Budget, and Comptroller for fiscal matters) (figure 1) and a "deputy chief of air staff for materiel" (figure 6).

(U) Concerning the location of various agencies, the Department of National Defense and the bulk of the "central organizations" (except for the Chief of the general staff and his subordinates) and "ministerial services" (figure 1) are located in downtown Saigon, while the general staff (figure 2) (less air and navy elements) is inefficiently located in a series of company-sized troop barracks on the edge of the city - the chief of the general staff is several miles removed from the Department of National Defense. And the navy and air staffs (figures 5 and 6) are also separately located in downtown Saigon. With such a physical layout, staff action and decision making are unduly delayed on even the simplest of matters.

(C) The overall ministerial structure described above was as originally set up by the French (perhaps deliberately establishing a cumbersome structure) and as slightly modified by Presidential decree on 3 October 1957. (US MAAG had proposed a different top command structure putting the "ministry" and the "general staff" in closer proximity physically and in command relationships. But the MAAG proposal was not accepted by the President, perhaps because he wished to continue to maintain a division and duplication of powers and thus prevent any one individual -- other than himself -- from having too much authority. The present system has been in operation for some years, however, and has been made to work, more or less.) US MAAG should continue to study the basic defense structure (including the location of various agencies), and the use and abuse of the established chain of command with a view to the submission of appropriate recommendations at the propitious times.

(S) The Armed Forces of the Republic of Vietnam are anxious to take the offensive and "march to Hanoi." The Chief, MAAG, and his principal assistants who come in direct contact with the Vietnamese high command must be constantly alert to detect this desire and any evidence of preparations specifically therefor, as the consequences of such a premature act, not only to the numerically inferior South Vietnamese Armed Forces but also to the entire region and possibly the whole world, could be most serious. (Eventual reunification through "peaceful means" is to be hoped for.)

(U) For more detailed information concerning the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces, see the National Intelligence Survey, South Vietnam, N/S 430, Chapter VIII, and the Order of Battle Summary, Foreign Ground Forces (CGSC Archives).

6 Inclosures:
Figure 1 - Department of National Defense
Figure 2 - General Staff
Figure 3 - Army
Figure 4 - New Infantry Division
Figure 5 - Navy
Figure 6 - Air Force



* ADMINISTRATION, BUDGET, AND COMPTROLLER
** IN TIME OF WAR, A DIRECTORATE OF MILITARY POSTAL SERVICES WILL BE ACTIVATED
- - - - ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL ONLY

FIGURE 1. DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, VIETNAM



FIGURE 2. GENERAL STAFF, VIETNAM



*In practice, the President retains close personal control over operational commands (antiguerrilla campaigns, etc.).

FIGURE 3. ARMY, VIETNAM



FIGURE 4. NEW INFANTRY DIVISION, VIETNAM



FIGURE 5. NAVY, VIETNAM



FIGURE 6. AIR FORCE, VIETNAM

*AIR TRAINING CENTER:
BASIC FLIGHT TRAINING
MECHANICS' SCHOOL
RADIO/RADAR SCHOOL
NAVIGATION/OBSERVER TRAINING

AIR CRAFT	
F8F/RF8F	21
C-47	34
H-19	9
T-6	18
L-19	54
C-45	2
AERO COMDR	1

U. S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE ADVISORY GROUP -- VIETNAM (U)

CONTENTS

ANNEX D (S)

MILITARY ASSISTANCE ADVISORY GROUP - VIETNAM (U)

INTRODUCTION

(U) From the very beginning MAAG-Vietnam (and its predecessor MAAG-Indochina) has been unique among MAAGs. First of all, MAAG-Indochina was activated during combat and operated along the fringes of the battle zone in Vietnam supplying French, Vietnamese, Cambodian, and Laotian forces which were fighting the Communists. Due to still another strange arramgement, for the first four years of its existence the MAAG provided no direct assistance to the Vietnamese at all; everything went through a middleman, the French. When the Geneva Accords ended overt hostilities, the MAAG engaged in another unusual operation - the mass evaucation of over 800,000 personnel and 200,000 tons of military equipment from North Vietnam. Since Geneva many of the MAAG logistical operations in Vietnam have been odd in that they have been conducted in the reverse of most MAAGs, that is, sending military equipment out of the country instead of bringing it in.

(C) The results of the Geneva Accords presented the MAAG with a real paradox. On the one hand its personnel ceiling was frozen at a maximum of 342 spaces. At the same time it had to assume all responsibilities from the 140,000 man French Expeditionary Corps for organizing, training, supplying, and equipping the Vietnamese Armed Forces. In addition it was responsible for the recovery and out-shipping of the tons of US MAP equipment which was scattered throughout Vietnam.

(S) To accomplish these missions without exceeding the Geneva imposed MAAG personnel ceiling, a subterfuge was adopted in the form of a separate organization called the Temporary Equipment Recovery Mission (TERM). The mission of this agency was ostensibly to recover the MAP equipment. In order to stay within the Geneva Accords, it had to operate separately from the MAAG. To function with such separated organizations has in turn forced the adoption of unusual staff structures in both MAAG and TERM.

(C) Still another unusual feature is the direct communist efforts to attack MAAG/TERM itself. Since its inception, members of MAAG/TERM-Vietnam have been the targets and occasionally the victims of sporadic communist bombings, ambushes, and assassination plots.

(U) Finally, MAAG-Vietnam is unique in that it is the only US MAAG in the world where the Chief's billet is that of a Lieutenant General. This is indicative of the importance given to this critical position in Southeast Asia.

SECTION I

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND MAAG VIETNAM

1.(U) Prior to Geneva.

In May 1950 Secretary Acheson made the initial announcement that the United States would grant military and economic aid to restore security and develop "genuine nationalism" in Indochina. In his announcement he made it clear that US aid would go not only to the Associated States of Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam but also to France. Actually, no military assistance was given directly to the Vietnamese until 1954. The first increment of MAAG Indochina arrived in Saigon on 2 Aug 1950. On 7 Nov 50, a Provisional Detachment, Military Assistance Advisory Group, Indochina was designated.

The MAAG to Indochina was authorized from an international standpoint on 23 December 1950, at the time of the signing of the so-called "Pentalateral Agreement." This agreement was between the US, France, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos for the Administration of Mutual Defense Assistance in Indochina. MAAG Indochina was formally activated on 8 January 1951. It had an authorized personnel strength of 128 and was responsible for MAAG activities in Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos.

From its inception to the signing of the Geneva Accords in July 1954, the role of MAAG Indochina was that of a logistical MAAG, responsible for assuring receipt of equipment by designated recipients, utilization of equipment for the purpose intended, and conduct of proper maintenance.

In April 1954, Lt General John W. "Iron Mike" O'Daniel was dispatched to Vietnam as Chief MAAG to obtain agreement from General Ely, the French CINC in the area for US participation in training of the Vietnamese Armed Forces. General O'Daniel obtained this agreement on 15 June 1954. He sent messages to Washington asking that more personnel be sent to Vietnam to conduct this training before a cease fire would occur with the possibility of limitations on added personnel as had happened in Korea. General O'Daniel's requests met with no substantial response.

2.(U) General Accords Effecting MAAG-Vietnam.

Neither the United States nor Vietnam signed the Geneva agreements, although the US representative, General "Beedle" Smith, took

note of the final conference declaration for the United States. He stated in substance that the US would abstain from any threat to modify the accords, and that it would regard any assumption of aggression in violation of the accords with grave concern and as a serious menace to international peace and security. The Geneva agreements which impact on the organization and functions of MAAG-Vietnam are:

> Prohibition of the introduction of military personnel -- Introduction of troop reinforcements and additional military personnel, including instructors, except for rotation of units, admittance of individual personnel on a TDY basis, and return to Vietnam of individuals from leave or temporary duty abroad, which are allowed under defined and controlled conditions. (Article 16)
>
> Prohibition on the introduction of military equipment -- Introduction of all types of arms, munitions, and other war materiels, including aircraft, except for piece-by-piece replacement of war materiel, arms, munitions destroyed, damaged, worn out, etc. or used up after cessation of hostilities. (Article 17)
>
> An International Control Commission to be composed of India, Canada and Poland, with India as chairman, to be established for the purpose of ensuring observance and enforcement of the terms and provisions of the agreement. The commission to have both fixed and mobile inspection teams. (Chapter VI, Articles 28-47)
>
> No military base under the control of a foreign State may be established in either zone; the parties shall also ensure that the zones assigned to them do not adhere to any military alliance and are not used for the resumption of hostilities or to further an aggressive policy. (Articles 18 and 19)

On 20 July 1954, official date of the signing of the Geneva Agreements, there were 342 US military personnel in Vietnam. MAAG Indochina was authorized a personnel strength of 128 plus an additional 15 officers who arrived prior to 20 July 1954 and two hundred Air Force Technicians who had been sent to Vietnam in early 1954. The State Department interpreted Article 16 as applying to US military personnel and therefore a MAAG personnel ceiling of 342 spaces was established.

3. (S) After Geneva.

(U) Immediately after the cessation of hostilities, MDAP aid to Indochina stopped abruptly. MAAG Indochina was engaged primarily with the evacuation of personnel and equipment from North Vietnam for the next ten months. Chief, MAAG Indochina was overall coordinator for US participation in the evacuation of North Vietnam which was completed in May 1955. The MAAG also

participated in the reception of evacuees in South Vietnam as well. Over 800,000 personnel and over 200,000 tons of military equipment were moved from the north in perhaps the greatest mass evacuation in the history of the world.

(U) The MAAG Indochina mission after Geneva was to assist the Vietnamese National Army to attain the capability of maintaining internal security. The United States had anticipated that while the Vietnamese were obtaining this capability a sizable element of the 140,000 man French Expeditionary Corps (FEC) would remain in Vietnam as a deterrent force against the Viet Minh. Therefore, 100 million dollars had been allocated by the US in FY 1955 for the support of the FEC.

(U) Though General O'Daniel had attained oral agreement from the French for US participation in the training of the Vietnamese army in June of 1954, it was not until 13 December 1954 that a formal agreement was signed between the Vietnamese Deputy Minister of Defense, General Collins, the US Special Representative, and General Ely, the French Special Representative for the establishment of a combined French - US training mission. General O'Daniel headed the mission under the overall command of the French CINC. On 27 February 1955, the mission was oficially established as the "Training Relations and Instruction Mission (TRIM)." The US TD for TRIM called for 217 spaces of the 342 authorized for MAAG Indochina. In March of 1955 there were only 68 US personnel available for assignment to TRIM. Key staff positions were held by both French and US officers. In the case of the advisory teams, if the senior were French, his associate (second in charge) was American, and vice versa. These advisory teams were to be placed with the military geographical subdivisions (Regions), the field divisions, light divisions, training centers, and schools. Members of the headquarters staff doubled in duty by additionally acting as advisors to their Vietnamese counterparts in higher headquarters and with the chiefs of the technical services.

(U) With this organization the tasks of collecting, reorganizing, re-equipping, and training of the Vietnamese Armed Forces were begun under the auspices of the US Chief, MAAG. Though the overall responsibility

was vested in the French CINC, he never interfered with TRIM operations.

(U) The combined aspect of the training effort was doomed to failure almost before it got under way due to the anti-French sentiments of the Vietnamese, particularly in the Hue area. With these circumstances prevailing, the French agreed with Chief MAAG that it might be better to withdraw the French advisors in the Hue area. This was done and the trend was established which can best be illustrated by the figures showing the comparative French-US officer strengths in TRIM during the first year's operations.

	US Officers	French Officers
March '55	68	209
May	121	225
July	124	108
September	125	66
November	142	58
January '56	149	53
March '56	189	0

(U) On 13 June 1955 MAAG Cambodia was established, although MAAG Indochina continued to support MAAG Cambodia on all Navy and Air Force matters.

(U) On 28 October 1955 MAAG Indochina was officially redesignated MAAG Vietnam. By this time the rapid withdrawal of the FEC was creating major problem areas for MAAG Vietnam. First, it was rapidly depleting the strength of TRIM which was responsible for the training of the Vietnamese Armed Forces. Secondly, the French were beginning to turn over the logistics installations and functions to the Vietnamese who were totally incapable of handling their own logistical system. Additionally, in the logistics field the withdrawal of the French was creating an extensive recovery, relocation and outshipment program for excess MDAP equipment resulting from termination of the war.

(U) On 18 November 1955 Lt General S. T. Williams replaced General O'Daniel as Chief, MAAG Vietnam. He was directed by Washington in December 1955 to prepare a TD for the MAAG which would supply the personnel to solve the major problems confronting that organization.

(U) Instead of increasing the MAAG Vietnam personnel ceiling, Washington adopted a subterfuge in the form of a "Temporary Equipment Recovery Mission" (TERM) with a personnel strength of 350. Ostensibly TERM was to

facilitate the processing of US origin excesses of equipment in Vietnam; while in fact it was a much needed across the board augmentation for MAAG. To carry the subterfuge further, it was directed that TERM operate as a separate organization directly under Chief MAAG. Chief, MAAG could interchange personnel between MAAG and TERM and it was recognized that TERM should furnish a proportionate share of the common administrative support personnel. Implementation of the directive to keep TERM as a separate organization created major organizational problems at the local level in order not to belie openly the subterfuge effort.

(C) The International Control Commission (ICC), composed of Indians, Poles, and Canadians and responsible for maintaining the provisions of the Armistice, never completely accepted TERM. It neither approved nor disapproved its introduction but maintains an almost continuous check on TERM's activities.

(C) In December 1955 a Programs Evaluation Office (PEO) was established in Laos in lieu of a MAAG which was prohibited by the Geneva Accords, thus relieving MAAG-Vietnam of responsibility for programming and inspecting the maintenance support for US MAP equipment in Laos.

(C) It is pertinent to examine in some detail the circumstances from which the tremendous logistical problems in Vietnam were derived and which in turn made the augmentation of the MAAG absolutely imperative.

(C) At the close of the Indochina war the FEC had a strength of approximately 140,000. The Vietnamese Armed Forces were at a strength of 290,000. It was agreed at the time of the signing of the MDAP agreement in December 1954 that the United States would support a Vietnamese Armed Force of approximately 100,000. By mid-1955 the FEC had reduced to roughly 35,000 and other factors, such as the failure of special representatives of the French and Vietnamese to open negotiations on the future status of the FEC in Vietnam, plus the fact that the French military budget for CY 1956 made no provisions for Indochina, indicated a questionable future for the FEC in Vietnam at best.

(C) In addition to the excesses generated by the reduction of forces, another factor further complicated the logistical picture. Prior to

January 1956, the French completely dominated the logistic field and had closely held the logistic support of the Vietnamese forces to the exclusion of both Vietnamese and the Americans. Despite the fact that logistical autonomy had been planned for the Vietnamese forces by January 1956, US influence on the logistic system was for the most part confined to the combined staff efforts in TRIM. In actuality, influence on logistical matters was practically nil. As a result, the Vietnamese in late 1955 were totally inexperienced and untrained to assume logistical responsibility. The limited number of US logistical advisors could do little to offset the lack of Vietnamese experience.

(C) After January 1956, the accelerated withdrawal of the French forces further aggravated an already complex situation. The French literally dumped mountains of equipment upon the Vietnamese, the majority of which were improperly packed, indiscriminately piled, often placed in outside storage, and supported by inadequate or meaningless inventory records. To add to this confusion the Vietnamese were prone to open all packages and this was not conducive to preservation. It is questionable that the Vietnamese could have handled this situation properly had they been well trained.

(C) With regard to the qualitative nature of the equipment, consideration must again be given to the contributing circumstances of the French withdrawal. The French were confronted with a rapidly deteriorating situation in North Africa which required more and more effort in terms of military personnel and equipment. Therefore, they were primarily concerned with salvaging the best equipment for their own use. With this in mind, the French were able to exploit to full advantage the agreement which authorized their removal of MAP type equipment based on proportionate input. In the face of French reluctance to allow US personnel to inventory, there was no way by which US personnel could determine the qualitative or quantitative status of equipment.

(C) Refusal of the French to allow US personnel into their installations and dumps covered their attempts to obtain the best of everything in the quantities desired for their future needs. The equipment turned

over to the Vietnamese was qualitatively inadequate. In most instances, it had been used prior to Indochina and had subsequently seen hard service under wartime conditions. Maintenance requirements could not be met since critical spare parts and tools were non-existent. The arrival of TERM in mid-1956 provided the beginning of the answer to this deplorable situation.

(C) Still another category of logistic problems, that created by the Geneva Armistice relative to the introduction of war materiels, has not been unduly restrictive nor a matter of major concern to date.

(C) The bilateral protocol (French-DRV) which specifically defines "arms, munitions, and war materiel" also specifies the procedures for the control of the importation and exportation of these items under the supervision and auspices of the ICC. Also prescribed are the procedures for notifying the ICC in order that credit may be obtained for items exported. French and Vietnamese positions with regard to this protocol are as follows:

(C) Upon withdrawal, the French took vast quantities of munitions, materiel, and equipment with them. Despite their responsibilities with respect to the protocol it is assumed that only a small portion of this was reported to the ICC in such a way as to obtain credit against future imports.

(C) In view of the fact that the protocol was concluded between the French and DRV, the Vietnamese Government has consistently refused to recognize its validity or openly to comply with its provisions. It is expected that the French would support this position of Vietnam in a "showdown" since it could be shown that they were remiss in complying with the provisions concerning exportation.

(C) TERM's activities also enter into this picture since they have been responsible for removal of large quantities of materiel through exportation, destruction, and scrapping. Additionally, items have been sent out of the country for repair and rebuild and then returned to Vietnam.

($) Actually, the ARVN was never reduced to a force goal of 100,000. In light of the rapid withdrawal of the bulk of the FEC, continued Viet Minh

build-up, and the civil war against the dissident sect forces, MAAG Vietnam took the position that such a force goal was inadequate. With Country Team concurrence in May of 1955, MAAG porposed a 150,000 man force goal to be reached by 1 July 1956. This proposal was subsequently approved and remains in effect to date.

(U) Although the French Expeditionary Corps departed in April 1956, the French continued to train the Vietnamese Air Force and Navy until June 1957, when MAAG-Vietnam took over this task. To obtain personnel to assume this additional responsibility, 43 spaces of common administrative support type personnel (communications, commissary, FPO, medical, etc.) were transferred to the Embassy from the MAAG.

(U) Due to a new wave of communist terrorism the internal security situation in Vietnam deteriorated markedly in early 1960 and MAAG-Vietnam was augmented with three 10-man Special Forces teams to assist in training Vietnamese forces for antiguerrilla operations.

(U) TERM's mission of recovering and outshipping economically repairable US material in excess of Vietnamese needs has been virtually completed. Plans have been prepared to close out TERM and transfer its personnel spaces and logistical responsibilities to MAAG-Vietnam in the summer of 1960. ICC has been made aware of this prcposal and has made no objections.

SECTION II

MAAG/TERM MISSION AND ORGANIZATION

1. (U) MAAG Vietnam Mission.

The mission of MAAG, Vietnam, is to assist the Vietnamese Government in raising the military capabilities of its Armed Forces through planning for, developing, and administering the Military Assistance Program. A copy of the detailed terms of reference governing the MAAG Vietnam mission organization, procedures, relationships, responsibilities and functions, is included at Appendix 1.

2. (U) TERM Vietnam Mission.

The mission of TERM is to recover and outship economically repairable MDAP material excess to authorized Vietnamese Armed Forces MDAP material requirements and to dispose of salvage and scrap returned to United States control. A copy of the detailed terms of reference governing TERM Vietnam mission, concept of operation, command relationship and reporting procedures, is included at Appendix 2.

3. (U) Vietnamese Instructions on MAAG/TERM Mission and Authority.

The Headquarters of the Vietnamese Armed Forces published instructions for all Vietnamese commanders defining the authority and missions of United States MAAG/TERM-Vietnam advisors. Included in these instructions are the relationships and responsibilities of a Vietnamese organization to its U.S. MAAG/TERM advisors. A detailed copy of these instructions reproduced by MAAG Vietnam is included at Appendix 3.

4. (U) MAAG-Vietnam Staff Organization.

At Appendix 4 is the MAAG organization chart. The Chief, MAAG, is a three-star Army Billet. He retains the PIO and the advisors to the Vietnamese Secretary of Defense and C/S Armed Forces Republic of Vietnam under his immediate and direct control. Deputy Chief of MAAG for Training, a two star billet, is also Chief of the Army Section. Deputy Chief of MAAG logistics, a one star Army billet, is responsible for supervision of the administration of the command. His biggest jobs are the management of the Vietnamese military budget and operation of the temporary equipment recovery mission. The Chief

of Staff, Deputy Chiefs of Staff for operations and administration, and the Assistant Chief of Staff/Staff Secretary are all Army billets and function in a normal staff manner except that there is no "J" or "G" staff. US clerical and administrative personnel in the Chief of Staff Section come from both the Army and the Navy. A Vietnamese interpreter/translator pool is also included in this section.

The Joint Services Support Division has Army, Navy and Air Force personnel which handle administrative activities, not only of the command, but of certain other US organizations in Vietnam as well. Its major activities are billeting, post office, commissary, post exchange, transportation, dispensary, communications and other administrative support operations for all headquarters and field advisory groups throughout Vietnam.

The Comptroller Division has Army, Navy and Air Force personnel and functions in a normal manner. Its biggest job is to provide assistance to Chief MAAG on Vietnamese budget matters.

Deputy Chief, MAAG, Training, is responsible for the over-all supervision of the employment of American advisors who assist in the training of the Vietnamese. He is responsible for the approval of training programs and policies and for making training visits and inspections. He executes his responsibilities primarily through the Chief, Combined Arms Training Organization (CATO), an all Army organization which handles the G1, G2, and G3 functions. CATO acts as the administrative headquarters of all the Army field advisor groups. Chief, CATO, provides field advisory groups with direction, supervision, administration, and discipline. These field advisors are broken down into small detachments all over the country, located and living with the Vietnamese units which they advise. This is true of the Navy and Air Force Divisions of MAAG and TERM as well as CATO. Insofar as Infantry is concerned, there are sufficient advisors to provide one for each regiment. Insofar as the supporting arms are concerned, there is approximately one advisor to each two battalions. In the case of the Technical Services, there are sufficient advisors for each major depot or group of technical service units. At each major Vietnamese Army Headquarters, such as a Corps or a Region (a territorial command similar to our Army areas),

all the Technical Services (both repair and supply types) are usually grouped in a complex near the major headquarters. One signal Corps advisor would be available to advise all signal type activities and units within this complex. The same advisor situation also applies to the other technical services. US Advisors are at all the schools, central depots, the Vietnamese Armed Forces Headquarters, and the Office of the Minister of Defense. It is through these advisor groups that the policies of Chief, MAAG, in the field of training are executed.

The Adjutant General Division of the MAAG functions in a normal manner.

The Combined Studies Division provides studies as required by Chief, MAAG.

The Navy Division advises and assists in the training, organization, logistics, and operation of the Vietnamese Navy and Marines. The Air Force Division advises and assists in the training, organization, logistics, and operation of the Vietnamese Air Force.

5. (C) MAAG-Vietnam Table of Distribution.

At Appendix 5 is the MAAG-Vietnam Joint Tables of Distribution effective 1 July 1959. It must be pointed out that this T/D is to be replaced in the very near future (30-90 days) by a new MAAG-Vietnam T/D which phases TERM into MAAG. Also included at Appendix 5 is the Joint Table of Distribution for the administrative support unit for MAAG/TERM Vietnam which in practice operates under the Joint Service Support Division of MAAG.

6. (C) TERM-Vietnam Staff Organization.

Deputy Chief, MAAG, Logistics is responsible for the overall supervision of the administrative support provided ARVN forces under MDAP, MAP, and other US programs. He is responsible for the preparation of MAAG logistical programs and budgets; for making visits and inspections to ARVN logistical installations; and for coordinating with the ICC the reporting, outshipping, sale, and/or disposal of MDAP material excess to authorized ARVN/MDAP material requirements. He executes his responsibilities primarily through the Chief, Temporary Equipment and Recovery Mission (TERM). TERM is an all Army organization which handles the G4 functions.

The TERM organization chart is at Appendix 6. Within each Technical Service branch are depot advisors to ARVN logistical depots within the Saigon area; program and budgeting officers; functional specialists; and liaison officers to the Technical Service Chiefs, ARVN.

The Plans and Operations Section prepares quarterly reports, and coordinates intra TERM actions pertaining to two or more Technical Services and inter MAAG actions a reports. One member of the Plans and Operations Section is the advisor to ARVN G4; another, a permanent member of the Deputy Chief, MAAG, Logistics Inspection Team.

TERM officers assigned to the field are attached to MAAGs CATO directed field advisor groups.

7. (C) TERM-Vietnam Table of Distribution.

At Appendix 7 is the TERM-Vietnam Joint Table of Distribution effective 1 July 1959. It must be pointed out that this table is to be replaced in the very near future (30-90 days) by a new MAAG-Vietnam T/D which phases TERM into MAAG. Also included at Appendix 7 is a Joint Table of Distribution Master Recapitulation Sheet for MAAG/TERM Vietnam.

SECTION III

OPERATIONAL PLANS AND OBJECTIVES

1. (U) Emergency Plans

MAAG-Vietnam assists the US Embassy Saigon in the preparation and implementation of Embassy plans for the protection and evacuation of US National and about 2500 US-sponsored non-combatants from Vietnam. This plan is integrated with CINCPAC Plan 60-59.

2. (U) War Plans

a. Cold War - MAAG-Vietnam in coordination with the other US agencies in Vietnam is responsible for the implementation of the CINCPAC Cold War Plan 70-60 in Vietnam, which promotes US interests and deters communist aggression.

b. Defense of Vietnam. MAAG-Vietnam assists in planning and implementation of those portions of CINCPAC Plans 46-56 and 46A-57 which provide for the defense of Vietnam.

c. Defense of Mainland Southeast Asia. MAAG-Vietnam assists in planning and implementation of those portions of CINCPAC Plan 35-59 which are designed to counter communist aggression or insurgency in Southeast Asia.

d. New Southeast Asia Plan. CINCPAC Operation Plan No. 32-59 for the defense of mainland Southeast Asia was promulgated on 16 December 1959 and is currently being reviewed by the JCS. Preparation of supporting plans of subordinate commanders to include MAAG-Vietnam have been initiated. When reviewed and approved by JCS, OPLAN 32-59 will supersede other existing plans for conflict short of general war in mainland Southeast Asia. However, such plans will remain in effect until separately cancelled by CINCPAC.

3. (U) US Strategic Objectives

In May and July 1959 CINCPAC submitted to the JCS comments and recommendations with respect to US Strategic Objectives for Allied Countries of the PACOM Area for FY 1962. The JCS response in October, 1959 provided guidance to be used in developing military assistance planning for FY 1962 through FY 1966. On 1 February 1960 CINCPAC published this guidance together with a listing of the US Strategic Force Objectives for Allied Countries of the PACOM Area for the 1962-1966 period.

SECTION IV

MAAG/TERM PROBLEMS, ACCOMPLISHMENTS, PAST AND FUTURE VIETNAMESE PROGRAMS

1. (U) MAAG/TERM Problems

a. (U) US Internal Problems.

(1) (U) Excessive Time Required for Non-Advisory Type Duties. MAAG/TERM advisory personnel in general and particularly those in the field, spend a great amount of their duty time on such non-advisory tasks as filing, typing, driving long distances to draw supplies, supervising indigenous mess personnel (particularly on sanitation), hunting for scarce supplies which must be procured locally, waiting for the arrival of late courier aircraft, hand carrying messages because of an inadequate telephone net, and many other tasks required by simply living in Vietnam.

(2) (U) MAAG/TERM Organizational Problems. The fact that TERM must be operated separately from MAAG even though in reality it has exactly the same mission as MAAG has led to MAAG/TERM organizational problems at all levels. A "Jerry Rig" arrangement exists wherein the G4 advisory functions are under TERM and the G1, G2 and G3 advisory functions are under MAAG.

(3) (U) Rapid Turnover of the Majority of MAAG/TERM Personnel. The rapid turnover of short tour MAAG/TERM personnel is one of the major problems of MAAG/TERM Vietnam. By the time an advisor has been with a Vietnamese unit long enough to be truly accepted by that unit, and knows what advice it needs, and even more important how to get the Vietnamese commander to accept his advice, it is time for the advisor to depart and his replacement must go through this same time consuming process.

(4) (U) Qualifications of Advisory Personnel Assigned MAAG/TERM. Many of the US advisory personnel assigned to MAAG/TERM Vietnam are not graduates of The Military Assistance Institute, nor have they had previous MAAG experience. Thus, they have had no preparation for MAAG duties and all of their orientation and breaking-in-time must be gotten while on the job in Vietnam.

b. (U) TERM/Vietnamese Problems

The principal logistical problems of the Vietnamese Armed Forces which remain to be solved as seen by TERM are:

(1) (C) Lack of command attention to maintenance and failure to follow-up when inspection reveals that corrective action is required.

(2) (C) Relocation of logistical units and installations to support the new seven division program.

(3) (C) Implementation of a preventive medicine program to reduce disease incidence among Vietnamese units.

(4) (C) Pertinent extractions from the latest TERM report dated 4 Jan 60 are included at Appendix 8. A complete copy of this report is available in the Archives (C-17160.55).

2. MAAG/TERM Accomplishments

a. (C) TERM-Vietnam

The mission for which TERM was ostensibly brought to Vietnam -- the recovery and outshipping of economically repairable US material in excess of Vietnamese needs -- has been virtually completed. In addition to its stated MAP recovery mission, TERM has also made considerable progress in improving the logistical capabilities of the Vietnamese Armed Forces.

b. (U) MAAG-Vietnam

MAAG-Vietnam has directly assisted in the organization, equipping, supplying and training of the Vietnamese Army, Navy and Air Force since 1954. Under the auspices of MAAG the Vietnamese Armed Forces have risen from a loose conglomeration of small tactical units to a balanced organized National Defense Force.

3. (U) Past and Future / Military and Economic Assistance Programs for Vietnam.

a. U. S. military assistance programmed for Vietnam from FY 1950 through FY 1960 amounted to 541.4 million dollars. Of this amount some 498.7 million dollars worth has been delivered.

b. CINCPAC's FY 60 mutual security program allocated Vietnam a total of 209.5 million dollars, 44.7 million dollars for military assistance and 164.8 million dollars for a economic assistance.

c. CINCPAC's FY 61 mutual security program proposes a total allocation to Vietnam of 214.1 million dollars, 49.3 million dollars for military assistance and 164.8 million dollars for economic assistance. See Figure 1 for information on MAP material provided or to be provided Vietnam.

All "$" values are in thousands.

CATEGORIES and MAJOR COMPONENTS	ANNUAL PROGRAMS			
	FY 1959	FY 1960	Proposed FY 1961	
	Value	Value	Quantity	Value
Aircraft, Comp, Spares & Related Equip	-	$ 3,696		-
Ships & Harbor Craft, Comp & Spares	$ 1,033	$ 1,246		$ 3,046
Tanks, Other Veh, Weapons, Comp & Spares	$ 1,438	$ 16		$ 2,671
Ammunition	$ 3,782	$ 4,183		$ 5,717
Electronics & Comm Equip, Comp & Spares	$ 2,389	$ 1,660		$ 1,539
Spare Parts	$ 5,995	$ 8,848		$ 4,579
Other Material	$19,569	$13,472		$15,048
Construction	$ 466	$ 387		$ 4,667
Repair & Rehabilitation of Excess	$ 1,608	$ 1,382		$ 462
Packing, Crating, Handling & Transportation	$ 3,698	$ 4,012		$ 5,176
Training	$ 5,597	$ 5,702		$ 6,340
Other Services	-	$ 95		$ 7
Data for Selected Major Items	Quantity	Quantity	Quantity	Value
AD4 Aircraft	-	25	-	-
Landing Craft Utility (LCU)	1	3	5	$ 38
Landing Craft Vehicle Personnel (LCVP)	-	-	8	$ 97
Landing Craft (LSIL)	2	3	3	$ 45
Landing Ship Medium (LSM)	2	1	5	$ 660
Landing Ship Tank (LST)	-	-	1	$ 1,219
Coastal Minesweeper (MSC)	-	-	1	$ 18
Submarine Chaser (PC)	4	6	5	$ 632
Trailer, Cargo, 1/4 ton, 2 wheel	-	-	2,397	$ 553
Trailer, Cargo, 1 1/2 ton	-	-	1,008	$ 788
Truck, Cargo, 4-6 ton	-	-	55	$ 396
Rifle, Cal 30	9	-	-	-
Cartridge, 4.2" (M Rds)	6	4	76	$ 1,404
Cartridge, Cal 30 (M Rds)	669	-	822	$ 29
Cartridge, 81mm (M Rds)	20	-	-	-
Cartridge, 105mm (M Rds)	5	5	48	$ 1,301
Cartridge, 155mm (M Rds)	-	9	67	$ 2,817
Rocket, 3.5"	137,981	66,100	-	-
AN GRC Radio Series	94	472	169	$ 206
AN PRC Radio Series	1,857	993	1,527	$ 779
AN TRC 4 Radio Relay	13	1	1	$ 8

d. FY 61 MAP Training Summary for Vietnam.

(1) CONUS and overseas training of two thousand and seven Vietnamese military personnel at a cost of approximately $3,000,000.00.

(2) Sixty technical representatives to be sent to Vietnam - at a cost of approximately $900,000.00.

(3) Four mobile training teams to be sent to Vietnam - at a cost of approximately $70,000.00.

(4) FY 61 US MAAG expenses and other training costs approximately $2,500,000.00.

1. GENERAL INFORMATION FOR PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO MAAG-VIETNAM

a. Location of MAAG Personnel within the Country

MAAG Vietnam Headquarters is located in Cholon, a city of mostly Chinese population adjacent to Saigon. The headquarters can be reached by automobile in about fifteen minutes from the center of Saigon.

MAAG Advisor Detachments are located throughout Vietnam as indicated on the map in Appendix 9 . The size of these detachments is from 4 to 25 advisors. Each detachment is self-sufficient and does not depend on the Vietnamese for food or equipment. All detachments have movie projectors and record players. Five movies are delivered weekly and records are exchanged. Rations and Post Exchange items are delivered weekly. Mail is delivered at least twice each week and many detachments receive mail more often. An adequate supply of books and magazines is provided.

b. Length of Tour

The tour of duty in Vietnam is:

AREA	WITH DEPENDENTS	W/O DEP.
Vietnam (excluding Saigon	24 months	12 months
Saigon/Cholon	24 months	14 months

The tour of duty for military personnel with dependents in the command is 24 months, or 12 months subsequent to arrival of dependents, whichever is later.

c. Duty Hours

Duty hours for all personnel, military and civilian, on duty at Headquarters MAAG, Vietnam are:

Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday, Friday, and Saturday mornings: 0740 to 1150 hours.

Monday, Tuesday, Thursday, and Friday afternoons: 1345 to 1730 hours.

Offices of Headquarters MAAG, Vietnam, are closed Wednesday afternoons to enable military personnel to participate in athletics and recreation. Advisors conform to duty hours of the Vietnamese with whom they are working.

d. Billeting and Messing

(1) Temporary

Upon arrival in Saigon, personnel are assigned temporary quarters which are operated in conjunction with established BOQs and BEQs.

(2) Personnel without Dependents

There are six hotels in Saigon that are leased by MAAG for bachelor officers and six for bachelor enlisted personnel. All personnel are provided private or semi-private accommodations. Some rooms are air-conditioned; others are provided with ceiling fans.

Officers' clubs are located in the Brink, 75 E. D. V., and at the Five Oceans Hotel. The dining rooms are supervised by American personnel and the food is comparable to U.S. standards. The cost of meals per officer per month is $47.00 to $60.00; this also includes laundry service for occupants. Of the hotels leased by MAAG for military personnel, the Brink for bachelor officers, and the Plaza for bachelor enlisted personnel, are the newest. The Brink Hotel has over 100 rooms, the majority of which are three- and four-bedroom apartments. The Plaza is a particularly attractive hotel, completely air-conditioned, facing one of Saigon's busiest thoroughfares. It has a spacious U.S. -styled lobby, although somewhat less elaborate.

Meals for bachelor enlisted men can be obtained at the Metropole Hotel and the Enlisted Club at the Dai Nam Hotel. The Metropole is the one official mess facility for enlisted men. The charge per patron is $40.00 monthly in advance. Occupants of billets not having messes are required to join messes available at adjacent billets.

Personnel assigned as advisors to units outside the Saigon area are well-housed, usually in motel-type buildings.

(3) Personnel with Dependents

Dependent quarters in Saigon are French and Vietnamese style homes or apartments with two, three, or four bedrooms. Personnel utilizing private housing forfeit their respective BOQ/BEQ allowances. Most houses are single units surrounded by gardens and high walls. Maintenance of garden and yard is at the individual's expense. Appropriate tools should be brought by the sponsor as they are not usually available locally. A small

supply of dust cloths, dish cloths, and "rags" for cleaning is also recommended. A minimum of two sheets and two pillow cases, as well as a few towels, should be brought in accompanying luggage to serve until personal effects arrive.

Table silver, china, and kitchenware are usually not available in Saigon. The Navy Exchange is beginning to stock such items, but as yet their stock is very limited. It is recommended that at least minimum supplies of such items be brought from the States. The amount and quality of silverware and china are dependent on individual taste and entertainment plans. Servants are often careless and sometimes dishonest, although breakage and loss are generally not excessive. Inexpensive silverplate for 24 would probably be adequate for senior officers. Articles purchased from mail order houses or department stores, mailed through the FPO, are quite satisfactory and offer reasonable replacement possibilities.

Saigon offers very few ready-made articles of furniture, but wicker, rattan, and hardwood furniture can be procured, although prices are high. Bangkok and Hong Kong are excellent sources for bamboo and rattan furniture. Saigon's upholstered pieces and beds are usually made without springs and local mattresses are hard and uncomfortable. Choice of upholstery is limited and materials are poor and practically non-existent at present. Slip covers made from locally obtainable fabrics are of poor quality. The quality of imports in Saigon has greatly declined in the past year. This situation, however, may be temporary.

Houses in Saigon are supplied with basic furniture, but personnel should bring supplemental items such as lamps, decorative pieces, cushions, etc. Ordinary American-made furniture is subject to deterioration--warpage, shrinkage, unglueing, and infestation by insects. Wool rugs are not recommended, -- the floors of Saigon houses are of tile or terrazzo, and are cool, colorful, and easily cleaned. Fiber mats of various types can be purchased locally at reasonable cost.

Most houses have large, efficient ceiling fans in each room; however, small fans are nice to have. Floor fans are available in limited quantities locally, though expensive, and are desirable in dining rooms and

bedrooms where direct downdraft causes food to cool rapidly or contributes to head colds. In general, fans operate almost continuously in homes but towards the end of the rainy season it may become cool enough at nights to make a very light-weight blanket desirable.

Curtains and drapes are usually not required in Saigon and only rarely are fixtures available to hang them. Houses and apartments are open (no window glass) and consequently furnishings soil rapidly. Dry cleaning facilities for drapes and upholstered furniture are unreliable.

Almost every Saigon kitchen is detached from the house and sets of kitchen furniture can seldom be used. However, since kitchens and servants' quarters are usually unfurnished, any furniture needed should be purchased locally. Although the Navy Exchange is now stocking quite a few kitchen utensils, a minimum supply of pots, pans, backing dishes, and other small utensils should be brought. Butagaz (bottled gas) stoves are placed in all housing and are quite satisfactory. The gas is imported, but is nearly always available. Charcoal stoves may be used in times of gas shortage and simple electric plates are available locally. Neither kerosene nor electric stoves can be purchased in Saigon, except on order. Replacement of parts, or repairs, are virtually impossible.

Laundry service in Vietnam is considered satisfactory. Personnel with dependents normally have an "Amah" who does nothing but the laundry. Washing is accomplished by placing the item on a slab of cement or board and scrubbing with a brush. Normally cold water and crude soaps are used. Soap and bleach may be obtained from the commissary. Washing machines are not available on the local market. It is advisable to bring a standard wringer type washer, thus saving great wear on clothes. Laundry service is usually slow. During the rainy season it is sometimes impossible to dry clothes for several days. It is advisable to bring irons and extra electrical cords for the iron.

Dry cleaning in Saigon does not compare favorably with that in the U.S. Sometimes satisfactory work can be obtained, but prices are high. A must for Saigon dry cleaning is to send the complete outfit -- never send the trousers and not the coat. There is a tendency for the dry cleaning process to change the color of the garment slightly.

e. Appliances

The current in Saigon is 110-volt, 50-cycle, alternating. Clocks, Hi-Fi sets, and tape recorders require modification to be of use here. Conversion kits should be ordered from the manufacturer of the specific appliance(s). It is best not to bring electrical clocks, Hi-Fi sets, and electrical razors, as voltage regulators are a must, specifically as pertains to Hi-Fi sets, which require a steady unvariable current. The electrical system is not always reliable.

American appliances requiring 110-volt current can be used and may be shipped. Appliances designed for maximum efficiency on 60-cycle current are not efficient on the 50-cycle current available, but may be used. French male and female plugs (Edison plugs) are different from the American types but adapter plugs may be purchased. French-type light bulbs are used and are available. American-type light bulbs to fit American-type lamps are not available in Vietnam but may be purchased from Clark Air Force Base in the Philippines. American radios with international wave bands may be used. However, reception is not always good. There are no television stations in Vietnam.

f. Food

The MAAG-operated Navy Exchange provides a grocery section which stocks a full line of commissary items imported from CONUS. Canned goods, frozen meat, poultry and fish, baking needs, cereals, baby foods, and canned whole milk are always available. Fresh produce is in stock upon the arrival of a reefer ship from CONUS or the Philippines. Fresh milk and ice cream presently are not available. The monetary unit used in the exchange is U.S. dollars. Personal checks may also be used.

The local market provides an abundance of fresh fruit and vegetables. These foods cannot be eaten safely unless peeled or boiled. Local tropical fruit available includes bananas, pineapples, mangoes, papayas, pomelos (similar to grapefruit), and others. Local vegetables include green beans, corn, carrots, onions, potatoes, squash, turnips, peas, cabbage, as well as other less familiar Oriental vegetables.

g. Clothing

(1) Military Uniform. The uniform is worn by all officers in the grade of Lieutenant Colonel (Navy Commander) and above, who are assigned to duty in the Saigon area, and by all military personnel assigned as Field Advisors to Vietnamese military units, or in any other capacity involving daily contact with Vietnamese military personnel. The maximum allowance of khaki uniforms (including shorts and short sleeved shirts, khaki) may be shipped to this station. Short sleeved shirts, khaki, are authorized for wear with regular trousers, cotton khaki. Officers in the grade of Major and below, and enlisted personnel assigned duty in the Saigon area who are not involved in daily contact with Vietnamese military personnel are required to wear civilian clothes during duty hours. Such civilian attire consists of slacks and conservative sport shirts. Loud-colored Hawaiian type "Aloha" shirts are not considered to be in good taste. One winter uniform (Army Green; Navy Service Dress, Blue, "B"; Air Force Winter Blue) should be included for wear in case of travel to an area of colder climate.

Officers stationed in Vietnam should have the White Uniform prescribed by appropriate service regulations. Hand-tailored white uniforms and mess jackets, including caps may be purchased locally and at a considerable saving. (Buttons, cap shield, insignia, shoulder knots, and miniature medals are not normally available on the local market.)

Three suits of HBT (fatigues) and two pairs of combat boots are required for each officer. These items are not available in Vietnam. An adequate supply of belts, ribbons, and other required insignia should be shipped. It is advisable to bring zippers, since those obtained in Saigon are of inferior quality.

Local tailors do an adequate job on military uniforms. Cotton khaki uniforms, either short sleeved shirt and shorts, or long trousers, cost in the neighborhood of 500 to 600 piastres. White dress uniforms, including cap, will run from 1800 to 2400 piastres, depending on material.

(2) Enroute Clothing. Personnel assigned to MAAG, Vietnam, report in civilian clothing. This can be slacks and conservative sport shirt, or business suit. Assignment orders normally authorize each individual to proceed from the port of embarkation to Vietnam in civilian attire. There have been few, if any instances of surface travel to Vietnam. There would be no objection to wearing the uniform when and if traveling by surface, or in fact, by air, providing each military person debarks at Saigon in civilian attire. An individual should have his personal clothing accompany him, and keep a close check enroute to see that it is unloaded, transferred, etc. Baggage that does not accompany the individual usually takes at least six weeks in transit. Heavy enroute baggage is placed in the hold of the plane and is inaccessible during flight.

(3) Civilian Clothing

Appropriate civilian attire is authorized for wear by all personnel when not on duty, except where the dress uniform is directed for wear at special functions. Civilian clothing should be of the type that can be washed. Material for linen or sharkskin suits may be obtained in Manila or Hong Kong and the garments tailored in Saigon. Such material is available in Saigon but is more expensive. Many social functions require a business suit as an alternate to the white dress uniform. Wash and wear summer suits are highly recommended. It is desirable to bring one such suit and purchase others on the local market if the need arises.

For recreation, shorts and sport shirts are popular. Burmuda-length shorts with knee-length hose and open-necked shirts are worn by many Americans, but men on the embassy staff use them only during off-duty hours. Men wearing bright Hawaiian-type shirts on the street will find themselves "marked men", the target of every souvenir-seller in Saigon. As swimming is one of the most popular forms of recreation and as the tropical sun fades fabric rapidly, two or three bathing suits are desirable. Ready-made shirts, socks, ties, underwear, and accessories are available in limited supplies in Saigon. However, they are usually French products with a cut and design not popular with the Americans.

Dry cleaning is both unsatisfactory and expensive. It is recommended that only washable suits and shirts be brought. Linen, seersucker, sharkskin, cotton, and rayon cord have been the most popular fabrics in the past, but many who have recently arrived with clothing made from a blend of Dacron and cotton prefer it to the other fabrics. Nylon and other synthetic materials which do not permit air to flow through freely and do not absorb perspiration are not recommended for Saigon's sticky climate.

h. Community Services

(1) Post Exchange. PX facilities are limited in comparison with those in the U.S. or at most overseas stations. There are ample supplies of toiletries plus a limited supply of underclothes for both men and women. Items such as candy, gum, pots and pans, silverware, record players, records, dishes, glassware, towels, socks, toasters, cameras, shoe polish, stationery, and many small necessities are usually available. The PX is supplied by ship, consequently, there are times when some of the above listed items are not available pending receipt of incoming shipments.

(2) Commissary. Although normally a well-stocked facility, it does, at times, become a little bare pending receipt of incoming shipments. Available are meats, fruits, vegetables, and staples with which any family can subsist with enjoyment. There are plentiful stocks of desserts, cookies, jams and jellies, and similar items. For the bachelor there are numerous items in stock for snacks or sandwiches.

(3) Class VI Store. A very adequate and well-stocked facility containing many brands of liquor, wine, and beer. Liquor is rationed at six bottles per month. Beer is rationed at three cases per month. Wine is not a rationed item. Liquor, liqueurs, wine, and beer are also available on the local market at a higher price. Cigarettes are sold in the class VI store. Most popular brands, plain or filter-tips, are available at a ration of six cartons per month.

(4) EM Clubs. The Enlisted Men's Open Mess is located in mid-Saigon. Entertainment available here is varied; weekly dances, and bingo are provided. It has a well-stocked bar and a choice selection of meals.

(5) Officers' Clubs. Entertainment available is similar to that of the EM Open Mess.

i. Police Protection

Police protection in the Saigon-Cholon area is quite similar to that found in most cities in the United States. Police are found in greater numbers due to lack of communication and transportation facilities. All BOQs and BEQs are under 24-hour guard. Roving patrols of bicycle-mounted police cover suburban areas.

j. Laws Applicable to U.S. Personnel

Military personnel assigned to duty with the Military Assistance Advisory Group, Vietnam, are subject to U.S. Military Law. At present, all official United States personnel are accorded diplomatic immunity by special concession of the Government of the Republic of Vietnam. U.S. military, or their dependents, if involved in local incidents, are reported to Chief, MAAG, Vietnam, for appropriate disciplinary action. This arrangement is very satisfactory and Vietnamese Government officials have high regard for the prompt and fair manner in which Chief MAAG has handled the very few incidents that have occurred.

Driving in Vietnam, particularly Saigon-Cholon, is extremely hazardous due to constantly congested roadways. Many prefer to use military vehicles or commercial taxis rather than run the risk of accidents.

k. Leave and Pass Policy

Unaccompanied military personnel assigned to MAAG, Vietnam, for a regular tour of duty are authorized seven days leave during the tour. In addition, an R&R trip to Hong Kong (four days of which is chargeable as leave) is authorized. The seven-day restriction does not apply to personnel serving in Vietnam for 24 months.

Division chiefs and chief TERM are authorized to approve ordinary leave not to exceed seven days. Leaves in excess of seven days and leaves outside of Vietnam are approved by the Chief of Staff.

Weekend passes to points of interest and recreational areas are encouraged. Passes are approved by division chiefs.

1. Finance and Banking

There are no U.S. banking facilities for U.S. personnel in Vietnam. The American Embassy and MAAG Disbursing Offices provide facilities for cashing U.S. Treasury checks and travelers checks. The disbursing office at the American Embassy will cash personal checks drawn on stateside banks. Payments for these checks are made in piastres, the local currency. There is a limit on the amount of U. S. dollar currency each service member is permitted to draw during any one month. For unaccompanied personnel the limit is $75.00 per month and for members with their dependents $100.00 is authorized. MAAG commissary and post exchange purchases may be paid for by U.S. currency or by personal checks, made out only for the exact amount of the purchase. The limited free market access rate which governs U.S. personnel piastre transactions fluctuates between 70 and 75 piastres for one U.S. dollar. The official rate of exchange is 35 piastres for one U.S. dollar.

m. Amount of Money Recommended to be on Hand

Upon arriving in Vietnam personnel should have sufficient funds to defray a month's living expenses. Basic monthly expenses for personnel without dependents in Vietnam are approximately:

Food	$55.00
Laundry	$ 7.00
Miscellaneous	$20.00
TOTAL:	$82.00

During the first month in Vietnam initial supply expenses are usually a little more than those of a normal month. Per diem payments are paid on an accrual basis. Consideration must be given to the amount of funds an individual will receive on his first pay day to insure that these funds are sufficient to defray the following months expenses. Expenses for members with dependents are normally comparable to those in the U.S.

Commissary and exchange prices are controlled as in the U.S. While the inventories at these installations in some cases are limited, they are adequate.

Recreational facilities under military control are limited to one movie theater and the Officers' and Enlisted Open Messes. Under civilian management there is available a golf course, tennis courts, and swimming pools. Memberships range from 400 piastres or $5.75 to 550 piastres or $8.00 per month. The theater, operated under military supervision, charges admission in U.S. currency; twenty-five cents for adults and fifteen cents for children.

n. Medical Facilities

There is a dispensary operated on a share-expense basis by all the official U.S. Government Agencies in Vietnam. It is under the administration of the U.S. Embassy. A small six-bed infirmary is provided for short term care, but many serious cases are air-evacuated to Clark AFB, the Philippines, or to Tokyo, Japan. The staff consists of two medical officers, one dental officer, six nurses (five local and one American), one dental assistant, one X-ray technician, and one laboratory technician. Ambulance service is provided for emergency cases. Any special medication required that is not in the standard list of drugs should be obtained in sufficient quantities prior to departure from the U.S. or arrangements should be made to have it sent as needed. All immunizations are available at the dispensary.

o. Newspapers and Periodicals

There are two circulating libraries, maintained by the American and British Information Services, which have books and magazines in English. The USIS Library concentrates on books explaining United States history, government, business, technology, art, literature, etc. The British Council Library does the same thing with the British point of view. Their collections stress non-fiction and technical works with relatively little fiction. Bookshops carrying a fair selection of American books and magazines have recently been opened in central Saigon, Passage Eden, and in Cholon.

Some of the more popular American magazines, such as Life, Saturday Evening Post, Look, Holiday, The New Yorker, Harpers, and Esquire can be purchased locally but copies are usually about two months old. Pacific air editions of Time and Newsweek are received regularly each week. International air editions of The New York Times (about a week old) are sometimes

available. A few French magazines and newspapers are regularly received in the city's leading bookshop. Magazines and books purchased locally are not overly expensive.

There are two small daily newspapers printed locally in French and an English-language weekly, The Times of Vietnam. The latter features editorialized reviews of local events, economic summaries, and brief articles on Vietnamese history, art, and literature.

In view of the fact that surface mail takes one to two months, arrangements for subscriptions to periodicals should be made before leaving the U.S.

Subscriptions to both newspapers and magazines published in the United States are recommended as the best means of keeping informed.

p. Transportation

Transportation to Saigon, Vietnam, is either by commercial air or by Military Air Transport Service. Travel by surface carrier may be authorized by port authorities when a cogent reason is substantiated. Transportation to the United States upon reassignment may be by commercial air, or a combination of air and surface travel. Military air is not normally available for return to CONUS.

Concurrent travel of dependents is not authorized to Saigon unless so stated in sponsor's orders. Depending upon the availability of dependent housing, the nature of the individual's duty assignment, and the approval of Chief, MAAG, personnel may be given the opportunity to apply for travel of dependents. This application will be made only after the sponsor's arrival in Vietnam. Therefore, no conclusions should be reached by sponsors as to the movement of their dependents, prior to determination of all the circumstances in each individual case.

Military transportation is authorized within Vietnam for recreational travel to points of interest not normally serviced by commercial transportation facilities. Bus transportation is authorized and furnished for travel between BOQ's, BEQ's, messes, and place of duty. Local taxi service is adequate, cost is cheap and many people prefer this taxi service to driving their own automobile. Commercial bus transportation, although available, is not considered adequate by U.S. standards and is not utilized.

q. Postal Facilities

The most expeditious and reliable means of sending and receiving mail in Vietnam is through the United States Military Postal System. Military personnel stationed in Vietnam, as well as other members of official U. S. agencies, are served by the MAAG-operated APO 143, San Francisco. Regular air mail takes approximately five days from the East Coast. The Post Office is presently served four times weekly by PAA flights from San Francisco.

Parcel Post usually takes from five to six weeks. Receipt of surface mail is very irregular, depending on daily schedules of vessels from the U. S.

International Air Mail from the U. S. usually travels to Saigon via Paris aboard Air France aircraft. Letters from the United States arrive in about five days. International parcel post takes considerable time to arrive, is very expensive, and its use is not recommended. The cost of mailing anything through international mail channels is much more than through the military system, the safe arrival of checks and valuables is not always guaranteed.

r. Vietnamese Functions

Certain functions, because of their semi-official nature, place attendance on almost a mandatory basis. Anyone who receives an invitation from an official of the Vietnamese Government should consider it their duty to attend, unless extenuating circumstances such as conflicting social engagements, duty, or illness dictate otherwise.

s. Familiarization Firing

Regardless of Branch of Service, all newly assigned MAAG/TERM personnel shortly after their arrival in Vietnam must fire a familiarization course with the pistol, carbine, M1 rifle, Browning automatic rifle and light machine gun.

t. Station Allowances

(1) Housing allowances. Effective 16 August 1959, under provisions of the Joint Travel Regulations, personnel on duty with MAAG/TERM stationed in Saigon/Cholon who are not provided housing accommodations

by MAAG are entitled to a daily housing allowance as follows:

GRADE	WITHOUT DEPENDENTS	WITH DEPENDENTS
E-4 thru O-10	1.30	2.10
E-1 thru E-3	1.30	Dependents not authorized

(2) Station cost of living allowance. Effective 1 Feb 59, under the provisions of the Joint Travel Regulations, personnel on duty with MAAG/TERM Vietnam are entitled to a daily cost of living allowance as follows:

(CHART ON PAGE D-31)

Unaccompanied personnel assigned to duty in Saigon are housed in hotel- or apartment-type accommodations provided by MAAG. Station allowances are for the purpose of adjusting to the additional cost of living in Vietnam. Some of the modern everyday necessities to which U. S. people are accustomed are considered a luxury in Vietnam and are priced accordingly on the local markets. The location of a small commissary-PX requires use of a taxicab, the principal mode of transportation.

When travel of dependents to Vietnam is authorized, local housing is provided for the military member and his dependents. Cost of this housing is paid for by the U. S. Government and the member forfeits his basic allowance for quarters. Servants, and other household help such as cooks, nursemaids, and houseboys are paid for by the service member.

To promote international relations; to protect U. S. citizens' interests; and for use in connection with commemorative and ceremonial requests, some key officials are provided with representation funds to defray additional expenses incurred by these activities. This method of "individual contact" has proven most beneficial to both governments concerned.

GRADE	MEMBERS WITHOUT DEPEND-ENTS	MEMBERS WITH DEPENDENTS				
		1 Dependent	2 Dependents	3 Dependents	4 Dependents	5 or more Dependents
O-10) O-9) O-8)	$3.35	$4.20	$4.40	$4.60	$4.85	$5.15
O-7	3.25	4.05	4.25	4.45	4.65	4.90
O-6	2.95	3.55	3.75	3.95	4.15	4.40
O-5	2.65	3.15	3.35	3.55	3.75	3.95
O-4	2.50	3.00	3.15	3.35	3.55	3.75
O-3	2.25	2.70	2.85	3.05	3.20	3.40
O-2	1.85	2.15	2.30	2.45	2.65	2.80
O-1	1.45	1.75	1.85	2.00	2.15	2.20
W-4	2.35	2.80	2.95	3.15	3.30	3.50
W-3	2.15	2.55	2.70	2.85	3.00	3.20
W-2	1.90	2.25	2.40	2.55	2.70	2.90
W-1	1.80	2.10	2.30	2.40	2.55	2.75
E-9	2.00	2.45	2.65	2.90	3.15	3.45
E-8	1.85	2.25	2.50	2.70	3.00	3.25
E-7	1.70	2.10	2.30	2.55	2.80	3.05
E-6	1.55	1.90	2.10	2.30	2.50	2.70
E-5	1.35	1.65	1.85	2.05	2.20	2.40
E-4	1.15	1.40	1.60	1.70	1.85	2.00
E-3	1.00					
E-2	.80					
E-1	.80					

2. a. (U) Administrative Support Furnished MAAG/TERM by other Agencies.

(1) (U) US Embassy Saigon. Furnishes MAAG/TERM with a very substantial amount of administrative support on a reimbursable basis. Many of the indigenous civilian personnel working for the MAAG on housekeeping duties, drivers, mechanics, clerical personnel, etc., are in reality Embassy paid employees. The Embassy controls both the total numbers and their grade structure. The Embassy also provides a representation allowance for certain key MAAG/TERM personnel.

(2) (U) US Operations Mission (USOM) (ICA). Assists MAAG/TERM in a rather indirect way. It is the actual disbursing and accounting agency for all US economic or military funds provided the Vietnamese Government.

(3) (U) USIS. Provides a film library and some photographic and publicity support for the MAAG.

(4) (U) Government of Vietnam. Provides MAAG/TERM with certain administrative support such as housing, interpreters and civilian and military guards for MAAG/TERM installations and quarters. In addition, it furnishes kitchen police, drivers, and cooks for field advisory detachments.

(5) (U) Department of the Army. Provides Army personnel, an APO, Army command and liaison aircraft, and funding for: civilian clothing for Army enlisted personnel, pay, station allowances, and PCS movements of Army personnel assigned to MAAG/TERM.

(6) (U) Department of the Navy. Provides Navy personnel, a Navy Exchange, Navy aircraft for air evacuation, and funding for: the majority of MAAG housekeeping, civilian clothing for Navy enlisted personnel, pay, station allowance and PCS movements of Navy personnel assigned to MAAG/TERM.

(7) (U) Department of the Air Force. Provides Air Force personnel, Air Force aircraft for air evacuation, and funding for: civilian clothing for Air Force enlisted personnel, pay, station allowance and PCS movements of Air Force personnel assigned to MAAG/TERM.

b. (S) Administrative Support Furnished other Agencies by MAAG/TERM.

(1) (U) The Navy and Air Force aircraft assigned to MAAG/TERM are used for emergency air evacuation to the Clark Air Base Hospital in the

Philippines, regardless of the US agency to which the patient is assigned.

(2) (U) All US personnel assigned to US agencies in Vietnam are authorized use of the MAAG/TERM Navy exchange and APO facilities.

(3) ($) Under certain emergency plans MAAG-Vietnam has responsibility for the administrative support and evacuation of certain US and US-sponsored personnel in Vietnam.

10 Incls.

App 1 (U) - Terms of Reference, MAAG.

App 2 (U) - Terms of Reference, TERM.

App 3 (U) - Vietnamese Terms of Reference for MAAG/TERM.

App 4 (U) - MAAG Organization Chart.

App 5 (U) - MAAG Joint Table of Distribution.

App 6 (U) - TERM Organization Chart.

App 7 (U) - TERM Joint Table of Distribution.

App 8 (U) - Special TERM Report, 1 Apr - 30 Sep 59.

App 9 (U) - Location MAAG Army Detachments.

App 10(U) - Security Clearance Certificate.

UNCLASSIFIED

TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR
THE U. S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE ADVISORY GROUP TO VIET-NAM

1. These instructions will govern the organization and operation of the U. S. Military Assistance Advisory Group to Vietnam, hereinafter referred to as the MAAG. Previous instructions concerning the military assistance functions and organization of the MAAG in conflict with this directive are hereby rescinded.

2. The primary mission of the MAAG will be to assist the Vietnamese armed forces to attain the capability of maintaining internal security and resisting external attack.

3. Organization, Procedures and Relationships

a. The Chief of the MAAG is nominated by the Department of the Army and is approved by the Secretary of Defense.

b. The MAAG will be comprised of a Chief, a U. S. Army Section, a U. S. Navy Section, and a U. S. Air Force Section. Coordination between these three Service Sections will be the responsibility of the Chief, MAAG.

c. A small Joint Advisory and Planning Staff, composed of the Chiefs of the three Service Sections and additional personnel from the Service Sections as required, may be established within the MAAG. The function of the Joint Advisory and Planning Staff will be limited to advising the Chief, MAAG, on matters affecting his responsibilities.

d. The Senior Army, Navy and Air Force officers assigned to the MAAG will be Chiefs of their respective Service Sections, except that the Chief of the MAAG will not act as Chief of a Service Section. With the concurrence of CINCPAC, the Chief of each Service Section will receive instructions from and is authorized to communicate with his Military Department and appropriate elements of the Pacific Command on technical and routine operational matters primarily concerned with his own Service aid program, keeping the Chief of the MAAG informed, as appropriate.

e. The Chief of the MAAG will formulate policies for, and supervise the operation of, his organization in consonance with general MSP

policy directives of the U. S. Ambassador to Viet-Nam and, in military matters, in consonance with directives by CINCPAC. On those military policy matters appropriate for Mutual Security Program (MSP) channels of the Department of State, the responsibility of the Chief of the MAAG will be directly to the U. S. Ambassador. He is authorized, however, to make recommendations through military channels with respect to programming in consonance with instructions received from higher military authority. The Chiefs of the Service Sections will be authorized to communicate directly with the Chief of the Diplomatic mission, after advising the Chief of the MAAG, and with corresponding components of the armed forces of Viet-Nam on technical, administrative and other matters concerned with the activities of their own Service or their own Service aid program. The Chief of the MAAG will, however, be kept informed of all actions undertaken pursuant to such authority.

f. The MAAG will be attached to the U. S. Embassy in Viet-Nam and will be an element of the Country Team. The relationship of the MAAG with the Ambassador will be governed by current Executive Orders. The Chief of the MAAG will have direct access to the U. S. Ambassador and should keep him informed of pertinent activities and programs of the MAAG. The MAAG will operate under the military command of CINCPAC.

g. MAAG relationship with the U. S. Service Attaches will be one of mutual cooperation toward the accomplishment of their respective missions. Although the MAAG will not actively engage in the collection of intelligence information, such information of intelligence value to the U.S. as may be developed will be made available for collection by the U. S. Service Attaches.

4. Responsibilities and Functions. The Chief of the MAAG, in accordance with appropriate directives of higher authority, will take the following actions in administering in Viet-Nam applicable aspects of the MSP for which the Secretary of Defense is responsible under Section 524 of the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended.

a. Furnish the U. S. Ambassador, as Chief of the U. S. Diplomatic

Mission, such advice on military matters as he may require in exercising general direction of the MSP. This includes coordination, as necessary, with other MSP agencies present in the country.

b. With respect to the primary mission of the MAAG, the Chief of the MAAG will:

(1) Provide advice and assistance to the Vietnam Armed Forces, as appropriate, on administrative procedures, personnel management, logistics, operations, organization and training, in order to insure proper utilization of the military equipment and supplies furnished to the Vietnam Government under the aid program. To this end, personnel of the MAAG are authorized to participate in an advisory or training capacity with Vietnamese field units, training agencies, logistics agencies engaged in operational, mobilization and war planning.

(2) Assist CINCPAC, as directed, in carrying out the responsibilities in Vietnam which are now or may later be assigned to CINCPAC by appropriate higher authority.

(3) Insure that advice and assistance furnished to Vietnam are in accordance with directives of CINCPAC.

c. Advise and assist the Vietnamese Government in the preparation of general requests for aid under the provisions of the Military Assistance Program(MAP), screen such requests in accordance with current programming guidelines approved by the Secretary of Defense, and forward to CINCPAC as the basis for development of an approved MAP for Vietnam, net deficiency lists with recommendation as to end item requirements (including justification therefor as prescribed by the Services), desired delivery schedules, and priority of supply among the various military units.

d. Conduct continuing review of shipping forecasts received from the Services and the relation thereof to the military needs of the Vietnamese armed forces. Submit recommendations for acceleration or deferment of deliveries, as appropriate, with a view to achieving the highest possible degree of coordination between MAP deliveries and unit equipment objectives.

e. Review all allocations of MAP materiel proposed for delivery by the Military Departments, recommending cancellation or deferment of shipments when equipment items cannot be usefully absorbed by Vietnamese military units promptly after delivery.

f. Conduct continuing review of the approved MAP for Vietnam with a view to deleting items therefrom which can be provided by the country without cost to MAP.

g. Advise and assist the Vietnam authorities in the receipt of materiel furnished under MAP and effect transfer of title to Vietnam.

h. Advise and assist the country in the requisition, receipt, identification, storage and distribution of supplies and equipment furnished under MAP, and on the use, nomenclature, techniques of operation, maintenance and tactical employment of items furnished or planned to be furnished. In addition, observe end use and maintenance of equipment furnished under MAP.

i. In coordination with the U. S. Diplomatic and International Cooperation Administration (ICA) Missions, provide the country, insofar as is authorized and practicable, with technical information, such as plans, specifications and characteristics, for the purpose of assisting indigenous production of military equipment.

j. Advise and assist Vietnamese personnel in obtaining formal training in the U. S. Service Schools in the United States and overseas.

k. Direct the activities of the U. S. personnel temporarily assigned by higher authority to assist in military assistance matters.

l. Submit such reports as required by higher headquarters through military channels.

5. General.

a. The MAAG shall consist of such number of U. S. personnel as may be agreed upon by the Governments of the United States of America and Viet-Nam, and concurred in by the U. S. Ambassador. The Departments of the Army, the Navy and the Air Force, with the concurrence of the Secretary of Defense, will determine their respective personnel contributions after

consideration of the recommendations of CINCPAC and the Chief of the MAAG.

b. The Chief of the MAAG will obtain such strategic guidance as may be required from CINCPAC. CINCPAC will control military advice and information of a strategic nature provided by the MAAG to foreign authorities.

c. No member of the MAAG shall assume any duty as a result of which he will be responsible to the government of Vietnam.

d. In discharging the responsibilities stated herein, the Chief of the MAAG will not commit the United States, directly or indirectly, to any future course of action.

e. Administrative services and logistical support of the MAAG, except as noted below, will be provided by the Department of the Navy subject to existing inter-Service agreements concerning reimbursement, or will be chargeable to MAP funds to the extent directed by the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The Department of the Air Force will furnish aircraft for MAP administrative use for the MAAG as a whole. Such flying time for this purpose will be on a reimbursable basis subject to fund availability.

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HEADQUARTERS
MILITARY ASSISTANCE ADVISORY GROUP, VIETNAM
Saigon, Vietnam

MAGAG 26 May 1956

SUBJECT: Approved Terms of Reference for Temporary Equipment Recovery Mission (TERM) Vietnam

TO: See Distribution

1. Cited below is Department of Defense message number 903397, dated 23 May 1956, from ASD/ISA signed Gray, which sets forth the approved Terms of Reference for TERM:

a. Mission:

(1) Recover and outship economically repairable MDAP material excess to authorized Vietnamese Armed Forces MDAP material requirements.

(2) Improve the logistical capabilities of the Vietnamese Armed Forces to the extent that Vietnamese can properly receive, store, handle, issue and maintain MDAP and other United States supplied material.

(3) Dispose of salvage and scrap returned to United States control.

b. Concept of Operation: In accomplishment of mission, CH, TERM will:

(1) Supervise recovery and outshipment of excess MDAP material as follows:

(a) Army Material:

1. Dispose of locally or by sale of external authorized sources excesses deemed to be of salvage and scrap in accordance with AR 755-10.

2. Transfer and report to Department of Army serviceable material to fill valid Army, Navy and Air Force requirements in Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos, with Army requirements accorded first priority.

3. Report to Department of Army for shipment to AFFE for reconditioning and return to Vietnam unserviceable but repairable

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end items, assemblies, and spare parts, required for the support of the Vietnamese Army.

4. Report to Department of Army for disposition, other unserviceable but repairable end item assets and spare parts.

5. Report to Department of Army serviceable material excess to Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos requirements for shipping instructions to other MDAP recipients.

6. Limit maintenance in Vietnam for the immediate future to field maintenance and rebuild by use of rebuilt assemblies only.

(b) Navy Material:

1. Dispose of unserviceable material beyond repair either locally or by sale to external authorized sources.

2. Transfer serviceable material to fill valid Army, Navy and Air Force requirements in Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos, with Navy requirements accorded first priority.

3. Report to CINCPAC serviceable and unserviceable but repairable material excess to Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos requirements for further screening and disposition in accordance with CNO message 052203Z April 1956.

(c) Air Force Material:

1. Report to AMFPA for disposition instructions on repairable material (References AFMMS-OP message 59265 dated 9 Sep 55).

2. Subsequent to receipt of disposition instructions from AMFPA, repairable material will be shipped to designated overseas repair facilities. Replacement with serviceable like items, if required, will be requisitioned through normal channels. (Reference Section 8, Volume IX, AFM 67-1, dated 13 March 1956).

3. Redistribute serviceable material to Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos against approved force basis. This process currently in effect and known as "After the Fact Programming." (Reference AFMMS-OP message 53829, dated 27 December 1955)

4. Report to AMFPA serviceable redistributeable

material excesses for disposition or shipping instructions to other MDAP recipients. (Reference AFMMS-OP message 59265, dated 9 September 1955)

5. Depot level maintenance will be determined by AMFPA and COMPACAF with COMFEAF to provide assistance when requested.

6. Dispose of excess unserviceable material beyond economical repair locally or by sale to external authorized sources. (Reference instructions are included in Section 13, Volume IX, AFM 67-1 and Volume XIII, AFM 67-1.)

(2) Assist in improvement of Vietnamese logistical capacilities so as to preserve MDAP material now under jurisdiction of Vietnamese Armed Forces or to be turned over to them by French:

(a) Identify and classify material.

(b) Establish effective depot operation and depot operation procedures.

(c) Conduct limited depot maintenance and establish depot maintenance procedures.

(d) Supervise activities of civilian employees and/or Vietnamese Armed Forces personnel in accomplishment of (a), (b) and (c), above.

(e) Instruct selected Vietnamese Armed Forces personnel in operations, policies and procedure to accomplish (a), (b), (c) and (d), above.

c. Command Relationships:

(1) All personnel assigned to, or on duty with, TERM will be under the over-all command of Chief, MAAG, Vietnam.

(2) Communication and operations conducted in conjunction with other US agencies, or with French, Vietnamese of ICC personnel will be as directed by Chief, MAAG.

(3) Direct communication by Chief, TERM with US military departments on matters of purely technical nature is authorized, keeping the Chief, MAAG informed as appropriate.

(4) Within approved ceilings, Chief, MAAG, is authorized to

transfer personnel subsequent to arrival in Vietnam between MAAG and TERM. Official notification to higher headquarters will be made subsequent to such transfers.

d. Other Instructions:

(1) The TERM mission is appropriately a military, logistical mission. At no time will TERM or TERM personnel be a party to a covert operation. Under guidance of Chief, MAAG, and after consultation by him with US Ambassador, Chief, TERM will prescribe the uniform to be worn on all occasions. Whenever practicable, personnel should be authorized to wear civilian clothing.

(2) The personnel ceiling of 350 personnel assigned to or on duty with TERM and who are physically present in Vietnam will not be exceeded except that a reasonable overlap of personnel caused by rotational replacements is authorized.

(3) Undue publicity in the attainment of TERM objectives will be avoided.

(4) Civilian contractors may be employed to supplement TERM for accomplishment of the TERM missions upon approval of CINCPAC and military department concerned. Contracts will be concluded in accordance with applicable contracting laws and regulations. Also Japanese and Filipino civilian technicians may be employed to agument TERM.

e. Reporting Procedures:

(1) Quarterly activities report will be submitted through Chief, MAAG, Vietnam directly to agencies indicated: CINCPAC, 5 copies; Department of Navy, 5 copies; Department of Air Force, 3 copies; Department of Army, 12 copies; OSD/ISA, 2 copies and JCS, 3 copies.

(a) Additional copies may be furnished upon request to other military commands, American Embassy-Saigon or Department of State.

(b) The report should include but not be limited to the following:

1. Roster of personnel.

2. Number of civilians, both US and foreign, employed.

3. Types and amount of equipment outshipped.

4. Description of maintenance, repair, and rebuild and salvage operations.

5. Status of depot operations.

6. Progress of logistical training of Vietnamese.

7. Major problems.

(c) The report will be divided into service sections.

(2) Reports will also be prepared covering outshipment and arrival of material and equipment, for use by Embassy for ICC notification purpose.

f. State Department concurs in above Terms of Reference and requests copy be passed to Ambassador.

FOR THE CHIEF:

/s/ Howard A. Berg
HOWARD A. BERG
Major AGC
Adjutant

DISTRIBUTION:
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Appendix 3 to Annex D

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HEADQUARTERS
MILITARY ASSISTANCE ADVISORY GROUP, VIETNAM
Saigon, Vietnam

MAAG-320 16 November 1956

SUBJECT: Terms of Reference

TO: See Distribution

1. At the request of and in conjunction with, this MAAG, Terms of Reference accrediting Advisors and TERM field representatives assigned to Units and Agencies of the Vietnamese Armed Forces, have been published by ARVN and are reproduced in paragraph 2, below.

2. "SUBJECT: Instruction defining the authority and missions of US Advisors.

This instruction aims at defining the authority and missions of the U.S. Advisors accredited to the Vietnamese Military Commanders; it also defines the responsibilities of the latter towards U.S. Advisors and their relations with these Advisors.

I/-GENERAL

The mission of the U. S. Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) is to assist the Vietnamese Government in the organization of an up-to-date, well-trained and powerful army.

The U.S. Advisors are assigned by MAAG, having as mission to assist and advise the Vietnamese Military Commanders in all matters on organization, training and logistics.

II/-ASSIGNMENT

All U.S. Advisors are assigned by the U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group to the Agencies or Units of the Vietnamese Republican Armed Forces.

But the assignment order is to be notified by the VNRA General Staff to the interested Agencies or Units to which the U.S. Advisors are accredited.

III/-RESPONSIBILITIES AND AUTHORITY OF MAAG PERSONNEL

U.S. Advisory personnel are authorized to:

1/- Represent Chief, MAAG in relation with the Vietnamese commands to which accredited;

2/- Advise and assist Vietnamese commanders and staff officers in the preparation and execution of their missions on organization, training and logistics.

3/- Visit units or agencies of the VNRA or subordinate units and agencies to which accredited. Such visits must be always made with the agreement of the Vietnamese commanders or agencies to which accredited, in the presence of the Unit commanders or their representatives.

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4/- As regards the visit to the Units or Agencies to which they are not accredited, it is necessary for them to obtain previous agreement of the VNRA General Staff. The latter shall notify the visit to the interested units and agencies, and at the same time, appoint a representative to take part in it.

5/- Receive access to the directives, orders and documents published by the Vietnamese Republican Armed Forces which are absolutely necessary to the efficient fulfillment of the advisory duties.

6/- Make periodic end-use inspection of U.S. Equipment provided units.

7/- Submit oral and/or written reports to the Chief MAAG on the status of units and agencies to which accredited especially on training, equipment, moral, efficiency and combat aptitude. Such reports will be discussed with the appropriate commanders prior to submission to higher authorities.

8/- U.S. Advisors have no command or supervisory authority over Vietnamese personnel or units.

9/- U.S. Advisors accredited to the units or agencies should rigidly respect all security instructions issued by such commanders.

IV/-RESPONSIBILITIES OF VNRA CONCERNING U.S. ADVISORS ACCREDITED TO V.N. UNITS.

Officers of the VNRA are responsible to their accredited Advisors for the following:

- Security for U.S. personnel;

- Fulfillment of material and comfort needs within the means available to include: lodging, vehicles, drivers, office space, mess personnel, interpretors, communications and emergency medical cares;

- To facilitate in every possible way the satisfactory accomplishments of the advisors' tasks, particularly in the following respects: furnishing of documents, on organization, training and logistics.

- To notify, if necessary, as to programs and scheduled military activities, or any decision or orders, issued to their subordinates concerning the above matters.

- To request advice in all fields but particularly in relation to new techniques, training and logistics.

- To examine advisors' recommendations with great care, and where execution of the recommendations will improve the efficiency of the command, to effect such recommendations without delay.

V/-TEMPORARY EQUIPMENT RECOVERY MISSION (TERM)

1/- Technical service representatives are furnished by a separate agency entitled the "TEMPORARY EQUIPMENT RECOVERY MISSION" whose primary mission is supervision and recovery of MDAP equipment.

2/- These U.S. personnel will enjoy the same relationship vis-a-vis Vietnamese Commander as the personnel of MAAG.

VI/-RELATIONS BETWEEN VIETNAMESE AND AMERICAN PERSONNEL

The responsibilities of the Vietnamese military commanders are

different from those of the U.S. Advisors.

The Vietnamese commanders bear responsibility towards their superiors for the agencies and units placed under their authorities; while the U.S. Advisors, rich in experience, have the task to assist and counsel the Vietnamese Commanders.

In order to perform their respective missions successfully, the personnel of the VNRA forces and personnel of the U.S. forces should entertain close relations between them and cooperate within the missions and authority above defined. It also strongly recommended that both parties must act together with each other in the spirit of solidarity and courtesy at all time."

3. All MAAG and TERM personnel, regardless of grade or duty assignment, will be familiar with the above quoted Terms of Reference.

FOR THE CHIEF:

s/ Einar Berge
EINAR BERGE
Captain AGO
Asst Adjutant

DISTRIBUTION:
C

MAAG VN CONTROL
C-951-56

ORGANIZATION CHART
MILITARY ASSISTANCE ADVISORY GROUP, VIETNAM



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Appendix 4 to Annex D

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APPENDIX 5 TO ANNEX D

JOINT TABLES OF DISTRIBUTION

MAAG-Vietnam (Seven Pages) and

MAAG/TERM Administrative Support Unit (One Page)

JOINT TABLE OF DISTRIBUTION FOR *(Specify Hq., Activity, or Command)* PAGE 1 OF 7 PAGES

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01		HEADQUARTERS M&AG																																					
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	19	Dpy Chief of Staff (Opns)	O	AR	2010	A	1					1																								75	422	67
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	28	Chief Planning Group	O	IN	2162	T	1					1																								75	414	67
	29	Plans Officer	O	AT	2162	T	1						1																									414	67
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	35	Clerk Typist	E		711.10	T	1															1															414	67
02		JOINT SERVICES SUPPORT DIVISION																																					
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	01	Chief JSSD	O	IN	2025	T	1					1																									414	67
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		FIELD SUPPORT SECTION																																					
	07	Chief, Fld Spt Section	O	AR	2120	T	1							1																								414	67
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		FIELD SUPPORT SECTION (Cont'd)																																				
	09	Supply Sergeant	E	NC	768.70	T	1											1																			414	67
	10	Clerk Typist	E	YN	0000	T		1													1																414	67
	11	Clerk Typist	E	YN	0000	T		1													1																414	67
	12	Warehouse Specialist	E		551.10	A	1														1																422	67
		MESS AND BILLETING SECTION																																				
	13	Billeting Officer	O	QM	2120	T	1								1																						414	67
	14	Mess Officer, Supervisor	O	AF	6444	T				1					1																						414	67
	15	Chief Clerk, Billeting	E	NC	717.60	A	1											1																			422	67
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	24	Administrative Specialist	E	NC	70250	T				1											1																414	67
		ACCOUNTABLE SUPPLY SECTION																																				
	25	Accountable Supply Officer	O	QM	4419	A	1							1																							422	67
	26	Warehousing Specialist	E	NC	64150	A				1											1																422	67
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	28	Organization Supply Supervisor	E	NC	64173	T				1								1																			414	67
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		SPECIAL SERVICE SECTION																																				
	30	Special Service Officer	O	AR	5000	A	1								1																						422	67
		TRANSPORTATION BRANCH																																				
	31	Transportation Officer	O	TC	0692	A	1																														422	67
	32	Asst Transportation Officer	O	TC	0612	A	1							1																							422	67
	33	Chief Clerk	E	NC	717.60	T	1											1																			414	67
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	38	Operations Sgt	E	NC	555.60	A	1														1																422	67
		PASSENGER MOVEMENT SECTION																																				
	39	Passenger Movement Clerk	E	NC	719.60	A	1													1																	422	67
	40	Sr Move Sp	E		719.10	A	1														1																422	67
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		ARMY AVIATION SECTION																																				
	42	Aviation Officer	O	AT	1981	T	5								5																						414	67
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	45	Motor Officer	O	TC	0600	A	1								1																						422	67
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	47	Motor Sergeant	E	NC	631.70	A	1													1																	422	67

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03		COMPTROLLER DIVISION																																					
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	01	Comptroller	O	FI	6000	A	1					1																									422	67
	02	Asst Comptroller	O	FI	6000	T	1						1																									414	67
	03	Executive Office	O	FI	6200	T	1							1																								414	67
	04	Chief Clerk	E	NC	732.60	T	1											1																				414	67
		DISBURSING BRANCH																																					
	05	Disbursing Officer	O	3100	1045	T		1								1																					414	67
	06	Disbursing Clerk	E	DK	0000	A		2										1	1																		422	67
	07	Finance Specialist	E	NC	67150	A				1										1																	422	67
		INTERNAL REVIEW AND MGT BR																																					
	08	Auditor, Compt	O	FI	6010	T	1							1																								414	67
		U. S. BUDGET AND FISCAL BRANCH																																					
	09	Budget Officer	O	AF	6736	T				1				1																								414	67
	10	Budget and Fiscal NCO	E	NC	733.6	T	1												1																			414	67
	11	Storekeeper	E	SK	0000	T		1										1																				414	67
		VN BUDGET BRANCH																																					
	12	Budget and Fiscal Officer	O	3100	1025	T		1						1																								414	67
		ADVISOR AND SPECIAL PROJECTS BR																																					
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	16	Budget & Fiscal Officer, Compt	O	FI	6302	T	2							2																								414	67
04		CATO DIVISION																																					
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	01	Chief	O	IN	2025	T	1					1																									414	67
	02	Deputy Chief	O	AT	2025	T	1					1																									414	67
	03	Executive Officer	O	AR	2025	T	1						1																								414	67
	04	Advisor to ARVN JAG	O	JA	8103	T	1						1																								414	67
	05	Advisor to SDC	O	MP	9100	T	1						1																								414	67
	06	Programs Officer	O	AT	2162	T	2							1	1																						414	67
	07	Advisor to Intelligence & Psy War School	O	IN	9305	T	1							1																							414	67
	08	Administrative Officer	O	AG	2120	T	1								1																						414	67
	09	Chief Clerk	E	NC	717.70	T	1											1																			414	67
	10	Classified Correspondence Cont Clk	E		717.10	T	1													1																414	67
	11	Correspondence Dist Clerk	E		710.00	T	2															2														414	67
	12	Steno	E		712.10	T	1																1													414	67
		OPERATIONS BRANCH																																					
	13	Chief & Advisor to ARVN G-3	O	IN	2162	T	1						1																								414	67
	14	Operations Officer	O	IN	2162	T	3							2	1																						414	67
	15	Operations NCO	E	NC	113.80	T	1												1																		414	67
	16	Clerk Typist	E		711.10	T	1														1																414	67
		TRAINING BRANCH																																					
	17	Chief	O	IN	2520	T	1						1																								414	67
	18	Fld In & Range Constr Off	O	IN	2162	T	1							1																							414	67
	19	Training Officer	O	AT	2162	T	1							1																							414	67

JOINT TABLE OF DISTRIBUTION FOR *(Specify Hq., Activity, or Command)* PAGE 4 OF 7 PAGES

MAAG VIETNAM

INDEX PARA	INDEX LINE	DESIGNATION	IDENTITY	BRANCH	MOS NEC NSC AFSC	CATEGORY	STRENGTH ARMY	STRENGTH NAVY	STRENGTH MARINE	STRENGTH AIR FORCE	GRADE OFFICER 07	06	05	04	03	02	WO	ENLISTED E-7	E-6	E-5	E-4	E-3	E-2	CIVILIAN PERS. (GS) 14	12 13	10 11	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	IND	REMARKS	BUDGET	ACTIVITY
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27												
	20	Training Officer	O	AR	2162	T	1							1																							414	67
	21	On-shore Schools Officer	O	IN	2162	T	1							1																							414	67
	22	Band Advisor	W	USA	5241	T	1										1																				414	67
	23	Chief Clerk	E	NC	717.60	T	1												1																		414	67
	24	Administrative Specialist	E	NC	717.10	T	1													1																	414	67
	25	Clerk Typist	E		711.10	T	1														1															414	67
		ORGANIZATION & PERSONNEL BRANCH																																				
	26	Chief & Advisor to ARVN G1	O	IN	2260	T	1						1																							414	67
	27	Personnel Staff Officer & Advisor to ARVN AG	O	AG	2260	T	1							1																							414	67
	28	Troop Basis Officer	O	IN	2615	T	1							1																							414	67
	29	Organization & Equipment Off	O	IN	2615	T	1							1																							414	67
	30	Chief Clerk	E	NC	717.60	T	1												1																		414	67
	31	Clerk Typist	E		711.10	T	1														1															414	67
		CIT BRANCH																																				
	32	Chief & Advisor to ARVN G2	O	IN	9301	T	1						1																							414	67
	33	Intelligence Staff O & Adv MSS	O	AR	9301	T	1							1																							414	67
	34	Intelligence Staff Officer	O	AT	9300	T	3							3																							414	67
	35	Clerk Typist	E		711.10	T	1														1															414	67
		TRAINING AIDS BRANCH																																				
	36	Chief	O	IN	2548	T	1							1																							414	67
	37	Draftsman	E	NC	811.60	T	1												1																		414	67
		THU DUC SCHOOL CENTER																																				
	38	Senior Advisor	O	IN	2517	T	1						1																							414	67
	39	Staff Advisor	O	IN	2520	T	1						1																							414	67
	40	Infantry Training Advisor	O	IN	2520	T	1							1																							414	67
	41	Armor Training Advisor	O	AR	2520	T	1							1																							414	67
	42	Artillery Training Advisor	O	AT	2520	T	1							1																							414	67
	43	National NCO Academy Advisor	O	IN	32520	T	1							1																							414	67
	44	Chief Clerk	E	NC	717.60	T	1											1																			414	67
		VIETNAMESE MILITARY ACADEMY																																				
	45	Senior Advisor	O	IN	2517	T	1						1																							414	67
	46	Staff Advisor	O	IN	2520	T	1							1																							414	67
	47	Cadet Regiment Advisor	O	IN	2520	T	1								1																							414	67
	48	Training Advisor	O	EN	2520	T	1								1																							414	67
		COMMAND & GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE																																				
	49	Senior Advisor	O	IN	2520	T	1						1																							414	67
	50	Staff Advisor	O	IN	2520	T	2						1	1																							414	67
		QUANG TRUNG TRAINING CENTER #1																																				
	51	Senior Advisor	O	IN	2520	T	1						1																							414	67
	52	Staff Advisor	O	IN	2162	T	1						1																							414	67
	53	Training Advisor	O	IN	2520	T	4							4																							414	67
	54	Chief Clerk	E	NC	717.60	T	1											1																			414	67
	55	Range NCO	E	NC	542.60	T	1												1																			414	67

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MAAG VIETNAM

INDEX PARA	INDEX LINE	DESIGNATION	IDENTITY	BRANCH	MOS NEC NSC AFSC	CATEGORY	STRENGTH ARMY	NAVY	MARINE	AIR FORCE	GRADE OFFICER 07	06	05	04	03	02	WO	ENLISTED E-7	E-6	E-5	E-4	E-3	E-2	CIVILIAN PERS. (GS) 14	12 13	10 11	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	IND	REMARKS	BUDGET	ACTIVITY
1	.2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24														25	26	27
		FIELD COMMAND																																				
	56	Senior Advisor	O	IN	1542	T	1					1																									414	67
	57	Staff Advisor (G1-G4)	O	AT	4010	T	1							1																							414	67
	58	Staff Advisor (G2-G3)	O	IN	2162	T	1							1																							414	67
	59	Chief Clerk	E	NC	717.70	T	1											1																			414	67
		I CORPS AND 2ND MILITARY REGION																																				
	60	Senior Advisor	O	IN	1542	T	1					1																									414	67
	61	Staff Advisor (G1-G4)	O	IN	4010	T	1							1																							414	67
	62	Staff Advisor (G2-G3)	O	IN	1542	T	1							1																							414	67
	63	Staff Advisor (2d Mil Reg)	O	IN	1542	T	1							1																							414	67
	64	Artillery Advisor	O	AT	1193	T	1								1																							414	67
	65	Chief Clerk	E	NC	717.60	T	1											1																			414	67
		II CORPS AND 3RD & 4TH MIL REG																																				
	66	Senior Advisor	O	IN	1542	T	1					1																									414	67
	67	Dep Senior Advisor (3 & 4th MR)	O	IN	1542	T	2							2																							414	67
	68	Staff Advisor (G1-G4)	O	IN	4010	T	1							1																							414	67
	69	Staff Advisor (G2-G3)	O	IN	1542	T	1							1																							414	67
	70	Artillery Advisor	O	AT	1193	T	1								1																							414	67
	71	Chief Clerk	E	NC	717.60	T	1											1																			414	67
		III CORPS & 1ST & CAP MIL REG																																				
	72	Senior Advisor	O	IN	1542	T	1					1																									414	67
	73	Staff Advisor (G1-G4)	O	IN	4010	T	1							1																							414	67
	74	Staff Advisor (G2-G3)	O	IN	1542	T	1							1																							414	67
	75	Staff Advisor (Cap & 1st MR)	O	IN	1542	T	1							1																							414	67
	76	Chief Clerk	E	NC	717.60	T	1											1																			414	67
		5TH MILITARY REGION																																				
	77	Senior Advisor	O	IN	1542	T	1							1																							414	67
	78	Staff Advisor	O	IN	1542	T	1								1																							414	67
		INFANTRY DIVISION (7)																																				
	79	Senior Advisor	O	IN	1542	T	7					7																									414	67
	80	Staff Advisor (G1-G4)	O	AT	4010	T	7							7																							414	67
	81	Staff Advisor (G2-G3)	O	IN	1542	T	7							7																							414	67
	82	Regiment Advisor	O	IN	1542	T	21							21																							414	67
	83	Artillery Advisor	O	AT	1193	T	7								7																							414	67
	84	Chief Clerk	E	NC	717.60	T	7											7																			414	67
		SEPARATE UNITS																																				
	85	Advisor to Airborne Group	O	IN	71542	T	1							1																							414	67
	86	Advisor Territorial Regiment	O	IN	1542	T	5								5																							414	67
	87	Advisor Armored Regimental Adv	O	AR	1204	T	4								4																							414	67
	88	Advisor to General Reserves Artillery Battalion	O	AT	1193	T	5								5																							414	67
75		ADJUTANT GENERAL DIVISION																																				
	01	Adjutant General	O	AG	2110	A	1							1																							422	67
	02	Sergeant Major	E	NC	717.70	T	1											1																			414	67
	03	Stenographer	E		712.10	T	1															1															414	67
		PERSONNEL BRANCH																																				
	04	Personnel Officer & Div Exec Off	O	AG	2210	T	1								1																							414	67
	05	Assistant Personnel Officer	O	AG	2210	T	1									1																						414	67
	06	Assistant Personnel Officer	W	AG	2200	T	1										1																				84	414	67

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MAAG VIETNAM

INDEX PARA	INDEX LINE	DESIGNATION	IDENTITY	BRANCH	MOS NEC NSC AFSC	CATEGORY	STRENGTH ARMY	STRENGTH NAVY	STRENGTH MARINE	STRENGTH AIR FORCE	GRADE OFFICER 07	06	05	04	03	02	WO	GRADE ENLISTED E-7	E-6	E-5	E-4	E-3	E-2	GRADE CIVILIAN PERS. (GS) 14	12 13	10 11	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	IND	REMARKS	BUDGET	ACTIVITY
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24														25	26	27
		ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES BRANCH																																					
	07	Asst Adjutant General	O	AG	2110	A	1								1																							422	67
	08	Chief Clerk	E	NC	717.70	T	1											1																				414	67
		MAIL & DISTRIBUTION SECTION																																					
	09	Mail Dist Clk	E		717.10	T	2											2																				414	67
	10	Mail Clk	E		717.10	T	1													1																		414	67
06		NAVY DIVISION																																					
	01	Chief, Navy Division	O	1100	9940	A		1				1																									422	67
	02	Executive	O	1100	9436	A		1					1																									422	67
		TRAINING BRANCH																																					
	03	Training Officer	O	1100	3290	T		1					1																									414	67
	04	Assistant Training Officer	O		0302	T			1				1																									414	67
	05	Training Advisor	O	1100	3296	T		6						4	2																							414	67
	06	Senior Naval School Advisor	O	1100	3272	T		1					1																									414	67
	07	Naval School Advisor	O	1100	3251	T		2							2																							414	67
	08	Naval School Advisor	O	1100	3270	T		1						1																								414	67
	09	Engineer Advisor	E	EN	0000	T		1										2																				414	67
	10	Deck Advisor	E	BM	0000	T		1										1																				414	67
	11	Gunnery Advisor	E	GM	0000	T		1										1																				414	67
	12	Electrical Advisor	E	EM	0000	T		1										1																				414	67
	13	Electronics Advisor	E	ET	0000	T		1										1																				414	67
	14	Navigation Advisor	E	QM	0000	T		1										1																				414	67
	15	Damage Control Advisor	E	DC	0000	T		1										1																				414	67
	16	Yeoman	E	YN	0000	A		1										1																				422	67
	17	Sonar Advisor	E	SO	0000	T		1										1																				414	67
07		AIR FORCE DIVISION																																					
		OFFICE OF THE CHIEF																																					
	01	Chief	O		0066	A				1		1																									422	67
	02	Deputy Chief	O		0036	A				1			1																									422	67
		OPERATIONS & TRAINING BRANCH																																					
	03	Chief	O		0036	T				1			1																									414	67
	04	Opns Staff Officer	O		1416	A				1				1																									422	67
	05	Comm-Elec Staff Officer	O		3016	A				1				1																									422	67
	06	Grnd Radio Maint Supr	E		30480	A				1								1E8																				422	67
	07	Aeft Maint Tech	E		43171	A				2								1		1																		422	67
	08	Admin Supv	E		70270	A				1										1																		422	67
	09	Admin Clerk	E		70250	A				1											1																		422	67
	10	Air Opns Specialist	E		27150	A				1											1																		422	67
	11	Airborne Radio Opr	E		29352	A				1											1																		422	67
		MATERIEL BRANCH																																					
	12	Chief	O		0046	A				1			1																									422	67
	13	Aeft Maint Staff Officer	O		4316	A				1				1																									422	67
	14	Supply Staff Officer	O		6416	A				1				1																									422	67
	15	Aeft Maint Supr	E		43190	A				1								1E9																				422	67
	16	Supply Supr	E		64180	A				1								1E8																				422	67
	17	Inventory Mgmt Supv	E		64570	A				1								1																				422	67
	18	Org Supply Supv	E		64173	A				1										1																		422	67
	19	Admin Clerk	E		70250	A				2											2																		422	67
		ADMINISTRATIVE BRANCH																																					
	20	Admin Staff Officer	O		7024	A				1					1																							422	67
	21	Admin Supv	E		70270	A				1										1																		422	67

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MAAG VIETNAM

INDEX PARA	INDEX LINE	DESIGNATION	IDENTITY	BRANCH	MOS MEC NSC AFSC	CATEGORY	STRENGTH ARMY	STRENGTH NAVY	STRENGTH MARINE	STRENGTH AIR FORCE	GRADE OFFICER 07	06	05	04	03	02	WO	GRADE ENLISTED E-7	E-6	E-5	E-4	E-3	E-2	GRADE CIVILIAN PERS. (GS) 14	12 13	10 11	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	IND	REMARKS	BUDGET	ACTIVITY
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27
	22	Personnel Tech	E		73270	A				1									1																	422	67
	23	Admin Clerk	E		70250	A				1										1																422	67
		ADVISORY BR - BIEN HOA DEPOT																																			
	24	Chief	O		0046	A				1			1																							422	67
	25	Inventory Mgmt Supv	E		64570	A				3								2	1																	422	67
	26	Acft Maint Tech	E		43171A	A				1									1																	422	67
	27	Admin Supv	E		70270	A				1									1																	422	67
		ADVISORY BR - TAN SON NHUT																																			
	28	Manpower Mgmt Officer	O		7336	A				1				1																						422	67
	29	Personnel Staff Officer	O		7316	A				1				1																						422	67
		ADVISORY BR - NHA TRANG																																			
	30	Opns Staff Officer	O		1416	A				1				1																						422	67
08		COMBINED STUDIES DIVISION																																			
		OFFICE OF THE CHIEF																																			
	01	Chief	O	IN	1542	T	1						1																							414	67
	02	Executive Officer	O	IN	1542	T	1							1																							414	67
	03	Liaison Officer	O	IN	9300	T	1						1																							414	67
	04	Asst Liaison Officer	O	IN	1542	T	1							1																							414	67
	05	Operations Officer	O	IN	1542	T	1							1																							414	67
	06	Training Officer	O	IN	1542	T	1								1																							414	67

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ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT UNIT VIETNAM

INDEX PARA	INDEX LINE	DESIGNATION	IDENTITY	BRANCH	MOS NEC NSC AFSC	CATEGORY	STRENGTH ARMY	STRENGTH NAVY	STRENGTH MARINE	STRENGTH AIR FORCE	GRADE OFFICER 07	06	05	04	03	02	WO	ENLISTED E-7	E-6	E-5	E-4	E-3	E-2	CIVILIAN PERS. (GS) 14	12 13	10 11	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	IND	REMARKS	BUDGET	ACTIVITY
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24														25	26	27
12		ADMINISTRATIVE SECTION																																				
	01	Personnel Mgmt Specialist	E	NC	716.60	T	1												1																		414	67
	02	Clerk Typist	E	YN	2522	A		1													1																422	67
		COMMUNICATION BRANCH																																				
	03	Fixed Station Comm Ctr Off	O	SC	0222	A	1								1																						422	67
	04	Communication Center Spec	E	NC	29150	A				2										2																422	67
	05	Crypto Operator	E	NC	29151	A				3										1	2															422	67
	06	Fixed Station Reevr Rpmn	E		271.10	A	2													2																422	67
	07	Fixed Station Tmtr Rpmn	E		272.10	A	2													2																422	67
	08	TT Repairman	E		341.10	A	1													1																422	67
	09	Fixed Station Attendant	E		270.00	A	3													3																422	67
	10	Teleman	E	RM-1	2300	A		2												2																422	67
	11	Crypto Supv	E	NC	722.60	A	1												1																		422	67
	12	TT Oper Comm Branch	E	NC	723.60	A	1													1																422	67
	13	Cryptographer	E	NC	722.60	A	1													1																422	67
	14	Fixed Station Terminal Rpmn	E	NC	294.70	A	1													1																422	67
	15	Crypto Rpmn	E		342.10	A	1													1																422	67
	16	Signal Supply Spec (MCOIC)	E		765.60	A	1												1																	422	67
	17	Fixed Term Sta Sup	E	NC	2976	A	1												1																	422	67
	18	Fixed Station Aux Crypto Eqp Repairman	E		297.2	A	3														3															422	67
		MEDICAL AND SURGICAL BRANCH																																				
	19	Medical Officer	O	2130		A		1								1																				422	67
	20	Dental Officer	O	2200		A		1								1																				422	67
	21	Dental Specialist	E	DT	8701	A		1											1																	422	67
	22	X-Ray Specialist	E	HT	8452	A		1											1																	422	67
	23	Med Lab Specialist	E	MC	90450	A				1											1															422	67
	24	Medical Officer	O	MC	3000	A	1							1																						422	67

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ORGANIZATION CHART

TEMPORARY EQUIPMENT RECOVERY MISSION (TERM), VIETNAM



APPENDIX 7 TO ANNEX D

JOINT TABLES OF DISTRIBUTION

TERM-Vietnam (Five Pages) and Master Recapitulation

Sheet (One Page) For MAAG/TERM Vietnam

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1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24													25	26	27
01		OFFICE OF THE CHIEF TERM																																				
	01	Chief	O	AT	2025	T	1					1																								79	4114	67
	02	Deputy Chief	O	IN	2025	T	1					1																								79	4114	67
	03	Rep to G-4 ARVN	O	SC	2625	T	1					1																								79	4114	67
	04	Executive Officer	O	GM	2625	T	1						1																								79	4114	67
		ADMINISTRATIVE SECTION																																				
	05	Administrative Officer	O	AG	2120	T	1							1																								4114	67
	06	Admin Supv	E	NC	717.70	T	1											1																				4114	67
	07	Admin Specialist	E	NC	717.60	T	1												1																			4114	67
	08	Admin Specialist	E	NC	717.10	T	1													1																		4114	67
	09	Stenographer	E	NC	712.10	T	1														1																	4114	67
	10	Clerk-Typist	E	NC	711.10	T	3														3																	4114	67
		PLANS & OPERATIONS SECTION																																				
	11	Operations Officer	O	AT	2625	T	1						1																								79	4114	67
	12	Plans Officer	O	SC	2625	T	1						1																								79	4114	67
	13	Programs & Budget Officer	O	GM	2625	T	1						1																								79	4114	67
	14	Logistical Officer	O	AR	2625	T	1						1																								79	4114	67
	15	Rep to Log Management School	O	GM	2625	T	1						1																								79	4114	67
	16	Logistical Inspectors	O	OD	2625	T	1							1																							79	4114	67
	17	Logistical Inspector	O	EN	2625	T	1							1																							79	4114	67
02		EXCESS AND SALVAGE PROPERTY OFFICE, TERM																																				
	01	Chief	O	GM	4010	T	1						1																									4114	67
	02	Excess Property Officer	O	GM	4010	T	1							1																								4114	67
	03	Clerk, General	E	NC	711.10	T	1																1														4114	67
	04	Property Disposal Officer	O	GM	4600	T	1								1																						4114	67
	05	Salvage Supervisor	E	NC	764.70	T	1											1																			4114	67
	06	Clerk, Property Records	E		764.10	T	1																1														4114	67
03		ENGINEER BRANCH																																				
	01	Chief	O	EN	7010	T	1					1																									4114	67
	02	Operations Officer	O	EN	7010	T	3						1	2																							4114	67
	03	Engineer Supply Officer	O	EN	4470	T	2						1	1																							4114	67
	04	Engr Maintenance Officer	O	EN	4880	T	2							1	1																						4114	67
	05	Construction Engineer	O	EN	7110	T	3						1	1	1																						4114	67
	06	Post Engineer	O	EN	7130	T	2							2																							4114	67
	07	Programs & Budget Officer	O	EN	4470	T	1							1																							4114	67
	08	Executive Officer	O	EN	7010	T								1																							4114	67
	09	Operations NCO	E	NC	121.70	T	1												1																		4114	67
	10	Engineer Supply NCO	E	NC	762.60	T	3												3																		4114	67
	11	Engineer Equipment Repair Sup	E	NC	622.60	T	1												1																		4114	67
	12	Administrative Specialist	E	NC	717.70	T	1													1																	4114	67
	13	Clerk Typist	E	NC	711.10	T	3																3														4114	67
		DEPOT REPRESENTATIVE SECTION																																				
	14	Engineer Supply Officer	O	EN	4470	T	2							1	1																						4114	67
	15	Engineer Maintenance Officer	O	EN	4880	T	1								1																						4114	67
	16	Engineer Supply NCO	E	NC	762.60	T	1											1																			4114	67
	17	Engineer Parts NCO	E	NC	772.60	T	1											1																			4114	67
	18	Engineer Equipment Repair	E	NC	622.60	T	1											1																			4114	67
		FIELD REPRESENTATIVE SECTION																																				
	19	Engineer Field Rep	O	EN	1331	T	8							5	3																						4114	67
	20	Engineer Supply Officer	O	EN	4470	T	1								1																						4114	67
	21	Engineer Maintenance Officer	O	EN	4880	T	2								2																						4114	67

OPNAV FORM 5320-1 (5-57) C-07486

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INDEX PARA	INDEX LINE	DESIGNATION	IDENTITY	BRANCH	MOS NEC NSC AFSC	CATEGORY	STRENGTH ARMY	NAVY	MARINE	AIR FORCE	GRADE OFFICER 07	06	05	04	03	02	W0	ENLISTED E-7	E-6	E-5	E-4	E-3	E-2	CIVILIAN PERS. (GS) 14	12 13	10 11	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	IND	REMARKS	BUDGET	ACTIVITY
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24														25	26	27
	22	Training Officer	O	EN	2520	T	1							1																								414	67
	23	Topographic Engineer	O	EN	7915	T	1								1																							414	67
	24	Engineer Equip Repair Sup	E	NC	622.60	T	1											1																			414	67
04		MEDICAL BRANCH																																				
	01	Chief	O	MC	3000	T	1						1																								414	67
	02	Administrative Officer	O	MSC	2120	T	1								1																						414	67
	03	Budget & Programs Officer	O	MSC	4490	T	1							1																						414	67
	04	Medical Supply Officer	O	MSC	4490	T	1							1																						414	67
	05	Preventive Medicine Officer	O	MC	3005	T	1							1																						414	67
	06	Sanitary Engineer Officer	O	MSC	7960	T	1									1																				414	67
	07	Operations Officer	O	MSC	2162	T	1							1																						414	67
	08	Training Officer Med Tng Ctr	O	MSC	2520	T	1							1																						414	67
	09	Chief Clerk	E	NC	717.70	T	1												1																		414	67
	10	Clerk Typist	E	NC	711.10	T	1															1														414	67
	11	Medical Supply Specialist	E	NC	767.70	T	1											1																		414	67
	12	Operations & Training NCO	E	NC	911.68	T	1												1																		414	67
		DEPOT OPERATIONS SECTION																																				
	13	Medical Supply Officer	O	MSC	4490	T	1									1																				414	67
	14	Medical Maintenance Officer	O	MSC	4890	T	1									1																				414	67
	15	Medical Maintenance Tech	E	NC	208.68	T	3											1	2																	414	67
		FIELD REPRESENTATIVE SECTION																																				
	16	Training Officer	O	MSC	2520	T	9							9																						414	67
05		ORDNANCE BRANCH																																				
	01	Chief	O	OD	4512	T	1						1																								414	67
	02	Operations Officer	O	OD	4512	T	2							1	1																						414	67
	03	Ord Ammunition Officer	O	OD	4514	T	1							1																						414	67
	04	Ord Maintenance Officer	O	OD	4600	T	1							1																						414	67
	05	Ord Supply Officer	O	OD	4530	T	2							1	1																						414	67
	06	Program & Budget Officer	O	OD	4512	T	1							1																						414	67
	07	Administrative Specialist	E	NC	717.60	T	1												1																		414	67
	08	Ord Ammunition NCO	E	NC	411.60	T	1											1																		414	67
	09	Ord Maintenance NCO	E	NC	635.70	T	1											1																		414	67
	10	Ord Stock Control NCO	E	NC	763.60	T	1											1																		414	67
	11	Programming NCO	E	NC	763.60	T	1											1																		414	67
	12	Clerk Typist	E		711.10	T	1															1														414	67
		DEPOT REPRESENTATIVE SECTION																																				
	13	Ord Liaison Officer	O	OD	4512	T	1						1																								414	67
	14	Ord Ammunition Officer	O	OD	4514	T	1							1																						414	67
	15	Ord Maintenance Officer	O	OD	4800	T	3							1	2																						414	67
	16	Ord Supply Officer	O	OD	4530	T	3							1	2																						414	67
	17	Ord Ammunition NCO	E	NC	411.60	T	2											1	1																		414	67
	18	Ord Auto Repair NCO	E	NC	635.70	T	1											1																		414	67
		FIELD REPRESENTATIVE SECTION																																				
	19	Ord Field Representative	O	OD	4512	T	5							3	2																						414	67
	20	Ord Ammunition Officer	O	OD	4514	T	3								3																						414	67
	21	Ord Supply Officer	O	OD	4530	T	3								3																						414	67
	22	Ord Maintenance Officer	O	OD	4800	T	7							2	5																						414	67
	23	Ord Automotive Maint Officer	O	OD	4805	T	1								1																						414	67
	24	Ord General Supply NCO	E	NC	763.60	T	3												3																		414	67
	25	Ord Auto Repair Opns NCO	E	NC	635.60	T	4												4																		414	67
06		QUARTERMASTER BRANCH																																				
	01	Chief	O	QM	4015	T	1						1																								414	67
	02	Plans and Training Officer	O	QM	4015	T	1							1																								414	67

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INDEX PARA	INDEX LINE	DESIGNATION	IDENTITY	BRANCH	MOS NEC NSC AFSC	CATEGORY	STRENGTH ARMY	STRENGTH NAVY	STRENGTH MARINE	STRENGTH AIR FORCE	GRADE OFFICER 07	06	05	04	03	02	WO	GRADE ENLISTED E-7	E-6	E-5	E-4	E-3	E-2	GRADE CIVILIAN PERS. (GS) 14	12 13	10 11	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	IND	REMARKS	BUDGET	ACTIVITY
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24														25	26	27
	03	Programs & Budget Officer	O	QM	4015	T	1							1																							414	67
	04	QM Supply Officer	O	QM	4419	T	1								1																						414	67
	05	POL Products Officer	O	QM	4960	T	1							1																						414	67
	06	Adm Specialist	E	NC	717.70	T	1													1																414	67
	07	Clerk Typist	E	NC	711.10	T	1															1														414	67
		DEPOT REPRESENTATIVE SECTION																																				
	08	QM Liaison Officer	O	QM	4015	T	1						1																							414	67
	09	POL Products Officer	O	QM	4960	T	1								1																					414	67
	10	QM Supply Officer	O	QM	4419	T	2							1	1																					414	67
	11	Para, Maint & Aerial Sup O	O	QM	74820	T	1							1																						414	67
	11A	Airborn Tech Rep, Abn Grp	O	IN	71542	T	1								1																					414	67
	12	POL Laboratory Technician	E	NC	903.60	T	1											1																		414	67
	13	QM Supply NCO	E	NC	764.60	T	1											1																		414	67
		FIELD REPRESENTATIVE SECTION																																				
	14	POL Products Officer	O	QM	4960	T	1								1																					414	67
	15	QM Field Representatives	O	QM	4419	T	3								2	1																				414	67
	16	QM Rep Thu Duc Sch Ctr	O	QM	4015	T	1									1																				414	67
07		SIGNAL BRANCH																																				
	01	Chief	O	SC	0210	T	1						1																							414	67
	02	Operations Officer	O	SC	0210	T	1						1																							414	67
	03	Programs & Budget Officer	O	SC	0210	T	1								1																					414	67
	04	Chief Clerk	E	NC	717.70	T	1													1																414	67
	05	Logistics Clerk	E	NC	765.60	T	1											1																		414	67
	06	Clerk Typist	E		711.10	T	1															1														414	67
		COMMUNICATIONS SECTION																																				
	07	Chief, Communication Section	O	SC	0210	T	1							1																						414	67
	08	Communications Engineering Off	O	SC	7860	T	1								1																					414	67
	09	Organization & Training Officer	O	SC	2520	T	1								1																					414	67
	10	Signal Rep, ARVN Hq Sig Bns	O	SC	0210	T	1								1																					414	67
		LOGISTICS SECTION																																				
	11	Chief, Logistics Section	O	SC	4400	T	1							1																						414	67
	12	Signal Supply Officer	O	SC	4400	T	1								1																					414	67
	13	Signal Maintenance Officer	O	SC	4415	T	1								1																					414	67
		DEPOT REPRESENTATIVE SECTION																																				
	14	Signal Supply Officer	O	SC	4400	T	1							1																						414	67
	15	Signal Maintenance Officer	O	SC	4415	T	1								1																					414	67
	16	Stock Control NCO	E	NC	765.60	T	1											1																		414	67
	17	Storage and Issue NCO	E	NC	765.60	T	1											1																		414	67
	18	Signal Maintenance NCO	E	NC	296.60	T	1											1																		414	67
		FIELD REPRESENTATIVE SECTION																																				
	19	Field Representative, ARVN Fld Comd	O	SC	0210	T	1							1																						414	67
	20	Field Representative, Mil Region	O	SC	0210	T	5							4	1																					414	67
	21	Fld Rep, Thu Duc Sch Cen	O	SC	2520	T	1								1																					414	67
	22	Fld Rep, Signal Tng Cen	O	SC	2520	T	1								1																					414	67
	23	Fld Rep, Infantry Division	O	SC	0210	T	7							1	6																					414	67
	24	Sig Maint NCO, Military Reg	E	NC	296.60	T	5											5																		414	67
	25	Sig Maint NCO, Thu Duc Sch Cen	E	NC	296.60	T	1											1																		414	67
08		TRANSPORTATION BRANCH																																				
	01	Chief	O	TC	0692	T	1						1																							414	67
	02	Programs & Budget Officer	O	TC	0692	T	1							1																						414	67

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1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24														25	26	27
	03	Chief Clerk	E	NC	717.70	T	1												1																			414	67
	04	TC Liaison Officer	O	TC	0694	T	1							1																								414	67
		TRANSPORTATION TERMINAL																																				
	05	Port Opns Off (Terminal)	O	TC	0815	T	1							1																								414	67
		FIELD REPRESENTATIVE SECTION																																				
	06	TC Field Representative	O	TC	0612	T	4							4																								414	67
09		ADMINISTRATIVE BRANCH																																				
	01	Clerk Typist, Comd See	E		711.10	T	4															4															414	67
	02	Stenographer, Comd See	E		712.20	T	2														2																414	67
	03	Interpreter (Fre-Eng), Comd See	E		965.10	T	1															1															414	67
	04	Interpreter (VN-Eng), Comd See	E		965.10	T	1															1															414	67
	05	Asst Intpr	E		965.10	T	1																1														414	67
	06	Translator (VN-Eng), Comd See	E		967.10	T	2														2																414	67
	07	Asst Translator	E		967.10	T	1															1															414	67
	08	Support Coordinator, JSSD	E	NC	768.70	T	1												1																		414	67
	09	Mess Supervisor	E	NC	941.60	T	1													1																		414	67
	10	Mess Supervisor	E	NC	941.60	T	1													1																		414	67
	11	Mess Supervisor	E	NC	62270	T				1										1																		414	67
	12	Mess Supervisor	E	GS	0000	T		1												1																		414	67
	13	Mess Supervisor	E	NC	941.60	T	1													1																		414	67
	14	Utilities Foreman	E	NC	524.60	T	1												1																		414	67
	15	General Supply Spec JSSD	E	NC	768.70	T	1												1																		414	67
	16	General Supply Spec, JSSD	E	NC	768.70	T	1												1																		414	67
	17	Senior Operations Sgt, JSSD	E	NC	555.70	T	1													1																	414	67
	18	Operations Sgt, JSSD	E	NC	555.60	T	1														1																414	67
	19	Aircraft Mechanic, JSSD	E		671.10	T	1														1																414	67
	20	Aircraft Mechanic	E		671.10	T	1															1															414	67
	21	Aircraft Mechanic H	E		670.00	T	1																1														414	67
	22	Motor Maintenance Sgt, JSSD	E	CM	0000	T		1											1																		414	67
	23	Motor Maintenance Sgt, JSSD	E	NC	631.70	T	1												1																		414	67
	24	Admin Spec, Trans Br, JSSD	E		717.10	T	1														1																414	67
	25	Warehouse Specialist, JSSD	E		555.10	T	1															1															414	67
	26	Warehouse Equip Oper, JSSD	E		550.00	T	1																1														414	67
	27	Stenographer, Compt Div	E	NC	712.1	T	1															1															414	67
	28	Clerk Typist, Compt Div	E	NC	711.1	T	1															1															414	67
	29	Disbursing Clerk, Compt Div	E	DK	2901	T		2												2																	414	67
	30	Personnel Mgmt Supv, AG Div	E	NC	716.60	T	1												1																		414	67
	31	Administrative Spec, AG Div	E	NC	717.70	T	1												1																		414	67
	32	Administrative Spec AG Div	E	NC	717.10	T	1														1																414	67
	33	Personnel Mgmt Spec, AG Div	E	NC	716.60	T	1													1																	414	67
	34	Personnel Adm Spec, AG Div	E		716.10	T	2														2																414	67
	35	Personnel Adm Clerk	E		716.10	T	2															2															414	67
	36	Asst Pers Clerk	E		710.00	T	2																2														414	67
	37	Clerk Typist, AG Div	E		711.10	T	3															3															414	67
	38	Clerk Typist, AG Div	E		70250	T				1												1															414	67
10		NAVY GROUP																																				
		ADMINISTRATIVE BRANCH																																				
	01	Administrative Officer & Pilot	O	1300	2615	T		1						1																								414	67
	02	Asst Admin Off & Pilot	O	1300	2605	T		1							1																							414	67
	03	Chief Clerk	E	YN	0000	T		1											1																		414	67
	04	Asst Chief Clerk	E	YN	0000	T		1												1																		414	67
	05	Clerk Typist	E	YN	0000	T		1												1																		414	67
	06	File Clerk	E	YN	0000	T		1												1																		414	67
	07	Personnel Man	E	PN	0000	T		1													1																414	67
	08	Aviation Mechanic	E	AD	6425	T		1											1																		414	67
	09	Aviation Technician	E	AT	6636	T		1											1																		414	67

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1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24														25	26	27
		MARINE CORPS BRANCH																																					
	10	Marine Representative	0		0302	T			2						2																						414	67
		INDUSTRIAL BRANCH																																					
	11	Industrial Representative	0	1400	7410	T		1						1																						414	67
	12	Asst Industrial Representative	0	1400	7410	T		1							1																					414	67
		SUPPLY BRANCH																																					
	13	Supply Officer	0	3100	1918	T		1						1																						414	67
	14	Programs Officer	0	3100	1025	T		1							1																					414	67
	15	Supply Representative	0	3100	1410	T		1							1																					414	67
	16	Chief Storekeeper	E	SK	0000	T		1										1																		414	67
	17	Aviation Storekeeper	E	AK	0000	T		1												1																414	67
	18	Asst Supply Representative	E	SK	0000	T		2										1		1																414	67
11		AIR FORCE BRANCH																																					
	01	Senior Representative	0		0046	T				1			1														1									414	67
	02	Opns Staff Officer	0		1416	T				4			1	3																						414	67
	03	Air Opns Officer	0		1435	T				4					4																					414	67
	04	Navigator	0		1534	T				2					2																					414	67
	05	Communications Officer	0		3034	T				1					1																					414	67
	06	Aeft Maint Staff Officer	0		4316	T				2				2																						414	67
	07	Aeft Maint Officer	0		4344	T				3					3																					414	67
	08	Staff Supply Officer	0		6416	T				2				2																						414	67
	09	Budget Officer	0		6736	T				1				1																						414	67
	10	Educational Specialist	0		7524	T				1					1																						414	67
	11	Instl Engineer Staff Off	0		5516	T				1				1																						414	67
	12	Comm Center Supv	E		29170	T				1								1																		414	67
	13	Radio Opns Supv	E		29370	T				1									1																		414	67
	14	Aeft Radio Maint Tech	E		30170	T				3								2	1																		414	67
	15	Grnd Comm Equip Maint Tech	E		30472	T				1									1																		414	67
	16	Aeft Propeller Tech	E		42171	T				1									1																		414	67
	17	Instrument Repair Tech	E		42270	T				1									1																		414	67
	18	Aeft Elec Repair Tech	E		42370	T				1									1																		414	67
	19	Helicopter Tech	E		43170	T				1								1																		414	67
	20	Aeft Maint Tech	E		43171	T				8								3	5																		414	67
	21	Recip Engine Tech	E		43271	T				1									1																		414	67
	22	Munitions Spt	E		46170	T				1								1																		414	67
	23	Weapons Maint Supv	E		46270	T				1									1																		414	67
	24	Vehicle Maint Tech	E		47170	T				1								1																		414	67
	25	Machine Shop Tech	E		53170	T				1									1																		414	67
	26	Warehousing Supv	E		64171	T				3								1	2																		414	67
	27	Supply Inspection Tech	E		64172	T				2								1	1																		414	67
	28	ACandW Supv	E		27370	T				1									1																		414	67
	29	ACandW Radar Maint Tech	E		30372	T				1									1																		414	67
	30	Central Office Equip Tech	E		36270	T				1									1																		414	67
	31	Admin Clerk	E		70250	T				3										3																	414	67
	32	Stenographic Tech	E		70470	T				1									1																		414	67
	33	Personnel Clerk	E		73250	T				1										1																	414	67
	34	Food Service Supervisor	E		62270					1									1																		414	67
	35	Production Scheduling Tech	E		45170	T				1								1																		414	67
	36	Materials Estimator Tech	E		45171	T				1								1																		414	67
	37	Aeft Hydraulic Tech	E		42172					1									1																		414	67
	38	Orgn Supply Supv	E		64173					5								2	3																		414	67

OPNAV FORM 5320-1 (5-57)

C-47486

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MASTER RECAPITULATION SHEET VIETNAM

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CNO, Op-10

Date approved: 1 July 1959

Date effective: 1 July 1959

OPNAV FORM 5320-1 (5-57)

Appendix 8 to Annex D

HEADQUARTERS
TEMPORARY EQUIPMENT RECOVERY MISSION
APO 143, San Francisco, California

TERM-CH 4 January 1960

SUBJECT: Third Semi-Annual Special Report of TERM of Vietnam, 1 April 1959 - 30 September 1959.

THRU: Chief
Military Assistance Advisory Group, Vietnam
APO 143, San Francisco, California

TO: See Distribution

In compliance with paragraph E, 1, of DEF message 9033-97, DTG 222305Z, May 1956, amended by DA message 928846 from DCSLOG/D5, DTG 302122Z, August 1957, as changed by 2d indorsement DCSLOG, dated 2 June 1958 to letter, MAAG, Vietnam, subject: "Quarterly Special TERM Report", dated 15 April 1958, the attached report for the Temporary Equipment Recovery Mission (TERM), Vietnam, is submitted.

1 Incl
Quarterly Sp TERM Rept

JOHN E. ROBB
Colonel, Arty
Chief, TERM

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12 - CofSA
3 - CofS, USAF
5 - CINCPAC
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1 - Chief, CATO
12 - Chief, TERM
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EXCEPT: None.

ASHBY W. HARDY, Major, QMC
BY AUTHORITY OF CHIEF, MAAG, 4 Jan 60

MAGCH-CH (4 Jan 60) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Third Semi-Annual Special Report of TERM of Vietnam, 1 April 1959 - 30 September 1959

HEADQUARTERS, MILITARY ASSISTANCE ADVISORY GROUP, VIETNAM, APO 143, San Francisco, California, 11 January 1960

TO: See Distribution

Approved.

1 Incl
n/c

S. T. WILLIAMS
Lt General, USA
Chief

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THIRD SEMI ANNUAL SPECIAL REPORT OF TEMPORARY EQUIPMENT RECOVERY MISSION (TERM) OF VIETNAM (1 APRIL 59 TO 30 SEPTEMBER 59)

I N D E X

* Only those portions of the original report pertinent to this study are included. See Archives Document C-17160.55 for complete report.

** Deleted as not being pertinent to this study. See Archives Document C-17160.55 for complete report.

THIRD SEMI-ANNUAL SPECIAL REPORT OF TEMPORARY EQUIPMENT RECOVERY MISSION (TERM) OF VIETNAM (1 APRIL 59 TO 30 SEPTEMBER 1959)

1. GENERAL:

1. (U) In accordance with authority contained in 2d Indorsement DCSLOG, dated 2 June 1958, to letter this MAAG, Subject: "Quarterly Special TERM Report", dated 15 April 1958, the report was changed from a quarterly to a Semi-Annual Special Report. This report is the third of the series of "Semi-Annual Special TERM Reports" and is a continuation of the preceding series of "Quarterly Special TERM Reports", the last of which was the "Eighth Special TERM Report" as of 31 May 1958. The "First Semi-Annual Special TERM Report covered the period 1 June 1958 through 30 September 1958. The Second Semi-Annual Special TERM Report covered the period 1 October 1958 through 31 March 1959.

2. (U) The logistical capabilities of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Vietnam continue to improve. U.S. Advisors and Technicians continue to stress U.S. procedures modified as necessary to meet local conditions, with particular emphasis on supply and maintenance. Off-shore schooling and on-the-job training are contributing materially to improvement in the logistic capability of the Vietnamese Armed Forces.

3. (U) A Logistic Supply Management School is being established by the Army of the Republic of Vietnam. Current plans call for the first class to start July 1960.

4. (U) For planning purposes a committee was appointed to study the problems likely to be encountered in the event TERM is closed out. A proposed MAAG TD which considered requirements generated by ARVN reorganizations, increased emphasis upon logistics and advisory activities, and the potential need for expansion has been prepared. This proposed TD considered both the minimum personnel requirements and a desireable optimum strength. A new TERM TD for current operations was submitted to Department of Army for approval on 13 April 1959. No answer has been received to date. The total strength in officers and enlisted men remained the same as in the previous TD.

5. (U) Discussion continues with ARVN to determine the feasibility of the use by ARVN of electric accounting machines to accelerate stock status information, maintain stock records and provide information required to permit more realistic requirement planning. Medical service has been selected by ARVN as the first service to establish the electric accounting procedure. The estimated date of establishment is 15 March 1960.

6.(U)a. The visit of the Station Liaison Team from the US Army Logistical Depot, Japan, for Signal, Ordnance and Engineers proved so beneficial it has been requested that this service be expanded to cover all the other technical services.

b. The visit of Mr. Virgil L. Springer and Mr. W. E. Pruitt from the Office of the Chief of Engineers was most productive. Problems of bridging and stream crossing equipment were discussed. Trips were made to all units in ARVN who were authorized, or had on hand, any of this type equipment. Many problems were analyzed and resolved on the spot. Units were observed in operation and advice was given on improved procedures for erecting a class 60 bridge. Mr. Springer recommended the adoption of the M4T6 bridge for Vietnam. CINCPAC has indicated approval of this recommendation, however, the final decision rests with Department of the Army. As of this report, DA decision is still unknown.

c. Information has been received that the U.S. Army Logistical Depot, Japan, has been designated the MAP Inventory Control Point for PACOM Countries. Proposed procedures for requisitioning and redistribution of excess have been received from the depot, studied, and comments returned.

d. Utilization of Japanese Nationals as technicians at the 101st Ordnance Rebuild Battalion on a contract basis is being studied for possible inclusion in FY 62 training program.

7. (U) The railroad rehabilitation program being carried out by the Government of Vietnam in coordination with the United States Operations Mission has resulted in the connection of the last division in the Saigon-Dong Ha Rail System. The rail-line, which was opened on 7 August 1959, will eventually carry a 13 ton axle load between Saigon and Dong Ha. Presently the line between Dieu Tai and Quang Ngai is restricted to a 10 ton axle load; however, it is expected that 13 ton axle loads will be possible by 1 December 1959. The rail is narrow or meter gauge and is laid on steel ties. Between Nha Trang and Hue there are 17 tunnels, several of which are at least one kilometer long. At present, the railroad has 113 steam locomotives which are from 20 to 60 years old. Many of these should be retired. The French, through a grant-in-aid, have turned over six diesel locomotives to the GVN. A proposal which will be financed by a Development Fund Loan is now under consideration. Approval of this loan will permit procurement of an additional 23 diesel locomotives. The railroad owns approximately 1100 units of rolling stock, much of which is old and out of date. There are approximately 135 passenger cars, consisting of both sleepers and coaches, of which 61 are over 50 years old. The Development Loan Fund also will be used to procure 62 new units. A project has been approved by the Government of Vietnam to construct a rail line from the main line at Da Nang to the Nong Son coal mine.

8. (U) The Chief of Transportation, ARVN, has placed a centrally regulated transportation movements program into effect under the provisions of an ARVN directive published in March 1959. Four Zone Transportation Offices, each with supporting Branch Movements Offices, have been established with the Military regions of Vietnam. These offices in coordination with Traffic Division, Office of the Chief of Transportation, are engaged in the planning, programming and direction of an inter-regional movements program. The zone offices are in the process of establishing intra-regional programs within their respective operational areas. Liaison is continuing between Transportation ARVN and G4 ARVN, in the development of a series of publications which will clearly outline the functioning and inter-relationships of an effective transportation movements program.

9. (U) An agreement between the International Cooperation Agency, through USOM/VN, and the Government of Vietnam (GVN), which provides for a modern high-capacity telecommunications system for VIETNAM was signed on 28 June 1958. Microwave will provide the backbone of the system along the coast with VHF furnishing the links into the plateau region. Local telephone systems and toll switching facilities will be constructed or rehabilitated at population centers. Military, governmental, and commercial long lines requirements will be met by this system. It has been estimated that the system will cost 8 million dollars, plus a GVN equivalent in-kind contribution of 2 million and require 30 to 36 months to complete. The International Cooperation Agency contracting office in WASHINGTON, D.C. is now reportedly in the final stages of negotiating a contract with Television Associates of Indiana, Inc. to engineer and construct this system. Initially, single sideband radio circuits between SAIGON, VIENTIANE AND BANGKOK will also be installed. Later, it is proposed to link up the three SEASIA countries in a more sophisticated system, using microwave and/or tropospheric scatter links.

10. (U) CINCPAC approved on 13 July 1958 a MAAG-recommended single sideband telecommunication system to connect RVNAF Headquarters with subordinate installations. This system will furnish communications on a point to point basis until the microwave system is completed and then provide a protected means of communications as insurance against loss of communications through destruction of one or more of the microwave relay stations. This project was included in the FY-59 MAP and approved by amendment 929 thereto. Requisitioning action is in process. Site selections to include buildings have been

completed. It is estimated that shipment of materials, installation, and testing of the system will require six to eight months before the system can be considered operational.

11. (U) ARVN communications capabilities are improving through use of better operational and maintenance procedures. Lead covered cable left in place by the French is being rehabilitated. The VUNG-TAU and DA-NANG Areas are completed. The field wire replacement program will eliminate all existing field wire now in use at fixed plant installations, except in areas where ICA plans to install telephone cable. The field wire will be replaced with plastic multo-pair cable. ARVN now has nineteen approved projects under this program with plans for eleven more near completion.

12. (U) ARVN submitted fixed plant radio projects for each of the military Regions. The equipment in these projects is currently installed and in operation. Rather than MAAG approving the individual projects, they were returned to ARVN Signal Command for inclusion in the TE's of the respective Military Region.

13. (U) The ARVN Medical Supply System has acquired additional warehouse space at Da Nang which has permitted the storage of additional emergency type reserve medical items in that area. Revised methods for computing requirements, stockage objectives and excesses have been accepted and are in process of being applied to the system. These factors have materially improved the ARVN Medical Supply System for both normal and emergency type operations.

14. Engineer Road Construction Training.

a. (C) KONTUM Road Projects.

(1) The Kontum Road Projects, situated in the central plateau area of South Vietnam, involve both the construction of new roads and the improvement of existing roads. These projects are part of the overall training program for Vietnam Engineer troop units. They are high priority missions not only because they are vital to Vietnam's military operations, but also because they will aid in the economic development of the plateau area.

(2) The Kontum-MoDuc project (Route 5) will connect the plateau area with Route 1 and the railroad along the East coast of South Vietnam. Vietnam engineer troop units are working on the 123 kilometer section from Mo Duc to Gia Vuc. This road will be one-lane with turnouts and will be surfaced with laterite and crushed rock. Bridges will be one-lane, 18-Ton capacity. Estimated date of completion of the Kontum - Gia Vuc section is 30 October 1959.

(3) The Kontum - Pleiku project involves rehabilitation of a 47 kilometer section of Route 14, to provide a two-way, laterite or crushed rock surface roadway and 50-ton, two-lane bridges. Estimated date of completion is February 1960.

(4) The Kontum - Dakto project was completed in June 1959. This road extends north by north-northwest for 46 kilometers the principal Vietnam inland route.

b. (C) Phuoc Thanh Province Road: The Phuoc Thanh road project involves construction of a new, 60-kilometer military road for support of military operations in the area northeast of Bien Hoa. Traveled way will be one-lane with turnout, surfaced with laterite or crushed rock. Bridges will be 18-ton capacity, one-lane. Project was started 7 April 1959, but inclement weather has severely hampered operations. Estimated completion date is not available.

15. (C) Mortar Ammunition - A shortage continues to exist for replacement fuzes MS25 (T336E&) for 60MM and 81MM mortar ammunition. These have been programmed and shipment is expected in FY 1960. Only 90,500 rounds of 60MM mortar equipped with MS25 (T336E7) fuze have been received in Vietnam. Replacement fuzes are required since the MS2 fuze with which the 60MM and 81MM mortar ammunition are equipped have been suspended except for "Emergency Combat Use."

16. (U) Construction of New Ammunition Storage Areas:

a. Construction has begun on the new ammuniton depot at Phu Bai (Hue). The date construction was to begin on the Pleiku Depot (1 May 1959), concurrent with construction at Phu Bai, was delayed due to disruption of first survey. A second survey has been conducted and supplies, sand, rock, tile, etc., have been delivered to the Pleiku site preparatory to construction. Areas for the extension of the existing Ban Me Thout Depot and the new 703rd Field Ammunition Depot at Duc My have been approved and final layout plans are being made.

b. Two sites selected near Bien Hoa for the 701st Base Ammunition Depot have been disapproved by the President of Vietnam since the areas are to be used for other purposes having a higher priority. An initial reconnaissance was made on 10 September 1959 by ARVN and MAAG personnel to select a third area. Recommendations for this site have been made and a final decision from the Government of Vietnam is expected in the near future.

c. Completion of proposed ammunition storage construction plus existing storage sites will provide adequate storage for all ammunition in Vietnam.

17. (C) Inspection, Maintenance, and Renovation of Ammunition.

a. An on-the-job training program (ammunition surveillance) was conducted by a CONUS Team during the months of March through May 1959. This training has given Vietnam the nucleus of an ammunition inspection organization. A depot surveillance records system has been established and inspection teams activated. These teams are assigned to the depots and are presently engaged in the inspection of all ammunition.

b. Inspection of ammunition will provide for a more effective maintenance and renovation program. At the present time 105mm Howitzer, 155mm Howitzer and Small Arms Ammunition are being renovated at the 701st Base Ammunition Depot. Redesign of the 105mm renovation line at the 701st Base Ammunition Depot is underway. It is anticipated that, on completion, production should increase 100 percent. The quality of work is superior.

c. The practice of shipping all ammunition requiring renovation to the 701st Base Depot has been changed. Ammunition is now renovated locally when reconditioning only is required. This has saved handling and transportation of an estimated 600 tons per year. A 105mm line is in operation at the 702nd Field Ammunition Depot, Tourane. 155mm lines are planned at the 702nd Depot and at Pleiku.

d. All Air Force bomb fuzes and detonators are being function-tested. Air Force rocket motors are being tested for continuity. 750 pound fire bomb cases have been inspected. A requirement has been placed on VNAF for 55 gallon metal drums for repacking all napalm thickener.

e. Return to Vietnam of ARVN personnel receiving ammunition renovation training in CONUS will accelerate the maintenance and renovation program.

18. (C) Vehicle Exchange Program.

The program for exchange of WWII 2 1/2 ton cargo trucks for the new Japanese manufactured 2 1/2 ton diesel cargo trucks is well underway and was scheduled for completion in December 1959 (NOTE: Due to Typhoon damage in Japan subsequent to 30 September 1959, completion is rescheduled for March 1960). Concurrent spare parts for the diesel trucks are being received and distributed. Policy for the supply of follow-on repair parts has not been established but preliminary studies have been initiated that will facilitate submission of requisitions when procedures have been finalized. The program for exchange of WWII 1/4 ton truck and 3/4 ton weapons carriers for Japanese gasoline operated vehicles is underway. This program should be completed by September 1960 if present delivery schedules are met. For further information see Annex "C".

19. (U) ARVN Preventive Maintenance Team:

a. During the period of this report the ARVN Preventive Maintenance Demonstration Team (organized and trained by ARVN G-4) conducted a series of demonstrations throughout all military regions in Vietnam.

b. The Principal missions of this team were:

(1) To teach commanders at all levels how to inspect and thus to determine the status of maintenance in their units.

(2) To emphasize by demonstration and discussion the importance of first echelon maintenance and the part it plays in keeping materiel and equipment in constant readiness for combat.

c. Reports from the field indicate the missions were accomplished. The demonstrations were effective, the team was well received and attendance was good.

d. Concurrently, efforts are being made through command and technical channels to improve the overall preventive maintenance program within ARVN.

20. (U) End-Use Inspections:

a. During the period of this report one hundred fifty eight (158) ARVN units received End-Use Inspections. These inspections were conducted by US advisor personnel in conjunction with ARVN.

b. Analysis of reports submitted as a result of those inspections indicate that slow, but continuous progress is being made in the overall status of maintenance of ARVN units.

c. The principal deficiencies are lack of command attention to maintenance and failure to follow-up when inspections reveal that corrective action is required. This is particularly true of vehicles and weapons.

d. Corrective action is being strongly emphasized to ARVN at <u>all</u> levels and US personnel are giving continuous attention to organizational maintenance. Indications are that ARVN is becoming increasingly aware of this problem.

* * * * * * *

SECTION II. PERSONNEL & TRAINING

23. (U) PERSONNEL:

* * * * * * *

b. Total number of Civilians and Military Authorized and assigned to TERM, as of the end of the period:

(1) Personnel authorized.

(a)	U.S. Civilians	0
(b)	Indigenous personnel	43
(c)	Military personnel:	
	Officers	182
	Enlisted	168
	TOTAL AUTHORIZED	393

(2) Personnel assigned

(a)	U.S. Civilian	0
(b)	Indigenous personnel	43
(c)	Military personnel:	
	Officers	154
	Enlisted	174
	TOTAL ASSIGNED	371

c. Mobile Training Teams and Contract Technicians.

(1) During the period of this report there were four (4) Mobile Training Teams operating in Vietnam:

(a) One (1) Ordnance Ammunition Renovation Team. This team consisted of six (6) DA civilians who arrived here on 1 May 59. Their mission was to provide advice and assistance in training ARVN Ordnance personnel in correct methods of ammunition inspection procedures. This team departed Vietnam on 31 May 59.

(b) Three (3) Signal Corps teams as follows:

1 Two (2) VHF Radio teams. Each team consisted of four (4) enlisted men. Their mission is to conduct training for personnel of ARVN in VHF Radio operations.

2 One (1) Manual Central office team. This team consisted of three (3) enlisted men. Their mission was to conduct training in the operation of Manual Central Office telephone equipment.

All three teams listed above arrived in Vietnam on 27 May 59. The two (2) VHF teams are scheduled to depart Vietnam during the week of 6 Dec 59, and the MCO team departed on 13 Aug 59.

d. Contract Technicians:

(1) US TECHNICIANS:

(a) As of the end of this period there were fifty-seven (57) U.S. contract technicians in Vietnam.

1 Emerson Radio and Phonograph Corporation.

Eight (8) technicians are furnishing Signal advisory support to Vietnamese Army Signal personnel.

2 Philco Corporation:

Twenty-five (25) technicians are furnishing advisory support to Vietnamese Army Engineer personnel in equipment operation, supply, and maintenance procedures.

3 Vinnell Corporation: UNCLASSIFIED

Eighteen (18) technicians are furnishing Ordnance Advisory support to Vietnamese Army Ordnance personnel in supply and maintenance operations.

4 Tippets, Abbott, McCarthy and Stratton (TAMS):

Eight (8) Civilian Engineers are furnishing Engineer advisory support to Vietnamese Army Engineer personnel on planning, design, construction and on repairs and utilities maintenance.

(2) Other Contract Technicians:

Filipino technicians are furnished by the Eastern Construction Company. As of the end of this period there were one hundred and eighty-three (183) Filipino technicians under contract to the Vietnamese Army.

Breakout of Filipino technicians by technical service is as follows:

Administrative	- Nine (9)
Ordnance	- Sixty-seven (67)
Signal	- Eighty-one (81)
Engineer	- Twenty-one (21)
Quartermaster	- One (1)
Medical	- Four (4)
TOTAL:	One Eighty-three (183)

24. (U) TRAINING:

a. Progress made in logistical training of the Vietnamese Army is indicated in the following summary of graduated students.

(1) Total MAP supported school and training center graduates through Mar 1959.+

ONSHORE		
Engineer		3664
Medical		4816
Ordnance		1683
Quartermaster (Military Administration)		747
Signal		6119++
Transportation		11261++
	TOTAL	28290
CONUS		
Engineer		116
Signal		167
Medical		42
Ordnance		135
QM		51
Transportation		30
	TOTAL	541

+ Totals since curricula at On Shore Schools were revised along U.S. service school lines. Generally, these curricula instituted in late 1955 and first half 1956.

++ The majority of this total represents graduates of short duration courses repeated frequently.

OVERSEAS (Primarily U.S. Military and some Third Country)	
Engineer	62
Signal	120
Medical	98
Ordnance	29
QM	0
TOTAL	309

Total thru Mar 1959	29140
Total for the Period	6614
Grand Total thru 30 Sept 1959	35754

(2) Engineer personnel trained (1 Apr 59 - 30 Sep 59)

ONSHORE (MAP SCHOOL)	
Engineer Advanced Individual Training	411
Engineer CC-1	34
Engineer CC-2	54
Demolition Specialist	28
Equipment Course A	23

* * * * * * *

III - ARMY SECTION (U)

25. a.(U) The Frency Liquidation Branch of the Saigon Centre for the Return of Materiel American (short title CRMA) was discontinued as of 1 April 1959. The French considered that the Saigon CRMA was no longer necessary as the majority of MAP/IC property under French control had been declared to the U.S.

* * * * * * *

b. Emphasis continues to be placed on the turn-in of redistributable property, scrap and salvage by Armed Forces Republic of Vietnam units.

(1) In July 1959, CINCPAC inauguarated a one year campaign for FY 1960, nicknamed, "Clean Sweep," to rid PACOM MAP countries of excess material and scrap. Campaign "Clean Sweep" is a concerted drive to declare, report and dispose of excess material in accordance with current directives.

* * * * * * *

26. (U) Projects:

The time Phase Activities Report which was inclosure No. 3 of the 2nd Semi-Annual report has been up dated as of 30 September 1959 and consolidated with this section of the report to facilitate ease of reading and study.

a. Supervise Recovery and Outshipment of Excess MAP Equipment:

(1) Completion of Equipment Identification:

Completed by all services for items stored in the depots. Further action will be routine identification of items turned into the depots.

(2) Completion of Property Classification:

	Estimated date of completion
Engineer	January 1961
Med, Ord, Qm, Sig	Completed

(3) Completion of Excess Property Determination:

	Estimated completion date
Engineer	January 1961
Medical & Signal	Completed
Ordnance	June 1960
QM	April 1960

* * * * * * *

(4) Completion of Reporting by ARVN of Known or Anticipated Excess Property:

	Estimated completion date
Engineer	June 1961
Medical	Feb 1960
Ordnance	July 1961
QM	June 1960
Signal	Mar 1960

* * * * * * *

(5) Completion of Disposition of Economically Repairable Excess:

	Estimated date of completion
Engineer	October 1960
Medical	Not applicable
Ordnance	June 1961
QM	Not applicable
Signal	June 1960

* * * * * * *

b. Improvement of Logistic Capabilities of the Vietnamese Army:

(1) Establish Effective Depot Operation:

(a) Relocation and initial consolidation of Logistic Installations Completed for all services.

* * * * * * *

(d) Establish current stock locator system: (While completed for all technical services except QM, the system is being refined.)

* * * * * * *

(4) Establish Maintenance Procedure:

(a) Completion of 1st and 2nd echelon preventive maintenance procedures: Completed for all services.

(b) Establish "Repair Equipment" report:

Completed for all services.

(c) Establish technical inspection procedures for logistical installations: Completed for all services.

* * * * * * *

(d) Establish initial depot stock levels and requisitioning levels and stockage objectives:

	Estimated date of completion
Engineer	June 1960
Medical	Completed
Ordnance	Completed
QM	June 1960
Signal	Completed

* * * * * * *

(f) Establish, where practical, "Cross Servicing Between Services" or Single Service Responsibility" where appropriate:

Ordnance has been selected as the service to start the "Single Service" responsibility for nine common items in the CY 1960. QM has been selected to start "Single Service" on soap required by all services in CY 1960. It is expected that other common items will be selected for other services for CY 1961.

(g) Establish policy of decentralization of supply authority for non-critical items:

	Estimated date of completion
Engineer	June 1960
Med, Ord, Qm, Sig	Completed

* * * * * * *

(i) Use of Electrical Accounting machines by ARVN Technical Service:

Medical has been selected to initiate this program. The estimated date of installation is March 1960. It is expected that other services will start on this program as soon as the program of medical has proven successful.

(6) Activation of ARVN Logistic Supply Management School:

Estimated date of completion is July 1960.

(7) Establish and Implement Effective Procedures for Master Planning and 5 year Construction Program:

(a) Establish overall master planning within technical services for:

1. Construction program to support 7 Division Program: Estimated completion date of construction December 1963.

2. Relocation of logistic units and installations to support new 7 Division Program:

	Estimated date of completion
Engineer	Completed
Medical	December 1959
Ordnance	June 1962
QM	October 1961
Signal	June 1962
TC	June 1962

* * * * * * *

3. VN Military Academy:

Estimated completion date is December 1963.

(8) Establish and Implement a Preventive Medicine Program with a View to Correcting Sanitary Deficiencies and Reducing Disease Incidence Among ARVN Units:

There has been considerable improvement in this project during this period, however, the completion date is still indefinite for all services.

(9) Complete Translation and Publication of ARVN Technical Manuals:

(a) Translation of U.S. Manuals:

	Estimated date of completion
Engineer	December 1962
Medical	Completed
Ordnance	June 1962
QM	December 1962
Signal	June 1960
TC	December 1963

(b) Preparation of VN Manuals:

	Estimated date of completion
Engineer	December 1962
Medical	Completed
Ordnance	June 1962
QM	June 1963
Signal	June 1960
TC	December 1963

(10) Development of ARVN Operational Ration:

There has been substantial progress made during this period on this project and the estimated date of completion is June 1960.

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(12) Vehicle Exchange Program:

(a) Truck Cargo 2 1/2 ton (Diesel) Toyota.

Estimated completion date is December 1959.

(b) Truck 3/4 ton, WE (gasoline).

Estimated completion date is September 1960.

(c) Truck 1/4 ton C & R (gasoline).

Estimated completion date is September 1960.

IV NAVY SECTION

27. (C) DESCRIPTION OF MAINTENANCE, REPAIR, REBUILD AND SALVAGE OPERATIONS.

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b. Shipboard Maintenance. The material condition of ships has not improved materially during the reporting period. This is due in part to the shortage of experienced officers and petty officers, occasioned by the intensity of the off-shore training schedule, which renders implementation of the progressive maintenance program most difficult.

c. Marine Corps Group. Marine Corps Group units conduct organizational maintenance and limited 3rd echelon maintenance consisting of repainting, replacement of certain units, and repairs of certain motor transport equipment. Other 3rd echelon maintenance and difficult field maintenance is accomplished by VN Army units and facilities. Base maintenance which requires major repair is handled by Army Military Regions.

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c. End-Use Ship Inspections. Fifty end-use ship inspections were completed during the reporting period. The ships that are in operating condition show little improvement in normal preventive maintenance. During the at sea periods personnel are still reluctant to do any appreciative maintenance. Preventive maintenance is still generally accomplished after the craft returns to port.

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30. (C) MAJOR PROBLEMS.

a. Navy. The major problem that continues to face the VN Navy in the logistical field is inability to provide efficient support which stems from inexperienced and untrained personnel in the shipyard, ships and stations. The River Forces overhaul program will continue to be marginal until the completion of the Western Repair Facility piers and marine railway at CANTHO which are scheduled for completion in the spring of 1960.

b. Marine Corps Group. The major problems in the Marine Corps Group are the shortages of personnel; the employment of security detachments throughout Vietnam; the almost continous employment of battalions and companies on independent anti-dissident operations; and the stationing of three battalions at three widely separated locations.

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UNCLASSIFIED

ANNEX A

ENGINEER SECTION

1. (C) DESCRIPTION OF MAINTENANCE, REPAIR, REBUILD, AND SALVAGE OPERATIONS:

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Lack of organizational maintenance remains the primary cause of equipment deadline. This can be attributed mainly to inadequate supervision by VN personnel.

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c. Inventory. The inventory of repair parts was completed in June 1958. While no cyclic inventory as such, of repair parts is observed, a "running inventory" is underway as repair parts are assigned Federal Stock Numbers and relocated in newly constructed and numbered bins. Procedures for the cyclic inventory of general engineer items are being developed and will be implemented before the end of 1960. (ARVN Engineer Services are extremely reluctant to discuss inventories of any nature.)

However, through the medium of frequent conferences special emphasis is being placed on the importance of accurate inventories as a tool of good management. It is believed that responsible Vietnamese authorities are beginning to recognize the advantages to be gained by an inventory since preliminary plans are now being made for a country wide inventory of mechanical equipment.

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4. (C) Major Problem

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d. Continued refinement of the in-country inventory. This is a major problem and requires close supervision by US personnel. As ARVN is not concerned with make, models, or serial numbers, this information has to be kept current by US advisors, thereby keeping them away from more important duties.

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ANNEX B

MEDICAL SECTION

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4. (C) MAJOR PROBLEMS

a. The Medical Service of the Army of Vietnam has four major problems:

(1) The improvement of the warehousing and stock procedures at the regional depots.

(2) Installation of adequate utilities at all Medical installations.

(3) Disposition of excess medical supplies of French origin.

(4) American equipment, given to the French during the war, is being accounted for as French equipment rather than MAP equipment.

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ANNEX C

UNCLASSIFIED

ORDNANCE SECTION.

1. (U) DESCRIPTION OF MAINTENANCE, REPAIR, REBUILD, AND SALVAGE, OPERATION:

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b. Base Maintenance.

(1) The present rebuild capability of the 101st Ordnance Rebuild Depot is not sufficient to meet in-country rebuild requirements of Ordnance major items and assemblies presently on hand. The rebuild of Ordnance materiel for ARVN has, in the past, been supplemented by the Ordance Rebuild shops in Japan. The current program for increasing the rebuild capacity within Vietnam envisages progressive increases with the optimum to be attained during FY 1962.

(2) A comparison of the present annual rebuild capability of the 101st Ordnance Rebuild Depot with the estimated capability required for FY 1962 is as follows:

	CURRENT CAPABILITY	EST FY 1962 REQUIREMENT
General Purpose Vehicles (a)	250	2,000
Special Purpose Vehicles (a)		430
Combat Vehicles (a)	150	64
Materials Handling Equip (a)	0	20
Fire Control Equip	3,000	2,770
Small Arms	36,095	36,095
Artillery	200	162
Engines, all types (a)	850	4,014
Power Train assemblies (a)	3,000	15,500
Misc C&I assemblies (starters, generators, carburetors, etc.) (a)	0	5,000

NOTE: (a) indicates those categories of items for which there is currently insufficient rebuild capability to meet the predicted requirements for FY 1962.

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3. (U) DEPTAR FIVE YEAR VEHICLE PLAN

a. Introduction of the Vehicle Exchange Program to Vietnam is in the form of the Japanese manufactures 2 1/2 ton diesel cargo truck. 2907 of these trucks have been allocated to Vietnam under the provision of the DETAR 5-year Vehicle Program.

b. Approximately 1800 of these vehicles have been received in Vietnam and are being distributed as rapidly as organizations have been trained to operate and maintain them. Current plans provide for the completion of the exchange of the 2 1/2 ton vehicles by 31 Dec 1959 and the evacuation of, or local disposal of, all WW II type 2 1/2 ton cargo trucks by March 1960.

c. Vietnam has also been allocated 4015 each 3/4 ton gasoline driven trucks. 300 of these will have 12 Volt electrical systems and the first increment of 6 of these trucks was delivered on 30 Aug 59. The balance of 12 Volt type vehicles (294) are scheduled for delivery during the next 60 days. The 3715 trucks with 24 Volt electrical systems are expected to commence arriving in November 1959.

UNCLASSIFIED

e. The receipt of these vehicles will significantly improve the military stature of Vietnam if logistical support in the form of replacement and repair is adequate. It is imperative that the Japan Logistical Depot be able to exercise prompt and effective action on supply demands initiated by Vietnam.

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ANNEX D

QUARTERMASTER SECTION

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e. (U) Country-wide stock levels are currently under study. Recent War Games revealed that stock levels in some areas should be reviewed and revised. The project previously reported as complete has been re-opened to establish more realistic initial depot stock levels, requisitioning levels and stockage objectives.

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h. (C) The operational ration being developed by the ARVN QM is progressing to the point of first user test. A contract has been let to a rice supplier for sufficient dehydrated cooked rice to assemble 300 rations. Delivery of the rice and procurement of other components will be followed by assembly of the rations in the R & D Center and delivery to selected units for supervised tests.

Funds have been requested in the FY 60 Direct Support Budget for the procurement of 590,000 rations for a complete extensive user test plus development of a supplier capability within Vietnam.

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4. (C) MAJOR PROBLEMS

Raincoat is the desired ARVN uniform item. Poncho has been substituted for raincoat in MAP support actions.

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Ponchos will remain in short supply until MAP 59 stocks are received.

ANNEX E

SIGNAL SECTION

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4. (U) MAJOR PROBLEMS

a. Problems:

(1) (U) Premature dry battery failures because of lack of proper refrigerated storage facilities for dry batteries.

(2) (C) Shortage of qualified personnel to staff the Signal Base Depot.

(3) (U) Requirement to provide RVNAF with a telecommunications system capable of reliable and rapid transmission of messages.

b. Actions being taken to correct Major Problems:

(1) (U) Request for the construction of an adequate refrigerated warehouse was included in the ARVN DS CY-59 budget. Actual construction is dependent upon the availability of funds. Pending construction, batteries are being requisitioned more often but in smaller quantities.

(2) (C) The ARVN Signal Service states it is aware of the critical shortage of qualified civilian depot personnel and it cites stringent GVN qualifying Civil Service criteria as the basic reason for the reduced civilian manning status, notwithstanding the fact that DS fund support is provided for the additional personnel required. MAAG has been advised that RVNAF has recommended that Civil Service qualifications be revised to permit hiring of qualified personnel who do not fully meet the educational or military service requirements.

(3) (U) The approved FY-59 MAP Single Sideband System will materially assist in overcoming this problem pending completion of the ICA SE Asia Regional Telecommunications Project.

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ANNEX F

TRANSPORTATION SECTION

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4. MAJOR PROBLEMS

a. (C) Logistical Over-The-Shore Operations (LOTS) - There is a continuing deficiency in plans, organization and training within ARVN for the conduct of LOTS operation. The ARVN Transportation Corps does not have either a water lift capability or the units to carry out the contemplated beach operations. A limited capability for small scale operations exists within the VN Navy. Beach surveys and port studies are being completed in order to produce basic material from which an overall evaluation report can be produced. A related ARVN-TERM evaluation of the highway net of Vietnam is also in progress. Separate studies will be integrated into an overall evaluation report which will be coordinated with the ARVN Chief of Transportation.

b. (U) Traffic Management - The development of sound doctrine for the movement of cargo and personnel within Vietnam has been the subject of research and discussion between G4, ARVN, Chief of Transportation, ARVN and Transportation Branch, TERM. There is a definite shortage of trained traffic management personnel within ARVN and a considerable degree of coordination and education has been required to develop concepts and principles upon which doctrine is to be based. Differences of opinion exist between G4, ARVN and transportation personnel which must be resolved prior to publication of a clear, concise, directive.

Education of field personnel will be a continuing requirement and pending publication of necessary directives will be a weak point in the traffic management system within the country. The Zone Transportation Officers in the various military regions are making excellent progress in making units conscious of transportation management principles; however, these efforts are not always fully coordinated or uniform in application. Forecasting of cargo movement requirements continues to be a major problem area which must be resolved.

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Appendix 9 to Annex D

MAAG ARMY DETACHMENTS



MAP OF
SOUTH VIETNAM

_____ - Principal Roads

0 50 100 150 200 KM

SECURITY CLEARANCE CERTIFICATE

1. In view of the current world situation, I will not communicate or transmit, orally or in writing, to any person except as officially directed by competent authority, any information of a classified nature which may have become known to me in the course of my duties or during my assignment with MAAG or TERM Vietnam.

2. I have properly accounted for all classified material for which I have been responsible and do not have any classified material, to include personal notes, in my possession for removal from this MAAG or TERM.

3. I have read, understand and agree to comply with the foregoing, a copy of which I have received.

Name Rank BR

Duty Assignment

Signature Date

Distribution:
1 - Ind concerned
2 - Field 201 File
3 - Hqtrs Central Files

ANNEX E (S)

RESISTANCE ACTIVITIES AND COUNTERMEASURES (U)

CONTENTS(U)

ANNEX E (U)

RESISTANCE ACTIVITIES AND COUNTERMEASURES (UNCLASSIFIED)

SECTION I

THE VIET MINH

1. (U) General.

When the Viet Minh regular forces launched their attacks on the French in December 1946, they believed themselves capable of quickly defeating the French forces in open battle. Their beliefs were not realized and resulted in the almost total destruction of Viet Minh forces in 1947. After this experience, Viet Minh leaders turned to the works of Mao Tse-Tung as the theoretical basis for revolutionary warfare in Asia. As a result, the later successes of the Viet Minh lay in their conception of the guerrilla army and clandestine underground.

2. (U) Operations.

Viet Minh revolutionaries, theorists as well as practitioners, from the very beginning recognized the crucial value of the guerrilla in the underdeveloped country and difficult terrain in which they were operating. Their conception of the guerrilla fighter and their refinement of guerrilla warfare beyond previous historical experience explains much of their ultimate success.

The precedent of Indochina is an important lesson on the value of the guerrilla in all phases of revolutionary war. It is likely to be long remembered in the Communist Bloc. Even though Communist Bloc countries may be increasingly able to put regular forces into the field, it is conceivable that they will find guerrilla warfare a safer and more attractive alternative. This approach would have all the advantages proved in Indochina: slow attrition of the enemy, relative immunity from countermeasures, time in which to build up regular forces for the decisive final attack, and low cost.

Viet Minh operations were based on the population. The natives were won psychologically for the revolutionary cause to the point not

merely of acquiescence but of active participation in the struggle. The means to this end included an understanding of their political preconceptions and their social customs and needs that only intimate knowledge and a superior intelligence effort could supply. It was also essential to reduce the instinctive, traditional distrust between the population and army, and to make a recognizeable effort to furnish economic aid. In the attainment of these objectives the Viet Minh guerrillas were eminently successful. In Indochina they performed the infiltration and organization that gave the Viet Minh superior intelligence. They aided in vital nonmilitary tasks such as harvesting, emergency relief, and public improvements. Such acts gained the gratitude of the natives. Their irregular status and non-uniformed appearance helped overcome the separation and suspicion that prevailed between civilians and the Army.

Viet Minh paramilitary operations were traditional to guerrilla warfare and were characterized by brief, violent actions initiated by the Viet Minh forces at a time and place of their own choosing. Their use of guerrilla tactics restricted French movements to the few available roads, continually cut their land lines of communications, and forced the utilization of large scale air support.

3. (S) Organization.

Ever since the armistice in 1954 and the formation of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV), communist North Vietnam has concentrated on the development of its army. In recent years the efforts have been accelerated to gain a more modern, standardized regular army, for more intensive political indoctrination of the soldiers, and for a higher degree of army participation in DRV's over-all economic effort.

During the war the Viet Minh guerrillas were a trained force with specific and detailed missions including economic assistance, psychological warfare, and paramilitary operations. Their continuing importance in the struggle for communist domination in that area of the

world has been recognized by the DRV. Recent developments in Laos confirm the fact that guerrilla forces have once more come to occupy an important place in the military picture and are ready and available for action.

Apart from their potential military usefulness, the guerrillas have proved to be the most effective element for covert infiltration and political indoctrination in the countries bordering on the DRV. DRV emphasis continues on political warfare within North Vietnam and in the adjacent countries, side by side with the drive for a greater regular military capability. At present guerrilla units are being used consistently for both subversion and paramilitary operations.

Immediately after the armistice the wartime guerrillas were organized into a militia with a variety of civil and military functions. The militia acted, for example, as a police force and also assisted in political indoctrination. However, little attention was paid to them and they were allowed to disintegrate in some areas. In 1957, the need for internal security was again a problem and once more ex-guerrillas were the basis for reestablishing the militia.

It appears therefore that some guerrilla forces are attached to the regular army for special covert or clandestine operations while others continue to function as part of the militia. In either case, their usefulness is not likely to be lessened by the growth and modernization of the military establishment since they will be better suited to such activities and better able to escape detection than soldiers of the regular army.

4. (S) Current Resistance Activities.

The Viet Minh, now called the Viet Cong, continue to be the principal threat to internal security in South Vietnam. The Government of the Republic of Vietnam (RV), though well aware of the threat and trying to eliminate it, has not been very successful.

During 1959 the Viet Cong increased its overt or guerrilla activity. This indicates that the original DRV strategy of propaganda and

subversion instead of terrorism and paramilitary attack has changed. The Viet Cong, however, has not given up its other activities. It has, for example, been placing heavy emphasis on "tax and loan" collections from Gia Dinh, Phuong Dinh, Vinh Long, and An Giang Provinces in South Vietnem. Also, Viet Cong propaganda has become more and more open, as evidenced by an increasing number of antigovernment leaflets and the appearance of DRV flags in villages.

Viet Cong cadres have been sent into the Nam Thai Son land development area in Kien Giang Province in South Vietnam to distribute subversive propaganda and organize sabotage of farm implements and equipment. Supposedly on the grounds that roads now being built in South Vietnam could be used as air strips in case of war, the Viet Cong has been attempting to delay construction by causing labor unrest and by sabotaging warehouses and other installations.

The RV army and the Security Forces have also been primary targets of the Viet Cong. Its agents have attempted to subvert RV Army members, particularly officers, and to lower their morale by terrorism. The terrorist attacks coincided with a propaganda campaign within the RV army calling for resistance to US military officers, who were accused of insulting trainees and of being responsible for the death of trainees during military exercises. The Viet Cong appear to have been largely unsuccessful in subverting Army personnel, mainly because RV Army security measures have been effective.

US agencies have for some time received reports of attacks planned against Americans, particularly in the Saigon area. On 8 July 1959, an attack was made on the MAAG Detachment at Bien Hoa killing two Americans. This was the first attack on a US installation since the October 1957 bombings, and the first US personnel killed since Ngo came into power in 1955. Public indignation ran high and Vietnamese staged mass protest demonstrations in Saigon. In view of the public reaction and the quick apprehension of the assassins by the RV Military Security Service, it is unlikely that the Viet Cong will make

further attacks against Americans until the adverse reaction to the Bien Hoa incident has been forgotten.

On 18 January 1959, the Viet Cong propaganda machine unleashed its most violent attack against the RV Government. The Viet Cong had mobilized all its propaganda resources to spread the story that on 1 December 1958 the RV Government had willfully poisoned more than 1,000 political prisoners at the Phu Loi detention camp, 33 miles north of Saigon near Thu Dau Mot. The British Consul General in Hanoi reported that this campaign was pursued with "near hysteria" and that there had been nothing to equal it within the experience of any member of the British.

The Viet Cong consider the Phu Loi propaganda campaign a success. The sheer volume of propaganda commanded the attention of the population of North Vietnam, probably reached many in South Vietnam, and aroused questions and comments in the non-Communist world. In South Vietnam many people were confused when the Government did not immediately deny the accusations. This confused and inconsistent handling of the situation failed to meet the difficult problems. But the RV Government has recently tried to correct some of its deficiencies in the handling of such incidents and has been quicker to seize opportunities to wage counterpropaganda against DRV.

The Viet Cong appears to be giving continued attention to improved organization, recruiting, training, simplifying communications, and meeting the threat posed by informers and RV counterespionage activities.

The Viet Cong, Nam Bo High Commission in March 1959 reorganized resistance zones and commands in the southern provinces, as is their policy in trying to confuse RV intelligence agencies.

The intensive recruiting program and the infiltration from North Vietnam and Cambodia have steadily increased the number of Viet Cong units in South Vietnam. The RV estimated Viet Cong strength at the end of March 59 as 1,810 persons, and at the end of June this estimate

rose to 2,338. Current estimates place the Vietnamese Communist strength at 3000. These figures do not include those who, willingly or through coercion, supply arms, money, food, hideouts, and information.

What has made this Communist build-up appear more massive is the switch in tactics. Before 1959 the Communists had been reluctant to attack any point which was even partially protected. They would not engage any RV forces of even platoon strength and would use no more than a handful of men in any operation. But by Sep 59 the Communists began their new tactics of boldly striking with larger forces against military installations. They also no longer feared to engage RV forces in combat. By Jan 60, this new boldness carried Vietnamese Communists to a successful attack on an RV regiment at Tay Ninh.

Undoubtedly, the new Vietnamese tactics took the South Vietnamese Government by surprise. The situation, though admittedly dangerous in some areas, does not appear to have become critical enough to threaten South Vietnam's existence. What seems most needed is a calm assessment of the Communist tactics and a realization that for the South Vietnamese Government to be stampeded into irrational acts will accomplish a Communist objective--the unbalancing of South Vietnam's Government so that it can not plan a long-range program of putting an end to insurgency.

There has been no significant independent action recently by the dissident religious sects. Although various sects continued to retain their identity, their activities were hardly distinguishable from Viet Cong groups, under whose control they appear to be operating. The strength of the Hoa Hao, religious fanatics, now consists of scattered armed groups devoted to pillage and terrorism in remote areas of Kien Giang, An Giang, and Vinh Long Provinces. In An Giang, a group of 50 Hoa Hao was reportedly engaged in "tax collections, kidnaping and intimidation." Cao Dai, another religious group, has been reported to have activities in Tay Ninh and Kien Giang Provinces, but no particular activity has been noted. In the Bay Mon Gang and other remnants of the Binh Xuyen, which is an organization of pirates and bandits, a number of leading cadres have been reduced in rank

and replaced with hard core Viet Cong guerrillas, who have taken over the leadership.

These developments would appear to indicate that the sects have come under Viet Cong direction to such a degree that as individual organizations they no longer represent a significant threat to internal security in the south.

Viet Cong use of the Cambodian frontier as sanctuary continues to hamper the RV effort in eliminating these guerrillas in the southwest province. Bands ranging in size from a few to more than 200 have been reportedly operating across the frontier from bases in Cambodia. In March 1959, South Vietnam proposed the creation of a five-mile zone along both sides of the frontier in which security forces of both sides would have the right of "hot pursuit." The Cambodian Government did not accept the proposal. The problem remains one of many that have strained Cambodian-Vietnamese relations and have not been solved to date.

SECTION II

ASPECTS OF VIET MINH SUCCESS

1. (¢) Disadvantages of the Viet Minh

The Viet Minh campaign demonstrated some of the weaknesses of revolutionary warfare as well as its advantages.

Particularly during the early war years, the Viet Minh effort suffered considerably from poor logistics, shortages of money and materiel, lack of trained officer cadres, and hence an inability to carry out sustained attacks.

Lack of a modern transportation system and the concomitant need for staggering numbers of coolies created a permanent shortage of manpower. This condition would have been far more severe, however, if the war needs had called for transport of POL and of large amounts of artillery ammunition. These primitive means of transport had the incidental advantage of virtual immunity to detection and destruction.

2. (¢) Advantages of the Viet Minh

Some of the advantages of the Viet Minh over the French were inescapable.

The infiltrating techniques of the Viet Minh guerrillas and their familiarity with the country, terrain and people permitted much intelligence material to be obtained that the French could not hope to equal.

Racial characteristics rendered native Viet Minh guerrillas indistinguishable from peaceful inhabitants of the villages. Conversely, the French reconnaissance elements were easy targets and had no way of "merging" with the population.

The absence of fronts compelled the French to protect every installation individually and thus tie up many thousands of troops in passive security.

The scarcity of so-called strategic targets and the profusion and elusiveness of tactical targets made target acquisition an almost hopelessly difficult task for the French air force. Photo reconnaissance,

so important to Western armies, was hampered by heavy vegetation, mountainous terrain, and frequent bad weather.

3. (U) Political

The French Government did not make the national effort required to defeat the Viet Minh. The French objective was to maintain a position of strength from which an "honorable" settlement could be negotiated.

The United States failed to recognize the limited nature of the French objective and was deluded into believing the French could and would achieve a military victory. By so believing, the United States did not take the diplomatic or military measures needed to insure victory.

The French Government failed to make the political concessions necessary to gain support of the Vietnamese. French reluctance to grant full independence to these people permitted the Communists to cloak their actions in the guise of a popular, nationalist, anticolonial movement. Many nationalists in Vietnam believed that a French victory would mean a continuation of French colonial influence, but that a Communist victory, regardless of the cost to Vietnamese personal liberties, would bring some type of national independence.

Both France and the United States failed to appreciate the extent to which the Viet Minh would be supported by the Sino-Soviet Bloc.

4. (U) Psychological

The French did not develop effective psychological or unconventional warfare programs; the Viet Minh did. Viet Minh subversive, guerrilla, and propaganda programs were highly effective, gained the support of the people, and mobilized them behind the Viet Minh in a "people's war."

One of the reasons the Viet Minh were able to advance their psychological warfare programs so adroitly may stem from the possibility that the Japanese, through their occupation of Indochina and their "Asia for Asians" theme, had created an ideal climate for the generation of an indigenous independence movement and had completely removed from the Vietnamese whatever liking existed for colonialism and the French.

5. (S) Strategic UNCLASSIFIED

The French failed to direct all their efforts toward a decisive, obtainable goal. The theater commander was given missions beyond the capabilities of his forces. He was ordered, for example, to avoid losing any ground or creating any situation in which the Communists might gain an apparent tactical success. This, combined with the failure of the French Government to provide sufficient military forces, resulted in an essentially defensive posture and gave the initiative to the Viet Minh.

After 1950, the constant threat of Chinese Communist intervention further influenced the deployment of French forces and was the major factor contributing to the development of the permanent field fortifications in North Vietnam and the "Maginot complex." Considering the threat of a Chinese Communist invasion from the north and the trend of UN operations in Korea, the French saw no alternative but to construct a series of fortifications to cover the withdrawal of their forces to port areas for evacuation.

The French did not position available military units where they could accomplish required missions. This resulted from French failure to adapt their forces to the terrain and techniques of the enemy. French forces were essentially roadbound and relied too heavily on conventional heavy equipment and support systems. Special forces and ranger-type operations were relegated to a very minor role. This was due in part to the lack of realistic planning at theater-level and in part to insufficient helicopter and inadequate airlift support.

The slow development of the Vietnam national armed forces was a direct result of French reluctance to press for the rapid expansion of indigenous forces. In 1953-54 when cadres were needed for rapid expansion, such cadres were not available.

The French in Vietnam did not adequately evaluate the actual effectiveness of the Viet Minh strategic and tactical doctrine. Viet Minh organization and supply methods enabled them to overcome the numerical superiority enjoyed by the French forces. Refusal of the Viet Minh to

engage in combat except under favorable circumstances further frustrated French operations both real and diversionary. This Viet Minh technique reduced their ammunition requirements far below those of conventional forces. The development of "cottage arsenals" also permitted the Viet Minh to maintain guerrilla pressure on the French throughout Vietnam without dependence upon long lines of communication and supply. Clandestine storing of ammunition and other supplies in areas of intended attack allowed continuing surprise attacks by the Viet Minh without reliance upon resupply convoys.

The French Air Force was unable to inflict any sustained, major damage upon the jungle-hidden enemy despite the fact the French held complete air superiority throughout the war.

6. (S) Tactical

In general the French failed to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative. They were not aggressive in finding, identifying and attacking the enemy. Instead, the French preferred to move into enemy territory, dig in, and await the counterattack. This move-up-and-dig-in attitude resulted largely from the elusiveness of the Viet Minh and the unfamiliarity of the French with the terrain. This attitude of over-caution prevailed not only at battalion level but extended into division echelons.

Although well versed in conventional tactics, the French were reluctant to alter their doctrine to fit the situation imposed by the terrain. Artillery and armor were usually confined to movement on roads and therefore could not support the infantry in cross-country movements. Because of the effectiveness of Viet Minh attacks, French commanders hesitated to move their infantry beyond support range of their roadbound armor and artillery units. This enabled the Viet Minh to outmaneuver the French repeatedly. In a few instances, the French lightened their regimental task forces for cross-country movement and conducted highly successfull operations. These forces were resupplied by air for weeks at a time.

The French habitually failed to exercise proper tactical security measures during the movement of units. Units repeatedly fell

into ambushes or were attacked by surprise from the flanks because of failure to put out points or flank guards. Thie violation of security resulted from the reckless attitude of the veteran French officers and NCOs who prided themselves on being able to fight their way out of any situation.

Perhaps more significant than the tactical failure of the French were the sound and successful tactical techniques of the Viet Minh. The Viet Minh constantly emphasized thorough reconnaissance and intelligence preparation for attacks, cross-country mobility, and the principles of concentration and surprise attack at the time and place of their own choosing.

SECTION III

MILITARY-CIVIL COUNTERMEASURES

1. (U) Pacification

At the end of 1954, President Ngo issued a military security directive which placed all insecure provinces under military authority. Provinces in zones which were to be cleared of Viet Minh forces were included in those to be administered by the military. The Presidential directive also provided for the phasing out of military authority as civilian administrators became available and capable. (This was carried out harmoniously and effectively later.) The operational doctrine for the take-over of zones evacuated by the Viet Minh was known as "pacification." US and French officers in the combined Training Relations and Instruction Mission (TRIM), under the US Chief of MAAG, advised the RV on pacification operations.

The first pacification campaign used military forces of about brigade strength. The second had forces about the strength of a corps. Essentially, these operations were march-ins by the troops and the establishment of free government in the areas used as combat zones of the eight-year war. Roads and railroads needed rehabilitation. Bridges, schools, hospitals, and markets had to be rebuilt. The population needed medical care and, in many places, food and clothing. Armed bands were still in the area and farms and villages needed protection. Troops for these campaigns were given special training in courtesy towards the civilians (including how to answer communist propaganda), in disbursing of aid, in construction, and in administrative procedures. As a result of good planning, training, and operations by the military, effective government and security were quickly established in the pacification areas. Much of the war-torn economy was rehabilitated, and many of the communist organizations left behind were revealed by the population. A great many hidden caches of arms and equipment were seized.

Similar pacification measures were taken in actions against rebellious sect forces in the western regions and in the jungle-foothill regions north of Saigon. The latter operation experimented with building a force around a small Army cadre (used for central administration and for patrols into

the further reaches of the jungle), and making use of civil police forces and civilian administrative teams. The operation was not wholly successful and had to be strengthened eventually with Army troops.

2. (U) Military-Civil Cooperation

During the pacification campaigns, the RV Army learned to work closely with two notable civilian organizations. The organizations were "Operation Brotherhood" of the International Jaycees and the Vietnamese Government's "Civic Action."

"Operation Brotherhood" was originally staffed by Filipino volunteer doctors, dentists, and nurses, who establishes a large clinic to treat refugees in the Saigon-Cholon area. They entered Camau with Army pacification forces. Later, small field teams of Filipino doctors and nurses went out into the countryside with Vietnamese Army patrols to give inoculations and teach public health measures. Eventually, medical personnel of many other nations of the free world joined the Operation Brotherhood effort. They trained Vietnamese as hospital aides, taught first-aid, sanitation, and food preparation to the villagers, and guided community development in addition to performing medical services.

"Civic Action" was established as a civilian organization to bring public administration to the villages of RV. It was placed under the Ministry of Defense initially for support and for coordinated operations with the Army in pacification work. Civil service employees of all Ministries were asked to volunteer. Teams of four men would enter a village, enlist the help of villagers in building a community house (for meetings of village elders, a first-aid clinic, and an information room where news of the government was posted), a school house, and a public market. The team would then give on-the-job training to volunteer villagers in teaching, village administration, first-aid, sanitation, public works (wells, street drainage, pit latrines, etc.) and agricultural methods. Once the local villagers were trained, the Civic Action team would move on to another village. These teams moved in right after the Army patrols. A number of these unarmed civilians were killed by dissident guerrillas. The Civic Action organization was later placed directly under the

President to permit full participation of all Ministries in its operations.

3. (U) Current Pacification Activities

The Vietnamese Army has continued the civil activities it commenced during the pacification campaigns. Its major work is in the High Plateau areas building and improving roads and bridges, bringing government administration to the nomad tribes of the mountains and jungle, and assisting pioneer settlers build new communities. Much of the current activity centers around small outposts established in the more remote areas paralleling the RV borders with Laos and Cambodia. Rough roads are constructed to these outposts, the jungle cleared for farming, and security established to protect the new communities. The new communities are attracting hardy pionecrs to virgin lands that they will be willing to protect, adding new security to borders that have long been vulnerable to Viet Minh cross-country tactics.

4. (U) Offensive Operations

In early February 1959, the RV Army Psychological Warfare Directorate completed "Operation Nguyen Trai." This program had an overt and covert action plan. Mass rallies were held and Self-Defense Corps and Civil Guard training in psychological warfare was instituted. RV agents, posing as Viet Cong members, distributed anti-government leaflets, and conducted terrorist activities to confuse and demoralize the Viet Cong and to force local officials to act against the Viet Cong.

In March 1959, the RV launched an all-out offensive against Viet Cong guerrilla forces reportedly regrouping in "Resistance Zone D" (which includes parts of Phuoc Thanh, Bien Hoa, Long Khanh, and Phuoc Long Provinces). For the first time the RV Air Force took offensive action against dissident forces. The results were not decisive since the guerrillas succeeded in evading RV forces, who were hampered by the thick jungle and forest. RV forces did capture a number of bases containing equipment and items of logistic support. RV elements were ordered to remain in this area and try to build roads through the jungle, thereby opening it up and lessening the danger of renewed Viet Cong activity there.

Creation in February 1959 of the new Province of Phuoc Thanh, composed of large areas of forest and jungle which had long served as shelter for Viet Cong groups, was in part designed to tighten security. The new province was created from portions of Bien Hoa, Long Khanh, Phuoc Long, and Binh Duong Provinces. The Government is establishing agricultural development centers in this area. By benefiting the people and the national economy, agricultural development in itself could be a more effective weapon against the Viet Cong than police action alone.

5. (S) New Security Measures

A plan for pacification of the southwestern provinces was put into effect in April 59 with the creation of a new Government Delegation to the Southern Provinces (Southern Delegation) with headquarters at Can Tho. The Southern Delegation has jurisdiction over the 12 provinces lying south and west of Saigon. The Chief of the 5th Military Region was given extraordinary powers bordering on martial law, including control over all military units and operations in the western provinces and indirect control over all administrative offices.

The plan includes the formation of special security units. Each of these units consists of approximately 30 men, organized into two elements: one for intelligence operations, the other for armed attack. These units operate as mobile teams, moving from one trouble area to another. This method of operation is designed to eliminate a major problem that has beset the Self-Defense Corps. The Self-Defense Corps is usually composed of local inhabitants, and is particularly vulnerable to local Viet Cong subversion and control through the Viet Cong terrorizing parents and relatives of its members.

Although the plan itself is sound, the actual operation has been impeded by administrative and operational difficulties. The Director of the National Police and Surete Service is not in complete agreement with the plan and resents other authority over special security units and has failed to furnish the necessary and promised logistical and financial support.

6. (S) Military Tribunals

From the tenor of Viet Cong propaganda, the RV decree 10/59 has caused some fear in Viet Cong ranks. Decree 10/59, approved by the National Assembly on Apr 1959 provides for the creation of Special Military Tribunals and sets forth the penalties for crimes aimed at destroying or abusing external or internal national security. The decree provides for three Special Military Tribunals--one in Saigon, for the southern provinces; in Banmethout for the central Vietnam highlands; and in Hue for the central Vietnam lowlands. Additional courts may be created by decree. The basic decree appears to be a modified form of martial law. In his request to the National assembly to pass the decree, President Ngo stated that the reasons for the creation of the Special Courts were: the nation was facing its worst security situation since the Republic of Vietnam was created in 1955; Viet Cong members were tried under a variety of old French laws which tended to draw cases out for as long as two or three years; and the Viet Cong could continue operating because it was too difficult to obtain the firm and exacting proof required to convict them under the old laws.

Decree 10/59 is in use and its effectiveness was substantiated in a report that in Kien Phong Province six Viet Cong members were tried by a Military Tribunal. Three of the six were sentenced to death, two to life imprisonment, and one to 20 years at hard labor. Two Viet Cong members were tried at Tay Ninh for assassination, one was sentenced to death, and the other to life imprisonment at hard labor.

In the continued search for more effective measures, President Ngo reportedly instructed the National Revolutionary Movement and the director of the RV intelligence service to organize mobile teams which could handle the Viet Cong terrorists, who could not be dealt with through normal, judicial procedures for lack of concrete proof. These teams were to be composed of members of the Civil Guard, Police, Surete, and possibly Army representatives and would be organized and controlled by the province chiefs in coordination with the regional military commanders. They would meet Viet Cong tactics with Viet Cong tactics in order to accomplish

their goal. The present status of such "terrorist teams" is not known. It seems unlikely that the President would go to such extremes, although the Intelligence Director has frequently resorted to similar unsavory measures.

7. (¢) Future Measures

RV countermeasures are becoming increasingly effective in controlling Viet Cong activities although much remains to be done. Although warranted by the increase in Viet Cong activity the severe nature of the countermeasures undertaken or under consideration by RV nevertheless raise certain problems. The solution to internal security problems can be made easier only if the peasants feel protected and not persecuted, particularly since Viet Cong terrorist bands must rely to a large extent on the voluntary or involuntary support of the peasantry. If the new measures are to be effective not only in controlling the Viet Cong but also in instilling confidence into the populace, they must be carried out wisely and judiciously at the top and on the local level. The use of Cambodian territory as a "privileged sanctuary" by Viet Cong and other dissidents must also be stopped before South Vietnam can hope to eliminate internal security difficulties.

8. ($) Unconventional Warfare and Psychological Warfare Units

The 1st Observation Group, RV Army, with an authorized strength of 305 constitutes the Vietnamese Special Force organization. The group has a limited capability to assist in maintaining internal security and to provide resistance to external attack. Plans are underway to provide a ten man US Special Force team to conduct anti-guerrilla and PSYWAR training for 35 selected Vietnamese Civil Guard personnel in early 1960.

ANNEX F

GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS

ARVN - Armed Forces of Vietnam (French)

CINCPAC - Commander-in-Chief, Pacific

DLF - Development Loan Fund

DRV - Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam)

ECA - Economic Cooperation Administration

FEC - French Expeditionary Corps

FOA - Foreign Operations Administration

GVN - Government of Vietnam

ICA - International Cooperation Administration

ICC - International Control Commission

LOTS - Logistical Over - The - Shore Operations

OSP - Offshore Procurement Program

PACOM - Pacific Command

PEO - Programs Evaluation Office

MAAG - Military Assistance Advisory Group

MAP - Military Assistance Program

MDAP - Mutual Defense Assistance Program

MSA - Mutual Security Administration

MSP - Mutual Security Program

NRM - National Revolutionary Movement

RV - Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam)

TCA - Technical Cooperation Administration

TERM - Temporary Equipment Recovery Mission

TRIM - Training Relations Instruction Mission

USOM - United States Operations Mission

VNA - Vietnamese National Army

VNAF - Vietnamese Air Force

VNN - Vietnamese Navy

WPP - Weapons Production Program

CATO - Combined Arms Training Organization

ANNEX G

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ADDENDA:

28. Far East portion of the Mutual Security Program, fiscal year 1961 estimates, prepared by DOD and ICA. S-18532.2-H

Provides both general and detailed information on the Mutual Security Program for Vietnam (pages 176-197). Gives considerable coverage to the ICA aspects. Arrived too late to be completely integrated with this study. It is of great value to personnel assigned to MAAG-Vietnam.

29. World Wide Summary Statements of the Mutual Security Program, fiscal year 1961 estimates, prepared by DOD and ICA. S-18532.2-G

Provides general and specific information on the Mutual Security Program for FY 61 to include methods for programming; military assistance, defense support, development loan funds, technical cooperation and other programs. Arrived too late to be completely integrated with the study. Of value to personnel assigned to MAAG or Mission duty.

30. Non-Regional Programs of the Mutual Security Program, fiscal year 1961 estimates, prepared by DOD and ICA. S-18532.2-F

Provides Mutual Security Program information on such subjects as administrative expenses, interregional program expenses, modernization, MAP owned property, and special assistance programs. Arrived too late to be completely integrated with the study. Of value to personnel assigned to MAAG or Mission duty.

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