Strategic Mobility Alternatives for the 1980s. Volume 2. Analysis and Conclusions
Abstract
This report addresses an interconnected set of issues affecting strategic mobility: the capacity of the United States to move substantial combat ready forces quickly to distant parts of the world in time of crisis. Although a great many demanding scenarios have been and can be constructed that strain that capacity in various ways, the timely reinforcement of NATO by Army and Air Force combat units is generally considered to be a baseline requirement. If it can be satisfied, it will provide a capability adequate to serve most other conceivable needs. For that reason, and because the NATO-reinforcement scenario has most often been used by analysts to test the effectiveness of different modes of strategic mobility, it has also been used here. It is assumed, therefore, that a capacity to insure early reinforcement of U.S. forces on the NATO Central Front in time of crisis will be critical to deterrence of an attack by the Warsaw Pact and, should deterrence fail, to NATO's ability to repel any such attack.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Mar 01, 1977
- Accession Number
- ADC010080
Entities
People
- A. A. Barbour
- J. H. Hayes
- J. R. Gebman
- R. L. Perry
- W. E. Hoehn Jr.
Organizations
- RAND Corporation