Summary of Rand Interviews of Captured North Vietnamese That Deal With the Effectiveness of Air Power in Southeast Asia
Abstract
In response to a request from Maxwell Air Force Base for reactions of North Vietnamese to the effectiveness of air power in Southeast Asia, RACIC screened a sample of interviews conducted by RAND Corporation of captured or rallied North Vietnamese or National Liberation Front members. The RAND interviews were conducted between December 1964 and the present. The following series of interviews were sampled based on their relevance to the use of air power in Southeast Asia: Confidential G, LX, G, AG, SF, SX, DT, and Bombing Halt. This report provides a sampling of the information secured in selected interviews that bears on the effectiveness of air power in Southeast Asia. The following summarizes the effects of air attacks on North Vietnam and on military operations in the South as reflected in the interview series sampled: (1) Hindered communication; (2) Slowed traffic and transport of supplies and personnel; (3) Reduced efficiency in production due to disruption of work hours and decentralization of factories. Production was reduced by the destruction of factories and rice field dikes. (4) Increased determination on the part of North Vietnamese to side with Hanoi and increased hatred of Americans; (5) Brought about rationing of food and fuel; (6) Broke off or changed military operations in the South as a result of air power; and (7) Reduced tactical training. Training in the South by North Vietnamese troops had to be conducted at night or in the jungle.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Aug 04, 1969
- Accession Number
- ADC056343
Entities
People
- Walter H. Veazie Jr.
Organizations
- Battelle Memorial Institute