A Minimum Sensitivity Incentive Control Approach to Team Problems,
Abstract
This paper analyzes a class of two-agent team decision problems with a hierarchical decision structure, wherein one of the decision makers may have a slightly different perception of the overall team goal, with this slight variation not known by the other agent who is assumed to occupy the hierarchically dominant position. The leading agent has access to dynamic information and his role is to announce such a policy (incentive scheme) which would lead to achievement of the overall team goal, in spite of the slight variations in the other agent's perception of that goal, which are not known or predictable by him.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Dec 01, 1983
- Accession Number
- ADP002911
Entities
People
- D. Cansever
- J. B. Cruz Jr.
- T. Basar
Organizations
- University of Illinois Urbana–Champaign