Dynamic, Hierarchical Decision Problems,
Abstract
A hierarchical decision problem with one leader and a continuum of followers is investigated. The problem is formulated as a stochastic Stackelberg game with nonnested information structure, and studied by using the Inducible Region concept. For the single-stage case, it is shown that the inducible region can be delineated, and the optimal Stackelberg strategy can be constructed. These results are then extended to the two-stage case. Although the problem is formulated in a pricing context in terms of companies and customers, the formulation can be interpreted differently to model Command Control and Communications Systems related problems. (Author)
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Dec 01, 1983
- Accession Number
- ADP002912
Entities
People
- P. B. Luh
- T. Ning
- T. S. Chang
Organizations
- University of Connecticut