Generic Adversary Characteristics and the Potential Threat to Licensed Nuclear Activities from Insiders
Abstract
NRC has been charged by Congress with the responsibility for provision and maintenance of safeguards against theft and sabotage of licensed nuclear materials and facilities. In the discharge of this mandate, the Commission directed the Division of Safeguards to undertake two studies: one aimed at a systematic determination of the characteristics of potential adversaries to nuclear programs and the second aimed at a more detailed examination of the potential insider adversary. The first study, entitled Generic Adversary Characteristics (GAC), was intended as an initial NRC effort at threat definition. It entails an analysis characteristics associated with subnational conventional crimes and terrorist actions that could be analogous to potential nuclear events. The Insider Study addresses the two types of insider crime that are the primary concern of nuclear safeguards--theft and sabotage-- and focuses on the insider adversary, one whose authorized access to a facility or activity may be exploited by him or others in the commission of a crime. The three objectives of the study are shown here. Data used in fulfilling these objectives were derived primarily from case histories of insider crime, but also from expert opinion and from non-NRC studies.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jun 01, 1981
- Accession Number
- ADP003374
Entities
People
- Sarah A. Mullen
Organizations
- Nuclear Regulatory Commission