On the Provision of Safety Assurance via Safety Kernels for Modern Weapon Systems
Abstract
In this paper we discuss some of the challenges and approaches for providing safety assurance for modern weapon systems via software-based safety kernels. We argue that software-centric approaches for designing and verifying safety kernels are flawed. We claim that the design and verification of safety kernels for complex event-driven real-time systems is a matter of physics and dynamical system analysis of system design. We describe an approach for rapidly prototyping safety kernels (and plants and controllers) using an agent-based safety-kernel architecture. The approach utilizes multiagent modeling and hybrid automata
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Mar 22, 2006
- Accession Number
- ADP022173
Entities
People
- Anil Nerode
- Duminda Wijesekera
- J. B. Michael
Organizations
- Naval Postgraduate School