Characterizing and Drawing Lessons from Tactics and Methods of Illicit Procurement to Improve Counter-proliferation and Prevent Future Nuclear, Missile, and Military Proliferation
Abstract
Trafficking in nuclear, missile, and military commodities is an ongoing threat perpetuated by states that operate outside of global nonproliferation norms and agreements. Such countries rely heavily on outside supply to obtain the commodities needed to build covert or banned nuclear, missile, and military programs. In a recent study, our Institute found that many countries are at risk for exploitation by these state-directed efforts and that this trafficking may be poised to worsen. According to the survey, some 74 countries currently do not have any export control systems in place. Moreover, dozens of countries that do have export control systems still fall far below adequate for detecting and preventing illicit nuclear procurement attempts alone. At least one dozen of that number are Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) member states. Together, these trends indicate that many countries are increasingly at risk for exploitation by state-directed illicit nuclear, missile, and military procurement networks, either by attempts to obtain sensitive and controlled equipment from their territories, or through use of their territories in other ways, such as re-transfer points or proliferation financing hubs. Driving the increased threat is also the fact that there has recently been an augmentation in the number of countries that make and supply sensitive and dual-use goods in the developing world, creating greater availability of sensitive commodities worldwide. As adversaries seek to obtain the wherewithal to create and augment nuclear, missile, and military programs, the United States and its allies must be better prepared to detect and stop these attempts. The Institute for Science and International Security thus proposes a one-year project aimed at assessing and characterizing the tactics and methods used by which state actors and their networks seek to obtain proliferation-sensitive goods from or via at-risk countries. The project would produce a 75-page monograph which characterizes these tactics and methods and draws out lessons for the United States and likeminded nations to better use signatures of illicit procurement to prevent it from occurring today and in the future. Such a comprehensive report is urgently needed in the public realm. It would serve the important public purpose of informing policymakers and the private sector about key ways in which proliferant states and their associates try to seek and successfully obtain sensitive commodities, and about ways in which countries can improve their detection and prevention of such attempts. It would also contribute to efforts to prevent additional proliferation by adversaries and mitigate existing proliferation which would help safeguard U.S. and international security.
Document Details
- Document Type
- DoD Grant Award
- Publication Date
- Oct 17, 2018
- Source ID
- FA70001810019
Entities
People
- David Albright
Organizations
- Defense Threat Reduction Agency
- Institute for Science and International Security
- United States Air Force Academy