Mechanism Design for Complex Systems: A Black-box Model Approach
Abstract
Many complex resource allocation problems require vast amounts of distributed input informa- tion, which is proprietary to stakeholders. A resource allocation of this kind { with incomplete information about stakeholders private information { is an optimization problem with a game- theoretic twist: a stakeholder may misrepresent their input information if this course of action is to her/his own gain. This kind of behavior may result in a highly suboptimal allocation of resources. Designing rules of interaction between the resource allocator and the stakeholders (players) so that an optimal allocation can be implemented (without the possibility of input manipulation) is the overarching goal of mechanism design.
Document Details
- Document Type
- DoD Grant Award
- Publication Date
- Mar 23, 2016
- Source ID
- FA95501510504
Entities
People
- Alfredo Garcia
Organizations
- Air Force Office of Scientific Research
- United States Air Force
- University of Florida