Mechanism Design for Control-theoretic Objectives
Abstract
Game theory has long been used to analyze how strategic and self-interested decision makers interact. In this project, we focus on the field of incentive design, where a principal designs incentives to be provided to the players to elicit desired behavior from them in the resulting game. Specifically, we will consider incentive design in sequential decision making problems for control-oriented objectives such as ensuring stability or satisfaction of temporal constraints in multi-agent problems. Challenges such as consideration of the asymptotic regime as the time horizon of the problem increases, information assymetry among the agents and the principal, non-standard and interconnected utility functions of the agents, and characterization of the computational complexity will be considered explicitly. The results will be illustrated through multiple case studies.
Document Details
- Document Type
- DoD Grant Award
- Publication Date
- Jan 21, 2022
- Source ID
- FA95502110231XX0
Entities
People
- Vijay Gupta
Organizations
- Air Force Office of Scientific Research
- United States Air Force
- University of Notre Dame