The Logic of Kidnapping in Civil War
Abstract
Why do some armed groups kidnap, whereas others do not? And, does kidnapping work for perpetrators? Despite a dramatic spike in kidnappings by political groups over the last several decades, there has been limited scholarly examination of this tool of coercion. Leveraging evidence from extensive interviews with former combatants from Colombia’s civil war, including the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and National Liberation Army (ELN), as well as military and security personnel, I show that ransom kidnapping is used to enforce the taxes that armed groups impose on civilian populations. It is both the most lucrative way to punish tax evasion, as well as a strategic means of compelling future cooperation. However, kidnapping presents a temporal trade-off for armed groups- While it increases tax compliance in the short term, it presents longterm legitimacy costs to perpetrators. Interviews and focus groups conducted with former targets of rebel extortion serve to demonstrate these competing dynamics. This novel study explains when we should see kidnapping in armed conflict, describing an unexplored way that selective violence bolsters insurgency.
Document Details
- Document Type
- DoD Grant Award
- Publication Date
- Feb 22, 2024
- Source ID
- FA95502310017
Entities
People
- Danielle Gilbert
Organizations
- Air Force Office of Scientific Research
- Board of Trustees of Dartmouth College
- United States Air Force