Integrated Deterrence- Episodic Analysis
Abstract
Our empirical analysis is enabled by a unique dataset under development, which records the very high frequency of attacks along the Gaza - Israel border, collected by neutral observers, from 2007 through 2018. Measurement occurs at a frequency of up to five minutes, and includes attacks from multiple IDF platforms and multiple Gazan protagonists, both using a variety of armaments (including missiles, rockets, mortars, airstrikes, incursions, etc…), including casualties and fatalities of both combatants and noncombatants. It spans large Israeli incursions --conducting deterrence by denial, as well as the introduction of “Iron Dome� air defense -providing resilience. Those data are supplemented with data on border crossings, reflecting bilateral trade and humanitarian activity, adding a frenemies dimension. An additional attractive aspect of these data is that we can discuss it with decisionmakers on at least one side and cross-validate it with social media of all protagonists. Preliminary analysis based on a partial version of those data reveals that the conflict is best understood as a sequence of attacks and counterattacks aggregated to episodes. Episodes have an internal logic of stimulus-response in which calendar time is of secondary importance. That structure necessitates creating new techniques in computer-aided coding to establish sequence, and in statistically analyzing episodic data to deal with serially correlated errors between actions (rather than time periods). These techniques, piloted on preliminary data, indicate stable response functions over hundreds of episodes, once the intensity of attack is aggregated across munitions to create common damage measures. Those (preliminary) response functions indicate stable deterrent postures of both sides -Israel and Gaza. Consistent with this posture, Israel disincentivizes violence by opening border crossings during lulls. The conflict has a single, stable equilibrium, though at a positive level of violence -indicating incomplete deterrence. Both sides practice mixed (i.e. probabilistic) stratey.
Document Details
- Document Type
- DoD Grant Award
- Publication Date
- Mar 06, 2024
- Source ID
- FA95502310437
Entities
People
- Eli Berman
Organizations
- Air Force Office of Scientific Research
- Office of the Secretary of Defense
- University of California, San Diego