Analog Side Channel Attacks and Defenses for Satellites
Abstract
Most approaches to computer and communication system security assume that interaction with the system will occur only through one of its explicit input-output interfaces, but side-channel attacks break this assumption and can thus circumvent most traditional protection measures. Recent advances inside channel attacks call for investigation of satellites and their exposure to side-channel attacks. The question of particular interest is whether the type of satellite payload and their scheduling can be obtained from a distance. That information, once obtained by an attacker, reveals a lot about the satellite s function, mission, and capabilities. We propose to explore the threat surface for analog and digital side channel attacks on satellites- what payloads are available on a satellite, what is their schedule, what information are they collecting, etc. Our objective is to 1) parameterize attack methods, i.e., to investigate hardware and software available on satellites and find out what can be deduced using side channels, 2) identify key parameters that control feasibility of attacks such as timing, frequencies at which signals leak, how far away signals can be observed, what type of information can be collected, etc. and 3) identify possible attack countermeasures.
Document Details
- Document Type
- DoD Grant Award
- Publication Date
- Feb 05, 2025
- Source ID
- FA95502410079
Entities
People
- Milos Prvulović
Organizations
- Air Force Office of Scientific Research
- United States Air Force