INDUSTRIAL MOBILIZATION ASSESSING SURGE CAPABILITIES, WARTIME RISK, AND SYSTEM BRITTLENESS
Abstract
Industrial mobilization for a long duration, high-intensity conflict was a concern during the Cold War, but that concern disappeared during the post-Cold War period of short, limited regional conflicts. After a generation of absence, it has now returned. The National Security Strategy criticized the notion that “all wars would be fought and won quickly, from stand-off distances and with minimal casualties.” The National Defense Strategy highlighted the “reemergence of long-term strategic competition” against “revisionist powers,” including Russia and China. However, the highly consolidated and fragile U.S. defense industrial base is not designed to meet this challenge. Instead, it has been designed to reduce cost and that has meant squeezing out excess capacity that might be used for mobilization. Gen. Dunford, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, termed this “brittleness”. Strategists often think of the industrial mobilization experience in World War II as a model, but that is not applicable today. In World War II, the United States had years of strategic warning and protection by ocean barriers that gave it time to build facilities and convert civilian industry to military production. That kind of time will not be available in future great power conflicts. This research will break new ground because mobilization has not been an element of national security strategy for over a generation. It will do this by investigating three key questions: • What is the ability of existing and surge industrial production capabilities to replace current inventories? • Are some industries or portfolios of weapons at greater risk than others in an industrial mobilization situation? • Has the industrial base become more brittle over time? The project will do this by examining peacetime and surge production rates of individual systems as described in DOD’s budget documents and calculating the length of time required to replace the system’s inventory. It will look at different groupings of systems and different acquisition strategies to see whether these have common characteristics and whether any groupings or strategies produce greater or lesser risk. To develop insights into “brittleness”, it will compare results at different points in time. The project will engage subject matter experts to test hypotheses and get their views on the emerging results and recommendations. The final paper will include results of analysis, insights about greatest risks, and recommendations for policy action. The research results will help both private and public sector be better prepared for this new element of national defense strategy. Research Plan: The research project seeks to answer the following questions: • What is the ability of existing and surge industrial production capabilities to replace current inventories, for example, in the event of a prolonged great power conflict? • Are some industries or portfolios of weapons at greater risk than others? • Has the industrial base become more brittle over time? The objectives of the proposed research are as follows: • To ascertain the degree of risk in industrial mobilization capabilities. • To identify areas of greatest risk by service, industry, acquisition strategy, and weapon system portfolio. • To ascertain whether “brittleness” has been increasing and why. • To broaden awareness of mobilization issues to facilitate industrial preparedness and academic discussion. This research project will conduct quantitative analysis of publicly available government data to answer the research questions.
Document Details
- Document Type
- DoD Grant Award
- Publication Date
- Nov 01, 2021
- Source ID
- HQ00341910009
Entities
People
- Mark Cancian
Organizations
- Center for Strategic and International Studies
- Office of the Secretary of Defense
- Washington Headquarters Services