An Empirical Approach to Cross-Domain Deterrence
Abstract
ABSTRACT An Empirical Approach to Cross-domain Deterrence We propose an extension to the DoD Minerva project “Deterring Complex Threats” to collect new data on cross-domain deterrence. The Minerva project is developing a new understanding of cross-domain deterrence by refining existing theoretical concepts, but it is not able to conduct a full test of theories of complex deterrence. We have identified existing datasets that can be enhanced to incorporate more detailed information about capabilities and interaction in and across various domains. Augmenting existing data with information about cross-domain deterrence is much more efficient and cost-effective than attempting to create entire new coding schemes for conflict behavior. Conducting innovative tests of cross-domain crises and conflict also necessitates the development of new variables to capture the increase in complexity associated with technological innovation. Finally, we have a new measure of how uncertainty about a state’s capabilities varies across domains. These data promise new insights into the way cross-domain deterrence operates in the real world.
Document Details
- Document Type
- DoD Grant Award
- Publication Date
- Aug 12, 2016
- Source ID
- N000141512792
Entities
People
- Erik Gartzke
Organizations
- Office of Naval Research
- United States Navy
- University of California, San Diego