The grant is a continuation of N00014-14-1-0843 Deterrence with Proxies
Abstract
The performer will develop an overarching framework of dynamic deterrence in proxy relationships that builds on recent progress in understanding dynamic principal-agent relationships. In the framework, the proxy has aninformational advantage in suppressing terrorism, and so can do so more cheaply than the principal, but does not share the principal s objectives. Incentives through future rewards or punishments are therefore necessaryto induce proxy effort. The framework will be informed by case study evidence from similar principal/proxy relationships in counterterrorism and counterinsurgency in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Philippines, in which existing, extensive data on the decision-making of the protagonists. The framework will be empirically tested using new data from two conflicts, Israel s relationship with Hamas in suppressing terrorism from Gaza, and the Indian federal government s relationship with eight states in combatting the Maoist Naxalite insurgency. The research will draw on three sources: (1) new theoretical findings which allow more flexible models that generate testable implications; (2) data from conflicts in Gaza/Israel and India that allow testing in environments not studied in developing the theory; and (3) case study evidence from Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Philippines where we will assemble cases and use data previously collected to study decision making and behavior of protagonists in deterrent/proxy relationships.
Document Details
- Document Type
- DoD Grant Award
- Publication Date
- Aug 12, 2016
- Source ID
- N000141612516
Entities
People
- Eli Berman
Organizations
- Office of Naval Research
- United States Navy
- University of California, San Diego