Escalation Management in the Gray Zone
Abstract
It is well known in deterrence scholarship that the assumptions underlying much of it, while elegant, lack explanatory power, empirical support, and the nuance required by operators trying to identify effective strategies to deal with real world concerns. Advancing our understanding of the relationship between power deterrence strategies and escalation management in modern conflict requires that systematic research be performed in order to catch up with real world complexity and begin to fill those gaps. That is the core goal of this proposed project. Scholars and operators alike need a better sense of the conditionality of deterrence and escalation effectiveness – in other words, understanding how to impact the decision-making calculus of different types of actors in diverse strategic environments. Existing theoretical frameworks are insufficient to suggest whether, for example, we should expect coercive threats to be more likely to deter an adversary that is acting as a proxy for an emerging regional power, or the regional power itself. In a world increasingly characterized by constant low-level conflict that threatens to unravel the traditional interstate escalation management mechanisms, addressing these gaps is vital for U.S. foreign policy. The proposed project will take a multi-method nested approach to the problem: it will combine deductive modeling with iterative computer modeling; and leverage new and available data for quantitative analysis. The goal is to provide robust and replicable insights that contribute to both - enhancing the theoretical understanding of modern deterrence dynamic, and addressing real world policy problems.
Document Details
- Document Type
- DoD Grant Award
- Publication Date
- Jul 26, 2018
- Source ID
- N000141812369
Entities
People
- Jonathan Wilkenfeld
Organizations
- Office of Naval Research
- United States Navy
- University of Maryland