ROSETA-5G (RObust and SEcure TActical 5G Slice)
Abstract
5G systems, are extensible and provide multiple opportunities for developing a solution where DoD seamlessly integrates with civilian systems and coalition networks, therefore capitalizing on developments in the commercial world, in terms of cost and faster deployment cycle of a highthroughput low-latency communications capability. 5G being internationally standardized to substantially use mid-band spectrum owned by the DoD in the US (e.g., 3GHz Fixed Satellite Systems (FSS) or Coastal Radar), is both an opportunity and a challenge for fine-grain sharing of spectrum. However, leveraging 5G systems for the DoD should carefully consider that cellular systems were designed with a set of security, survivability, and cost requirements and trade-offs, suitable for civilian applications. They are susceptible to protocol exploits and are sensitive tocross-layer attacks. Distributed Maritime Operations require a navy tactical grid providing uninterrupted secure communications capability for information transfer over intermittent links and highly dynamic infrastructure, even in the presence of smart adversaries, and intentional interference. If 5G DoD networks can augment the outreach of the core network to the tactical edge at a significantly lower cost without sacrificing security and QoS, it would significantly boost Navy Integrated Fire Control. A 5G DoD slice would also support the Navy warfighter with a lower SWaP-C, lower delay, graceful degradation, and increased security and stealth.We propose to evaluate the opportunities, challenges, and feasibility of a secure and robust finegrain spectrum sharing between 5G DoD systems, DoD incumbents, and 5G commercial systems. A critical component of this work is the analysis of security and robustness of 5G protocols, and the design of defense mechanisms against spoofing, sniffing, and inference of sensitiveinformation as a result of using or interfacing with 5G commercial systems, as well as denial of service attacks. We will focus on protocol exploits and amplification attacks, from sensitivity to spoofing, privacy leaks, and robustness. We will conduct a comprehensive investigation of opportunities for a 5G DoD slice, in particular leveraging the 5G converged service-based architecture to support both 3GPP and non-3GPP, and the proposed frameworks for networkfunction virtualization, authentication protocols extensions, and rogue infrastructure detection. Note that our vision for a 5G DoD Slice goes beyond the typical definition of slicing. We envision protocol enhancements and extensions that can be achieved through software/firmware modifications and enable co-existence with both civilian 5G systems, coalition 5G systems, and DoD infrastructure (e.g., navy radar). The team in collaboration with stakeholders will create a design blueprint for a 5G DoD slice and select a set of extension mechanisms to address DoD and specifically Navy requirements. The 5G DoD slice will be architected to embed and support security and survivability mechanisms as part of its core functionality, to mitigate protocol exploits, and amplification attacks; and survivability mechanisms such as 5G gNodeB distribution to mitigate cross-layer jamming attacks. The team will prototype the mechanisms selected during the first year such as privacy-preserving authentication, prevention of tracking, and threats detection/mitigation; the hybrid commercial/indigenous untrusted and DoD 5G Non-Access Stratum; sharing with incumbents; and survivability mechanisms distributed gNodeB. We willsetup an extensible platform for a 5G DoD Slice, integrating the developed mechanisms and evaluating/demonstrating on a medium scale testbed.
Document Details
- Document Type
- DoD Grant Award
- Publication Date
- Feb 17, 2020
- Source ID
- N000142012124
Entities
People
- Guevara Noubir
Organizations
- Northeastern University
- Office of Naval Research
- United States Navy