(Re)Forging Identity: Comparative Ethnographic Studies of Influence Operations in Taiwan and Estonia
Abstract
We propose a multilayered research design aimed at uncovering the mechanisms behind Chinese and Russian influence operations in Taiw,an and Estonia, respectively. We focus on how influence -operations either directly contribute to or take advantage of the formation, of collective -identities. We argue that (1) strategic narratives in information operations shape collective -identities at times o,f fluity; and that (2) collective identities, with their embedded attitudes -and preferences, then drive political behavior. In our, two-stage design, Identity serves here as -both an explanatory variable and an outcome variable. We first interrogate what shapes, identity. -Using an ethnographic approach in Taiwan and Estonia, augmented by survey data and experimental -methods, we address th,e puzzle of the how and why of Chinese and Russian influence operations and build on pre-existing identities and manipulate them to, their political ends. We address the black -box left by computational methods of why certain influencers and relay stations become, effective, -how they harness pre-existing identities, and what outcomes they shape. Going beyond data on -opinion formation, we ex,amine mechanisms and differentiate between attitudes and action, bottom-up -rather than top-down. We determine not only what social, media is used but why it is so popular, -among whom, and to which political effects. Finally, we do not merely select on the depend,ent -variable and show case studies of Chinese and Russian successes, but also cases of failures and why influence operations fail., In other words, we offer a clear contribution to policymakers wishing to -disrupt or interdict influence operations by offering a r,oadmap to how these networks work and what blocks them.-Anti-democratic forces use misinformation, disinformation, and weaponized co,rruption to ex- ploit -perceived weaknesses and sow division within and among free nations, erode existing-international rules, and, promote alternative models of authoritarian governance.-Both the Interim National Security Guidance and the 2018 National Defense S,trategy clearly set -forth the threat of revisionist powers? influence operations. Since the ascension of Xi Jinping, -Beijing no l,onger hides its influence operations, nor its goals of shaping its adversaries? foreign -policies. Beyond China, in- fluence operat,ions are now a standard tool of revisionist states?those -that oppose the international order itself, as well as the balance of powe,r?and non-state actors. -Whether coming from China or Russia, in- fluence operations deliberately undermine numerous -democratic pr,ocesses, from the 2016 U.S. presidential election and Brexit referendum to the -elections in France (2017) and in Taiwan (2018 and 2,020) (e.g. Blan- chard 2019; Jakhar 2018; -Morenne 2017). These influence operations pose a direct threat to the legitimacy and inte,rnal -cohesion of democracies around the world?including the United States. But the mechanisms behind -these operations, let alone, the countermeasures to interdict them, remain elusive. We intend to -ex- plicate those mechanisms, and from them the means to devi,se countermeasures, with an innovative research design focused on Chinese and Russian influence operations shape social identity, an,d from that political engagement.-
Document Details
- Document Type
- DoD Grant Award
- Publication Date
- Oct 07, 2022
- Source ID
- N000142212782
Entities
People
- Marc Ratkovic
Organizations
- Office of Naval Research
- Trustees of Princeton University
- United States Navy