Tenable DC Power Electronics Systems
Abstract
The overarching theme of this research is to safeguard DC power electronics systems against potential cyber intrusion scenarios. The power electronics power distribution systems (PEPDS) paradigm envisions that each integrated Power Electronics Building Block (iPEBB) interfaces with a common DC bus, either directly or indirectly. Networked control allows power electronics converters to collaborate toward collective objectives. Heavily sensorized power electronics converters, ubiquitous embedded controllers, and prevalent communication protocols in the PEPDS environment offer significant advantages in creating an ultimately observable, controllable, andintelligent power distribution grid, but they inadvertently increase the attack surface. DC power electronics systems in a PEPDS environment are at particular risk, given their weak grid nature, lack of generational inertia, volatile load profiles, and compromised situational awareness due to the absence of a central control entity. Significant gaps remain in understanding quantified resiliency metrics, robust energy management, safe control synthesis, and integrity of information exchanged for DC Power Electronics Systems. We seek to minimize the knowledge gaps in the following research thrusts:[T1] Resilience certificate via antagonistic control: Weintend to treat DC power electronics systems from the perspective of a potential malicious player who would want to destabilize them. By extending the concept of antagonistic control to DC power networks, we plan to investigate resiliency certificates for a givencontroller, identify minimum-effort avenues for intrusion, and provide guidelines for resilience-cognizant control design.[T2] Energy management under uncharted attack: We plan to account for unforeseen load-altering attacks using a risk-averse energy management paradigm that leverages empirical data about individual loads while considering the worst-case scenarios across all possible joint distributions compatible with empirical data.[T3] Certified control in a contested environment: We aim to design controllers that arecorrect by construction and formally guaranteed to meet operational bounds guided by resiliency certificates, even in the presence of untrusted data in a contested environment.[T4] Distributed control with tractable authentication: We intend to fortify distributed control paradigms via computationally tractable authentication methods that leverage the knowledge asymmetry between the controller and eavesdropper about specific features of the physical system.[T5] Validation with controller/hardware-in-the-loop: The first four research thrusts explore resiliency certificates, risk aversion, formal guarantees, and data integrity, whose features are then demonstrated in this research thrust in a real-time simulation environment.University of Texas at Arlington is a Carnegie R1 institution, a Hispanic-serving institution, and an Asian American Native American Pacific Islander-serving institution. The team has a significant research track record in power electronics, power systems, control systems, and optimization theory, with an extensive experimental setup, and is uniquely positioned to help train the next generation of cyber-aware energy workforce.Approved for Public Release.
Document Details
- Document Type
- DoD Grant Award
- Publication Date
- Nov 08, 2024
- Source ID
- N000142412624
Entities
People
- Ali Davoudi
Organizations
- Office of Naval Research
- United States Navy
- University of Texas at Arlington